Holding

Prosecutions cannot be quashed as the offences are grave, but undertrials who have served half the maximum sentence must be released on bail subject to prescribed conditions, and a Special Court is constituted only after both notification and appointment of its judge, with cases already taken cognizance by a Sessions Court not requiring transfer.

Summary

The Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee filed a writ petition on behalf of undertrial prisoners detained under the NDPS Act, alleging that delays in constituting special courts and stringent bail provisions violated Articles 14, 19 and 21. The petition sought quashing of the prosecutions and release of the undertrials. The Court held that the offences are grave, so prosecutions cannot be quashed, but detention beyond half the maximum sentence infringes the right to a speedy trial, requiring release on bail with specific conditions. It clarified that a special court is deemed constituted only after both the Gazette notification and the appointment of a judge, and that cases already taken cognizance by a Sessions Court during the transitional period need not be transferred to the special court. Accordingly, detailed bail directions were issued, notices were sent to other states, and the petition was disposed of.

Issues considered

Whether denial of speedy trial and restrictive bail provisions under the NDPS Act violate Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution
Whether prosecutions under the NDPS Act can be quashed on the ground of inordinate delay
Whether undertrials who have served half the maximum punishment are entitled to release on bail
When a Special Court under Section 36 of the NDPS Act is deemed to be constituted
Whether cases taken cognizance of by a Sessions Court during the transitional period must be transferred to the Special Court

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 190, s. 209, s. 4, s. 6
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985s. 31, s. 31A, s. 36, s. 36A, s. 36D, s. 37

Subjects

speedy trialbailundertrial prisonersNDPS Actspecial courtsfundamental rightsArticle 14Article 19Article 21constitutional lawcriminal procedure

Judgment

A SUPREME COURT LEGAL AID COMMITTEE
REPRESENTING UNDERTRIAL PRISONERS
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

OCTOBER 7, 1994
B
[AM. AHMADI AND B.L. HANSARlA, JJ.)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985, S.37.

C Constitution of India Articles 14, 19 and 21-BaiH!ndertrials lan-
guishing in jails without trial on account of delay in constitution of special
courts-Whether denial of speedy trial as well as of bail violative of fun-
damental rights under Articles 14, 19 and 21 and whether prosecutions ought
to be quashed-Held, while prosecutions cannot be quashed since the offen-
ces are grave, deprivation of further liberty of undertrials who have been in
D jail beyond half of the period of maximum sentence violative of Article 21 :
detailed directions given for release on bail.

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 ss.36, 36A, and
36D-Special Courts constituted in Bombay on January 4, 1991 but judge
E appointed on April 6, 1991-Whether cases taken cognizance of by Court of
Sessions in respect of offences after January 4 but prior to April 6 would stand
transfe"ed and be dealt with by Special Coult-Held no : constitution of
special court is complete only when judge is appointed.

F •
After an amendment effective from May 29, 1989, S. 36A of the
Narcotic Druge and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 ('Act') provided
that all offences under the Act would be tried exclusively by the Special
Conrt constituted under S.36. Till such constitution, the offences would be
tried by the Court of Sessions. Sub-section (2) of S.36D dispensed with the
need for transfer to the Special Court of cases already taken cognizance
G of by the Court of Sessions. S. 37 made every offence under the Act
cognizable and nonbailable. Bail could not be granted to a person accused
of an offence punishable for a term of five years or more unless the public
prosecutor was given an opportunity to o:ipose it and further only where
the Court was satisfied that there were reasonable groJJnds for believing
H that the accused was not guilty of the offence and was not likely to indulge
386
S.C.LA COMMITfEE v. U.O.J. 387
in similar activity. A
On account of the delay in the constitution of the special courts,
cases under the Act ·piled up. This coupled with the stringent conditions
for grant of bail, led to a large number of undertrial prisoners languishing
in jails without trial. Invoking their fundamental right to speedy trial, the B
petitioner in public interest petitioned the Court for quashing of the
prosecutions and setting them at liberty.

In Bombay although two Special Courts were constituted by a
notification of Jannary 4, 1991, a judge was appointed to one of them,
only on April 6, 1991; By a decision dated August 1, 1992, a single Judge C
of the Bombay High Court, held that the Special Court contd be said to
be constituted only on April 6, 1991 and that for trial of offences
committed up to that date, the Sessions Court alone bad jurisdiction.
On September 18, 1992 .a Division Bench of the High Court reversed the
single Judge's ruling holding that under S.36D the Sessions Court would D
be deemed to be a Special Court till such time the latter was constituted.
Accordingly, cases filed after May 29, 1989 were to be tried only by the
Special Court except where in the transitional preiod prior to its
constitution, the Sessions Court bad 'substantially proceeded with the
trial'.
E
Disposing of the matter in respect of Maharashtra and issuing
notices to the other States eliciting further information, this Court

HELD : 1.1. The offences were grave; the prosecutions could not be
quashed and the accused persons whose trials were delayed beyond F
reasonable time, could not be set free. [405-D]

1.2. Further deprivation of personal liberty of persons who have
suffered imprisonment which is half the maximum punishment would be
violative of the fundamental right to speedy trial visualised by Article 21 G
which bas to be telescoped with the right to a fair, just and reasonable
procedure under Article 14. (405-C]

f{ussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980] 1 SCC
98; Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar, [1983] 2 SCC 104; Kanar Singh v.State
of Pu11jah, (1994] 3 SCC 569 andA.R. Antulay v. R.S. Naik, [1992] 1 SCC H
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A 225, referred to.

1.3. In view of the large pendency of cases, the undertrials would be
released on bail subject to certain general directions regarding surrender
of passport and reporting to the police periodically as hereunder :

B (i) Where charged with an offence punishable with imprisonment
np to five years and fine, if the person has been in jail for a
period not less than half the maximum. Where the offence
prescribes the maximum fine, the bail amount shall be fifty
per cent of the said amount with two sureties for like amount;
C [405-G]
(ii) Where charged with an offence punishable with imprisonment
exceeding five years, on the terms set out in (i) above snbject
to the bail amount being not less than Rs. 50,000 with two
sureties for like amonnt. [406-B)
D (iii) Where charged with an offence punishable with mm1mum
imprisonment of ten years and minimum fine of Rupees one
lakb, if the person has been in jail for a period not less than
five years provided that bail is furnished in the sum of Rupees
one lakb with two sureties for like amount. [406-CJ
E
2.1. Where the Court of Session has already taken cognizance under
S. 36D(l), that Court will be entitled to hear and dispose of the case and
will not be required to transfer the same to the Special Court. All offences
under the Act during the transitional period become triable only by the
Court of Session till the constitution of the Speicial Court. There would
F be no question of the Magistrate going through the exercise of committal
proceedings. [399-F-D)

Kishun Singh v. State of Bihar, [1993) 2 SCC 16, referred to.

G Banka Das v. State of Orissa, 75 (1993) CLT 225, approved.

2.2. The constitution of the Special Court cannot be said to be
c~mplete unless the judge expected to man the court is appointed.

Cotpus Juris Secundum, Volume 21 p. 214; Words and Phrases, Per-
H manent Edition, Volume 10 p. 380, referred to.
S.C.L.A COMMITIBE v. U.0.1. [AHMADI, J.] 389

EXTRAORDINARY WRIT JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Cr!.) A
No. 307 of 1993.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)

Ranjit Kumar for the Petitioners.
B
A. Subba Rao, A.D.N. Rao for the V.K. Verma for the Respondent
in No. 1.

A.S. Bhasme for the Respondent in No. 2.

The Judgm~nt of the Court was delivered by
c
AHMADI, J. The Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,
1985 (Act 61 of 1985), hereinafter alluded to as 'the Act', was enacted inter
alia to make stringent privisions for the control and regulation of opera-
tions relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic suostances and for mat- D
ters connected therewith. The enactment received the' President's assent
on 16th September, 1985. The dictionary of the Act is to be found in
Section 2 thereof. Section 2 (XXIX) says that words and expressions used
in the Act and not defined but defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, hereinafter called 'the Code', shall have the meanings assigned to E
them in the Code. The Act is divided into six chapters comprising 83
sections. Since in the instant case we are concerned with only a few
provisions we need not examine the scheme of the Act. We had an occasion
to examine the scheme of the Act in some detail in Raj Kumar Karwal v.
Union of India & Others, [1990] 2 SCC 409, Chapter IV defines the offences
and prescribes stringent punishments, with minimum p11_nishments and
F
fines for them. For certain offences the punishment prescribed can extend
to rigorous imprisonment for 20 years and a fine of rupees two lakhs, with
a minimum rigorous imprisonment of 10 years and a fine of rupees one
lakh. By section 37 offences punishable uoder the Act are made cognizable
and non-bailable. Where the offender is accused of an offence punishable G
with imprisonment of 5 years or more, the section provides that he shall
not be released on bail or on his own bond unless (i) the Public Prosecutor
has had an opportunity to oppose the bail and (ii) if bail is opposed, the
Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he .is
not guilty and is not likely to indulge in the commission of similar offences. H
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A By Amending Act No. 2 of 1989, styled as the Norcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances (Amendment) Act, 1988, far reaching changes
came to be made in the Act. This Amending Act came into force with
effect from 29th May, 1989, vide S.B. 379(E) of even date. By this Amend-
ing Act the punishment prescribed under the newly added Section 31A for
B certain offences extended to death ·penalty also. Section 36 came to be
replaced by a new provision and Sections 36A to 36D were inserted for
the first time. The substituted Section 36, insofar as relevant for our
purpose reads thus :

"36 Constitution of Special Courts. - (1) The Government may,
c for the purpose of providing speedy trial of the offences under this
Act, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute as many
Special Courts as may be necessary for such areas as may be
specified in the notification.

(2) A Special Court shall consist of a single Judge who shall be
D appointed by the Government with the concurrence of the Chief
Justice of the High Court."

Only a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge is eligible to be
appointed a Special Judge. Under Section 36A, all offences under the Act
E 'shall' be triable only by the Special Court constituted for the area in which
the commission of the offence has taken place. This provision overrides the
provisions in the Code. Section 36B clarifies that appeals and revisions
from the orders passed by the Special Courts shall lie to the High Court
as if they passed by a Session Court. Section 36C provides for the applica-
tion of the privisions of the Code to proceedings before the Special Court
F as if the Special Court is a Court of Session, unless the Act provides
otherwise. We then come to Section 36D which may be reproduced at this
stage. It reads :

"36-D. Transitional Provisions. - (1) Any offence committed under
this Act on or after the commencement of the Narcotic Drugs and
G Psychotropic Substances (Amendment) Act, 1988, until a Special
Court is constituted under Section 36, shall, notwithstanding any-
thing contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1974), be tried by a Court of Session :

H Provided that offences punishable under Sections 26, 27 and
S.C.LACOMMITI'EEv. U.0.1.[AHMADl,J.] 391

32 may be tried summarily. A

(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall be construed to require the
transfer to a Special Court of any proceedings in relation to an
offence taken cognizance of by a Court of Session under the said
sub-section (1) and the same shall be heard and disposed of by B
the Court of Session."

It becomes immediately clear that before the introduction of the
present group of provisions by Amending Act No. 2 of 1989, the offences
under the Act were triable by the ordinary courts under the Code. How-
ever, after the enactment of the Act it was expected that speedy trials and C
harsh punishments would help prevent and combat abrise of and illicit
traffic in narcotic drugs, etc., and rid the society of drug menace. But it
was soon realised that the aim of bringing the culprits to book with dispatch
was not achieved. The legislature, therefore, thought that the aim of speedy
trials may be achieved if Special Courts are constituted to try offences D
under the Act. This objective is clearly writ large in the text of Section 36
which in no uncertain terms says that the Government may constitute
Special Courts 'for the purpose of providing speedy trial of offences under
this Act'. That is why Section 36A posits that all offences under the Act
shall be triable 'only' by the Special Court constituted for the area under
Section 36, notwithstanding anything in the Code. Clause ( d) of sub-section E
(1) of Section 36A empowers the Special Court to take cognizance of an
offence under the Act upon a police report or upon a complaint made by
an authorised officer. Section 36-C extends the provisions of the Code to
procedings before the Special Court, save as otherwise provided in the Act,
so that where the Act does not make any specific provision to the contrary, F
the Special Court may not be hamstrung and may lean on the provisions
in the Code. But then till the establishment of the Special Courts, provision
had to be made to cover the transitional period to avoid a stalemate
situation and hence the need for Section 36-D. The importance of this
provision is realised when we take ·notice of the fact that in many States
the constitution of Special Courts was delayed by a couple of years or even G
more.

The provision made in Section 36-D assumes considerable impor-
tance in deciding the principal question which arises in this case. But
before we indicate the backdrop in which the question falls for decision, it H
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A may be advantageous to understand the true scope and import of this
transitional provision. The section applies to cases where the offence
referred to under the Act has been committed on or after t!ie commence-
ment of the Amendment Act i.e. 29th May, 1989. It has no application to
offences committed before 29th May, 1989. Offences committed under the
Act on and after 29th May, 1989 would have to be tried by the Special
B
Court constituted for the area in view of clause (a) of sub-section {1) of
Section 36A. But the legislature was aware that there may be a time-gap
between the coming into force of the provisions contained in Sections 36
and 36A and the constitution of the Special Court for the concerned area.
It has, therefore, provided that offences committed under the Act on or
c after 29th May, 1989 shall be tried by a Court of Session until a Special
Court for the area is constituted under Section 36, notwithstanding any-
thing contained in the Code. Therefore, offences committed before 29th
May, 1989 would be continued to be tried by courts constituted under the
Code. Sub-section (2) of Section 360 clarifies that nothing in sub-section
D (1) shall be construed to require the transfer of any proceedings to a
Special Court if the Court of Session has taken cognizance of the offence
under sub-section (1). Once the Court of Sessions has taken cognizance of
an offence committed on or after 29th May, 1989, at a time when the
Special Court was not in existence, such a case will not be required to be
transferred to the Special Court subsequently constituted, and the same
E would have to be heard and disposed of by the Court of Session. Thus,
proceedings which have commenced before the Court of Session in respect
whereof it has taken cognizance before the establishment of the Special
Court shall be heard and disposed of by the former which implies that cases
pending before the Court of Session in relation whereto it has not taken
cognizance would have to be transferred to the Special Court on its
F
constitution.

Section 36 of the Act lays down the mode for the constitution of a
Special Court. It provides that Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, constitute as many Special Courts as may be necessary for
G the areas to be specified in the notification. Therefore, as soon as the
notification contemplated by Section 36 is published in the official Gazette
constituting one or more Special Courts for the areas to be specified in the
notification, the Special Court comes into existence. Sub-section (2) says
that the Special Court shall consist of a single Judge appointed by the
H Government in the manner provided by that sub-section. Sub- section (2),
S.C.L.A COMMITTEE v. U.0.1. [AHMADI, J.] 393

therefore, indicates the strength of the Special Cour~ that is to say it will A
consist of a single Judge.

We may now give an abridged version of the factual matrix. A large
number of cases in relation to offences under the Act were detected in
Bombay and prosecutions were launched against the offenders. Until 28th B
May, 1989, these cases were being dealt with by Courts having jurisdiction
under the Code. Judicial Magistrates, where they had jurisdiction, depend:
ing on the maximum sentence provided for the concerned offence, dealt
with such cases but where the sentence prescribed conferred jurisdiction
on the Court of Session, orders of committal of such cases came to be
passed. As the number of such cases was large, there was accumulation of c
work in the Court of Session at Bombay. _The Session Judge, Bombay,
distributed such cases amongst his colleagues who were Additional Ses-
sions Judges. However, the distribution was so made that there was ac- .
cumulation of such work in the court of one single Additional Sessions
Judge Shri Pathan. After the insertion of Sections 36, 36A to 360 by the D
Amendment Act No. 2 of 1989, the State Government published on 4th
January, 1991, a notification constituting two Special Courts for Greater
Bombay. By a subsequent notification dated 6th April, 1991 published in
the Offical Gazette Shri Pathan was appointed a Judge of one of the
Special Couris constituted by the notification of 4th January, 1991. On the
retirement of Shri Pathan, Shri Ghare succeeded him with effect from 25th E
February, 1992. When certain bail applications were taken up by Shri
Ghare, a contention was raised that in cases in which the Court of Session
had taken cognizance before the constitution of the Special Court, the
latter had no jurisdiction, a contention which found favour with the learned
Judge. This gave rise to the question whether the learned Judge was right F
in the view taken by him. The issue came up before the Bombay High Court
in certain Criminal Applications preferred by the department as well as
the accused persons. Daud, J. who heard these applications put the issue
a little broadly, in that, he covered offences committed not only prior to
4th January, 1991, the date on which the notification constituting Special G
Courts was issued and published in the Official Gazette, but also offences
upto 5th April, 1991, the date of which the notification appointing Shri
Pathan was issued and published in the Official Gazette. This has given
rise to the question - when is a court constituted? Daud, J. after pointing
out the divergence of views between different High Courts, approved the
view expressed by Hansaria, C.J. (as he then was) in Bhagwan Singh v. State H
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A · of Orissa and Others, [1992) II CCR 1237 departing from the view ex-
pressed by Deshpande, J of the same High Court in 1989 Cri.LJ. 2422. We
may incidentally mention that the view expressed by Hansaria, O, on the
need for a committal order by a Magistrate before the Sessions Judge can
take cognizance was not approved by the Full Bench of the Orissa High
Court in Banka Dass v. State of Orissa, 75 (1993) CLT 225. Daud, J. also
B
took the view that the special Court could be said to have been legally
constituted on 6th April, 1991. He, therefore, concluded that in respect of
offences committed between 29th May, 1989 and 6th April, 1991, during
which period the Special Courts were not in existence, the Court of Session
only could exercise jurisdiction in view of the clear language of Secion 360.
C This is how the learned Judge sums up :

"In respect of cases relating to offences committed prior to 28th
day of May, 1989, trial of these cases was to be governed under
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In respect of such. cases if
the Magistrates were empowered to award the sentences
D
prescribed by the different sections, they could deal with the
matters. Where the offences were punishable with imprisonment
for 10 years and more, the Magistrates had to commit the offenders
to stand trial in the Court of Sessions. The second category was
that of persons who had committed offences under the Act be-
E tween 29.5.1989 and 5.4.1991. Such offences were to be tried by a
Court of Sessions under sub-section (1) of section 360 of the
NDPS Act. Judge Ohare seems to have made a distinction between
offences committed in the period 4.1.1991 to 5.4.1991. This seems
to rest on his making a distinction between the creation of a court
and the appointment of a Judge to man it. The distinction is
F
without any significance for the constitution would be incomplete
unless a Judge is appointed to man the created Special Court. The
third category would be offences committed after 5.4.1991. Here,
the jurisdiction would unquestionably be that of the Special Court.
Judge Ohare has to be sustained when he says that he does not
G have jurisdiction to entertain cases relating to offences committed
prior to 4.1.1991. As a matter of fact the disability extends right
upto 5.4.1991."

Before Daud, J. rendered his decision on 1st August, 1992, the
H learned Additional Sessions Judge Shri Ohare had made a reference to the
S.C.LA COMMITIEE v. U.0.1. [AHMADI, J.] 395

High Court under section 395(1) of the Code relating to certain foreign A
nationals who were languishing in jails for long periods for the commission
of offences under the Act. This reference was heard and answered by a
Division Bench of the High Court on 18th Spetember, 1992. While answer-
ing the reference the Division Bench comprising Kurudukar and Saldhana,
JJ. dealt with the question regarding the true meaning and scope of section B
·( 36D(2) of the Act. In doing so it noticed the decision rendered by Daud,
J. only a few days before. After referring to the relevant provisions of the
Act and the case law bearing on the point, Kurudukar, J. (as he then was)
who spoke for the Bench observed :

"Under section 36(1) the Government may constitute a Special C
Court/Courts and such constituted Court/Courts shall be manned
by Judges in terms of section 36(3) of the Act. There could be a
situation like the present one, where the Government has issued
notification constituting Special Court/Courts under the Act, but
the notification appointing Judges to man such Court/Courts was D
not issued simultaneously but issued after some time, then in such
a situation Court/Courts constituted under ordinary criminal law
of the land (Code) will have jurisdiction to try offences committ~d
under the Act. This period i.e. until Judges are appointed, would
be a transitional period covered by section 36-D(l) of the Act.
Section 36-D is a deeming provision and requires to be given its E
true meaning having regard to the object of Act 2/1989. Court of
Sessions will be deemed to be "as if a Special Court'. Unless we
read this deeming provision in Section 36-D(l) of the Act true
meaning thereof cannot be assigned and any other construction of
this sub-section will render the object in enacting this sub-section F
nugatory."

Then in the light of what he called the deeming provision, the learned
Judge proceeded to ascertain the true meaning of Section 36-D(2), and
held that 'if Section 36A(l)(a) and 36(D)(l) and (2) are read together it G
leaves no manner of doubt that Section 36D has been enacted to cover
such transitional period where the Special Court is not constituted in the
real sense and trial has commenced before the Court of Sessions'. The
Division Bench then adverted to the views of Daud, J. that unless a Judge
is appointed to the Special Court, the Special Court cannot be said to have
been constituted under the Act and consequently cases in which cog- H
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A nizance has been taken by the Court of Session upto 6th April, 1991 would
fall outside the purview of the Special Court, and proceeded to observe :

"From this unreported decision it appears that the contention as
regards deeming provision under Section 36-D was not raised
before the. learned Single Judge. Consequently, the learned Single
B Judge had no occasion to consider the effect of the deeming
provision contained in Section 36-D(l) of the Act. With great
respect to the learned Single Judge, we are unable to agree with
the view taken by him in this unreported decision. In the view which
we have taken, this unreported decision needs to be overruled and
c we do so."

The Division Bench in the ultimate concluded (i) cases filed under
the Act prior to 29th May, 1989 shall be tried by the Court of Session (ii)
cases filed on and after 29th May, 1989 shall be tried by the Special Court
D constituted under the Act and (iii) if cognizance of a case is taken by a
Sessions Court, during transitional period in the absence of constitution of
Special Court in the real sense, the Sessions Court shall not be required
to transfer the case to the Special Court if it has substaintia/ly proceeded
with the trial. With respect, there are two aspects of the judgment which
are difficult to comprehend, firstly, reference to the deeming provision in
E Section 36-D(l) - there is no such deeming provision therein - and second-
ly, reference .to the constitution of the Special Court in the real sence after
overruling Daud, J. that the constitution is complete only after the appoint-
ment of a Judge to the Special Court. The Division Bench, therefore, is
largely in agreement with the view expressed by Daud, J. except that cases
F pending with the Court of Session from 4th January, 1991 to 5th April, 1991
would also be triable by that Court if it has taken cognizance but here again
as pointed out above there is some confusion when the Division Bench
carves out an exception that if during the transitional period there is no
constitution of the Special Court 'in the real sense' and the case has
proceeded 'substantially' before the Court of Session, it will not be neces-
G sary to transfer it to the Special Court.

In order to answer the point arising for our determination we may
first refer to a few provisions of the Code. By virtue of Section 4(1) all
offences under the Indian Penal Code have to be investigated, inquired
H into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions of the Code.
·.
S.C.LA COMMITIEE v. U.0.1. [AHMADI, J.] 397

Section 4(2) provides that all offences under any other law shall be similarly A
investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with under the Code,
subject ofcourse to any law for the time being in force regulating the
manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing
with such offences. Section 6 provides that except the High Courts and
Courts constituted under any other law, i.e. other than the Code, there shall B
be, in every State the following classes of Criminal Courts, namely (i)
Courts of Session; (ii) Judicial Magistrates, First Class or Metropolitan
Magistrates; (iii) Judicial Magistrates, Second Class; and (iv) Executive
Magistrates. The powers of different Courts have been indicated in Chap-
ter III. The High Court or Court of Session can try any offence under the C
Penal Code and .Pass any sentence authorised by law, but a sentence of
death if passed by the Sessions Court would be subject to confirmation by
the High Court. A Chief Judicial Magistrate and a Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate may pass a sentence for a term not exceeding seven years. A
Judicial Magistrate of the First Class and Metropolitan Magistrate are
empowered to pass a sentence for a term not exceeding three years. Section D
209 provides that when an accused appears or is brought before a
Magistrate and it appears that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court
of Session, the Magistrate shall commit the case to the Court of Session.
It will, thus, be seen that where an offecne is exclusively triable by the Court
of Session the Magistrate is enjoined by law to pass an order committing E
the case to the Court of Session for trial. Once the case is committed, the
Court of Session can take cognizance at any time thereafter.

Now under the Act different punishments have been prescribed for
different offences ranging from six months to tewenty years and even to
F
death to those with previous conviction. Therefore, under the Code some
of the offences would be triable by a Magistrate of the First Class or
Metropolitan Magistrate, some by the Chief Judicial Magistrate or Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate and the rest by the Court of Session. This was
the position till the Act underwent changes by virtue of the amendments
introduced by Amendment Act 2 of 1989. The introduction of Sections 36, G
36A to 360 changes the situation.

Section 36 provides for the constitution of Special Courts and section
36A{l){a) says that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, all
offences under the Act shall be triable only by the Special Court con- H
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A stituted for the area in which the offence has been committed or where
there are more Special Courts than one for such area, by such one of them
as may be specified in this behalf by the Government. On a conjoint
reading of these two provisions it becomes clear beyond any manner of
doubt that once a Special Court (or more than one) has been constituted
B for an area or areas in which the offence has been committed, then
notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, the Special Court alone
will have jurisdiction and all other Courts exercising jurisdiction prior to
the constitution of the Special Courts will cease to have jurisdiction.
Sub-section 36A(l)(a) and (d) which also begin with a non-obstante clause
C - notwithstanding anything contained in the Code - provide that a Special
Court may, upon a perusal of the police report of the facts constituting an
offence under the Act or upon a complaint made by an officer of the
concerned Government authorised in this behalf, take cognizance of that
offence without the accused being committed to it for trial. This is a
provision which is analogous to section 190 of the Code. It is clear from
D this provision that a Special Court may take cognizance of an offence
without the accused being committed to it for trial. Section 36C makes the
provisions of the Code applicable to proceedings before a Special Court,
save as otherwise provided in the Act, and says that the Special Court shall
be deemed to be a Court of Session. That brings us to section 36D which
E is a transitional provision. Under sub-section (1) of section 36D any offence
committed under the Act on or after the commencement of the Amend-
ment Act, 1988, until a Special Court is constituted under section 36, shall,
notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, be ·tried by a Court of
Session. The non-obstante clause in this provision makes it clear that until
F a Special Court is constituted under section 36, the Court of Session shall
try any offence committed on or after the commencement of the Amending
Act and no other Court including the Magistrate's Court will have juris-
diction to try an offence under the Act. Sub-section (2) of section 36D
further provides that nothing in sub-section (1) shall be construed to
require the transfer to a Special Court of any proceeding in relation to an
G offence taken cognizance of by the Court of Session under sub-section (1)
and the same shall be continued, heard and decided by the latter Court.
As we have pointed out earlier before this group of sections came to be
introduced in the Act by the Amending Act 2 of 1989 with effect from 29th
May, 1989, the offences under the Act were triable by different Courts
H
S.C.L.A. COMM11TEE v. U.0.1. [AHMADI, J.] 399

under the Code depending on the punishments provided therefore. But A
after the introduction of this group of sections in the Act, the legislature,
with a view to speeding· up the trial provided for the constitution of a
Special Court and until such Court was constituted it provided by sub-sec-
tion (1) of section 36B that the Court of Session will have jurisdiction to
try any offence committed under the Act; the provisions in the Code B
notwithstanding. The effect of this provision is to vest jurisdiction in the
Court of Session alone during the transitional period in respect of offences
under the Act even where the punishment prescribed is three years or less.
Ordinarily the Magistrate's Court would have power to try the offence
under the Code but by this provision the power is vested in the Court of C
Session alone and, therefore, the Courts of the Magistrate, 1.st Class,
Metropolitan Magistrates, Chief Judicial Magistrates and Chief
Metropolitan Magistrates would cease to have j~risdiction. Sub-section (1)
of section 36-A overrides the provisions of the Code. So, from the date of
its introduction on the statute book the Magisterial Courts ceased to have
jurisdiction or power to try any offence committed under the Act even if D
the punishment prescribed is three years or Jess since ony the Court of
Session is empowered to deal with such cases. There would, therefore, be
no question of the Magistrate going through the exercise of committal
proceedings as on account of the non-obstante clause in section 360(1)(a),
all offences under the Act become triable only by the Court of Session till E
the constitution of Special Courts and thereafter by the Special Court.
Ordinarily, therefore, cases pending before the Court of Session by virtue
of section 360(1) would be transferred to the Special Court, but sub-sec-
tion (2) of section 360 carves out an exception in relation to an offence of
which the Court of Session has alrLady taken cognizance. Where the Court F
of Session has already taken cognizance under sub- sectjon (1) of section
·I
360 that Court will be entitled to hear and dispose of the case and will not
be required to transfer the same to the Special Court.of the area by virtue
of the exception carved out by sub-section (2) of section 360. On a conjoint
reading of sections 36, 36A to 360, it seems clear to us that after the G
insertion of these provisions all offences under the Act have to be tried by
the Special Court for the area constituted under section 36. That is the
thrust of clause (a) of sub:section (1) of section 36A. But the legislature
was aware that there may be a time-gap between the coming into force of
these provisions w.ei. 29th May, 1989 and the constitution of a Special
H

I
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Court. This period which is a transitional period is taken care of by section
36D of the Act. Under this provision during the transitional period offen-
ces committed under the Act would be tried by the Court of Session alone
notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Code. But once
the Special Court is constituted under section 36 that Court alone would
g have jurisdiction to try the offences under the Act save and except those
in relation whereto the Sessions Court has already taken cognizance. It is
not necessary to elaborate on when cognizance is understood to have been
taken because that is fairly well- settled by a catena of decisions of this
Court, vide decisions based on an interpretation of section 190 of the Code.
C Also see para 7 of Kishun Singh v. State of Bihar, [1993] 2 SCC 16.

This takes us to the next question : when can a Special Court be said
to have been constituted? The plain language of section 36 says that the
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute as many
Special Courts as may be necessary for such areas as may be specified in
D the notification. Therefore, the mode of constitution of Special Courts is
by issuance of a notification in the Official Gazette specifying the area for
which each Special Court is constituted. Sub-section (2) of section 36
states that the Special Court will be a single Judge Court. Sub-section (3) ,
next provides that a person who has immediately before such appointment
E functioned as a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge shall be
eligible to be appointed as a Judge of the Special Court. Section 36,
therefore, has two stages, namely, the first stage in regard to the constitu-
tion of Special Courts is by issuance of a notification in the Official Gazette
and then comes the appointment of the individual to function as a Judge
of the Special Court. Therefore, as soon as the notification is issued under
F sub- section (1) of section 36 the process of constitution of a Special Court
commences and it is only thereafter that the Government can seek the
concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court for the appointment of
a Judge of that Court. As stated earlier, only a person who has worked as
a Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge immediately before such
G appointment is qualified to be a Judge of the Special Court. This is the
plain language of Section 36.

But the question still survives whether the constitution of the Special
Court can be said to be complete and effective only after the Judge to
H preside over the Court is appointed? The likelihood of a time-gap between
S.C.L.A COMMITIBE v. U.0.1. [AHMADI, J.] 401

the issuance of a notification under sub- section (1) of section 36 and the A ·
appointment of a Judge to man the court has to be countenanced. This is
evident from the facts ·of this case which show that the notification under
section 36(1) was issued on 4th January, 1991 and the notification appoin-
ing Shri Pathan to man one of the two courts was issued on 6th April, 1991.
Can the Special Court be said to have been constituted on 4th January, B
1991, or on 6th April, 1991? Daud, J. opines that it could be said to have
been constituted with effect from 6th April, 1991. The learned counsel for
the petitioner commends the view of Daud, J. for acceptance. The Division
Bench, as pointed out earlier, disagreed with Daud, J. on the erroneous
view that Daud, J. had omitted to notice the deeming provision in section C
360(1) when there is no such deeming provision in that sub-section or for
that matter in Section 360. Secondly, reference to constitution of the
Special Court in the real sense betrays confusion. Since Daud, J. has also
not discussed this question in detail we may briefly deal with it.

It is common knowledge that a 'court' is an. agency created by the D
sovereign for the purpose of administering justice. It is a place where
justice is judicially administered. It is a legal entity. It is a Tribunal presided
over by one or more Judges on whom are conferred certain judicial powers
for administering justice in accordance with law. When a Judge takes his
seat in court, the court is said to have assembled for administering justice. E
Thus the word 'court' is a generic term and embraces a Judge but the
vice-versa is not true. Therefore, the words 'court' and 'Judge' are frequent·
ly used interchangeably because a Judge is an essential constituent of a
court since there can be no dispensation of justice without a Judge. But
that is not to say that when a Judge demits office the court ceases to exist.
F
Bacon defines a court as 'an incorporeal being, which requires for its
existence the presence of the Judges or a competent number of them, and
a clerk or prothonotary, at or during which and at a place where it is by
law authorised to be held'. Therefore, while the words 'court' and 'Judge'
are frequently used interchange~bly they are not stricto sensu synonymous
for the simple reason that a Judge by himself does not constitute a court G
being only an essential part of the court. In Corpus Juris Secondum, Volume
21, page 214 we find at $ 139 the following statement:

"A court cannot exist without a Judge, and the power to create a
court embraces the power to create the office of Judge thereof. H.
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A A court cannot be established until it has a judge, and unless the
things required by the constitution for the existence of a court
concur the court cannot exist. The power to create a court or-
dinarily implies the power to create the office of judge thereof and
to confer jurisdiction.''

B ·Since the authority to create courts is an attribute of sovereignty, the power
can be exercised under the Constitution or under a constitutionally valid
statute. The power to create courts carries with it the power to organise
courts which would include the power to appoint the Presiding Officers for
the courts. But as stated earlier while the words 'court' and 'Judge' are
C often used interchangeably they are not, strictly speaking, synonymous. The
following observation illustrates the distinction :

"A 'court' is an instrumentality of government. It is a cre<ition of
the law, and in some respects it is an imaginary thing that exists
only in legal contemplation, very similar to a corporation. A time
D when, a place where, and the persons by whom, judicial functions
are to be exercised, are essential to complete the idea of a 'court'.
It is in its organized aspect, with all these constituent elements of
time, place and officers, that completes the idea of a 'court' in the
general legal acceptation of the term. But a 'court' may exist in
E legal contemplation without any officers charged with the duty of
administering justice. The officers might all die or resign, and still
the legal fiction would continue to exist. The judge of a court, while
presiding over the court, is by common courtesy, called 'the court,'
and the words 'the court' and 'the judge' or 'judges' are frequently
F used in the statutes as synonymous. State ex rel Maer v. City of
Cincinat~ 19 N.E. 2d 902, 60 Ohio App. 119."

(See Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Volume 10 page 380).

Thus when complete in its organised aspect with all the constituent ele-
G ments of time, place and officers, that a 'court' is constituted in the general
legal acceptation of the term. This is true of the 'initial' constitution only;
thereafter the Court will exist even if the Court is without a Judge by reason
of the Judicial Officer having vacated Office on resignation or retirement
or removal or the like. The provision as to the constitution of the Court at
H the 'initial stage' as contemplated by section 36, must, therefore, be under-
S.C.L.A. COMMITfEE v. U.0.1. [AHMADI, J.) 403

stood to mean that all its constituent elements of time, place and officers A
are complete and unless the Judge expected to man the court is appointed
the constitution cannot be said to be complete because the court cannot
take off till then. The initial constitution becomes complete only when the
requirements of both sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 36 have been
completed. For these reasons we are in agreement with the view expressed B
by Daud, J. in this behalf.

But the main reason which motivated the Supreme Court Legal Aid
Society to file this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was the
delay in the disposal of cases under the Act involving foreigners. The reliefs
claimed included a direction to treat further detention of foreigners, who C
were languishing in jails as undertrials under the Act for a period exceeding
two years, as void or in any case they be released on bail and it was further
submitted .by counsel that their cases be given priority over others. When
the .petition came up for admisssion it was pointed out to counsel that such
an invidious distinction between similarly situate undertrials who are D
citizens of this country and who are foreigners may not be permissible
under the Constitution and even if priority is accorded to the cases of
foreigners it may have the effect of foreigners being permitted to jump the
queue and slide down cases of citizens even if their cases are old and
pending since long. Counsel immediately realised that such a distinction if E
drawn would result in cases of Indian citizens being further delayed at the
behest of foreigners, a procedure which may not be consistent with law.
He, therefore, rightly sought permission to amend the cause title and
prayer clauses of the petition which was permitted. In substance the
petitioner now prays that all undertrials who are in jail for the commission
of any offence or offences under the Act for a period exceeding two years
F
on acconnt of the delay in the disposal of cases lodged against them should
be forthwith released from jail declaring their further detention to be illegal
and void and pending decision of this Court on the said larger issue, they
should in any case be released on bail. It is indeed true and that is obvious
from the plain language of section 36(1) of the Act, that the legislature G
contemplated the creation of Special Courts to speed up the trial of those
prosecuted for the commission of any offence under the Act. It is equally
true that similar is the objective of Section 309 of the Code. It is also true
that this Court has emphasised in a series of decisions that Articles 14, 19
and 21 sustain and nourish each other and any law depriving a person of H
404 SUPREMECOURTREPORTS [1994]SUPP.4S.C.R.

A 'personal liberty' must prescribe a procedure which is just, fair and
reasonable, i.e. a procedure which promotes speedy trial. See Hussainara
Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, [1980] 1 SCC 98 and [1986] 4
SCC 481 and Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar, [1983] 2 SCC 104, to quote
only a few. This is also the avowed objective of section 36(1) of the Act.
B However, this laudable objective got frustrated when the State Government
delayed the constitution of sufficient number of Special Courts in Greater
Bombay; the process of constituting the first two special courts started with
the issuance of a notifications under section 36(1) on 4th January, 1991 and
under section 36(2) on 6th April, 1991 almost two years from 29th May,
1989 when Amendment Act 2 of 1989 became effective. Since the number
c of courts constituted to try offences under the Act were not sufficient and
the appointments of Judges to man these courts were delayed, cases piled
up and the provision in regard to enlargement on bail being strict the
offenders have had to languish in jails for want of trials. As stated earlier
section 37 of the Act makes every offence punishable under the Act
D cognizable and non-bailable and provides that no person accused of an
offence punishable for a term of five years or more shall be released on
bail unless (i) the Public Prosecutor has had an opportunity to oppose bail
and (ii) if opposed, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds
for believing that he is not guilty of the offence and is not likely to indulge
E in similar activity. On account of the strict language of the said provision
very few persons accused of certain offences under the Act could secure
bail. Now to refuse bail on the one hand and to delay trial of cases on the
other is clearly unfair and unreasonable and contrary to the spirit of section
36(1) of the Act, section 309 of the Code and Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the
F Constitution. We are conscious of the statutory provision finding place in
section 37 of the Act prescribing the conditions which have to be satisfied
before a person accused of an offence under the Act can be released.
Indeed we have adverted to this section in the earlier part of the judgment.
We have also kept in mind the interpretation placed on a similar provision
G in section 20 of the TADA Act by the Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh
v. State of Punjab, [1994] 3 SCC 569. Despite this provision, we have
directed as above mainly at the call of Article 21 as the right to speedy trial
may even require in some cases quashing of a criminal proceeding al-
together, as held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in A.R. Antulay v.
R.S. Naik, [1992] 1 SCC 225, release on bail, which can be taken to be
H
S.C.L.A COMMITIBE v. U.O.!. [AHMADI, J.) 405

embedded in the right of speedy trial, may, in some cases be the demand A
of Article 21. As we have not felt inclined to accept the extreme submission
of quashing the proceedings and setting free the accused whose trials have
been delayed beyond reasonable time for reasons already alluded to, we
have felt that deprivation of the personal liberty without ensuring speedy
trial would also not be in consonance with the right guaranteed by Article B
21. Of course, some amount of deprivation of personal liberty cannot be
avoided in such cases; but if the period of deprivation pending trial
becomes unduly long, the fairness assured by Article 21 would receive a
jolt. It is because of this that we have felt that after the accused persons
have suffered imprisonment which is half of the maximum punishment C
provided for the offence, any further deprivation of personal liberty would
be violative of the fundamental right visualised by Article 21, which has to
be telescoped with the right guaranteed by Article 14 which also promises
justness, fairness and reasonableness in procedureal matters. What then is
the remedy? The offences under the Act are grave and, therefore, we are
not inclined to agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the D
petitioner that we should quash the prosecutions and set free the accused
persons whose trials are delayed beyond reasonable time. Alternatively he
contended that such accused persons whose trials have been delayed
beyond reasonable time and are likely to be further delayed should be
released on bail on such terms as this Court considers appropriate to E
impose. This suggestion commends to us. We were told by the learned
counsel for the State of Maharashtra that additional Special Courts have
since been constituted but having regard to the large pendency of such
cases in the State we are afraid this is not likely to make a significant dent
in the huge pile of such cases. We, therefore, direct as under : p

(i) Where the undertrial is accused of an offence(s) under the Act
prescribing a punishment of imprisonment of five years or less and
fine, such an undertrial shall be released on bail if he has been in
jail for a period which is not less than half the punishment provided G
for the offence with which he is charged and where he is charged
with more than one offence, the offence providing the highest
punishment. If the offence with which he is charged prescribes the
maximum fine, the bail amount shall be 50% of the said amount
with two sureties for like amount. If the maximum fine is not
prescribed bail shall be to the satisfaction of the concerned Special H
406 SUPREMECOURTREPORTS [1994)SUPP.4S.C.R.

A Judge with two sureties for like amount.

(ii) Where the undertrial accused is charged with an offence(s)
under the Act providing for punishment exceeding five years and
fine, such an undertrial shall be released on bail on the term set
out in (i) above provided that his bail amount shall in no case be
B less than Rs. 50,000 with two sureties for like amount.

(iii) Where the undertrial accused is charged with an offence(s)
under the Act punishable with minimum imprisonment of ten years
and a minimum fine of Rupees one lakh, such an undertrial shall
be released on bail if he has been in jail for not less than five years
c provided he furnishes bail in the sum of Rupees one lakh with two
sureties for like amount.

(iv) Where an undertrial accused is charged for the commission
of an offence punishable under sections 31 and 31A of the Act,
such an undertrial shall not be entitled to be released on bail by
D virtue of this order.

The directives in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) above shall be subject to the
following general conditions :

(i) the undertrial accused entitled to be released on bail shall
E
deposit his passport with the learned Judge of the concerned
·Special Court and if he does not hold a passport he shall file an
affidavit to that effect in the form that may be prescribed by the
learned Special Judge. In the latter case the learned Special Judge
will, if he has reason to doubt the accuracy of the statement, wiite
F to the concerned Passport Officer to verify the statement and the
Passport Officer shall verify his record and send a reply within
three weeks. If he fails to reply within the said time, the learned
Special Judge will be entitled to act on the statement of the
undertrial accused;
G (ii) the undertrial accused shall on being released on bail
present himself at the police station which has prosecuted him at
least once in a month in the case of those covered under clause
(i), once in a fortnight in the case of those covered under clause
(ii) and once in a week in the case of those covered by clause (iii),
H unless leave of absence is obtained in advance from the concerned
S.C.L.A COMMITTEE v. U.0.1. [AHMADI, J.] 407

Special Judge; A
(iii) the benefit of the direction in clauses (ii) and (iii) shall not
be available to those accused persons who are, in the opinion of
the learned Special Judge, for reasons to be stated in writing, likely
to tamper with evidence or influence the prosecution witnesses;
B
(iv) in the case of undertrial accused who are foreigners, the
Special Judge shall, besides impounding their passports, insist on
a certificate of assurance from the Embassy/High Commission of
the country to which the foreigner- accused belongs, that the said
accused shall not leave the country and shall appear before the C
Special Court as and when required;

(v) the undertrial accused shall not leave the area in relation
to which the Special Court is constituted except with the permis-·
sion of the learned Special Judge ;
D
(vi) the undertrial accused may furnish bail by depositing cash
equal to the bail amount;

('Vii) the Special Judge will be at liberty to cancel bail if any of
the above conditions are violated or a cases for cancellation of bail E
is otherwise made out; and

(viii) after the release of the undertrial accused pursuant to this
order, the cases of those undertrials who have not been released
and are in jail will be accorded priority and the Special Court will F
proceed with them as provided in section 309 of the Code.

We may state that the above are intended to operate as one time
directions for cases in which the accused persons are in jail and their trial
are delayed. They are not intended to interfere with the Special Court's
power to grant bail under section 37 of the Act. The Special Court will be G
free to exercise that power keeping in view the complaint of inordinate
delay, in the disposal of the pending cases. The Special Court will, not-
" withstanding the directions, be free to cancel bail if the accused is found
· to be misusing it and grounds for cancellation of bail exist. Lastly, we grant
liberty to apply in case of any difficulty in the implementation of this order. H
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A We are conscious of the fact that the menance of drug trafficking has
to be controlled by providing stringent punishments and those who indulge
in such nefarious activities do not deserve any sympathy. Sul at the same
time we cannot be oblivious to the fact that many innocent persons may
also be languishing in jails if we recall to mind the percentage of acquittals.
B Since harsh punishments have been provided for under the Act, the per·
centage of disposals on plea of guilt is bound to be small; the State
Government should, therefore, have realised the need for setting up suffi·
dent number of Spedal Courts immediately after the amendment of the
Act by Amendment Act 2 of 1989. Even after the Division Bench of the
Bombay High Court refused to grant en bloc enlargement on bail on 1st
c February, 1993 in Criminal Application No. 3480 of 1992 and B.D. Criminal
No. 565 of 1992, no snbstantial improvement in the pendency is shown since
new cases continue to pour in, and, therefore, a one-time exercise has
become imperative to place the system on an even keel. We also recom·
mend to the State Government to set up Review Committees headed by a
D Jndicial Officer, preferably a retired High Court Judge, with one or two
other members to review the cases of undertrials who have been in jail for
long including those released under this order and to recommend to the
State Government which of the cases deserve withdrawal. The State
Government can then advise the Public Procecutor to move the Court for
E withdrawal of such cases. This will not only help reduce the pendency but
will also increase the credibility of the prosecution agency. After giving
effect to this order the Special Court may consider giving priority to cases
of those undertrials who continue in jail despite this order on account of
their inability to furnish bail.
F
We dispose of the pellt1on insofar as it relates to the State of
Maharashtra. But we are told that the situation is equally grave, with
varying degrees, in certain other States like the States of Andhra Pradesh,
Assam, Kerala, Karnataka, Gujarat, Orissa, Bihar, West Bengal, Uttar
G Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. We direct notices to issue to these States
through their Chief Secretaries to furnish information in the proforma
appended hereto the enable this Court to decide if similar action is called
for. The information must be furnished within 4 weeks duly verified to be
correct by an officer of the concerned Depa~tment not below the rank of
H a Deputy Secretary.
S.C.L.A COMMITIEE v. U.0.1. [AHMADI, J.] 409

Name of State : A
PROFORMA
No. of No. of
No. of Average Average
cases with Special
cases with time taken time taken
No. of maxtmum Courts in
maximum for for
pending sentence of exitence with B
sentence of disposal of disposal of
cases more than dates of
5 years & cases in cases m
5 year & their
fine column 2 column 3
fine constitution
1 2 3 4 5 6

S.M. Petition disposed of.