Holding

In a case of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish an unbroken chain of circumstances; the failure to do so warrants acquittal.

Summary

The appellant Sujoy Sen was convicted under Section 302 IPC for the murder of Anindita Sengupta, the daughter of the complainant. The FIR stated that the accused entered the complainant's house while the latter was absent, and the complainant later altered his testimony to claim the accused was leaving the house when he entered. Key witnesses claimed to have seen the accused entering the house, but their statements were not recorded in the police report under Section 161 CrPC. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution, relying on circumstantial evidence, failed to establish an unbroken chain of circumstances linking the accused to the crime. The missing link—whether the accused was present at the time of the murder—created reasonable doubt, leading the Court to set aside the conviction and order the appellant's release.

Issues considered

Whether the prosecution proved the murder charge beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of circumstantial evidence.
Whether discrepancies between the FIR and later testimonies break the chain of circumstances required for conviction.
Whether witness statements not recorded under Section 161 CrPC are admissible and reliable.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 161
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302

Subjects

murdercircumstantial evidencechain of circumstancesbenefit of doubtFIR discrepancySection 302 IPCSection 161 CrPCcriminal appeal

Judgment

A SUJOY SEN @ SUJOY KR. SEN
v.
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL

MAY 8, 2007

B [S.B. SINHA AND MARKANDEY KA TJU, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860; s. 302:

Murder-Accused allegedly committed murder of daughter of first 1
C informant by throttling her neck-FIR-Investigation conducted by CJD.-
Charge-sheet-Trial Court found accused guilty of committing offence of
murder com•icted and sentenced him under Section 302 !PC-Affirmed by
High Court-On appeal, Held: It is a case of circumstantial evidence-Jn
such a case prosecution has to establish chain of circumstances which
D inevitably connect the accused to crime-Jn case link breaks, the whole
prosecution case collapse-Jn FIR informant/father of the deceased stated
that accused entered in his house in his absence-However, in his evidence
before the trial Court, he has stated that accused was leaving his house when
· he was entering into it-Statement of PW4, a neighbour of the deceased, that
he saw the accused entering into the house cannot be believed as he hds not
E stated that fact in his statement to the Police recorded under Section 161
Cr.P.C.-Thus the first informant never saw the accused leaving his house
when he was entering into and his subsequent version is an improvement-
A vital link in the chain of circumstances missing-The prosecution failed to
prove the chain of circumstances linking the accused to the crime beyond
F reasonable doubt-Under the circumstances, accused is entitled to benefit of
doubt-Code of Criminal Procedure; 1973-s. 161-Evidence-
Circumstantial evidence.

According to the prosecution, on the fateful day at about 11.30 hrs.,
when the deceased, the only daughter of the first informant, was alone in her
G residence, accused-appellant committed her murder by throttling her neck.
The informant, father of the deceased when returned to his house early noticing
his daughter lying on the floor of a room, he became suspicious of the situation
and raised hue and cry. The victim was taken to a Hospital where she was
declared dead by the attending doctor. An FIR was lodged by the father of the
deceased and after the investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted by C.I. D. v<
H JU
SUJOY SEN @SUJOY KR. SEN v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL 113
against the accused under Section 302 IPC. The trial Court found accused A
guilty of committing the crime under Section 302 IPC, convicted and sentenced
him accordingly. Aggrieved, the accused filed an appeal before the High Court,
which was dismissed by the High Court. Hence the present appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court
B
HELD: 1.1. This is a case of circumstantial evidence, and it is well
settled that in a case of circumstantial evidence the prosecution has to
) establish the chain of circumstances which inevitably connect the accused to
the crime. Even if a single link breaks, the whole prosecution case collapses.
[Para 7) (115-C-D)
c
1.2. In the FIR, the first informar.t stated that the accused entered into
the house of the first informant during his absence. Thus, according to the
FIR version, the first informant never saw the accused leaving his house when
he was entering into it. It is only subsequently in his evidence before the trial
Court he has stated that the accused was leaving the house of the first
D
informant when he was entering into the house. [Para 8) (115-D-F)
.....
_
1.3. PW4, a neighbour, stated in his evidence that he saw the accused
entering into the house of the informant at 12 noon, but he has thereafter
stated that he did not state before the Police that he saw the accused entering
into the said house. Thus the statement of PW4 that he saw the accused E
entering into the house of the first informant father of the deceased, cannot
be believed as he had not stated that fact in his statement to the Police recorded
under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Similarly, PW7 in his deposition stated that he
saw the accused coming down from the door steps of the house of the first
informant at the relevant time and he heard the informant say "Sujoy ki
Korli". However, subsequently in his deposition, he stated that he had not F
~
stated before the Police that PW4 disclosed to him that he saw the accused
entering into the house of the first informant.
[Paras 9 and 10] [115-F-H; 116-A-B)

1.4. It appears that the appellant was implicated only on the strong
suspicion on the part of the first informant against him. It has come in evidence
G
that the appellant, who is a young man, used to visit the daughter of the first
informant and this was resented by the first informant and also by some
'-· neighbours. In fact, the first informant told the appellant not to meet his
daughter. It is quite possible that on the basis of suspicion the first informant
has implicated the appellant. However, from the version given in the FIR, it is H
I I4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 6 S.C.R.

A evident that the first informant had not seen the accused leaving the house of
the first informant when the latter entered into it. In fact, in the FIR it is
mentioned clearly that the appellant entered into the house of the first
informant in the absence of the latter. Thus, it appears that the first informant
never saw the appellant leaving the house of the first informant when the latter
B entered into it and the subsequent version is an improvement. A vital link in
the chain of circumstances is missing in this case. (Para 12) (116-C-E]

1.5. No doubt a minor discrepancy in a FIR will not be fatal to the
prosecution case. But the discrepancy in the FIR in the present case is not a 1
minor discrepancy, but a major one. Had the first informant seen the accused
C entering into the house at the time of the incident he would have definitely
mentioned the fact in the FIR. The prosecution has not been able to prove the
chain of circumstances linking the accused to the crime beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. [Paras 13 and 14)

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 202 of
D 2006.
From the Final Judgment and Order dated 22.08.2005 of the High Court
at Calcutta in C.R.A. No. 125of1996.

Piyush K. Roy and G. Ramakrishna Prasad for the Appellant.
E
Tara Chandra Sharma for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

MARKANDEY KATJU, J. I. This appeal has been filed against the
F impugned judgment and order dated 22.8.2005 of the Calcutta High Court in
C.R.A No. 125of1996.

2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

3. The prosecution case is that on 22.3.1991 at about 11.30 hrs., one
G Anindita Sengupta @ Porn, the only daughter of Pranab Sengupta was alone
in their residence. It is alleged that the appellant came to the said residence
and finding Anindita alone in the house, murdered her by throttling her neck.
Pranab Sengupta, on the ground of his son Joy Sengupta's Madhyamik
examination took permission from his school, where he was a teacher, to
return to his house early and when he came to his house early, he noticed
H Anindita lying on the floor of a room, and being suspicious of the situation
SUJOY SEN @SUJOY KR. SEN v. STATE OF WESTB EN GAL (MARKANDEY KATJU, J.J l 15

he raised hue and cry and at this neighbours rushed to the place of occurrence A
and soon thereafter Anindita was removed to Ranaghat Sub-Divisional
Hospital where she was declared dead by the attending doctor.

4. After the investigation held by the C.l.D, West Bengal in connection
with this incident, a charge-sheet was submitted against the appellant under
Section 302 !PC. B
5. The trial court after considering the evidence on record convicted the
,\ appellant and his appeal before the High Court was dismissed. Hence, this
appeal.

6. In our opinion this appeal has to be allowed. c
7. This is a case of circumstantial evidence, and it is well settled that
in a case of circumstantial evidence the prosecution has to establish the chain
of circumstances which inevitably connect the accused to the crime. Even if
a single link breaks, the whole prosecution case collapses.
D
8. In the present case, a perusal of the FIR which was lodged on
22.3 .1991 at 6 P.M. shows that the first inforrnant, who is the father of the
deceased, has not stated that he saw the accused leaving the house of the
deceased when the first informant was entering into it. In fact, in the FIR
Pranab Sengupta, the first informant, stated that the accused entered into the
house of the first informant during his absence. Thus, according to the FIR E
version, the first informant never saw the accused leaving his house when
he was entering into it. It is only subsequently in his evidence before the trial
court that the first informant stated that the accused was leaving the house
of the first informant when he was entering into the house.

9. PW4, Surath Biswas who is a neighbour, stated in his evidence that F
he saw the accused entering into the house of Pranab Sengupta at 12 noon,
but he has thereafter stated that he did not state before the Police that he
saw the accused entering into the said house. Thus the statement of PW4
that he saw the accused entering into the house of the first informant Pranab
Sengupta, father of the deceased, cannot be believed as he had not stated G
that fact in his statement to the Police recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C.

10. Similarly, PW7 Dilip Das in his deposition stated that he saw the
. \,
accused coming down from the door steps of the house of Pranab Sengupta
at the relevant time and he heard Pranab say "Sujoy ki korli ". However,
subsequently, in his deposition he stated that he had not stated before the H
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 6 S.C.R.

A Police that PW4 Surath Biswas disclosed to him that he saw the accused
entering into the house of Pranab.
~
-
11. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon a decision of
this Court in Manoj@ Bhau and Ors v. State of Maharashtra, [1999] 4 SCC
268, where it has been stated that FIR need not be an encyclopaedia. That
B may be true, but an FIR is a very vital material as it is the first information
about the incident and has less chances of altering the version and
improvement.
L.
12. It appears to us that the appellant was implicated only on the strong
suspicion on the part of the first ·informant against the appellant. It has come .
c in evidence that the appellant, who is a young man, used to visit the daughter
of the first informant and this was resented by the first informant and also
by some neighbours. In fact, the first informant told the appellant not to meet
his daughter. It is quite possible that on the basis of suspicion the first
informant has implicated the appellant. However, from the version given in the
D FIR it is evident that the first informant had not seen the accused leaving the
house of the first informant when the latter entered into it. In fact, in the FIR
it is mentioned clearly that the appellant entered into the house of the first
informant in the absence of the latter. Thus, it appears to us that the first
informant never saw the appellant leaving the house of the first informant
when the latter entered into it and the subsequent version is an improvement.
E A vital link in the chain of circumstances is missing in this case.
13. No doubt a minor discrepancy in a FIR will not be fatal to the
prosecution case. But the discrepancy in the FIR in the present case is not
a minor discrepancy, but a major one. Had the first informant seen the accused
entering into the house at the time of the incident he would have definitely
F mentioned the fact in the FIR.

14. Thus, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has not been able
to prove the chain of circumstances linking the accused to the crime beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. We
order accordingly.
G
15. Resultantly, the impugned orders of the Courts below are set aside.
The appeal is allowed. The appellant shall be released forthwith unless required
in connection with any other case.
-
S.K.S. Appeal allowed.
H