SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE(C.B.I)versusDEEPAK CHOWDHARY AND ORS.
- Citation
- 1995 INSC 477
- Decided
- 17 August 1995
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
Holding
The grant of sanction under s.6(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 is an administrative function and does not require an opportunity of hearing; departmental exoneration is irrelevant to the sanctioning decision.
Summary
A complaint was lodged that the United Bank of India, where the respondent was branch manager, had been defrauded of Rs. 45,000 in collusion with some officers. The Superintendent of Police (C.B.I.) investigated and obtained sanction under s.6(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 to file a charge‑sheet for several IPC offences and for an offence under s.5(1)(d) read with s.5(2) of the same Act. The respondent challenged the sanction before the Calcutta High Court, arguing that he was denied a hearing before the sanction was granted and that a departmental inquiry had exonerated him. The High Court quashed the sanction, but the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the grant of sanction is a purely administrative act, not a quasi‑judicial function, and therefore no opportunity of hearing is required; the departmental exoneration was also irrelevant. The appeal was allowed, the High Court order set aside, and the trial was directed to proceed expeditiously.
Issues considered
- Whether the grant of sanction under s.6(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 is a quasi‑judicial function requiring a hearing in accordance with natural justice.
- Whether an exoneration in a departmental inquiry is relevant to the decision to grant sanction under the PC Act.
Legislation cited
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 109, s. 120B, s. 201, s. 420, s. 467, s. 468, s. 471, s. 477A
- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947s. 5(1)(d), s. 5(2), s. 6(1)(c)
Subjects
Judgment
A SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE (C.B.I).
v.
DEEPAK CHOWDHARY AND ORS.
AUGUST 17, 1995
B [K. RAMASWAMY AND B.L. HANSARIA, JJ.)
Criminal Law :
Prevention of Co11Uption Act, 1947 :
c Ss.6(1)(c), 5(1)(d) 5(2Hublic servant-t:omplaint againsHnvestiga-
tion-Sanction for prosecution-Opportunity of hearing before grant of sanc-
tion-Held, need not be afforded since grant of sanction is an administrative
function-Exoneration in departmental inquiry not relevant at the time of
grant of sanction.
D
On a complaint that the bank, whereof the respondent was the
Branch Manag,er at the relevant time, had been, in connivance with some
of its officers, defrauded for a sum of Rs. 45,000, the appellant investigated
the matter and was accorded sanction under s.6(1) (c) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act 1947, to file the charge sheet against the respondent for
E
offences punishable under ss.120B, 420, 467, 468, 471, 477.A, 201and109
IPC as also under s.5(1)(d) read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act. The respondent challenged the sanction by filing a writ
petition before the High Court, which quashed the sanction on the ground
that the respondent was not afforded any opportunity of hearing before
F granting the sanction and in the departmental inquiry the respondent had
been exonerated. Aggrieved; the Superintendent of Police (C.B.I.) filed the
appeal by special leave.
Allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of the High Court,
G this Court
HELD : 1. The grant of sanction under s.6(1) (c) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1947 being only an administrative function, an oppor- ~
tunity of hearing to the accused need not be provided before according the
sanction, though the accused may be saddled with the liability to be
H prosecuted in a court of law. Nor is the fact of departmental exoneration
818
SUPDT. OF POLICE v. D. CHOWDHARY 819
by disciplinary authority relevant. What is mderial at that time is that the A
necessary facts collected during investigation constituting the offence have
to be placed before the sanctioning authority and it has to consider the
material. Prima f acie, the authority is required to reach the satisfaction
that the relevant facts would constitute the offence and then either grant
or refuse to grant sanction. The High Court, was in error in holding that B
the order of sanction is vitiated by violation of the principles of natural
justice. [820-D-F]
..
1
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7940 of
1995.
From the Judgment and Order dated 2.4.92 of the Calcutta High
c
Court in Matter No. 489 of 1987.
N.N. Goswamy, P. Parmeswaran, T.C. Sharma, C.V.S. Rao and Ms.
Neelam for the Appellants.
~
D
T.C. Ray, Ms. Mridual Ray Bharadwaj, Bhola Prasad Singh, Sumant
• Bhardwaj and Ms. Mridula Ray for the Respondents.
The following Order of. the Court was delivered :
Leave granted. E
Delay of 232 days condoned.
The facts lie in a short compass. During the year 1982, while the
respondent No. 1 was working as a Branch Manager in Desh Priya branch
F
of the United Bank of India at Calcutta it was realised that certain officers
working in that bank had conspired with a creditor and the bank was
defrauded for a sum of Rs. 45,000. On a complaint laid, a crime case was
registered and the appellant investigated the matter and submitted the
report to the competent authority for sanction, who, by its order dated the
14th January, 1987 accorded sanction under 6(1-C) of the Prevention of G
Corruption Act, 1947 (for short, 'PC Act) to file the charge-sheet against
the respondent for the offences punishable under Section 120B, 420, 467,
468, 471477A, 201and109 IPC and also under Section 5(1) (d) read with
Section 5(2) of the PC Act. The respondent filed writ petition in the High
Court to quash the sanction. The High Court by the impugned order dated H
820 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 2 S.C.R,
A the 2nd April, 1992 in Matter No. 498/87 quashed the sanction on two
grounds, namely, that the respondent was not given any opportunity of
hearing before granting sanction and in the departmental enquiry con-
ducted by the Bank, respondent was exonerated of the charge. Therefore,
it was not expedient to proceed with the prosecution of the respondent.
_B Hen~e, the above appeal has been filed.
It is contended for the appellant that the question of giving an
opportunity to the charged officer before granting sanction does not arise
since it is not a quashi-judicial function. Grant of sanction is an administra-
tive function. What is required is that the investigating officer should place
C all the necessary material before the sanctioning authority who should
apply its mind to that material and accord sanction. Therefore, the question
of giving opportunity of hearing to the accused before granting sanction
does not arise.
D We find force in the contention. The grant of sanction is only an
administrative function, though it is true that the accused may be saddled
with the liability to be prosecuted in a court of law. What is material at
that time is that the necessary facts collected duri_ng investigation constitut-
ing the offence have to be placed before the sanctioning. authority and it
E has to consider the material. Prima f acie, the authority is required to reach
the satisfaction that the relevant facts would constitute the offcnce and then
either grant or refuse to grant sanction. The grant of sanction, therefore,
being administrative act the need to provide an opportunity of hearing to
the accused before according sanction does not arise. The High Court,
.F · therefore, was clearly in error in holding that the order of sanction is
vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice.
The second ground of departmental .exoneration by the disciplinary
authority is also not relevant. What is necessary and material is whether
the facts collected during investigation would constitute the offence for
G which the sanction has been sought for.
It is not appropriate at this stage to go into the merits of the
culpability of the respondent though sought to be contended for by Shri
Thopas Roy, the learned counsel. In fairness to the accused, we deem it
.H inappropriate to go into the merits to express any opinion.
SUPDT. OF POLICE v. D. CHOWDHARY 821
The appeal is accordingly allowed, the order of the High Court is set A
aside and the trial court is directed to proceed with the trial against the
respondent as expeditiously as possible and conduct joint trial, if trial is
not already concluded, along with other accused. If the case has been
separated and the trial of other accused has been concluded, than the trial
court is directed to expeditiously conclude the trial of the respondent, not B
exceeding one year.
R.P. Appeal allowed.
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