Holding

The High Court erred in exercising its inherent power under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceedings; the order is set aside.

Summary

Sunita Jain alleged that her husband Pawan Kumar Jain and his parents harassed her for dowry, physically and mentally torturing her, leading her to lodge an FIR. The trial court framed charges under IPC sections 498A, 506, 406, 34 and Dowry Prohibition Act sections 3 and 4. The High Court, invoking its inherent power under Section 482 of the CrPC, quashed the criminal proceedings, despite the Supreme Court having earlier dismissed a Special Leave Petition and upheld the framing of charges. The respondents appealed, contending that the High Court had no authority to review a judgment already affirmed and that Section 362 of the CrPC makes a court functus officio. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s exercise of Section 482 was erroneous, as inherent power can be used only in rare cases and cannot override a prior affirmation of charges. Consequently, the order quashing the proceedings was set aside and the appeal was disposed of.

Issues considered

The High Court's jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC after the Supreme Court had upheld the framing of charges.
Whether Section 362 CrPC precludes a court from reviewing or altering its own judgment once pronounced.
Whether the allegations constituted an abuse of process warranting the exercise of inherent power to quash.
Whether the High Court's order amounted to an unauthorized review of a criminal judgment.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 127, s. 155(2), s. 156(1), s. 362, s. 482
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961s. 3, s. 4
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 34, s. 406, s. 498A, s. 506

Subjects

dowry harassmentSection 498Ainherent powerSection 482 CrPCreview of judgmentfunctus officioabuse of processquashing criminal proceedings

Judgment

[2008] 2 S.C.R. 58
·-t-

A SUNITAJAIN
v.
PAWAN KUMAR JAIN & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No. 174 of 2008)
JANUARY 25, 2008
B
(C.K. THAKKER AND D.K. JAIN, JJ.)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1~73; Ss. 362 and 482: .,
Quashing of criminal proceedings - Demand of dowry -
c Torturing of wife by her husband and in-laws - Lodging of FIR
by wife. - Police filing Chai/an against husband and in-laws of
victim ulss.498A, 506, 406 rlw s.34 IPC and also ulss.3 & 4 of
Dowty .Prohibition Act - Framing of charges by trial Court -
Challenge to - Quashing charges against brother and sister
D of husband of the victim, High Court dismissed the petition as
against.other accused persons - SLP dismissed by Supreme
Court - Husband and his parents filing petition for invoking
s.482 of the Code - Allowed by High Court - Correctness of - ~

Held: Incorrect - Trial Court satisfied that prima facie case
E made out against accused husband and his parents and
framed charges against them - Order of trial Court upheld by
High Court as against husband and his parents - Special
Leave Petition also dismissed by Supreme Court, thus,
upholding framing of charges against accused husband and
F his parents - In terms of s. 362 of the Code, as soon as
Judgment pronounced by a Court, it becomes functus officio '1
and has no power to review, override, alter or interfere with the
order passed by it - Power of review is not an inherent power
and must be conferred on a Court by express provisions to
G that effect- On the facts and in the circumstances of the case,
High Court erred in exercising power uls. 482 of the Code in
~
quashing criminal proceedings - Hence, order of the High
Court set aside - Appropriate Court to decide the matter in
accordance with law-, Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Ss. 34, 406,
H 58
..
-+- SUNITA JAIN v. PAWAN KUMAR JAIN & ORS. 59

).
498A and 506 - Dowry Prohibition Act - Ss. 3 & 4 - Demand A
of dowry- Harassment of wife by husband - Power of judicial
review - Scope of
Inherent power- Exercise of- Held: It must be exercised
in rarest of rare cases.
8
According to the appellant, she was married to
respondent No.1 and remained with him for a few days.
t She gave birth to twins. She allegeQ that her husband and
in-laws had been harassing her for demand of dowry.
h
When the demand was not met with, her husband even c
assaulted her causing injury to her, torturing her physically
and mentally. The appellant informed her father about the
ill-treatment meted out to her by her husband and in-laws;
and that her children had been taken away by them and
were not allowed to see her. The appellant was again
assaulted and severely beaten by her husband and was D
also compelled to sign a document purported to be a
compromise deed between her husband and herself. She
, lodged a complaint in the Police Station. Respondent No.1
was called at the Police Station, he assured in writing that
he would not ill treat the appellant. When respondent No.1 E
was transferred from Raipur to Raigarh, appellant was
allegedly not taken by respondent No.1 along with him.
Later, he sent a notice through advocate to father of the

. ~
appellant informing him about filing of a divorce petition.
The appellant's father brought her with him. Later, the F
appellant lodged First Information Report (FIR) in Women
Police Station giving details about physical and mental
torture meted out to her by respondent No.1 and his family
members. Non-bailable warrants were issued against
them.
G
Respondent No.1 filed a petition for grant of bail and
~ ~
made a statement in the High Court that he had settled
the dispute amicably with his wife and both of them had
decided to live together. High Court granted bail to
respondent No.1 and his parents. In the meantime, Police H
60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.
-+- -
A filed Challan against the respondents for committing
offences punishable under Sections 498A, 506, 406 read
with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) and also under
Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Trial Court
framed charges against respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and also
B against brother and sister of respondent No.1. All the
accused challenged the action of framing of charge
against them in the High Court by filing a Revision
Petition. The High Court partly allowed the revision and
quashed charges against brother and sister of
c respondent No.1. The High Court, however, held that so
far as other respondents were concerned, charges could
not be quashed against them and dismissed the petition.
Being aggrieved by the order of the High Court, the
respondents approached this Court by filing a Special
Leave Petition which was dismissed by this Court.
0
Respondents then filed a petition in the High Court by
invoking Section 482 of the Code, which was allowed by
the High Court by quashing the proceedings. Hence, the
present appeal.
E Appellant contended that grave and serious error has
been committed by the High Court in quashing the
proceedings as once the proceedings had been initiated
in accordance with law and the Court was satisfied that
prima facie case was made out, charges were framed and
F the said action was upheld by the High Court as well as
by this Court, it was not open to the High Court to quash
the proceedings on the ground that there was abuse of
process of Court; and that the High Court has virtually
reviewed its earlier order. There is no power of review in a
G Court exercising criminal jurisdiction under the Code and
such order is illegal and without jurisdiction.
Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 submitted that taking into
account, overall conduct of the appellant and actions
taken by her against them and in the light of subsequent
H facts which were brought to the notice of the High Court,
SUNITA JAIN v. PAWA.N KUMAR JAIN & ORS. 61

._
the High Court was satisfied that it was in the interest of A
justice to quash the proceedings. Such an action of the
High Court cannot be said to be illegal or improper, that
there was no demand of dowry raised by them and a
totally false and concocted complaint was filed by the
appellant against them and the High Court was convinced B
that the action had been taken by the appellant to harass

,
the respondents, therefore, the proceedings were liable
-t
to be quashed; that two children were born in 1990 but
the appellant had never taken interest in them nor even
seen them since 1990. Both the children are residing with c
the respondents happily; and that this Court may not
exercise equitable jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
Constitution in favour of the appellant.
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
D
HELD: 1.1 The High Court was wrong in quashing
the proceedings. From the facts, it is clear that a complaint
was lodged by the petitioner against respondent Nos. 1
to 3 as also against other accused for offences
punishable under Ss. 498A, 342 and 406, IPC and Ss. 3
and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. The trial Court satisfied E
that prima facie case was made out and accordingly
charges were framed against respondent Nos. 1 to 3 as
well as against other accused. In a petition challenging
that action, the High Court partly allowed the petition and
)-
quashed charges against brother-in-law and sister-in-law F
of the appellant but upheld the order of framing of charge
against the remaining respondents. Supreme Court
dismissed the Special Leave Petition. (Para - 12)
[68-F-H; 69-A]
G
,.._
1.2 It is clear that all the Courts including this Court
were of the view that there was prima facie case for framing
~
of charge against the respondents. (Para - 13) [69-C]
" 1.3 The High Court in the impugned order noted that
earlier the respondents had approached the Court against H
-t-
62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.
...
A framing of charge and the said action was not interfered
· with even by the Supreme Court. But observing that a
Court of law cannot be expected to remain a silent
spectator and cannot be made a tool of gratifying personal
vengeance of any party, it held that the case in hand was
B a fit one to exercise inherent power under Section 482
Cr.P.C. and accordingly the proceedings were ordered to
be quashed. However, after the order passed by this Court 't
dismissing Special Leave Petition upholding framing of
charge against respondent Nos. 1 to 3, the High Court
c could not have exercised power under Section 482 of the f
I
Code quashing criminal proceedings initiated by the
appellant. (Paras - 13 & 19) [69-G-H; 72-C-D]
Madhu Limaye V. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 sec
551; G V Rao v. L.H. V Prasad & Ors., (2000) 3 SCC 693 and
D B.S. Jos.1-ii & Or~. v. State of Haryana & Anr., (2003) 4 SCC
675 - relied on.
2.1 The High Court has exercised power of review
not conferred by the Code on a Criminal Court. (Para -
20) [72-E]
E
2.2 Section 362 Cr.P.C. makes it clear that a Court
cannot alter or review its judgment or final order after it is
signed except to correct clerical or arithmetical error. The
scheme of the Code is clear that as a,;general rule, as soon
F as the judgment is pronounced or order is made by a
Court, it becomes functus officio and has no power to
review, override, alter or interfere with it. (Para - 21)
[72-G-H; 73-A]
2.3 No doubt, Section 362 Cr.P.C. starts with the words
G. "Save as otherwise provided by this Code" .. Thus, if the
Code provides for alteration, such power can be ~
...,..
exercised. For instance, sub-section (2) of Section 127
Cr.P.C; But in absence of express power, alteration or ..
modification of judgment or order is not permissible.
H (Para - 22) [73-B]
+ SUNITA JAIN v. PAWAN KUMAR JAIN & ORS. 63

>-
2.4 It is also well settled that power of review is not A
an inherent power and must be conferred on a Court by a
specific or express provision to that effect. (Para - 23)
[73-C]
Patel Narshi Thakershi & Ors. v. Shri Pradyumansinghji
Arjunsinghji, (1971) 3 SCC 844 and Hari Singh Mann v.
B
Harbhajan Singh Bajwa & Ors., (2001) 1 SCC 169 - relied
on.
3.1 In the case on hand, charges were framed against
respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and the said order was affirmed c
by the High Court and by this Court. It is no doubt true
that thereafter there was a talk of settlement between the
parties which could not be materialised. It is also true that
the appellant filed a suit for compensation of Rs.20 lakhs
against the husband and in-laws. However, that would not o·
confer jurisdiction on the High Court to quash criminal
proceedings when the action of framing of charge against
the respondents had been upheld by this Court. The order
... impugned in the present appeal is thus clearly illegal~
improper, contrary to law and deserves to be set aside.
(Para - 26) [74-B-C] E

3.2 On the facts and in the cjrcumstances of the case,
the High Court was not justified in invoking Section 482
of the Code a·nd in quashing prosecution against the
respondents. Moreover, it is well-settled that inherent F
power under Section 482 of the Code must be exercised
in rarest of rare cases. The order of the High Court
.deserves to be set aside. The matter will be decided in
accordance with law by an appropriate Court. (Paras - 29
& 30 & 33) [75-0-E; 78-G-H; 79-A] G'
~
R.P Kapur v. State of Punjab, (1960) 3 SCR 388 and
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992) Supp 1 SCC 355 -
relied on.
3.3 It is clarified that this Court has not entered into
H
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R. +--
A merits of the matter or allegations and counter allegations
by -the' parties and has not expressed any opinion one
way or the other~ All observations made by this Court have
been made only for the limited purpose of deciding the
issue before this Court. (Para - 34) [79-8-C]
B CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No:-174 of2008.
....... ..
~ ~ ' . ' . .
·· · "· From the Judgment and final Order dated 31.10.2003 of
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Misc. Crl. Case
No.: 1442/1999.
c
' . Sushil Kumar Jain, Puneet Jain, Christi Jain, Sarad
Singhania, Piyush Jain and Pratibha Jain for the Appellant.
.· Jaideep Gupta, Ankit Singhal, Nikhil Nayyar, TV.S .
Raghavendra, Ashok Kumar Singh, Naresh Kumar Gaur, Sapam
D B. Meitei, Govind Goel, C.D. Singh, Maru Sagar Samanta Ray,
Vairagva Vardhan, Sunny Choudhary and Ram Naresh Yadav,
for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E C.K. THAKKER, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal is filed against the judgment and
. order dated October 30, 2003 in Miscellaneous Criminal Case
No: 1442 of 1999 passed by the High Court of Judicature at ..
I

Jabalpur. By the said order, the High Court allowed the
F application· filed by the respondents-accused under Section 482
of the. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred ~

to as 'the Code') and quashed criminal proceedings initiated
by the appellant
3. To appreciate the controversy raised in the present
G
appeal, few relevant facts may be noted.
4. The appellant herein is the wife of Pawan Kumar Jain-
respondent No.1. Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, namely, Poolchand
Jain and Smt. Sarojbai Jain are parents of respondent No.1
H and .father-in-law and mother-in-law respectively of the appellant.
-+ SUNITA JAIN v. PAWAN KUMAR JAIN & ORS. 65
[C.K. THAKKER, J.]

It is the case of the appellant that she married to respondent A
No.1 on July 8, 1989. After the marriage, she remained with her
husband for few days at Jabalpur and during that period, her
husband and in-laws harassed her as her father had not given
sufficient amount of dowry. They taunted the appellant saying
that had the respondent No.1 married to any other lady, they B
would have received dowry amount of Rs.8-10 lakhs. On
September 5, 1990, the appellant gave birth to twins. According
T to the appellant, the greed of the respondents for dowry was so
much that in 1991, the first respondent went to the extent of
getting quality of gold ornaments given by her father tested by ac
Goldsmith which were found to be of good quality. It is also the
case of the appellant that on December 14, 1991, marriage of
the appellant's younger sister was solemnized at Sagar and
respondent No.1 and his father had come to attend it. At that
time also, the respondents demanded car, colour TV and more
D
gold. When the demand was not met with, the first respondent
attacked the appellant and caused injury to her. In March, 1992,
the 1st respondent took the appellant with him and kept her with
'of his parents at Jabalpur. Even after giving assurance that she
will not be ill-treated, she was physically and mentally tortured
for dowry. The appellant informed her father that her husband E
and in-laws were demanding dowry from her and her husband
assaulted her and her children had been taken away and they
were not allowed to see the mother (appellant).
5. The appellant stated that Harish Chandra and Daya F
Chandra Jain, who were known to her father, learnt about the
~-
miserable condition of the appellant and both of them informed
the father of the appellant in September, 1993 about the plight
of the appellant at her in-laws. One Ram Ratan Jain, who was
also knowing the appellant, persuaded the respondents to
G
behave properly but in vain. In May, 1995, again the appellant
).-
was assaulted and severely beaten. She was also compelled
to sign a document purported to be a compromise deed
between the appellant and the 1st respondent. The appellant
lodged a complaint in Police Station Civil Lines, Raipur on May
H
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 2 S.C.R.
+--
,I.
.A 10, 1998 which was registered as Crime No. "738 of 1998.
Respondent No.1 was called at the Police Station and he
executed a writing that he would not ill treat the appellant. The
1st respondent also gave assurance that he will not use any
writing against the appellant said to have been signed by her.
B 6. In July, 1995, the 1st respondent was transferred from
Raipur to Raigarh and in spite of the request by the appellant,
she was not taken by her husband along with him. On March 8,
1996, the 1st respondent sent a notice through advocate to father "'"
ofthe appellant stating that he had filed a divorce petition. He
c further stated that he was ready to pay maintenance to the
appellant. On 17th March, 1996, the appellant's father brought
the appellant to Sagar. The appellant had to go with her father
as the 1st respondent did not take her with him and had also
issued notice for divorce. On March 20, 1996, the appellant
D lodged First Information Report (FIR) in Women Police Station
which was registered as Crime No. 6 of 1996 giving details
apout physical and mental torture and dowry demands by
respondent No.1 and his family members. According to the ....
appellant, on July 10, 1996, non-bailab~e warrants were issued.
E In the High Court, however, the 1st respondent made a statement
through his advocate that parties had decided to live together
. and had settled the dispute amicably. On that statement being
made, bail was granted to respondent No.1 and his parents.
On September 28, 1996, cha/Ian was filed against the
F respondents for offences punishable under Sections 498A, 506,
. 406 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) and also ~

under Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. On
January 30, 1997, charges were framed against respondent
Nos. 1 to 3 (husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law) and also
against brother and sister of respondent No.1. All the accu~ed
G
challenged the action of framing of charge against them in the
High Court by filing a Revision Petition. The High Court vide its ~
order dated October 22, 1997, partly allowed the revision and
quashed charges against brother and sister of respondent No.1.
The High Court, however, held that so far as other respondents
H
SUNITA JAIN v. PAWAN KUMAR JAIN & ORS. 67
[C.K. THAKKER, J.]

were concerned, charges could not be quashed and dismissed A
the petition. Being aggrieved by the said order, the respondents
approached this Court by filing Special Leave Petition but even
this Court dismissed the SLP on February 23, 1998. The
respondents then once again filed a petition in the High Court
by invoking Section 482 of the Code on February 23, 1999. s
The appellant filed her reply to the said petition. The High Court
vide the impugned order, allowed the petition holding that there
was abuse of process of law by the appellant in initiating criminal
proceedings. The proceedings were, therefore, quashed. The
said order is challenged in the present appeal. c
1:Notice was issued by this Courton April 5, 2004. Several
adjournments were taken by the parties so that the matter can
amicably be settled. The matter, however, could not be settled
and was ordered to be posted for final hearing.
D
8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
9. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that
grave and serious error has been committed by the High Court
in quashing the proceedings. He submitted that once the
proceedings had been initiated in accordance with law and the E
Court was satisfied that prima facie case was made out, charge.
was framed and the said action was upheld by the High ·court
as well as by this Court, it was not open to the High Court to
quash the proceedings on the ground that there was abuse of
process of Court. Such an order could not have been made by F.
the High Court in the light of the order passed by this Court.
10. It was also submitted that the High Court has virtually
reviewed its earlier order. There is no power of review in a Court
exercising criminal jurisdiction under the Code and such order
is illegal and without jurisdiction. A grievance was also made G
).- that once this Court upheld framing of charge against respondent
Nos. 1 to 3, the High Court could not have held that the
proceedings were initiated ma/a fide or there was abuse of
process of Court. Such order, in the teeth of order passed by
this Court, was totally illegal, unwarranted and must be set aside. H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.
. -t·
68

A 11. The learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 to 3
supported the order of the High Court. He submitted that
considering the totality of facts and circumstances, the High
Court passed the impugned order which is strictly in consonance
with law. It was urged that taking into account, overall conduct of
B the appellant and actions taken by her against the 1st
respondent-husband and his family members in the light of
subsequent facts which were brought to the notice of the Court,
the Court was satisfied that it was in the interest of justice to
+
quash the proceedings. Such an action cannot be said to be
c illegal or improper. It was also stated that two children were born
in 1990 but she had never taken interest nor even seen them
after 1990. Both the children are with the respondents and they
are very happy. According to the respondents, there was no
demand of dowry either by respondent No.1 or by his family
members and a totally false and concocted complaint was filed
0
against them and the Court was convinced that the action had
been taken by the appellant to harass the respondents and the
proceedings were liable to be quashed. Finally, it was submitted
that this Court may not exercise equitable jurisdiction under
Article 136 of the Constitution in favour of the appellant.
E
12. Having given anxious consideration to the rival
submissions of the parties, in our view, the High Court was wrong
in quashing the proceedings. From the facts noted hereinabove,
it is clear that a complaint was lodged by the petitioner against
F respondent Nos. 1 to 3 as also against other accused for
offences punishable under Sections 498A, 342 and 406, IPC
and Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. The trial Court
satisfied that prima facie case was made out and accordingly
charges were framed against respondent Nos. 1 to 3 as well as
G against other accused. In a petition challenging that action, the
High Court partly allowed the petition vide its order dated
October 22, 1997 and quashed charges against brother-in-law
and sister-in-law of the appellant herein but upheld the order of
framing of charge against the remaining respondents i.e.
respondent Nos. 1 to 3. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 challenged the
H
--+ SUNITA JAIN v. PAWAN KUMAR JAIN & ORS. 69
[C.K. THAKKER, J.]

order of the High Court by approaching this Court. It was A
registered as Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 509of1998. On
December 23, 1998, this Court dismissed the special leave
petition by passing the following order:
"We are not inclined to interfere with the order of the
B
High Court dated 22.10.1997 framing charges against
the petitioner. The SLP (Crl.) No. 509/98 is dismissed. So
T far as order dated 28.11.97 is concerned refusing to
transfer the proceedings, issue notice. Pending
proceedings before the C.J.M. Sagar, is stayed".
c
13. It is thus, clear that all the Courts including this Court
were of the view that there was prima facie case for framing of
charge against the respondents herein. It appears that thereafter
the parties tried for amicable settlement of the matter again.
The Court was also informed that the parties had almost settled
D
the matter and negotiations were going on with regard to amount
to be paid to the wife. The respondent No.1-hustiand offered
Rs.7.50 lakhs towards full and final settlement. According to the
respondents, the petitioner-wife insisted for more amount. The
efforts of settlement thus failed. It has also come on record that
appellant-wife filed a suit against the husband for compensation E
of Rs.20 lakhs in the Court of First Addi. Judge, Sagar. A
Revision Petition filed by respondent Nos. 1 to 3 was allowed
by the High Court and it was held that Sagar Court had no
territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. After the order passed
by this Court in August, 1998, respondent Nos. 1 to 3 again F
moved the High Court under Section 482 of the Code for
quashing of criminal proceedings. The High Court in the
impugned order noted that earlier the respondents had
approached the Court against framing of charge and the said
action was not interfered with even by the Supreme Court. But G
).- observing that "a Court of law cannot be expected to remain a
silent spectator and cannot be made a tool of gratifying personal
vengeance of any party", it held that the case in hand was a fit
one to exercise inherent power under Section 482 and
accordingly the proceedings were ordered to be quashed. The H
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R. -+-
A Court, for coming to the said conclusion, relied upon certain
decisions of this Court ..
14. In Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4
SCC 551, an interlocutory order was passed by a Court
subordinate to the High Court against which Revision Petition
B was filed. It was contended that sub-section (2) of Section 397
barred exercise of revisional powers "in relation to any
interlocutory order passed in an appeal, inquiry, trial or in any -t-
other proceeding". Since the order was interlocutory in nature,
revision petition was not maintainable. This Court held that even
c where an order cannot be challenged in revision, inherent powers
under Section 482 of the Code could be exercised by the High
Court in appropriate cases.
15. This Court stated:
D "On a plain reading of Section 482, however, it would
follow that nothing in the Code, which would include sub-
section(2)of Section 397 also, 'shall be deemed to limit or
affect the inherent powers of the High. Court'. But, if we ).-
were to say that the said bar is not to operate in the
E exercise of the inherent power at all, it will be setting at
naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise
of the revisional powers. In such a situation, what is-the
harmonious way out? In our opinion, a happy solution of
this problem would be to say that the bar provided in sub-
F section (2) of Section 397 operates only in exercise of the
revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby that
the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to
any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one of
the other principles enunciated above, the inherent power
will come into play, there being no other provision in the
G
Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved
party. But then, if the order assailed is purely of an ~
interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise
of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898
Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent
H
SUNITA JAIN v. PAWAN KUMAR JAIN & ORS. 71
[C.K. THAKKER, J.]

power. But in case the impugned order clearly brings about A
a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court
or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice
interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary,
then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or affect
the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But B
such cases would be few and far between. The High
. Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly."
16. The High Court also referred to G. V Rao v. L.H. V
Prasad & Ors., (2000) 3 SCC 693 wherein this Court considered
the object underlying marriage as sacred ceremony and to end C
the dispute amicably between the parties by pondering over
differences and misunderstandings. It was observed that the
parties should not litigate by instituting criminal cases which
would take long time and in that'process, lose their 'young' days
in chasing their cases in different Courts. The Court, therefore, D
observed that such matters should be settled immediately.
17. In B.S. Joshi & Ors. v. State of Haryana &Anr., (2003)
4 sec 675, proceedings for offences punishable under
Sections 498A and 406, IPC were quashed. It was observed
that Section 320 of the Code relating to 'compounding of E
offences' would not limit the power of the High Court under
Section 482 of the Code and if the High Court is satisfied that
the proceedings were initiated mala fide and there is abuse of
process of law, they can be quashed. Referring to earlier
judgments, the Court held that there are special features in F
matrimonial matters and it is the duty of the Court to encourage
genuine settlement of matrimonial disputes.
1~· Discussing the underlying object of insertjng Chapter.
XXA (Section 498A) in the Indian Penal Code, the Court stated: G
,,._ "There. is no doubt that the object of introducing
Chapter XX-A containing Section 498-A in the Indian Penal
Code was to prevent torture to a woman by her husband
or by relativ~s of her husbar:id. Section 498-A was added
with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who H
72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.

A harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to
satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The hypertechnical view
would be counterproductive and would act against interests
of women and against the object for which this provision
was added. There is every likelihood that non-exercise of
B inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends
of justice would prevent women from settling earlier. That
is not the object of Chapter XX-A of the Indian Penal Code." '+-
19. In spite of best efforts by the learned counsel for the
respondents, we are unable to persuade ourselves to hold that
C after the order passed by this Court dismissing Special Leave
Petition upholding framing of charge against respondent Nos.
1 to 3, the High Court could have exercised power under Section
482 of the Code quashing criminal proceedings initiated by the
appellant. The High Court observed that even after dismissal of
D SLP by this Court, it was open for the Court to consider the
prayer of the accused to quash prosecution in exercise of
inherent powers because "the extraordinary jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Code may be exercised at any stage".
20. To us, the learned counsel forthe appellant is right that
E in substance and in reality, the High Court has exercised power
of review not conferred by the Code on a Criminal Court. Section
362 of the Code does not empower a Criminal Court to alter its
· judgment. It reads thus:

F 362. Court not to alter judgment:- Save as otherwise
provided by this Code or by any other law for the time
being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment
or order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the
same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error.
G (emphasis supplied)
21. The section makes it clear that a Court cannot alter or
review its judgment or final order after it is signed except to
correct clerical or arithmetical error. The scheme of the Code,
in our judgment, is clear that as a general rule, as soon as the
H judgment is pronounced or order is made by a Court, it becomes
-
,-
__L

SUNITA JAIN v. PAWAN KUMAR JAIN & ORS. 73
[C.K. THAKKER, J.]

functus officio (ceases to have control over the case) and has A.
no power to review, override, alter or interfere with it.
22. No doubt, the section starts with the words "Save as
otherwise provided by this Code". Thus, if the Code provides
for alteration, such power can be exercised. For instance, sub-
section (2) of Section 127. But in absence of express power, 8
.,, alteration or modification of judgment or order is not permissible.
23. It is also well settled that power of review is not an
inherent power and must be conferred on a Court by a specific
or express provision to that effect. [Vide Patel Narshi Thakershi c
& Ors. v. Shri Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, (1971) 3 SCC
844) No power of review has been conferred by the Code on a '
Criminal Court and it cannot review an order passed or judgment
pronounced.
24. In Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa & Ors., D
(2001) 1 SCC 169, this Court held that a High Court has no
-.. jurisdiction to alter or review its own judgment or order except
to the extent of correcting any clerical or arithmetical error. It
deprecated the practice of filing Criminal Miscellaneous
Petitions after disposal of main matters and issuance of fresh E
directions in such petitions.
25. The Court said;
Section 362 of the Code mandates that no court, when
it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a F
case shall alter or review the same except to correct a
clerical or an arithmetical error. The section is based on
an acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is
finally disposed of by a court, the said court in the absence
of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officio G
and disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for the same
relief unless the former order of final disposal is set aside
by a court of competent jurisdiction in a manner prescribed
by law. The court becomes functus officio the moment the
official order disposing of a case is signed. Such an order H
--+- .
74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.
,.
.A cannot be altered except to the extent of correcting a
clerical or an arithmetical error. I-

26. In the case on hand, charges were framed against
respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and the said order was affirmed by the
High Court and by this Court. It is no doubt true that thereafter r
B there was a talk of settlement between the parties which could j

not be materialised. It is also true that the appellant filed a suit ";- ~

for compensation of Rs.20 lakhs against the husband and in-
laws. In our considered opinion, however, that would not confer
jurisdiction on the High Court to quash criminal proceedings
c when the action of framing of charge against the respondents
.
had been upheld by this Court. The order impugned in the present
appeal is thus clearly illegal, improper, contrary to law and
...

deserves to be set aside. '
!
27. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that
D
virtually the High Court sat over the decision of this Court and
exercised appellate power by upsetting the order of the Court
of framing charge against the respondents. The counsel, in this
,. ,.
connection, referred to Jharia slo Mania v. State of Rajasthan
&Anr., (1983) 4 SCC 7. In that case, the accused was convicted
E by a Sessions Court for an offence punishable under Section
302 read with Section 34, IPC. The order of conviction and
sentence was confirmed by the High Court as well as by this
. Court. Thereafter, a substantive petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution was instituted by the accused for issuance of a Writ .,.
F of Mandamus directing the State to forbear from giving effect to
the judgment of all Courts including this Court. A declaration
was also sought that the conviction was illegal and his detention
in jail was without the authority of law and violative of
Fundamental Rights.
1).ii
G ~
28. Dismissing the petitio·n, this Court observed:
We fail to appreciate the propriety of asking for a '
declaration in these proceedings under Article 32 that
conviction of the petitioner by the High Court for an offence
H punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the
__ I ,,_
SUNITA JAIN v. PAWAN KUMAR JAIN & ORS. 75
[C.K. THAKKER, J.]
.
Indian Penal Code is illegal, particularly when this court A
has declined to grant special leave under Article 136. Nor
can the petitioner be heard to say that his detention in jail
amounts to deprivation of the fundamental right to life and
liberty without following the procedure established by law
in violation of Article 21 read with Articles 14 and 19. B
--' When a special leave petition is assigned to the learned
Judges sitting in a Bench, they constitute the Supreme
Court and there is a finality to their judgment which cannot
be upset in these proceedings under Article 32. Obviously,
the Supreme Court cannot issue a writ, direction or order c
to itself in respect of any judicial proceedings and the
learned Judges constituting the Bench are not amenable
to the writ jurisdiction of this court.
29. Even if we may not go to the extent that the High Court
ventured to sit over the order passed by this Court in quashing D
the proceedings, in our considered opinion, on the facts and in
the circumstances of the case, the High Court was not justified
in invoking Section 482 of the Code and in quashing prosecution
against the respondents.
30. Moreover, it is well-settled that inherent power under E
Section 482 of the Code must be exercised in rarest of rare
cases. Before more than four decades in the leading case of

- )'
R.P Kapur v. State of Punjab, (1960) 3 SCR 388, this Court
stated:

It is well-established that the inherent jurisdiction of the
F
'I High Court can be exercised to q·uash proceedings in a
)
·~ proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of
any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an
G
accused person must be tried under the provisions of
the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to
interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory
stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay
down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise
H
--+--
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.
1

A of this inherent jurisdiction_ However, we may indicate
some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction
can and should be exercised for quashing the ·~
proceedings. There may be cases where it may be
possible for the High Court to take the view that the
f-
B institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against \
I

an accused person may amount to the abuse of the I '
process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned r,.
proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the I
._
f,
criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence
c alleged to have been committed by an accused person
and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against
the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the ~
I
High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding ·,,
on that ground_ Absence of the requisite sanction may,
for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases
D I
may also arise where the allegations in the first ~
information report or the complaint; even if they are taken
at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not ~

constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question
of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of :>-
E looking at the complaint or the first information report to
decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not_
In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to
hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process
of the criminal court to be issued against the accused
F person. A third category of cases in which the inherent --.(

jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked
may also arise. In cases falling under this category the
allegations made against the accused person do [
constitute offence alleged but there is either no legal
G evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence
adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear
in mind the distinction between a case where there is no
·legal evidence or where th ere is evidence which is
H manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation
~ SU NITA JAIN v. PAWAN KUMAR JAIN & ORS. 77
[C.K. THAKKER, J.]

r made and cases where there is legal evidence which on A
its appreciation may or may not support the accusation
in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section
561-A the High Court would not embark upon an
enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is
reliable or not. That is the function of the trial B
Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to
any party to invoke the High Court's inherent
jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable
appreciation of the evidence the accusation made
against the accused would not be sustained. c
(emphasis supplied)

31. Yet, in another important decision in State of Haryana
v. Bhajan Lal, (1992) Supp 1 SCC 355, the Court referred to a
number of leading decisions on the point and laid down the
following principles for exercising power of quashing criminal D
proceedings.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the E
accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
"' and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation F
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
I
155(2) of the Cbde.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the G
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
)'-
make out a case against the accused.
"
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constityte only a non-cognizable
H

:,......:.;;.
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R. ~-

A offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer ~

without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
B
which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion
that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express leg~I bar engrafted in any
c of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is
a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
D
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private ~

E and personal grudge.
32. Speaking for the Court, Pandian, J. stated:

"(T)he power of quashing a criminal proceeding should
be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and >-
F that .too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not
be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the
reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations
made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary
or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction
on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice."
G
33. We are in respectful agreement with the above
observations. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, ~ ;;,..._
in our judgment, the High Court was clearly in error in exercising
power under Section 482 of the Code and in quashing criminal
H proceedings. The said order, hence, .deserves to be set aside. ,
SUNITA JAIN v. PAWAN KUMAR JAIN & ORS. 79
[C.K. THAKKER, J.}

The matter will now be decided in accordance with law by an A
appropriate Court.

' 34. Before parting with the matter, we may clarify that we
have not entered into merits of the matter or allegations and
counter allegations by the parties and we may not be understood B
to have expressed any opinion one way or the other. All
observations made by us hereinabove have been made only
for the limited purpose of deciding the issue before us. As and
when the matter will come before the Court, it will be considered
on its own merits without being inhibited or influenced by the·
observations made by the High Court or by us in the present· C
order.
35. The appeal is accordingly disposed of.
S.K.S. Appeal disposed of.
D

1'
'