SURENDER KAUSHIK AND OTHERSversusSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS

                   [2013] 1 S.C.R. 1053


          SURENDER KAUSHIK AND OTHERS                        A
                            v.
      STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS
          (Criminal Appeal No. 305 of 2013)
                  FEBRUARY 14, 2013
                                                             B
   [K.5. RADHAKRISHNAN AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]

     FIR - Lodgment of two FlRs - In respect of same incident
- Permissibility - Held - Lodgment of two FIRs is not
permissible in respect of one and the same incident - C
However, the concept of sameness does not encompass filing
of counter FIR - Prohibition is for further complaint by same
complainant and others against the same accused - In the
present case, the allegations in the FIRs are distinct and
separate and the same may be regarded as counter D
complaint - Principle of sameness does not get attracted -
Hence, second FIR not liable to be quashed on account of
existence of first FIR - Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles
226 and 227.
                                                             E
    The question for consideration in the present appeal
was whether after registration of FIR and commencement
of investigation, a second FIR relating to the same
incident on the basis of a direction issued by the
Magistrate u/s. 156 (3) Cr.P.C. can be registered.
                                                             F
    Dismissing the appeal, the Court

    HELD: 1..Lodgment of two FIRs is not permissible in
respect of one and the same incident. The concept of
sameness has been given a restricted meaning. It does        G
not encompass filing of a counter FIR relating to the same
or connected cognizable offence. What is prohibited is
any further complaint by the same complainant and
others against the same accused subsequent to the
                           1053                              H
    1054    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 1 S.C.R.

A registration of the case under Cr.P.C, for an investigation
  in that regard would have already commenced and
  allowing registration of further complaint would amount
  to an improvement of the facts mentioned in the original
  complaint. The prohibition does not cover the allegations
B made by the accused in the first FIR alleging a different
  version of the same incident. Thus, rival versions in
  respect of the same incident do take different shapes and
  in that event, lodgment of two FIRs is permissible. [Para
  24) [1067-G-H; 1068-A-C]
c        2. In the present case, if the involvement of the
    number of accused persons and the nature of the
    allegations are scrutinized, it becomes crystal clear that
    every FIR has a different spectrum. The allegations made
    are distinct and separate. It may be regarded as a counter
D   complaint and cannot be stated that an effort has been
    made to improve the allegations that find place in the first
    FIR. It is impossible to say that the principle of sameness
    gets attracted. If the said principle is made applicable to
    the case at hand and the investigation is scuttled by
E   quashing the FIRs, the complainants in the other two
    FIRs would be deprived of justice. The appellants have
    lodged the FIR making the allegations against certain
    persons, but that does not debar the other aggrieved
    persons to move the court for direction of registration of
F   an FIR as there have been other accused persons
    including the complainant in the first FIR involved in the
    forgery and fabrication of documents and getting benefits
    from the statutory authority. To say that it is a second FIR
    relating to the same cause of action and the same
G   incident and there is sameness of occurrence and an
    attempt has been made to improvise the case is not
    correct. Hence, the plea that the FIR lodged by the fourth
    respondent is a second FIR and is, therefore, liable to be .
    quashed, does not merit acceptance. [Para 25) [1068-G-
H   H; 1069-A-E]
     SURENDER KAUSHIK v. STATE OF UTTAR                1055
                 PRADESH
    Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash and Ors. (2004) 13 SCC           A
292 - relied on.

     Amrawati and Anr. v. State of UP 2005 Crl. L.J. 755; Lal
Kamlendra Pratap Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.
(2009) 4 SCC 437: 2009 (4) SCR 1027; State of Haryana           B
and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335:
 1990 (3) Suppl. SCR 259; T. T. Antony v. State of Kera/a
and Ors. (2001) 6 SCC 181: 2001 (3) SCR 942; Pandurang
Chandrakant Mhatre and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra (2009)
10 SCC 773: 2009 (15) SCR 58; Babubhai v. State of
Gujarat and Ors. (2010) 12 SCC 254: 201 O (10) SCR 651;         C
Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Administration) (1979) 2 SCC
322; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan Guru
(2005) 11 SCC 600: 2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 79; Ram Mohan
Garg v. State of U.P. (1990) 27 ACC 438; Kari Choudhary v.
Sita Devi (2002) 1 SCC 714: 2001 (5) Suppl. SCR 588;            D
State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Sa/danha (1980) 1 SCC 554: 1980
(2) SCR 16; Ramesh Baburao Devaskar v. State of
Maharashtra (2007) 13 SCC 501; Vikram v State of
Maharashtra (2007) 12 SCC 332 - referred to.
                                                                E
                     Case Law Reference:
    2005 Crl. L.J. 755            Referred to      Para 3
    2009 (4) SCR 1027             Referred to      Para 3
    1990 (3) Suppl. SCR 259 Referred to            Para 8       F

    2010 (10) SCR 651             Referred to       Para 8
    2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 79        Referred to      Para 10
    (1979) 2 sec 322              Referred to       Para 13     G
    2001 (3) SCR 942              Referred to      Para 14
    (2004) 13 sec 292             Relied on         Para 16
    (1990) 27 ACC 438             Referred to      .Para 16
                                                                H
    1056    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 1 S.C.R.


A        2001 (5) Suppl. SCR 588 Referred to             Para 18

        1980 (2) SCR 16                Referred to       Para 18

        2009 (15) SCR 58               Referred to      Para 21

        2001 (3 ) SCR 942              Referred to       Para 21
B
        (2007) 13 sec 501             Referred to       Para 21

        2007 (6) SCR 185              Referred to       Para 21

      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
C No. 305 of 2013.

        From the Judgment & Order dated 12.10.2012 of the High
    Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh in Criminal
    Misc. Writ Petition No. 15077 of 2012.
D        Nagendra Rai, R.K. Dash, Altaf Ahmed, Smarhar Singh,
    Shantanu Sagar, Abhishek Kr. singh, Gopi Raman, Chandra
    Prakash, Abhisth Kumar, Archana Singh, Ashok K. Srivasta for
    the appearing parties.                 ,

E       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. Leave granted.

        2. The present appeal, by special leave, is directed
  against the order dated 12.10.2012 passed by the Division
F Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal
  Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 15077 of 2012 wherein the
  High Court has declined to quash the FIR No. 442 of 2012
  registered at P.S. Civil Lines, Meerut, that has given rise to
  Crime No. 491 of 2012 for offences punishable under Sections
G 406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code
  (for short "the IPC").

      3. At the very outset, it is requisite to be stated that the
  appellants had invoked the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
H Constitution for quashment of the FIR on two counts, namely,
       SU RENDER KAUSHIK v. STATE OF UTTAR                  1057
             PRADESH [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
first, that no prima facie case existed for putting the criminal     A
law into motion and, second, when on the similar and identical
cause of action and allegations, FIR No. 425 of 2012
corresponding to Crime No. 4 75 of 2012 had already been
registered, a second FIR could not have been lodged and
entertained. The High Court, by the impugned order, has opined       B
that it cannot be held that no prima facie case is disclosed and,
thereafter, proceeded to· issue certain directions in relation to
surrender before the concerned court and grant of interim bail
in view of the decision rendered by the Full Bench of the
Allahabad High Court in Amrawati and Another v. State of UP1         c
and Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
Others2.

     4. We are not adverting to the second part of the order as
the controversy in this regard has not emerged before this Court
in the present case. The assail to the validity of registration of   D
second FIR has not been dealt with by the High Court. Mr.
Nagendra Rai, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellants, did not advance any contention and, rightly so, with
regard to the existence of a prima facie case for registration
of the FIR, but emphatically put forth the proponements              E
pertaining to the validity of entertaining the second FIR despite
the lodgment of an earlier FIR in respect of the same cause of
action and the same incident. Therefore, we shall restrict our
delineation to the said sentinel issue exclusively.
                                                                     F
      5. From the factual background which has been exposited
in this appeal and the documents annexed thereto, it is limpid
that FIR No. 274 of 2012 was lodged by the appellant No. 1,
Surender Kaushik, as the Secretary of Sanjeev Memorial
Education Society on 29.5.2012 against Dr. Subhash Gupta,            G
Dr. Harshu Gupta and Yunus Pahalwan, members of the
society, alleging that in collusion with one Surya Prakash Jalan,
they had prepared fake and fraudulent documents. It was further
1.   2005 Cri. L.J. 755.
2.   c2oos) 4 sec 437.                                               H
    1058    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 1 S.C.R.


A   alleged that their signatures had been forged indicating their
    participation in various general/executive meetings of the
    society, though they had not attended the said meetings. On
    the basis of the said FIR, a crime under Sections 420, 467,
    468 and 471 of the IPC was registered.
B
       6. One Dr. Subhash Gupta filed an application before the
  Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate. Meerut, under Section
  156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for brevity "the
  Code") alleging, inter alia, that he was never a member of the
C Sanjeev Memorial Education Society, Ghaziabad and further
  he was neither present in the meetings of the society which
  were held on 1.10.2008 and 16.4.2009 nor was he a signatory
  to the resolutions passed in the said meetings. It was further
  asseverated in the application that the accused persons,
  namely, P.C. Gupta, Seema Gupta, Surender Kaushik,
D Kamlesh Sharma and Vimal Singh, had fabricated an affidavit
  on 15.12.2008 with forged signatures and filed before the
  Deputy Registrar, Society Chit and Fund, Mohanpuri, Meerut.
  The said petition was entertained and on the basis of the
  direction of the learned Magistrate, FIR No. 425 of 2012 was
E lodged on 21.8.2012 for the offences punishable under
  Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 504 and 506 of the IPC.

       7. As the facts would further unfurl, FIR No. 442 of 2012
  which gave rise to Crime No. 491 of 2012 was registered on
F 4.9.2012 and it is apt to note that the said FIR came to be
  registered on the basis of an order passed by the learned
  Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code. In the said case,
  the complainant was Smt. Nidhi Jalan, one of the members of
  the Governing Body of the society, and it was alleged that she
G is a member of the society which runs an educational institution,
  namely, Mayo International School, and the accused persons,
  namely, P.C. Gupta, Seema Gupta, Vikash Jain, Shawna Jain,
  Sushil Jain, Shubhi Jain, Surender Kaushik, Kamlesh Sharma,
  Rajender Sharma, Virender Bhardwaj, Vimal Singh and Renu
  Sharma, having entered into a conspiracy had prepared forged
H
      SURENDER KAUSHI~ v. STATE OF UTIAR                    1059
           PRADESH [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
documents regarding meetings held on different dates,                A
fabricated signatures of the members and filed before the
competent authority with the common intention to grab the
property/funds of the society. Be it noted, the members had filed
affidavits before the competent authority that they had never
taken part in the meetings of the school management and had          B
not signed any papers. As already stated, the said FIR
pertained to offences punishable under Sections 406, 420,
467, 468, 471, 504 and 506 of the IPC.

     8.lt is submitted by Mr. Nagendra Rai, learned senior C
counsel, that the FIR No. 442 of 2012 could not have been
lodged and entertained as law prohibits lodgment of the second
FIR in respect of the same cognizable offence and it is
propounded by him that when there is a legal impediment for
setting the criminal law in motion, the decision in State of
Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others3 gets attracted. D
To bolster the contention that the second FIR could not have
been entertained, the learned senior counsel has commended
us to the decisions in T. T. Antony v. State of Kera/a and
Others", Pandurang Chandrakant Mhatre and Others v. State
of Maharashtra 5 and Babubhai v. State of Gujarat and Others6.       E

      9. Mr. R.K. Dash, learned senior counsel for the State, per
contra, submitted that there is no absolute prohibition in law for
lodgment of a second FIR and, more so, when allegations are
made from different spectrum or, for that matter, when different     F
versions are put forth by different persons and there are
different accused persons. It is urged by him that the decisions
relied upon by the appellants are distinguishable on facts and
the proposition of law laid down therein is not applicable to the
case at hand. The learned senior counsel would further contend       G
that the principles stated in Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi
3.   1992 Supp (1) sec 335.
4.   (2001) a sec 1a1.
s.   (2009) 10 sec 773.
a.   (2010) 12 sec 254.                                              H
     1060      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 1 S.C.R.


A Administration)7 and Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash and Others8
  are attracted to the case at hand.

          10. Mr. Altaf Ahmed, learned senior counsel appearing for
    the complainant, the fourth respondent herein, has submitted
    that on certain occasions, same set of facts may constitute
8
    different offences and when there are two distinct offences
    having different ingredients, there would be no embargo for
    registration of two Fl Rs. It is further canvassed by him that on
    certain occasions, two FIRs may have some overlapping
    features but it is the substance of the allegations which has to
C   be looked into, and if a restricted view is taken, then no counter
    FIR can ever be lodged. The learned senior counsel would
    further submit that the investigation by the police cannot be
    scuttled and the accused persons cannot be allowed to pave
    the escape route in this manner. It has been highlighted by him
D   that lodging of second FIR for the same cause of action or
    offence is based on the principle that a person should not be
    vexed twice, but if there are offences having distinctive
    ingredients and overlapping features, it would not invite the
    frown of Article 20 of the Constitution of India. The
E   pronouncement in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias
    Afsan Guru9 has been commended to us.

        11. Chapter XII of the Code deals with information to the
  police and their powers to investigate. As provided under
F Section 154 of the Code, every information relating to
  commission of a cognizable offence either given orally or in
  writing is required to be entered in a book to be kept by the
  officer-in-charge of the concerned police station. The said FIR,
  as mandated by law, has to pertain to a cognizable case.
G Section 2(c) of the Code defines 'cognizable offence" which
  also deals with cognizable cases. It reads as follows:-


    1.   (1979) 2 sec 322.
    s.   (2004) 13 sec 292.
H   9.   c2oosi 11 sec soo.
     SURENDER KAUSHIK v. STATE OF UTTAR                      1061
          PRADESH [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
    "cognizable offence" means an offence for which, and              A
    "cognizable case" means a case in which, a police officer
    may, in accordance with the First Schedule or under any
    other law for the time being in force, arrest without warrant;"

     12. If the primary requirement is satisfied, an FIR is           B
registered and the criminal law is set in motion and the officer-
in-charge of the police station takes up the investigation. The
question that has emerged for consideration in this case is
whether after registration of the FIR and commencement of the
investigation, a second FIR relating to the same incident on the      C
basis of a direction issued by the learned Magistrate under
Section 156(3) of the Code can be registered.

      13. For apposite appreciation of the issue raised, it is
necessitous to refer to certain authorities which would throw
significant light under what circumstances entertainment of           D
second FIR is prohibited. In Ram Lal Narang (supra), this Court
was dealing with the facts and circumstances of a case where
two FIRs were lodged and two charge-sheets were filed. The
Bench took note of the fact that the conspiracy which was the
subject-matter of the second case could not be said to be             E
identical with the conspiracy which was the subject-matter of
the first one and further the conspirators were different, although
the conspiracy which was the subject-matter of the first case
may, perhaps, be said to have turned out to be a part of the
conspiracy which was the subject-matter of the second case.           F
After adverting to the various facets, it has been opined that
occasions may arise when a second investigation started
independently of the first may disclose wide range of offences
including those covered by the first investigation. Being of this
view, the Court did not find any flaw in the investigation on the     G
basis of,the subsequent FIR.

     14. In T. T. Antony (supra), it was canvassed on behalf of
the accused that the registration of fresh information in respect
of the very same incident as an FIR under Section 154 of the
Code was not valid and, therefore, all steps taken pursuant           H
    1062     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 1 S.C.R.

A thereto including investigation were illegal and liable to be
  quashed. The Bench, analyzing the scheme of the provisions
  of Sections 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 of the
  Code, came to hold that only the earliest or the first information
  in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies
B the requirements of Section 154 of the Code and, therefore,
  there can be no second FIR and consequently, there can be
  no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent
  information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the
  same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more
c cognizable offences. It was further observed that on receipt of
  information about a cognizable offence or an incident giving rise
  to a cognizable offence or offences and on entering the FIR in
  the station house diary, the officer in charge of a police station
  has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported
  in the FIR but also other connected offences found to have been
0
  committed in the course of the same transaction or the same
  occurrence and file one or more reports as provided in Section
  173 of the Code.
        15. It is worth noting that in the said case, the two-Judge
E Bench explained and distinguished the dictum in Ram Lal
  Narang (supra) by opining that the Court had indicated that the
  real question was whether the two conspiracies were in truth
  and substance the same and held that the conspiracies in the
  two cases were not identical. It further proceeded to state that
F the Court did not repel the contention of the appellant regarding
  the illegality of the second FIR and the investigation based
  thereon being vitiated, but on facts found that the two FIRs in
  truth and substance were different since the first was a smaller
  conspiracy and the second was a larger conspiracy as it turned
G out eventually. Thereafter, the Bench explained thus: -

        "The 1973 CrPC specifically provides for further
        investigation after forwarding of report under sub-section
        (2) of Section 173 CrPC and forwarding of further report
        or reports to the Magistrate concerned under Section
H       173(8) CrPC. It follows that if the gravamen of the charges
           SU RENDER KAUSHIK v. STATE OF UTTAR                  1063
                 PRADESH [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
           in the two Fl Rs - the first and the second-_ is in truth A
           and substance the same, registering the second FIR and
           making fresh investigation and forwarding report under
           Section 173 CrPC will be irregular and the court cannot
           take cognizance of the same."
                                                                         B
           16. In Upkar Singh (supra), a three-Judge Bench was
      addressing the issue pertaining to the correctness of law laid
      down in the case of T. T. Antony (supra). The larger Bench took
      note of the fact that a. complaint was lodged by the first
      respondent therein with Sikhera Police Station in Village          C
      Fahimpur Kalan at 10.00 a.m. on 20th May, 1995 making
      certain allegations against the appellant therein and some other
      persons. On the basis of the said complaint, the police had
      registered a crime under Sections 452 and 307 of the IPC. The
      appellant had lodged a complaint in regard to the very same
      incident against the respondents therein for having committed      D
      offences punishable under Sections 506 and 307 of the IPC
      as against him and his family members. As the said complaint
      was not entertained by the concerned police, he, under
      compelling circumstances, filed a petition under Section 156(3)
      of the Code before the Judicial Magistrate, who having found       E
      a prima facie case, directed the concerned police station to
      register a crime against the accused persons in the said
··    complaint and to investigate the same and submit a report. On
      the basis of the said direction, Crime No. 48-A of 1995 was
      registered for offences punishable under Sections 147, 148,        F
      149 and 307 of the IPC. Challenging the direction of the
      Magistrate, a revision was preferred before the learned
      Sessions Judge who set aside the said direction. Being
      aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge,
      a Criminal Miscellaneous petition was filed before the High        G
      Court of Judicature at Allahabad and the High Court, following
      its earlier decision in Ram Mohan Garg v. State of U.P. 10 ,
      dismissed the revision. While dealing with the issue, this Court

     10. (1990) 21 sec 438.                                              H
    1064     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 1 S.C.R.


A   referred to paragraph 18 of T. T. Antony (supra) and noted how
    the same had been understood: -

        "11. This observation of the Supreme Court in the said
        case of T. T. Antony is understood oy the learned counsel
        for the respondents as the Code prohibiting the filing of a
B
        second complaint arising from the same incident. It is on
        that basis and relying on the said judgment in T. T. Antony
        case an argument is addressed before us that once an FIR
        is registered on the complaint of one party a second FIR
        in the nature of a counter-case is not registrabte and no
c       investigation based on the said second complaint could
        be carried out."

        17. After so observing, the Court held that the judgment in
    T. T. Antony (supra) really does not lay down such a proposition
D of law as has been understood by the learned counsel for the
  respondent therein. The Bench referred to the factual score of
  T. T. Antony (supra) and explained thus:-

        "Having carefully gone through the above judgment we do
        not think that this Court in the said cases of T. T Antony
E
        v. State of Kera/a has precluded an aggrieved person
        from filing a counter-case as in the present case."

        To arrive at such a conclusion, the Bench referred to
  paragraph 27 of the decision in T. T. Antony (supra) wherein it
F has been stated that a case of fresh investigation based on the
  second or successive FIRs, not being a counter-case, filed in
  connection with the same or connected cognizable offence
  alleged to have been committed in the course of the same
  transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR
G either investigation is under way or final report under Section
  173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit case
  for exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code or under
  Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. Thereafter, the three-Judge
  Bench ruled thus:
H
     SUREN DER KAUSHIK v. STATE OF UTIAR                    1065
          PRADESH [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
     "In our opinion, this Court in that case only held that any     A
     further complaint by the same complainant or others
     against the same accused, subsequent to the registration
     of a case, is prohibited under the Code because an
     investigation in this regard would have already started and
     further complaint against the same accused will amount to       8
     an improvement on the facts mentioned in the original
     complaint, hence will be prohibited under Section 162 of
     the Code. This prohibition noticed by this Court, in our
     opinion, does not apply to counter-complaint by the
     accused in the first complaint or on his behalf alleging a      c
     different version of the said incident."

     18. Be it noted, in the said verdict, reference was made
to Kari Choudhary v. Sita Devi11 , wherein it has been opined
that there cannot be two FIRs against the same accused in
respect of the same case, but when there are rival versions in       D
respect of the same episode, they would normally take the
shape of two different FIRs and investigation can be carried
out under both of them by the same investigating agency.
Reference was made to the pronouncement in State of Bihar
v. J.A. C. Saldanha 12 wherein it has been highlighted that the      E
power of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code to
direct further investigation is clearly an independent power and
does not stand in conflict with the power of the State
Government as spelt out under Section 3 of the Police Act.
                                                                     F
    19. It is worth noting that the Court also dealt with the view
expressed in Ram Lal Narang (supra) and stated thus: -

     "22. A perusal of the judgment of this Court in Ram Lal
     Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.) also shows that even in
     cases where a prior complaint is already registered, a          G
     counter-complaint is permissible but it goes further and
     holds that even in cases where a first complaint is

11. c2002) 1 sec 714.
12. (1980) 1 sec 554.                                                H
     1066     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 1 S.C.R.


A         registered and investigation initiated, it is possible to file
          a further complaint by the same complainant based on the
          material gathered during the course of investigation. Of
          course, this larger proposition of law laid down in Ram Lal
         Narang case is not necessary to be relied on by us in the
B        present case. Suffice it to say that the discussion in Ram
         Lal Narang case is in the same line as found in the
         judgments in Kari Choudhary and State of Bihar v. J.A. C.
         Saldanha. However, it must be noticed that in T. T. Antony
         case, Ram Lal Narang case was noticed but the Court
c        did not express any opinion either way."

        20. Explaining further, the Court observed that if the law
   laid down by this Court in T. T. Antony (supra) is to be accepted
  to have held that a second complaint in regard to the same
  incident filed as a counter complaint is prohibited under the
D Code, such conclusion would lead to serious consequences
  inasmuch as the real accused can take the first opportunity to
  lodge a false complaint and get it registered by the jurisdictional
  police and then that would preclude the victim to lodge a
  complaint.
E
        21. In Pandurang Chandrakant Mhatre (supra), the Court
  referred to T. T. Antony (supra), Ramesh Baburao Oevaskar
  v. State of Maharashtra 13 and Vikram v. State of Maharashtra 14
  and opined that the earliest information in regard to the
F commission of a cognizable offence is to be treated as the first
  information report and it sets the criminal law in motion and the
  investigation commences on that basis. Although the first
  information report is not expected to be an encyclopaedia of
  events, yet an information to the police in order to be first
  information report under Section 154(1) of the Code, must
G contain some essential and relevant details of the incident. A
  cryptic information about the commission of a cognizable
  offence irrespective of the nature and details of such information
    13. c2001) 13 sec so1.
H 14. c2001) 12 sec 332.
     SURENDER KAUSHIK v. STATE OF UTTAR                      1067
          PRADESH [Dlf>AK MISRA, J.]
may not be treated as first information report. After so stating,     A
the Bench posed the question whether the information regarding
the incident therein entered into general diary given by PW-5
is the first information report within the meaning of Section 154
of the Code and, if so, it would be hit by Section 162 of the
Code. It is worth noting that analyzing the facts, the Court opined   B
that information given to the police to rush to the place of the
incident to control the situation need not necessarily amount to
an FIR.

     22. In Babubhai (supra), this Court, after surveying the C
earlier decisions, expressed the view that the court has to
examine the facts and circumstances giving rise to both the
FIRs and the test of sameness is to be applied to find out
whether both the FIRs relate to the same incident in respect of
the same occurrence or are in regard to the incidents which
are two or more parts of the same transaction. If the answer is D
in the affirmative, the second FIR is liable to be quashed.
However, in case the contrary is proved, where the version in
the second FIR is different and they are in respect of two
different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible. In
case the accused in the first FIR comes forward with a different E
version or counterclaim in respect of the same incident,
investigation on both the FIRs has to be conducted.

     23. It is worth noting that in the said case, the Court
expressed the view that the High Court had correctly reached          F
the conclusion that the second FIR was liable to'be quashed
as in both the FIRs, the allegations related to the same incident
that had occurred at the same place in close proximity of time
and, therefore, they were two parts of the same transaction.

     24. From the aforesaid decisions, it is quite luminous that      G
the lodgment of two Fl Rs is not permissible in respect of one
and the same incident. The concept of sameness has been
given a restricted meaning. It does not encompass filing of a
counter FIR relating to the same or connected cognizable
offence. What is prohibited is any further complaint by the same      H
    1068     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2013] 1 S.C.R.


A complainant and others against the same accused subsequent
  to the registration of the case under the Code, for an
  investigation in that regard would have already commenced and
  allowing registration of further complaint would amount to an
  improvement of the facts mentioned in the original complaint.
B As is further made clear by the three-Judge Bench in Upkar
  Singh (supra), the prohibition does not cover the allegations
  made by the accused in the first FIR alleging a different version
  of the same incident. Thus, rival versions in respect of the same
  incident do take different shapes and in that event, lodgment
c of two FIRs is permissible.
          25. In the case at hand, the appellants lodged the FIR No.
    274 of 2012 against four accused persons alleging that they
    had prepared fake and fraudulent documents. The second FIR
    came to be registered on the basis of the direction issued by
D   the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate in exercise of
    power under Section 156(3) of the Code at the instance of
    another person alleging, inter alia, that he was neither present
    in the meetings nor had he signed any of the resolutions of the
    meetings and the accused persons, five in number, including
E   the appellant No. 1 herein, had fabricated documents and filed
    the same before the competent authority. FIR No. 442 of 2012
    (which gave rise to Crime No. 491 of 2012) was registered
    because of an order passed by the learned Magistrate. Be it
    noted, the complaint was filed by another member of the
F   Governing Body of the Society and the allegation was that the
    accused persons, twelve in number, had entered into a
    conspiracy and prepared forged documents relating to the
    meetings held on different dates. There was allegation of
    fabrication of the signatures of the members and filing of forged
G   documents before the Registrar of Societies with the common
    intention to grab the property/funds of the Society. If the
    involvement of the number of accused persons and the nature
    of the allegations are scrutinized, it becomes crystal clear that
    every FIR has a different spectrum. The allegations made are
H   distinct and separate. It may be regarded as a counter
     SURENDER KAUSHIK v. STATE OF UTTAR                      1069
          PRADESH [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
complaint and cannot be stated that an effort has been made           A
to improve the allegations that find place in the first FIR. It is
well-nigh impossible to say that the principle of sameness gets
attracted. We are inclined to think so, for if the said principle
is made applicable to the case at hand and the investigation
is scuttled by quashing the Fl Rs, the complainants in the other      B
two FIRs would be deprived of justice. The appellants have
lodged the FIR making the allegations against certain persons,
but that does not debar the other aggrieved persons to move
the court for direction of registration of an FIR as there have
been other accused persons including the complainant in the           c
first FIR involved in the forgery and fabrication of documents
and getting benefits from the statutory authority. In the ultimate
eventuate, how the trial would commence and be concluded is
up to the concerned court. The appellants or any of the other
complainants or the accused persons may move the
                                                                      0
appropriate court for a trial in one court. That is another aspect
altogether. But to say that it is a second FIR relating to the same
cause of action and the same incident and there is sameness
of occurrence and an attempt has been made to improvise the
case is not correct. Hence, we conclude and hold that the
submission that the FIR lodged by the fourth respondent is a          E
second FIR and is, therefore, liable to be quashed, does not
merit acceptance.

    26. In view of the aforesaid premised reasons, the appeal,
being sans substance, stands dismissed.                               F

K.K.T.                                        Appeal dismissed.