Holding

Section 39 (and by analogy Section 40) of the Act does not protect a tenant unless the eviction suit was pending on 15 July 1972 and the tenant deposited the full arrears within one month of that date, which did not occur here.

Summary

The landlord Suresh Chand let a premises completed in 1967 to tenant Gulam Chisti and filed an eviction suit on 27 May 1972, before the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 came into force on 15 July 1972. The tenant later deposited the arrears of rent and costs in September 1977, within one month after the ten‑year exemption under Section 2(2) expired, seeking protection under Section 39 of the Act. The Supreme Court held that Section 39 (and 40) applies only when the suit is pending on the date of commencement of the Act and the tenant makes the required deposit within one month of that date (or of knowledge of the pendency). Because the deposit was made five years after the commencement date, the tenant could not claim the statutory protection. The Court set aside the lower courts' orders, allowed the appeal, and directed the tenant to vacate within a year and to pay all arrears and damages.

Issues considered

The applicability of Section 39 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 to an eviction suit filed before the Act's commencement.
Whether a deposit made after the ten‑year exemption period satisfies the one‑month deposit requirement under Section 39.
The interpretation of the phrase "such date of commencement" in Section 39.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 115
U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947
U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972s. 20, s. 2(2), s. 39, s. 40

Subjects

Section 39Section 40evictionrent controlten‑year exemptionpending suitdeposit requirementU.P. Urban Buildings Actlandlord‑tenant

Judgment

SURESH CHAND
A
v.
GULAM CHISTI -~

JANUARY :H, 1990

B [SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, CJ., K. JAGANNATHA
SHETTY AND A.M. AHMADI, JJ.]

U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)
Act, 1972: Sections 2(2), 39 and 40-Premises constructed in 1967-
Tenant-Whether entitled to protection of statutory provision.
c On the completion of construction of the demised premises in
1967, the appellant-landlord had let it out to the respondent-tenant in
the same year. Later, on 27th May, 1972 the landlord filed the eviction
suit against the tenant. On 15th July, 1972 the U.P. Urban Buildings
(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 came into force.
D The tenant deposited in the Court on 2nd September, 1977 an amount
of Rs.4005 being the arrears of rent inclusive of interest and cost. This
payment was made within one month after the expiry of the period of
ten years stipulated in section 2(2) of the Act to take advantage of
section 39 of the Act. Section 2(2) inter a/ia provided that nothing in the _)
Act shall apply to a building for a period of ten years from the date on
E which its construction was completed, while section 39 dealt with pend-
ing suits for eviction relating to building brought under the regulation
for the first time.

The Trial Court gave the benefit of section 39 and refused to order
ejectment of the tenant. The landlord's revision application was
F rejected by the Additional District Judge, and his further revision was
dismissed by the High Court.

Allowing the appeal, this Court.

HELD: (I) In order to secure the benefit of Section 39 or 40 it
G must be shown that the suit, appeal or revision was pending on the date
of commencement of the Act. Secondly, if the suit is founded on the
allegation of non-payment of rent, the tenant must, within one month y
from the date of commencement of the Act or from the date of know-
ledge of the pendency of the suit, deposit in court the entire amount of
rent and damages for use and occupation of the building with interest as
H prescribed and landlord's entire cost of the suit, to take the benefii of
186
SURESH CHAND v. GULAM CHISTI 187

the said provision. If both these conditions are satisfied, the law, section A
39, mandates that no decree for eviction shall be passed except on any of
the grounds specified in the proviso to sub-section (1) or clauses (b) to
(gJ of sub-section (2) of section 20 of the Act. Similarly, section 40 lays
down that if an appeal or revision (arising out of a suit for eviction of a
tenant from any building to which the old Act does not apply) is pending
on the date of commencement of the Act, the benefit of section 39 will be B
available to the tenant. l 1998-EJ

(2) The legislature intended to give the benefit of sections 39 and
40 to s.uit, -appeals or revisions which were pending on 15th July, 1972
and in which the deposit came to be made within one month from that
date. The expression 'such' preceding the word 'commencement' is C
clearly suggestive of the fact that it has reference to the date of com-
mencement of the Act and the payment must be made within one
month from such commencement. unless such a restricted meaning
to the section is given, it would not be able to advance the legisla·
tive intent to relieve the landlords of new buildings from the rigours
of the Act. [lOOF-H] D

(3J The Legislature desired to limit the scope of the application of
sections 39 and 40 to suits, appeals and revisions pending on the date of
commencement of the Act, i.e., 15th July, 1972, relating to buildings to
)., which the old Act did not apply and to which the new Act was to apply
forthwith and not at a later date. This is clear from the fact that the E
section contemplates deposit of arrears to rent and damages together
with interest and cost within one month from 'such date of commence-
ment' meaning the date of commencement of the Act. 12008-C J

R.D. Ram Nath & Co. & Anr. v. Girdhari Lal & Anr., [1975]
A.L.J. 1; Ram Swaroop Rai v. Lilavathi, [1980] 3 SCR 1034-(1980) 3 F
SCC 452; Om Prakash Gupta etc. v. Dig Vijendrapal Gupta etc., lJ982J
3 SCR 491; Vineet Kumar v. Mangat Sain Wadhera, [1984] 3 SCC 352;
Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders, 11975] 1 SCC
770; A.K. Gupta & Sons v. Damodar Valley Corporation, [1966] I
SCR 796; Nand Kishore Marwah v. Samundri Devi, 11987] 4 SCC 382
and Atma Ram Mittal v. lshwar Singh Punia, [1988] 4 SCC 284, refer- G
red to.

(4) The Courts below. committed an error In giving the benefit of
section 39 of the Act to the tenant since admittedly the tenant could not
and had not made the deposit within one month from the date of com-
mencement ol' the Act on 15th July, 1972 but had made the deposit H
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 1 S.C.R.

within a month after the moratorium period expired in 1977. [20!F]
A
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
~4ci~. A
From the Judgment and Order dated 3.1.1979 of the Allahabad
B High Court in Civil Revision No. 3714 of 1978.

K.B. Rohtagi for the Appellant.

R.K. Garg and D.K. Garg for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c '
AHMADI, J. The short question which arises for our considera-
tion in this appeal by special leave is whether a tenant of a premises
constructed in 1967 is entitled to the protection of Section 39 of the
U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act,
D 1972 (Act No. 13 of 1972 as amended by Act No. 17 of 1985), herein-
after called 'the Act', in an eviction suit instituted before the com-
mencement of the Act. The Act came into force w.e.f. 15th July, 1972
by virtue of the notification issued by the State Government in exer-
cise of power conferred by Sub-Section 4 of Section 1 of the Act, vide

E
Notification No. 3409/XXIX-59-72 dated 27th June, 1972 published in
the U .P. Government Gazette, Extra, dated 1st July, 1972. The Act
A.
was enacted for inter alia regulation of letting and eviction of tenants
from certain classes of buildings situate in urban areas specified in
Sub-Section (3) of Section 1. Section 2 indicates the buildings to which
the Act shall not apply. We are concerned with Sub-Section (2) of
Section 2, the relevant part whereof reads as under:
F
"Except as provided in sub-section (5) of section 12, sub-
section (1-A) of Section 21, sub-section (2) of Section 24,
Sections 24-A, 24-B, 24-C or sub-section (3) of section 29,
nothing in this Act shall apply to building during a period {

of ten years from the date on which its construction is
G completed".

Since it is not disputed before us that the construction of the suit
property was completed in 1967, we need not set out the provisos and y
the explanations to the sub-section.

H Section 3 defines the various expressions used in the Act. Under
SURESH CHAND v. GULAM CHJSTI [AHMADI, J.] 189

clause (a) 'tenant', in relation to a building means a person by whom A
its rent is payable and 'building' according to clause (i) means a resi-
dential or-non-residential roofed structure including any land, garages
and out-houses appurtenant thereto. Any person to whom rent is or if
the building were let, would be, payable, including his agent or
attorney or such person, is a 'landlord' within the meaning of clause (j)
of that section. It would thus seem that but for the exemption granted B
by Section 2(2), the provisions of the Act would have applied. to the
letting of the suit premises. The scheme of Section 2 is that buildings
referred to in clauses (a) to (f) are exempt from the operation of the
Act for all times (subject of course to legislative changes) whereas the
exemption granted by Section 2(2) is for a period of ten years from the
date of completion of construction.
c
Chapter Ill regulates to letting. Section J1 provides that no
person shall let any building except in pursuance of an allotment order
issued by the District Magistrate under Section 16. Chapter IV regu-
lates eviction. Section 20 inter alia prohibits the institution of a suit for
eviction of a tenant from any building except on the grounds catalo- D
gued in clauses (a) to (g) of sub-section (2) thereof. Section 21 pro-
vides for the eviction of a tenant if the building is bona fide required by
the landlord for his own use or the use of any of his family membe.r.
The scheme of Chapters Ill & IV clearly shows that both the letting of
and eviction from the buildings to which the Act applies are regulated
by the provisions of the Act. E

Section 39 of the Act with which we are mainly concerned finds
its place in Chapter VII entitled Miscellaneous and Transitional Provi-
sions. That section reads as under:

"Pending suiis for eviction relating to building b;·ought F
under regulation for the first time-In any suit for eviction
of a tenant from any building to which the old Act did not
apply, pending on the date of commencement of this Act,
where the tenant within one month from such date of com-
mencement or from the date of his knowledge of the
pendency of the suit, whichever be later, deposits in tho. G
court before which the suit is pending, the entire amount of
rent anj damages for use and occupation (such damages for
use and occupation being calculated at. the same rate as
rent) together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per
cent per annum and the landlord's full cost of the suit, no
decree for eviction shall be passed except on any of the H
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 1 S.C.R.

grounJs mentioned in the proviso to sub-section ( 1) or in
A
clauses (b) to (g) of sub-section (2) of Section 20, and
parties shall be entitled to make necessary amendment in
their pleadings and to adduce additional evidence where
necessary."

B This Section carried an explanation which came to be omitted by Sec-
tion 8(iv) (and be deemed always to have been omitted) of the Civil
Laws Amendment Act, 1972. Section 40 lays down that where an
appeal or revision arising out of a suit for eviction of a tenant from any
building to which the old Act did not apply is pending on the date of
J
commencement of this Act, it shall be disposed of in accordance with
the provisions of Section 39, which shall mutatis mutandis apply.
c ~

The plain reading of Section 39 makes it clear that the said sec-
tion obliges the court to refuse to pass a decree for eviction, except.Cm
any of the grounds mentioned in the proviso to sub-section ( 1) or in
clauses (b) to (g) of sub-section (2) of Section 20, if the following four j
D requirements are satisfied:

(i) the building is one to which the old Act (the U .P. (Tempo-
rary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947-U.P. Act
No. III of 1947) did not apply;

(ii) the eviction suit must be pending on the date of commence-
r\
E
mentoftheActi.e., 15th July, 1972:

(iii) the tenant deposits in court the entire amount of rent/dam-
ages for the use and occupation of the building together

F
with interest at 9% per annum and the landlord's full cost of
the suit; and

(iv) such deposit is made within one month from the date of
commencement of the Act or from the date of knowledge of
the pendency of the eviction suit, whichever is later.
r
G The benefit of Section 39 is extended mutatis mutandis to an appeal or
revision arising out of an eviction suit to which the old Act did not
apply provided the said appeal or revision was pending on the date of
commencemen~ of the Act. '
'f

On a plain reading of Section 39 it becomes clear that in a suit for
H eviction to which the said provision applies, the Court trying the suit is
SURESH CHAND v. GULAM CH!STI [AHMADI, J.] 191

precluded from passing a decree for eviction if the tenant deposits in A
court the entire amount of rent and damages together with interest at
9% per annum and the landlord's full cost of the suit within the time
allowed but this embargo does not apply if eviction is sought on the
gtound or gi:Ollnds mentioned In the proviso to Sub-section ( l) or in
dauses (b) to (!i) of Sub·sedion (2) of Section 20. The ground
mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (I) of Section 20 is determina- a
t\ou of tenancy by efflux of time where the duration of tenancy is fixed
undet a compromise or adjustment arrived at with reference to a-suit,
appeal; tevision or execution IJroceedin)i which is recorded iii Court or
is otherwise reduced ti) Writin)i aud s'igned by the tenant. Sub·section
(2) of Section 20 enumerates the grounds in clauses (a) to (g) on which
an eviction suit call be founded against a tenant. Clause (a) permits the
institution of a suit tor evictiM if the tenant is in arrears of rent for not C
less than four months and has failed to pay the same within one month
from the date of service of a notice of demand upon him. the grounds
in clauses (b) M (g) ate other than arrears of rent. From the fact that a
suit founded 011 a11yone or more of the grounds set out in the proviso to
sub"section ( 1) aild clauses (b) to (g) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 is 0
exempt from the operation of Section 39, it would seem that the legis-
lature desired to grant protection from eviction where the same is
sought on the sole ground of arrears of rent. That is why in the exemp-
tion chmse ctlii!ained ill Section 39, clause (a) to sub"section (2) of
Section 20 which penilits evlciion on the ground of arrears of rent is
deliberately and intentionally excluded and an embargo is created E
agahist the passing of an eviction decree if the tenant deposits in court
within the time allowed !he entire arrears of rent together with interest
and costs. If the suit is on anyone or more of the exempted grounds;
the landlord is permitted to jJtoceed with the same, if necessary by
effecting an amendment in the pleading and by adducing additionai
evidence. Such a suit may be continued and if the ground or grounds F
pleaded is/are proved, the court is entitled to grant eviction. It, there-
fore, seems clear to us that the legislature intended to protect eviction
of a tenant on the ground of arrears of rent if ihe tenant conilJiled With
the conditions of Section 39.

tn the present proceedings it is not disputed that the construction G
of the demised premises was completed in 1967 and the letting had
taken place in the same year. It is also not disputed that immediately
on the completion of ten years the tenant deposited on 2nd September;·
1977 an amount of Rs.4,005 being the arrears of rent inclusive of
interest and cost. It is not disputed that this payment was made within
one month after the expiry of the. period of ten years stipuiated in H.
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 1 S.C.R.

A Section 2(2) of the Act to take advantage of Section 39 of the Act. The
eviction suit was admittedly filed on 27th May, 1972 i.e. before the
commenceme.nt of the Act i.e. 15th July, 1972. There is also no dispute
that the prov1s10ns of the old Act did not apply to the suit. On these
undisputed facts the trial r.ourt gave the benefit of Section 39 and
refused to order ejectment of the tenant. The landlord filed a revision
B application which was rejected by the Second Additional District
Judge, Bulandshahr, on 15th July, 1978. The High Court rejected the
landlord's further revision application on the ground that the question
was concluded by the decision in R.D. Ram Nath & Co. & Anr. v.
Girdhari Lal & Anr., [ 1975] A.L.J. 1. It is against the said decision
that the present appeal is preferred. The question then is whether or
not the provision of Section 39 of the Act is attracted in the backdrop
c of the above facts.

We may now consider the case law on the point to which our
attention was called. In Ram Swaroop Rai v. Lilavathi, [1980] 3 SCR
1034-11980] 3 SCC 452, this Court while construing section 2(2) o.·
D the Act observed that the burden is on the landlord to show that his
case falls within the exemption engrafted in the said sub-section. in the
present case, since the facts are not in dispute the question of onus
recedes in the background. In Om Prakash Gupta etc. v. Dig Vijen;
drapal Gupta etc., [1982] 3 SCR 491, a three-Judge Bench had to
consider the effect of section 2(2) read with section 39 of the Act. In
E that case, an eviction suit was filed against the appellant-tenant on the
ground that the provisions of the Act did not apply to the demised
shop and the tenant was therefore liable to be evicted. The Trial Court
decreed the suit on the finding that the construction of the suit shop
was completed in 1967 and since 10 years had not elapsed from the
date of completion of the construction the provisions of the Act had no
F application. The tenant carried the matter in revision but the judgment
and decree of the Trial Court was substantially maintained. The tenant
thereupon moved the High Court under section 115, C.P.C. The
learned Single Judge who heard the revision remitted the matter to the
Trial Court for recording a finding as to on what date the construction
of the building could be said to have been completed within the mean-
G ing of section 2(2) read with Explanation I(a) thereto. The Trial Court
returned a finding to the effect that the construction of the disputed
shop must be taken to have been completed on the date of the first
assessment, i.e. !st April, 1968, within the meaning of the said provi-
sion. The tenant challenged the finding on the ground that the date of
'(
occupation should have been taken to be the date of completion of the
H construction and not the date of the first assessment. The Division
SUP.ESH CHAND v. GULAM CHISTI (AHMADI, J.] 193

Bench to which the case .was referred concluded that the construction A
of the shop must be deemed to have been completed on !st April, 1968
). i.e. at the date of the first assessment and not at the date of actual
occupation and hence the provisions of the Act had no application to
the building till the date of the decision of the revision application on
23rd March, 1978 as the period of 10 years expired later on 31st March,
1978. This Court upheld the finding that the date of construction must B
be taken as the date of first assessment i.e. 1st April, 1968 and not the
date of actual occupation. To overcome this difficulty it was contended
on behalf of the tenant that on a.correct reading of section 2(2) the
exemption engrafted therein would not embrace buildings constructed
pri.or to the enforcement of the Act. This Court construing the
language of section 2(2) of the Act held that the sub-section nowhere
provided that the building should have been constructed after the c
commencement of the Act; to so interpret it would tantamount to
adding words in it which was not permissible. This Court, therefore,
negatived the contention that tjie exemption under the sub-section did
not embrace buildings constructed before the Act came into force. As
pointed out earli¢r the revision application was decided on 23rd D
March, 1978 whereas the period of 10 years from the date of comple-
tion of the construction i.e. 1st April, 1968 was to end on 31st March,
1978 i.e. a week later. Section 39 of the Act, therefore, clearly did not
apply in the facts of that case. Secondly, it was found that the suit was
instituted on 23r\! March, 1974 long after the commencement of the
Act and ·was therefore not pending on 15th July, 1972 to attract the E
application of Section 39 of the Act. For these reasons, this Court
came to the conclus10n that the appellant Om Prakash was not entitled
to me protection of section 39 of the Act. Two features which fatin-
guish this case from the case on hand are: (i) that the revision applica-
) tion was disposed of by the High Court before the expiry of the
morat9rium period of 10 years granted by section 2(2) of the Act; and F
\ I
(ii) the suit having bee11.filed long after the commencement of the Act
011 15th July, 1972 could not be said to be pending at the date of the
commencement of the Act to enable the tenant to seek redress under
section 39 of the Act.

In Vineet Kumar v. Manga/ Sain Wadhera. [1984] 3 SCC 352, an G
. eviction suit was filed on the .grou"nd of arrears of, ent and damages for
use and occupation of the demised premises pendente lite. The tenant
was inducted in the building stated to have been constructed in 1971 on
7th February, 1972,ona mpn.thly rent of Rs.250. The building in suit
was assessed to house and water tax on 1st October, 1971. The tenant
· defaulted in the paymept of rent ·despite service of notice dated 24th H
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 1 S.C.R.

March, 1977. Admittedly, the suit was filed after the commencement
A
of the Act. The point for consideration was whether the building which
was not JO years' old on the date of the suit and was therefore exemp-
ted from the operation of the Act, would be governed by it on the
expiry of the period of 10 years pendente lite. Dealing with this conten-
tion this Court observed in paragraph 13 of the judgment as under:
B
''The moment a building becomes ten years old to be
reckoned from the date of completion, the new Rent Act
J
would become applicable."

The decision in Om Prakash Gupta's case (supra) was rightly
distinguished on the ground that it was not necessary in that case to
c deal with the question whether the tenant would be entitled to the
benefit of Section 39 as the building had not become ten years old
when the revision was disposed of by the High Court on 23rd March,
1978.

D Dealing next with the contention that the Court had to decide
the case on the basis of the cause of action that had accrued before the
institution of the suit and not on a new cause of action, this Court,
relying on the observations to the effect that subsequent developments
can be looked into m~cle in paragraph 14 of the decision in Pasupu/eti
Venkateswarlu v.Motor and General Traders, [1975] 1 SCC 770,
I! observed as under:

"Normally amendment is not allowed if it changes the
cause of action. But it is well recognised that where the
amendment does not constitute an addition of a new cause

F
of action, or raise a new case, but amounts to no more than
adding to the facts already on the record, the amendment
would be allowed even after the statutory period of limita-
r-
tion. The question in the present case is whether by seeking
the benefit of Section 39 of the new Act there is a change in
the cause elf action."

After referring to the case of A.K. Gupta & Sons v. Damodar Valley
Corporation, {1966] 1 SCR 796, this Court further observed:

"The appellant in the present case only seeks the protec-
tion of the new Rent Act which became applicable to the
premises in question during the pendency of the litigation.
H We see no reason why the benefit of the new Rent Act be
SURESH CHAND v. GULAM CHJSTI [AHMADI, J.] 195

·not given to the appellant. Section 20 of the new Rent Act A
· provides a bar to a suit for eviction of a tenant except on
the specified grounds as provided in the section. Sub-
section (4) of Section 20 stipulates that in any suit for evic-
tion on the grounds mentioned in clauses (a) to sub-section
(2), viz. the arrears of rent, if at the first hearing of the suit
the tenant in default pays all arrears of rent to the landlord B
or deposits in court the entire amount of rent and damages
for use and occupation of the building due from him, such
damages for use and occupation being calculated at the
same rate as rent together with interest thereon at the rate
of nine per cent per annum and the landlord's cost of the
suit in respect thereof after deducting therefrom any C
amount already deposited by the tenant under sub-section
(1) of Section 30, the court may, in lieu of passing a decree
for eviction on that ground, pass .an order relieving the
tenant against his liability for eviction on that ground. Sec-
tions 39 and 40 of the new Rent Act also indicate that the
benefit of the new Act will be given to the tenant if the D
conditions contemplated in those sections are satisfied.
Section 39 also indica\es that the parties are entitled to
make necessary amendment in their pleadings and to
adduce additional evidence where necessary."

On this line of reason this Court set aside the judgment and E
decree of the High Court insofar as it related to eviction.

We find, with respect, that Their Lordships committed an error
in overlooking the text of Section 39 of the Act. That section in terms
says that the suit must be pending at the commencement of the Act to
\ seek the benefit of that provision. Admittedly, the suit in question was F
filed after the commencement of the Act and hence the tenant was not .
\I entitled to the benefit of Section 39 of the Act. But that apart, in a
subsequent decision of this Court in Nand Kishore Marwah v.
Samundri Devi, [ 1987] 4 SCC 382, this Court dissented from the view
in Vineet Kumar's case on the ground that the attention of the Court
was not drawn to Om Prakash Gupta's case (supra) which specifically G
considered the provisions of the Act and in particular the language of
Section 39 of the Act to point out that in order to attract that provision
it must be shown that the suit was pending at the commencement of
the Act i.e. on 15th July, 1975. Referring to Section 20 of the Act,
which bars institution of a suit for eviction of a tenant except on
grmmds specified in clauses (a) to (g) this Court observed as ~der: H
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 1 S.C.R.

A "This Clearly indicates that the restriction put under Sec-
. tion 20 is to the institution of the suit itself and therefore it
is clear that if the provisions of this Act applied then no suit
for eviction can be instituted except on the ground ·speci-
fied in the sub-sections of this section. Keeping in view the
language of this section if we examine the provisions
B contained in sub-section (2) of Section (2) it will be clear
that for a newly constructed building the provisions of this
Act will not apply for 10 years and therefore so far as the
restriction under Section 20 is concerned they will not
apply and therefore it is clear that within 10 years as
provided for in sub-section (2) of Section 2 restriction on
the institution of suit as provided for in Section 20 sub-
c section ( 1) quoted above will not be applicable and it is
thus clear that during the pendency of the litigation even
if 10 years expired the restriction will not be attracted as
the suit has been instituted within 10 years and therefore
restriction as provided for in Section 20 cannot be attr-
D acted."

It may with respect, be pointed out that the comment that the Court's
attention was drawn to Om Prakash Gupta's case is not correct as this
case is specifically mentioned in paragraph 14 of the judgment in that
case.
E
Lastly, in Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia, [1988] 4 SCC
284, the appellant-landlord had filed an eviction suit in respect of a
shop which had been rented to the respondent in 1978. The suit was
filed on the ground that the tenant was in arrears of rent from 1st
December, 1981 to 31st May, 1982 and the tenancy had been duly
F terminated by a notice. The suit was filed under sub-section (3) of
Section 1 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act,
1973. That sub-section provided that "nothing in the Act shall apply to
any building the construction of which is completed on or after the
commencement of this Act for a period of ten years from the date of its
completion". Section 13( 1) enumerated the usual grounds on which
G possession of a building or land could be obtained from a tenant. In
November 1984, the tenant ~pplied for dismissal of the suit on the.
ground that the moratorium period of 10 years expired in June 1984
since admittedly the demised shop was constructed sometime in June
1974. Quoting the following passage from Ram Swaroop Rai's, case
(supra):
H
SURESH CHAND v. GULAM CHISTI [AHMADI, J.l 197

'The legislature found that rent control law had a chillinb
A
effect on new building construction, and so, to encourage
more building operations, amended the statute tci release,
from the shackles of legislative restriction, 'new construc-
tions' for a period of ten years. So much so, a landlord
who had let out his new building could recover possession
without impediment if he instituted such proceeding within B
ten years of completion."
... this Court held as under:

"It is well settled that no man should suffer because of the C
fault of the court or delay in the procedure. Broom has
stated the maxim "actus curiae neminem gravabit"-an act
of court shall prejudice no man. Therefore, having regard
to the time normally consumed for adjudication, the ten
years' exemption or holiday from the application of the
Rent Act would become illusory, if the suit has to be filed D
within that time and be disposed of finally. It is common
knowledge that unless a suit is instituted soon after the date
of letting it would never be disposed of within ten years and
even then within that time it may not be disposed of. That
will make the ten years holiday from the Rent Act illusory
and provide no incentive to the landlords to build new E
houses to solve problem of shortages of houses. The pur-
pose of legislation would thus be defeated. Purposive
interpretation in a social amelioration legislation is an
imperative irrespective of anything else."

Proceeding further, this Court said: F

"We. are clearly of the opinion that having regard tc the
language we must find the reason and the spirit of the law.
If the immunity from the operation of the Rent Act is made
and depended upon the ultimate disposal of the case within G
the period of exemption of ten years which is in reality an
impossibility, then there would be empty reasons. In our
opinion, bearing in mind the well settled principles that the
rights of the parties crystallise to the date of the institution
of the suit as enunciated by this Court in Om Prakash
Gupta v. Digviiendrapai Gupta, the .meaningful construe- H
198 SUPREM<l COURT RE!;'ORTS. [\990] 1 S.C.R.

A lion must be that the exemption would apply for a period of
ten years and will cc;>ntinue le;> be available until suit is dis-.
posed of or adjudicated. Such suit or proceeding mus.t be
instituted within the stipulated period of ten years. Once
rights crystallise the adjudication must be in accordance
with law."
B
In order to appreciate the controversy in the correct perspective
it wc;>uld not be out of place to notice the legislative changes. During
tile secoud world war certain orders were issued under the Defen.ce oi
India Rules, 1939, relating to the control and letting of accommoda-
tions to cope with the pauc\ty of accqmmodation. This was followed by
c an ordinance promulgated in 1946 which was repealed by the U .P·.
(Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 described as \he
Old Act by Section 3(h) of the Act. The measure which was Qit1>nded
to be of a temporary character only continued till the passing of 1!11>
Act in 1972. When the old Act replaced the 1946 ordinance, the expec-
:ation was that the acute shortage of accommodation was only a
D temporary feature and would disappear with the passage of time. The
hope was belied and the stringent restrictions placed on the landlord's
rights in the matter of fixation and recovery of rent a11d eviction fr\>m
the rented premises had to be continued indefinitely. These restric-.
tions discouraged building activity which added to the already serious
housing problem. There was an urgent need to provide incentives and.
E thereby encourage new constructions. With that in view Section 2(2)
provided that nothing in the Act shall apply to a building during a
period of I.en years from the date on which its construction is comp-
leted. In other words the legislature has relieved the owner of a new
building from the restrictive provisions relating to rent, etc., CQntained
in Sections 4 to 9 of the Act. So also such owners are granted a holiday
F or recess of ten years from the restrictive provisions reg; 1lating letting
(Chapter III) and Eviction (Chapter IV) contained in the Act. This
freedc;>m from the operation of the Act for ten years is given for th.e
obvious purpose of encouraging building activity to ease the problem
of scarcity of accommodation. The provisions of the Act in this behalf
must, therefore, be understood in this background.

Section 2(2) in terms says that the provisions of the Act will not
<1pply to new constn1ctions for a period of ten years from the date c;>f
e\>mple\ion c;>.( th,e; G\>nstruction. Read positively it means that the Act
will apply to such buildings on the expiry of the recess period. But h\>.w
H are suits already filed during the recess period to be dealt with? Does
SUReStt <;HAND v. GULAM CHISTI (AHMADI, J.I 199

the Act offer any clue in this behalf? In this connection. the only provi- A
sions which come to mind are sections 39 and 40 of the Act. Section 39
J.. \l.i;ab. with suits pending on the date of commencement of the Act.
S{lction 40 extends protection to an appeal or revision pending on the
date of commencement of the Act provided it bas arisen out of an
eviction suit filed against a tenant to which the old Act did not apply.
Sucb an appeal or revision has to be disposed of in the same manner as B
the su.it is required to be dealt with under Section 39 of the Act. In
order· to sei;ure tbe benefit of Section 39 or 40 it must be shown that the
S\lit, appeal or revision was pending on the date of commencement of
the A.c.t .. Secondly, if the suit is founded on the allegation of non-
payment of rent, the tena.nt m\lst, within one month from the date of
cornrnencement of the Act or frorn the date of knowledge of the
pen\lency of the suit, deposit in court the entire anH.>Unt of rent and C
damages· for use and occupation of the building with interest as pre-
scribed and landlord's entire cost of the suit, to take the benefit of the
said provision. If both these conditions are satisfied, the law, Section
39, mandates that no decree for eviction shall be passed except on. any
of the grounds specified in the proviso to sub-section ( 1) or clauses (b) D
to (g) of s11b-section (2) of Section 2() of the Act. Similarly Section 40
lays down that if an appeal or revision (arising· out of a suit for eviction
of a tenant from any building to which the old Act does not apply) is
pending on the date of con.lmi;ncement of the Act, the benefit of
Se.ction 39 will be available to the tenant. What these two pn.>vlslons
emphasise is that in order to avail of the benefit engrafted therein, the E
proceedings i.e., the suit, appeal or revision application must be pend-
ing at the date of commencement of the Act, i.e., 15th July, 1972, and
th\i tenant must have deposited the arrears of rent and damages to-~
gether~ with interest and fill! cost of the landlord in thti court within one
month from the date of such commencement. Once the four conditions
of Sec.tion 39 set out in the earlier part of this judgment are satisfied, F
the cou~rt is debarred from passing a decree in ejectment e'!'cept on any
of the grounds mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (1) or in clauses
(b) to (g) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act. Therefore, even
in a suit, appeal or revision application pending at the date of com-
mencement of the Act, a decree for eviction can be passed if the case is
brought within the exemption cluase of Section 39 notwithstanding· the G
fact that the tenant has deposited the full amount of arrears of rent and
damages tog{Other .with interest and cost as required by that section. It,
y therefore, seems clear to us on the plain language of Section 39 of the
A.ct tbat the legislature. de~lred to grant protection from eviction wherti
the same was sought on~ the sole ground of arrears of rent. In cases
falling within the exemption clauses of that section, the legislature has H
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 1 S.C.R.

A itself permitted the landlord to proceed with the suit and claim eviction
on any of the grounds enumerated in the proviso to sub-section ( 1) or
in clauses (b) to (g) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act, if
necessary by making the required amendment in the pleadings and by
adducing additional evidence where necessary.

B
It therefore seems to us that the legislature desired to limit the
scope of the application of Sections 39 and 40 to suits, appeals and
revisions pending on the date of commencement of the Act, i.e. 15th
July 1972, relating to buildings to which the old Act did not apply and to
which the new Act was to apply forthwith and not at a later date. This
is clear from the fact that the section contemplates deposit of arrears of
c rent and damages together with interest and cost within one month
from' ··such date of commencement" meaning the date of commence-
ment or tne Act. To put it differently the section expects the tenant to
make the deposit within one month from 15th July, 1972. This may not )
be possible unless the Act is to apply to the building forthwith. Of
course the benefit of an extended date is given to those cases Where the
.D knowledge about the pendency of the proceedings is gained after 15th
July, 1972. For example where a suit is actually filed before the com-
m1,ncement of the Act but the summons of the suit is served in October
·.972, the tenant woulq be entitled to make the deposit within one
month from the service of the summons to avail of the benefit of this
provision. So also it can apply to cases where the tenant had died
E before the Act came into force or before the expiry of one month from
the date of commencement of the Act and the landlord took time to
bring the legal representative on record; in which case the legal rep-
resentative would be entitled to seek the benefit from the date of
knowledge. Of course this benefit would not be available where the
F tenant dies after the expiry of the period within which the right is to be
exercised. The same would be the case in the case of an appeal or
revision application. It seems to us that the legislature intended to give
the benefit of Sections 39 and 40 to suits, appeals or revisions which
were pending on 15th July, 1972 and in which the deposit came to be
made within one month from that date. The expression such preced-
G ing the_ word 'commencement' is clearly suggestive of the fact that it
has reference to the date of commencement of the Act and the pay-
ment must be made within one month from such commencement.
Unless we give such a restricted meaning to the section we would not
be able to advance the legislative intent to relieve the landlords of new
buildings from the rigours of the Act. This interpretation is also in tune
with the ratio in Ram Swaroop Rai's case (supra).
~.
SURESH CHAND v. GULAM CHISTI [AHMADI, J.] 201

It was argued that the words 'commencement of this Act' shoul.d
A
be construed to mean the date on which the moratorium period
-;. expired and the Act became applicabfe to the demised buildings. Such
a view would require this Court to give different meanings to the same
expression appearing at two places in the same section. The words 'on
the date of commencement of this Act' in relation to the pendency of
the suit would mean 15th July, 1972 as held in Om Prakash Gupta B
(supra) but the words 'from such date of commencement' appearing
immediately thereafter in relation to the deposit to be made would
~· have to be construed as the date of actual application of the act at a
date subsequent to 15th July, 1972. Ordinarily the rule of construction
is that the same expression where it appears more than once jn th~
same statute, more so in the same provision, must receive the same
meaning unless the context suggests otherwise Besides, such an c
interpretation would render the use of prefix 'such' before the word
'commencement' redundant. Thirdly such an interpretation would run
,,..i. counter to the view taken by this Court in Atma Ram Mittal's case
(sµpra) wherein it was held that no man can be made to suffer because
of the court's fault or court's delay in the disposal of the suit. To put it D
differently if the suit could be disposed of within the period of ten
ye<ars, the tenant would not be entitled to the protection of Section 39
bijt if the suit is prolonged beyond ten years the tenant would be

~ etjtitled to such protection. Such an interpretation would encourage
the tenant to protract the litigation and if he succeeds in delaying the
disposal of the suit till the expiry of ten years he would secure the E
benefit of Section 39, otherwise not. We are, therefore, of the opinion
that it is not possible to uphold the argument.

In-the above view of the matter we are of. the opinion that the
~ courts below committed an error in giving the benefit of Section 39 of
I.\ the Act to the tenant since admittedly the tenant could not and had not F
made the deposit within one month from the date of commencement
of the Act on 15th July, 1972 but h.ad made the deposit within a month
after the moratorium period expired in 1977. As stated above the
legislature intended to limit the application of Sections 39 and 40 of the
Act to cases where the Act became applicable immediately and the
deposit could be made within one mo.nth from its applicability and not G

'/ to cases where the moratorium period was to expire long thereafter.

,For the reasons stated above we think the courts below were
wrong in the view they took: We, therefore, set aside the judgment
and decree of the courts below by allowing this ap~eal. Having_ regard H
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1990] 1 S.C.R.
A
10 the fact that the respondent will have lo look for alternative accom-
modation we give him a year's time to vacate on condition that he pays
all the arrears of rent and damages, if due, within one month and files
an undertaking in the usual form within even time. In the circums-
tances of the case we think the parties may be left to bear their own
B costs.

R.S.S. Appeal allowed.

J