SURAT SINGH (DEAD)versusSIRI BHAGWAN & ORS.

                        [2018] 1 S.C.R. 1063                            1063


                     SURAT SINGH (DEAD)                                 A
                                 v.
                     SIRI BHAGWAN & ORS.
               (Civil Appeal Nos. 9118-9119 of 2010)
                       FEBRUARY 19, 2018                                B
  [R. K. AGRAWAL AND ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, JJ.]
       Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 : s. 100 – Second appeal –
Substantial question of law – On facts, the High Court allowed the
second appeal, after hearing the appellant of second appeal only
                                                                        C
and not hearing the contesting respondent No.4 who had filed an
application u/s. 151 r/w Or. LXI, r. 21 CPC praying for an
opportunity of hearing – High Court did not frame any substantial
question of law while admitting the appeal as per sub-section(4) of
Section 100 though it remained pending for a long time – While
proceeding to allow the second appeal, the High Court framed the        D
substantial question of law in the impugned judgment – Sustainability
of – Held: Not sustainable – High Court failed to follow the
procedure prescribed u/s. 100 while allowing the second appeal
and thus, committed a jurisdictional error calling for interference
by this Court – High Court while passing a final judgment framed
                                                                        E
the substantial question of law for the first time and simultaneously
answered the said question in appellant’s favour – High Court was
under a legal obligation to frame the substantial question at the
time of admission of the appeal after hearing the appellant or/and
his counsel under sub-section (4) of s. 100 – High Court had no
jurisdiction to frame the substantial question at the time of writing   F
of its final judgment in the appeal except to the extent permitted
under sub-section (5) – Procedure adopted by the High Court, also
resulted in causing prejudice to the respondents because the
respondents could not object to the framing of substantial question
of law.
                                                                        G
      Allowing the appeals, the Court
      HELD: 1.1 When respondent No. 4 (appellant) filed an
application under Section 151 read with Order LXI Rule 21 of
the Code praying for an opportunity of hearing, his application
was dismissed by the High Court. The High Court erred in                H
                              1063
1064           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2018] 1 S.C.R.


 A     deciding the second appeal much less allowing it after hearing
       the appellant of second appeal only and not hearing the contesting
       respondent No.4 (appellant) and also erred in dismissing his
       application filed under Section 151 read with Order LXI Rule 21
       CPC for rehearing of the second appeal. [Paras 12-14]
       [1070-D-F]
 B
             1.2 Having regard to the nature of controversy involved in
       the case and further in the light of the grounds on which the
       application for rehearing of the appeal was founded, the High
       Court should have granted one opportunity of hearing to
       respondent No. 4 for opposing the second appeal and for that
 C     purpose should have restored the second appeal for its re-hearing
       on merits in accordance with law. This Court cannot countenance
       the manner in which the High Court decided the second appeal
       on merits. [Paras 15, 16] [1070-G-H]
             1.3 The High Court as it seems did not frame any substantial
 D     question of law while admitting the appeal as per sub-section(4)
       of Section 100 though it remained pending for a long time.
       However, the High Court proceeded to allow the second appeal
       and while doing so framed the substantial question of law in the
       concluding para of the impugned judgment. The manner and the
 E     procedure adopted by the High Court while allowing the second
       appeal are against the procedure laid down in Section 100. [Paras
       18, 19] [1071-B-E]
             1.4 Sub-section (1) of Section 100 states that the second
       appeal would be entertained by the High Court only if the High
 F     Court is “satisfied” that the case involves a “substantial question
       of law”. Sub- section (3) makes it obligatory upon the appellant
       to precisely state in memo of appeal the “substantial question of
       law” involved in the appeal. Sub-section (4) provides that where
       the High Court is satisfied that any substantial question of law is
       involved in the case, it shall formulate that question. In other
 G     words, once the High Court is satisfied after hearing the appellant
       or his counsel, as the case may be, that the appeal involves a
       substantial question of law, it has to formulate that question and
       then direct issuance of notice to the respondent of the memo of
       appeal along with the question of law framed by the High Court.
 H
      SURAT SINGH (DEAD) v. SIRI BHAGWAN & ORS.                        1065


Sub-section (5) provides that the appeal shall be heard only on        A
the question formulated by the High Court under sub-section
(4). In other words, the jurisdiction of the High Court to decide
the second appeal is confined only to the question framed by the
High Court under sub-section(4). The respondent, however, at
the time of hearing of the appeal is given a right under sub-section
                                                                       B
(5) to raise an objection that the question framed by the High
Court under sub-section (4) does not involve in the appeal. The
reason for giving this right to the respondent for raising such
objection at the time of hearing is because the High Court frames
the question at the admission stage which is prior to issuance of
the notice of appeal to the respondent. In other words, the            C
question is framed behind the back of respondent and, therefore,
sub-section(5) enables him to raise such objection at the time of
hearing that the question framed does not arise in the appeal.
The proviso to sub-section (5), however, also recognizes the
power of the High Court to hear the appeal on any other
                                                                       D
substantial question of law which was not initially framed by the
High Court under sub-section (4). However, this power can be
exercised by the High Court only after assigning the reasons for
framing such additional question of law at the time of hearing of
the appeal. [Para 21] [1072-C-H]
      1.5 On facts, it cannot be understood as to how the High         E
Court while passing a final judgment in its concluding para could
frame the substantial question of law for the first time and
simultaneously answered the said question in appellant’s favour.
Obviously, the Judge must have done it by taking recourse to
sub-section (4) of Section 100 of the Code. The High Court was         F
under a legal obligation to frame the substantial question at the
time of admission of the appeal after hearing the appellant or/and
his counsel under sub-section (4) of Section 100 of the Code, but
the High Court did it while passing the final judgment in its
concluding para. Such novel procedure adopted by the High
Court, is wholly contrary to the scheme of Section 100 of the          G
Code and renders the impugned judgment legally unsustainable.
[Paras 22-24] [1073-A-C]
      1.6 The High Court had no jurisdiction to frame the
substantial question at the time of writing of its final judgment in
                                                                       H
1066            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2018] 1 S.C.R.


 A     the appeal except to the extent permitted under sub-section (5).
       The procedure adopted by the High Court, apart from it being
       against the scheme of Section 100 of the Code, also resulted in
       causing prejudice to the respondents because the respondents
       could not object to the framing of substantial question of law.
       Since the High Court failed to frame any substantial question of
 B
       law under sub-section(4) of Section 100 at the time of admission
       of the appeal, the respondents could not come to know on which
       question of law, the appeal was admitted for final hearing. It cannot
       be disputed that sub-section (5) gives the respondents a right to
       know on which substantial question of law, the appeal was
 C     admitted for final hearing. Sub-section (5) enables the respondents
       to raise an objection at the time of final hearing that the question
       of law framed at the instance of the appellant does not really arise
       in the case. [Paras 25-27] [1073-D-G]
             1.7 The respondents are only required to reply while
 D     opposing the second appeal to the question formulated by the
       High Court under sub-section (4) and not beyond that. If the
       question of law is not framed under sub-section (4) at the time of
       admission or before the final hearing of the appeal, there remains
       nothing for the respondent to oppose the second appeal at the
       time of hearing. In this situation, the High Court would have no
 E     jurisdiction to decide such second appeal finally for want of any
       substantial question of law. [Para 28] [1073-H; 1074-A]
              1.8 The scheme of Section 100 is that once the High Court
       is satisfied that the appeal involves a substantial question of law,
       such question shall have to be framed under sub-section(4) of
 F     Section 100. It is the framing of the question which empowers
       the High Court to finally decide the appeal in accordance with
       the procedure prescribed under sub-section (5). Both the
       requirements prescribed in sub-sections (4) and (5) are, therefore,
       mandatory and have to be followed in the manner prescribed
 G     therein. Indeed, the jurisdiction to decide the second appeal finally
       arises only after the substantial question of law is framed under
       sub-section (4). There may be a case and indeed there are cases
       where even after framing a substantial question of law, the same
       can be answered against the appellant. It is, however, done only

 H
      SURAT SINGH (DEAD) v. SIRI BHAGWAN & ORS.                          1067


after hearing the respondents under sub-section (5). If, however,        A
the High Court is satisfied after hearing the appellant at the time
of admission that the appeal does not involve any substantial
question of law, then such appeal is liable to be dismissed in limine
without any notice to the respondents after recording a finding in
the dismissal order that the appeal does not involve any substantial
                                                                         B
question of law within the meaning of sub-section (4). It is
needless to say that for passing such order in limine, the High
Court is required to assign the reasons in support of its
conclusion. It is, however, of no significance, whether the
respondent has appeared at the time of final hearing of the appeal
or not. The High Court, in any case, has to proceed in accordance        C
with the procedure prescribed under Section 100 while disposing
of the appeal, whether in limine or at the final hearing stage. [Paras
29-31] [1074-B-F]
      1.9 It is a settled principle of rule of interpretation that
whenever a statute requires a particular act to be done in a             D
particular manner then such act has to be done in that manner
only and in no other manner. The said principle applies to the
instant case because, the High Court failed to follow the
procedure prescribed under Section 100 while allowing the second
appeal and thus committed a jurisdictional error calling for
interference by this Court. [Paras 32-33] [1074-G-H; 1075-A]             E

      1.10 The impugned judgment cannot be sustained as it
does not conform to the requirements of Section 100 CPC. The
impugned judgment is set aside. The case is remanded to the
High Court for deciding the second appeal afresh on merits. The
case is remanded due to the infirmity noticed in the manner in           F
which the second appeal was decided. [Para 36, 37, 38] [1075-D-
F]
      Baru Ram v. Parsanni (Smt.) AIR 1959 SC 93 :
      [1959] Suppl. SCR 1403; Santosh Hazari v.
      Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by L.Rs., (2001) 3 SCC               G
      179 : [2001] 1 SCR 948 – referred to.
      Interpretation of Statutes by G.P. Singh, IXth Edn.
      p 347 – referred to.

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1068            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2018] 1 S.C.R.


 A                              Case Law Reference
             [1959] Suppl. SCR 1403         referred to           Para 32
             (2001) 3 SCC 179                referred to          Para 34
             CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 9118-
 B     9119 of 2010.
              From the Judgment and Orders dated 13.12.2006 and 22.01.2007
       of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh.in Civil Regular
       Second Appeal No. 382 of 1992 and in Civil Misc. No. 448-C of 2007 in
       Regular Second Appeal No. 382 of 1992 respectively.
 C            Vibhuti Sushant Gupta, Neeraj Upadhyay, Dr. Kailash Chand, Advs
       for the Appellant.
             Dhruv Mehta, Sr. Adv, O. P. Bhadani, S. S. Pandey, A. K. Suman,
       Advs for the Respondents.
             The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
 D
              ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. 1. These appeals are directed
       against the final judgment and order dated 13.12.2006 passed by the
       High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Regular Second
       Appeal No.382 of 1992 whereby the High Court allowed the appeal
       filed by respondent No.1 herein, set aside the judgment dated 13.11.1986
 E     of the District Judge, Narnaul in Civil Appeal No.83 of 1984 and reversed
       the judgment dated 16.05.1984 of the Trial Court in Civil Suit No. 315 of
       1981. By order dated 22.01.2007, the High Court also dismissed the
       application (C.M. No.448-C of 2007 in RSA No.382/1992) filed by the
       appellant herein for recalling the judgment dated 13.12.2006.
 F           2. In order to appreciate the short issue involved in the appeals,
       few relevant facts need mention infra.
              3. One Murti Devi (since dead) and her daughter Smt. Bholi Devi
       filed Civil Suit No.315/81 in the Court of Sub-Judge, IInd Class, Rewari
       against one Siri Bhagwan (respondent No.1 herein). The suit was for a
 G     declaration that the decree obtained by Siri Bhagwan against Murti Devi
       on 11.11.1980 in Civil Suit No. 638/1980 in relation to the land measuring
       37 Kanals 14 Marlas situated at Village Alampur, Tahsil Rewari, District
       Mahendergarh be declared null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs
       because it was obtained by defendant No.1-Siri Bhagwan by playing
 H     fraud and misrepresentation on the plaintiff-Murti Devi by taking
       SURAT SINGH (DEAD) v. SIRI BHAGWAN & ORS.                            1069
              [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

advantage of her illiteracy and poverty. The defendant No.1-Siri            A
Bhagwan contested the suit.
       4. The Trial Court, by judgment/decree dated 16.05.1984 in C.S.
No.315 of 1981 dismissed the suit. Felt aggrieved, the plaintiff-Murti
Devi, filed first appeal (C.A. No.83 of 1984) before the District Judge.
By Judgment/decree dated 13.11.1986, the first Appellate Court allowed      B
the appeal, set aside the judgment/decree of the Trial Court and decreed
the plaintiff’s suit.
      5. Felt aggrieved, defendant No. 1- Siri Bhagwan filed Second
Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) in the High Court of Punjab &       C
Haryana out of which these appeals arise. During the pendency of the
second appeal, the appellant herein-Surat Singh purchased the suit land
from Murti Devi vide registered sale deed dated 30.07.1988 for
Rs.80,000/-.
       6. The appellant-Surat Singh then filed an application under Order   D
1 Rule 10 read with Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code praying therein to
become a party respondent along with original plaintiff/respondent No.1
in the second appeal as a subsequent purchaser of the suit land from the
plaintiff/respondent No.1, pending litigation.
      7. By order dated 04.01.1989, Surat Singh’s application was           E
allowed and he was allowed to become a party-respondent in the second
appeal. In the meantime, Murti Devi expired. Since one daughter of
Murti Devi was already on record as plaintiff No.2 and the other daughter
was on record as proforma defendant No. 2, the Lis involved in the
appeal continued.
                                                                            F
       8. By impugned judgment dated 13.12.2006, the Single Judge of
the High Court allowed the second appeal, set aside the judgment/decree
of the first Appellate Court and restored that of the Trial Court, which
resulted in dismissal of the suit filed by Murti Devi and her daughter.
Since the impugned judgment dated 13.12.2006 was passed without
hearing the appellant herein(respondent No.4 in the High Court), he filed   G
an application under Section 151 read with Order 21 Rule 21 of the
Code for recalling the judgment dated 13.12.2006. By order dated
22.01.2007, the High Court dismissed the application. Aggrieved by
both the judgment/order dated 13.12.2006 and 22.01.2007, the appellant
has filed these appeals by way of special leave in this Court.
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1070            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2018] 1 S.C.R.


 A            9. Therefore, the short question, which arises for consideration in
       these appeals, is whether the High Court was justified in allowing the
       second appeal filed by defendant No. 1-Siri Bhagwan (respondent No.1
       herein) and thereby was justified in dismissing the plaintiff’s suit by
       restoring the judgment/decree of the Trial Court.
 B            10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal
       of the record of the case, we are constrained to allow the appeals, set
       aside the impugned judgment and remand the case to the High Court for
       deciding the second appeal afresh on merits in accordance with law.

             11. The reasons for remanding the case to the High Court are
 C
       more than one as set out hereinbelow.

                12. First, we find that the High Court allowed the second appeal
       filed by respondent No. 1 herein without hearing respondent No.4 before
       it, i.e., (appellant herein). In other words, the High Court allowed the
 D     second appeal after hearing the appellant of second appeal only and not
       respondent No.4 of the second appeal, who was absent at the time of
       hearing.

              13. When respondent No. 4 (appellant herein) filed an application
       under Section 151 read with Order 41 Rule 21 of the Code praying for
 E     an opportunity of hearing, his application was dismissed by the High
       Court.

              14. In our opinion, the High Court erred in deciding the second
       appeal much less allowing it without hearing the contesting respondent
       No.4 (appellant herein) and also erred in dismissing his application filed
 F     under Section 151 read with Order 41 Rule 21 of the Code for rehearing
       of the second appeal.

               15. Having regard to the nature of controversy involved in the
       case and further in the light of the grounds on which the application for
       rehearing of the appeal was founded, the High Court should have granted
 G     one opportunity of hearing to respondent No. 4 for opposing the second
       appeal and for that purpose should have restored the second appeal for
       its re-hearing on merits in accordance with law.

             16. Second and more important, this Court cannot countenance
       the manner in which the High Court decided the second appeal on merits.
 H
       SURAT SINGH (DEAD) v. SIRI BHAGWAN & ORS.                              1071
              [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

      17. We find that the judgment of the first Appellate Court, which       A
was impugned in the second appeal, was delivered on 13.11.1986 whereas
the second appeal was registered in 1992 (S.A. No.382/92) and the
impugned judgment was delivered on 13.12.2006.
       18. The High Court as it seems did not frame any substantial
question of law while admitting the appeal as per sub-section(4) of Section   B
100 though it remained pending for a long time. However, the High Court
proceeded to allow the second appeal and while doing so framed the
substantial question of law in the concluding para of the impugned
judgment. It reads as under:
           “The substantial question of law would, therefore, be              C
      whether the finding of the learned lower appellate court
      terming the transfer on the basis of a consent decree as a
      gift in the absence of any pleadings was perverse or not?
      The question of law stands answered in the foregoing
      discussion.
                                                                              D
           In view of this, the appeal is allowed and the judgment
      of the learned lower appellate court dated 13.11.1986 is
      set aside.”
       19. In our considered opinion, the manner and the procedure
adopted by the High Court while allowing the second appeal are against        E
the procedure laid down in Section 100.
      20. Section 100 of the Code reads as under:
      “100. Second appeal.- (1) Save as otherwise expressly
      provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for
      the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court          F
      from every decree passed in appeal by any Court
      subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied
      that the case involves a substantial question of law.(2) An
      appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree
      passed ex parte.(3) In an appeal under this section, the
                                                                              G
      memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial
      question of law involved in the appeal.(4) Where the High
      Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is
      involved in any case, it shall formulate that question.(5)
      The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated
                                                                              H
1072             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2018] 1 S.C.R.


 A           and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be
             allowed to argue that the case does not involve such
             question:Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be
             deemed to take away or abridge the power of the court to
             hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other
             substantial question of law formulated by it, if it is satisfied
 B
             that the case involves such question.”

              21.Sub-section (1) of Section 100 says that the second appeal
       would be entertained by the High Court only if the High Court is “satisfied”
       that the case involves a “substantial question of law”. Sub- section (3)
 C     makes it obligatory upon the appellant to precisely state in memo of
       appeal the “substantial question of law” involved in the appeal. Sub-
       section (4) provides that where the High Court is satisfied that any
       substantial question of law is involved in the case, it shall formulate that
       question. In other words, once the High Court is satisfied after hearing
 D     the appellant or his counsel, as the case may be, that the appeal involves
       a substantial question of law, it has to formulate that question and then
       direct issuance of notice to the respondent of the memo of appeal along
       with the question of law framed by the High Court. Sub-section (5)
       provides that the appeal shall be heard only on the question formulated
       by the High Court under sub-section (4). In other words, the jurisdiction
 E     of the High Court to decide the second appeal is confined only to the
       question framed by the High Court under sub-section(4). The respondent,
       however, at the time of hearing of the appeal is given a right under sub-
       section (5) to raise an objection that the question framed by the High
       Court under sub-section (4) does not involve in the appeal. The reason
 F     for giving this right to the respondent for raising such objection at the
       time of hearing is because the High Court frames the question at the
       admission stage which is prior to issuance of the notice of appeal to the
       respondent. In other words, the question is framed behind the back of
       respondent and, therefore, sub-section(5) enables him to raise such
       objection at the time of hearing that the question framed does not arise
 G     in the appeal. The proviso to sub-section (5), however, also recognizes
       the power of the High Court to hear the appeal on any other substantial
       question of law which was not initially framed by the High Court under
       sub-section (4). However, this power can be exercised by the High
       Court only after assigning the reasons for framing such additional question
 H     of law at the time of hearing of the appeal.
       SURAT SINGH (DEAD) v. SIRI BHAGWAN & ORS.                                 1073
              [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

        22. Adverting to the facts of this case at hand, we are at a loss to     A
understand as to how the High Court while passing a final judgment in
its concluding para could frame the substantial question of law for the
first time and simultaneously answered the said question in appellant’s
favour. Obviously, the learned Judge must have done it by taking recourse
to sub-section (4) of Section 100 of the Code.
                                                                                 B
       23. Here is the case where the High Court was under a legal
obligation to frame the substantial question at the time of admission of
the appeal after hearing the appellant or/and his counsel under sub-section
(4) of Section 100 of the Code, but the High Court did it while passing
the final judgment in its concluding para.
                                                                                 C
      24. Such novel procedure adopted by the High Court, in our
considered opinion, is wholly contrary to the scheme of Section 100 of
the Code and renders the impugned judgment legally unsustainable.
       25. In our considered opinion, the High Court had no jurisdiction
to frame the substantial question at the time of writing of its final judgment   D
in the appeal except to the extent permitted under sub-section (5). The
procedure adopted by the High Court, apart from it being against the
scheme of Section 100 of the Code, also resulted in causing prejudice to
the respondents because the respondents could not object to the framing
of substantial question of law. Indeed, the respondents could not come
to know on which question of law, the appeal was admitted for final              E
hearing.
      26. In other words, since the High Court failed to frame any
substantial question of law under sub-section(4) of Section 100 at the
time of admission of the appeal, the respondents could not come to know
on which question of law, the appeal was admitted for hearing.                   F
       27. It cannot be disputed that sub-section (5) gives the respondents
a right to know on which substantial question of law, the appeal was
admitted for final hearing. Sub-section (5) enables the respondents to
raise an objection at the time of final hearing that the question of law
framed at the instance of the appellant does not really arise in the case.       G
       28. Yet, the other reason is that the respondents are only required
to reply while opposing the second appeal to the question formulated by
the High Court under sub-section (4) and not beyond that. If the question
of law is not framed under sub-section (4) at the time of admission or
                                                                                 H
1074             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2018] 1 S.C.R.


 A     before the final hearing of the appeal, there remains nothing for the
       respondent to oppose the second appeal at the time of hearing. In this
       situation, the High Court will have no jurisdiction to decide such second
       appeal finally for want of any substantial question(s) of law.
               29. The scheme of Section 100 is that once the High Court is
 B     satisfied that the appeal involves a substantial question of law, such
       question shall have to be framed under sub-section(4) of Section 100. It
       is the framing of the question which empowers the High Court to finally
       decide the appeal in accordance with the procedure prescribed under
       sub-section (5). Both the requirements prescribed in sub-sections (4)
       and (5) are, therefore, mandatory and have to be followed in the manner
 C     prescribed therein. Indeed, as mentioned supra, the jurisdiction to decide
       the second appeal finally arises only after the substantial question of
       law is framed under sub-section (4). There may be a case and indeed
       there are cases where even after framing a substantial question of law,
       the same can be answered against the appellant. It is, however, done
 D     only after hearing the respondents under sub-section (5).
              30. If, however, the High Court is satisfied after hearing the
       appellant at the time of admission that the appeal does not involve any
       substantial question of law, then such appeal is liable to be dismissed in
       limine without any notice to the respondents after recording a finding in
 E     the dismissal order that the appeal does not involve any substantial question
       of law within the meaning of sub-section (4). It is needless to say that
       for passing such order in limine, the High Court is required to assign the
       reasons in support of its conclusion.
             31. It is, however, of no significance, whether the respondent has
 F     appeared at the time of final hearing of the appeal or not. The High
       Court, in any case, has to proceed in accordance with the procedure
       prescribed under Section 100 while disposing of the appeal, whether in
       limine or at the final hearing stage.
              32. It is a settled principle of rule of interpretation that whenever
 G     a statute requires a particular act to be done in a particular manner then
       such act has to be done in that manner only and in no other manner.
       (See- Interpretation of Statutes by G.P. Singh, IXth Edition page
       347 and Baru Ram vs. Parsanni (Smt.), AIR 1959 SC 93).
             33. The aforesaid principle applies to the case at hand because,
       as discussed above, the High Court failed to follow the procedure
 H
        SURAT SINGH (DEAD) v. SIRI BHAGWAN & ORS.                              1075
               [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

prescribed under Section 100 of the Code while allowing the second             A
appeal and thus committed a jurisdictional error calling for interference
by this Court in the impugned judgment.
      34. While construing Section 100, this Court in the case of Santosh
Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by L.Rs., (2001) 3 SCC
179 succinctly explained the scope, the jurisdiction and what constitutes      B
a substantial questions of law under Section 100 of the Code.
      35. It is, therefore, the duty of the High Court to always keep in
mind the law laid down in Santosh Hazari (supra) while formulating the
question and deciding the second appeal.
        36. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we cannot sustain the    C
impugned judgment which, in our view, does not conform to the
requirements of Section 100 of the Code and hence calls for interference
in this appeal.
       37. The appeals thus deserve to be allowed. They are accordingly
allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside. The case is remanded to           D
the High Court for deciding the second appeal afresh on merits. The
High Court will now frame proper substantial question(s) of law after
hearing the appellant and if it finds that any substantial question(s) of
law arises in the case, it will formulate such question(s) and accordingly
hear the appeal on the question(s) framed finally in accordance with           E
law.
        38. We, however, make it clear that we have not applied our mind
to the merits of the controversy involved in the appeals, but only formed
an opinion to remand the case due to the infirmity noticed in the manner
in which the second appeal was decided. The High Court will, therefore,        F
decide the second appeal uninfluenced by any of our observations made
in this order.
       39. Since the matter is quite old, we request the High Court to
decide the second appeal expeditiously preferable within six months from
the date of receipt of this judgment.
                                                                               G

Nidhi Jain                                                  Appeals allowed.




                                                                               H