Supreme Court of India
SUREKHA DOMAJI BELEversusEXECUTIVE ENGINEER, TESTING DIVISION, MSEDCL
- Citation
- 2026 INSC 639
- Decided
- 11 June 2026
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
Holding
The dismissal order is set aside as wholly disproportionate, the suspension period cannot be treated as a separate punishment, and a fresh show‑cause notice must be issued, while the finding of misconduct remains undisturbed.
Summary
Surekha Domaji Bele, an Upper Division Clerk with over two decades of service at MSEDCL, was suspended in 2006 for alleged indiscipline and related misconduct. A domestic enquiry was held but later declared unfair, leading to a de novo adjudication before the Labour Court where misconduct was proved. The employer dismissed her in 2017, relying on an earlier show‑cause notice and treating the entire suspension period as punishment. The Supreme Court held that while the finding of misconduct remains valid, the dismissal was disproportionate, the authority lacked power to treat the suspension as an additional penalty, and a fresh show‑cause notice was required for the proposed punishment. Consequently, the dismissal order was set aside, the suspension period was not to be treated as punishment, and the competent authority was directed to re‑consider the quantum of penalty and subsistence allowance.
Issues considered
- Whether the dismissal order dated 12.07.2017 was passed by a competent authority
- Whether a fresh show‑cause notice for punishment was required after the de novo proceedings before the Labour Court
- Whether the plea relating to subsistence allowance requires reconsideration
- Whether the direction treating the suspension period as punishment is valid
- Whether the punishment of dismissal is disproportionate
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Art.311
- MSEDCL Employees Service Regulations, 2005s. Regn.86, s. Regn.88(a)(i), s. Regn.88(a)(ii), s. Regn.88(a)(iii), s. Regn.88(a)(v), s. Regn.88(j), s. Regn.91, s. Regn.91(2)(d), s. Regn.91(2)(g)
- Payment of Wages Act
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the dismissal order was passed by the competent authority; whether a fresh show-cause notice for punishment was required after the de novo proceedings before the labour court; whether the plea relating to subsistence whether the direction treating the suspension period as punishment is valid; and whether the punishment of dismissal is disproportionate. Headnotes† MSEDCL Employees Services Regulations, 2005 – Dismissal from service – Appellant-Upper Division Clerk in the service of
Subjects
dismissal orderfresh show‑cause noticesuspension period as punishmentdisproportionate punishmentde novo proceedingssubsistence allowancedisciplinary authority competenceproportionality of penaltyservice regulations
Judgment
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 255 : 2026 INSC 639
Surekha Domaji Bele
v.
Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
(Civil Appeal No(s). 8459-8460 of 2026)
11 June 2026
[Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether the dismissal order was passed by the
competent authority; whether a fresh show-cause notice for
punishment was required after the de novo proceedings before
the labour court; whether the plea relating to subsistence
allowance requires reconsideration; whether the direction treating
the suspension period as punishment is valid; and whether the
punishment of dismissal is disproportionate.
Headnotes†
MSEDCL Employees Services Regulations, 2005 – Dismissal
from service – Appellant-Upper Division Clerk in the
service of the respondent-management for more than two
decades, suspended from service for the acts of indiscipline,
insubordination, disobedience of superior officers, tampering
with official documents, and later was charge-sheeted –
Two years later served with a show-cause notice after the
domestic enquiry – Domestic enquiry was found not to be
fair – In revision, the matter remanded to the labour court and
permitted the respondent to prove the misconduct before the
labour court rather than hold fresh domestic enquiry – Upon
remand, misconduct held proved – Respondent thereafter
passed the dismissal order relying on the earlier show-cause
notice, and period of suspension was directed to be treated
as punishment – Appellant’s challenge to the finding of
misconduct in Revision failed and was not carried further –
Challenge to the dismissal order on the grounds of competence
of disciplinary authority to pass the dismissal order, absence
of proper post-enquiry show-cause notice, non-payment of
subsistence allowance, illegal treatment of the suspension
period as punishment, and disproportionality of the penalty of
* Author
256 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
dismissal, failed before the labour court, the Industrial Court
and the High Court – Correctness:
Held: Dismissal order set aside as wholly disproportionate to
the charges proved, while leaving the finding of misconduct
undisturbed – Imposition of the second punishment of treating
the suspension undergone as punishment not permissible and
set aside – Finding that misconduct stood proved against the
appellant to remain undisturbed and the adjudication of misconduct
recorded in complaint by the labour court, which was also affirmed
in Revision not reopened – Appellant was a party to the adjudicatory
proceedings before the labour court where the misconduct was
recorded and had the opportunity to lead and in fact led the
evidence in her favour – Not established that the appellant holds
a civil post thus, entitled to the protection as envisaged in Art.311
of the Constitution – No error in the concurrent finding that the
Executive Engineer was competent under the Regulations to
pass an order of punishment against the Appellant-Pay Grade-III
employee – Challenge to the dismissal order on the ground of
lack of competence rejected – Regarding the dismissal order,
the disciplinary authority proceeded substantially on the earlier
show-cause notice, which was based on the domestic enquiry
that was subsequently found not to be valid – After remand, the
misconduct was still established, but in a different manner before
the new forum, based on the evidence led before the labour
court – Disciplinary authority was, thus, required to give another
show cause notice with fresh application of mind to enable the
appellant to submit her representation as regards the nature of
punishment – Before imposing the penalty of dismissal from service,
the disciplinary authority failed to consider the relevant factors
bearing on punishment – Competent authority to determine the
appellant’s claim for subsistence allowance – Since the appellant
has already crossed the age of superannuation, no direction for
reinstatement can be issued at this stage – Thus, the impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court set aside in terms
of the directions. [Paras 111.1-112]
Constitution of India – Art. 311 – Applicability to employees
of Government Companies/Corporations – Civil post under
Union or State – Protection u/Art. 311 – Explained. [Paras 35-37]
MSEDCL Employees Service Regulations, 2005 – Regn.88(j) –
Fresh show-cause notice for punishment, if required after the
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 257
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
de novo proceedings before the labour court – Disciplinary
authority, if could impose dismissal by relying substantially
on the earlier notice, without independently considering the
findings which ultimately survived after remand and without
giving the appellant an opportunity to place her explanation on
the quantum of punishment in the light of those later findings:
Held: Second opportunity against proposed punishment is not a
mandate in every disciplinary proceeding – However, where the
applicable service regulation expressly provides for a post-enquiry
notice communicating the findings and calling upon the employee
to show cause against the contemplated punishment, the authority
must comply with that regulation – Regn.88(j) contemplates that,
after the enquiry is completed, the competent authority shall
communicate its findings and call upon the employee to show
cause against the contemplated punishment – On facts, the
enquiry which ultimately sustained the charges was the de novo
adjudication before the labour court after the earlier enquiry was
found defective – Thus, decision-making process on punishment
could not be treated as complete merely because the earlier
show-cause notice was held valid – Non-service of a fresh notice
after the labour court’s de novo finding does not vitiate the finding
of misconduct, since the appellant was party to the adjudicatory
proceedings before labour court and industrial court – However,
the disciplinary authority was required to apply its independent
mind to the findings which ultimately survived after remand to the
question of appropriate punishment and issue fresh showcause
notice on the proposed punishment, for the period of reply in terms
of the earlier show-cause notice had long expired and the basis
of it also does not exist – While the finding of misconduct remains
undisturbed, matter remitted to the competent authority for fresh
consideration as regards quantum of punishment by issuing a
fresh show-cause notice. [Paras 42, 54,56-57]
MSEDCL Employees Service Regulations, 2005 –
Regns.88(a)(ii)(i), (ii), (iii) – Subsistence allowance – Suspension
order to the effect that during suspension the appellant would
be entitled, as per MSEDCL rules, to subsistence allowance
and it directed the appellant to mark attendance once in a
week at the office of the Executive Engineer – Appellant’s
case that she was not paid subsistence allowance during the
entire period of suspension, till the order of dismissal which
continued for nearly eleven years:
258 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Held: Subsistence allowance is intended to preserve the
suspended employee’s minimum means of survival and to enable
her to effectively defend herself in the disciplinary proceedings
– Reporting condition had a regulatory foundation and cannot
be treated as wholly extraneous – However, the existence of a
reporting condition does not mean that subsistence allowance
can be mechanically denied for the entire period of nearly eleven
years without examining the effect of the remaining parts of
Regn.88 – Object of requiring a suspended employee to report is
to ensure that the employee remains available to the employer,
does not evade the proceedings, and does not take advantage
of suspension by engaging in gainful employment elsewhere or
becoming unavailable – On facts, no finding that the appellant was
gainfully employed elsewhere during the period of suspension –
Appellant’s suspension continued till the dismissal, for nearly
eleven years – During this period, she was required to defend
herself in the departmental process, before the Labour Court,
and in connected proceedings – Denial of subsistence allowance
for such a prolonged period directly affects the employee’s ability
to survive and to defend herself effectively – For the period from
04.09.2006 to 03.03.2007, the original reporting condition in the
suspension order may be relevant while considering the appellant’s
entitlement to subsistence allowance, including whether leave of
absence from reporting ought to have been sought or granted –
For the remaining period, the appellant be treated as eligible for
subsistence allowance. [Paras 58, 68-77]
MSEDCL Employees Service Regulations, 2005 – Regn.91 –
After imposing the penalty of dismissal from service,
the disciplinary authority further directed that the entire
period already spent under suspension also be treated as
punishment – Direction treating the suspension period as
punishment, if valid:
Held: Treating the entire suspension period as punishment may
deprive the employee of the ordinary service and monetary benefits
attached to that period, including arrears of pay and allowances,
continuity-related benefits, increments or other service advantages
depending on the rules, and consequential retiral or terminal
benefits – This consequence is severe because the suspension
period was for nearly eleven years – Thus, treating the entire period
as punishment is not a routine consequential adjustment – It has
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 259
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
the practical effect of depriving the appellant of the standard service
benefits for a substantial part of her remaining service, apart from
the subsistence allowance which Regn.88(a)(v) expressly protects
if it was already paid or payable – Appellant’s suspension from
04.09.2006 was not, by itself, a punishment – It was a suspension
pending enquiry – Appellant cannot be visited with both dismissal
u/Regn.91(2)(g) and a separate punishment of suspension
u/Regn.91(2)(d) for the same misconduct – Direction in the dismissal
order treating the suspension period as punishment shall not
operate as an independent or additional penalty over and above
the harsher penalty finally imposed – Competent authority, while
passing the fresh order on punishment, to separately decide the
service and monetary consequences of the suspension period only
in accordance with Regn.88(a)(v) – While doing so, it shall keep in
mind that subsistence allowance already paid or payable stands
protected under the said provision, and that the past suspension
period cannot be treated as an independent additional punishment
for the same misconduct, if the disciplinary authority chooses a
more severe punishment. [Paras 79-81, 87-89]
MSEDCL Employees Service Regulations, 2005 –
Regns.86, 91 – Punishment of dismissal, if disproportionate:
Held: Misconduct found proved against the appellant relates to
indiscipline, insubordination, and the consequent tampering with
documents – However, the material presently noticed does not show
corruption, illegal gratification, moral turpitude, misappropriation of
funds, proved pecuniary loss to the employer, public scandal, or
conduct bringing the institution into public disrepute – Allegations
substantially appear to arise out of internal office functioning and
service-related conflict and did not play out in the public domain –
Competent authority did not undertake an exercise of evaluating
various relevant factors – Order does not reflect consideration of
the appellant’s long service, past record, age, absence or presence
of dishonesty, or absence or presence of actual loss as also
commended by the Labour Court – Even where the Regulations
include dismissal as one of the permissible punishments for acts
of misconduct, the authority is not relieved of its duty to consider
all relevant factors to see whether the facts of the case truly
warrant the most extreme form of penalty – Mere fact that a
proved act falls within the broad category of “misconduct” under the
Regulations does not mean that dismissal must follow as a matter
260 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of course – Dismissal is ordinarily justified where the misconduct is
of such gravity that continuance of the employee would be wholly
incompatible with discipline, trust or institutional functioning –
Cases involving corruption, illegal gratification, moral turpitude,
misappropriation, acts causing substantial loss to the employer, or
conduct showing complete unfitness for continued service stand
on a different footing – However, where the misconduct does
not involve corruption, moral turpitude, financial misappropriation
or proved loss to the employer, and where there is long service
without much blemish, the disciplinary authority must carefully
examine whether any lesser punishment would meet the ends of
justice. [Paras 107-110]
Service – Dismissal from service – Form of penalty – Severest
form. [Paras 106-110]
Case Law Cited
S.L. Agarwal v. General Manager, Hindustan Steel Ltd. [1970] 3
SCR 363 : (1970) 1 SCC 177; Khem Chand v. The Union of India
and Others [1958] 1 SCR 1080 : AIR 1958 SC 300; Managing
Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar [1993] Supp. 2 SCR 576 : (1993)
4 SCC 727; Workmen of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India
(P) Ltd. v. Management [1973] 3 SCR 587 : (1973) 1 SCC 813;
State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan Tale [1983] 3 SCR 337 :
(1983) 3 SCC 387; O.P. Gupta v. Union of India [1988] 1 SCR
27 : (1987) 4 SCC 328; Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India
[2015] 2 SCR 415 : (2015) 7 SCC 291; Union of India and Anr. v.
S.C. Parashar [2006] 2 SCR 529 : (2006) 3 SCC 167; Ranjit
Thakur v. Union of India [1988] 1 SCR 512 : (1987) 4 SCC 611; B.C.
Chaturvedi v. Union of India [1995] 4 SCR 644 : (1995) 6 SCC 749;
Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Ltd. v. Mukul Kumar
Choudhuri [2009] 13 SCR 487 : AIR 2010 SC 75 – referred to.
List of Acts
Payment of Wages Act; MSEDCL Employees Services Regulations,
2005; Constitution of India.
List of Keywords
Dismissal order; Fresh show-cause notice for punishment; Treating
suspension period as punishment; Punishment of dismissal
disproportionate; De Novo Proceedings; Subsistence Allowance;
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 261
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
Reporting condition; Disciplinary proceedings Notice; Dismissal
from service; Treatment of suspension period as punishment;
Proportionality of punishment.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s).
8459-8460 of 2026
From the Judgment and Order dated 05.04.2024 and 11.11.2024
of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay at Nagpur in WP No.
1200 of 2023 and MCA No. 357 of 2024, respectively
Appearances for Parties
Adv. for the Appellant(s):
Ms. Asmita Singh.
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, A.S.G., Prabhat Kumar, Bhadresh
Harikant, Ms. Jayati Sharma, Ms. Pallavi Sharma.
Petitioner-in-person.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, J.
1. IA No. 61680 of 2025 seeking exemption from payment of court fee
is allowed.
2. Leave granted.
3. The present appeal arises out of the judgment and order dated
05.04.2024 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur
Bench, in Writ Petition No. 1200 of 2023, whereby the writ petition
preferred by the Appellant came to be dismissed. The Appellant
also assails the order dated 11.11.2024 passed by the High Court
in MCA No. 357 of 2024, by which the review application preferred
by her was also rejected.
4. The dispute arises from the disciplinary proceedings initiated
against the Appellant, who was employed with the Maharashtra
262 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
State Electricity Distribution Company Limited (hereinafter referred
to as “MSEDCL”). The proceedings culminated in the order dated
12.07.2017, by which the Appellant was dismissed from service and
the period of suspension was directed to be treated as punishment.
The order of dismissal has been upheld by the Labour Court, the
Industrial Court and the High Court. Having failed before the said
fora, the Appellant has approached this Court.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
5. The Appellant, Surekha Domaji Bele, was appointed as a Lower
Division Clerk in the erstwhile Maharashtra State Electricity Board,
O&M Circle, Chandrapur, pursuant to the appointment order dated
01.04.1985. She joined the service on 02.04.1985. She was thereafter
promoted as an Upper Division Clerk with effect from 11.04.1988.
The Appellant was in the service of the Respondent-management
for more than two decades before the disciplinary proceedings that
form the subject matter of the present appeal were initiated, resulting
in her dismissal from service.
6. The record indicates that certain service disputes had arisen between
the Appellant and the management of MSEDCL much before the
disciplinary action in issue was initiated. The Appellant had been
reverted to the post of Lower Division Clerk on 29.09.1995, which
she challenged. She was thereafter transferred from Ballarsha to
the Warora Pole Factory on 16.01.2002, which she successfully
challenged, and the said transfer order was set aside on 24.06.2003.
The Appellant also stated that she had initiated proceedings under the
Payment of Wages Act and other proceedings in respect of her service
grievances. According to the Appellant, the subsequent disciplinary
action was a counterblast to the proceedings she initiated against
the management. The Respondent, however, has maintained that
the disciplinary proceedings were founded upon acts of misconduct
affecting discipline and office functioning.
7. On 04.09.2006, the Appellant was placed under suspension
pending enquiry. The suspension order alleged acts of indiscipline,
insubordination, disobedience of superior officers, tampering with
official documents and negligence. The suspension order also
recorded that during the period of suspension the Appellant would be
entitled to the subsistence allowance as per rules. It further directed
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 263
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
her to mark attendance once every week, on Wednesday, at the
office of the Executive Engineer, O&M Division, MSEDCL, Warora.
The Appellant’s case is that the direction to report at Warora was
unjustified because her earlier transfer to Warora had already been
set aside. The Respondent’s case is that the reporting condition was
validly imposed under the Service Regulations and that the Appellant
did not comply with the same.
8. A charge-sheet dated 19.09.2006 was then issued to the Appellant.
Broadly stated, the charges alleged indiscipline, insubordination
or misbehaviour, disobedience of superior officers, tampering with
official documents, negligence in the discharge of duty, and misuse
of company property. The Appellant did not file a reply to the charge-
sheet, but instead sought copies of certain documents. According to
her, although she requested those documents on 26.11.2006, they
were supplied only on 18.02.2008.
9. The domestic enquiry was thereafter taken up in March 2008. The
Appellant’s case is that the enquiry was scheduled on 24.03.2008, but
she was required to appear as a witness in another proceeding on that
date. The enquiry then was adjourned to 25.03.2008. On 25.03.2008,
the Appellant appeared before the Enquiry Officer and sought further
time of 8 to 10 days to participate in the enquiry. However, the request
was declined. The Enquiry Officer then proceeded ex parte, examined
five witnesses in the absence of the Appellant and closed the enquiry.
10. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 25.04.2008. Based on
the said enquiry report, the Respondent issued a show-cause notice
dated 25.04.2008 proposing dismissal from service. The Appellant
challenged the said show-cause notice by filing Complaint (ULP)
No. 34 of 2008 before the Labour Court, Chandrapur.
11. The Labour Court, by order dated 29.11.2014, held that the enquiry
was not fair and the finding was perverse. The Respondent-
management then challenged the said order of the Labour Court
before the Industrial Court by filing Revision (ULP) No. 4 of 2015.
By order dated 14.08.2015, the Industrial Court set aside the Labour
Court’s order dated 29.11.2014 and remanded the matter to the
Labour Court by permitting the Respondent-management to establish
the misconduct by leading evidence before the Labour Court, since
the domestic enquiry had been found not to be fair.
264 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
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12. After remand, proceedings in Complaint (ULP) No. 34 of 2008
resumed before the Labour Court. The Respondent-management
led evidence before the Labour Court to prove the misconduct. The
Appellant sought an opportunity to respond to the charge-sheet
in view of the post-remand proceedings, but the said request was
declined. Upon consideration of the evidence adduced before it, the
Labour Court, by judgment dated 27.06.2017, held that the misconduct
stood proved. The Labour Court also held that the show-cause notice
dated 25.04.2008 was legal and proper and accordingly, dismissed
the Complaint (ULP) No. 34 of 2008.
13. The judgment dated 27.06.2017 of the Labour Court is material for the
present appeal because the misconduct was ultimately sustained in a
manner different from the earlier domestic enquiry. The show-cause
notice dated 25.04.2008 had been issued based on the domestic
enquiry. That enquiry, however, did not remain the effective foundation
for sustaining the misconduct, since it was held to be perverse and
the management was thereafter permitted by the Industrial Court to
prove the charges by leading evidence before the Labour Court after
remand. The misconduct was ultimately held proved based on such
evidence led before the Labour Court. Thus, though the finding of
misconduct has attained finality, the foundation on which such finding
rested was the post-remand adjudication before the Labour Court,
and not the earlier domestic enquiry report. This distinction has to be
kept in mind while we examine the Appellant’s grievance regarding
Regulation 88(j) of the MSEDCL Employees Services Regulations,
2005 (hereinafter referred to as “Service Regulations”).
14. After the Labour Court dismissed the Complaint (ULP) No. 34
of 2008 on 27.06.2017, the Respondent passed the order dated
12.07.2017 dismissing the Appellant from service. By the same
order, the Respondent directed that the period of suspension shall
be treated as punishment. The dismissal order records that the
Appellant had not submitted any explanation to the show-cause
notice dated 25.04.2008. The Appellant’s grievance is that the
Respondent relied on that earlier show-cause notice, though the
misconduct was ultimately sustained on the basis of evidence led
before the Labour Court after remand. No fresh notice was issued
after the findings recorded in the de novo proceedings before the
Labour Court.
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 265
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
15. The Appellant challenged the Labour Court’s judgment dated
27.06.2017 by filing Revision (ULP) No. 37 of 2017 before the
Industrial Court. The said revision was dismissed by the Industrial
Court on 08.06.2018. The Appellant did not challenge that order
further.
16. The Appellant subsequently challenged the dismissal order dated
12.07.2017 by filing Complaint (ULP) No. 28 of 2017 before the Labour
Court. In the said complaint, she questioned the dismissal order on
several grounds, including the competence of the disciplinary authority
to pass the dismissal order, absence of proper post-enquiry show-
cause notice, non-payment of subsistence allowance, illegal treatment
of the suspension period as punishment, and disproportionality of
the penalty of dismissal.
17. By judgment dated 08.08.2019, the Labour Court dismissed the
Complaint (ULP) No. 28 of 2017. It held that the Appellant could not
reopen the finding of misconduct, since the said finding had already
been recorded in Complaint (ULP) No. 34 of 2008 and affirmed in
revision by the Industrial Court. The Labour Court further held that
the Executive Engineer was competent to impose the punishment
of dismissal, that no fresh show-cause notice was required, that the
treatment of the suspension period as punishment was valid, and
that the punishment of dismissal could not be said to be shockingly
disproportionate.
18. The Appellant carried the matter in Revision (ULP) No. 14 of 2019
before the Industrial Court. By judgment dated 18.01.2023, the
Industrial Court dismissed the revision and affirmed the Labour
Court’s judgment dated 08.08.2019. The Industrial Court held that
the issue of misconduct had attained finality, that the dismissal order
was passed by the competent disciplinary authority, and that no
interference was warranted with the punishment imposed.
19. The Appellant thereafter filed a writ petition, viz., Writ Petition No.
1200 of 2023 before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur
Bench. The High Court, by judgment dated 05.04.2024, dismissed
the writ petition. It upheld the concurrent findings of the Labour Court
and the Industrial Court. The High Court rejected the Appellant’s
contentions regarding lack of competency of the disciplinary authority,
non-conformity to the prescribed format of the dismissal order, show-
cause notice, treatment of suspension period and proportionality of
266 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
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punishment. The review application filed by the Appellant in MCA No.
357 of 2024 was also dismissed by the High Court on 11.11.2024.
20. The Appellant had earlier approached this Court in SLP(C) No. 1400
of 2025. By order dated 14.02.2025, this Court permitted withdrawal
of the said petition with liberty to file a fresh petition on the same and
subsequent cause of actions and further directed that delay would
not come in the way if the fresh petition was filed within the time
indicated. The present appeal arises in this background.
21. The material sequence may therefore be stated briefly. The Appellant
was suspended on 04.09.2006. She was charge-sheeted on 19.09.2006
and was served with a show-cause notice dated 25.04.2008 after the
domestic enquiry. The domestic enquiry was thereafter found not to be
fair. In revision, the Industrial Court remanded the matter to the Labour
Court on 14.08.2015 and permitted the Respondent-management
to prove the misconduct before the Labour Court rather than hold a
fresh domestic enquiry. Upon remand, evidence was led before the
Labour Court and misconduct was held proved by judgment dated
27.06.2017. The Respondent thereafter passed the dismissal order
dated 12.07.2017 relying on the earlier show-cause notice dated
25.04.2008. The Appellant’s challenge to the finding of misconduct
in Revision (ULP) No. 37 of 2017 failed and was not carried further.
Her separate challenge to the dismissal order also failed before the
Labour Court, the Industrial Court and the High Court.
22. The finding of misconduct has, therefore, attained finality and is
not being reopened in the present appeal. The question before us
is narrower. It is whether, after the domestic enquiry was found
defective and the misconduct was thereafter proved before the
Labour Court in the de novo proceedings, the Respondent could
impose dismissal by relying substantially on the earlier show-cause
notice dated 25.04.2008 which was based on the domestic enquiry
was earlier found to be vitiated by the Labour Court. The connected
questions relate to the competence of the disciplinary authority, denial
of subsistence allowance, treatment of the suspension period as
punishment, and proportionality of the dismissal order.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
23. The Appellant submitted that the order of dismissal is without
the authority of law. According to her, she was appointed by the
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 267
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
Superintending Engineer and, therefore, could not have been
dismissed by the Executive Engineer a post lower to Superintending
Engineer. It was urged that the courts below failed to appreciate that
the punishment of dismissal could not be imposed by an authority
lower than the appointing authority.
24. The Appellant submits that the Regulation 88(j) of the MSEDCL
Employees Service Regulations contemplates a notice after the
departmental enquiry is completed, communicating the findings of
the competent authority and calling upon the employee to show
cause against the contemplated punishment. The show-cause
notice dated 25.04.2008 was issued based on the domestic
enquiry, but the Labour Court subsequently found that enquiry
defective. Pursuant to the remand by the Industrial Court, the
Respondent-management led evidence before the Labour Court
and the misconduct was proved in the de novo proceedings
before the Labour Court and not by way of a domestic enquiry.
According to the Appellant, once the finding was based on the de
novo adjudication before the Labour Court, a fresh notice under
Regulation 88(j) was mandatory before imposing the penalty of
dismissal. It is urged that reliance on the earlier show-cause notice,
which was based on a domestic enquiry that was held defective,
is contrary to the mandate of Regulation 88(j).
25. The Appellant has also urged that she was not paid subsistence
allowance during suspension from 04.09.2006 till the date of dismissal
on 12.07.2017, a period of nearly eleven years. It is submitted that
subsistence allowance is a means of survival and of effective defence.
While the Appellant acknowledges that the suspension order required
reporting at Warora, she contends that complete denial of subsistence
allowance for such a long period could not be mechanically justified
merely on that basis, especially when there is no finding of gainful
employment elsewhere and when the Service Regulations themselves
require review of suspension beyond six months.
26. The Appellant also submits that the punishment of dismissal was
grossly disproportionate, and that, in addition, the dismissal order also
treated the period of suspension as punishment, thereby imposing
two consequences by way of punishment for the same misconduct
arising out of the same proceeding. She also submitted that she had
rendered about twenty-one years of service before the disciplinary
268 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
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proceedings were initiated. It is submitted that several allegations
resemble minor lapses under Schedule A of Regulation 86, and that
there was no allegation of financial misappropriation, corruption, moral
turpitude or pecuniary loss to the employer, and that the competent
authority did not apply its mind to the long service, previous conduct
and the possibility of imposing a lesser penalty.
27. Per contra, the Respondent supports the judgments of the Labour
Court, the Industrial Court and the High Court. The Respondent
submits that the misconduct had been proved before the Labour
Court after the management led the evidence. That finding of the
Labour Court was tested in revision before the Industrial Court and
attained finality. The Respondent submits that the Appellant cannot
now be permitted to reopen the finding of misconduct in the later
proceedings challenging the dismissal order.
28. The Respondent further submits that no fresh show-cause notice
was required, since the earlier show-cause notice had been held
legal and proper by the Labour Court and Industrial Court. On the
quantum of punishment, it is submitted that the charges were serious,
related to discipline and office functioning, and therefore dismissal
could not be said to be disproportionate. On the issue of subsistence
allowance, the Respondent relies on the reporting condition in the
suspension order and contends that the Appellant did not comply
with the said condition.
ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
29. Upon considering the record and the rival submissions, the following
questions arise for consideration:
Firstly, whether the dismissal order dated 12.07.2017 was passed
by the competent authority;
Secondly, whether a fresh show-cause notice for punishment was
required after the de novo proceedings before the Labour Court;
Thirdly, whether the plea relating to subsistence allowance requires
reconsideration;
Fourthly, whether the direction treating the suspension period as
punishment is valid; and
Fifthly, whether the punishment of dismissal is disproportionate.
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 269
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
FIRST ISSUE - WHETHER THE DISMISSAL ORDER DATED
12.07.2017 WAS PASSED BY THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY
30. The Appellant has laid considerable emphasis on the fact that she
was appointed by the Superintending Engineer but dismissed by the
Executive Engineer. According to her, the dismissal order is invalid
because it was passed by an authority lower than the appointing
authority.
31. The courts below examined the applicable MSEDCL Employees
Service Regulations and found that the Appellant was a Pay Grade-III
employee. They further held that, under the relevant regulations and
schedules governing disciplinary action, the Executive Engineer was
competent to impose punishment on an employee belonging to that
category. The High Court also considered the Appellant’s reliance
on the schedule relating to transfers and held that the said schedule
did not govern dismissal from service.
32. The question of competence has to be determined with reference to
the service regulations governing the employee. If the regulations
empower a particular authority to impose punishment on a specified
category of employees, the order cannot be set aside merely on a
general proposition that the authority that passed the punishment
order should not be below the authority that issued the appointment
order. The Appellant has not established that the Executive Engineer
was excluded from exercising the power of disciplinary authority
under the applicable Regulations.
33. The relevant entry in the Service Regulations expressly deals with
the authority competent to dismiss or remove an employee from
service. The relevant entry reads as follows:
“Sr. No. 44 - Regulation No. 25 - To dismiss or
remove from service after following the prescribed
procedure.
Competent Authority: Appointing Authority as prescribed
in Third Schedule.
OR
The Competent Authority prescribed in Schedule ‘C’.”
34. Relevant portion of Schedule ‘C’ reads as follows:
270 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
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Sr. Category of Competent Appellate 2nd Appellate
No. employees Authority Authority Authority if
(for 1st Appeal) 2nd appeal is
permitted by
the Appellate
Authority
iii) Employees Officers of Officers of the Head of
in Pay Gr.III the rank rank of S.E. or Department.
in the Field of E.E./ equivalent &
(excluding A.C.P.O./ above.
employees in E.E.(Stores)/
Security Deptt.) A.C.O.S. or
equivalent &
above.
35. The Appellant’s challenge to the competence of the Executive
Engineer also rests substantially on the protection contained in
Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India. There can be no dispute
that if Article 311(1) applies, no service regulation can override that
constitutional protection. However, the threshold question is whether
the Appellant, being an employee of MSEDCL, has established that
she held a civil post under the Union or the State. In S.L. Agarwal v.
General Manager, Hindustan Steel Ltd., (1970) 1 SCC 177, a
Constitution Bench of this Court considered whether an employee
of Hindustan Steel Ltd. could claim protection under Article 311. The
relevant portion reads as follows:
“6. The question that arises in this case is : whether the
employees of a Corporation such as the Hindustan Steel
Ltd., are entitled to the protection of Art. 311? This question
can only be answered in favour of the Appellant if we hold
that the Appellant held a civil post under the Union. It was
conceded before us that the Appellant could not be said
to belong to the civil service of the Union or the State. Art.
311, on which this contention is based, reads as follows :
‘311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons
employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State.
(1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the
Union or an all-India service or a civil service or a State
or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 271
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that
by which he was appointed.”
The Constitution Bench thereafter rejected the argument that
employment under a Government-controlled company would, by
itself, amount to holding a civil post under the Union. The relevant
concluding paragraph reads as follows:
“10…The existence of shareholders, of capital raised by
the issuance of shares, the lack of connection between the
finances of the corporation and the consolidated fund of
the Union rather make out a greater independent existence
than that of the corporation in the English case. We must,
therefore, hold that the corporation which is Hindustan
Steel Limited in this case is not a department of the
Government nor are the servants of it holding posts
under the State. It has its independent existence and
by law relating to Corporations it is distinct even from its
members. In these circumstances, the Appellant, who was
an employee of Hindustan Steel Limited, does not answer
the description of a holder of ‘a civil post under the Union’
as stated in the article. The Appellant was not entitled to
the protection of Art. 311. The High Court was therefore
right in not affording him the protection. The appeal fails
and is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case we
make no order about costs.”
36. The broader principle is that a corporation or company having a legal
personality distinct from the Government is not, merely because of
Government ownership or control, is to be treated as a Government
department for the purpose of Article 311. What is material is whether
the employee holds a civil post under the Union or State or not. In
the present case, it has not been established that the Appellant holds
a civil post thus, entitled to the protection as envisaged in Article
311 of the Constitution.
37. We therefore find no error in the concurrent finding that the Executive
Engineer was competent to pass the order of dismissal.
SECOND ISSUE - WHETHER A FRESH SHOW-CAUSE NOTICE
FOR PUNISHMENT WAS REQUIRED AFTER THE DE NOVO
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE LABOUR COURT
272 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
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38. The Appellant’s principal submission is that the show-cause notice
dated 25.04.2008 was issued on the basis of the domestic enquiry.
That enquiry was thereafter found to be not fair. The Industrial Court,
by order dated 14.08.2015, remanded the matter to the Labour
Court and permitted the Respondent-management to establish the
misconduct before the Labour Court. According to the Appellant,
once misconduct was proved in the de novo proceedings before the
Labour Court, the Respondent could not have mechanically acted
upon the earlier show-cause notice issued based on the earlier
domestic enquiry which was found to be defective.
39. The submission requires consideration in the light of Regulation 88(j)
of the MSEDCL Service Regulations. Regulation 88(j), titled “Show
Cause Notice”, reads as follows:
“After the enquiry is completed, the Competent Authority
shall serve a notice on the employee communicating to
him its findings and asking him to show cause within a
specified time as to why the contemplated punishment
involving dismissal, removal or reversion or withholding of
increment/s should not be inflicted on him. The employee
may be supplied with a copy of the findings of the
Competent Authority or of those of the Enquiry Officer,
as the case may be, or he may be given an opportunity
to take a copy of such findings.”
40. The language of Regulation 88(j) is significant. It contemplates a
notice to be issued after the enquiry is completed. The purpose
of such notice is not an empty formality. The employee must be
informed of the findings based on which the competent authority
proposes to impose punishment and must be given an opportunity
to show cause why the contemplated punishment should not be
inflicted.
41. The rationale underlying such opportunity was stated by this Court
in Khem Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 300, where this
Court observed as follows:
“18. In addition to showing that he has not been guilty
of any misconduct so as to merit any punishment, it is
reasonable that he should also have an opportunity to
contend that the charges proved against him do not
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 273
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
necessarily require the particular punishment proposed
to be meted out to him. He may say, for instance, that
although he has been guilty of some misconduct it is not
of such a character as to merit the extreme punishment
of dismissal or even of removal or reduction in rank and
that any of the lesser punishments ought to be sufficient
in his case…”
and
“19. To summarise: the reasonable opportunity envisaged
by the provision under consideration includes-
(a) an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his
innocence...
(b) an opportunity to defend himself by cross-
examining the witnesses produced against him...
and finally
(c) an opportunity to make his representation as to
why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted
on him…”
42. We are conscious that a second opportunity against proposed
punishment is not a mandate in every disciplinary proceeding.
However, where the applicable service regulation expressly provides
for a post-enquiry notice communicating the findings and calling upon
the employee to show cause against the contemplated punishment,
the authority must comply with that regulation. In the present
case, therefore, the issue arises not as an abstract constitutional
requirement, but from the express language of Regulation 88(j).
43. In Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727,
this Court emphasized the importance of giving the delinquent
employee an opportunity to meet the findings which may
influence the disciplinary authority. The relevant passage reads as
follows:
“57. The findings or recommended punishment by
the enquiry officer are likely to affect the mind of the
disciplinary authority in his concluding the guilt or penalty
to be imposed. The delinquent is, therefore, entitled to
meet the reasoning, controvert the conclusions reached
274 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
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by the enquiry officer or is entitled to explain the effect of
the evidence recorded... Even if the disciplinary authority
comes to the conclusion that charge or charges is/are
proved, the case may not warrant imposition of any penalty.
He may plead mitigating or extenuating circumstances to
impose no punishment or a lesser punishment. For this
purpose the delinquent needs reasonable opportunity or
fair play in action.”
44. The Respondent is correct in submitting that where a domestic
enquiry is found defective, the employer may be permitted to prove
the misconduct before the Labour Court. In Workmen of Firestone
Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. v. Management, (1973) 1 SCC
813, this Court held that:
“37…Therefore, the position is that even now the employer
is entitled to adduce evidence for the first time before the
Tribunal even if he had held no enquiry or the enquiry held
by him is found to be defective. Of course, an opportunity
will have to be given to the workman to lead evidence
contra... This right in the management to sustain its order
by adducing independent evidence, before the Tribunal,
if no enquiry has been held or if the enquiry is held to be
defective, has been given judicial recognition over a long
period of years.”
45. This Court further held in Workmen of Firestone (supra) that, when
such evidence is adduced before the Tribunal, it is the Tribunal which
has to be satisfied on the question of guilt. The relevant paragraph
reads as follows:
“39. Having held that the right of the employer to adduce
evidence continues even under the new section, it is
needless to state that, when such evidence is adduced for
the first time, it is the Tribunal which has to be satisfied on
such evidence about the guilt or otherwise of the workman
concerned...
40. It has to consider the evidence and come to a
conclusion one way or other.”
46. The principle in Workmen of Firestone (supra) enables the employer
to sustain the charge of misconduct by leading evidence before the
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 275
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
Labour Court where the domestic enquiry is defective. That principle,
however, operates at the stage of proving misconduct. It does not
dispense with the disciplinary authority’s duty to consider the findings
that ultimately survive and to decide the appropriate penalty under the
applicable Service Regulations. The Labour Court decides whether
misconduct is proved. The competent disciplinary authority decides
what punishment should follow.
47. The Appellant’s submission has to be examined from this limited
perspective. After the domestic enquiry was found defective, the
Respondent-management was permitted to adduce evidence before
the Labour Court. The Appellant was a party to those proceedings. The
Labour Court considered the evidence and held that the misconduct
stood proved. That finding was carried in revision before the Industrial
Court and attained finality. The Appellant cannot, therefore, reopen
the finding of misconduct merely on the ground that no fresh notice
was issued after the Labour Court recorded its finding. The issue
is whether the disciplinary authority, while imposing dismissal on
12.07.2017, could rely substantially on the earlier show-cause notice
dated 25.04.2008, though misconduct was ultimately proved in a
different manner, namely by adducing evidence adduced before the
Labour Court after remand.
48. The show-cause notice dated 25.04.2008 was undoubtedly issued
after the domestic enquiry. But the foundation of that notice was
the domestic enquiry report. Once the domestic enquiry was found
defective, the legally sustainable basis for holding misconduct proved
was no longer the domestic enquiry report, but the finding recorded
by the Labour Court after evidence was led before it.
49. We are conscious that the Labour Court and the Industrial Court
are adjudicatory bodies, that the Appellant had participated in the
proceedings before those fora, and that the show-cause notice dated
25.04.2008 was not invalidated. Therefore, the absence of a fresh
notice after the Labour Court’s finding cannot be treated as causing
prejudice in relation to the adjudication of guilt or misconduct.
50. However, the question of punishment stands on a different footing.
The disciplinary authority was required to consider the findings
which ultimately survived, namely the findings recorded in the de
novo adjudication before the Labour Court, and thereafter apply its
mind to the appropriate punishment. This consideration necessarily
276 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
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included the gravity of the misconduct, the nature of the charges
proved, the Appellant’s long service, past record, absence or presence
of financial loss or dishonesty, and whether a lesser penalty would
meet the ends of justice.
51. The dismissal order dated 12.07.2017 proceeds substantially on the
footing that a show-cause notice had already been issued after the
departmental enquiry and that no explanation had been received
from the Appellant. Such an approach does not sufficiently reflect
independent consideration by the competent authority of the findings
recorded after remand by the Labour Court, or of the factors relevant
to the quantum of punishment. The Appellant’s failure to reply to the
earlier show-cause notice could not have been treated as conclusive
when the enquiry on which that notice was founded had itself been
found defective and the misconduct was subsequently thereafter
established through a separate adjudicatory process and not before
the departmental forum.
52. The Labour Court, in Complaint (ULP) No. 34 of 2008, held that
misconduct stood proved and that the show-cause notice dated
25.04.2008 was legal and proper. That finding was affirmed in
revision. But the question before us is not merely whether the
earlier show-cause notice was valid when issued. The question is
whether the disciplinary authority could impose dismissal by relying
substantially on the earlier notice, without independently considering
the findings which ultimately survived after remand and without giving
the Appellant an opportunity to place her explanation on the quantum
of punishment in the light of those later findings.
53. We also clarify the role of the Labour Court in the post-remand
proceedings. Once the domestic enquiry was found defective and
the Respondent-management was permitted to prove the misconduct
before the Labour Court, the Labour Court was required to decide
whether the charges stood proved on the evidence adduced before
it. Any observation by the Labour Court describing the misconduct
as grave or serious could not substitute the independent satisfaction
of the competent authority on the question of penalty. Similarly, the
finding that the earlier show-cause notice dated 25.04.2008 was legal
and proper could not relieve the competent authority of its obligation
to consider the findings which ultimately survived after remand and
to apply its own mind on the quantum of punishment.
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 277
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
54. Regulation 88(j) contemplates that, after the enquiry is completed,
the competent authority shall communicate its findings and call upon
the employee to show cause against the contemplated punishment.
In the peculiar facts of the present case, the enquiry which ultimately
sustained the charges was the de novo adjudication before the Labour
Court after the earlier enquiry was found defective. Therefore, the
decision-making process on punishment could not be treated as
complete merely because the earlier show-cause notice was held
valid.
55. We, therefore, clarify that our concern is limited to the decision-
making process before imposing punishment. Since the disciplinary
authority proceeded substantially on the earlier show-cause notice
founded on the defective domestic enquiry and did not undertake
a fresh consideration of punishment on the basis of the findings by
the Labour Court which ultimately survived after remand, the order
of dismissal dated 12.07.2017 cannot be sustained. Even if the
show-cause notice dated 25.04.2008 was held valid, the seven days’
time granted under that notice had long expired. The Respondent
under the circumstances ought to have called upon the Appellant
afresh to submit her response against the proposed punishment in
the light of the findings recorded by the Labour Court after remand.
56. We, accordingly, hold that non-service of a fresh notice after the Labour
Court’s de novo finding does not vitiate the finding of misconduct,
since the Appellant was a party to the adjudicatory proceedings
before the Labour Court and the Industrial Court. However, the
disciplinary authority was required to apply its independent mind to
the findings which ultimately survived after remand to the question
of appropriate punishment and issue a fresh show-cause notice on
the proposed punishment, for the period of reply in terms of the
earlier show-cause notice dated 25.04.2008 had long expired and
the basis of it also does not exist.
57. Accordingly, while the finding of misconduct remains undisturbed, the
matter deserves to be remitted to the competent authority for fresh
consideration as regards the quantum of punishment by issuing a
fresh show-cause notice. The Appellant shall be given an opportunity
to place her explanation as regards the punishment. The competent
authority shall thereafter pass a reasoned order about the punishment
proposed to be imposed on the Appellant.
278 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
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THIRD ISSUE - WHETHER THE PLEA RELATING TO SUBSISTENCE
ALLOWANCE REQUIRES RECONSIDERATION
58. The Appellant has urged that she was not paid subsistence allowance
during the entire period of suspension, i.e. from 04.09.2006 till the
order of dismissal dated 12.07.2017. The period of suspension
continued for nearly eleven years. The grievance cannot be treated
as a mere monetary claim of a routine nature. Subsistence allowance
is intended to preserve the suspended employee’s minimum means
of survival and to enable her to effectively defend herself in the
disciplinary proceedings.
59. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan Tale, (1983) 3 SCC 387,
this Court explained that subsistence allowance is the bare minimum
required for maintenance. This Court held that;
“20…If the civil servant under suspension, pending a
departmental enquiry or a criminal trial started against
him, is entitled to subsistence allowance at the normal rate
which is a bare minimum required for the maintenance
of the civil servant and his family, he should undoubtedly
get it... Whether he is lodged in prison or released on bail
on his conviction pending consideration of his appeal, his
family requires the bare minimum by way of subsistence
allowance. Subsistence allowance provided for... at the
nominal rate of Re. 1 per month is illusory and meaningless.”
60. This Court further observed in the same decision that it would be
impossible for a civil servant under suspension, who has no other
means of subsistence, to defend himself effectively without payment
of subsistence allowance. The principle is that the subsistence
allowance must be real and meaningful because the employee is
kept away from work and is not permitted to earn a regular salary
during suspension; hence, it ordinarily cannot be denied.
61. In O.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1987) 4 SCC 328, this Court
emphasized that suspension cannot be continued indefinitely and
that disciplinary proceedings must be concluded with reasonable
diligence. The relevant principle was stated thus:
“15…It is a clear principle of natural justice that the
delinquent officer when placed under suspension is entitled
to represent that the departmental proceedings should be
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 279
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
concluded with reasonable diligence and within a reasonable
period of time. If such a principle were not recognised, it
would imply that the executive is being vested with a totally
arbitrary and unfettered power of placing its officers under
disability and distress for an indefinite duration.”
62. In Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India, (2015) 7 SCC 291,
this Court again cautioned against unduly prolonged suspension. It
directed:
“21. We, therefore, direct that the currency of a Suspension
Order should not extend beyond three months if within
this period the Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet
is not served on the delinquent officer/employee; if the
Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet is served a
reasoned order must be passed for the extension of the
suspension.”
63. The above decisions do not mean that every suspension beyond
a particular period will be automatically void in all cases, but they
underline an important principle that suspension is not to become
an indefinite condition of civil and economic disability.
64. At the same time, the Respondent is right in submitting that the
reporting condition in the present case cannot be ignored altogether.
Regulation 88(a)(i) of the Service Regulations empowers the
competent authority to direct a suspended employee to report to it or
to any other officer at such intervals as may be deemed necessary
during the period of suspension. Regulation 88(a)(i) reads as follows:
“An employee charged for an act of misconduct or against
whom a case in respect of criminal offence is under
investigation, enquiry or trial is liable to be suspended by
the Competent Authority if his continuance in the post held
by him or in the office in which he is working is likely to
vitiate the enquiry or to become otherwise detrimental to
the proceedings or to the interest of the Organization. The
Competent Authority may in its discretion direct an
employee who has been suspended to report to it or
to any other Officer at such interval as may be deemed
necessary by it during the period of suspension.”
65. Regulation 88(a)(ii), however, is equally material. It shows that
suspension is not contemplated to be an indefinite state of suspension
280 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
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and continuation beyond six months requires review. Regulation
88(a)(ii) reads as follows:
“(a) In case where an employee is suspended as provided
in S.R.88(a)(i), the Competent Authority, who ordered
suspension shall revoke the suspension, if preliminary
enquiries instituted against him are completed and
also disciplinary action completed within a period of six
months.
(b) In case, where the preliminary enquiries are not
completed and disciplinary action is yet to start and
the suspension of an employee is continued beyond
six months, then the case shall be referred to the
next higher authority of the Suspending Authority
with a detailed report giving the reasons for delay, if
any, together with specific recommendations of the
Suspending Authority for review of suspension. On
receipt of such report, the next higher authority of
the Suspending Authority shall consider the matter
and take the appropriate decision as to whether the
suspension is to be continued or revoked.”
66. Regulation 88(a)(iii), which deals with subsistence allowance, reads
as follows:
“An employee shall, during the period of suspension, be
eligible to a Subsistence Allowance as the Competent
Authority may decide which shall in no case exceed 50
percent of the Basic Pay that he was drawing prior to his
suspension in addition to the full Dearness Allowance.
Entitlement to Subsistence Allowance shall be dependent
upon compliance by the employee under suspension or
reporting his presence as directed in his suspension order
subject to leave of absence that may be granted to him
by the Competent Authority.”
67. The suspension order dated 04.09.2006 also contained two relevant
clauses. First, it recorded that during suspension the Appellant
would be entitled, as per MSEDCL rules, to subsistence allowance.
Secondly, it directed the Appellant to mark attendance once in a
week at Warora. The relevant portions read as follows:
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 281
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
“As per rules of the MSEDCL, during the period of
suspension you will be entitled to get 50% basic pay +
other allowances as per rule, subsistence allowance.”
and
“...you are directed to mark your attendance once in a week
on Wednesday or if there is public holiday on Wednesday,
on that second day in the office of E.E. O&M Dn. MSEDCL,
Warora at 10.00 a.m.”
68. Thus, the reporting condition had a regulatory foundation and
cannot be treated as wholly extraneous. However, the existence of
a reporting condition does not mean that subsistence allowance can
be mechanically denied for the entire period of nearly eleven years
without examining the effect of the remaining parts of Regulation 88.
The object of requiring a suspended employee to report is to ensure
that the employee remains available to the employer, does not evade
the proceedings, and does not take advantage of suspension by
engaging in gainful employment elsewhere or becoming unavailable.
In the present case, there is no finding before us that the Appellant
was gainfully employed elsewhere during the period of suspension.
69. A conjoint reading of Regulation 88(a)(i), Regulation 88(a)(ii) and
Regulation 88(a)(iii) is therefore necessary. Regulation 88(a)(i)
permits the competent authority to impose a reporting condition during
suspension. Regulation 88(a)(iii) makes entitlement to subsistence
allowance dependent upon compliance with such reporting direction,
subject to leave of absence that may be granted by the competent
authority. However, these provisions cannot be read apart from
Regulation 88(a)(ii), which requires review if suspension continues
beyond six months. The Regulations do not contemplate that an
employee may remain under suspension indefinitely on the strength of
the original suspension order alone. Once the suspension crosses six
months, its continuation must be reviewed in the manner contemplated
by Regulation 88(a)(ii). In the absence of such review, continued
reliance on the original suspension order would be contrary to the
Regulations.
70. The present case is not an ordinary case of short suspension.
The Appellant was suspended on 04.09.2006. The first period of
six months expired on 03.03.2007. She nevertheless continued
282 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
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under suspension till the dismissal order dated 12.07.2017, i.e., for
nearly eleven years. During this period, she was required to defend
herself in the departmental process, before the Labour Court, and
in connected proceedings. Denial of subsistence allowance for such
a prolonged period directly affects the employee’s ability to survive
and to defend herself effectively.
71. For the period from 04.09.2006 to 03.03.2007, the original reporting
condition in the suspension order may be relevant while considering
the Appellant’s entitlement to subsistence allowance, including whether
leave of absence from reporting ought to have been sought or granted.
However, for the period after 03.03.2007, the Respondent cannot
rely solely on the original reporting condition to deny subsistence
allowance for the entire remaining period up to 12.07.2017.
72. The words “subject to leave of absence that may be granted to him
by the Competent Authority” in Regulation 88(a)(iii) must also be
understood in the same regulatory setting. The question of leave of
absence from reporting would properly arise during the subsistence
of a valid suspension order and reporting direction. Once the first six-
month period expired, the Respondent was required to show that the
suspension was reviewed and continued in accordance with Regulation
88(a)(ii). The original reporting condition cannot operate perpetually as
a ground to deny subsistence allowance for the post-six-month period,
which unfortunately is not on record nor justified by the Respondent.
73. We are, therefore, of the view that even if the Appellant’s non-reporting
at Warora is treated as relevant for the first six months, the position
after 03.03.2007 stands on a different footing. In the absence of any
order reviewing or validly continuing the suspension beyond six months
being shown on record, the Appellant shall be treated as eligible for
subsistence allowance for the period after 03.03.2007 till 12.07.2017.
74. With respect to the first six months, i.e., 04.09.2006 to 03.03.2007,
the Appellant’s explanation for not reporting at Warora also requires
consideration. Her case is that the direction to report at Warora was
unjustified because her earlier transfer to Warora had already been
set aside. Whether this explanation was sufficient for the initial six-
month period, and whether leave of absence from reporting ought
to have been granted, are matters which the competent authority
was required to examine.
75. Regulation 88(a)(v) further supports this view. It reads as follows:
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 283
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
“When an employee has not been wholly exonerated and
the period of suspension has been treated as punishment,
the employee shall not be eligible to any arrears of pay
and allowances for the period of suspension nor shall
the Subsistence Allowance already paid or payable
to the employee on any account be recoverable from
the employee.”
76. Regulation 88(a)(v), extracted above, uses the expression
“Subsistence Allowance already paid or payable”. The expression
“payable” is important. It shows that subsistence allowance occupies
a separate position from arrears of pay and allowances. Therefore,
even where the employee is not wholly exonerated and the suspension
period is not treated as duty, the subsistence allowance which was
payable under the Regulations cannot be denied merely because
the suspension period is later treated as punishment.
77. Accordingly, the claim for subsistence allowance shall be determined
in two parts. For the period from 04.09.2006 to 03.03.2007, the
authority shall consider the original reporting condition, the Appellant’s
explanation for non-reporting at Warora, the effect of her earlier
transfer to Warora having been set aside, and whether leave of
absence from reporting ought to have been granted. For the remaining
period after 03.03.2007 till 12.07.2017, the Appellant shall be treated
as eligible for subsistence allowance.
FOURTH ISSUE - WHETHER THE DIRECTION TREATING THE
SUSPENSION PERIOD AS PUNISHMENT IS VALID
78. The Appellant next contends that the dismissal order dated 12.07.2017
could not have further directed that the period of suspension shall
be treated as punishment. According to the Appellant, this direction
amounts to imposing an additional punishment for the same
misconduct arising out of the same disciplinary proceeding. This
contention has to be considered in the context of the fact that the
Appellant remained under suspension from 04.09.2006 till 12.07.2017,
i.e., for nearly eleven years.
79. Treating the entire suspension period as punishment may deprive the
employee of the ordinary service and monetary benefits attached to
that period, including arrears of pay and allowances, continuity-related
benefits, increments or other service advantages depending on the
284 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
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rules, and consequential retiral or terminal benefits. In the present
case, this consequence is particularly severe because the suspension
period was for nearly eleven years. Therefore, treating the entire
period as punishment is not a routine consequential adjustment. It
has the practical effect of depriving the Appellant of the standard
service benefits for a substantial part of her remaining service, apart
from the subsistence allowance which Regulation 88(a)(v) expressly
protects if it was already paid or payable.
80. At the outset, it is necessary to distinguish between two concepts
of suspension in service jurisprudence. First, suspension pending
enquiry, which is an interim departmental arrangement to facilitate
proper enquiry and is not, by itself, a form of punishment. Secondly,
suspension as a substantive form of punishment, where the applicable
rules expressly prescribe suspension as one of the penalties which
may be imposed after misconduct is proved.
81. Therefore, the Appellant’s suspension from 04.09.2006 was not, by
itself, a punishment. It was a suspension pending enquiry. The present
issue arises because, after imposing the penalty of dismissal from
service, the disciplinary authority further directed that the entire period
already spent under suspension shall also be treated as punishment.
82. Regulation 91 of the MSEDCL Employees Service Regulations
prescribes punishments for minor lapses and acts of misconduct.
Insofar as acts of misconduct are concerned, Regulation 91(2)
includes suspension, reversion, removal and dismissal as separate
punishments. The relevant portion reads:
“2. Acts of misconduct
(a) As in (d) above but for loss in excess of Rs.50,000/-
according to the gravity of the offence and the loss
incurred by the Company.
(b) Withholding of increment with cumulative effect.
(c) Stoppage of promotion.
(d) Suspension.
(e) Reversion to a lower post.
(f) Removal from service.
(g) Dismissal.”
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 285
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
83. Thus, while Regulation 91(2)(d) contemplates suspension as an
independent penalty, Regulation 88(a)(v) deals with the consequences
where an employee is not wholly exonerated and the suspension
period is treated as punishment. The Regulation 88(a)(v) has been
already quoted under para 75 (supra).
84. The aforesaid provision does contemplate that, where an employee
is not wholly exonerated, the period spent under suspension may be
treated as punishment if the disciplinary authority chooses to treat
the period of suspension as punishment for the misconduct proved.
However, it does not create an independent second substantive
penalty under Regulation 91 over and above the penalty of dismissal
imposed for the proved misconduct. The effect of such punishment
of suspension being imposed is that arrears of pay and allowances
for the suspension period, will be denied but subsistence allowance
already paid or payable cannot be forfeited or denied.
The said provision explains what would be the effect when the
disciplinary authority imposes the penalty of punishment by treating
the period of suspension as punishment.
85. If the authority describes the entire past suspension period as
punishment, in addition to imposing of the punishment of dismissal, a
question will arise whether imposition of such additional punishment
will be permissible under law.
86. In Union of India v. S.C. Parashar, (2006) 3 SCC 167, this Court
considered a case where the disciplinary authority had imposed
an amalgam of penalties in the same disciplinary proceeding. The
employee had been visited with reduction in pay, loss of seniority
and recovery of loss. This Court held as follows:
“12. The penalty imposed upon the Respondent is
an amalgam of minor penalty and major penalty. The
Respondent has been inflicted with three penalties : (1)
reduction to the minimum of the time-scale of pay for a
period of three years with cumulative effect; (2) loss of
seniority; and (3) recovery of 25% of the loss incurred
by the Government to the tune of Rs.74,341.89p., i.e.,
Rs.18,585.47p. on account of damage to the Gypsy in 18
(eighteen) equal monthly instalments. Whereas reduction of
time-scale of pay with cumulative effect is a major penalty
within the meaning of clause (v) of Rule 11 of the CCS
286 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
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Rules, loss of seniority and recovery of amount would come
within the purview of minor penalty, as envisaged by clause
(iii) and (iii)(a) thereof. The Disciplinary Authority, therefore,
in our opinion acted illegally and without jurisdiction in
imposing both minor and major penalties by the same order.
Such a course of action could not have been taken in law.”
87. The principle emerging from the aforesaid decision is that where the
service rules prescribe distinct penalties, the disciplinary authority
cannot impose an amalgam of separate substantive penalties for
the same misconduct unless the rules authorise such a course. The
order of punishment must therefore be tested with reference to the
penalties prescribed under the governing Regulations.
88. Accordingly, we hold that the Appellant cannot be visited with both
dismissal under Regulation 91(2)(g) and a separate punishment of
suspension under Regulation 91(2)(d) for the same misconduct.
The direction in the dismissal order dated 12.07.2017 treating the
suspension period as punishment shall not operate as an independent
or additional penalty over and above the harsher penalty finally imposed.
89. The competent authority shall, while passing the fresh order
on punishment, separately decide the service and monetary
consequences of the suspension period from 04.09.2006 to
12.07.2017 only in accordance with Regulation 88(a)(v). While doing
so, it shall keep in mind that subsistence allowance already paid or
payable stands protected under the said provision, and that the past
suspension period cannot be treated as an independent additional
punishment for the same misconduct, if the disciplinary authority
chooses a more severe punishment.
FIFTH ISSUE - WHETHER THE PUNISHMENT OF DISMISSAL IS
DISPROPORTIONATE
90. The Appellant has urged that the punishment of dismissal is grossly
disproportionate to the charges proved.
91. The Appellant has submitted that several allegations, even if accepted,
would fall within the category of minor lapses under Regulation 86(2)
read with Schedule A of the MSEDCL Employees Service Regulations,
2005. She has relied upon entries such as late attendance, irregular
attendance, absence without prior permission, minor negligence,
lack of courtesy towards colleagues and lack of respect towards
superiors not amounting to insubordination.
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 287
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
92. Regulation 86 classifies offences as follows:
“86. CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCES
(1) Offences are classified in two categories as shown
below-
(a) Minor lapses, and
(b) Acts of misconduct
(2) Minor lapses are those mentioned in Schedule ‘A’ (with
any modification that may be effected by the Company)
which may result in a punishment upto the limit prescribed
in (1) of the Statement below Regulation 91.
(3) Acts of misconduct are those which have been listed in
Schedule ‘B’ (with such modifications as may be specified by
the Company from time to time) for which maximum penalty
is as prescribed in (2) of the Statement below Service
Regulation 91 according to the gravity of the misconduct.
(4) Any minor lapse may be treated as an act of misconduct
if repeated for a third time within the period of one year
and may be dealt with accordingly.
Note: Schedules A and B appended to the Service
Regulations are only indicative of what could be deemed
as a minor lapse or act of misconduct. The list is neither
complete nor exhaustive. Such of the irregularities or
offences committed by an employee not included in the
list but commonly or generally known or understood to be
against the cannon of good behavior and discipline, may
be deemed to have been included in either of the two
schedules according to the nature and gravity of the offence
committed, at the discretion of the authority competent to
order departmental proceedings.”
93. Schedule A, on which the Appellant relies, enumerates minor
lapses. The relevant entries charged against Appellant are extracted
hereunder:
“SCHEDULE ‘A’
MINOR LAPSES
[See Service Regulation 86(2)]
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1. Late attendance on more than 3 occasions in a month.
2.Irregular attendance.
4.Absence without prior permission.
6. Instances of carelessness of minor nature.
7. Minor negligence in the discharge of duties assigned.
8. Instances of lack of normal courtesy towards colleagues
and subordinates.
14. Lacking in sense of respect towards superiors (not
amounting to disrespect or insubordination).
Note: Any of the above instances of misbehavior may, at
the discretion of the Competent Authority, be treated as
an act of misconduct according to the circumstances and
gravity of the misbehavior.”
94. Schedule B deals with acts of misconduct. The entries relevant to
the present case are as follows:
“SCHEDULE ‘B’
ACTS OF MISCONDUCT
[See Service Regulation 86(3)]
9. Indiscipline.
12. Insubordination, insolence, impertinence, rude and
uncivil behavior or commission of any act subversive of
good behavior.
13. Disobedience of any order of the superior officer or
a senior officer.
14.Theft, embezzlement, fraud, falsification of account,
tampering with official documents, breach of trust,
misappropriation or dishonesty in connection with the
affairs or property of the Company.
22. Breach of any Rules, Regulation, Circulars, Orders
or Instructions.
23. Negligence or neglect of work.”
95. Regulation 91 prescribes the punishments for minor lapses and acts
of misconduct. The material portion reads as follows:
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 289
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
“91. PUNISHMENTS FOR MINOR LAPSES AND ACTS
OF MISCONDUCT
The following punishments are prescribed for minor lapses
and acts of misconduct.
1. Minor lapses
(a) Warning
(b) Reprimand
(c) Fine up to 1/3rd of the gross salary of the
employee.
(d) Recovery from gross salary / or an encashment
of leave at the time of retirement to make up wholly
or partly the pecuniary loss caused to the Company
due to negligence or breach of orders (amounts less
than Rs.50,000/-).
(e) Withholding of increment without cumulative effect.
2. Acts of misconduct
(a) As in (d) above but for loss in excess of Rs.50,000/-
according to the gravity of the offence and the loss
incurred by the Company.
(b) Withholding of increment with cumulative effect.
(c) Stoppage of promotion.
(d) Suspension.
(e) Reversion to a lower post.
(f) Removal from service.
(g) Dismissal.”
96. Note 4 below Regulation 91 is also relevant. It reads:
“Note 4: The act of grave misconduct like theft of energy/
abetment in theft of energy, obtaining or attempting to
obtain illegal gratification, misappropriation of Company’s
property or money or stores, theft, fraud, falsification
of account, tampering with official document, gross
290 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
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irregularity or negligence in discharging of official duties
with a dishonest motive, act of disloyalty, sabotage etc.
(The list is illustrative and not exhaustive and is intended to
serve as guide) shall necessarily merit action of imposing
one of the major penalties as prescribed for the acts of
misconduct and the Competent Authority shall not have
any discretion to convert the act of misconduct into minor
lapses and impose the punishment prescribed for the
minor lapses.”
97. The above scheme shows that Schedule A and Schedule B are not
rigid watertight compartments. The Note to Regulation 86 expressly
states that the Schedules are indicative and not exhaustive. It further
permits irregularities or offences to be treated either as minor lapses
or as acts of misconduct depending on their nature and gravity.
Schedule A itself provides that even instances mentioned therein
may, at the discretion of the competent authority, be treated as
acts of misconduct according to the circumstances and gravity of
the misbehaviour.
98. In the present case, the charge-sheet did not proceed merely
on isolated late attendance or a single absence. The charges
were framed under Regulation 86(3) read with Schedule B. The
Schedule B heads invoked against the Appellant included indiscipline,
insubordination or misbehaviour, disobedience of orders of superior
officers, tampering with official documents, negligence and misuse
of company property. The Labour Court also recorded that the main
proved charges related to indiscipline, misbehaviour, disobedience
of superior officers, tampering with official documents and negligent
discharge of duty.
99. Therefore, the proved acts cannot be reclassified by this Court as only
minor lapses under Schedule A. The finding that misconduct stood
proved shall remain undisturbed. However, the Appellant’s submission
is relevant while considering the proportionality of punishment. The
fact that some components of the charge resemble minor lapses,
the absence of financial misappropriation, the long service of the
Appellant, and the period to which the allegations substantially relate,
are all matters which the competent authority must consider while
deciding the appropriate penalty.
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 291
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
100. The Appellant had rendered long service before disciplinary
proceedings were initiated. She joined service in 1985, and she was
dismissed from service on 12.07.2017. Her case is that there were
no allegations of misconduct for about 21 years of service and that
the allegations arose substantially during a limited period in 2006.
She has also contended that the punishment was a counterblast
to the proceedings she instituted regarding her service grievances.
101. The Respondent has maintained that the proved charges were
serious and related to discipline and office functioning. While we
are not inclined to reopen the finding of misconduct, the question
of punishment stands on a different footing. The punishment must
bear a reasonable relationship with the gravity of the misconduct,
the past service record, the surrounding circumstances and the
impact of the misconduct on the establishment as also observed
by the Labour Court while referring the finding of the alleged
misconduct proved.
102. The Labour Court in its final order dated 27.06.2017 passed in
Complaint ULP No. 34/2008 observed in paragraph 49 of the order
as follows:
“49. As such, in present case in hand considering above
discussion, disciplinary authority cannot be prevented from
imposing proper punishment on complainant by allowing
her complaint. Needless to say, that while determining
appropriate punishment according to law, disciplinary
authority has to consider length of service of complainant,
her past service record, gravity of misconduct proved
against her and reply filed to the impugned show cause
notice.
103. On the issue of proportionality, this Court in Ranjit Thakur v. Union
of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611, held that:
“25. Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed
against a decision, but is directed against the decision-
making process. The question of the choice and quantum
of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the
Court-Martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and
the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh.
It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to
shock the conscience...”
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104. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, this
Court noted the limited scope of interference with punishment,
while recognizing that the Court may mould relief in an appropriate
case. It held that:
“18…The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power
of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own
conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If
the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or
the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High
Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either
directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider
the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may
itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate
punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.”
105. In Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Ltd. v. Mukul
Kumar Choudhuri, AIR 2010 SC 75, this Court reiterated that
punishment, which is grossly excessive, disproportionately high
or unduly harsh cannot claim immunity from judicial scrutiny. It
observed that:
“24. So far as our legal system is concerned, the doctrine
is well settled. Even prior to CCSU, this Court has held that
if punishment imposed on an employee by an employer
is grossly excessive, disproportionately high or unduly
harsh, it cannot claim immunity from judicial scrutiny, and
it is always open to a court to interfere with such penalty
in appropriate cases.”
106. Dismissal from service is the severest form of penalty which can
be inflicted on a delinquent employee in service jurisprudence.
It brings the relationship of employer and employee to an end
permanently, and ordinarily deprives the employee of the incidents
of past service, including retiral benefits. It does not lead merely to
the loss of the existing source of income for the employee but also
for the dependent family members. Thus, it will have a devastating
effect not only on the dismissed employee but also on all those
who are dependant on the employee. Because of the severity of
its impact not only on the employee but also to his dependents,
the disciplinary authority must be very careful in seeking to impose
the severest form of punishment of dismissal.
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 293
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
It further carries consequences beyond immediate cessation of
employment. It leaves a permanent stigma on the service record
of the employee concerned, and may impair future employment
prospects, particularly in public employment, statutory bodies,
public sector undertakings and other regulated establishments
where antecedents and service record are material. For this reason,
dismissal must remain reserved for cases where the misconduct is
of the most serious nature where elements of synthetic consideration
would be undesirable and inappropriate.
107. The misconduct found proved against the Appellant relates to
indiscipline, insubordination, and the consequent tampering with
documents. We are not minimizing the importance of discipline in an
office establishment. However, the material presently noticed does not
show corruption, illegal gratification, moral turpitude, misappropriation
of funds, proved pecuniary loss to the employer, public scandal, or
conduct bringing the institution into public disrepute. The allegations
substantially appear to arise out of internal office functioning and
service-related conflict and did not play out in the public domain.
108. In the present case, we do not find that the competent authority
undertook such an exercise of evaluating various relevant factors. The
order does not reflect consideration of the Appellant’s long service,
past record, age, absence or presence of dishonesty, or absence or
presence of actual loss as also commended by the Labour Court.
109. Even where the Regulations include dismissal as one of the
permissible punishments for acts of misconduct, the authority is not
relieved of its duty to consider all relevant factors to see whether
the facts of the case truly warrant the most extreme form of penalty.
The mere fact that a proved act falls within the broad category of
“misconduct” under the Regulations does not mean that dismissal
must follow as a matter of course.
110. Dismissal is ordinarily justified where the misconduct is of
such gravity that continuance of the employee would be wholly
incompatible with discipline, trust or institutional functioning.
Cases involving corruption, illegal gratification, moral turpitude,
misappropriation, acts causing substantial loss to the employer, or
conduct showing complete unfitness for continued service stand on
a different footing. However, where the misconduct does not involve
corruption, moral turpitude, financial misappropriation or proved
loss to the employer, and where there is long service without much
294 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
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blemish, the disciplinary authority must carefully examine whether
any lesser punishment would meet the ends of justice.
CONCLUSION & DIRECTIONS
111. For the reasons discussed above, the appeal is partly allowed in
the following terms.
111.1. We hold that imposition of the second punishment of
treating the suspension undergone as punishment was not
permissible and accordingly, the same is set aside.
111.2. With respect to the punishment of dismissal which we
consider wholly disproportionate to the charges proved, the
competent authority shall consider any punishment other
than the ultimate penalty of dismissal from service, after
considering the Appellant’s long service, past record, age,
nature of misconduct, absence or presence of financial loss,
and other relevant circumstances.
111.3. It shall also decide the service and monetary consequences
of the suspension period in accordance with the Regulations
as discussed above including payment of subsistence
allowance in terms of our observations above.
111.4. The finding that misconduct stood proved against the
Appellant shall remain undisturbed and we are not reopening
the adjudication of misconduct recorded in Complaint (ULP)
No. 34 of 2008 by the Labour Court, which was also affirmed
in Revision (ULP) No. 37 of 2017 by the Industrial Court.
The Appellant was a party to the adjudicatory proceedings
before the Labour Court where the misconduct was recorded
and had the opportunity to lead and in fact led the evidence
in her favour.
111.5. We also find no error in the concurrent finding that the
Executive Engineer was competent under the applicable
MSEDCL Employees Service Regulations to pass an
order of punishment against the Appellant, who was a Pay
Grade-III employee. The challenge to the dismissal order
on the ground of lack of competence is therefore rejected.
111.6. However, regarding the dismissal order dated 12.07.2017,
the disciplinary authority proceeded substantially on the
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 295
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
earlier show-cause notice dated 25.04.2008, which was
based on the domestic enquiry that was subsequently
found not to be valid. After remand, the misconduct was
still established, but in a different manner before the new
forum, i.e., based on the evidence led before the Labour
Court. The disciplinary authority was, therefore, required to
give another show cause notice with fresh application of
mind to enable the Appellant to submit her representation
as regards the nature of punishment.
111.7. Before imposing the penalty of dismissal from service, the
disciplinary authority failed to consider the relevant factors
bearing on punishment, including the nature and gravity of
the misconduct, the Appellant’s long service, past record,
age, absence of financial loss to the Respondent – Company,
or dishonesty, and the possibility of imposing a lesser penalty.
The dismissal order dated 12.07.2017 is, therefore, set
aside as wholly disproportionate, while leaving the finding
of misconduct undisturbed.
111.8. The competent authority shall, within four weeks from the
date of receipt of this judgment, issue a proper show-cause
notice to the Appellant based on the findings of the Labour
Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 34 of 2008, as regards the
penalty proposed to be imposed other than dismissal,
having regard to the gravity of the misconduct. Thereafter,
the competent authority shall pass a reasoned order on
penalty within eight weeks.
111.9. The competent authority shall determine the Appellant’s
claim for subsistence allowance in two parts.
For the period from 04.09.2006 to 03.03.2007, the authority
shall consider the original reporting condition, the Appellant’s
explanation for non-reporting at Warora, the effect of her
earlier transfer to Warora having been set aside, and whether
leave of absence from reporting ought to have been granted.
For the period after 03.03.2007 till 12.07.2017, the Appellant
shall be treated as eligible for subsistence allowance. The
said amount shall be paid to the Appellant irrespective of
the nature of punishment that may be passed.
296 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
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111.10. Since the Appellant has already crossed the age of
superannuation, no direction for reinstatement can
be issued at this stage. The monetary and retiral
consequences, if any, shall abide by the fresh order to
be passed by the competent authority in terms of this
judgment and the applicable Regulations.
112. Consequently, the impugned judgment and order dated 05.04.2024
passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench
in Writ Petition No. 1200 of 2023 is set aside in terms of the
directions and observations made above. As a sequel, the order
dated 11.11.2024 passed by the High Court in MCA No. 357 of
2024 is also set aside.
Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeal partly allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
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