SURESH KUMAR BHIKAMCHAND JAINversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR.

                     [2013] 1 S.C.R. 1037


          SURESH KUMAR BHIKAMCHAND JAIN                               A
                                V.
           STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR.
       (Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.147 of 2013)
                     FEBRUARY 13, 2013
                                                                      -B
    [ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI, J. CHELAMESWAR AND
              VIKRAMAJIT SEN, JJ.

     CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973:
                                                                      c
      s. 167 (2) - Statutory bail - Charge-sheet filed within the
stipulated period, but cognizance not taken as sanction for
prosecution had not been obtained - Held: Grant of sanction
is nowhere contemplated u!s 167 - Once a charge-sheet is
filed within the stipulated time, question of grant of default bail   0
or statutory bail does not arise - Filing of charge-sheet is
sufficient compliance with provisions of s.167(2)(a)(ii) in the
instant case - Merely because sanction had not been
obtained to prosecute the accused and to proceed to the stage
of s.309 Cr.P.C., it cannot be said that the accused is entitled      E
to grant of statutory bail, as envisaged in s. 167.

    During investigation ·of a case of misappropriation of
amount meant for development of slums, the petitioner,
who was an MLA and was functioning as the Minster of
Housing and Slum Area Development, at the relevant                     F
time, was arrested on 11.3.2012. The case against him
pertained to offences punishable u/ss 120-8, 409, 411,
406, 408, 465, 466, 468, 471, 177, 109 read with s.34 IPC
and also u/ss 13(1 )(c), 13(1) (d) and 13(2) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988. The first charge-sheet against               G
four other accused was filed on 25.4.2012 and the
supplementary charge-sheet in which the petitioner was
named was filed on 1.6.2012.

                              1037                                    H
    1038    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013) 1 S.C.R.

A      In the instant petition for special leave to appeal, the
  issue for consideration before the Court was regarding
  the right of the petitioner to be released on bail u/s 167(2)
  CrPC, as though the charge-sheet in the case had been
  filed within the stipulated period, the sanction for his
B prosecution was not obtained as a result of which no
  cognizance was taken of the offence and remand orders
  continued to be made and the petitioner remained in
  magisterial custody.

        Dismissing the petition, the Court
c
       HELD: 1.1. The power of remand is vested in the
  court at the very initial stage before taking of cognizance
  u/s 167(2) Cr.P.C. During the period of investigation, the
  accused is under the custody of the Magistrate before
D whom he or she is first produced. During that stage, u/s
  167(2) Cr.P.C., the Magistrate is vested with authority to
  remand the accused to custody, both police custody and/
  or judicial custody, for 15 days at a time, up to a
  maximum period of 60 days in cases of offences
E punishable for less than 10 years and 90 days where the
  offences are punishable for over 10 years or even death
  sentence. [para 15 and 18] (1047-G; 1052-8-C]

       1.2. The scheme of the Cr.P.C. is such that once the
  investigation stage is completed, the court proceeds to
F the next stage, which is the taking of cognizance and trial.
  An accused has to remain in custody of some court.
  Once cognizance is taken, the power to remand shifts to
  the provisicn~ of s.309 Cr.P.C., under which the trial court
  is empowered to postpone or adjourn proceedings and,
G for the said purpose, to e;ttend the period of detention
  from time to time. However, the provisions of s. 309
  Cr.P.C. have no application to the facts of the instrnt
  case. [para 15 and 18] (1047-G-H; 1048-B; 1052-A]

H       1.3. In the event, an investigating authority fails to file
SURESH KUMAR BHIKAMCHAND JAIN v. STATE OF 1039
             MAHARASHTRA
the charge-sheet within the stipulated period, the accused     A
is entitled to be released on statutory bail. In such a
situation, the accused continues to remain in the custody
of the Magistrate till such time as cognizance is taken by
the court trying the offence, when the said court assumes
custody of the accused for purposes of remand during           B
the trial in terms of s.309 Cr.P.C. The two stages are
different, but one follows the other so as to maintain a
continuity of the custody of the accused with a court.
[para 18] [1052-C-E]

     1.4. Sanction is an enabling provisio.n to prosecute,
                                                               c
which is totally separate from the concept of investigation
which is concluded by the filing of the charge-sheet. The
two are on separate footings. Merely because sanction
has not been obtained to prosecute the accused and to
proceed to the stage of s.309 Cr.P.C., it cannot be said       D
that the accused is entitled to grant of statutory bail, as
envisaged in s.167 Cr.P.C. Grant of sanction is nowhere
contemplated u/s 167 Cr.P.C. What the said Section
contemplates is the completion of investigation in
respect of different types of cases within a stipulated        E
period and the right of an accused to be released on bail
on the failure of the investigating authorities to do so.
Once a charge-sheet is filed within the stipulated time, the
question of grant of default bail or statutory bail does not
arise. Whether cognizance is taken or not is not material      F
as far as s.167 Cr.P.C. is concerned. [para 17-19] [1050-
G-H; 1051-F-G; 1052-F-G]
     1.5. In the instant case, both the charge-sheet as also
the supplementary charge-sheet were filed within 90 days       G
from the date of the petitioner's arrest and remand to
police custody. It is true that cognizance was not taken
by the Special Court on account of failure of the
prosecution to obtain sanction to prosecute the accused
under the provisions of the PC Act, but such failure does
not amount to non-compliance of the provisions of              H
    1040    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 1 S.C.R.


A s.167(2) CrPC. The filing of charge-sheet is sufficient
  compliance with the provisions of s.167(2)(a)(ii). The right
  which may have accrued to the petitioner, had charge-
  sheet not been filed, is not attracted to the facts of the
  instant case. [para 17 & 18] [1050-F-G; 1051-F-G]
B
       Sanjay Dutt v. State 1994 (3) Suppl. SCR 263 = (1994)
  5 SCC 410; Natabar Parida v. the State of Orissa 1975
                     =
  Suppl. SCR 137 (1975) 2 SCC 220 - referred to.

      1.6 . This Court, therefore, holds that though the
C prosecution had not been able to obtain sanction to
  prosecute the accused, he was not entitled to grant of
  statutory bail since the charge-sheet had been filed well
  within the period contemplated u/s 167(2)(a)(ii) Cr.P.C.
  [para 19] [1052-F]
D
                      Case Law Reference:
        1994 (3) Suppl. SCR 263 referred to               para 10
        1975 Suppl. SCR 137          referred to          para 10
E       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: SLP (Criminal)
    No. 147 of 2013.

      From the Judgment & Order dated 17.12.2012 of the High
  Court of Judicature at Bombay Bench at Aurangabad in
F Criminal Application No. 4601 of 2012.
          U.U. Lalit, Nagendra Rai, Harish Salve, Siddharth
    Aggarwal, Shyel Trehan, Subhash Jadhav, Adit S. Pujari, Arjun
    S. Suri, Nikhil Pillai, Sudesh Kotwal, Kumar Rachit, Liz Mathew
    for the Petitiioner.
G
        B.H. Marlapalle, Amol B. Karande, Kunal Cheema, Naresh
    Kumar, Sanjay V. Kharde, Sachin J. Patil, Preshit V. Surshe,
    Asha Gopalan Nair for the Respondents.

H       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SURESH KUMAR BHIKAMCHAND JAIN v. STATE QF1041
             MAHARASHTRA

     ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI. 1. This Special Leave Petition              A
arises out of the judgment and order dated 17th December,
2012, passed by the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High
Court in CRLA No. 4601 of 2012, dismissing the same and
directing the Special Judge, in seisin of the matter, to expedite
the hearing on framing of charge, as had been directed by this       B
Court on 12th October, 2012, while disposing of Special Leave
to Appeal (Crl.) No. 6463 of 2012, filed by the co-accused
Pradeep Raisoni.

      2. This case has thrown into focus certain important issues    C
regarding the right of an accused to be released on bail under
Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
hereinafter referred to as "Cr.P.C.". One of such issues
concerns the power of the Magistrate to pass orders of remand
even beyond the period envisaged under Section 167(2)
Cr.P.C. In the instant case, despite charge-sheet having been        D
filed, no cognizance has been taken on the basis thereof. The
learned Magistrate has, however, continued to pass remand
orders, without apparently having proceeded to the stage
contemplated under Section 309 Cr.P.C. In order to appreciate
the issues which have cropped up during the hearing of the           E
instant case, it is necessary to briefly set out the facts giving
rise to the said questions, which have fallen for determination.

       3. As per the prosecution case, the Petitioner, Suresh
Kumar Bhikamchand Jain, is alleged to have misappropriated           F
amounts meant for development of slums in Jalgaon city, when
he was functioning as the Minister of Housing and Slum Area
Development, as a Member of the Legislative Assembly.
Initially, charge-sheet was filed against certain persons claiming
to be the contractors and the Vice-President of the Municipal        G
Corporation, Jalgaon. Thereafter, during investigation the
Petitioner was arrested on 11th March, 2012, and while charge-
sheet was filed against the four other accused persons on 25th
April, 2012, a supplementary charge-sheet came to be filed
against the Petitioner herein on 1st June, 2012. For a while,        H
    1042     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 1 S.C.R.

A the Petitioner was released on interim bail, but upon rejection
  of his application for bail on merit, he was again taken into
  custody on 5th July, 2012.

       4. What has been stressed upon on behalf of the Petitioner
  is that, although, charge-sheet had been filed within the time
8
  stipulated under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., sanction to prosecute
  the Petitioner had not been obtained, as a result whereof, no
  cognizance was taken of the offence. Notwithstanding the
  above, remand orders continued to be made and the Petitioner
C remained in magisterial custody.

       5. At this stage, it may be pertinent to point out that the
  Petitioner is an accused in respect of offences punishable
  under Sections 1208, 409, 411, 406, 408, 465, 466, 468, 471,
  177, 109 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,
D hereinafter referred to as "IPC" and also under Sections
  13(1)(c), 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
  1988, hereinafter referred to as "the PC Act", in Crime No. 13
  of 2006, registered with the City Police Station Jalgaon.

E       6. Appearing in support of the Special Leave Petition, Mr.
   U.U. Lalit, learned senior Advocate, submitted that since the
  statutory period of 90 days, envisaged under Section 167(2)
   Cr.P.C., had lapsed, the Petitioner could not have been
  remanded to custody, as had been done by the learned Special
  Judge, who is yet to take cognizance for want of sanction. Mr.
F Lalit submitted that the Petitioner was, therefore, entitled to be
  released on bail forthwith, since the orders of remand passed
  by the learned Magistrate after a period of 90 days were without
  jurisdiction and, therefore, invalid in the facts and circumstances
  of the case.
G
       7. Mr. Lalit also submitted that Section 309 Cr.P.C., which
  also deals with remand of the accused under certain
  ctrcumstances, does not apply to the allegations relating to the
  provisions of the PC Act, inasmuch as, there is no committal
H proceeding contemplated in the proceeding before the learned
SURESH KUMAR BHIKAMCHAND JAIN v. STATE OF 1043
    MAHARASHTRA [ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]

Special Judge. However, as far as Section 309 Cr.P.C. is              A
concerned, Mr. Lalit submitted that the same would be
applicable only after cognizance of the offence had been taken
or upon the commencement of the trial before the Special
Court. In the absence of cognizance being taken by the Special
Court, it could not be said that the trial had commenced and,         B
therefore, further detention of the Petitioner was wholly illegal
and not authorised in law and he was, therefore, entitled to be
released on bail forthwith on the basis of the "indefeasible right"
acquired by him on the failure of the Investigating Authorities
to obtain sanction for prosecuting the Petitioner.                    c
      8. Mr. Lalit submitted that the High Court also went wrong
in holding that in the absence of sanction, the actual trial could
not be stayed and could be proceeded with and that the
question of grant of sanction could be considered at the stage
of framing of charge, as to whether such sanction was actually        D
required to prosecute the accused.

      9. In support of his submission, Mr. Lalit referred to and
relied upon the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in
Sanjay Dutt v. State [(1994) 5 SCC 410), wherein the said             E
Bench had occasion to consider the effect of non-completion
of investigation within the time stipulated under Section 167(2)
Cr.P.C. Learned counsel pointed out that in the said decision,
it has, inter alia, been held that default in completion of
investigation within 180 days did not give a fully indefeasible       F
right to the accused to be released on bail. Such a right arises
from the time of default in filing of the charge-sheet and
continues till the filing thereof, but does not survive once the
charge-sheet is filed. Thereafter, grant of bail would be decided
on merits. Mr. Lalit submitted that the indefeasible right referred   G
to in the said decision would become absolute in the event an
application for bail was filed after the expiry of the statutor}t
period stipulated by the statute, but before filing of the charge-
sheet. In such a case, Mr. Lalit submitted that the concerned
accused was entitled as a matter of right to be released on bail.     H
     1044     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 1 S.C.R.


 A       10. Mr. Lalit also referred to the decision of this Court in
   Natabar Parida v. the State of Orissa [(1975) 2 SCC 220],
   which was decided by a Bench of 2-Judges, who also had
   occasion to consider the impact of Section 167(2) Cr. P. C. and
   the proviso (a) thereto. In the said case, the powers of the High
 B Court to pass an order of remand of an accused on the basis
   of inherent powers, was sought to be negated. It was ultimately
   held that the Court will have no inherent power of remand of an
   accused to any custody, unless the power is conferred by law.
   Mr. Lalit urged that since remand orders passed against the
 c Petitioner in the present case did not have the sanction either
   of Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. or Section 309 Cr.P.C., the Petitioner
   was entitled to be released on statutory bail forthwith.

         11. Appearing for the State of Maharashtra, Mr. Sanjay V.
1   Kharde, learned Advocate, supported the decision of the High
  D Court and urged that with the filing of the charge-sheet under
    Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., the conditions of the said Section stood
    satisfied and even if sanction had not been obtained for
    prosecuting the Accused, the Trial Court was entitled to proceed
    further in the matter. Mr. Kharde submitted that the orders of
  E remand passed by the Trial Court were not vitiated since
    charge-sheet had already been filed within 90 days of the arrest
    of the Petitioner.
        12. Also referring to the decision in Sanjay Duff's case
F (supra), Mr. Kharde submitted that the "indefeasible right" of the
  accused to be released on bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.,
  in default of completion of the investigation and filing of charge-
  sheet within the time allowed, is a right which accrued to and
  is enforceable by the accused only from the time of default till
G the filing of the charge-sheet and it does not survive or remain
  enforceable on the charge-sheet being filed. Accordingly, if in
  a given case, the accused applies for bail, under the aforesaid
  provision, on expiry of the period of 180 days or the extended
  period, as the case may be, then he has to be released on bail
H forthwith. However, once the charge-sheet is filed, the question
 SURESH KUMAR BHIKAMCHAND JAIN v. STATE OF1045
     MAHARASHTRA [ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]
 of bail has to be decided only with reference to the merits of       A
 the case under the principles relating to grant of bail to an
 accused after filing of the charge-sheet. Mr. Kharde reiterated
 that in the instant case since the charge-sheet had already
 been filed, notwithstanding the fact that sanction had not been
 obtained, it could not be said that the powers of the learned        B
 Magistrate or the Trial Court to pass orders of remand came
 to an end, even if sanction had not been obtained for
 prosecuting the accused under the provisions of the PC Act.

        13. The question posed in this Special Leave Petition
  concerns the right of a Magistrate or the Trial Court to pass       C
  orders of remand in terms of Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. beyond
·the period prescribed therein. Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., Jlhich
  is relevant for an understanding of the issues involved in this
 case, is extracted hereinbelow:
                                                                      D
      "167. Procedure when investigation cannot be
      completed in twenty-four hours.

      (1) *** *** ***

     (2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is                  E
     forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has
     not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise
     the detention of the accused in such custody as such
     Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days
     in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case      F
     or commit it for trial, and considers further detention
     unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded
     to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction:

     Provided that-                                                   G
     (a) The Magistrate may authorize the detention of the
     accused person, otherwise than in the custody of the
     police, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied
     that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate
     shall authorise the detention of the accused person in           H
    1046   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 1 S.C.R.

A      custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding-

       (i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence
       punishable with death, imprisonment for life or
       imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years;
B      (ii) Sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other
       offence,

       and, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty
       days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be
c      released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail,
       and every person released on bail under this sub-section
       shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions
       of Chapter XXXlll for the purposes of that Chapter;
       (b) no Magistrate shall authorize detention of the accused
D
       in custody of the police under this section unless the
       accused is produced before him in person for the first time
       and subsequently every time till the accused remains in the
       custody of the police, but the Magistrate may extend further
       detention in judicial custody on production of the accused
E      either in person or through the medium of electronic video
       linkage;

       (c) no Magistrate of the second class, not specially
       empowered in this behalf by the High Court, shall authorise
F      detention in the custody of the police.
       Explanation I. - For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby
       declared that, notwithstanding the expiry of the period
       specified in paragraph (a), the accused shall be detained
       in custody so long as he does not furnish bail.
G
       Explanation II. - If any question arises whether an accused
       person was produced before the Magistrate as required
       under clause (b), the production of the accused person
       may be proved by his signature on the order authorising
H      detention or by the order certified by the Magistrate as to
SURESH KUMAR BHIKAMCHAND JAIN v. STATE OF 1047
    MAHARASHTRA [ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]

    production of the accused person through the medium of           A
    electronic video linkage, as the case may be.

          Provided further that in case of a woman under
    eighteen years of age, the detention shall be authorised
    to be in the custody of a remand home or recognised
                                                                     8
    social institution."

      14. From the above provision, it would be amply clear that
the Magistrate may authorise the detention of an accused
person, otherwise than in the custody of the police, beyond a
period of 15 days, if he is satisfied that there are adequate        C
grounds for doing so, but no Magistrate is authorised to detain
the accused person in custody for a total period exceeding 90
days where the investigation relates to an offence punishable
with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of
not less than ten years and 60 days where the investigation          D
relates to any other offence. In other words, if an accused was
ready to offer bail, once the stipulated period for the
investigation had been completed, then the Magistrate no
longer had the authority to extend the period of detention beyond
the said period of 90 days and, consequently, he had no option       E
but to release the accused on bail. The language used in
Sections 167(2)(a)(i) and (ii) is that on the expiry of the period
of 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be, the accused person
shall be released on bail, if he is prepared to and does furnish
bail. The direction upon the learned Magistrate or the Trial Court   F
is mandatory in nature and any detention beyond the said
period would be illegal.

      15. The power of remand is vested in the Court at the very
initial stage before taking of cognizance under Section 167(2)
Cr.P.C. Once cognizance is taken, the power to remand shifts         G
to the provisions of Section 309 Cr.P.C., under which the Trial
Court is empowered to postpone or adjourn proceedings and,
for the said purpose, to extend the period of detention from time
to time. Section 309(2) Cr.P .C. contemplates a situation where
if the Court after taking cognizance of an offence or                H
    1048    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 1 S.C.R.


A commencement of trial finds it necessary to postpone the
  commencement of, or adjourn, any inquiry or trial, it may, for
  reasons to be recorded, postpone or adjourn the inquiry or trial
  on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers
  reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if
B in custody, for a period of fifteen days at a time. Although, the
  provisions of Section 309 Cr.P.C. may not have any application
  to the facts of this case, in order to appreciate the view that
  we have taken, the same are reproduced hereinbelow:

        "309. Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings.-
c       (1) In every inquiry or trial the proceedings shall be held
        as expeditiously as possible, and in particular, when the
        examination of witnesses has once begun, the same shall
        be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in
        attendance have been examined, unless the Court finds
D       the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to
        be necessary for reasons to be recorded.

        Provided that when the inquiry or trial relates to an offence
        under Sections 376 to Section 376 D of the Indian Penal
E       Code (45 of 1860), the inquiry or trial shall, as far as
        possible, be completed within a period of two months from
        the date of commencement of the examination of
        witnesses.

        (2) If the court, after taking cognizance of an offence, or
F       commencement of trial, finds it necessary or advisable to
        postpone the commencement of, or adjourn, any inquiry or
        trial, it may, from time to time, for reasons to be recorded,
        postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks
        fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by
G       a warrant remand the accused if in custody:

        Provided that no Magistrate shall remand an accused
        person to custody under this section for a term exceeding
        fifteen days at a time:                    ·
H
SURESH KUMAR BHIKAMCHAND JAIN v. STATE OF 1049
    MAHARASHTRA [ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]

   Provided further that when witnesses are in attendance, no   A
   adjournment or postponement shall be granted, without
   examining them, except for special reasons to be recorded
   in writing:

   Provided also that no adjournment shall be granted for the   8
   purpose only of enabling the accused person to show
   cause against the sentence proposed to be imposed on
   him.

   Provided also that -
                                                                c
   (a) no adjournment shall be granted at the request of a
   party, except where the circumstances are beyond the
   control of that party;

   (b) the fact that the pleader of a party is engaged in
   another Court, shall not be a ground for adjournment;        D

   (c) where a witness is present in Court but a party or his
   pleader is not present or the party or his pleader though
   present in Court, is not ready to examine or cross-examine
   the witness, the Court may, if thinks fit, record the        E
   statement of the witness and pass such orders as it thinks
   fit dispensing with the examination-in-chief or cross-
   examination of the witness, as the case may be.

   Explanation 1 - If sufficient evidence has been obtained
                                                                F
   to raise a suspicion that the accused may have committed
   an offence and it appears likely that further evidence may
   be obtained by a remand this is a reasonable cause for a
   remand.

   Explanation 2 - The terms on which an adjournment or         G
   postponement may be granted include, in appropriate
   cases, the payment of costs by the prosecution or the
   accused."

                                                                H
    1050         SUPREME COURT REPORTS            (2013] 1 S.C.R.


A        16. At this juncture, we may refer to certain dates which
    are relevant to the facts of this case, namely:

           (a)    11.03.2012 - Petitioner arrested and remanded to
                  police custody;
B          (b)    25.04.2012 - First charge-sheet filed against the
                  four accused;

           (c)    1.06.2012 - Supplementary charge-sheet filed in
                  which the Petitioner is named;
c          (d)    30.07.2012 - The Trial Court rejected the
                  Petitioner's prayer for grant of bail;

           (e)    13.09.2012 - The High Court confirmed the order
                  of the Trial Court;
D
           (f)    2.10.2012 -Application filed under Section 167(2)
                  Cr.P.C. before the Trial Court;

           (g)    5.10.2012 - Trial Court rejected the application
                  under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.
E
        17. From the above dates, it would be evident that both
  the charge-sheet as also the supplementary charge-sheet were
  filed within 90 days from the date of the Petitioner's arrest and
  remand to police custody. It is true that cognizance was not
F taken by the Special Court on account of failure of the
  prosecution to obtain sanction to prosecute the accused under
  the provisions of the PC Act, but does such failure amount to
  non-compliance of the provisions of Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. is
  the question with which we are confronted. In our view, grant of
G sanction is nowhere contemplated under Section 167 Cr.P.C.
  What the said Section contemplates is the completion of
  investigation in respect of different types of cases within a
  stipulated period and the right of an accused to be released
  on bail on the failure of the investigating authorities to do so.
H The scheme of the provisions relating to remand of an accused,
SURESH KUMAR BHIKAMCHAND JAIN v. STATE OF 1051
     MAHARASHTRA [ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]

first during the stage of investigation and, thereafter, after         A
cognizance is taken, indicates that the Legislature iritended
investigation of certain crimes to be completed within 60 days
and offences punishable with death, imprisonment for life or
imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, within 90
days. In the event, the investigation is not completed by the          B
investigating authorities, the accused acquires an indefeasible
right to be granted bail, if he offers to furnish bail. Accordingly,
if on either the 61st day or the 91st day, an accused makes an
application for being released on bail in default of charge-sheet
having been filed, the Court has no option but to release the          c
accused on bail. The said provision has been considered and
interpreted in various cases, such as the ones referred to
hereinbefore. Both the decisions in Natabar Parida's
case(supra) and in Sanjay Duff's case (supra) were instances
where the charge-sheet was not filed within the period
                                                                       0
stipulated in Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. and an application having
been made for grant of bail prior to the filing of charge-sheet,
this Court held that the accused enjoyed an indefeasible right
to grant of bail, if such an application was made before the filing
of the charge-sheet, but once the charge-sheet was filed, such         E
right came to an end and the accused would be entitled to pray
for regular bail on merits.

     18. None of the said cases detract from the position that
once a charge-sheet is filed within the stipulated time, the
question of grant of default bail or statutory bail does not arise.    F
As indicated hereinabove, in our view, the filing of charge-sheet
is sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section
167(2)(a)(ii) in this case. Whether cognizance is taken or not
is not material as far as Section 167 Cr.P.C. is concerned. The
right which may have accrued to the Petitioner, had charge-            G
sheet not been filed, is not attracted to the facts of this case.
Merely because sanction had not been obtained to prosecute
the accused and to proceed to the stage of Section 309
Cr.P.C., it cannot be said that the accused is entitled to grant
of statutory bail, as envisaged in Section 167 Cr.P.C. The             H
    1052     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 1 S.C.R.


A scheme of the Cr.P.C. is such that once the investigation stage
  is completed, the Court proceeds to the next stage, which is
  the taking of cognizance and trial. An accused has to remain
  in custody of some court. During the period of investigation, the
  accused is under the custody of the Magistrate before whom
B he or she is first produced. During that stage, under Section
  167(2) Cr.P.C, the Magistrate is vested with authority to
  remand the accused to custody, both police custody and/ or
  judicial custody for 15 days at a time, up to a maximum period
  of 60 days in cases of offences punishable for less than 10
c years and 90 days where the offences are punishable for over
  10 years or even death sentence. In the event, an investigating
  authority fails to file the charge-sheet within the stipulated
  period, the accused is entitled to be released on statutory bail.
  In such a situation, the accused continues to remain in the
D custody of the \/lagistrate till such tiIT'e as cognizance is taken
  by the Court trying the offence, when the said Court assumes
  custody of the accused for purposes of remand during the trial
  in terms of Section 309 Cr.P.C. The two stages are different,
  but one follows the other so as to maintain a continuity of the
E custody of the accused with a court.
       19. Having regard to the above, we have no hesitation in
  holding that notwithstanding the fact that the prosecution had
  not been able to obtain sanction to prosecute the accused, the
  accused was not entitled to grant of statutory bail since the
F charge-sheet had been filed well within the period
  contemplated under Section 167(2)(a)(ii) Cr.P.C. Sanction is
  an enabling provision to prosecute, which is totally separate
  from the concept of investigation which is concluded by the filing
  of the charge-sheet. The two are on separate footings.
G
        20. In that view of the matter, the Special Leave Petition
    deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.

    R.P.                                           SLP dismissed.