Holding

The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of divorce on the basis of cruelty and desertion, held that the husband's remarriage does not invalidate the decree, and directed a lump‑sum maintenance of Rs 8 lakhs, staying and eventually quashing related pending proceedings upon payment.

Summary

Suja Uday Patil (wife) appealed against the decree of divorce granted to her husband, Uday Madhukar Patil, on the grounds of cruelty and desertion under the Hindu Marriage Act. The trial court had initially ordered judicial separation, but the District Judge later dissolved the marriage and awarded alimony, a decision affirmed by the High Court. The husband subsequently remarried and had a child with his second wife. The Supreme Court examined whether the divorce decree should stand despite the remarriage and clarified the meaning of "cruelty" under Section 13(1)(i‑a). It held that the lower courts' findings were well‑founded, the decree should be maintained, and a lump‑sum payment of Rs 8 lakhs was appropriate maintenance, superseding the parties' offers of property settlement. The Court also stayed pending proceedings under Section 125 CrPC, Section 494 IPC and the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, to be quashed upon payment.

Issues considered

Whether the decree of divorce on the grounds of cruelty and desertion is valid and should be affirmed.
Whether the husband's remarriage after the decree warrants setting aside the divorce decree.
How the term "cruelty" under Section 13(1)(i‑a) of the Hindu Marriage Act is to be interpreted.
What form of maintenance is appropriate – lump‑sum payment versus property settlement.
Effect of the maintenance award on pending proceedings under Section 125 CrPC, Section 494 IPC and Section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedures. 125
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955s. 13(1)(i-a), s. 13(1)(i-b), s. 25, s. 28(4)
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 494

Subjects

divorcecrueltydesertionHindu Marriage Actmaintenancelump‑sum awardremarriagematrimonial lawSection 125 CrPCSection 494 IPCpragmatic approach

Judgment

SUJATA UDAY PATIL A
v.
UDAY MADHUKAR PATIL

DECEMBER 13, 2006

[G.P. MATHURANDA.K. MATHUR,JJ.] B

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955-Sections 13(1) (i-a) and (i-b)-Divorce
petition on the ground of cruelty and desertion by wife-Trial Court granting
decree of judicial separation-Appellate Courts granting decree of divorce C
and alimony to the wife and the child-Husband remarried after decree of
divorce-In appeal, held: Decree of divorce rightly granted-In view of
remarriage by husband, denial of decree of divorce to husband would not
serve any useful purpose-Direction to pay lump sum amount of eight lakhs
towards maintenance of wife and son.
D
Matrimonial Law-Matrimonial disputes-Adjudication of-Held:
Matrimonial disputes have to be decided by Courts in a pragmatic manner
keeping in view the ground realities.

Words and Phrases-' Cruelty'-Nature and meaning of in the context
of matrimonial law. E
Respondent (husband) filed a petition for seeking decree of divorce
against appellant (wife) on the ground of cruelty and desertion. Trial Court
passed decree of judicial separation holding that the respondent was not able
to make out a case of divorce. Both the parties filed appeals. Appellate Court
allowed the appeal of the respondent dissolving the marriage by decree of F
divorce. It also directed permanent alimony of Rs. 700/- per month to wife and
Rs. 500/- per month to their son. Appeal of appellant (wife) was dismissed.
second appeal by the wife was also dismissed. Other proceedings filed by wife
were pending. Hence the present appeal.

Disposing of the appeal, the Court G

HELD: 1.1. The findings recorded by the District Judge and also by the
High Court are fully born out from the material on record and cannot be
faulted with on any ground. Therefore, the decree for divorce has to be
955 H
956 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. JO S.C.R.

A maintained.1961-A-B]
1.2. Matrimonial disputes have to be decided by courts in a pragmatic
manner keeping in view the ground realities. For this purpose a host of factors
have to be taken into consideration and the most important being whether the
marriage can be saved and the husband and wife can live together happily and
B maintain a proper atmosphere at home for the upbringing of their offsprings.
This the court has to decide in the fact and cfrcumstances of each case and it
is not possible to lay down any fixed standards or even guidelines.
(961-G-H; 962-AI

1.3. In the case in hand it is an established fact that the respondent has
C married again and has a child from the second wife. In such circumstances
even if the decree for divorce granted by the District Judge which has been
affirmed by the High Court is set aside, as prayed by the appellant herein, no
usefUI purpose would be served. The appellant cannot possibly live with the
husband in such a scenario nor it will be conducive to the upbringing of her
D son. 1962-A-B]

1.4. The offer made by the respondent regarding giving of some
immovable properties to the appellant and her son in lieu of maintenance may
not be workable and may create complications, specially in vi1:w of the fact
that the respondent has asserted the said properties to be the joint family
E properties and there is no such enforceable d(lcument on record by which the
consent of the father and other brothers may be clearly and unequivocally
accepted. Payment of a lump sum amount of rupees eight lakhs by the
respondent to the appellant would meet the ends of justice. The respondent is
directed to pay a lump sum amount to the appellant as maintenance for herself
and her son. 1963-C-D; 963-F-H)
F
1.5. After the entire amount of rupees eight lakhs has been paid by the
respondent to the appellant, the proceedings of th~· cases instituted under
Section 125 cr:P.C. and Section 494 IPC shall stand quashed and the
proceedings under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act
G shall be itbated. 1964-B-C(

2. A liberal approach has to be adopted in dealing with various clauses
of sub-section (I) of Sect!on 13 of the Act and full meaning should be given
to the words used by the legislature. [960-D-El

3. The word "cruelty" and the kind or degree of "cruelty" necessary
H which may amount to a matrimonial offence has not been defined in the Act.
SUJATA UDAY PAT!Lv. UDAY MADHUKARPATIL [GP. MATHUR,J.) 957
What is cruel treatment is to a large extent a question of fact or a mixed A
question of law and fact and no dogmatic answer can be given to the variety of
problems that arise before the court in these kind of cases. The law has no
standard by which to measure the nature and degree of cruel treatment that
may satisfy the test. It may consist of a display of temperament, emotion or
pervasion whereby one gives vent to his or her feelings, without intending to B
injure the other. It need not consist of direct action against the other but
may be misconduct indirectly affecting the other spouse even though it is not
aimed at that spouse. It is necessary to weigh all the incidents and quarrels
between the parties keeping in view the impact of the personality and conduct
of one spouse upon the mind of the other. Cruelty may be inferred from the
)

facts and matrimonial relations of the parties and interaction in their daily C
life disclosed by the evidence and inference on the said point can only be drawn
after all the facts have been taken into consideration. Where there is proof
of a deliberate course of conduct on the part of one, intended to hurt and
humiliate the other spouse, and such a conduct is persisted, cruelty can easily
be inferred. Neither actual nor presumed intention to hurt the other spouse
is a necessary element in cruelty. (960-E-H; 961-A] D
CIVIL APPELLAET JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5779 of2006.

From the Final Judgment and Order dated 9.3.2004 of the High Court of
Judicature of Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad in Second Appeal Nos. 141 &
142 of2003. E
Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure for the Appellant.

Sanjay V. Kharde (for Chandan Ramamurthi) for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by F
G.P. MATHUR, J. Leave granted.

2. These appeals, by the special !eave, have been preferred against the
judgment and decree dated 9.3.2004 of Bombay High Court (Aurangabad
Bench) by which the second appeals preferred by the appellant herein were G
dismissed and the decree of divorce passed by the learned District Judge,
· Jalgaon, on 12.11.2002 was affirmed.

3. The marriage of the appellant and the respondent was performed on
\.3. l 994 and a son Cham! @ Chaitan ya was born &ut of the wedlock on
H
958 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 10 S.C.R.

A 6.2.1995. In the year 1999 the respondent (husband) filed a petition for a
decree of divorce against the appellant (wife) under Section 13(1 )(i-a) and (i-
b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on the ground that the appellant had
treated him with cruelty and had also deserted him for a continuous period
of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the
petition. The petition was contested by the appellant on various grounds.
B The Joint Civil Judge (Senior Division) passed a decree for judicial separation
on 10.12.2001. The appellant and respondent both preferred appeals against
the said decree and the learned District Judge, Jalgaon, by the judgment and
decree dated 12.11.2002, dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant and
allowed the appeal filed by the respondent and dissolved the marriage of the
C parties by a decree of divorce. He further directed that the respondent shall
pay permanent alimony@ Rs.700/- per month to the appellant and@ Rs.500/
per month to the son Charul @ Chaitanya. The second appeals preferred by
the appellant against the decree passed by the learned District Judge were
dismissed by the High Court on 9.3.2004.

D 4. The trial court held that the appellant behaved in a cruel manner and
did not cohabit with the husband; that the husband failed to prove that the
wife deserted him without any reasonable excuse and that the appellant was
ill-treated by the respondent and his parents. On these findings the trial court
came to a conclusion that the respondent was not entitled for a decree of
E divorce but had made out a case for judicial separation and a decree was
accordingly passed. The learned District Judge, after a detailed discussion of
oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the wife had treated the
husband with cruelty; that she had deserted the husband for a continuous
period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of
the petition and that there was no legal impediment in granting the decree for
F divorce. On these findings decree of divorce was granted.

5. The High Court in second appeal, after a careful consideration of the
submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and the material
available on record, has recorded the following findings:-

G "After giving my thoughtful consideration the submissions made by
the counsel for the parties and also having gone through the evidence
recorded at the trial and findings recorded by the courts below and
reasons assigned therefore, I am of the opinion that it was a case
where the wife was guilty of deserting the husband without sufficient
cause and the desertion was certainly with the intention to put an er.d
H
SUJATA UDAYPAT!Lv. UDAYMADHUKARPATIL [G.P. MATHUR,J.] 959
to the matrimonial relations. The trial court as well as appellate court A
have rightly found that the wife was guilty of conduct amounting to
cruelty. Here as rightly submitted by Mr. Dixit learned counsel for the
respondent, the act of cruelty was pertinent and grave on account of
police complaints lodged against the appellant and his father and that
too during the period when the marriage of respondents brother was
settled. It was in that background that the wife voluntarily left the B
matrimonial home and desertion on her part stood confirmed by the
fact that she lived separately for over two years and did not make any
efforts to come back to matrimonial home for cohabitation. The wife
having failed to establish the alleged acts of cruelty on the part of the
husband, it is needless to say that her leaving the matrimonial home C
and cause separation was without sufficient cause .
........................................................................................... As against
that, one cannot lose sight of the fact that wife, even after having
lodged complaint against the husband in police station, left the
matrimonial home happily without there being any remorse or D
repentance and that too carrying all her belongings with her and
admittedly she did not return though a period of two years lapsed and
the husband issued notice seeking divorce. Therefore, the appellate
court was right in observing in his judgment that there was no
condonation of cruelty on the part of the husband and that there was
no reconciliation between the parties and that the husband is not E
taking undue advantage of his own wrong."

Holding as above the High Court dismissed the second appeals filed by the
appellant and affirmed the decree of divorce passed by the learned District
Judge.
F
6. Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
(hereinafter referred as 'the Act') lays down the grounds on which a marriage
may be dissolved by a decree of divorce. This sub-section has several
clauses and under clause (i-a) cruelty and under clause (i-b) desertion for a
continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the
presentation of the petition, are grounds for granting a decree of divorce. G
The following observation made by this Court in Reynolds Rajamani v. Union
of India, AIR (1982) SC 1261, which is a case under Section 10 of the Divorce
Act, throw considerable light on the approach which should be adopted in
dealing with a provision relating to divorce: -
H
960 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 10 S.C.R.

A "The history of all matrimonial legislation will show that at the outset,
conservative attitude influenced the grounds on which separation or
divorce could be granted. Over the decades a more liberal attitude
has been adopted, fostered by a recognition of the need for individual
happiness of the· adult parties directly involved. But although the
grounds for divorce have been liberalized, they nevertheless continue
B to form an exception to the general principles favouring the
continuation of the marital tie. In our opinion, when a legislative
provision specifies the grounds on which divorce may be granted
they constitute the only conditions on which the Court has jurisdiction
to grant divorce. If grounds need to be added to those already
c specifically set forth in the legislation, that is the business of the
Legislature and not of the Courts. It is another matter that in construing
the language in which the grounds are incorporated the courts should
give a liberal construction to it. Indeed we think that the courts must
give the fullest amplitude of meaning to such a provision. But, it
must be meaning which the language of the section is capable of
D holding."

Therefore, a liberal approach has to be adopted in dealing with various
clauses of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act and full meaning should
be given to the words used by the legislature.

E 7. The word "cruelty" and the kind or degree of "cruelty" necessary
which may amount to a matrimonial offence has not been defined in the Act.
What is cruel treatment is to a large extent a question of fact or a mixed
question of law and fact and no dogmatic answer can be given to the variety
of problems that arise before the court in these kind of cases. The law has
F no standard by which to measure the nature and degree of cruel treatment
that may satisfy the test. It may consist ofa display of temperament, emotion
or pervasion whereby one gives vent to his or her feelings, without intending
to injure the other. It need not consist of direct action against the other but
may be misconduct indirectly affecting the other spouse even though it is not
aimed at that spouse. It is necessary to weigh all the incidents and quarrels
G between the parties keeping in view the impact of the personality and conduct
of one spouse upon the mind of the other. Cruelty may be inferred from the
facts and matrimonial relations of the parties and interaction in their daily life
disclosed by the evidence and inference on the said point can only be drawn
after all the facts have been taken into consideration. Where there is proof
H of a deliberate course of conduct on the part of one, intended to hurt and
SUJATA UDA Y PATIL v. UDA Y MADHUKAR PATIL [G.P. MATHUR, J.] 96 J
humiliate the other spouse, and such a conduct is persisted, cruelty can easily A
be inferred. Neither actual nor presumed intention to hurt the other spouse
is a necessary element in cruelty.

8. We have carefully considered the findings recorded by the learned
District Judge and also by the High Court and in our opinion they are fully
born out from the material on record and cannot be faulted with on any B
ground. Therefore, the decree for divorce has to be maintained.

9. There is another aspect of the case which has a serious bearing on
the outcome of the litigation. It is averred in the counter affidavit filed by
the respondent that after the decree of divorce had been granted by the
learned District Judge on 12. l l .2002 he married one Manisha Patil on l l. l .2003 C
and a daughter Sejal Uday Patil was born out of the said wedlock. In the
rejoinder affidavit filed by the appellant it is averred that immediately after the
judgment was delivered by the learned District Judge, an application for
certified copy of the judgment was given and thereafter a notice by registered
post was sent to the respondent on l l. l .2003 that she was taking steps to D
file a second appeal in the High Court and this notice was served upon the
respondent on 14. l.2003. The second appeals were filed in the High Court
on 2 l. l .2003 and it was thereafter that the respondent married Manish Patil
on 25.1.2003. It may be mentioned here that at the relevant time Section 28
(4) of the Hindu Marriage Act provided a limitation of 30 days for filing an E
appeal against all decrees made by the court in any proceeding under the Act.
This provision has been amended by Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 2003
on 23.12.2003 and now the period of limitation for filing an appeal is 90 days.
Therefore, when the respondent entered into wedlock with Manisha Patil, the
period of limitation for filing the appeal against the decree of divorce granted
by the learned District Judge had expired and no order staying the decree had F
been obtained by the appellant. We may clarify here that it should not be
understood that this Court is expressing any opinion regarding the validity
or otherwise of the second appeals which were filed by the appellant before
the High Court. However, the fact remains that the respondent has married
again and he has a child from the second wedlock.
G
10. Matrimonial disputes have to be decided by courts in a pragmatic
manner keeping in view the ground realities. For this purpose a host of
factors have to be taken into consideration and the most important being
whether the marriage can be saved and the husband and wife can live
together happily and maintain a proper atmosphere at home for the upbringing H
962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 10 S.C.R.

A of their offsprings. This the court has to decide in the fact and circumstances
of each case and it is not possible to lay down any fixed standards or even
guidelines.

11. In the case in hand it is an established fact that the respondent has
married again and has a child from the second wife. In such circumstances
B even if the decree for divorce granted by the learned District Judge which has
·been affirmed by the High Court is set aside, as prayed by the appellant
herein, no useful purpose would be served. The appellant cannot possibly
live with the husband in such a scenario nor it will be conducive to the
upbringing of her son Charul @ Chaitanya. The learned District Judge has
C mentioned in the judgment that he made serious efforts for reconciliation and
talked to the parties in arriving at an amicable solution but the respondent
was reluctant to take back the appellant on account of strained relationship
and at the same time the appellant, who refused to give divorce to the
respondent, was not firm as to whether their union would bring about happy
reunion. He has further mentioned that he suggested to the parties to take
D some unanimous decision keeping in mind the future of their son Charul @
Chaitanya but they failed to come to any such decision. The case was
adjourned several times in this Court also to enable the parties to arrive at a
settlement but it did not bring about any fruitful result.

12. The appellant had filed an application in this Court claiming Rs.
E 6,000/- towards maintenance. A reply has been filed by the respondent and
paragraph 4 thereof reads as under: -

"4. It is submitted that the petitioner in her application has pointed
out that the respondent is holding agricultural land gut No. 34
admeasuring 24 are, gut No. 380/2 admeasuring 96 are and a residential
F house admeasuring 45/12.5 feet situated at Shevge, Tehsil-Pachora,
District Jalgaon. It is submitted that the said properties are joint
family properties and same are not the independent properties of the
respondent. However, with consent of father and brother towards full
and final settlement I am ready to give all the three aforesaid properties
G to the petitioner and son Charul in lieu of the maintenance subject to
withdrawal of all the proceedings and orders obtained by the petitioner
against respondent in various courts below."

In para 5 of the reply it is averred that the learned District Judge has directed
the respondent to pay Rs.700/- per month to the appellant and Rs.500/- per
H month to the son Charul @ Chaitanya as maintenance as per the provisions
./
SUJATA UDAY PATILv. UDAY MADHUKAR PATIL [G.P. MATHUR,J.} 963

contained in Section 25 of the Act. In special civil suit No. 88 of 2000 filed A
under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act the trial court has directed
the respondent to pay Rs.1,000/- per month as maintenance for son Charul
@ Chaitanya in addition to the aforesaid amount. Apart from above an ex-
parte order has also been passed in proceedings under Section 125 of Criminal
Procedure Code wherein the respondent had been directed to pay Rs.1,000/ B
- per month to the appellant and Rs.800/- per month to the son Charul @
Chaitanya. It is also averred that a criminal case has also been instituted by
the appellant against the respondent under Section 494 of Indian Penal Code.

13. We are of the opinion that the offer made by the respondent regarding
giving of some immovable properties to the appellant and her son Charul @ C
Chaitanya in lieu of maintenance may not be workable and may create
complications, specially in view of the fact that.the respondent has asserted
the said properties to be the joint family properties and there is no such
enforceable document on record by which the consent of the father and other
brothers may be clearly and unequivocally accepted. We, therefore, consider
it proper that the respondent should pay a lump sum amount to the appellant, D
interest income whereof may be enough for her maintenance and also that of
her son Charul @ Chaitanya. It has come on record that the appellant is
living with her father and she is working as a teacher in some school where
she is getting Rs.2,000/- per month. The respondent is working as a Junioc
Engineer in Municipal Corporation of the city of Jalgaon. Though he has E
produced a salary certificate wherein his basic salary is shown to be Rs.2,360
per month and gross salary as Rs.8,423/- but the same has been seriously
challenged by the appellant on the ground that the respondent has not opted
for t~e. ·grade which is payable in accordance with the recommendations of
Fifth Pay Commission and is deliberately drawing salary in a lower grade.
However, we do not want to enter into this controversy. In our opinion, F
payment of a lump sum amount of rupees eight lakhs by the respondent to
the appellant would meet the ends of justice.

14. In view of the discussion made above the appeals are disposed of
in following terms:-
G
(i) The decree of divorce passed by the learned District Judge on
I2. I I .W02 is affirmed.

(ii) The respondent is directed to pay a lump sum amount of rupees
eight lakhs to the appellant as maintenance for herself and her
son Charul @ Chaitanya. The respondent is granted three months H
964 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 10 S.C.R.

A time to pay rupees four Iakhs and the balance in the next three
months and thus the entire amount should be paid within six
months.

(iiO The proceedings initiated by the appellant or by her son against
the respondent under (a) The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance
B Act, (b) Section 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure and (c)
criminal case under Section 494 IPC shall remain suspended for
a period of three months and if the amount is paid as indicated
earlier, for a further period of three months.
(iv) After the entire amount of rupees eight Iakh has been.paid by the
c respondent to the appellant, the proceedings of the cases instituted

.
under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and Section 494 IPC shall stand quashed
and the proceedings under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions
and Maintenance Act shall be abated.
).-
(v) If the sum of rupees eight lakhs is not paid by the respondent
D to the appellant as indicated above, it will be open to the appellant
to execute the decree and recover the said amount from the
respondent in accordance with law.

K.K.T. Appeal disposed of.
. '

'1