Holding

The deemed date of construction is the date on which the building is recorded as completed by the local authority, i.e., the municipal inspection report of 30 January 1978, and the landlord’s failure to prove construction within ten years renders the eviction suit barred under Section 20.

Summary

The appellant, a tenant inducted in 1973, challenged an eviction suit filed by the landlord in 1990, arguing that the suit was barred under Section 20 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 because the ten‑year exemption period for newly constructed buildings had expired. The key issue was the "deemed date of construction" under Explanation I to Section 2(2) of the Act – whether it should be the date of municipal inspection report (30‑Jan‑1978) or the later date of first tax assessment (1‑Apr‑1981). The Supreme Court held that "otherwise recorded" includes the municipal inspection report, making 30‑Jan‑1978 the deemed completion date. Since the tenant had occupied the premises since 1973, the exemption period had long expired, and the landlord failed to prove construction within ten years of the suit. Consequently, the eviction suit was barred and dismissed. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court’s decision.

Issues considered

The correct "deemed date of construction" for the exemption under Section 2(2) Explanation I of the U.P. Urban Buildings Act.
Whether the landlord bears the burden of proving that the building was constructed within ten years of the eviction suit.
Whether the eviction suit filed in the Small Causes Court is barred under Section 20 of the Act.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 100
Constitution of Indias. 136
Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. 106
U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972s. 20, s. 2(2)

Subjects

rent controlevictionexemption perioddeemed date of constructionU.P. Urban Buildings Actmunicipal recordsburden of proofbeneficial legislationSection 20Section 2(2) Explanation Ilandlord-tenant

Judgment

A SURESH KUMAR JAIN
v.
SHANTI SWARUP JAIN AND ORS.

NOVEMBER 21, 1996

B [G.N. RAY AND G.B. PATIANAIK, JJ.]

Rent Control and Eviction :

U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act,
C 1972: Section 2(2) Expln. I & proviso and S.20.

Completion of building-Deemed date of-Statutory period of exemp-
tion-From applicability of Act-For purpose of computation of-Completion
of building reported to municipality-Notice under S.143 of U.P.
Municipalities Act issued to landlord and reply thereto received-Sub-
D sequently, official of Municipality inspected building and recorded that part
of building rented out was well constructed-After hearing landlord,
Municipality passed house tax assessment order in respect of building-But
due to litigation assessment came into effect after delay of about three
years-Later on landlord instituted suit in Court of Small Causes for eviction
E of tenant-Held : Date of completion of tenanted premises is as recorded by ·
official of municipality and not date of coming into effect of assessment order
was deemed date of completion of building for determining if suit was filed
within statutory period of JO years for applicability of Act---Act a beneficial
legislation-Hence, keeping in mind purpose of Ac~ broad-based interpreta-
tion of expression '"otherwise recorded" used in Expln. I to S.2(2) called
F fo,-{f.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, Ss. 143 and 182-Transfer of Property Act,
1882, S.106.

Section 2(2)-£xemption under-Object and scope of such exemption
explained.
G Sections 2(2) and 21>-£viction suit-Filed in Court of Small Causes
and not in appropriate forum under Act on ground of inapplicability of
Act-Held : Onus to prove strictly that building was constructed within
statutory period of exemption, lay on landlord.

H Section 2(2)-completion of building-Deemed date of-Determina-
28
S.KR. JAIN v. S.S. JAIN 29

tion of-By appreciating and interpreting municipal records and assessment A
proceedings-Nature of-Held : such detem1ination involved mixed question
of law and fact and not a mere finding of fact simplicitor-Hence, inteiference
under Arl. 136 with concwrent findings of fact by cowts below was not
improper-Co11stitutio11 of India, 1950, Arl. 136.
B
Words. and Phrases :

"Otherwise recorded''-Meaning of-In the context of U.P. Urban Build-
ings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, S.2(2), Explanation
!(a).
c
The appellant was inducted as a tenant on the ground floor of a
building within the limits of municipality by the landlord-respondent in
1973. The Municipality gave a notice to the respondent under Section 143
of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 fixing the annual valuation of the
building and inviting his objections, if any. In reply to the said notice the D
respondent raised certain objections but did not state that the construc-
tion of the building was not completed. The Section Head Clerk inspected
the building on 30-1-1978 and filed a report recording that the ground floor
and the first floor had been rented respectively and the second floor of the
building was in possession of the respondent-owner. In the said report it
was indicated that the shop was well constrncted. The Municipality in- E
timated the respondent of a date of hearing and after that date passed an
order of assessment of house tax which was challenged by the respondent
and ultimately came into effect from 1-4-1981 on the conclnsion of litiga-
tion. The respondent instituted a sui( for eviction of the appellant in the
Small Causes Court in 1990. The suit was decreed and the finding of the F
trial court was upheld in revision by the Additional District Jndge. The
High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant-tenant. Being
aggrieved the appellant preferred the present appeal.

On behalf of the appellant-tenant it was contended that the expres-
sion "otherwise recorded" used in Explanation I to Section 2(2) of the U.P. G
~ ,, Urban Bnildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972
should be given the widest possible meaning and, therefore, the exemption
period (10 years) started on 30-1-1978 when the Head Clerk had recorded
that the building was complete; and that the eviction suit was barred under
Section 20 of the Rent Act. H
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A On behalf of the respondent-landlord it was contended that the
perio~f exemption commenced from the date of coming into effect of the
house tax assessment; that the eviction suit was filed within the period of
exemption and was not barred under Section 20 of the Act; that the
appellant-tenant having wrongly contended that he had been continuing in
the old premis~s even prior to 1973 was not permitted to rely on sub·
B '
sequent construction of the tenanted premises; and that the concurrent
finding of fact of deemed date of construction acquired finality and no
interference of this Court was called for under Article 136 of the Constitu·
ti on.

C Allowing the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1.1. The premises Tenancy Act is a beneficial legislation
intended to protect the tenant from being evicted by the landlord at his
will or on flimsy ground. The pleasure doctrine implicit in the Transfer of
Property Act entitles the landlord to evict bis tenant by determining the
D tenancy by appropriate notice. For such eviction the landlord does not owe
any explanation to the tenant. The action for eviction is basically actuated
by the desire to evict the tenant. The U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of
Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 like other Rent Acts also envisages
protection of tenant governed by the Rent Act from being evicted from the
E tenanted premises except on specified grounds for such eviction and on
conditions for such eviction being fully complied with. [43·D·E]

1.2. For mitigating the hardship likely to be meted out to a landlord
who has mad;; new construction by incurring substantial expenses, the
landlord, in case of tenancy in a newly constructed building has been
F favoured with exemption of the rigours of the Tenancy Act in the matter
of evicting a tenant inducted in such newly constructed premises. But such
exemption is not unfettered but controlled by the provisions of Section 2(2)
of1he said Rent Act read with Explanation I and proviso to such Explana·
tion I. The outer limit of the period of exemption in respect of newly
G constructed building is ten years. Such outer limit of the period of exemp·
tion has been introduced for balancing the equities between the landlord
and tenant. In order to ensure that such exemption in favour of the
landlord is not extended indefinitely, the legislature has provided a
mechanism for determining the date with reference to which the building
H in qnestion will be deemed to have been constructed by indicating four
S.KR.JAIN v. S.S. JAIN 31

distinct alternatives. [43-F-H; 44-A-B] A
2.1. In the instant case, both the dates, namely, the date on which the
completion of the building is reported to the local authority and the date
on which the completion of the building is otherwise recorded by the local
authority having jurisdiction, are available. On 30-1-1978, the building
B
constructed by the respondent-landlord was inspected by the Section Head
Clerk of the Municipality, who recorded that the building in question was

-
well constructed. Consequent to this report, the Municipality issued a
letter intimating the respondent-landlord of the date of hearing of the
object to the assessment of house tax. Therefore, the appellant-tenant has
rightly contended that the import of the expression "otherwise recorded" c
used in Explanation I to Section 2(2) of the Rent Act should be construed
in a broad based manner having wide amplitude, keeping in mind the
beneficial purpose of U.P. Rent Act for protecting the interest of tenants
covered by the said Rent Act. Such recording of the date of completion of
the tenanted premises in question fully satisfies the recording of deemed D
date of construction under Section 2(2) of the U.P. Rent Act and it is not
necessary to investigate whether for the purpose of assessment of rates
and taxes of a building, inspection of the building bad been done strictly
in accordance with the Municipalities Act. [44-E-H; 45-A-C)
E
2.2. The contention of the respondent landlord that the tenant appel-
lant having wrongly contended that he bad been continuing in the old
premises even prior to 1973, is not permitted to rely on the subsequent
construction of the tenanted premises, cannot be accepted for the simple
reason that the landlord having instituted the eviction suit in the Small
Causes Court, instead of filing such eviction suit before the appropriate F
forum under the Rent Act, on the plea that the building in which the tenant
was inducted in 1973 was a newly constructed building for which he was
entitled to exemption under Section 2(2) of the Rent Act, was under an
obligation to strictly prove that such building, in fact, had been constructed
within ten years from the date of the institution of the suit. [45-C-E]
G
2.3. The other contentions raised by the respondent landlord about
the finality of the concurrent finding of fact of deemed date of construction
and impropriety of interference in exercise of discretionary remedy under
Article 136 of the Constitution cannot be accepted being devoid of any
substance. In the facts of the case, such determination of deemed date of H
32 SUPR~ME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.:

A construction by appreciating and interpreting municipal records and as·
sessment proceedings was not determination of a fact simplicitor but such
determination involved a determination of mixed question of law and fact.
It is the case of the landlord that after evicting erstwhile tenant, the
appellant tenant was inducted for the first time in 1973. The very fact that
B the appellant was inducted as tenant in respect of the said shop room
clearly indicates that such unit of tenancy had been constructed as a unit
fit for occupation at least in 1973 when the appellant was inducted as a
tenant in such shop room. The report of the Head Clerk of the
Municipality is also to the effect that the shop room is well constructed. '
C The eviction suit was instituted only in 1990. It will be travesty of justice
if such suit is decreed in favour of the landlord by allowing the untenable
plea that the premises in question was constructed within a period of ten
years from the date of the institution of the suit. [45-F-H; 46-A-C]

Sheonandan v. State of Bihar, [1987] 1 SCC 288; Dipak Banerjee v.
D Lilabati Chakrabarty, [1987] 4 SCC 188; Samundari Devi v. Nand Kishore,
(1987) ALJ 255; Tilak Raj v. Debendra Singh, (1975) All LR 721, Hirday
Ram v. R.S. Kochar, (1977\ ARC 323; State of Bombay v. Pandurang
Vinayak, AIR (1953) SC 244; G. C. Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, AIR
(1977) SC 915; S. Sundaram Pillai v. VR. Patturianan, AIR (1985) SC 1982;
E Mrinalini B. Shah v. Bapalal Mohan/al, AIR (1980) SC 954 and K.S. Nangji
Company v. Jata Shankar, AIR (1961) SC 1474, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2131 of
1996.

F From the Judgment and Order dated 21.12.95 of the Allahabad High
Court in C.M.W.P. No. 1558 of 1995.

Dr. AM. Singhvi Ciccu Mukhopadhyaya, Rakesh K. Sharma for the
Appellant.

G S.S. Jain in-person Respondent No. 1.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ' --
G.N. RAY, J. This appeal is directed against judgment dated Decem-
ber 21, 1995 passed by the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Writ
H Petition No. 1558 of 1995. It may be stated here that against the earlier
S.KR.JA!Nv. S.S. JAIN [G.N.RAY,J.] 33

judgment of the High Court passed in the said Civil Misc. Writ Petition, A
this Court was moved by filing S.L.P. (C) No. 4280 of 1995. Such Special
Leave Petition was disposed of by this Court and by order dated July 24,
1995, the Writ Petition was remanded to the High Court for fresh adjudica-
tion in the light of observations made in the judgment of this Court.

The appellant was inducted as a tenant on the ground floor of a B
building numbered as 29 Mainganj Ward No.4, Block No.2, Kapra Market,
Etah, within the limits of Etah Municipality at a monthly rental of Rs. 75
with effect from March, 1973 by the owner landlord respondent Sri Shanti
Swamp Jain.
c
For the purpose of appreciating rival contentions of the parties in
this appeal, the following facts which are on record appear to be relevant.

(a) The Executive Officer, Municipal Committee, Etah, gave notice
dated November 15, 1977 to the owner landlord respondent Sri Shanti
Swamp Jain under Section 143 of U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 that in D
respect of house Nos. 29, 29A and 29B of Mohalla Maniganj of Block No.
2, Ward No. 4 of the said Etah Municipality, the annual valuation had been
fixed at Rs. 1,800 and the House Tax for the said premises had been
assessed at Rs.90. It was indicated in the said notice that if the landlord
had any objection, such objection would be filed during the working hours E
on December 20, 1977 or earlier. It may be indicated that originally the
House No 29 before reconstruction was a single storied building. After
reconstruction the building comprises ground, first and second floor and
such reconstructed building has been numbered as House Nos. 29, 29A
and 29B. The receipt of said notice of the Municipality under Section 143
was acknowledged by the owner respondent on November 25, 1977. F

(b) In reply to the said notice of assessment, the owner respondent
filed his objections that the assessment of House Tax was high and that
only one shop was let out on a monthly rental of Rs. 75 and the remaining
portion of the building was lying unused. In the said objections the owner G
landlord did not state that the construction of the said House Nos. 29, 29A
and 29B was not completed.

(c) On January 30, 1978, the building constructed by the respondent
was inspected by the Section Head Clerk of the Municipality and a report
was filed by the said Head Clerk recording that the ground floor and the H
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.
'(
A first floor had been rented respectively at Rs. 75 and Rs. 60 per month and
the seco1,1d floor of the building was in possession of the respondent owner.
In the said report it was indicated that the shop was well constructed.
\
(d) The Municip~lity issued a letter dated January 30, 1978 to the
respondent which was received by him on January 31, 1978, intimating the
B date for hearing the objection to the assessment of house tax, was fixed on
February 1, 1978 at 11.00 A.M. An order of assessment in respect of the
said house Nos. 29, 29A and 29B was passed on February 2, 1978. Such
assessment was, however, challenged by the respondent and the assessment
of house tax ultimately came into effect from April 1, 1981 on the con-
c clusion of pending litigation on account of challenge of the order of
assessment of House Tax.

On December 19, 1990, the plaintiff respondent No. 1 Sri Shanti
Swamp Jain, instituted a suit for eviction of the appellant from the suit
premises in which he was inducted at a monthly rental of Rs. 75 in the
D Court of Munsif Small Causes being Suit No. 18 of 1990. The defendant
tenant who is the appellant herein raised an objection as to the main-
tainability of the said Eviction Suit No. 18 of 1990 before the learned
Munsif Small Causes. It was contended inter a/ia by the tenant appellant
that under the provisions of U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting,
E Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, the jurisdiction to entertain the said suit by
the learned Munsif, Small Causes, was barred under Section 20 of the said
Rent Act. Section 2 of the said Rent Act provides for exemption from the
operation of the Act under certain conditions but such conditions were not
fulfilled in the instant case. The deemed date of construction of the
building is provided in Explanation I of Sub-Section (2) of Section 2 of the
F Rent Act. It will be appropriate to refer to the Explanation I of Sub-Section
(2) of Section 2 of the said Rent Act.

Explanation I - (For the purposes of this Section) -

(a) the construction of a building shall be deemed to have been
G completed on the date on which the completion thereof is reported
to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction, •,
and in the case of a building subject to assessment, the date on
which the first assessment thereof comes into effect, and where
the said dates are different, the earliest of the said dates, and in
H the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on
S.KR.JAINv. S.S. JAIN [G.N.RAY,J.] 35

which it is actually occupied (not including occupation merely for A
the purposes of supervising the construction or guarding the build-
ing under construction) for the first time :

Provided that there may be different dates of completion of con-
struction in respect of different parts of a building which are either
designed as separate units or are occupied separately by the B
landlord and one or more tenants or by different tenants :

Dr. AM. Singhvi, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
appellant, has submitted thai there is no scope to dispute that if the
building in question in respect of which the said eviction suit was instituted
c
in the court of the learned Munsif, Small Causes, had not been completed
within ten years from the date of institution of the said suit, the same was
not maintainable being barred under Section 20 of the said Rent Act.

Dr. Singhvi has submitted that the Explanation I of Sub-Section (2)
of Section 2 of the said Rent Act clearly indicates that the legislature has D.
~/
with the intention of balancing the equities between the landlord and the
tenants, exempted the landlord from the protection granted to the tenants
against eviction under the said Rent Act for a limited period of ten years
from the date of completion of newly constructed building. In order to
safeguard the interest of the tenants for which the rent legislation was E
primarily enacted, and in order to ensure that the protection in favour of
the landlord is not extended indefinitely, the legislation has provided a
mechanism for determining the date on which the building in question will
be deemed to have been constructed by providing four distinct alternatives
and also providing that in the event the said dates are different, the earliest
of the date would be the deemed date of construction. F
Dr. Singhvi has further submitted that the ratio or principle behind
1
the said provision to take the earliest of the deemed dates of construction,
was obviously to give protection due to the tenant once the building is
established to be ten years old on the earliest point of time amongst the G
various dates of deemed construction. Dr. Singhvi has also submitted that
it is significant to note that the proviso to Explanation I of Sub- Section
(2) of Section 2 of the Rent Act specifically states that there may be
different dates of completion of construction in respect of different parts
of a building which are designed as separate units or occupied separately
by the landlord or one' or more tenants or by different tenants. H ·
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A Dr. Singhvi has contended that various dates as indicated in Explana-
tion I for computing the period of completion of the premises in question
for the purpose of finding whether completion was within ten years or not,
are as follows :

B (a) The date on which completion thereof is reported to the local
authority having jurisdiction;

(b) The date on which the completion thereof is otherwise recorded
by the local authority having jurisdiction;

c (c) the date on which the assessment to property tax comes into
effect;

~ccording to Dr. Singhvi, landlord, according to the case pleaded
by him in the plaint of the eviction suit, has pleaded and accepted that the
D construction of the ground floor and indeed the entire building i.e. ground,
first and second floors were completed in March, 1973 when the appellant
was inducted as a tenant at a monthly rental of Rs. 75. Although the
landlord did not specifically make a report to the local authorities having
jurisdiction about the completion of the building, the local authorities have
E clearly recorded vide the said inspection report of January 30, 1978, that
the building bearing No. 29, 29A and 29B is well constructed. Dr. Singhvi
has submitted that the e>.lJression "otherwise recorded" used in Explanation
I to Section 2(2) of the Rent Act must necessarily be given the widest
possible meaning as the words have no restriction in the Explanation and,
therefore, a recording by the local authorities that the building is complete
F or constructed as found on inspection for the purpose of assessment of
house tax would satisfy the requirements under the Explanation I. Hence,
it would not be open to the respondent to contend that the date on which
first assessment to property tax came into effect would be the governing
date for computing the period of ten years.
G
Dr. Singhvi has also submitted that the objections of the respondent
landlord to the notice of assessment of House Tax clearly indicated that
there had been admission of the landlord that the building though con-
structed was let out to a tenant and other portions were laying vacant or •
H unused on the date of said objection i.e. on December 16, 1977.
S.KR.JAINv. S.S. JAIN [G.N.RAY,J.] 37

Dr. Singhvi has also submitted that in the suit for eviction, th~ A
y landlord respondent has sought for possession of the ground floor of thif
said building from the tenant appellant. The ground floor has admittedly
been treated as a separate and distinct part of the building and such
distinct and separate part was in the occupation and exclusive possession
of the tenant appellant ever since March, 1973. B

It has been contended by Dr. Singhvi that in view of the fact that
construction of ground floor was completed in 1977 and the appellant was
indicated as a tenant in such constructed unit ever since March, 1973 under
the proviso to Explanation I which specifically provides that different parts
of the building may have different dates of construction, the eviction suit C
must be held as cl~arly barred under Section 20 of the Rent Act because
the said constructed unit comprising tenancy of the appellant had been
built in 1~73.

· Dr. Smghvi has submitted that the proviso to Explanation I clearly D
reveais the intention of the legislature to limit the benefit of exemption of
provisions of Rent Act upto a period of ten years from the construction of
the building or any separate unit of the building but after the expiry of such
period of ten years, the tenant is entitled to full protection under the
beneficial legislation, namely, the said Rent Act. As in the facts of the case,
the appellant tenant has been able to clearly demonstrate with reference E
to recgrds which are not disputed that House No. 29 since let out to him
ever since March, 1973, stood constructed at the time of inception of
tenancy and the tenant has all along been in exclusive possession of this
separate unit from the date of inception of tenancy, it cannot but be held
that the tenanted premises being the separate unit of the building having F
been constructed long before the period of ten years prior to the date of
the institution of the Eviction Suit, the said suit was hopelessly barred
under Section 20 of the Rent Act and the decree passed on such suit by
wrongfully assuming jurisdiction by the learned Munsif, Small Causes
Court is a nullity.
G
Dr. Singhvi has disputed the contention of the landlord respondent
that the recording of completion of construction in the process of assess-
ment to house tax cannot be taken as the date of computation in view of
the provisions of Section 182 of U .P. Municipalities Act, 1976 by conferring
that such contention is devoid of any substance. Dr. Singhvi has submitted H
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 9 S.C.R.
A that the said Section provides for inspection of the work of the building
requiring sanction. Hence, in the case of a building which does not require . '(

sanction, being the subject matter pf the eviction suit, there would be no
occasion to have a date of completion recorded in the municipal records.
But the only date available would be either a date of occupation or the
date of first assessment coming into force. Dr. Singhvi has submitted that
B
any construction of various dates mentioned in Explanation I to Section
2(2) of the Rent Act in a restricted manner will make the various criteria
specified therein redundant.

Dr. Singhvi has, therefore, submitted that the High Court has failed
c to appreciate the true import of Explanation I read with proviso under
Section 2(2) of the Rent Act and on a total misconception of the facts and
circumstances of the case and the materials on record has come to an
erroneous finding that eviction suit instituted in the Court of the learned
Munsif, Small Causes, was maintainable and the decree for eviction passed
in such suit was legal and valid. Dr. Singhvi has submitted that since the
D
eviction suit, in the facts of the case, was not maintainable in law, the
decree for eviction passed in such suit is a nullity and is of no consequence.
This appeal should, therefore, be allowed by setting aside the decree fcit
eviction and dismissing the said suit for eviction with cost.

E Shri Shanti Swarup Jain, the respondent herein, has appeared in
person and has made submissions in support of his case. The respondent
has not disputed that eviction suit was instituted by him against the ,tenant
appellant who was inducted by him as a tenant in 1973 in ~he !~anted
premises comprising a portion of the building which was reconstructed by
F him after demolishing the old structure. Sri Jain has submitted that the
reconstructed shop in respect of which the appellant is a tenant was
assessed to tax for the first time in 1981 and the assessment of the saicr
newly constructed building was made effective from April 1, 1981. The
eviction suit was instituted on December 19, 1990. Accordingly, the Rent
Act (U.P. Act No. 3 of 1972) was not applicable in respect of the tenanted
G premises because 10 years' period as contemplate,d under Explanation I to
Section 2(2) had not expired at the time of institution of the suit. Sri Jain
has submitted that on a clear finding upon consideration of oral and .....
documentary evidence that April 1, 1981 being the date of first effective
assessment of house tax, was the date of completion of the building, the
H maintainability of the eviction suit was found in favour of the landlord.
S.KR.JA!Nv. S.S.JAIN [G.N.RAY,J.] 39
Sri Jain has submitted that the appellant tenant's main contention in A
the- said suit was that no new construction was made and the tenanted
premises being in the same condition as it was in 1970, the said premises
could not be held to be a newly constructed building. The tenant appellant
also raised the same plea in the revision petition filed before the District
Judge, Et ah, assailing the decree for eviction passed by the learned M unsif B
of Small Causes. The said Revision Case No. 41 of 1982 was disposed of
by the learned Additional District Judge upholding the finding of the
learned Munsif. Sri Jain .has further submitted that before the trial court
he filed documentary evidence showing that one Ashrafi Lal Jain was the
tenant under him at a monthly rental of Rs. 14 and the said Ashrafi Lal
having died on March 9, 1971, his heirs were arrayed as defendants. The C
landlord Sri Jain got possession of the tenanted premises on August 20,
1972 by executing the decree for eviction. The appellant had no connection
in the tenancy in respect of the shop in which Ashrafi Lal was a tenant.
But the appellant tenant made false assertion of tenancy in respect of the
said tenancy of Ashrafi Lal. Sri Jain has contended that as the appellant D
tenant had resorted to false assertions and has not come with clean hand,
he is liable to be punished under the Contempt of Courts Act. Sri Jain has
submitted that such false assertion as to his tenancy right in respect of
shop in which Ashrafi Lal was tenant was made with an oblique purpose
to rely on the earlier assessment of house tax in 1970.
E
Sri Jain has contended that the finding of fact in the said eviction
suit became final with the disposal of the said Revision Case No. 41 of 1982
and the concurrent finding of fact could not be challenged before the High
Court in view of provisions of Section 100 Civil Procedure Code. After
unsuccessful attempt to assail the decree for eviction before the High F
Court, a special leave petition was moved by the appellant tenant by
suppressing relevant facts. Such Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4280 of
1995 was disposed of by this Court and the matter was remitted back to
the High Court for deciding the date of completion of the building in
question in accordance with Section 2(2) of the said Rent Act.
G
Sri Jain has submitted that the contention of the appellant made in
. ,> ground No. V of the Special Leave Petition concerning this appeal that the
court below had no jurisdiction to hold that the first assessment was made
on April 1, 1981 in the absence of any document to that effect, is without
any basis and incorrect on the face of assessment order dated April 1, 1981. H
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A Sri Jain has contended that Explanation I to Sub Section (2) of Section 2
of the Rent Act speaks about four specific dates, namely, (1) reporting of '(

construction (2) or otherwise recorded by the local authority having juris-
diction (3) in the case of building subject to assessment, the date on which
the first assessment comes into effect and where dates are different, the
earliest of the three dates is to be taken as the date of completion and (4) •
B
in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which
it is actually occupied.

Sri Jain has further contended that the date of report or any specific
date of recording has not been proved by any evidence on record by the
c tenant appellant. In the aforesaid facts, the date of assessment made
effective on April 1, 1981, is the only earliest date as referred to in
Explanation I. Hence, acceptance of such date by the trial court is legal
and justified. Sri Jain has also contended that the landlord in this case has
discharged his burden of proving the date of completion of construction of
the tenanted building with reference to first date of assessment made
D effective on April 1, 1981. If the tenant appellant intends to dispute such
date of completion, it was for the tenant to establish any other date of
completion as specified in Explanation I but the tenant has failed to prove
any other date of construction.

E Sri Jain has submitted that the tenant appellant cannot be permitted
to allege any date of construction of the building in question in view of
specific case pleaded and argued by the tenant that the tenanted premises
was not constructed but the tenant had continued as tenant in the old
construction. Sri Jain has submitted that jurisdiction under Article 136 of
F
the Constitution being equitable and discretionary, the appellant does not
deserve any exercise of such discretionary jurisdiction in his favour in this
...
appeal as the appellant has resorted to falsehood and has not come with
clean hands.

Sri Jain has submitted that no new plea which had not been taken in
G the courts below can be taken before this Court for the first time. This
appeal is liable to be dismissed on the ground of suppression of material
evidence. The evidence assessed by the courts below should not be reap-
predated or reassessed by this Court. Sri Jain has also contended that '
inspection report dated November 15, 1987 cannot be taken to be an
H inspection report contemplated under Section 182 of the Municipalities
S.KR.JAINv. S.S.JAIN [G.N. RAY,J.) 41
Act. The tenant appellant did not plead in the written statement that any A
inspection was made by the municipal authorities under Section 182 of the
Municipal Act. No evidence has been led to establish that such inspection
was made by the municipal authorities. It has been clearly held by the trial
court that no date of actual construction has been proved in this case.
B
Sri Jain has also contended that in the order of remand passed by
this Court, the finding of the court below that in the facts and circumstan-
ces of the case, April 1, 1981 had to be taken as the date on which fresh
assessment of the building was made, had not been disturbed. In the
aforesaid facts, no interference is called for in this appeal and the same
should be dismissed with costs.
c
In the additional written submissions filed by the respondent, it has
been contended that the khoka of the shop was completed in 1973 but the
rest of construction was done in p(ecemeals in view of certain calamities
in the family of the respondent. If the entire construction had been com- D
• pleted in 1973, the Nagar Palika would not have issued notice for assess-
ment in 1977-78. It has been further contended that this Court will not
embark on a enquiry into the facts and evidences of the case and will not
allow this Court to be converted as the court of fact. For such contention,
the appellant has placed reliance on the decision in Sheonandan v. State E
of Bihar, (1987] 1 sec 288.

Sri Jain has contended that if the essential ingredients necessary for
finding of fact have not been found by the courts below, then this Court
should examine whether any injustice or wrong has been done and the F
burden to show that the concurrent decision of two or more Courts or
Tribunals is manifestly unjust, is on the appellant. Once such b\lrden is
charged, it is not only be right but also a duty of this Court to remedy
injustice. For this contention, Sri Jain has referred to the decision of this
Court in Dipak Banerjee v. Lilabati Chakrabarty, (1987] 4 SCC 188. Sri Jain G
has also contended that this Court has laid down that although Article 136
is couched in the widest phraseology, the jurisdiction of this Court is
limited only by its discretion. It has been held by this Court that this Court
has jurisdiction and power to exercise all the powers of an appellate court
but exercise of such power has to be regulated by the practice of this Court
and the practice of the Privy Council and followed by Federal Court and H
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 9 S.C.R.
(

A also by this Court is not to interfere on questions of fact except in
exceptional cases which shock the conscience of the Court or the findings
were made in disregard to the forms of the legal process or findings are
made in violation of principles of natural justice or the decision has
occasioned grave and substantial injustice.

B Sri Jain has sulimitted that the High Court had considered the
implication of the deeming clause in Section 2(2) of the Rent Act as
indicated in the decision of the High Court in Samundari Devi v. Nand
Kishore, (1987) AU 255 and it was observed in the said decision that the
date of deemed construction must be known with definiteness in order to
C achieve this, the legislature engrafted a legal fiction in the said Explanation
I., Sri Jain has also submitted that the High Court has also placed reliance
on another decision of the same High Court in Ti/ak Raj v. Debandra Singh,
(1975) All LR 721 wherein it was observed that a building is deemed to be
·constructed if it is subjected to assessment on the date with effect from
D which the first assessment is made. Reliance has also been made in the
decision in Hriday Ram v. H.S. Kochar, (1977) ARC 323 wherein it has
been held that when a law has interposed to lay down a fiction, it is not •
open to fall back on the reality of the factual aspect of the matter because
if the factual aspects of the matter were to be considered then the course
will be in the teeth of deeming provision.
E
Sri Jain has submitted that the very essence of legal fiction is assumed
existence of something that does not actually exist and that even though
may be different from actual state of affair, yet the law does not take notice ~.

of the actual fact unless it is followed by the fulfilment of one of the
p conditions mentioned in Explanation I. Sri Jain has further submitted that
the provision in question is a legislative device for assuming something
which in reality it was not and that the mere fact that the deeming
provision is expressed to be an explanation will not alter its basic character
and will also not limited it to a mere explanation of substantive provision.
In support of such submission, reliance has been placed in the decisions of
G this Court in the State of Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayak, AIR (1953) SC
244; G.C. Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1977) SC 915; S. Sun-
daram Pillai v. V. R. Patturianan, AIR (1985) SC 1982; Mrinalini B. Shah
v. Bapala/ Mohan/al, AIR (1980) SC 954. Sri Jain has also submitted that
the special leave petition filed against the decision in Samundari Debi
H (supra) has been dismissed.
S.KR.JAINv. S.S. JAIN [G.N.RAY,J.] 43
y
Sri Jain has also submitted that for proving a negative fact, the A
I
plaintiff is not required to do anything more than substantiating his allega-
tion prima facie. The onus to repudiate then shifts to the defendant to prove
positively the assertion made by the defendant. In this case, it was for the
defendant to prove the date of completion of building but such proof has
not been given by the defendant. The essential distinction between burden B
of proor as a matter of law and pleading as a matter of fact requiring
evidence to be led has been indicated by this Court in KS. Nangji Company
v. Jata Shanker, AIR (1961) SC 1474. Sri Jain has submitted that in the
facts of the case, no interference is called for against the well considered
judgment of the High Court both on the question of fact and on question
of law involved in the case. The appeal, therefore, should be dismissed with C
cost.

After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances
of the case and the submissions for the respective party, it appears to us
that the premises tenancy act is a beneficial legislation intended to protect D
the tenant from being · evicted by the landlord at his will or on flimsy
ground. The pleasure doctrine implicit in the Transfer of Property Act
entitles the landlord to evict his tenant by determining the tenancy by
appropriate notice. For such eviction, the landlord does not owe any
explanation to the tenant. The action for eviction is basically actuated by
the desire to evict the tenant. The U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of E
Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 like other. Rent Acts also envisages
protection of tenant governed. by the Rent Act from being evicted from the
tenanted premises except on specified grounds for such eviction and on
conditions for such eviction being fully complied with.
F
There is no dispute that the defendant appellant is a monthly tenant
covered by the provisions of the said Rent Act. It is apparent that for
mitigating the hardship likely to be meted out to a landlord who has made
new construction by incurring substantial expenses, the landlord, in case of
a
tenancy in newly constructed building has been favoured wit~, ex~mption G
of the rigours of the Tenancy Act in the matter of evicting a tenant inducted
in such newly constructed premises. But such exemption is not unfettered
but controlled by the provisions o.f Section 2(2) of the said Rent Act read
with Explanation I and proviso to such Explanation I. The outer limit of
the period of exemption in respect of newly constructed building is ten
years. Such outer limit of the period of exemption has been introduced for H
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R. .,
A balancing the equities between the landlord and tenant. In order to ensure
that such exemption in favour of the landlord is not extended indefinitely,
the legislature has provided a mechanism for determining the date with
reference to which the building in question will be deemed to have been
constructed by indicating four distinct alternatives. As such four dates are
B likely to be different, Legislature, in its anxiety to ensure that the period
of exemption is not unjustly extended beyond the period intended, has
indicated that such period of exemption is to be recokned from the date
which is on the earliest point of time amongst four different deemed dates
as provided for in Explanation I to sub-section (2) of Section (2) of the·
U.P. Rent Act. The four different dates for the purpose of compensation
C as to whether a newly constructed building is ten years old or not are as
follow:

(i) the date on which completion of the building is reported to the
local authority

D (ii) the date on which the completion of the building is otherwise
recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction

(iii) the date on which the assessment of property tax is first made.

(iv) in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the
E date on which the building was actually occupied.

In our view, in the facts of the case, both the dates, namely, the date
on which the completion of the building is reported to the local authority
and the date on which the completion of the building is otherwise recorded
F by the local authority having jurisdiction, are available. On January 30,
1978, the building constructed by the respondent landlord was inspected
by the Section Head Clerk of the Etah Municipality and a report was filed
by the said Head Clerk recording that the ground floor and the first floor
had been rented at Rs .. 75 and Rs. 60 per month respectively and the
second floor of the building was in possession of the respondent owner. In
G the said report it was alss._ indicated that the shop was well constructed.
The Etah Municipality thereafter issued a letter on January 30, 1978 to the
respondent landlord that the date of hearing the objection to the assess-
ment of house tax was fixed at 11.00 A.M. on February 1, 1978. Such notice
as a consequential action on the report of the Head Clerk 1mly indicates
H that the Municipality has also noted the factum of completion of the
.... .
S.KR.JA!Nv. S.S.JAIN [G.N.RAY,J.] 45
building at least from the date of receipt of the said report. In our view, A
Dr. Singhvi bas rightly contended that the import of the expression "other·
wise recorded" used in Explanation I to Section 2(2) of the Rent Act should
be construed in a broad based manner having wide amplitude, keeping in
mind the beneficial purpose of U .P. Rent Act for protecting the interest
of tenants covered by the said Rent Act. We may also indicate here that
B
such recording of the date of completion of the . tenanted premises in
question fully satisfies thnecording of deemed date of construction under
Section 2(2) of the U.P. Rent Act and it is not necessary to investigate
whether for the purpose of assessment of rates and taxes of a building,
inspection of the building had been done strictly in accordance with the
Municipalities Act. c
The contention of the respondent landlord that the tenant appellant
having wrongly contended that he had been continuing in the old premises
even prior to 1973, is not permitted to rely on the subsequent construction
of the tenanted premises, can not be accepted for the simple reason that
D
the landlord having instituted the eviction suit in the Small Causes Court,
instead of filing such eviction suit before the appropriate forum under the
Rent Act, on the plea that the building in which the tenant was inducted
in 1973 was a newly constructed building for which he was entitled to
exemption under Section 2(2) of the Rent Act, was under an obligation to
strictly prove that such building, in fact, had been constructed within ten E
years from the date of the institution of the suit.

The other contentions raised by the respondent landlord about the
finality of the concurrent finding of fact of deemed date of construction
and impropriety of interference in exercise of discretionary remedy under F
Article 136 of the Constitution cannot be accepted being devoid of any
substance. The deemed date of construction as found earlier by the courts
below was not approved by this court in allowing the appeal arising out of
the earlier special leave petition preferred by the tenant appellant and the
High Court was specifically directed to decide the deemed date of con·
struction under Section 2(2) of the Rent Act in the light of the observation G
-~ made by this Court. In the facts of the case, such determination of deemed
date of construction by appreciating and interpreting municipal records
and assessment proceedings was not determination of a fact simplicitor but
such determination involved a determination of mixed question of law. and
fact. It is the case of the landlord that after evicting erstwhile tenant, the H
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.
A appellant tenant was inducted for the first time in 1973 at a. monthly rental
of Rs. 75. It is not in dispute that the tenant appellant is in exclusive
possession of the shop room in question as a tenant under the respondent
landlord. Such shop room is undoubtedly a separate unit of construction
and the same is in possession of the tenant appellant. The very fact that
B the appellant was inducted as tenant in respect of the said shop room
clearly indic~tes that such unit of tenancy had been constructed as a unit
fit for occupation at least in 1973 when the appellant was inducted as a
tenant in such shop room. The report of the Head Clerk of the
Municipality is also to the effect that the shop room is well constructed.
The eviction suit was instituted only in 1990. It will be travesty of justice if
C such suit is decreed in favour of the landlord by allowing the untenable
plea that the premises in question was constructed within a period of ten
years from the date of the institution of the suit. The appeal is, therefore,
allowed and the impugned Judgment of the High Court is set aside and
the eviction suit stands dismissed with costs.

D v.s.s. Appeal allowed.

,
".