Holding

A Collector or Special Officer making a settlement award under the Land Acquisition Act does not act as a judge within the meaning of Section 19 IPC and is therefore not entitled to the protection of Section 77 IPC.

Summary

The case arose from a dispute over land acquired for a housing scheme where owners and power‑of‑attorney holders allegedly colluded with a Special Officer of the Rajasthan Housing Board to obtain allotment pattas fraudulently. An FIR was lodged under sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC. The respondents (owners/attorney holders) sought quashing of the FIR under section 482 CrPC, arguing that the Collector/Special Officer was immune under section 77 IPC because his award was a judicial act. The High Court had quashed the FIR on that ground. The Supreme Court held that a Collector or Special Officer making a settlement award under the Land Acquisition Act performs an administrative, not judicial, function and therefore is not a "judge" within the meaning of section 19 IPC; consequently, section 77 IPC immunity does not apply. The Court also affirmed that the FIR did not prima facie establish an offence against the owners concerning the 13 bighas, but set aside the quashing of the FIR as to the Special Officer. The appeal was allowed in part.

Issues considered

Whether a Collector/Land Acquisition Officer/Special Officer making an award under the Land Acquisition Act is entitled to immunity under section 77 of the Indian Penal Code.
Whether the allegations in the FIR constitute offences under sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 19, s. 420, s. 467, s. 468, s. 471, s. 77
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11(2), s. 12

Subjects

Section 77 IPC immunityLand Acquisition ActCollectorSpecial OfficerFIR quashingSection 482 CrPCCheatingForgeryAdministrative functionJudicial functionCollusion

Judgment

[2009] 1 S.C.R. 774

A SURENDRA KUMAR BHATIA
v.
KANHAIYA LAL & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No. 174 of 2009)

B JANUARY 30, 2009
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN AND J.M. PANCHAL, JJ.)
+
Penal Code, 1860: s. 77 - Immunity under - If available
c to the Collector/Land Acquisition Officer/Special Officer
making an award of compensation - Held: Not available -
Only Judges acting judicially are entitled to protection under
s. 77 - Collector is neither a Judge as defined under s. 19 nor
does he act judicially, when discharging any of the functions
D under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Therefore he is not
entitled to the protection under s. 77 - Land Acquisition Act,
1894 - s.11(2).

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.482 - Quashing of
FIR - Allegation in FIR that owners/power of attorney holders
E made false representation to the Housing Board for allotment
of pattas in collusion with the Special Officer of the Board -
High Court quashed FIR on the ground that averments made
in FIR did not make out prima facie case against them even
if allegations were taken to be true - Held: On facts, High
F Court rightly quashed FIR against owners/power of attorney
holders - However quashing of FIR in respect of Special
Officer cannot be upheld - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 4 20, 467,
468 and 471.

One 'C' entered into an agreement to sell 20 bighas
G
of land in Khasra 9 to a Society. Some lands including
31 bighas in khasra 9 were acquired for housing scheme
floated by Housing Board under the Land Acquisition
Notification. In the Notification, Khasra 9 was shown as

H 774
SURENDRA KUMAR BHATIA v. KANHAIYA LAL & ORS. 775

government land. 'C' filed declaratory suit which was A
decreed. Five persons were shown as owners of Khasra
9 in the revenue record.

A scheme was floated by the State Government
giving option to land owner for allotment of developed 8
land equal to 15% of acquired land in lieu of
compensation for the acquired land.

The land owners/Power of Attorney holders of
Khasra 9 approached Board for such allotment. 'K', the
successor of 'C', claimed allotment of developed land in C
lieu of 15 bighas of acquired land. The Society also filed
an application before the Board claiming compensation
in respect of 20 bighas in Khasra 9 on the basis of
agreement of sale, which was rejected. The Power of
Attorney holders of four owners of Khasra 9 also opted D
for allotment of developed land. After an inquiry, the
Allotment Committee accepted the request and a
settlement award was passed by the Special Officer of
the Housing Board recording the agreement to allot 15%
developed land in lieu of compensation in respect of 28 E
bighas 17 Biswas in Khasra No.9. Pattas were issued
subsequently in regard to such allotted land. Thereafter,
members of the Society filed a complaint before the
Board claiming that the Society ought to have received
the said 15% developed land in lieu of compensation F
relating to the 20 bighas of acquired land. The appellant
on behalf of the Board lodged an FIR alleging that the
Khatedars/Power of Attorney holders of Khasra No. 9 had
made false representations to the Board, and in collusion
with the Special Officer of the Board and office bearers G
of the society, hadJraudulently obtained allotment pattas.

First respondent who claimed to be the owner of 13
bighas in Khasra No.9 and respondent No. 2 who was his
attorney holder, filed a petition under section 482 Cr.P.C.
for quashing the FIR on the ground that the averments H
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 1 S.C.R.

A made in the FIR did not make out a prima facie case
against them, even if the allegations in the FIR were taken *
to be true. High Court quashed the FIR.

The questions which arose for consideration in these
appeals were whether the immunity under Section 77 IPC
B
is available to a Collector/Land Acquisition Officer/
Special Officer who makes an award, by way of
settlement or otherwise, under the provisions of Land +-
Acquisition Act, 1894 and whether the allegations in the
FIR did not constitute an offence under sections 420,
c 467,468 and 471 IPC.
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. Section 77 IPC provides that nothing is
D an offence which is done by a Judge when acting
judicially in the exercise of any power which is, or which .
in good faith he believes to be, given to him by law.
Section 19 IPC defines a 'Judge' as denoting not only
every person who is officially designated as a Judge, but
c also every person who is empowered by law to give in
'-
any legal proceedings, civil or criminal, a definitive
judgment, or a judgment which, if not appealed against,
would be definitive, or a judgment which, if confirmed by
some other authority, would be definitive, or who is one
of a body of persons empowered by law to give such a )<..
F judgment. [Para 12] [783-H; 784-A-B]

1.2. Any inquiry as to the market value of property
and determination of the amount of compensation by the
Collector, is administrative and not judicial in nature, even
G though the Collector may have power to summon and
enforce the attendance of witnesses and production of
documents. In making an award or making a reference
or serving a notice, the Collector neither acts in judicial
nor quasi judicial capacity but purely in an administrative
H capacity, exercising statutory powers as an agent and
SURENDRA KUMAR BHATIA v. KANHAIYA LAL & ORS. 777

representative of the GovernmenUAcquiring Authority. A
The award by a Collector is merely an offer of the amount
mentioned as compensation, on behalf of the
Government/Acquiring Authority to the person/s
interested. It is neither an executable decree, nor binds
the owners or persons interested in the acquired B
property. The Collector does not fun~tion as a Judicial
Officer who is required to base his decision only on the
material placed in the enquiry in the presence of parties,
but functions as a valuer who ascertains the market value
on material collected from all sources, personal c
inspection and his own knowledge and experience. (Para
15) [786-D-E]

Ezra vs. Secretary State (1905) 32 Indian Appeals 93;
Goku/ KrishnaBanerji vs. Secretary of State AIR (1932) Pat.
134; Raja HarishChandra Raj Singh vs. The Dy. Land D
Acquisition Officer (1962) 1SCR 676; Mis. Boman Behram
v. State of Mysore (1974) 2 SCC 316; Mrs.Khorshed Shapoor
Chenai vs. Controller of Estate Duty (1980) 2 SCC 1; Sharda
Devi v. State Government of Bihar (2003) 3 SCC 128 and
Kiran Tandon v. Allahabad Development Authority (2004) 10 E
sec 745, relied on.
1.3. Only Judges acting judicially are entitled to the
protection under Section 77 IPC. The Collector is neither
a Judge as defined under section 19 nor does he act F
judicially, when discharging any of the functions under
the Act. Therefore he is not entitled to the protection
under section 77 IPC. The decision of the High Court that
the FIR is to be quashed as the subject matter of the
complaint related to the action taken by the Collector/ G
Special Officer in his capacity as a 'Judge' is opposed to
law and therefore, liable to be set aside. (Para 16] [787-
·-* C-E]

2.1. The complaint by the members of the society was
in regard to the 20 bighas of land out of Khasra No. 9 H
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 1 S.C.R.

A which 'C' was alleged to have agreed to sell to the
society. The members of the society gave a complaint to +
the Board claiming that the compensation payable (or
15% developed land in lieu of compensation) in respect
of the said 20 bighas of land, had to be given to the
B Society and not persons claiming to be legal heirs of 'C'.
It was not in dispute that even the suit filed by the society,
that was said to be pending at the relevant time was
against 'C' in regard to the 20 bighas in Khasra No.9 and +-
that no suit or proceeding was pending in regard to the
c remaining 13 bighas claimed by the first respondent.
Only in January, 2003, second respondent and some
others were impleaded in the said suit relating to 20
bighas, in pursuance of an application filed on 14.11.2002,
long after respondents 1 and 2 had executed the
agreement and consent award had been made. The High
D
Court, therefore, rightly held that the allegations in the
+
FIR, even if accepted as true, did not relate to the
respondents 1 and 2 but to others who had claimed to
be the owners/attorney holders in regard to remaining 20
bighas of land and did not prima facie constitute an
E offence under sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC, by
respondents 1 and 2. [Paras 17 and 18] [787-F-H; 788-A-
E]
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC
~
F 335; Indian Qi/Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. 2006 (6) SCC
736 and lnder MohanGoswami v. State of Uttaranchal 2007
(12) sec 1, relied on.

2.2. While respondents 1 and 2 were concerned only
with 13 bighas which was not the subject matter of the
G
agreement with the society, the FIR specifically alleged
collusion between 'K' and the Special Officer of the
)c.
Board, in regard to 20 bighas of land which was agreed
to be sold to the society by 'C'. In fact the petition filed
by 'K' for quashing the FIR was rejected by the High
H
SURENDRA KUMAR BHATIA v. KANHAIYA LAL & ORS. 779

+- Court. As the finding of the High Court that the Collector/ A
Special Officer was a Judge has been set aside, the
quashing of the FIR with reference to the Special Officer,
cannot be upheld. To this extent, the contention of the
appellants merits acceptance and the quashing of the FIR
with reference to the then Special Officer is set aside. The 8
quashing of FIR as against respondents 1 and 2 would
...+ not have bearing on the FIR in so far as the other accused
with reference to the 20 bighas of land. [Para 19] [789-A-
DJ
Case Law Reference c .
1905 (32) Indian Appeals 93 Para 15 relied on
AIR 1932 Pat. 134 Para 15 relied on
~ (1962) 1 SCR 676 Para 15 relied on D
1974(2) sec 316 Para 15 relied on
1980 (2) sec 1 Para 15 relied on
2003 (3) sec 128 Para 15 relied on
E

- >
2004 (10) sec 745

2006 (6) sec 736
Para 15
1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335 Para 18
Para 18
relied on
relied on
relied on
., 2001 (12) sec 1 Para 18 relied on
F

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 174 of 2009.

From the final Judgment and Order dated 24.2.2006 of the G
High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur
in S.S. Crl. Misc. Petition No. 1552 of 2005.

WITH

Crl.A.No. 175 of 2009 H
780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 1 S.C.R.

A Dr. Manish Singhvi, A.A.G., Vijay Hansaria, P.H. Parekh, +
Sneha Kalita, B.D. Sharma, Narottam Vyas, Schan Singh, Ajay
Choudhary, Pravin Chandra, Ajay K. Jha, Divya Sinha, Pallavi
Srivastava, (for Mis. Parekh and Co.). Milind Kumar,
Aruneshwar Gupta, Mukul Kumar and P.O. Sharma for the
B appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court delivered by
+·
R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J. 1. Leave granted. Heard counsel.

_c 2. These appeals by special leave are preferred against
the order dated 24.2.2006 passed by the Rajasthan High Court,
allowing a petition filed by respondents 1 and 2 herein, under
section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ('the Code' for
short) and quashing FIR No.241 of 2005 registered at Jyoti
D Nagar Police Station, Jaipur, in so far as respondents 1 to 3 ....
herein.

3. One Chauthmal is said to have entered into an
agreement of sale dated 11.8.1980 followed by an agreement
dated 24.11.1988 agreeing to sell 20 bighas of land in Khasra
E No.9 in Sukhalpura village to Shiva Co-operative Housing
Society Ltd. (for short ·Society'). The said agreement is said
to have confirmed (i) that payment of the entire price of 20
bighas of land was made by the society to Chauthmal; (ii) that
possession of the land agreed to be sold was delivered to the ~
-
F society; and (iii) that out of 20 bighas agreed to be sold, 5 t

bighas of land stood in the name of other persons and
Chauthmal would ensure that an agreement was executed by
them also in favour of the society in regard to that extent.

4. Some lands in Sukhalpura village, including 31 bighas
G
in Khasra No.9, were acquired for a housing scheme floated
by Rajasthan Housing Board (for short, 'the Board') under
preliminary notification dated 5.4.1985 and final notification
dated 16.10.1985 issued under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
H
SURENDRA KUMAR BHATIA v. KANHAIYA LAL & ORS. 781
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

('Act' for short). Khasra No.9 was shown as 'Sivaya Chak' A
(government land) in the said notification and possession
thereof was delivered to the Housing Board on 13.6.1988.

5. Chauthmal is said to have filed a revenue suit for a
declaration that Khasra No.9 was not government land and that B
he was one of the owners of the said land and for consequential
re1iefs. The said suit was decreed on 10.9.1986, and was
affirmed by the Revenue Board, Ajmer. In pursuance of it, the
following five persons were shown as owners of Khasra No.9
in the revenue records, their share being shown in brackets :
Chauthmal (15/33), Mohanlal (2/33), Geeta Devi (2/33),
c
Kaushaliya Devi (1 /33) and Kanhaiyalal (13/33).

, 6. The State Government formulated a scheme enabling
the land owners to opt for allotment of developed land equal to
-·
' 15% of acquired land in lieu of the compensation for the D
~
acquired land. The cases where the land owners opt for such
· allotment, were to be considered by an Allotment Committee,
to decide upon the requests after due inquiry into title and after
ascertaining that there were no claims or court-cases.
E
7. The land owners/power of Attorney holders of Khasra
No.9 approached the Board for such allotment. One Kailash
Chand who claimed to be the successor (legatee) of
Chauthmal was one of them and he claimed allotment of
developed land in lieu of 15 bighas of acquired land. The
society also appears to have filed an application before the
F
Board on 21.12.2001 claiming compensation in respect of 20
bighas in Khasra No.9 on the basis of the agreement of sale.
The claim of the society was rejected on 8.7.2002.

8. On 17.7.2002 the power of attorney holders of four G
owners of Khasra No.9 (Kailash Chand, Mohanlal, Geeta Devi
.))
and Kanhaiyalal) entered into separate agreements with the
Housing Board, consenting for allotment of developed land
(15% of the extent of the acquired land) in lieu of compensation.
In the said agreements, the land owners asserted and declared H
782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 1 S.C.R.

A that their respective shares in the land were not subject to any
encumbrance and no dispute or litigation was pending in regard
to the same. After an inquiry, the Allotment Committee
accepted the request and a settlement award dated 22.7.2002
was passed by the Special Officer of Rajasthan Housing Board
B recording the agreement to allot 15% developed land in lieu of
compensation in respect of 28 bighas 17 Biswas in Khasra
No.9 (as the remaining 2 bighas 3 Biswas out of 31 bighas
_..__
notified, was found to be under encroachment). Pattas were
issued subsequently in regard to such allotted land.
c 9. Thereafter, the members of the society filed a complaint
before the Board claiming that the society ought to have
received the said 15% developed land in lieu of compensation
relating to the 20 bighas of acquired land. Some members of .,_
the society, through a forum known as Mithila Nagar Suraksha
D & Vikas Samiti also made a representation to the Chief ~
,.
Minister on 17 .10.2005 alleging that the Khatedars/power of
attorney holders of Khasra No.9 in collusion with the Special
Officer had practiced fraud and grabbed the valuable land from
the Rajasthan Housing Board. The Chief Minister's office
c: appears to have suggested action on such representation. In
'-

pursuance of it, the appellant on behalf of the Board lodged an
FIR on 7.11.2005 (at about 9.20 p.m.), alleging that the
Khatedars/Power of Attorney holders of Khasra No. 9 had
made false representations to the Board, and in collusion with :>l
F the Special Officer of the Board and office bearers of the
society, had fraudulently obtained allotment pattas in the year
2002.

10. First respondent herein who claimed to be the owner
of 13 bighas in Khasra No.9 and respondent No. 2 herein who
G
was his attorney holder, filed a petition under section 482 of
the Code for quashing the FIR on the ground that the averments "- '
made in the FIR did not make out a prima facie case against
them, even if the allegations in the FIR was taken to be true.
The High Court by the impugned order dated 24.2.2006
H
SURENDRA KUMAR BHATIA v. KANHAIYA LAL & ORS. 783
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

allowed the said petition and quashed the FIR insofar as A
-+-
respondents 1 and 2 as also the Special Officer of the Board
on the following two grounds :

(i) The Land Acquisition Officer, when passing an award
under Section 11 (2) of the Act functions as a "Judge" as
B
defined in Section 19 of the Indian Penal Code CIPC' for
short) and therefore, is entitled to the protection of section
~ 77 IPC. Therefore making a settlement award by the
Special Officer of the Board granting developed land in
·\
lieu of compensation to the land owners could not, under
any circumstances, give rise to an offence under the penal
c
Code.

(ii) The allegations in the FIR did not constitute an offence
of cheating or forgery punishable under Sections
420,467,468 and 471 of IPC. D
....
11. The said order of the High Court is challenged in these
two appeals by special leave. The first is filed by the
complainant namely the Deputy Housing Commissioner of
Rajasthan Housing Board. The second is filed by 'Mithila Nagar
E
Nyay Manch' claiming to represent the members of the society.
On the contentions urged, two questions arise for
consideration:-

j( (i) Whether the immunity under Section 77 IPC is available
to a Collector/Land Acquisition Officer/Special Officer who F
makes an award, by way of settlement or otherwise, under
the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
~1
(ii) Whether the allegations in the FIR did not constitute an
offence under sections 420, 467,468 and 471 of IPC. G
'·' Re : Question No.(i)
.:il.;t "'

12. Section 77 IPC provides that nothing is an offence
· which is done by a Judge when acting judicially in the exercise
of any power which is, or which in good faith he believes to be, H
784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 1 S.C.R.

A given to him by law. Section 19 IPC defines a 'Judge' as
denoting.not only every person who is officially designated as +
a Judge, but also every person who is empowered by law to
give in any legal proceedings, civil or criminal, a definitive
judgment, or a judgment which, if not appealed against, would
B be definitive, or a judgment which, if confirmed by some other
authority, would be definitive, or who is one of a body of persons
empowered by law to give such a judgment. The question is
whether the Collector (or any officer appointed by the ..... L

appropriate government or other acquiring authority) performing
c functions assigned under the Land Acquisition Act. can be said
to be a 'Judge' as defined in section 19 IPC, that is, a person
empowered by law to give a definitive judgment in a legal :·
proceeding and acting judicially in the exercise of such power.

13. The findings of the High Court that a Collector/Land
D Acquisition Officer making an award under Section 11 (2) of the
Act is entitled to the immunity of a Judge under section 77 IPC,
+-
is based on the following reasoning :

"Once an agreed award is passed by the competent
E authority and that award acquires the status of an
executable decree under the law, the evidence which
came before the competent authority on the basis of which
such award is passed, cannot be subjected to investigation
by the police authorities."
F The respondents also supported the said finding by referring *
to the various provisions of the Act relating to the powers
exercised by the Collector (which term includes not only the
Collector of a District or Deputy Commissioner, but any officer i•
specially appointed by the appropriate Government to perform
G the functions of a Collector under the Act). Section 9 requires
the Collector to cause public notice to be given stating that the .l-
Government intends to take possession of land in pursuance j.
of the acquisition and that claims to compensation for all
interests in such land may be made to him. Section 10
H empowers the Collector to require any such person to make a
SURENDRA KUMAR BHATIA v. KANHAIYA LAL & ORS. 785
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

statement containing the names of persons possessing any A
' --+
interest in the land and of the nature of such interest etc. Section
11 authorizes and reql!lires the Collector to hold an enquiry and
make an award in regard to the true area of land, the
compensation which, in his opinion should be allowed for the
land, and the apportionment of the compensation among all the B
persons interested in the land. It also provides that no award
_...._ shall bEl made by the Collector without the previous approval
of the appropriate Government or officer authorized by it.
Section 12 provides that the award so made shall be final and
conclusive evidence as between the Collector and the person c
interested, of the true area and value of the land and the
apportionment of the compensation among the persons
interested. Section 13 empowers the Collector to adjourn the
inquiry from time to time for any cause he deems fit. Section
13A empowers the Collector to correct any clerical or D
arithmetical mistakes in the award within six months. Section
14 empowers the Collector for the purpose of enquiries under
the Act, to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses,
including the parties interested or any of them and to compel
the production of documents by the same means and so far
E
as may be in the same manner, as is provided in the case of
a Civil Court only or of Civil procedure Code. Section 15
requires the Collector to be guided by the provisions contained
in Section 23 and 24 of the Act in determining the amount of
.x compensation. Having regard to the said provisions, it was
contended that the powers and functions exercised by the F
Collector under the Act were judicial powers of a Civil Court in
rendering definitive judgments and therefore a Collector making
an award, determining the compensation is a Judge as defined
in section 19 IPC.
G
14. On the other hand, the appellant contended that the
Land Acquisition Officer merely makes an offer on behalf of the
Government/Acquiring Authority and does not discharge any
judicial functions. It was also submitted that the award made
by the Collector does not bind the claimants, as they have the H
786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 1 S.C.R.

A choice of not accepting the award and requiring the Collector
to refer the matter to the Civil Court for determination of the
compensation. The appellants pointed out that while Section
26 the Act specifically provided that the award by the 'Judge'
(Reference Court) shall be deemed to be a decree and the
B statement of the grounds of such award, a judgment, section
11 contains no such provision in regard to the awards by
Collector.

15. The question whether the Collector/Land Acquisition
Officer while making an enquiry and award under the Act, acts
C in a judicial capacity or not, has been considered in a series
of judgments. The well settled principles are :

(a) Any inquiry as to the market value of property and )

determination of the amount of compensation by the
D Collector, is administrative and not judicial in nature, even
though the Collector may have power to summon and
enforce the attendance of witnesses and production of
documents. In making an award or making a reference or
serving a notice, the Collector neither acts in judicial nor
E quasi judicial capacity but purely in an administrative
capacity, exercising statutory powers as an agent and
representative of the GovernmenUAcquiring Authority.

(b) The award by a Collector is merely an offer of the
amount mentioned as compensation, on behalf of the
F GovernmenUAcquiring Authority to the person/s interested.
It is neither an executable decree, nor binds the owners
or persons interested in the acquired property.

(c) The Collector does not function as a Judicial Officer
G who is required to base his decision only on the material
placed in the enquiry in the presence of parties, but
functions as a valuer who ascertains the market value on
material collected from all sources, personal inspection and
his own knowledge and experience.
H
SURENDRA KUMAR BHATIA v. KANHAIYA LAL & ORS. 787
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

(See the decision of the Privy Council in Ezra vs. Secretary A
State -1905 (32) Indian Appeals 93, the decision of the
Patna High Court in Gokul Krishna Banerji vs. Secretary
of State - AIR 1932 Pat. 134 and the decisions of this
Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh vs. The Dy.
Land Acquisition Officer - 1962 (1) SCR 676; Mis. B
Boman Behram v. 9tate of Mysore - 1974 (2) SCC 316;
Mrs. Khorshed Shapoor Chenai vs. Controller of Estate
Duty- 1980 (2) SCC 1; Sharda Devi v. State Government
of Bihar - 2003 (3) SCC 128 and Kiran Tandon v.
Allahabad Development Authority- 2004 (10) SCC 745). c
16. Only Judges (as defined in section 19 IPC) acting
judicially are entitled to the protection under Section 77 IPC.
The Collector is neither a Judge as defined under Section 19
nor does he act judicially, when discharging any of the functions
under the Act. Therefore he is not entitled to the protection D
under Section 77 IPC. The decision of the High Court that the
FIR is to be quashed as the subject matter of the complaint
related to the action taken by the Collector/Special Officer in
his capacity as a ·Judge' is opposed to law and therefore, liable
to be set aside. E

Re : Question No. (ii)

17. The complaint by the members of the society was in
regard to the 20 bighas of land out of Khasra No. 9 in regard
to which late Chauthmal is alleged to have agreed to sell to the
F
society under agreements dated 11.8.1980 and 24.11.1988.
The members of the society gave a complaint to the Board
claiming that the compensation payable (or 15% developed
land in lieu of compensation) in respect of the said 20 bighas
of land, had to be given to the society and not persons claiming G
to be legal heirs of Chauthmal. It was also their contention that
on account of collusion among the successor of Chauthmal and
his CJ!torney holder, the Special Officer of the Board, and the
office bearers of the society, the 15% developed land was
allotted to persons who were not entitled to allotment, thereby H
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 1 S.C.R.

A defrauding the society and the Board. The respondents 1 and
+
2 approached the High Court pointing out that neither the
society nor the members of the society, at any point of time had
made any claim in regard to the 13 bighas in Khasra No.9,
which belonged to first respondent, that the entire complaint
s related to 20 bighas agreed to be sold by Chauthmal to the
society, and that as there was no complaint of irregularity or
commission of any offence in regard to the 13 big has of land
belonging to the first respondent, there was no question of
involvement of first respondent or his attorney holder (second
C respondent) in any offence of cheating or forgery. It is not in
dispute that even the suit filed by the society, that was said to
be pending at the relevant time was against Chauthmal in
regard to the 20 bighas in Khasra No.9 and that no suit or
proceeding was pending in regard to the remaining 13 bighas
claimed by the first respondent. Only in January, 2003, second
0
respondent and some others were impleaded in the said suit
relating to 20 bighas, in pursuance of an application filed on
14.11.2002, long after respondents 1 and 2 had executed the
agreement and consent award had been made. The High
Court, therefore, rightly held that the allegations in the FIR, even
E if accepted as true, did not relate to the respondents 1 and 2
but to others who had claimed to be the owners/attorney holders
in regard to remaining 20 bighas of land.

18. Having regard to the well settled principles laid down
F in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335;
Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. - 2006 (6) SCC 736;
lnder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal - 2007 (12) SCC
1, we are of the view that the High Court was justified in holding
that the allegations even if taken at their face value did not prima
G facie constitute an offence under sections 420, 467, 468 and
471 IPC, by respondents 1 and 2.

19. The learned counsel for the appellants next submitted
that even if the quashing of the FIR qua respondents 1 and 2
was upheld, the quashing of the FIR against the Special Officer
H
SURENDRA KUMAR BHATIA v. KANHAIYA LAL & ORS. 789
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

+ of the Board was unwarranted. While respondents 1 and 2 A
were concerned only with 13 bighas which was not the subject
matter of the agreement with the society, the FIR specifically
alleged collusion between Kailash Chand and the Special
Officer of the Board, in regard to 20 bighas of land which was
agreed to be sold to the society by Chauthmal. In fact the writ B
petition filed by Kailash Chand for quashing the FIR was
rejected by the High Court. (Civil W.P. No.9293/2005 decided
on 23.11.2005). As the finding of the High Court that the
Collector/Special Officer was a Judge has been set aside, the
quashing of the FIR with reference to the Special Officer, cannot c
be upheld. To this extent, the contention of the appellants merits
acceptance and the quashing of the FIR with reference to the
then Special Officer is set aside. The quashing of FIR as
against respondents 1 and 2 will have no bearing on the FIR
in so far as the other accused with reference to the 20 big has 0
of land. Nor anything stated above shall be construed as a
finding on the merits.
20. The appeals are accordingly allowed in part to the
extent mentioned above.
E
D.G. Appeal partly allowed.