Supreme Court of India
SUNDAR BABU AND ANR.versusSTATE OF TAMIL NADU
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 218
- Decided
- 19 February 2009
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the complaint was manifestly mala fide and fell within category (7) of Bhajan Lal, justifying quashal of the criminal proceedings under s.482 CrPC.
Summary
The wife, Sukanya, filed a complaint under IPC s.498A and Dowry Prohibition Act s.4 against her husband Sunder Babu, his parents, sister and maternal grandmother, alleging dowry harassment. The husband had left for the USA six months after their marriage and the complaint was lodged many months later without any explanation for the delay. The accused filed a petition under CrPC s.482 seeking quashal of the criminal proceedings, claiming the complaint was a malicious attempt to implicate them and an abuse of process. The High Court dismissed the petition, but the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the complaint fell within category (7) of the Bhajan Lal parameters—malicious, mala fide proceedings—and therefore warranted quashing. Consequently, the criminal petition before the Judicial Magistrate was set aside.
Issues considered
- Whether the High Court erred in rejecting the petition under CrPC s.482 to quash the criminal proceedings.
- Whether the complaint under IPC s.498A and Dowry Prohibition Act s.4 constitutes an abuse of process or a malicious prosecution within the scope of s.482.
- Whether the facts fall within any of the illustrative categories laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal for exercising inherent jurisdiction under s.482.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Section 482 CrPCquashing of criminal proceedingsabuse of processIPC 498ADowry Prohibition Actinherent jurisdictionBhajan Lal testmalicious prosecution
Judgment
[2009] 3 S.C.R. 326
A SUNDAR BABU AND ANR.
v.
STATE OF TAMIL NADU
(Criminal Appeal No. 773 of 2003)
FEBRUARY 19, 2009
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA
AND P. SATHASIVAM, JJ.)
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482 - Quashing
C of proceedings - Complaint against husband, his parents,
sister and maternal grandmother under s.498A /PC and s.4
of the Dowry Prohibition Act - Husband had purportedly left
for USA six months after marriage - Complaint was filed long
thereafter - No explanation for delayed lodging of complaint
D - Petition under s.482 CrPC - Dismissed - On appeal, held:
Scope for interference under s.482 is limited - However,
interference can be made in cases as spelt out in Bhajan Lal's
case - On facts, cursory perusal of complaint shows that the
case at hand falls within category (7) of the illustrative
E parameters highlighted in Bhajan Lal's case - High Court
erred in dismissing petition under s.482 CrPC - Penal Code,
1860 - s.498A - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 - s.4.
The wife of appellant no.1 filed a complaint against .-
him and his parents, sister and maternal grandmother
F alleging commission of offences punishable under s.498A
IPC and s.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Appellant
no.1 had purportedly left for USA six months after
marriage. The complaint was filed long thereafter. No
explanation for the delayed lodging of the complaint was
G given.
Appellants filed petition under s.482 CrPC
.. --
contending that the complaint petition was nothing but
an attempt to falsely implicate them and that continuance
H 326
SUNDAR BABU AND ANR. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 327
of proceedings against them would be an abuse of the A
process of law. The High Court dismissed the petition.
Hence the present appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD:1.1. Though the scope for interference while B
exercising jurisdiction under Sec.482 CrPC is limited, but
i it can be made in cases as spelt out in the case of Bhajan
Lal. The illustrative examples laid down. therein are as
follows: 1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are taken C
at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not
prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused; 2) Where the allegations in the first
information report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable o
offence, justifying an investigation by police officers
under Sec.156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Sec.155(2) of the Code;
3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the E
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused; 4) Where, the
allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
.,.
offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by a police officer without an F
order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Sec. 155 (2)
of the Code; 5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the
basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding G
against the accused; 6) Where there is an express legal
bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the
concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in
H
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 3 S.C.R.
' -
A the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party; 7)
where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
ma/a fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
8 on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge. [Para 6] [332-8-H; 333-A-C]
1.2. Section 482 CrPC does not confer any new
power on the High Court. It only saves the inherent
power which the Court possessed before the enactment
C of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under
which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely,
(i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent
abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise
secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor
D desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would
govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative
enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all
cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefere, have
inherent powers apart from express provisions of law
E which are necessary for proper discharge of functions
and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the
doctrine which finds expression in the section which ..
merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the
High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess,
F in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in
their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to
do the right and to undo a wrong in course of
administration of justice on the principle "quando lex
aliquid a/icui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res
G ipsae esse non potest" (when the law gives a person
anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist).
[Para 9] [333-E-H; 334-A-B]
1.3. While exercising powers under section 482, the
H
SUNDAR BABU AND ANR. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 329
-. '
court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. A
ll!fl- Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has
to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and
only when such exercise is justified by the tests
specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be
. exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial B
justice for the administration of which alone courts exist.
Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice
• and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as
to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent
abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to c
allow any action which would result in injustice and
prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers
court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it
finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of
the process of court or quashing of these proceedings D
would otherwise serve the ends of justice. [Para 9) [334-
8-E]
1.4. The powers possessed by the High Court under
Sec.482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude
of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court E
must be careful to see that its· decision in exercise of this
power is based on sound principles. The inherent power
... should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution .
The High Court being the highest court of a State should
,., normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a F
case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy,
more so when the evidence has not been collected and
produced before the Court and the issues involved,
whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be
,.. seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. G
~
Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in
regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its
extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at
any stage. [Para 1OJ [334-E-H; 335-A]
H
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 3 S.C.R.
A 1.5. In the present case, even a cursory perusal of the
complaint shows that the case at hand falls within the -
category (7) of the illustrative parameters highlighted in
Bhajan Lat's case. The proceedings in Criminal Petition
pending before the Judicial Magistrate are consequently
B quashed. [Paras 7 and 10) [333-D]
c
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 AIR 604; Janata
Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary (1992) 4 SCC 305; Raghubir Saran
(Dr.) v. State of Bihar AIR (1964) SC1 and Minu Kumari v.
State of Bihar (2006 (4) SCC 359, relied on.
-
........
Case Law Reference:
1992 AIR 604 relied on Para 5
(1992) 4 sec 305 relied on Para 9
D
AIR (1964) SC1 relied on Para 9
(2006 (4) sec 359 relied on Para 9
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
E No. 773103.
..
From the Judgment & Order dated 10.03.03 of the High ~
Court of Judicature at Madras in Criminal O.P. No. 6510/2003.
Joseph Pookkatt, Gaurav Agrawal and Prashant Kumar
F for the Appellants. .......
S. Thannanjayan for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Challenge in this appeal is
to the order passed by the learned single Judge of the Madras
. ..
High Court rejecting the petition filed under Sec.482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code').
H
.
SUNDAR BABU AND ANR. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 331
~-
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
2. Background facts in short are as follows: A
~--
3. Sukanya (hereinafter referred to as 'the complainant')
was married with Sunder Babu-appellant No.1. Appellant No.
2-Mr. Venugopal and Mrs. Ramathilagam appellant No.3 are
the parents of Sunder Babu. A.4-Rajinishree is his sister and B
Andalammal is his maternal grandmother. The marriage took
place on 25/11/1998. The appellant No.1 left for USA on 1/7/
1999. The complaint was filed on 6/2/2000 alleging
commission of offence punishable under Sec.498A of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') and Sec.4 of the
~ Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (in short 'D.P. Act').
c
4. The complaint was treated as First Information Report
and investigation was undertaken. On completion of
J. ·• investigation charge-sheet was filed on 8/6/2000. A divorce
. ...,
petition was filed by the complainant which appears to have D
been granted ex parte on 12/7/2001. According to the
appellants, complainant-Sukanya has remarried on 24/8/2002.
It was a stand of the appellant that the complaint filed was
nothing but an abuse of the process of law. The allegations
. )
were unfounded. There was no basis for making the allegations.
The appellant No.1 had left for USA after about six months of
the marriage. Long thereafter on 6/2/2000, the complaint was
filed. No explanation for the delayed lodging of the complaint
was offered. In essence, it was submitted that the continuance
E
of the proceedings will be an abuse of the process of law. The F
prosecuting agency before the High Court contested the petition
filed under Sec.482 Cr.P.C. taking the stand that a bare perusal
of the complaint discloses commission of alleged offences
and therefore it is not a case which needed to be allowed. The
High Court accepted the stand of the respondent-State and
_,.. dismissed the application.
G
"
5. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant
submitted that the factual scenario indicated above and even
a cursory glance of the complaint petition shows that the same
was nothing but an attempt to falsely implicate the accused H
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 3 S.C.R.
A persons. Learned counsel for the respondent State supported
-
. ,,___
the judgment.
6. Though the scope for interference while exercising
jurisdiction under Sec.482 Cr.P.C. is limited, but it can be
made in cases as spelt out in the case of Bhajan Lal. The
B
illustrative examples laid down therein are as follows:
1. Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not
c prima facie constitute any offence or make out a
case against the accused.
2. Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR ..o(,
D do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Sec.156(1) of
the Code except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Sec.155(2) of the Code.
3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
E FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case •
against the accused.
F 4. Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by
a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Sec. 155 (2) of the Code.
G 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the
basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a
. ·-
just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
H
SUNDAR BABU AND ANR. v. STAIE OF TAMIL NADU 333
~
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J{
'
6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in A
,.... any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned
Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted)
to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act, B
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
the aggrieved party.
7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
c
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a
view to spite him due to private and personal
-·'
grudge."
7. Even a cursory perusal of the complaint shows that the D
case at hand falls within the category (7) of the illustrative
parameters highlighted in Bhajan Lal's case (supra).
8. The parameters for exercise of power under Sec.482
have been laid down by this Court in several cases.
E
,. 9. The Section does not confer any new power on the
High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court
~ possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages
- three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may
be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the F
Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to
otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor
desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern
the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment
..... • dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may G
possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart
from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper
discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law.
That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which
merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High H
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 3 S.C.R.
' .
A Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the
absence of any express provision, as inherent in their
constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right
and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on
the principle "quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere
B videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest" (when the
law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it
cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the
c0ti.rt does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent
jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised
c sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such
exercise is justified by the tepts specifically laid .down in the
section itself. It is to be exercised ex d<;bito justitiae to do real
and substantial justice for the administration.of which alone
courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of
0 justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as
to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It
-
would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action
which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice.
In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any
E proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to
abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings
would otherwise serve the ends of justice.
10. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High
Court under Sec.482 of the Code are very wide and the very
F plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise.
Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of
this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power
-
should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The
High Court being the highest court of a State should normally
G refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the
entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the
evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court
. -
and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of
magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without
H sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid
SUNDAR BABU AND ANR. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 335
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise A
its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any
stage. (See: Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary (1992 (4) SCC
305), Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar (AIR 1964 SC1
) and Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar (2006 (4) SCC 359).
(See (2008) 11 SCALE 20) B
10. Consequently, the appeal deserves to be allowed.
The proceedings in Criminal Petition No. C.C.No. 385/2000
pending before the Judicial Magistrate, Palladam, are quashed.
11. The appeal is allowed. c
B.B.B. Appeal allowed.
-
-
-~ .
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