Holding

If the prosecution proves the ingredients of Section 304‑B, the mandatory presumption under Section 113‑B applies and the accused must rebut it; failure to do so results in conviction.

Summary

Suresh Kumar was convicted under Sections 304‑B (dowry death) and 498‑A IPC for the death of his wife Sulochana within seven years of marriage. The trial court acquitted him, deeming the death accidental, but the High Court reversed the acquittal, holding that the death occurred under non‑normal circumstances, that dowry was demanded, and that cruelty preceded the death, thereby invoking the statutory presumption of dowry death under Section 113‑B of the Evidence Act. The Supreme Court affirmed that once the prosecution establishes the ingredients of Section 304‑B, the burden shifts to the accused to rebut the presumption, which Kumar failed to do. The Court also held that the trial judge committed a jurisdictional error by excluding accidental deaths from Section 304‑B, justifying appellate interference. A delay in filing the FIR was not entertained as it was not raised earlier. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed and Kumar's conviction upheld.

Issues considered

The death of a woman within seven years of marriage, under non‑normal circumstances and with dowry demand, satisfies the ingredients of Section 304‑B IPC.
Whether the statutory presumption under Section 113‑B Evidence Act is mandatory and shifts the burden of proof to the accused.
Whether the accused discharged the reverse onus by proving the death was accidental.
Whether an appellate court may interfere with a trial court acquittal on the ground of jurisdictional error.
The effect of delay in lodging the FIR on the prosecution's case.

Legislation cited

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961s. 2
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 113-A, s. 113-B
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 304-B, s. 498-A

Subjects

dowry deathSection 304-B IPCSection 113-B Evidence Actreverse onusappellate interferenceaccidental deathcriminal procedure

Judgment

[2013) 14 S.C.R. 685

SURESH KUMAR A
v
STATE OF HARYANA
(Criminal Appeal Nos.218-219 of 2009)
NOVEMBER 11, 2013
B
[RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI AND MADAN
B. LOKUR, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860 - s. 3048 and 498A - D.Pwry death -
Death of wife within seven years of marriage - Under C
unnatural circumstances - Prosecution of husband (appellant)
and mother-in-law of deceased - Acquittal by trial C{)Urt on the
ground that the death was accidental - Acquittal of appellant-
accused reversed and convicted u/s. 3048 and 498A - Held:
Initial burden of proving the death of a woman within seven D
years of marriage in abnormal circumstances in connection
with demand of dowry accompanied by cruelty/harassment,
is on the prosecution - After discharge of initial burden,
reverse onus is put on the accused to prove his innocence
by showing that death was accidental - In the present case, E
ingredients of s. 3048 have been met - The accused failed
to rebut the presumption uls. 1138 - Conviction confirmed -
Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 113-8.

Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 113-B - Pre~;umption under -
Nature of - Held: Such presumption is mandatory - The F
courts have no option but to presume dowry death, unless
such presumption is rebutted by the accused - Penal Code,
1860 - s. 304 B.

Appeal - Against acquittal - Held: Interference with oraer G
of acquittal cannot be a matter of course - But the court can
interfere with such order if there is any jurisdictional error- In
the present case, High Court as appellate court ri{Jhtly

685 H
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 14 S.C.R.

A interfered with order of trial court which committed
jurisdictional effor.

Practice and Procedure - New plea - Held: Plea raised
for the first time before Supreme Cowt, cannot be entertained.
B Appellant-accused alongwith his mother was
prosecuted ulss. 3048 and 498A IPC. The prosecution
case was that the accused used to demand dowry from
her wife and also used to threaten and harass her on that
account. On the day of the incident, brother of the
C appellant-accused went to the house of brother of the
deceased (PW4) and informed that the deceased died
having suffered an electronic shock. When PW 4, PW 5
alongwith the Sarpanch of the village went to the
matrimonial house of the deceased, they came to know
D that the deceased had already been cremated. PW-4
lodged FIR alleging that the appellant and his mother
killed the deceased for dowry. Trial Court acquitted both
the accused. High Court reversed the acquittal order of
the appellant-accused and held him guilty ulss. 3048 and
E 498A IPC. Hence the present appeal.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. Section 304-8 IPC does not categorize
death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. Death caused
F by bodily injury can, in a given case, be homicidal or
suicidal or accidental. Finally, any death occurring
"otherwise than under normal circumstances" can, in a
given case, be homicidal or suicidal or· accidental.
Therefore, if all the other ingredients of Section 304-8 of
G the IPC are fulfilled, any death (whether homicidal or
suicidal or accidental) and whether caused by burns or
by bodily injury or occurring otherwise than under
normal circumstances shall, as per the legislative
mandate, be called a. "dowry death" and the woman's
H husband or his relative "shall be deemed to have caused
SURESH KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA 687

her death". The Section clearly specifies what constitutes A
the offence of a dowry death and also identifies the single
offender or multiple offenders who has or have caused
the dowry death. (Para 33) (699-D-Gl

Pawan Kumar vs. State of Haryana (1998) 3 SCC 309:
B
1998 (1) SCR 746; Kans Raj vs. State of Punjab (2000) 5
SCC 207: 2000 (3) SCR 662; Hira Lal vs. State (Govt. of
NCT), Delhi (2003) 8 sec 80: 2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 734;
Bakshish Ram vs. State of Punjab (2013) 4 SCC 131 - relied
on.
c
1.2. The evidentiary value of the presumption is stated
in Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 (the Act). The
key words in this Section are "shall presume" leaving no
option with a Court but to presume an accused brought
before it of causing a dowry death guilty of the offence. D
However, the redeeming factor of this provision is that
the presumption is rebuttable. Section 113-B of the Act
enables an accused to prove his innocence and places
a reverse onus of proof on him or her. [Para 34) (699-H;
700-A-B] E

1.3. The presumption under Section 113-B of the Act
is mandatory may be contrasted with Section 113-A of
the Act which was introduced contemporaneously.
Section 113-A of the Act, dealing with abetment to suicide,
uses the expression "may presume". This being the F
position, a two-stage process is required to be followed
in respect of an offence punishable under Section 304-B
of the IPC: it is necessary to first ascertain whether the
ingredients of the Section have been made out against
the accused; if the ingredients are made out, then the G
accused is deemed to have caused the death of the
woman but is entitled to rebut the statutory presumption
of having caused a dowry death. [Para 36) (700-E-G]

1.4. The initial burden of proving the death of a H
688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 14 S.C.R.

A woman within seven years of her marriage in
circumstances that are not normal is on the prosecution;
such death should be in connection with or for a demand
of dowry which is accompanied by such cruelty or
harassment that eventually leads to the woman's death
B in circumstances that are not normal. After the initial
burden of a deemed dowry death is discharged by the
prosecution, a reverse onus is put on the accused to
prove his innocence by showing, inter alia, that the death
was accidental. [Para 48] [707-D-F]
c Pawan Kumar vs. State of Haryana (1998) 3 SCC 309:
1998 (1) SCR 746; Shamnsaheb M. Multtani vs. State of
Karnataka (2001) 2 SCC 577: 2001 (1) SCR 514; Yashoda
vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2004) 3 SCC 98; Na/lam
Veera Stayanandam vs. Public Prosecutor, High Cowt of A.P.
D (2004) 10 SCC 769; Sharad vs. State of Maharashtra (2012)
5 SCC 548; Pathan Hussain Basha vs. State of A.P. (2012)
8 SCC 594: 2012 (7) SCR 290; Hira Lal vs. State (Govt. of
NCT), Delhi (2003) 8 sec 80: 2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 734 -
relied on.
E
Hira Lal vs. State (Govt. of NCT), Delhi (2003) 8 SCC
80: 2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 734; Kunhiabdul/a vs. State of
Kera/a (2004) 4 SCC 13: 2004 (2) SCR 853; State of Andhra
Pradesh vs. Raj Gopa/ Asawa (2004) 4 SCC 470: 2004 (3)
F SCR 32; Kamesh Panjiyar vs. State of Bihar (2005) 2 SCC
388: 2005 (1) SCR 903; Bakshish Ram vs. State of Punjab
(2013) 4 sec 131 - referred to.

1.5. In the present case, the deceased is said to have
died of an electric shock or electrocution, which is not a
G normal circumstance or a normal cause of death; her
death was admittedly within seven years of her marriage;
the finding of the High Court is that there was a demand
by appellant-accused for dowry in the form of a
motorcycle. This has come out in the evidence of PW-4,
H
SURESH KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA 689

PW-5, PW-7 and father of the deceased. There is also A
evidence that the deceased was treated with cruelty or
harassed for a motorcycle as dowry by the appellant-
accused. He had subjected her to cruelty or harassment
in connection with the demand by beating her despite the
intervention of brother of the deceased (PW-4) and her B
father. The appellant-accusedwas unrelenting and
insisted on a motorcycle being given by way of dowry;
the finding of the High Court is that the deceased was
treated with cruelty or harassment soon before (about 15
or 20 days) her death. [Para 49] [707-F-H; 708-A-B] c
1.6. Thus, the ingredients of Section 304-B of the IPC
having been met and the first stage process being over,
it is deemed that the deceased was a victim of a dowry
death and that the appellant-accused had caused the
dowry death. The burden of rebutting the presumption D
was on the appellant-accused. He did precious little to
rebut this presumption. The best evidence in this regard
could have been given by the doctor who is said to have
attended to the deceased and declared her dead, but he
did not produce him/her in the witness box. [Paras 50 and E
51] [708-B-C, E]

1.7. The theory of the deceased dying of an electric
shock was put forward only by brother of the appellant-
accused, who did not enter the witness box. Appellant- F
accused and another accused, in their statement under
Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. did not mention anything about
electrocution of the deceased. Consequently, on the facts
of this case, appellant-accused has not been able to
rebut the statutory presumption and thereby has failed G
to discharge the reverse onus placed upon him. [Para 54]
[709-B-D]

1.8. The plea that there was a delay in lodging the FIR
against the appellant-accused and so the prosecution is
vitiated. This contention was not raised by the appellant- H
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.

A accused at any earlier stage and so the same cannot be
entertained. There is also no adverse consequence or
presumption in the delay, if any, in lodging an FIR. [Para
60) [712-B-C]

2. Interference against an order of acquittal should
8
not be a matter of course, however, where the trial Judge
commits a jurisdictional error, the appellate court is
entitled to interfere and correct the error. In the present
case, the trial Judge arrived at a conclusion that the death
was accidental; he then proceeded on the basis that an
C accidental death is not punishable under Section 304-B
· of the IPC; therefore, there was no option before the trial
Judge but to ac.quit the appellant-accused. However,
even an accidental death would fall within the purview of
Section 304-B of the IPC. That being so, the trial Judge
D committed a jurisdictional error in keeping accidental
death of the deceased beyond the scope of Section 304-
B of the IPC. It is this jurisdictional error that was
corrected by the High Court. [Para 58) [711-E-H]

E Ghurey Lal vs. State of UP. (2008) 10 SCC 450: 2008
(11) SCR 499; S. Anil Kumar vs. State of Kamataka (2013)
7 SCC 219; Rohtash vs. State of Haryana (2012) 6 SCC
589: 2012 (6) SCR 62 - relied on.
Case Law Reference:
F
1998 (1) SCR 746 relied on Para 27
2000 (3) SCR 662 relied on Para 28
2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 734 relied on Para 30
G
(2013) 4 sec 131 relied on Para 31
1998 (1) SCR 746 relied on Para 37
2001 (1) SCR 514 relied on Para 40
H (2004) 3 sec 98 relied on Para 41
SURESH KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA 691

(2004) 1o sec 769 relied on Para 42 A
c2012) 5 sec 548 relied on Para 43
2012 (7) SCR 290 relied on Para 44
2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 734 referred to Para 45
B
2004 (2) SCR 853 referred to Para 46
2004 (3) SCR 32 referred to Para 46
2005 (1) SCR 903 referred to Para 46
(2013) 4 sec 131 referred to Para 47
c
2008 (11) SCR 499 relied on Para 55
(2013) 1 sec 219 relied on Para 57
2012 (6) SCR 62 relied on Para 57 D

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 218-219 of 2009.

From the Judgment & Order dated 25.03.2008 of the High
Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal E
No. 302-DBA of 1997.

R.C. Kohli, S.S. Shamshery, Bhakti Vardhan for the
Appellant.
F
Kamal Mohan Gupta, Rajeev Gaur Naseem, Mohd. Zahid
Hussain, Naresh Bakshi for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

MADAN B. LOKUR, J. 1. The correctness of the G
appellant's conviction for an offence punishable under Section
498-A and Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) is
questioned before us. The appellant had earlier been acquitted
by the Trial Court and on an appeal by the State, his acquittal
was reversed and he was convicted of the offences charged. H
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.

A In our opinion, the High Court was right, on merits, in convicting
the appellant for the offences for which he was charged.

2. The scope of interference against an order of acquittal
is also before us but in view of several decisions of this Court
on this subject, we are not inclined to repeat the conclusions
8 arrived at. All we need say is that on the facts of this case the
High Court was justified in interfering with the order of acquittal
passed by the Trial Court.

Brief facts
c 3. The appellant Suresh Kumar married Sulochana on 18th
February, 1990 at village Bal Chhappar. Since Suresh Kumar
was in the Army, he was not permanently staying in the
matrimonial home but would come home while on leave.

D 4. According to PW-4 Gian Singh (Sulochana's brother) a
substantial amount was spent on Sulochana's marriage but
despite this, soon after the marriage, Suresh Kumar demanded
a motorcycle as dowry. He even threatened that if the demand
was not met, he would not allow Sulochana to stay in the
E matrimonial home. When the demand was communicated to
Gian Singh, he and another person from his village PW-5 Mam
Chand as well as Jagdish went to Suresh Kumar's residence
and 'pacified' him.

F 5. A few days prior to 12th September, 1993 Suresh
Kumar again raised a demand for a motorcycle as dowry and
started harassing Sulochana, and even went to the extent of
beating her. Therefore, on 12th September, 1993 Gian Singh
went and met him in the matrimonial home and again pacified
G him but, as it appears, only temporarily. On 16th September,
1993 Krishan (Suresh Kumar's brother) came to Gian Singh's
house in village Gaganheri and informed him and others in his
family that Sulochana had died after having suffered an electric
shock.

H 6. After receiving this information, Gian Singh, Mam Chand
SURESH KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA 693
[MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]
and Jagdish went to village Bal Chhappar and on reaching A
there, they came to know that Sulochana had already been
cremated.

7. Gian Singh then made enquiries about the cause of
Sulochana's death and on the basis of his enquiries he B
concluded that she had been killed by Suresh Kumar and his
mother Leela Devi for dowry and that they had cremated
Sulochana's body before Gian Singh could arrive at village Bal
Chhappar.

8. On these broad facts, Gian Singh lodged a first C
information report with Police Station Chhappar on 19th
September, 1993.

9. Pursuant to the investigation carried out by the police,
Suresh Kumar was arrested on the same day while his mother D
Leela Devi was arrested on 20th September, 1993.

10. Subsequently, both were tried for offences punishable
under Section 498-A and Section 304-B of the IPC.

Decision of the Trial Court E

11. It came out in the evidence recorded before the
Additional Sessions Judge, Yamuna Nagar at Jagadhari in
Sessions Case No. 72 of 1993 that Krishan had reached Gian
Singh's village Gaganheri between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. on 16th
F
September, 1993. This conclusion was arrived at on the basis
of Gian Singh's statement as well as the statement of Mam
Chand and PW-6 Sardha (Sulochana's father). Gian Singh and
others from his family also stated that they had gone to village
Bal Chhappar, but they learnt on arrival that Sulochana had G
already been cremated.

12. However, the Trial Judge relied on the evidence of DW-
1 Jagdish Singh, the Sarpanch of the village Bal Chhappar to
conclude that several persons from Sulochana's family including
her brother and father were present at the cremation and that H
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 14 S.C.R.

A they did not voice any suspicion about Sulochana's death.

13. The Trial Judge also doubted the correctness of Gian
Singh's testimony and in fact discarded it altogether in view of
various discrepancies in his statement. It was further held that
soon after his marriage Suresh Kumar did not ask for a
8
motorcycle as dowry since no such evidence was given by
Sardha. In fact, the demand for a motorcycle was made for the
first time only about 15 or 20 days before Sulochana's death.
That a demand for dowry was made is not in issue.

C 14. Finally, it was held that Suresh Kumar and Sulochana
were happily married and there was no reason for either her
homicidal or suicidal death and that she had died as a result
of an accident for which the blame could not be foisted on the
accused persons.
D
15. The Trial Judge concluded by his judgment and order
dated 3rd October, 1996 that Sulochana had died of
electrocution while she was in the kitchen and that her death
was accidental and therefore the ingredients of Section 304-8
E of the IPC were not made out so as to convict Suresh Kumar
and Leela Devi.

16. Feeling aggrieved by the acquittal of Suresh Kumar
and Leela Devi, the State preferred an appeal in the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana. While leave to appeal in respec::t of
F Leela Devi was refused by the High Court by an order dated
1st April, 1997 the appeal against Suresh Kumar's acquittal
was admitted and registered as Criminal Appeal No.302-DBA
of 1997.

G Decision of the High Court

17. By its judgment and order dated 25th March, 2008 the
High Court reversed the acquittal of Suresh Kumar and held
him guilty of offences punishable under Sections 498-A and
304-B of the IPC. By a separate order on sentence, he was
H awarded rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years
SURESH KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA 695
[MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]
under Section 304-B of the IPC and rigorous imprisonment of A
three years along with a fine of Rs.5,000/- for the offence
punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC. The sentences
were directedy to run concurrently and the period of detention
undergone by him was required to be set off in terms of Section
428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. B

18. The High Court concluded that information about
Sulochana's death was received in village Gaganheri between
10 a.m. and 11 a.m. on 16th September, 1993. The High Court
referred to the testimony of the witnesses in respect of their
arrival in village Bal Chhappar to attend Sulochana's cremation. C
While there is some discrepancy in the time of their arrival which
ranges from 3 p.m. to 6 p.m., this seems to us to be not quite
relevant, on the facts of the present case, whether Gian Singh
and Sardha and others attended Sulochana's cremation.
D
19. The High Court also did not accept the statement of
Jagdish Singh that Sulochana's relatives had attended her
cremation. The High Court however accepted his statement that
Sulochana had died at about 7 a.m. on the morning of 16th
September, 1993. E

20. The High Court meticulously examined the evidence
on record and concluded that apart from the FIR lodged by Gian
Singh which was based upon information given to him by
Krishan that Sulochana had died of an electric shock, there was
no evidence to suggest that she did in fact die of electrocution. F
The doctor who is said to have examined her and pronounced
her dead was not examined by the prosecution or by the
defence; neither Suresh Kumar nor Leela Devi mentioned in
their statements under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. that
Sulochana's death was caused by electrocution. G

21. The High Court accepted the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses that a demand for a motorcycle as dowry
had been made almost immediately after Sulochana's marriage
with Suresh Kumar even though her father Sardha had not so H
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.

A stated. It was also held that soon before Sulochana's death, the
demand was repeated by Suresh Kumar and on the failure of
her family to meet that demand, she was treated with cruelty
and beaten up.

22. The High Court was of the view that the Trial Court had
8
not correctly appreciated the position at law and had therefore
committed an error in acquitting Suresh Kumar. The conduct
of Suresh Kumar was such as to hold that he had caused the
death of Sulochana.

C 23. On this basis the High Court reversed the judgment
and order passed by the Trial Court and converted the acquittal
into one of conviction. The High Court held that the ingredients
of Section 304-B of the IPC were made out inasmuch as
Sulochana had admittedly died within seven years of her
o marriage. Her death was said to be by electrocution and by
virtue of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 the
presumption was that her death had been caused by Suresh
Kumar and it was for him to rebut the presumption. It was held
that death by electrocution is not a death under normal
E circumstances.

24. Feeling aggrieved, Suresh Kumar is before us.

Ingredients of Section 304-8 of the IPC

F 25. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar made two
submissions. It was firstly contended on the merits of the case
that there was nothing to suggest that his client was guilty of
an offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC.
Secondly it was contended that the High Court ought not to have
G lightly interfered against an order of acquittal.

26. The actual words used in Section 304-B of the IPC are
of importance. This section reads as under:-

"304-8. Dowry death.·(1) Where the death of a woman
H is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise
SURESH KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA 697
[MADAN 8. LOKUR, J.]

than under normal circumstances within seven years of her A
marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she
was subjected to cruelty or haras$ment by her husband or
any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, 'any
demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry
death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to 8
have caused her death.

Explanation.-For the purpose of this sub-section, "dowry"
shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
c
(2) Whoever commits dowry death .shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven
years but which may extend to imprisonment for life."

27. In a large number of decisions, this Court has indicated D
the ingredients of Section 304-8 of the IPC, which are now
broadly accepted. In Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1998)
3 sec 309 the ingredients were identified as:

"(a) When the death of a woman is caused by any burns
or bodily injury, or E

(b) occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances

(c) and the aforesaid two facts spring within 7 years of girl's
marriage F
(d) and soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty
or harassment by her husband or his relative,

(c) this is in connection with the demand of dowry."
G
28. The ingredients of Section 304-8 of the IPC were
rephrased in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207
in the following words:

(a) the death of a woman was caused by burns or bodily
H
698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 14 S.C.R.

A injury or had occurred otherwise than under normal
circumstances;

(b) such death should have occurred within 7 years of her
marriage;
B (c) the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment
by her husband or by any relative of her husband;

(d) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in
connection with the demand of dowry; and
c (e) to such cruelty or harassment the deceased should
have been subjected soon before her death.

29. The expression "otherwise than under normal
circumstances" was explained to mean "death not in the usual
D course but apparently under suspicious circumstances, if not
caused by burns or bodily injury."

30. A somewhat recent exposition is to be found in Hira
Lal v. State (Govt. of NCT), Delhi, (2003) 8 SCC 80 wherein
E this Court held that to attract the application of Section 304-B
of the IPC, the essential ingredients are as follows:-

"(i) The death of a woman should be caused by burns or
bodily injury or otherwise than under a normal
circumstance.
F
(ii) Such a death should have occurred within seven years
of her marriage.

(iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment
by her husband or any relative of her husband.
G
(iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in
connection with demand of dowry.

(v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been
H meted out to the woman soon before her death . "
, .....
)
. I l
. SURESH KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA
· [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.)
699 "'' I

t
· 31. More recently the ingredients of Section 304-B of the
IPC have been abbreviated in Bakshish R,lflm State of v.
A
I
Punjab,.. (2013) 4 SCC 131 in the following words:. 1,
' , .. . .•... , .· -·
~·. - r. . -, , . I'
11
a
, "(a) that married woman had died otherwise than under I:

normal circumstances;
<.. , B I
!:
''
•
(b) such death was within seven years of her marriage; and
, _' .,J,' "'.I .' . ~~· :·' .·•. ··,

(c) the prosecution has established that there was cruelty
. - -· .·

Ii
and harassment in connection with demand for dowry soon ,'',
before her death." ~ •· · c r i
' .
· .. 32. This 'formula', though framed in different words by this .'
Court, fro~ time to time, conveys the same meaning. of the
essential ingredients of an offence punishable under Section
304-B of the IPC."
. ::.- . D
33. Importantly; Section 304~6 of the IPC does not
categorize death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. This '

is because death caused by burns can,' in a given case, be iI
homicidal or suicidal or accidental. Similarly, death caused by
bodily injury can, in a given case, be homicidal or suicidal or ·. E ' '
accidental. Finally, any death occurring "otherwise than under !
.I
normal circumstances" can, in a given case, be homicidal or I
suicidal or accidental. Therefore, if all the other ingredients of
Section 304-B of the IPC are fulfilled, any death (whether
homicidal or suicidal or accidental) and whether caused by F
bums or by bodily injury or occurring otherwise than under normal
circumstances shall, as per the legislative mandate, be called
a "dowry death''. and the woman's husband or his relative "shall
be deemed to have caused her death". The Section clearly
specifi;?s what constitutes the offence of a dowry death and also · ' G
identifies the single offender or multiple offenders who has or
have caused the dowry death •.

34. The evldentiary value of the presumption is stated in
Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 (the Act). The key
words in this Section are "shall presume" leaving no option with H
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.

A a Court but to presume an accused brought before it of causing
a dowry death guilty of the offonce. However, the redeeming
factor of this provision is that the presumption is rebuttable.
Section 113-8 of the Act enables an accused to prove his
innocence and places a reverse onus of proof on him or her.
8
35. Section 113-8 of the Act reads as follows:-

"113-8: Presumption as to dowry death- When the
question is whether a person has committed the dowry
death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her
c death such woman has been subjected by such person to
cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any
demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such
person had caused the dowry death.

D Explanation - For the purposes of this section 'dowry
death' shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-8
of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."

36. That the presumption under Section 113-8 of the Act
is mandatory may be contrasted with Section 113-A of the Act
E which was introduced contemporaneously. Section 113-A of the
Act, dealing with abetment to suicide, uses the expression "may
presume". This being the position, a two-stage process is
required to be followed in respect of an offence punishable
under Section 304-8 of the IPC: it is necessary to first ascertain
F whether the ingredients of the Section have been made out
against the accused; if the ingredients are made out, then the
accused is deemed to have caused the death of the woman
but is entitled to rebut the statutory presumption of having
caused a dowry death. '
G
Some key decisions

37. In Pawan Kumar this Court adverted to the reason for
amending the IPC by Act 43of1986 to introduce Section 304-
8 therein and the difficulty in curbing the menace of dowry
H related deaths. This Court said in paragraph 11 of the Report:
SURESH KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA 701
[MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]
"It is true, as argued by learned counsel for the appellants, A
that in criminal jurisprudence benefit of doubt is extendable
to the accused. But that benefit of doubt would arise in the
context of the application of penal law, and in the facts and
circumstances of a case. The concept of benefit of doubt
has an important role to play but within the confines of the B
stringency of laws. Since the cause of death of a married
woman was to occur not in normal circumstances but as
a "dowry death", for which the evidence was not so easily
available, as it is mostly confined within the four walls of a
house, namely the husband's house, where all likely c
accused reside. Hence the aforesaid amendments
brought in the concept of deemed "dowry death" by the
husband or the relatives, as the case may be. This
deeming clause has a role to play and cannot be taken
lightly and ignored to shield an accused, otherwise the very 0
purpose of the amendment will be lost. Of course, the
prosecution has to prove the ultimate essential ingredients
beyond all reasonable doubt after raising the initial
presumption of "deemed dowry death"."

38. This Court then observed that: "The objective is that E
men committing such crimes should not escape punishment.
Hence stringent provisions were brought in by shifting the
burden onto the accused by bringing in the deemed clause."

39.0n the question of burden of proof, this Court referred F
to Section 113-B of the Act and held in paragraph 19 of the
Report:

"We find that according to Section 8-A of the aforesaid
1961 Act 1 which came into force w.e.f. 2-10-1985 for
taking or abetting any dowry, the burden to explain is G
placed on such person against whom the allegation of
committing an offence is made. Similarly, under

1. Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
Crl. Appeal Nos. 218-219 of 2009. H
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.

A Explanation to Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act,
which was also brought in by the aforesaid Act 43 of 1986,
there is presumption that such death is on account of dowry
death. Thus the burden, if at all, was on the accused to
prove otherwise."
B
40. In Shamnsaheb M. Multtani v. State of Karnataka,
(2001) 2 SCC 577 a Bench of three judges of this Court
elucidated the requirements of Section 304-B of the IPC read
with Section 113-B of the Act and contrasted it with Section
C 113-A of the Act. Paragraphs 27 to 30 are extremely important
in this context and are reproduced below:

"27. The postulates needed to establish the said offence 2
are: (1) death of a wife should have occurred otherwise
than under normal circumstances within seven years of her
D marriage; (2) soon before her death she should have been
subjected to cruelty or harassment by the accused in
connection with any demand for dowry. Now reading
Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, as a part of the said
offence, the position is this: If the prosecution succeeds
E in showing that soon before her death she was subjected
by him to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with
any demand for dowry and that her death had occurred
(within seven years of her marriage) otherwise than under
normal circumstances "the court shall presume that such
F person had caused the dowry death".

28. Under Section 4 of the Evidence Act "whenever it is
directed by this Act that the court shall presume a fact, it
shall regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is
disproved". So the court has no option but to presume that
G the accused had caused dowry death unless the accused
disproves it. It is a statute~ compulsion on the court.
However it is open to the accused to adduce such evidence

2. Section 304-B of the IPC.
H Crt. Appeal Nos. 218-219 of 2009.
SURESH KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA 703
[MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]
for disproving the said compulsory presumption, as the A
burden is unmistakably on him to do so. He can discharge
such burden either by eliciting answers through cross-
examination of the witnesses of the prosecution or by
adducing evidence on the defence side or by both.
B
29. At this stage, we may note the difference in the legal
position between the said offence and Section 306 IPC
which was merely an offence of abetment of suicide
earlier. The section remained in the statute-book without
any practical use till 1983. But by the introduction of C
Section 113-A in the Evidence Act the said offence under
Section 306 IPC has acquired wider dimensions and has
become a serious marriage-related offence. Section 113-
A of the Evidence Act says that under certain conditions,
almost similar to the conditions for dowry death the court
may presume having regard to the circumstances of the D
case, that such suicide has been abetted by her husband
•
etc. When the law says that the court may presume the
fact, it is discretionary on the part of the court either to
regard such fact as proved or not to do so, which depends
upon all the other circumstances of the case. As there is E
no compulsion on the court to act on the presumption the
accused can persuade the court against drawing a
presumption adverse to him.

30. But the peculiar situation in respect of an offence under F
Section 304-B IPC, as discernible from the distinction
pointed out above in respect of the offence under Section
306 IPC is this: Under the former the court has a statutory
compulsion, merely on the establishment of two factual
positions enumerated above, to presume that the accused G
has committed dowry death. If any accused wants to
escape from the said catch the burden is on him to
disprove it. If he fails to rebut the presumption the court is
bound to act on it."

41. In Yashoda v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2004) 3 H
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.

A SCC 98 this Court held that once the ingredients of Section
304-8 of the IPC are fulfilled, the onus shifts to the defence to
produce evidence to rebut the statutory presumption and to
show that the death was in the normal course with which the
accused were not connected. This is what was said:
8
"Once the prosecution proves the facts which give rise to
the presumption under Section 304-8 IPC, the onus shifts
to the defence and it is for the defence to produce
evidence to rebut that presumption. The defence may
adduce evidence in support of its defence or may make
c suggestions to the prosecution witnesses to elicit facts
which may support their defence. The evidence produced
by the defence may disclose that the death was not
caused by them, or that the death took place in the normal
course on account of any ailment or disease suffered by
D the deceased ')r that the death took place in a manner with
which they were not at all connected. In the instant case if
the defence wanted to prove that the deceased had
suffered from diarrhoea and vomiting and that resulted in
her death, it was for the defence to adduce evidence and
E rebut the presumption that arose under Section 304-8 IPC.
The defence could have examined the doctor concerned
or even summoned the record from the hospital to prove
that in fact the deceased has suffered such ailment and
had also been treated for such ailment."
F
42. In Na/lam Veera Stayanandam v. Public Prosecutor,
High Court of A.P., (2004) 10 SCC 769 this Court specifically
adverted to an accidental death and the applicability of Section
304-8 of the IPC as well as the presumption under Section
G 113-8 of the Act and held:

"It is true from the_evidence led by the prosecution it has
been able to establish that the appellants were demanding
dowry which was a harassment to the deceased. It is also
true that the death of the deceased occurred within 7 years
H of the marriage, therefore, a presumption under Section
SURESH KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA 705
[MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]
113-B of the Evidence Act is available to the prosecution, A
therefore, it is for the defence in this case to discharge the
onus and establish that the death of the deceased in all
probability did not occur because of suicide but was an
accidental death."
B
43. Similarly, in Sharad v. State of Mahara9htra, (2012)
5 sec 548 this Court was again concerned with an accidental
death. This Court referred to Section 113-B of the Act to
conclude that the burden of proving that it was an accidental
death was upon the accused. It was held:
c
"The counsel for the appellant next tried to advance the
plea that it was in fact a case of accidental burn and Savita
caught fire by falling down on the chulha. It is seen above
that Savita died from burn injuries within two-and-a-half
years of her marriage with the appellant. It is also D
established that soon before her death she was subjected
to cruelty or harassment by the appellant in connection with
the demand for the unpaid amount of the dowry. All the
three facts and circumstances put together clearly attract
the provisions of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and E
the burden.lay upon the appellant to prove the defence plea
that it was a case of accidental burning. There is, however,
no evidence on record even to remotely support the plea
of accidental burn."

44. Finally, in Pathan Hussain Basha v. State of A.P.,
F
(2012) 8 SCC 594 ·this Court reiterated that the burden of
proving the innocence of the accused or rebutting the statutory
presumption is on him and not on the prosecution which has
only to prove that the ingredients of an offence of dowry death
are made out. It was held: G

"Applying these principles to the facts of the present case,
it is clear that the ingredients of Section 304-B read with
Section 498-A IPC are completely satisfied in the present
case. By a deeming fiction in law, the onus shifts on to the H
'
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 14 S.C.R.

A accused to prove as to how the deceased died. It is for
the accused to show that the death of the deceased did
not result from any cruelty or demand of dowry by the
accused persons. The accused did not care to explain as
to how the death of his wife occurred. Denial cannot be
B treated to be the discharge of onus. Onus has to be
discharged by leading proper and cogent evidence. It was
expected of the accused to explain as to how and why his
wife died, as well as his conduct immediately prior and
subsequent to the death of the deceased. Maintaining
silence cannot be equated to discharge of onus by the
c accused. In the present case, the prosecution by reliable
and cogent evidence has established the guilt of the
accused. There being no rebuttal thereto, there is no
occasion to interfere in the judgments of the courts under
appeal."
D
45. A discordant note on the issue of burden of proof in
an accidental death was struck in Hira. Lal wherein this Court
conjointly read Section 304-B of the IPC and Section 113-B of
the Act. It was held that the onus is on the prosecution to rule
E out the possibility of a natural or accidental death. It was held
in paragraph 9 of the Report as follows:

"A conjoint reading of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act
and Section 304-B IPC shows that there must be material
to show that soon before her death the victim was
F
subjected to cruelty or harassment. The prosecution has
to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death
so as to bring it within the purview of "death occurring
otherwise than in normal circumstances"."

G 46. These very words were repeated, almost in identical
terms, in Kunhiabdulla v. State of Kera/a, (2004) 4 SCC 13,
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Raj Gopal Asawa, (2004) 4 SCC
470 and in Kamesh Panjiyar v. State of Bihar, (2005) 2 SCC
388 that it is for the prosecution to show that the dowry death
H was not natural or that it was accidental.
SURESH KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA . 707
[MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]
47. This view has recently been followed in Bakshish Ram A
wherein it was held that:

"[A] perusal of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and
Section 304-B IPC shows that there must be material to
show that soon before her death the victim was subjected B
to cruelty or harassment. In other words, the prosecution
has to rule out the possibility of a natural .or accidental
death so as to bring it within the purview of "deatti
occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances". The
prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the C
occurrence, there was cruelty or harassment and only in
that case presumption operates."

48. We are, of course, bound by the decision of a larger
Bench of this Court in Multtani. Following that decision, we must
hold that the initial burden of proving the death of a woman D
within seven years of her marriage in circumstances that are
not normal is on the prosecution; such death should be in
connection with or for a demand of dowry which is
accompanied by such cruelty or harassment that eventually
leads to the woman's death in circumstances that are not E
normal. After the initial burden of a deemed dowry death is
discharged t:iy the prosecution, a reverse onus is put on the
accused to prove his innocence by showing, inter alia, that the
death was accidental.
F
49. So far as the present case is concerned, (i) Sulochana
is said to have died of an electric shock or electrocution, which
is not a normal circumstance or a normal cause of death; (ii)
Sulochana's death was admittedly within seven years of her
marriage; (iii) and (iv) The finding of the High Court (with which
we agree) is that there was a demand by Suresh Kumar for G -
dowry in the form of a motorcycle. This has come out in the
evidence of Gian Singh, Mam Chand, Sardha and PW-7 Beer
Singh. There is also evidence that Sulochana was treated with
cruelty or harassed for a motorcycle as dowry by Suresh Kumar.
He had subjected her to cruelty or harassment in connection H
708 · SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 14 S.C.R.

A with the demand by beating her despite the intervention of
Sulochana's brother Gian Singh and her father Sardha. Swesh
Kumar was unrelenting and insisted on a motorcycle being
given by way of dowry; (v) The finding of the High Court (with
which also we agree) is that Sulochana was treated with cruelty
8 or harassment-soon before (about 15 or 20 days) her death.

50. The ingredients of Section 304-8 of the IPC having
been met and the first stage process being over, it is deemed
that Sulochana was a victim of a dowry death and that Suresh
Kumar had caused the dowry death. To rebut the statutory
C presumption under Section 113-8 of the Act, learned counsel
for the appellant contended that Sulochana's death by an
electric shock or by electrocution was an accident and therefore
the case would fall outside the purview of Section 304-8 of the
IPC.
D
51. Therefore, the only matter in issue now is whether
Sulochana's death by electrocution or electric shock was
accidental or not. The burden of rebutting the presumption was
on-suresh Kumar. Unfortunately he did precious little to rebut
E this presumption. The best evidence in this regard could have
been given by the doctor who is said to have attended to
Suloch.ana and declared her dead, but he did not produce him/
her in the witness box.

52. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar submitted that it
F was for the prosecution to have produced the doctor as a
witness to ascertain the cause of death. We are not in
agreement with learned counsel. There is no doubt that the
death of Sulochana was not under normal circumstances. As
mentioned above, all other ingredients under Section 304-8 of
G the IPC having been made out, the burden of proving that
Sulochana's death was accidental had shifted from the
prosecution to Suresh Kumar, and it was for him to rebut the
statutory presumption.

H 53. Section 113-8 of the Evidence Act introduces a
SURESH KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA 709
[MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]
reverse onus, which is to say that though it is ordinarily for the A
prosecution to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, but
when a reverse onus is introduced, it is for the accused to refute
the case of the prosecution and prove his innocence. Suresh
Kumar has, unfortunately, not discharged the onus cast on him.
B
54. On the contrary, the High Court has noted, and rightly
so, that the theory of Sulochana dying of an electric shock was
put forward only by Krishan, who did not enter the witness box.
Suresh Kumar and Leela Devi, in their statement under Section
313 of the Cr.P.C. did not mention anything about Sulochana's C
electrocution. Consequently, on the facts of this case, we are
clearly of the view that Suresh Kumar has not been able to rebut
the statutory presumption and thereby has failed to discharge
the reverse onus placed upon him.

Appeal against acquittal D
55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not
to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was
submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should
lean in favout of the accused and should not interfere with an
E
acquittal.

56. A few years ago, the law on the subject was culled out
from a large number of decisions and summed up in Ghurey
Lal v. State of UP., (2008) 10 SCC 450 as follows:
F
"1. The appellate court may review the evidence in
appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of
the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing
evidence is wide and the appellate court can reappreciate
the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's G
conclusion with respect to both facts and law.

2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
The accused possessed this presumption when he was
before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the
H
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.

A presumption that he is innocent.

3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given
to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a
witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High
Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must
B
also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that
the trial court was wrong.

In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate
courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallised
c by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or
otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal:

1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise
disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial
D and compelling reasons" for doing so.

A number of instances arise in which the appellate court
would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to
discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and
compelling reasons" exist when:
E
(i) The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is
palpably wrong;

(ii) The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous
view of law;
F
(iii) The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave
miscarriage of justice";

(iv) The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with
G the evidence was. patently illegal;

(v) The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and
unreasonable; ·

(vi) The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the
H
SURESH KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA 711
[MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]
material evidence or has ignored material documents like A
dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc.

'(vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive."

57. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar referred to S. Anil
Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 7 SCC 219 particularly B
paragraph 14 of the Report wherein reliance was placed on
Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 to conclude
that it is "only in exceptional cases where there are compelling
circumstances and where the judgment in appeal is found to
be perverse, can the High-Court interfere with the order of C
acquittal." In Rohtash it was further observed:

''The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption
of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's
acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. o
Interference in a routine manner where the other view is
possible should be avoided, unless there are good
reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v.
Ta 1evar, (2011) c11 SCC 666 and Govindaraju v. State,
c2012) 4 sec 122.) E

58. While we agree that interference against an order of
acquittal should not be a matter of course, however, where the
Trial Judge commits a jurisdictional error, the appellate Court
is entitled to interfere and correct the error. In the present case,
the Trial Judge arrived at a conclusion that the death was F
accidental; he then proceeded on the basis that an accidental
death is not punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC;
therefore, there was no option before the Trial Judge but to
acquit Suresh Kumar. However, as we have noted above even
an accidental death would fall within the purview of Section 304- G
B of the IPC. That being so the Trial Judge committed a
jurisdictional error in keeping Sulocharia's accidental death
beyond the scope of Section 304-B of the IPC. It is this
jurisdictional error that was corrected by the High Court and this
H
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 14 S.C.R.

A clearly comes within the parameters of interference laid down
in Ghurey Lal.

59. The second contention of learned counsel for Suresh
Kumar is also rejected.
B 60. It was submitted that there was a delay in lodging the
FIR against Suresh Kumar and so the prosecution is vitiated.
This contention was not raised by Suresh Kumar at any earlier
stage and so we decline to entertain it. We also do not see
any adverse consequence or presumption in the delay, if any,
C in lodging an FIR.

Conclusion

61. We find n9 merit in these appeals and they are
accordingly dismissed.
0
62. The bail bond of Suresh Kumar is cancelled and it is
directed that he should be taken into custody to serve out the
remainder of his sentence.

E Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeals dismissed.