Supreme Court of India
SURAZ INDIA TRUSTversusUNION OF INDIA MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO.1630 OF 2020 IN WRIT PETITION (C) NO.880 OF 2016
- Citation
- 2021 INSC 575
- Decided
- 29 September 2021
- Disposal
- Directions issued
- Bench
- SANJAY KISHAN KAUL
Holding
The Court held that Rajiv Daiya is guilty of contempt of the Supreme Court for scandalising the Court, and his apologies are not genuine, warranting sentencing after a hearing.
Summary
The Suraz India Trust, chaired by Rajiv Daiya, filed a large number of public interest litigations that the Supreme Court deemed frivolous and ordered the Trust and its chairman to refrain from filing further petitions, imposing exemplary costs of Rs. 25 lakh. Daiya failed to pay the costs, repeatedly sought modifications, filed numerous applications, and wrote letters to the Attorney General, the President, and the Chief Justice seeking to initiate contempt proceedings against judges and court officials. His conduct, including scandalising the Court and refusing to comply with orders, led the Court to issue a contempt notice. The Court held that Daiya’s apologies were insincere and that his actions amounted to contempt of the Supreme Court, warranting punishment. While the Court is not bound to grant a hearing on sentencing, it ordered that his matter be listed for a hearing on the final sentence. The miscellaneous application seeking recovery of costs was closed, and the contempt proceedings were allowed to proceed.
Issues considered
- Whether the conduct of Rajiv Daiya amounts to contempt of the Supreme Court.
- Whether the unconditional apology tendered by the contemnor is sufficient to absolve contempt.
- Whether the contemnor is entitled to a hearing on the question of sentence.
- Whether the Supreme Court's power to punish for contempt under Article 129 is exercisable notwithstanding statutory provisions.
Legislation cited
Subjects
contempt of courtSupreme Courtpublic interest litigationfrivolous litigationexemplary costsapologyscandalising the courtArticle 129Article 142Constitution of India
Judgment
[2021] 7 S.C.R. 1063 1063
SURAZ INDIA TRUST A
v.
UNION OF INDIA
Miscellaneous Application No.1630 of 2020 in
Writ Petition (C) No.880 of 2016 B
SEPTEMBER 29, 2021
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND M. M. SUNDRESH, JJ.]
Contempt of Court – Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 –
Constitution of India – Articles 129, 142 – Petitioner – Trust filed a C
large number of cases in Rajasthan and Delhi, canvassed in person
by its Chairman – Mr. ‘D’ – 64 different proceedings in the 12 cases
filed in the Supreme Court alone – Litigation initiated by the Trust
was found to be frivolous – Direction issued to the Trust and Mr.
‘D’ to refrain from filing any cause in public interest before any
D
Court in the country, exemplary costs of Rs.25 lakhs imposed on
Mr. ‘D’ – Application filed by him for waiver of the costs, dismissed
– Registry was directed to proceed for recovery of costs – Mr. ‘D’
inter alia addressed letter to the Attorney General of India seeking
consent to initiate criminal contempt proceedings against three
judges including the then Chief Justice of India and also against E
certain Registry officers/officials – Continued to scandalise the
Court and prevent it from taking action to ensure recovery of costs
– Contempt notice issued to Mr.‘D’ – Bailable warrants issued –
Apology filed – Held: So-called unconditional apology is again a
recital of his alleged grievances in the earlier proceedings seeking
F
to canvas that the proceedings for recovery of costs had actually
come to an end which is not correct as it was his endeavour to seek
modification of the order of costs – Contemnor has made a
profession of filing public interest petitions of subjects he may not
know much of and then scandalise the Court to grant him relief
failing which he will continue to scandalise the Court – He is guilty G
of contempt of this Court – His actions to scandalise the Court
cannot be countenanced – He continues with his contumacious
behaviour – Apologies submitted are only endeavours to get out of
the consequences again followed by another set of allegations, thus,
a charade – Last apology can hardly be called an apology – There
H
1063
1064 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.
A is no remorse on the part of the contemnor – It is a contempt on the
face of the Court, however one more chance given to hear him on
the question of final sentence.
Directing the listing of the petition, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The raison d’etre of contempt jurisdiction is to
B maintain the dignity of the institution of judicial forums. It is not
a vindictive exercise nor are inappropriate statements by
themselves capable of lowering the dignity of a Judge. These are
often ignored but where despite all latitude a perennial litigant
seeks to justify his existence by throwing mud at all and sundry,
C the Court has to step in. [Para 1][1067-B-C]
1.2 The so-called unconditional apology is again a recital of
his alleged grievances in the earlier proceedings. It seeks to
canvas that the proceedings for recovery of costs had actually
come to an end, which was factually not so as it was his endeavour
D to seek modification of the order of costs. The same was declined
while permitting the Registry to take action for recovery. Since
the recovery did not take place, the Registry had placed the
matter before the Court. The Court has penned down all the
details in the present judgment not only to record the conduct of
Mr. ‘D’ as Chairman of the Trust prior to the order being passed
E in WP(C) No.880/2016, but continuously thereafter. In the
submissions he sought to suggest that he was compelled to take
this course of action to ensure that the proceedings he files in
different courts are not interceded or terminated on account of
his inability to pay costs. This can hardly be a course of action
F which is permissible. The State counsel referred to
communications addressed by him to the State Government, once
again, seeking to threaten the officers who had initiated
disciplinary proceedings against him. But for the fact that
Mr. ‘D’ appears in person and seeks to canvas his case with such
clear understanding, it could possibly have given rise to the
G apprehension that he was not all there. It also appears that he is
under constant legal advice beyond his abilities to address the
Court by the very nature of pleadings he files. Insofar as
Miscellaneous Application No.1630/2020 is concerned, nothing
more has to be directed than what was already stated on
H
SURAZ INDIA TRUST v. UNION OF INDIA 1065
06.05.2021, i.e., the State Government should take steps to A
commence process of recovery of costs as ‘arrears of land
revenue’ and the recovery amount be remitted to the beneficiary
as per the order already passed in WP(C) No.880/2016 on
01.05.2017. In the direction passed by this Court on 01.05.2017
it was observed “failing deposit, the above costs shall be
B
recoverable from Mr. Rajiv Daiya, its Chairman, through his
personal proceeds, if necessary.” In fact, if Mr. ‘D’ had just merely
expressed his inability to pay the amount as per his affidavit, the
matter could have been left at that, with, of course, the natural
consequences as contained in the order dated 01.05.2017 which
disabled him from filing public interest litigations. There cannot C
be a birthright to file public interest litigations and the level of
assistance and the nature of causes as canvassed has already
been adversely commented upon in the order dated 01.05.2017.
M.A. No.1630/2020 is closed with the aforesaid order. [Paras 18,
20-23][1073-C-D, F-H; 1074-A-F]
D
1.3 There is no absolute licence when appearing in person
to indulge in making aspersions as a tendency to scandalise the
Court in relation to judicial matters. Motivated and calculated
attempts to bring down the image of the judiciary in estimation of
public and impair the administration of justice must bester
themselves to uphold their dignity and the majesty of law. In the E
current context if seen, the grievance arises on account of the
inability of the contemnor to file public interest petitions on
account of costs being imposed, which he claims to be unable to
pay and the consequences thereof of not being able to prosecute
his petitions, which are large in number. The contemnor has F
apparently made a profession of filing public interest petitions of
subjects of which he may not know much and then seeking to
scandalise the Court to grant him relief failing which he will
continue to scandalise the Court. [Para 29][1077-B-D]
Roshan Lal Ahuja, In Re: (1993) 4 Suppl. SCC 446 G
– relied on.
1.4 The power to punish for contempt is a constitutional
power vested in this Court which cannot be abridged or taken
H
1066 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.
A away even by legislative enactment. The notice issued on
09.07.2021 was a composite notice issued to proceed against him
as well as to sentence him for his endeavour to scandalise the
Court. The contemnor is clearly guilty of contempt of this Court.
His actions to scandalise the Court cannot be countenanced. He
continues with his contumacious behaviour. The apologies
B
submitted by him are only endeavours to get out of the
consequences again followed by another set of allegations, thus,
a charade. The last apology can hardly be called an apology seeing
the contents. There is no remorse on the part of the contemnor.
It is a contempt on the face of the Court by the reason of the
C pleadings filed by him. This Court is not mandated in view of the
aforesaid to give him a hearing on the issue of sentence but would
still give him one more chance and, thus, consider it appropriate
to list the petition to hear the contemnor on the question of final
sentence. [Paras 31-34][1078-F-G; 1079-A-E]
D In Re: Vijay Kurle & Ors. (2020) SCC Online SC 407;
Mathews Nedumpara, In Re, (2019) 19 SCC 454;
Vishram Singh Raghubanshi v. State of U.P (2011) 7
SCC 776 : [2011] 8 SCR 105 – relied on.
E Case Law Reference
[2011] 8 SCR 105 relied on Para 33
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Miscellaneous Application
No.1630 of 2020 in Writ Petition (C) No.880 of 2016.
F
(Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India)
Rajiv Daiya, Petitioner-in-person.
Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, ASG, Dr. Manish Singhvi, Sr. Adv.,
G Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Mohd. Akhil, Sughosh Subramanyan, B. V. Balram
Das, Sandeep Kumar Jha, Advs. for the Respondent.
H
SURAZ INDIA TRUST v. UNION OF INDIA 1067
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
1. The raison d’etre of contempt jurisdiction is to maintain the
dignity of the institution of judicial forums. It is not a vindictive exercise
nor are inappropriate statements by themselves capable of lowering the B
dignity of a Judge. These are often ignored but where despite all latitude
a perennial litigant seeks to justify his existence by throwing mud at all
and sundry, the Court has to step in.
2. In order to understand the contours of the present dispute,
nothing more is required than to turn to the judgment of this Court C
in WP(C) No.880/2016 dated 01.05.2017. This judgment is not an
origination but in some sense a culmination. Mr. Rajiv Daiya, claims to
be the spirit behind Suraz India Trust (for short ‘Trust’), which has been
filing a large number of cases both in Rajasthan and in Delhi. A perusal
of the judgment dated 01.05.2017 would show that Mr. Daiya as
Chairman of the Trust has been canvassing matters in person. These D
petitions are stated to be public interest litigations. A list of cases filed by
him was prepared in the proceedings in WP(C) No.880/2016, numbering
12 before this Court alone. Further, as per the summary prepared by the
Registry, there were 64 different proceedings in these 12 cases as
mentioned in para 3 of the aforementioned judgment. The Court formed E
a prima facie view that the litigation initiated by the Trust was thoughtless
and frivolous. Liberty was granted to Mr. Daiya to make a voluntary
statement, if he considered it appropriate that Suraz India Trust will
henceforth not file any petition urging a cause in public interest. Thereby,
the Court made it clear to him that if he did so the matter would be
closed and no further consequences would follow. In the alternative, he F
was asked to file a response to establish the bona fides of the Trust.
Mr. Daiya wanted to prosecute the matter without filing a written response
despite the opportunity. He claimed to have been dissatisfied by the
Court, both on the administrative and judicial side, with their manner of
dealing with his representations. Thereafter, he forwarded a disparaging G
communication to the residential offices of Hon’ble Judges. The
endeavour, if one may say, was to browbeat the Registry at that time.
He sought to make representations to the President of India and the
Prime Minister too. In the text of grievances made by the Trust,
disparaging remarks were contained therein not only with reference to
H
1068 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.
A the Judges of the Rajasthan High Court but also with reference to the
Judges of this Court. The vilification extended to all levels of judicial
officers in the State of Rajasthan as also the Chief Justice and other
Judges of that Court. The Bench opined that extremely important matters
are taken up for consideration on a daily basis and judicial time gets
wasted because individuals not competent to assist the Court insist without
B
due cause to be granted a prolonged hearing. A misconceived petition in
that case was not only dismissed, but a direction was issued that the
Trust shall henceforth refrain from filing any cause in public interest
before any Court in this country and that it will equally apply to Mr. Rajiv
Daiya. Exemplary costs of Rs. 25 lakhs were imposed on Mr. Rajiv
C Daiya, to be deposited with the Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record
Welfare Trust within three months from the date of the order, failing
which the costs would be recovered from Mr. Rajiv Daiya through his
personal proceeds, if necessary. The matter was directed to be listed in
case costs were not deposited.
D 3. The costs were not deposited and Mr. Daiya filed an application
on 21.08.2017 seeking to submit unconditional apology with a prayer
that the costs imposed on him of Rs. 25 lakhs be waived and that he be
pardoned against charges of contempt. In MA No. 507 of 2017,
Mr. Daiya requested the court to not enforce the judgment dated
01.05.2017 passed in WP(C) No. 880 of 2016 as he had moved for
E sanction of prosecution to the President of India. The Court, on 21.08.2017
ordered that the letter requesting sanction of prosecution written by Mr.
Daiya to the President of India qua the Judges who presided over the
Bench be placed on record. Thereafter on 05.12.2017, the application of
Mr. Daiya was dismissed observing that the Bench was not inclined to
F modify the order and the Registry was directed to proceed as per law.
4. MA No. 1158 of 2017 was placed before this Court by the
Registry as Mr. Daiya had failed to withdraw all pending cases filed by
the Trust in accordance with paragraph 27 of the judgment dated
01.05.2017. Since costs were not deposited all applications and writ
G petitions filed by the Trust and Mr. Daiya were directed to be dismissed
with the direction to the Registry not to accept any application or petition
filed by either by the Trust or Mr. Daiya vide order dated 08.02.2018.
5. MA No.1630 of 2020 by way of an Office Report was placed
before the Court on 29.09.2020 informing that the costs had not been
H deposited by the Trust. This aspect was also confirmed by the Secretary
SURAZ INDIA TRUST v. UNION OF INDIA 1069
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]
of the Supreme Court AOR Welfare Trust since the costs had to be A
deposited with the said entity. That being the position on the said date an
order was passed issuing notice to the Trust. Instead of responding to
the same, Mr. Daiya sought from the Registry the note sheets on the
basis of which the directions had been sought by the Registry vide
e-mail dated 16.10.2020. This was followed by an e-mail dated
B
09.02.2021. In view of the peremptory nature of the order dated
08.02.2018 the said letter was sought to be circulated for directions to
accept the applications at the filing counter. On 12.02.2021 the Court
noted that there was no basis for demanding the note sheets. In view of
the obdurate stand of Mr. Daiya and non-appearance in pursuance of
the notices served, bailable warrants were directed to be issued for his C
production in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one surety of the like amount.
6. At that stage Mr. Daiya did a volte face and moved IA No.36444/
2021 on 22.02.2021 seeking to submit an unconditional apology with an
audit report showing his assets in compliance with the order dated
29.09.2020. The factum of this IA was placed on record by the Registry. D
The Court was informed that the same was not accepted on 22.02.2021,
once again, because of the peremptory nature of the order.
7. Now there was another U-turn by Mr. Daiya, who addressed a
letter dated 11.03.2021 to the Attorney General of India. In this letter,
consent was sought to initiate proceedings for criminal contempt against E
the Assistant Registrar of the PIL Section, Section X and Section XVI-
A and other officials for obstructing and interfering with administration
of justice by not letting the matter of Mr. Daiya be decided on merits of
the case. Simultaneously consent was also sought for filing contempt
proceedings against the then Chief Justice of India Shri J.S. Khehar
(since retired), Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and one of us (Sanjay Kishan F
Kaul, J.) as they were the three Judges party to the judgment passed on
01.05.2017 on the ground that the Judges were obstructing the meritorious
decision making of various petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution
of India. On 14.03.2021, Mr. Daiya sent a letter to the Registrar stating
that he had filed an application for unconditional apology and producing G
details of assets in compliance with the order dated 29.09.2020, however,
that the same be considered by a Bench comprising the Chief Justice of
India. On 15.03.2021, the Bench directed Mr. Daiya to place on record
his current sources of income, more so, as he had claimed that he was in
a Government job. He was directed to give a complete list of his movable
H
1070 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.
A and immovable assets, if any. Further, since he was claiming to be in a
Government job he should give his last salary slip which would show
emoluments being received by him along with deductions being made.
8. On 23.03.2021 the Attorney General sent two letters to Mr.
Daiya denying him initiation of contempt proceedings in respect of both
B the letters dated 11.03.2021. Mr. Daiya, however, addressed two letters
dated 26.03.2021 and 27.03.2021 to the Attorney General with identical
content, stating that he should be granted an opportunity to place the
entire record before him. On 26.03.2021, an e-mail was addressed to the
Assistant Registrar (PIL Section) stating that one of us (Sanjay Kishan
Kaul, J.) should recuse himself as he had moved for sanction of
C prosecution before the President of India against him. The letter addressed
to the President was also attached. This was in the context of the action
he wanted to take against the Coram which passed the order dated
01.05.2017 as according to him it fulfilled the requirements of an offence
under Section 219 of the Indian Penal Code (Public servant in judicial
D proceedings corruptly making reports, etc. contrary to law). On
27.03.2021, an e-mail was sent reminding the Attorney General of the
letter sent earlier on 26.03.2021.
9. On 02.04.2021, Mr. Daiya addressed a letter to the Chief Justice
of India requesting information to take suo motu cognizance of the criminal
E complaint against the Assistant Registrar and officers/officials of the
PIL (Writ) Section.
10. In the aforesaid context when the matter was listed on
05.04.2021, Mr. Daiya sought to excuse himself from appearing before
the Court on account of Covishield vaccination. He had not complied
F with the orders and was seeking to wriggle out of the proceedings by
raising all kinds of objections, i.e., that the matter should not be heard by
the Bench but by a bench headed by the Chief Justice of India. It was,
thus, observed that this was not the prerogative of Mr. Daiya, and the
Chief Justice had despite his letter continued to permit the same Bench
to deal with the matter. Since Mr. Daiya was found to be bent upon
G violating the directions of the Court, the Court deemed it appropriate to
issue notice of contempt to Mr. Daiya returnable on 12.04.2021.
Incidentally, Mr. Daiya, despite the aforesaid request, was present in
Court and accepted notice. On the issue of Government job, he stated
that what he was referring to was the fact that he was a Stenographer
H in a legal office, but deployed with the State of Rajasthan. Notice was
SURAZ INDIA TRUST v. UNION OF INDIA 1071
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]
thus issued to State of Rajasthan to verify the factum in view of non- A
cooperative attitude of Mr. Daiya.
11. On 08.04.2021, Mr. Daiya filed a report with details of his
movable and immovable assets. He claimed to have regularly taken loans
for meeting various requirements, which were being deducted from his
emoluments. In the liabilities he sought to put forth the expenses towards B
his daughter’s study apart from the liability of marriage of his daughter.
He submitted that he had no sufficient funds to make payment of the
costs.
12. In the next proceedings held on 12.04.2021, the State of
Rajasthan was asked to give information about the employment of Mr. C
Daiya and whether the activities he was carrying on were permissible
while being so engaged and drawing salary from the State. The request
made for appointment of an Amicus for Mr. Daiya was declined as he
had been appearing in person practically in all cases.
13. On 03.05.2021, an affidavit was filed by the State of Rajasthan D
informing that Mr. Daiya was working in the office of the Government
Advocate-cum-Additional Advocate General at Jodhpur, which was an
office separate from the office of the Advocate General of the State.
He had been issued show cause notice under relevant service rules
applicable and had been suspended and transferred since his conduct
before various courts as the Chairman of the Trust was in violation of E
the relevant service rules. Against this, Mr. Daiya had filed a writ petition
before the Rajasthan High Court, being S.B. Civil Writ No.6864/2021.
Thus, on 06.05.2021 in the proceedings it was noted that the State had
moved for vacation of interim order and the State would take steps to
commence the process for recovery of costs as ‘arrears of land revenue’. F
14. On 10.05.2021, Mr. Daiya filed an application for recalling/
review of the order dated 06.05.2021. It was claimed that he was not
given a chance to be heard and that the proceedings for recovery were
a nullity. It was his case that the dismissal of the recovery proceedings
in MA No.507/2017 by a Bench of three Judges on 21.08.2017 was G
binding on the present Bench. He conveniently ignored that the said
proceedings recorded only his submission with the direction to place an
application that he had moved for sanction of prosecution before the
President of India. The order passed in M.A. No.507/2017 on 05.12.2017
was to the effect that Mr. Daiya’s prayer to modify the order was actually
H
1072 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.
A declined and the Registry was directed to proceed as per law (for
recovery of costs).
15. Once again on 08.07.2017, Mr. Daiya addressed a letter to the
Registrar stating that he had filed a complaint with the President of India
against one of us (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.), for conducting an inquiry
B under In-House procedure vide letter dated 07.06.2021. A reminder was
sent on 08.07.2021 and once again, requesting that the matter be listed
before a Bench of which one of us (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.) was not a
member. He had also sought some RTI query.
16. On 09.07.2021 the attention of the Court was invited to the
C letter of Mr. Daiya. It was found that all kinds of pleadings were being
made in an issue of what was simply of recovery of costs from the
Trust/Mr. Daiya Letters were also written to scandalise the Court and
prevent the Court from taking action to ensure recovery of costs. It
was, thus, clearly an endeavour to browbeat the Court which the Court
would not countenance. Contempt notice was issued to Mr. Daiya as to
D why he should not be proceeded against and sentenced for his endeavour
to scandalise the Court returnable on the next date, i.e., 04.08.2021.
Thereafter, Mr. Daiya sought adjournment as he had undergone some
surgery and the State counsel was asked to verify when Mr. Daiya
would be able to attend the Court proceedings as per medical advice.
E On 18.08.2021 it was noticed that as per the affidavit filed on behalf of
the State of Rajasthan, affirmed on 16.08.2021, in pursuance of the medical
advice, the contemnor had resumed his duties on 11.08.2021. His
endeavour to seek adjournment by four months was found not acceptable.
It was further noted that the contumacious conduct continued and that
Mr. Daiya was under a misconception that by endeavouring to scandalise
F the Court he could get away with it. Bailable warrants in the sum of
Rs.10,000/- with one surety of the like amount were issued directing his
presence.
17. The petitioner filed a response to the contempt proceedings
and on 06.09.2021 filed an application for impleading the Secretary, Law
G and Legal Affairs Department, Government of Rajasthan, Registrar,
Supreme Court of India, one of us (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.) and B.
Sunita Rao, Secretary of the Supreme Court AOR Welfare Trust. He
also sought the placement of the complaint before the Chief Justice of
India and, on 07.09.2021, he further sought adjournment by 4-5 months
H so as to enable response by the Chief Justice of India to his earlier letter
SURAZ INDIA TRUST v. UNION OF INDIA 1073
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]
as reasoned orders were not being passed by the Bench. On 08.09.2021, A
in pursuance of the bailable warrants Mr. Daiya appeared and we heard
him at some length along with learned Additional Solicitor General and
learned counsel for the State. As had transpired earlier, in the end the
petitioner stated that he wanted to tender an unqualified apology and
sought to withdraw all what he had said. We told him that he was at
B
liberty to file what he pleased within three days and we would take that
into consideration while passing our orders and the judgment was
reserved. Thereafter, an application was filed, being IA No.114626/2021
seeking to place what he calls an “unconditional apology” and further
seeking review by IA No.114629/2021. It does not mention as to what
review was being sought. C
18. The so-called unconditional apology is again a recital of his
alleged grievances in the earlier proceedings. It seeks to canvas that the
proceedings for recovery of costs had actually come to an end, which
was factually not so as it was his endeavour to seek modification of the
order of costs. The same was declined while permitting the Registry to D
take action for recovery. Since the recovery did not take place, the
Registry had placed the matter before the Court. Thereafter, he had
made a grievance about the chargesheet served on him by the State
Government in terms of his employment, an aspect with which we are
not directly concerned with. He has mentioned that he seeks redressal
of various grievances in various proceedings he has filed, claiming the E
applicability of the doctrine of impossibility in relation with payment of
costs. He has referred to various petitions filed before the Rajasthan
High Court.
19. On a careful reading of the aforesaid we can hardly categorise
the same as an unconditional apology. F
20. We have penned down all these details not only to record the
conduct of Mr. Daiya as Chairman of the Trust prior to the order being
passed in WP(C) No.880/2016, but continuously thereafter. In the
submissions he sought to suggest that he was compelled to take this
course of action to ensure that the proceedings he files in different courts G
are not interceded or terminated on account of his inability to pay costs.
This can hardly be a course of action which is permissible. We would
like to emphasise on the kind of actions Mr. Daiya has embarked upon in
a simple issue of recovery of costs. In fact, the State counsel referred to
communications addressed by him to the State Government, once again, H
1074 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.
A seeking to threaten the officers who had initiated disciplinary proceedings
against him. But for the fact that Mr. Daiya appears in person and seeks
to canvas his case with such clear understanding, it could possibly have
given rise to the apprehension that he was not all there. It also appears
that he is under constant legal advice beyond his abilities to address the
Court by the very nature of pleadings he files.
B
21. Insofar as Miscellaneous Application No.1630/2020 is
concerned, in our view, nothing more has to be directed than what was
already been stated on 06.05.2021, i.e., the State Government should
take steps to commence process of recovery of costs as ‘arrears of
land revenue’ and the recovery amount be remitted to the beneficiary as
C per the order already passed in WP(C) No.880/2016 on 01.05.2017.
Other than that, no further directions are required as the recovery would
naturally depend on the available resources of both the Trust and Mr.
Daiya. In the direction passed by this Court on 01.05.2017 it was observed
“failing deposit, the above costs shall be recoverable from Mr. Rajiv
D Daiya, its Chairman, through his personal proceeds, if necessary.”
22. In fact, if Mr. Daiya had just merely expressed his inability to
pay the amount as per his affidavit, the matter could have been left at
that, with, of course, the natural consequences as contained in the order
dated 01.05.2017 which disabled him from filing public interest litigations.
E After all, there cannot be a birthright to file public interest litigations and
the level of assistance and the nature of causes as canvassed has already
been adversely commented upon in the order dated 01.05.2017.
23. M.A. No.1630/2020 is thus closed with the aforesaid order.
24. However, that unfortunately cannot be the end of the matter.
F
25. Let us say at the inception that the easier path is to recuse or
give up the matter instead of inviting so much trouble. But then that is
not the course for which the Judges have taken oath. Sometimes the
task is unenviable and difficult but it must be performed for the larger
good of the institution. Such litigants cannot be permitted to have their
G way only because they can plead and write anything they feel like and
keep on approbating by sometimes apologising and then again bringing
forth those allegations. We have thus chosen the more difficult path.
26. Now turning to the conduct of Mr. Daiya, which is apparent
from the judgment as aforesaid.
H
SURAZ INDIA TRUST v. UNION OF INDIA 1075
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]
27. We are enlightened in respect of the course of action we A
follow by judicial precedents. We would first like to turn to the judgment
in Roshan Lal Ahuja, In Re:1. Disparaging remarks and aspersions
deliberately and repeatedly made against the Supreme Court and its
Judges in memorandum of writ petition and in representation made before
the President of India in connection with order of reduction in rank and
B
subsequent dismissal from service of the contemnor was held to bring
down the image of judiciary in the estimation of public and to bring
administration of justice into disrepute. The contemnor was directed to
suffer four months simple imprisonment and pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-.
28. Suffice to note that even in the said proceedings, after tendering
apology, ostensibly on the ground that it was desired by the Judges, once C
again, the contemnor showed no redemption for his behaviour. The
observations by Justice A.S. Anand (as he then was) in paras 11, 12 &
13 are as under:
“11. The tendency of maligning the reputation of judicial officers
by disgruntled elements who fail to secure an order which they D
desire is on the increase and it is high time that serious note is
taken of the same. No latitude can be given to a litigant to browbeat
the court. Merely because a party chooses to appear in person, it
does not give him a licence to indulge in making such aspersions
as have the tendency to scandalise the court in relation to judicial E
matters.
12. Ordinarily, courts of law do not initiate proceedings to commit
a person for contempt of court where there is mere technical
contempt or where the contemnor satisfies the court that he was
truly repentant for his action. Judgments of the court are open to F
criticism. Judges and courts are not unduly sensitive or touchy to
fair and reasonable criticism of their judgments. Fair comments,
even if, put-spoken, but made without any malice or attempting to
impair the administration of justice and made in good faith in proper
language do not attract any punishment for contempt of court.
Lord Denning in Reg v. Commissioner of Police of the G
Metropolis, Ex parte Blackburn, 1968 (2) WLR 1204 made
some pertinent observations in this regard. In the words of the
Master of Rolls:
1
1993 Supp (4) SCC 446. H
1076 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.
A Those who comment can deal faithfully with all that is done in
a court of justice. They can say that we are mistaken, and our
decisions erroneous, whether they are subject to appeal or
not. All we would ask is that those who criticise us will
remember that, from the nature of our office, we cannot reply
to their criticism. We cannot enter into public controversy. Still
B
less into political controversy.
However, when from the criticism a deliberate, motivated and
calculated attempt is discernible to bring down the image of
judiciary in the estimation of the public or to impair the administration
of justice or tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute
C the courts must bester themselves to uphold their dignity and the
majesty of law. No litigant can be permitted to over step the limits
of fair, bona fide and reasonable criticism of a judgment and bring
the courts generally in disrepute or attribute motives to the Judges
rendering the judgment. Perversity, calculated to undermine the
D judicial system and the prestige of the court, cannot be permitted
for otherwise the very foundation of the judicial system is bound
to be undermined and weakened and that would be bad not only
for the preservation of Rule of Law but also for the independence
of judiciary. Liberty of free expression is not to be confused with
a licence to make unfounded, unwarranted and irresponsible
E aspersions against the Judges or the courts in relation to judicial
matters. No system of justice can tolerate such an unbridled
licence. Of course “Justice is not a cloistered virtue; she must be
allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though
outspoken, comments of ordinary men”, but the members of the
F public have to abstain from imputing improper motives to those
taking part in the administration of justice and exercise their right
of free criticism without malice or in any way attempting to impair
the administration of justice and refrain from making any comment
which tends to scandalise the court in relation to judicial matters.
G 13. The contemnor in the present case let alone showing any
remorse or regret has adopted an arrogant and contemptuous
attitude. His conduct in circulating the ‘note for directions’ adds
insult to injury. Of course, the dignity of the court is not so brittle
as to be shattered by a stone thrown by a mad man, but, when the
court finds that the contemnor has been reckless, persistent and
H
SURAZ INDIA TRUST v. UNION OF INDIA 1077
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]
guilty of undermining the dignity of the court and his action is, A
motivated, deliberate and designed, the law of contempt of court
must be activised.”
29. The aforesaid shows that there is no absolute licence when
appearing in person to indulge in making aspersions as a tendency to
scandalise the Court in relation to judicial matters. Motivated and B
calculated attempts to bring down the image of the judiciary in estimation
of public and impair the administration of justice must bester themselves
to uphold their dignity and the majesty of law. In the current context if
seen, the grievance arises on account of the inability of the contemnor to
file public interest petitions on account of costs being imposed, which he
claims to be unable to pay and the consequences thereof of not being C
able to prosecute his petitions, which are large in number. The contemnor
has apparently made a profession of filing public interest petitions of
subjects of which he may not know much and then seeking to scandalise
the Court to grant him relief failing which he will continue to scandalise
the Court. D
30. In Re: Vijay Kurle & Ors.2 which arose in suo motu contempt
petition after the conviction of Mr. Mathews Nedumpara, an advocate.
In those proceedings, the Court while not finally sentencing him to
imprisonment instead gave him a suspended sentence and barred him
from practice for a specified period of time before this Court3. This E
resulted in another round on account of complaints against the Indian
Bar Association and by some person claiming to be the National Secretary
of Human Rights Security Council wherein they had sought to send
contemptuous complaints to the President of India and the Chief Justice
of India (a somewhat similar situation in the case at hand). Shri
Nedumpara sought discharge on the ground that he did not really know F
those people. A Bench of this Court debated the powers of the Supreme
Court in relation to dealing with the contempt in the light of Articles 129
and 142 of the Constitution of India read with in conjunction with the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The provisions read as under:
“9. Article 129 of the Constitution of India reads as follows: G
“129. Supreme Court to be a court of record. The Supreme
Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers
2
2020 SCC Online SC 407.
3
Mathews Nedumpara, In Re, (2019) 19 SCC 454.
H
1078 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.
A of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of
itself.”
A bare reading of Article 129 clearly shows that this Court being
a Court of Record shall have all the powers of such a Court of Record
including the power to punish for contempt of itself. This is a constitutional
B power which cannot be taken away or in any manner abridged by statute.
10. Article 142 of the Constitution of India reads as follows:
“142. Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court
and orders as to discovery, etc. (1) The Supreme Court in the
exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such
C order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause
or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order
so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India
in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law
made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so
D made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe.
(2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by
Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of
the territory of India, have all and every power to make any
order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person,
E the discovery or production of any documents, or the
investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself.”
31. In the context of the aforesaid it was opined that the comparison
of the two provisions show that whereas the founding fathers felt that
the powers under clause (2) of Article 142 could be subject to any law
F made by the Parliament, there is no such restriction as far as Article
129 is concerned. The power to punish for contempt is a constitutional
power vested in this Court which cannot be abridged or taken away
even by legislative enactment. We have little doubt that what the
contemnor has been endeavouring is to have his way or, alternatively, I
will throw mud at all and sundry, whether it be the Court, its administrative
G staff or the State Government so that people, apprehensive of this mud
thrown, may back off.
We refuse to back off and are clear in our view that we must take
it to its logical conclusion.
H
SURAZ INDIA TRUST v. UNION OF INDIA 1079
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]
32. We may note that the notice issued on 09.07.2021 was a A
composite notice issued to proceed against him as well as to sentence
him for his endeavour to scandalise the Court.
33. We are of the view that the contemnor is clearly guilty of
contempt of this Court. His actions to scandalise the Court cannot be
countenanced. He continues with his contumacious behaviour. The B
apologies submitted by him are only endeavours to get out of the
consequences again followed by another set of allegations, thus, a
charade. The last apology can hardly be called an apology seeing the
contents. This Court has held that an apology cannot be a defence, a
justification can be accepted if it can be ignored without compromising
the dignity of the Court (Vishram Singh Raghubanshi v. State of U.P.4). C
There is, as already stated, no remorse on the part of the contemnor
which we find in the present case.
34. The only next question is whether he has a right to be heard
on sentence in the background of the facts that the notice sent to him by
our order is both to be proceeded against him on merits and on sentence D
for his endeavour to scandalise the Court. It is a contempt on the face of
the Court by the reason of the pleadings filed by him. We are not mandated
in view of the aforesaid to give him a hearing on the issue of sentence
but would still give him one more chance and, thus, consider it appropriate
to list the petition to hear the contemnor on the question of final sentence. E
Divya Pandey Directions issued.
F
G
4
(2011) 7 SCC 776. H
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