SUMAN SINGHversusSANJAY SINGH

                            (2017] 2 S.C.R. 788


A                            SUMAN SINGH
                                     v.
                             SANJAY SINGH
                   (Civil Appeal Nos. 7114-7115 of2014)
B                            MARCH 08, 2017
      [R: K. AGRAWAL AND ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, JJ.)
              Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 - s.JJ(J){ia) - Divorce on the
    ground of cruelty - A petition seeking divorce on some isolated
    incidents alleged to have occurred 8-10 years prior to filing of the
c   date of petition cannot furnish a subsisting cai1se of action to seek
    divorce - The incidents alleged should be of recurring nature or
    continuing one and they should be in near proximity with the filing
    of the petition - Few isolated incidents of long past and that too
    found to have been condoned due to compromising behavior of the
D   parties cannot constitute an act of cruelty within the meaning of
    s. JJ(J)(ia) of the Act.
            Allowing the appeals, the Court
            HELD: 1. Almost all the grounds taken by the respondent
    in his petition were stale or/and isolated and did not subsist to
E   e"nable the res'pondent to seek a decree for dissolution of
    marriage. In other words, the incidents of cruelty alleged had
    taken place even, according to the respondent, immediately after
    marriage. They were solitary incidents relating to the behavior
    of the appellant. Second, assuming that one or more grounds
F   constituted an act of cruelty, yet the acts complained of were
    condoned by the parties due to their subsequent conduct
    inasmuch as admittedly both lived together till 2006 and the
    appellant gave birth to their second daughter in 2006. Third, most
    of the incidents of alleged cruelty pertained to the period prior to
    2006 and some were alleged to have occurred after 2006. Those
G   pertained to period after t006 were founded on general allegations
    with no details pleaded such as when such incident occurred (year,
    month, date etc.), what was its background, who witnessed, what
    the appellant actually said etc. The incidents which occurred prior
    to 2006 could not be relied on to prove the instances of cruelty
H
                                  788
               SUMAN SINGH v. SANJAY SINGH                               789
                                  •


because they were deemed to have been condoned by the acts of A
the parties. So far as the instances alleged after 2006 were
concerned, they being isolated instances, did not constitute an
act of cruelty. Both the Courts below failed to take note of this
material aspect of the case and thus committed jurisdictional error
in passing a decree for dissolution of marriage. The High Court
                                                                     B
did not, in the first instance, examine the grounds taken in the
petition to find out as to whether such grounds constitute mental
cruelty or not. The finding, therefore, though concurrent did not
bind this Court. An incident which occurred somewhere in 2010
when the appellant visited the office of the respondent and alleged
to have misbehaved with the respondent in front of other officers c
would not constitute an act of cruelty on the part of the appellant
so as to enable the respondent to claim divorce. In the first
place, no decree for divorce on one isolated incident can be
passed. Secondly, there could be myriad reasons for causing such
isolated lncident. Merely because both exchanged some verbal
                                                                     D
conversation in presence of others would not be enough to
constitute an act of cruelty unless it is further supported by some
incidents of alike nature. It was not so. [Paras 26, 27 and 30-32] ·
[794-A-H; 79~-Cl
        2. The contention that since the appellant had made
allegation against the respondent of his having extra-marital             E
relatiou and hence such allegation would also constitute an act of
cruelty on the part of the appellant is also not tenable. Plea that
since both have been living separately for quite some time and
hence this may be considered a good ground to give divorce is
not acceptable. The appellant is entitled for a decree for restitution    F
of conjugal rights against the respondent. Now that the
respondent failed to make out any case of cruelty against the
appellant, it was the respondent who withdrew from the company
of the appellant without reasonable cause and not the vice vers11.
[Paras 33, 34, 37 and 38] [795-D-E; 796-A-B]
                                                                          G
       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 7114-
7115 of2014.
       From the Judgment and Order dated 23.05.2013 of the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in F.A.O. No. 108 of2013 and F. A. 0. No.
109 of2013.                                                               H
790             SUPREME COU~T REPORTS                             [2017] 2 S.C.R.


A              D. N. Goburdhan, Ms. Pallavi Chopra,Advs. for the Appellant.
             Gaurav Goel, Rajesh Kumar (For E.C. Agrawala}, Advs. for
      the Respondent.
               The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B               ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.
                I. These appeals are filed by the appellant (wife) against the
      final judgment and order dated 23.05.2013 passed by the High Court of
      Delhi at New Delhi in F.A.0. No.108 of 2013 and F.A.O. No.109 of
      2013 by which the High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the appellant
      and confirmed the judgment dated 14.12.20 I 0 of the Principal Judge,
c     Family Courts, Rohini which had granted decree for dissolution of
      marriage in favour of the respondent (husband) and, ·in consequence,
      also affirmed the order dis111issing the petition filed by the appellant (wife)
      for restitution of conjugal rights .
            . 2. Facts, in brief, to appreciate the controversy involved in the
D     appeals need mention infra.
            3. The marriage between the appellant and the respondent was
    solemnized on 26,02.1999 at Delhi as per the Hindu rites. The respondent-
    husband is working as "Caretaker" in the Government ofNCT of Delhi
    whereas the appellant is a housewife. Out of this wedlock, one daughter
E · was born on 15.06.2002 and the second daughter was born on I 0.02.2006.
    Both daughters are living with the appellant.                     ·
              4. On 11.07.20 I 0, the respondent (husband) fil.ed a petition for
      dissolution of marriage under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act,
      1955 (hereinafter referred to as "The Act") in the Family Courts, Rohini,
F     Delhi against the appellant (wife). The respondent sought decree for
      dissolution of marriage essentially on the ground of"cruelty".
              S. In substance, .the respondent, in his· petition, pleaded 9
      instances which, according to him, constituted "cruelty" .within the
      meaning of Section 13(1 Xi-a)oftheActcntitlinghim to claim dissolution
G     of marriage against the appellant.
               6. The first ground of cruelty was related to wife's behavior on
      the next day of marriage, i.e., 27.02.1999. It was alleged that the appellant
      came out of the bedroom in night dress and that too late when the close
      relatives of the respondent were sitting in the house. It was alleged that
      she did not pay respect and wishes to the elders. (Para 9 of the plaint)
H
                 SUMAN SINGH v. SANJAY SINGH                                   791
                  [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

          7. The second ground of cruelty was again about the appellant's       A
behavior with the respondent on the eve of New Year. However, the
year was not mentioned. According to the respondent, he agreed to
celebrate the new year with the appellant on her parental house as the
.parents of the appellant gave repeated cal ls. After reaching her parental
house, most of the time the appellant was busy with her family members
                                                                                B
 and left him alone in the drawing room. Even at the time of dinner, the
family members of the appellant did not behave properly. (Para 10).
         8. The third ground of cruelty was that the appellant did not
show any inclination or enthusiasm to attend any important family function
or festivals at the respondent's house whenever held. However, no details
were given about the date and the function held. The allegations are
                                                                                c
general in nature (Para 11 ).
       9. The fourth ground of cruelty was again about the indecent
behavior of the appellant towards the respondent's family members.
However, no details were pleaded except making general averments
(Para 12).                                                                      D

        I 0. The fifth ,ground of cruelty was in relation to an incident
which, according to the respondent, occurred in July 1999. lt was alleged
that the appellant, on that day, insisted that the couple shuuld live
separately from the respondent's parents (Para 13).
                                                                                E
          11. The sixth ground of cruelty was again general with no details.
It was alleged that the appellant was not interested in doing any household
work nor was interested in .preparing meals and used to insist the
respondent to have his lm\ch from outside. (Para 14).
        12. The seventh ground of cruelty was in relation to one incident
                                                                                F
which, according to the respondent, occurred on Diwali day in the year
2000. It was again about the behavior of the appellant with the family
members of the respondent which, according to the respondent, was
rude (Para 16).
        13. The eighth ground of cruelty was in relation to one isolated
                                                                                G
incident which, according to the respond.en!, occurred on 15.04.2001. lt
was again about the behavior of the appellant with the friends ofthe
respondent who had come to the respondent's house. According to the
respondent, the family members did not like it (Para 17).
         14. The ninth ground of cruelty was that one day in year 2010,
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792             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          (2017] 2 S;C.R.


A     the appellant visited the respondent's office and misbehaved with the
      respondent in the presence of other officials (Para 27).
              I 5. The respondent also alleged some instances in the petition.
      They, however, again essentially relate to the appellant's behaviour with
      the respondent and his family members.
B              I 6. The appellant filed. her written statement and denied these
      allegations. The appellant also applied for restitution of conjugal rights
      against the respondent in the same proceedings by filing petition under
      Section 9 of the Act and inter alia.alleged in her petition that it was the
      respondent who has withdrawn from her company without there being a
c     reasonable cause. She also while denying the case set up by the
      respondent justified her case for restitution ofconjugal rights.
              17. The Trial Court framed the following issues on the basis of
      pleadings in the case:
            1. Whether after solemnization of marriage, the Respondent
D           has treated the Petitioner with cruelty? OPP
            2. Whether the Petitioner is entitled to the decree of
            divorce as prayed? OPP
            3. Relief
               The following issues were framed based on the pleadings in the
E     petition under Section 9 of the Act:
            1. Whether the Petitioner is entitled to the restitution of
            conjugal rights as prayed? OPP
            2. Relief
               18. Parties adduced the evidence. By order dated 14.12.2012,
F     the Family Court allowed the petition filed by the respondent. It was
      held that the grounds alleged by the respondent amounted to mental
      cruelty within the meaning of Section I 3(1 )(ia) of the Act and the same
      having been proved by the respondent, he was entitled to clai.m a decree
      for dissolution of marriage against the appellant. Accordingly, the Trial
G     Court granted decree for dissolution of marriage in favour of the
      respondent and dissolved the marriage. Since the decree for dissolution
      of marriage was passed against the appellant, the petition filed by the
      appellant against the respondent seeking restitution of conjugal rights
      was disl'lissed.

H              19. The appellant, felt aggrieved by the aforesaid order, filed
                 SUMAN SINGH v. SANJAY SINGH                                   793
                  [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

first appeals before the High Court. In appeals, the question was whether       A
the Trial Court was justified in granting decree for dissolution of marriage
to the respondent (husband) and, in consequence, was justified in
dismissing the petition for restitution of conjugal rights filed by the
appellant (wife).
         20. By impugned judgment, the High Court dismissed the appeals         B
and affirmed the judgment/decree of the Trial Court. The appellant (wife),
felt aggrieved, has filed these appeals by special leave against the
judgment of the High Court.                               ·.
        21. Heard Mr. D.N. Gobmdhan, learned counsel for the appellant
and Mr. Gaurav Goel, learned counsel for the respondent.                        c
        22. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and· on
perusal of the record of the case, we are inclined to allow the appeals
and while setting aside the impugned order, dismiss the divorce petition
filed by the respondent(husband) against the appellant and, in
consequence, allow the petition filed by the appellant(wife) for restitution    D
of conjugal rights against the respondent (husband).
          23. The word "cruelty" used in Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act is
not defined under the Act. However, this expression was the subject ·
matter of interpretation in several cases of this Court. What amounts to
"mental cruelty" was succinctly explained by this Court (three Judge         E
Bench) in Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh [(2007) 4 SCC 511]. Their
Lordships speaking through Justice Dalveer Bhandari observed that no
uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance, yet it is appropriate
to enumerate some instances of human behavior which may be
considered relevant in dealing with the cases of"mental cruelty".
                                                                             F
          24. Their Lordships then broadly enumerated 16 category of
cases which are considered relevant while examining the question as to
whether the facts alleged and proved constitute "mental cruelty" so as
to attract the provisions of Section 13 (I) ( ia) of the Act for granting
decree of divorce.
                                                                             G
          25. Keeping in view the law laid down in Samar GhoGh's case
(supra), when we examine the grounds taken by the respondent in his
 petition for proving the mental cruelty for grant of divorce against the
appellant, we find that none of the grounds satisfies either individµally or
collectively the test laid down in Samar Ghosh's case (supra) so as to
 entitle the respondent to claim a decree of divorce.                        H
794             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          (2017] 2 S.C.R.


A              26. This we hold for more than one reason. First, almost all the
      grounds taken by the respondent in his petition were stale or/and isolated
      and did not subsist to enable the respondent to seek a decree for
      dissolution of marriage. In other words, the incidents of cruelty alleged
      had taken place even, according to the respondent, immediately after
      marriage. They were solitary incidents relating to the behavior of the
B
      appellant. Second, assuming that one or more grounds constituted an act
      of cruelty, yet we find that the acts complained of were condoned by the
      parties due to their subsequent conduct inasmuch as admittedly both ·
      lived togethertill 2006 and the appellant gave birth to their Second daughter
      in 2006. Third, most of the incidents ofalleged <'.ruelty pertained to the
c     period prior to 2006 and some were alleged to have occurred after 2006.
      Those pertained to period after 2006 were founded on general allegations
      with no details pleaded such as when such incident occurred (year, month,
      date etc.), what was its background, who witnessed, what the appellant
      actually said etc.
D              27. In our vie--:, the incidents which occurred prior to 2006 could
      not be relied on to prove the instances of cruelty because they were·
      deemed to have been condoned by the acts of the parties. So far as the
      instances alleged after 2006 were concerned, they being isolated instances,
      did not constitute an act of cruelty.

E              28. A petition seeking divorce on some isolated incidents alleged
      to have occurred 8-10 years prior to filing of the date of petition cannot
      furnish a subsisting cause of action to seek divorce after 10 years or so
      of occurrence of such incidents. The incidents alleged should IJe of
      recurring nature or continuing one and they should be in near proximity
      with the filing of the petition.
 F
               29. Few isolated incidents of long past and that too found to
      have been condoned due to compromising behavior of the parties cannot
      constitute an act of cruelty within the meaning of Section 13 ( 1)(ia)of
      the Act.
               30. In our considered opinion, both the Courts below failed to
G
      take note of this material aspect of the case and thus committed
      jurisdictional error in passing a decree for dissolution of marriage.
              31. We cannot, therefore, countenance the approach of the High
      Court because it did not, in tl1e first instance, examine the grounds taken
      in the petition to find out as.to whether such grounds constitute mental
H
                 SUMAN SINGH v. SANJAY SINGH                                    795
                  [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

cruelty or not? The finding, therefore, though concurrent does not bind          A
this Court.
          32. We are not impressed by the submission of the learned
counsel for the respondent that an incident which occurred somewhere
in 20 I 0 when the appellant visited the office of the respondent and alleged
to have misbehaved with the respondent in front of other officers would          B
constitute an act of cruelty on the part of the appellant so as to enable
the respondent to claim divorce. In the first place, no decree for divorce
on one isolated incident can be passed. Secondly, there could be myriad
reasons for causing such isolated incident. Merely because both
exchanged some verbal conversation in presence of others would not be
enough to constitute an act of cruelty unless it is further supported by        c
some incidents of alike nature. It was not so.
         33. We are also not impressed by the submission of the learned
counsel for the re~pondent that since the appellant had made allegation
against the res~~,ent of his having extra-marital relation and hence
such allegationW'Ulild also constitute an act ofcruelty on the part of the       D
appellant entitling the respondent to claim decree for dissolution of
marnage.
        3;i, ~imilarly, we are also not impressed by the submission of
learned ctiunsel for the respondent that since both have been living
separately for quite some time and, hence this may be considered a good          E
ground to give divorce.
         35. In the first place, the respondent did not seek a decree of
dissolution of marriage on these grounds. Second, the grounds of cruelty
taken by the respondent in his petition does not include these grou,nds.
Third, even if some stray allegations were made by the wife in her               F
pleading/evidence as were relied upon by the learned counsel are ofno
relevance because, as mentioned above, these ground were not pleaded
in the petition by the respondent for seeking a decree of divorce and nor
were put in issue; and lastly, the burden being on the respondent, the
same could be discharged by the respondent by pleading and then proving.
                                                                                 G
It was not so done. It is for these reasons, we cannot accept the
aforementioned two submissions for affirming the decree of d:vorce.
        36. This takes us to the next question as to whether the appellant
was able to make out any case for restitution of conjugal rights against
the respondent.
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796              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017] 2 S.C.R.


A              37. Having perused her petition and evidence, we. are of the
      view that the appellant is entitled for a decree for restitution of conjugal
      rights against the respondent.
              38. In our considered view, as it appears to us from perusal of
      the evidence that it is the respondent who withdrew from the appellant's
B     company without there being any reasonable cause to do so. Now that
      we have held on facts that the respondent failed to make out any case of
      cruelty against the appellant, it is clear to us that .it was the respondent
      who withdrew from the company of the appellant without reasonable.
      cause and not the vice versa.
c               39. In view of foregoing discussion, the appeals suc·ceed and
      are allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside. As a result, the petition
      filed by the respondent (husband) under Section 13( 1) of the Act seeking
      dissolution of marriage is dismissed. As a consequence thereof, the
      marriage between the parties is held to subsist whereas the petition filed
      by the appellant against the respondent under Section 9 of the Act seeking
D     restitution of conjugal right is allowed. A decree for restitution ofcoujugal
      right is, accordingly, passed against the respondent.
               40. We hope and trust that the parties would now realize their
      duties and obligations against each other as also would realize their joint
      obligations as mother and father towards their grown up daughters. Both
E     should, therefore, give quite burial to their past deeds/acts and bitter
      experiences and start I iving together and see that their daughters are
      well settled in their respective lives. Such reunion, we feel, would be in
      t~e interest of all family members in the long run and will bring peace,
      harmony and happiness. We find that the respondent is working as a
F     "Caretaker" in the Government Department (see Para 4·ofhis petition).
      He must, therefore, be the "Caretaker" of his own family that being his
      first obligation and at the same time attend to his Government duties to
      maintain his family.


      Devika Gujral                                                 Appeals allowed.