SULTAN SINGHversusSTATE OF HARYANA

                       [2014) 10 S.C.R. 742


A                        SULTAN SINGH
                                v.
                      STATE OF HARYANA
               (Criminal Appeal No. 1366 of 2010)
                     SEPTEMBER 26, 2014
B
                   [V. GOPALA GOWDA AND
                 ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, JJ.]

       PENAL CODE, 1860:
c
       ss.304-8 and 498-A - Dowry death - Bride died of burn
  injuries in matrimonial home within 5 years of marriage -
  Evidence of dowry demand continuing soon before death -
  Conviction by courts below - There is no ground to interfere
0 with the concurrent finding recorded by the courts below that ,
  it was not a case of accidental death but a death taking place
  in circumstances other than normal - Thus, the presumption
  uls 1138 of the Evidence Act has been rightly invoked and
  the offence against the appellant has been proved - There
E is no tangible circumstance to rebut the presumption.

       EVIDENCE ACT, 1872:

       s. 113-8 - Dowry death - Presumption - Under s. 113-
  8, presumption is attracted only in case of suicidal or
F homicidal death and not in case of an accidental death - In
  the instant case, there are no probabilities to support the
  defence plea of accident.

        EVIDENCE:

G      Expert opinion - Opinion of post-mortem doctor - The
  opinion of expert witness on technical aspects has relevance
  but the opinion has to be based upon specialized knowledge
  and the data on which it is based has to be found acceptable
  by the court.
H                              742
       SULTAN SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                 743

    Dismissing the appeal, the Court                           A

     HELD: 1. The brother and father of the deceased
have made categorical allegation of demand of dowry
which confirmed almost upto the date of death. Even
though version of PW 4, brother of the deceased, and PW        8
5, father of the deceased, may be exaggerated to the
extent of saying that they saw the accused and his
mother causing burn injuries, there is no reason to
disbelieve their version with regard to demand of dowry.
[para 11) [751-E]
                                                               c
     2.1. The presumption u/s 1138 of the Evidence Act,
1872 is attracted only in case of suicidal or homicidal
death and not in case of an accidental dei;lth. In the
instant case, there is no reason to hold that the burn
injuries were by accident. [para 9 and 11) [751-C, F]          D

    2.2. Though there is the statement of PW 3, the
doctor who conducted the post mortem that there was
more probability of death being caused by accidental fire
as there was no smell of kerosene oil from the body of         E
the deceased and that the fire had started from the lower
parts of the body towards upper parts, such statement
of an expert witness without being based on any
specialized knowledge cannot be accepted. The opinion
of expert witness on technical aspects has relevance but
                                                               F
the opinion has to be based upon specialized knowledge
and the data on which it is based has to be found
acceptable by the court. [para 13) [752-H; 753-A-B]

   Madan Gopa/ Kakkad versus Naval Dubey. 1992 (2)
SCR 921 = 1992 (3) sec 204 - relied on.                        G

    2.3. Having regard to the entirety of material, there is
no ground to interfere with the concurrent finding
recorded by the courts below that it was not a case of
accidental death but a death taking place in
                                                               H
    744      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A   circumstances other than normal. Thus, the presumption
    uls 1138 of the Evidence Act has been rightly invoked
    and the offence against the appellant has been proved.
    There is no tangible circumstance to rebut the
    presumption. [para 15) [761-C-D]
B
        Pa wan Kumar vs. State of Haryana 1998 (1) SCR 746       =
    1998 (3) SCC 309, Hira Lal vs. State (Govt. of NCT), Delhi.
    2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 734 = 2003 (8) sec 80 - relied on.

                         Case Law Reference:
c
      1992 (2) SCR 921              relied on          Para 13
      998 (1) SCR 746               relied on          Para 14
      2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 734       relied on          Para 14
D       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
    No. 1366 of 2010.

      From the Judgment and Order dated 10.07.2008 in
  Criminal Appeal No. 204-SB of 1996 of the High Court of
E Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh.

        D.P. Singh, Salil Bhattacharya, Sanjay Jain for the
    Appellant.

       Manjit Singh, AAG., Nupur Choudhary, Vivekta Singh,
F   Kamal Mohan Gupta for the Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

       ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J. 1. This appeal has been
G preferred against the conviction and sentence of the appellant
  under Sections 304-B and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (for
  short the "IPC"). Under Section 304-B IPC, the appellant has
  been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7 years
  while under Section 498A, IPC he has been sentenced to
H
       SULTAN SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                      745
            [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years, apart from            A
sentencey'of fine.
        I
     2. Jhe appellant was married to the deceased Lavjeet
Kaur on 27th February, 1990. On 17th June, 1994, PW 4-
Gurmeet Singh lodged First Information Report to the effect that     8
Lavjeet Kaur was burnt to death by the appellant and his
mother. It was further stated that she was harassed for dowry
soon before her death. Apart from other demands of dowry, it
was stated that 5-6 days before the death, the appellant visited
the parental house of the deceased and made a demand of              C
Rs.30,000/- for purchase of land. Since the said demand was
not met, he left the house under protest. On the fateful day, when
he (PW-4) visited the house of the appellant he found that the
appellant's mother poured oil from a 'can' on the deceased and
the appellant ignited the fire. He came to his parents and
                                                                     0
thereafter he went to the Civil Hospital where he learnt that the
accused was referred to the PGI Chandigarh but she died on
thew~y.

    3. On the basis of this First Information Report, the
investigation was conducted by PW 6-ASI, Madan Pal Singh             E
and after investigation, the appellant and his mother (who has
been acquitted by the High Court) were sent up for trial.

    4. The prosecution examined PW 4-Gurmeet Singh,
brother of the deceased, PW 5-Ujjagar Singh, father of the           F
deceased, apart from evidence of Investigating Officer and the
Medical Officer and other evidence.

     5. The appellant denied the allegations and took the plea
that the deceased caught fire accidentally while working on a        G
stove. He had gone to the school near their house for giving
his photo for the Identity Card for voting purpose. When he
learnt about the accident, he immediately took Lavjeet Kaur to
the hospital.
                                                                     H
    746       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A        6. The trial Court held that though the version of PW 4-
    Gurmeet Singh and PW 5-Ujjagar Singh that they had seen the
    appellant setting the deceased on fire was not reliable, their
    reversion of demand of dowry soon before the death could not
    be rejected. Since her death was within seven years of
8   marriage, demand of dowry was proved and the death was
    under the circumstances other than normal, presumption under
    Section 1138 of the Indian Evidence Act could be raised. Thus,
    the commission of offences under Sections 498-A and 304-8,
    IPC was proved. It was held that story of bursting of stove was
c   not reliable. The relevant discussion in this regard, is as follows:

          "From the sworn testimony of PWs Gurmeet Singh and
          Ujjagar Singh discussed above it has become very clear
          that deceased Smt. Lavjeet Kaur was subjected to cruelty
          or harassment by the accused persons for the demand
D         of dowry right from the beginning of her marriage till
          death. Even soon before her death she was subjected to
          cruelty by the accused persons when father of the
          deceased could not pay a sum of Rs.30,0001- to accused
          Sultan Singh 516 days prior to the death of deceased.
E         Deceased was married with accused Sultan Singh on
          27.2.1990 and she died on 17.6.1994 on account of bum
          injuries at the matrimonial home. The fact that the
          deceased died on account of bum injuries is well proved
          from the medical evidence consisting of the statements
F         of Dr. S.K. Gupta who medico-legally examined the
          deceased immediately on arrival at Civil Hospital
          Ambala Gantt., and also of Dr. Gajinder Yadav PW-3 who
          conducted the post mortem examination of the dead
          body of deceased. The deceased Smt. Lavjeet Kaur
G         aged about 22 years had suffered 70% burn injuries and
          died on account of the same. Thus, it has been well
          established that the death of deceased Smt. Lavjeet Kaur
          was caused by bums and she died unnatural death. It has
          also been established that she died within a period of
H         seven years of her marriage. As already discussed by
  SULTAN SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                    747
       [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
me that it has also been established that the deceased       A
was also subjected to cruelty by the accused persons for
the demand of dowry soon before her death. Thus in view
of the provisions contained in Section 113-8 of the
Indian Evidence Act it can very well be presumed that the
accused persons have caused dowry death. Since the           B
deceased Lavjeet Kaur was at the house of the accused
and therefore now it is for the accused persons to explain
how she died an unnatural death within a period of about
4- ~ years of her marriage.

The explanation furnished by the accused persons with C
respect to the death of Smt. Lavjeet Kaur in the form of
their defence version to the effect that the deceased died
just by mere accident as she caught fire on account of
bursting of stove when she was cooking meals cannot be
accepted. The investigating officer AS/ Madan Pal took D
into possession a plastic can Ex.P-1 smelling kerosene
oil and half burnt Gadda from inside the room of the
house. If Smt. Lavjeet Kaur had been caught fire while
 working on the stove I fail to understand as to how the
 Gadda lying in the bed room of the house would have E
caught fire. Secondly if the stove would have burst the
same must have been found lying at the place of
 occurrence, but the same was not available to the
 Investigating Officer when he visited the spot. It clearly
negatives the defence version that Smt. Lavjeet Kaur F
caught fire on account of bursting of stove. The argument
 of the learned defence counsel to the effect that PW
 Gurmeet Singh has deposed that he had seen the
 accused setting Smt. Lavjeet Kaur on fire by sprinkling
 kerosene oil upon her in the court yard of the house does G
 not effect the prosecution case in any way, because I have
 already observed in the earlier part of the judgment that
 the deposition of PW Gurmeet Singh so far as he has
 given an eye version account cannot be believed that
 therefore the story of the court yard put forward by him H
    748       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A         automatically goes. However, the fact remains that the
          Investigating Officer found the half burnt Gadda Ex.P-2
          and the plastic can Ex.P-1 smelling kerosene inside the
          bed room of the house. Thus, the non-availability of the
          burst stove on the spot itself speaks that the defence
B         version is nothing but is simply made up story and
          cannot be believed.

                   The medical evidence as pointed out by the
          learned defence counsel also does not help the accused
          persons in any way. It has been deposed by Dr. Gajinder
c         Yadav that there were deep burns on legs and chest of
          the deceased. It has come in the statements of both the
          medical officers that the deceased suffered 70% bum
          injuries and died as a result thereof. It has been
          categorically stated by Dr. Gajinder Yadav who
D         conducted the post-mortem examination that the
          deceased died on account of burn injuries which were
          sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
          I fail to understand as to what help the accused could take
          from the statements of the medical officers by pointing
E         out that the Medical Officers have deposed that there was
          no smell of kerosene from the body and clothes of the
          deceased. If it was so then it also smashes the defence
          version, because if the deceased had caught fire by
          bursting of stove then also there must be smell of
F         kerosene oil on her clothes. In my view, the smell of
          kerosene might have evaporated in between the time of
          occurrence till the post mortem examination because the
          occurrence had taken place on 17.6.1994 at about noon
          time, whereas the post mortem examination was
G         conducted on 18. 6. 1994.

               Further, the deceased was unconscious when she
          was admitted in the hospital and therefore, it is not known
          how the deceased could tell Dr. S.K. Gupta that she had
          caught fire while working on a stove. Another person from
H
       SULTAN SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                      749
            [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
    whom Dr. S.K. Gupta derived this information was one             A
    Amar Nath a private Medical practitioner, who
    accompanied the deceased to the hospital. However,
    Shri Amar Nath was not produced in defence to ascertain
    whether he had told this fact to the Medical Officer and if
    so how he acquired the said knowledge whether from the           B
    deceased or otherwise. Moreover, in the ruka Ex.PC sent
    by Dr. S.K. Gupta to the police there is no mentioning of
    the bursting of stove, nor it has been mentioned as to how
    he learnt that the deceased caught fire while working on
    a stove. It has simply been mentioned that the deceased          c
    was alleged to have sustained burns 70% while working
    on a stove. The word 'bursting' is missing in this ruka,
    whereas, it was so stated by Dr. S.K. Gupta when he
    appeared in the witness box. If the story of bursting of
    stove came to his knowledge it is not known why he
                                                                     0
    omitted to mention this fact in his ruka Ex. PC sent to the
    police. Taking into consideration all the facts and
    circumstances I am of the definite view that the statement
    of Dr. S.K. Gupta to the effect that there was the history
    of burns allegedly sustained by the deceased due to
    bursting of stove while cooking food is not legally sound        E
    because neither Amar Nath was produced, nor deceased
    could speak anything before her death."

     7. The appellant preferred an appeal. The High Court
upheld the conviction of the appellant while acquitting his mother   F
Mohinder Kaur, the co-accused, of the charge under Section
304-B, IPC but upheld her conviction under Section 498A, IPC.
It was observed that the allegation of demand of dowry soon
before the death was only against the appellant and not against
his mother. Rejecting the defence plea of accidental burning,        G
the High Court observed as under :

     ''The accused or their persons might have accompanied
     Lavjeet Kaur to the hospital. The accused are naturally
     interested to save themselves from legal punishment and         H
      750       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014) 10 S.C.R.


 A          such as the said history might have been given by them
            or Amar Nath to save the accused. PW-2 Dr. S.K. Gupta
            has no personal knowledge about the occurrence and
            has stated that there was history of burns sustained by
            Lavjeet Kaur due to bursting of stove while cooking food.
 B          So, that history was given by the accused or Amar Nath,
            accompanying the injured to the hospital.

            One another circumstance which militates against the
            case of the accused is that the police found the blood
            sustained Gadda in the room where the occurrence is
 c          stated to have taken place and not in the kitchen, as per
            stand of the accused. That fact belied the stand of
            accused.

            The statement of Dr. S.K. Gupta that history was given
 D          by the patient does not appeal to reason. The deceased
            was having 70% bum injuries and as such she was not
            in a position to narrate the occurrence. The police had
            no reason to change the place of occurrence from the
            kitchen to the room as shown in the rough site plan.
_ E         There were singeing of the skull hair of Lavjeet Kaur
            besides having burn injuries on the chest and lower part
            of the body. The fact of bursting of stove and giving the,
            case history by Lavjeet Kaur is not mentioned by Dr. S.K.
            Gupta in the record. The doctor is not supposed to orally
 F          know all the facts. It seems that Dr. S.K. Gupta has stated
            that the history of the case was given by the patient simply
            to favour the accused, moreso when there is nothing in
            this regard on the record. So, no reliance can be placed
            on the statement made by Dr. S.K. Gupta, in this regard.

 G          PW-3 Dr. Gajinder Yadav, has stated that there was
            probability of the deceased receiving bum injuries by
            accidental fire but he has not stated it with confidence that
            in all probability, the death could be accidental, in the
            present case. That doctor has not seen the other
 H          circumstantial evidence at the spot before arriving at the
       SULTAN SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                      751
            [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
    conclusion. So, the learned trial Court has rightly held         A
    that Lavjeet Kaur, deceased, has died due to unnatural
    injuries and not by accidental burn injuries."

    8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and
perused the evidence on the record.                                  8
    9. The main question raised for our consideration is
whether the evidence of demand of dowry soon before the
death was reliable and whether it was a case of accidental
death as pleaded by the defence. The presumption under
Section 1138 of the Indian Evidence Act is attracted only in         C
case of suicidal or homicidal death and not in case of an
accidental death.

    10. We are unable to accept the submissions advanced
on behalf of the appellant.                                          D
      11. The brother and father of the deceased have made
categorical allegation of demand of dowry which confirmed
almost upto the date of death. Even though version of PW 4,
brother of the deceased, and PW 5, father of the deceased,           E
may be exaggerated to the extent of saying that they saw the
accused and his mother causing burn injuries, there is no
reason to disbelieve their version with regard to demand of
dowry. It is true that in case of accidental death presumption
under Section 1138 of the Indian Evidence Act is not available       F
but there is no reason to hold that in the present case, the burn
injuries were by accident.

     12. Apart from the following reasons given by the trial Court
and the High Court, namely;
                                                                     G
      (i)     The Investigating Officer found the plastic can
             (Exhibit P-1) smelling kerosene oil and a half
             burnt mattress (Exhibit P-2);

      (ii)    The burst stove was not found at the place of          H
    752        SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A                  occurrence as stated by the Investigating Officer;

           (iii)   The deceased suffered 70% burn injuries which
                   was held to be sufficient to cause death in the
                   ordinary course of injury, there are other reasons
                   to reject the plea of accident;
B
          there are other reasons to support the findings.

          12. While in the case of homicidal death, if the victim is
    caught unaware, a person may not be able to make any effort
c   to save himself/herself and in case of suicidal burn injuries a
    person may take all precautions not to save himself/herself, in
    case of accidental bum injuries, victim makes all possible efforts
    to save himself/herself which may leave evidence to show that
    the death was accidental. Such a person may raise alarm and
o   try to escape. The Investigating Officer visiting the scene of
    occurrence can notice the available evidence by recreating the
    scene. In the present case, there are no probabilities to support
    the defence plea of accident, particularly when relations
    between the deceased and the appellant were not harmonio~s.
E
       13. Thus, taking of plea by the accused to save himself/
  herself is not enough. The contention in the present case that
  PW 2-Dr. S.K. Gupta mentioned the history of burn due to
  bursting of stove was given by the patient and one Amar Nath
  who accompanied her is without any merit. In the same
F statement the said witness states that the victim was unfit to
  make a statement. Amar Nath, who is said to have given this
  information, has not been examined by the defence. Statement
  of Dr. S.K. Gupta that Amar Nath gave this information is
  hearsay. Moreover, PW 2-Dr. S.K. Gupta has been examined
G as an expert witness to give his opinion about the ~health
  condition of the patient based on his expertise. He is not a
  witness of fact. Similarly, contention that PW 3-Dr. Gajinder
  Yadav who conducted the post mortem made a statement in
  cross examination that there was more probability of death
H
       SULTAN SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                     753
            [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
being caused by accidental fire as there was no smell of           A
kerosene oil from the body of the deceased and that the fire
had started from the lower parts of the body towards upper parts
is equally without any merit. Such statement of an expert
witness without being based on any specialized knowledge
cannot be accepted. The opinion of expert witness on technical     B
aspects has relevance but the opinion has to be based upon
specialized knowledge and the data on which it is based has
to be found acceptable by the Court. In Madan Gopal Kakkad
versus Naval Dubey. 1 , it was observed as under :
                                                                   c
    "34. A medical witness called in as an expert to assist
    the Court is not a witness of fact and the evidence given
    by the medical officer is really of an advisory character
    given on the basis of the symptoms found on
    examination. The expert witness is expected to put before
                                                                   0
    the Court all materials inclusive of the data which induced
    him to come to the conclusion ahd enlighten the Court
    on the technical aspect of the case by explaining the
    terms of science so that the Court although, not an expert
    may form its own judgment on those materials after giving
    due regard to the expert's opinion because once the            E
    expert's opinion is accepted, it is not the opinion of the
    medical officer but of the Court.

    35. Nariman, J. in Queen v. Ahmed Alfy. 2 , while
    expressing his view on medical evidence has observed           F
    as follows:

             "The evidence of a medical man or other skilled
             witnesses, however, eminent, as to what he thinks
             may or may not have taken place under particular G
             combination of circumstances, however,
             confidently, he may speak, is ordinarily a matter
             of mere opinion."
------
1. (1992) 3 sec 204.
2. (1998) 3 sec 309.                                           H
    754       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A      14. We may also note that the presumption under Section
  1138 of the Indian Evidence Act has been enacted to check
  the menace of the dowry deaths and in appreciating the
  evidence, the social background of the legislation cannot be
  ignored. In Pawan Kumar vs. State of Haryana. 3 , it was
B observed:

          "11. It is true, as argued by learned counsel for the
          appellants, that in criminal jurisprudence benefit of doubt
          is extendable to the accused. But that benefit of doubt
          would arise in the context of the application of penal law,
c         and in the facts and circumstances of a case. The
          concept of benefit of doubt has an important role to play
          but within the confines of the stringency of laws. Since the
          cause of death of a married woman was to occur not in
          normal circumstances but as a "dowry death", for which
D         the evidence was not so easily available, as it is mostly
          confined within the four walls of a house, namely the
          husband's house, where all likely accused reside. Hence
          the aforesaid amendments brought in the concept of
          deemed "dowry death" by the husband or the relatives,
E         as the case may be. This deeming clause has a role to
          play and cannot be taken lightly and ignored to shield
          an accused, otherwise the very purpose of the
          amendment will be lost. Of course, the prosecution has
          to prove the ultimate essential ingredients beyond all
F         reasonable doubt after raising the initial presumption of
          "deemed dowry death".

          12. Explanation to Section 304-B refers to dowry "as
          having the same meaning as in Section 2 of the 1961
G         Act", the question is: what is the periphery of the dowry
          as defined therein? The argument is, there has to be an
          agreement at the time of the maniage in view of the words
          "agreed to be given" occurring therein, and in the
          absence of any such evidence it would not constitute to
H 3.   11 WR Cr. 25.
   SULTAN SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                     755
        [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

be a dowry. It is noticeable, as this definition by             A
amendment includes not only the period before and at
the marriage but also the period subsequent to the
marriage.

13. When words in a statute are referable to more than          B
one meaning, the established rule of construction is found
in Heydon's easel also approved by this Court in Bengal
Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of BihaF- AIR at p. 674. The
rule is to consider four aspects while construing an Act:

       (a) what was the law prior to the law which is sought
                                                                c
       to be inte1preted;

       (b) what was the mischief or defect for which new
       law is made;
                                                                D
       (c) what is the remedy the law now provides; and

       (d) what is the reason of the remedy.

14. The Court must adopt that construction which,
"suppresses the mischief and advances the remedy".              E

15. Applying this principle, it is clear that the earlier law
was not sufficient to check dowry deaths hence aforesaid
stringent provisions were brought in, so that persons
committing such inhuman crimes on married women                 F
should not escape, as evidence of a direct nature is not
readily available except of the circumstantial kind. Hence
it is that interpretation which suppresses the mischief,
su/Jserves the objective and advances the remedy, which
would be acceptable. The objective is that men                  G
committing such crimes should not escape punishment.
Hence stringent provisions were brought in by shifting the
burden onto the accused by bringing in the deemed
clause. As aforesaid, the definition of "dowry" was
amended with effect from 19-11-1986, to include the
period even after the marriage.                                 H
    756       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A         16. The offence alleged against the appellants is under
          Section 304-8 /PC which makes "demand of dowry" itself
          punishable. Demand neither conceives nor would
          conceive of any agreement. If for convicting any offender,
          agreement for dowry is to be proved, hardly any offenders
B         would come under the clutches of law. When Section
          304-8 refers to "demand of dowry'; it refers to the demand
          of property or valuable security as referred to in the
          definition of "dowry" under the 1961 Act. It was argued on
          behalf of the appellants that mere demand of scooter or
c         fridge would not be a demand for dowry. We find from the
          evidence on record that within a few days after the
          marriage, the deceased was tortured, maltreated and
          harassed for not bringing the aforesaid articles in
          marriage. Hence the demand is in cqnnection with
          marriage. The argument that there is no demand of
D
          dowry, in the present case, has no force. In cases of dowry
          deaths and suicides, circumstantial evidence plays an
          important role and inferences can be drawn on the basis
          of such evidence. That could be either direct or indirect.
          It is significant that Section 4 of the 1961 Act, was also
E
          amended by means of Act 63 of 1984, under which it is
          an offence to demand dowry directly or indirectly from the
          parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride. The word
          "agreement" referred to in Section 2 has to be inferred
          on the facts and circumstances of each case. The
F         interpretation that the appellant seeks, that conviction can
          only be if there is agreement for dowry, is misconceived.
          This would be contrary to the mandate and object of the
          Act. "Dowry" definition is to be interpreted with the other
          provisions of the Act including Section 3, which refers to
G         giving or taking dowry and Section 4 which deals with
          penalty for demanding dowry, under the 1961 Act and the
          Indian Penal Code. This makes it clear that even demand
          of dowry on other ingredients being satisfied is
          punishable. This leads to the inference, when persistent
H         demands for TV and scooter are made from the bride
        SULTAN SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                     757
             [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
     after marriage or from her parents, it would constitute to     A
     be in connection with the marriage and it would be a case
     of demand of dowry within the meaning of Section 304-
     B /PC. It is not always necessary that there be any
     agreement for dowry."
                                                                    B
    Again in Hira Lal vs. State (Govt. of NCT), De/hi. 4 , it was
observed as under :

     8. Section 304-B /PC which deals with dowry death, reads
     as follows:
                                                                    c
           "304-8. Dowry death.-(1) Where the death of a
     woman is caused by any burns or bodl1y injury or occurs
     otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven
     years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before
     her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by        o
     her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in
     connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall
     be cafled 'dowry death', and such husband or relative
     shall be deemed to have caused her death.
                                                                    E
           Explanation.-For the purpose of this sub-section,
      'dowry' shaff have the same meaning as in Section 2 of
      the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28of1961).

            (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be
      punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be      F
      less than seven years but which may extend to
      imprisonment for life."

            The provision has application when death of a
      woman is caused by any bums or bodily injury or occurs        G
      otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven
      years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before
      her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by

4.   (2003) a sec so.                                               H
    758       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A         her husband or any relatives of her husband for, or in
          connection with any demand for dowry. In order to attract
          application of Section 304-8 /PC, the essential
          ingredients are as follows:

                (i) The death of a woman should be caused by
B
          burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a normal
          circumstance.

               (ii) Such a death should have occurred within seven
          years of her marriage.
c
               (iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty or
          harassment by her husband or any relative of her
          husband.

               (iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in
D         connection with demand of dowry.

               (v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have
          been meted out to the woman soon before her death.

E         Section 113-8 of the Evidence Act is also relevant for the
          case at hand. Both Section 304-8 /PC and Section 113-
          8 of the Evidence Act were inserted as noted earlier by
          Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a
          view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths.
F         Section 113-8 reads as follows:

          "113-8. Presumption as to dowry death.-When the
          question is whether a person has committed the dowry
          death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her
          death such woman had been subjected by such person
G         to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any
          demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such
          person had caused the dowry death.

          Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, 'dowry
H
      SULTAN SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                      759
           [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

    death' shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-           A
    B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."

    The necessity for insertion of the two provisions has been
    amply analysed by the Law Commission of India in its
    21st Report dated 10-8-1988 on "Dowry Deaths and Law            B
    Reform". Keeping in view the impediment in the pre-
    existing law in securing evidence to prove dowry-related
    deaths, the legislature thought it wise to insert a provision
    relating to presumption of dowry death on proof of certain
    essentials. It is in this background that presumptive
    Section 113-B in the Evidence Act has been inserted. As
                                                                    c
    per the definition of "dowry death" in Section 304-B /PC
    and the wording in the presumptive Section 113-B of the
    Evidence Act, one of the essential ingredients, amongst
    others, in both the provisions is that the woman
    concerned must have been "soon before her death"                D

•   subjected to cruelty or harassment "for or in connection
    with the demand of dowry". Presumption under Section
    113-B is a presumption of law. On proof of the essentials
    mentioned therein, it becomes obligatory on the court to
    raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry           E
    death. The presumption shall be raised only on proof of
    the following essentials:

          (1) The question before the court must be whether
    the accused has committed the dowry death of the                F
    woman. (This means that the presumption can be raised
    only if the accused is being tried for the offence under
    Section 304-B /PC.)

         (2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or
    harassment by her husband or his relatives.                     G

         (3) Such cruelty or harassment was for or in
    connection with any demand for dowry.

                                                                    H
    760       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A               (4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her
          death.

          9. A conjoint reading of Section 113-8 of the Evidence
          Act and Section 304-8 /PC shows that there must be
          material to show that soon before her death the victim was
B
          subjected to cruelty or harassment. The prosecution has
          to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death
          so as to bring it within the purview of "death occµrring
          otherwise than in normal circumstances". The expression
          "soon before" is very relevant where Section 113-8 of the
c         Evidence Act and Section 304-8 /PC are pressed into
          service. The prosecution is obliged to show that soon
          before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment
          and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in
          that regard has to be led by the prosecution. "Soon
D         before" is a relative term and it would depend upon the
          circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula
          can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of
          soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to
          indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the
E         importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an
          offence of dowry death as well as for raising a
          presumption under Section 113-8 of the Evidence Act.
          The expression "soon before -her dea(h" used in the
          substantive Section 304-8 /PC and Section 11,3-8 of the
F         Evidenpe Act is present with the idea ofproximity test.
          No definite period has been indicated and the
          expression "soon before" is not defined. A reference to
          the expression "soon before" used in -Bection 114
          Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act is reievarit. It lays down
G         that a court may presume that a man W}lo is in the
          possession ot goods "soon after the theft,,is either the_
          thief or has received the goods knowing' them to be
          stolen, unless he can account for their possession''. The
          determination of the period which can come within the
H         term "soon before" is left to be determined by the courts,
       SULTAN SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                      761
            [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
    depending upon facts and circumstances of each case.             A
    Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression "soon
    before" would normally imply that the interval should not
    be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned
    and the death in question. There must be existence of a
    proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based      B
    on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged
    incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become
    stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the
    woman concerned, it would be of no consequence.

     15. Having regard to the entirety of material, we do not find   C
any ground to interfere with the concurrent finding recorded by
the courts below that it was not a case of accidental deatA but
a death taking place in circumstances other than normal. Thus,
the presumption under Section 1138 of the Indian Evidence Act
has been rightly invoked and the offence against the appellant       0
has been proved. There is no tangible circumstance to rebut
the presumption.

      ~6. For the above re~sons, we do_Jlot find any merit in this
appeal. The appeal is dismissed. The' appellant who is on bail       E
is directed to surrender to custody to undergo the remaining
sentence.

Rajendra Prasad                                 Appeal dismissed.




                                                   '