Supreme Court of India
SUDHIR CHANDRA SARKARversusTATA IRON & STEEL CO. LTD. AND OTHERS.
- Citation
- 1984 INSC 69
- Decided
- 27 March 1984
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- D A DESAI
Holding
Rule 10's clause granting absolute discretion to the employer to refuse gratuity is unconstitutional and unenforceable; gratuity is a statutory right enforceable by a civil suit.
Summary
The appellant, a permanent uncovenanted employee of Tata Iron & Steel Co., rendered 29 years of continuous service and resigned, thereby becoming eligible for retiring gratuity under the 1937 Retiring Gratuity Rules. The company refused payment, invoking Rule 10 which purported to give it absolute discretion to pay or withhold gratuity. The trial court awarded the gratuity; the High Court reversed, holding that gratuity was not a enforceable right and could only be claimed before an industrial tribunal. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the gratuity provision is a statutory condition of service incorporated in the certified standing orders, that Rule 10's absolute discretion is unconstitutional and unenforceable, and that a civil court has jurisdiction to enforce the claim. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment, restored the trial court decree, and ordered payment of the gratuity with interest at 15% and costs.
Issues considered
- Whether gratuity under the Retiring Gratuity Rules constitutes a statutory condition of service enforceable as a right.
- Whether Rule 10, which confers absolute discretion on the employer to pay gratuity, is valid under the Constitution.
- Whether a civil suit can be entertained for recovery of gratuity despite the employee not being a 'workman' under the Industrial Disputes Act.
- Whether the Works Standing Orders certified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 form part of the contract of service and are enforceable.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. 14, s. 37, s. 41, s. 43
- Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946s. 13, s. 3, s. 8
- Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972
- Specific Relief Act, 1963s. 14
Subjects
gratuityretiring gratuity rulesabsolute discretionindustrial employment standing orderscivil suit jurisdictionstatutory condition of serviceconstitutional equalitylabour law
Judgment
,,
:1
325 1.f
i\
• SUDHIR CHANDR,A SARKAR A 'f
,j
.i
v.
...
--:rATA IRON & STEE_L CO. LTP.. AND OTHERS.
March 27, 1984 B
(D.A· DESAI, A..P . SEN ANQ V. 'BALAKRTS~r.-;A ERADI, JJ.]
Rttirlng Gratuity Rults,I9J7-Rule /(g)-Definition of 'Retirtmtllt' scop~ of
-Empluytt after y;orklttg fur 29 years left service by reslgl!ation which .;01 arce,_
udbyemplo)'U-Whtthn employee cotJid be said to hav~ rttittdfrom :ervice. · ·c
· 1/ttlring Gratuity Rules, 1937-Ru/e 10 validity of. Part af Rule 10 which
fNiftrs abso/JJre diScretion 011 tmplvyer to pay gratuity, even of it is earned, at il.r
dJJOiute discretion, u inefftcrive am/ enfu rceab/e,
InJ.strial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946-Sation 3--Certi/ieJ D
!ilrl!llling Ordtrs-:Nawr' of-Wh~ther form parr of contract of suvice-IVherflu
flotlr brtarlo can be rtpaired b) civil suit.
· Words and Plorases-''Gmtuity"-Concept of. Gratuity is a retirul benefit a1
""as11re of social seatrity ; it Is not lfrttlrlitous but has to be eumed by lo>nz N
.Lontinuout sen•il't; il can be r~c.,vt!red Jlrrough ciril Juit.
E
lbe app:llant .,..·ho ro,igned from service of the: respondent company after
'<'tvinc for o•·er 29 years wu• not paid retiring grntl,lity by the respond~nt, even
f. .,hen the appclbnt had become elil!ible. for it unJer the relevant gmmity ruloos
111tltd as tbe RetiriOII: Gratuity· Rules. J9J7 \Gr~tuity Rules for short). Tbo
. •PP<llantlilcd a 'uit in the Court of Subordinate Jutlge fo r recovering tbe
«mount of Voltuity. The Subordinate JuJgc decreed the suit. The High Court .
allowed tilt app:al f1led by the rc,pondent. Hence this appeal. The respoo.•
. dent• submitted; (I) t hat since the appo:llant did not retire from the service but
~It the ICn·u by resi~ning the po!l, he was not eligible for gratuity untler
ult 6 or the Retiring Gr11tuity Rules, t 937 ; l2) that uoJer Rule 10 the ..:tiring ·
. :atu!!y wu payable Mt the absolute discretion or tho respon~ent and rol\ld not
t claoa~cd •• a matter or right by the appellant even if he had become clisiblo
or~ ; and (JJ thut claim to aratuity could not be enforced in the dvil rourt. G
. Allu.,inathc appca I,
. H£Lo : Rule 6(a) which pre~ribcd the eligibility criterion f<>r p:~.yment gf
·lfllrlllJ . ·
cratUJ·y pmvidcs, f/11ter ulla, that every permanent uncovenanted em·
~ of tbe Comt~any, will be elivible tor rdirinll Qratulty• . The expression
ttlremcnt• h ...__
by .
I . . r .
as uocn defined in Rule l(a) to mean 'I ld ternunat1oo o serviCe H
ll ~<:owq. or any cau~ other then rcmovul by dhdlDrge due to misconduct'.
ii!Jnott<4 thQt the appellant wu ~ permanent uncovenan;ed :mployee or
j 26 [l9S4j 3 S C
. . ..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
. . .. . ·it..
ihe Company paid on monthly basis and he re~dercd sc,rvicc for over~ Y••
and his s~rvice came to an end by rea<on of hts tcndcnng resignation V.hit~
was unconditionally aa:cpted. II Is. not suggested that he was romovcd I>
discharge due to misconduct. un.questJonabl~. therefore, the appellant
within the meaning of the cxprcsston, thus .r•t•_red r"'IJ'l service of the
·h:
'"llOo: .
'• dent and he is qualified .for payment of gr.ttutt y to terms of Ru!c 6. [Jl2D.f] .
According to the High Court, ihc ,service conditions of the apP<ilant,,;,;~
gavemed by !he Works Standing Orders or the rc~~ondcnt. No C<Ctption h"
. be•n taken to this finding. These Wqrks Standtn~; Orders were framed •n~
certified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Order:;) Act, 1946. n ..
Act wu 8 kgi.slatlvc response to the /abJ~Z [airt rule or hire and fire ot· sweet
. will. It w3s an auempt at intposing statu(Ory comrac:t of'service b¢tw~cn tv."O-
1
c parties unequal io negotiate, on the footing of equ3 ity. The intendment ·.. j ·.·.··
underlyini the Act and the provi•ions of the Act enacted to give rffect to the
intendment and the scheme of the A~t l=lve no roorn for doubt that Stand·
· · ing Orders cerjificd under the Act become part or· the staiU10ry t<rms an~
· conditions of .. rvice between the employer and hi• cmp!o)<< nnd they eo.em
the relatiouship betwren the parti<s.I333E-3J4G]
...
D Wr~ttrn India March Company !.rd. v. Workmn.,: [1974] I SCR 4H. WJtk·
. man of Mtssrs FirtJiont T)" & Rul>ber Ca. of frtdia (Pl Lrtl. v, Manoxrin~nr
and Or1; [1973] 3 SCR '87 ot 612. Workm~n: ill fJurki!oglwm uurl Cumurfc
Mill• Mudros v. Buckingham ond Cantalic A[; /Is: ]1970]1 labour Law Journ•l
·26 at 29. M /s. Glaxo l.Aborarorl-. (I) Ltd. v. Tl.t Pr~mlill/! OJTrur, Lob..•:v
Court, Mfrrut & Ors; [19R4] t SCC 1. A.\"'11 Efu('{cily Supply Cu. I.J.d. f ,
·E
s,i Allot/in & Ors: [197U]l SCR 805, ref"rred to.
. Upon a corTbined r•ading or Srandio11 Order (S.O ,) S4 ulong with RuleS
and 6(u) or the Gr~tuity Ruks, it becomes diltinctly ck"r th•t PJY••~<nt of
·arouuily W.u dn cxprcs~ or st.tlutory conditiont of service eovcr~lnv th.: h:lJai.:>n·
ohip bct.,.«Q the appcllanl and the rc>po;ulcn t . Thorcfor~, It wuuiJ lJ<; <•bli~" t.'r)'
F Upon the rnpondcnt lO pay (I•Jtuity O;J r~ti wn!Ut to tho arp:i!Jht. JfthC
rrtpondcnt rdu' C'1 to pay or dl\ChJrgc- its stJtutory obli~~tuoo. th: claim on
be enrorc<d by. civil ~uit, T~e H·~·l Court WJS or the orinion th>l in""" of
. Rule)' ' or the Gratuity R~b. t«:ovcty of gr>lUJty c..nnct b<: cnrom:d by.
ci•·il ,_uit. But upon an lndu.ttrial ui•rute ~jng r:thcd the lmlu•trl.il Tntuc.Jt
m~y_bc ~n I positiOn 10 award th: if:J1Uity ;11 3 m:lltc; or rh;ht ev.:n unJ.:r lh.:
. c <ltltrn& rules, In reochlna this c"nctu5 ion th~ lllt:h Cuurt·ov~rl ool.cd the erT ct.
of the certified litandinv Ord:r1 and th~. inl<r·relutiun b<twe<:n rhe GrJtu'l)'
. Rulo ·ar.d S.O· H, Whco under 19-tG Act, nn obiliw:n'10n is c:1>l o.1 the·~·
Jllo>er to spccofi<ully ~nd prcci>cly Ia)· down the cunditions or ~crvice, 5<:· t Jt.)
•uhjccu the en•plo>)cr to~ V<n•ht if any act is <lone In contr.tvrntlv~ uf t~¢
Suondinf Orden e<:rtilied unJcr the Act, A rae~ I of collective bar~:~inin& h th.ll
•n) ~~et\l<m<nt ~rrivcd at between the JHrtiC~ would be treated ws inccrr"•t•J
In the c:.ontroct of·~··"'· 0 f ... h cmpiO)~C voverncu by the >ettl<nt<nt. Sm•iiJr~Y·
~rllfo :.d StJndins Ordcrt wh~~:b St~tut<mly prcs.:ribe the comlitk'ns ~r scrv~<.'#.
ll o.b~ I be dcerncd to be lncorporatt<l ·in lhc contra~! of tmpk>ym<nl of ea.:h ••~·
p:O}cc "'ith hi> cmp[O)Cr. J( tht employer C<>mllliti U brcadl Of th< ,,,ntr~'t
or en.plvJn:<Ut. the ~tn:e con tc cnfocced or c.meJicJ do~ndill~ Ul"-'"
...,,,e
I : ·
s.c. SARKA.R 1'••TA.TA IRO~ &_Sl'EfLS CO.
bY ~-civ11 suit. The jurisdictbn of civil court among<! others is
,.r~C s~u~h\ the natur~ of reliofclaim~d. If the relief claimed is a money
• termlned 1forcing statutory cond'111ons
.c · o r scrv1c~.
· the ctv1
G«l~ byh ~~ 1·udsdiction to grant the relief. [JJSF-337Bl
· ·r court would
327
A
(tf!JIOIY ••~ • . • , '. •
. [:Wuur [a,. f,.rt aiul Mat~da/J bj• Paul ·Davl-. and Mark Freedland p.233
•"" SyJ:t~l '
O.~Jn<lustrial Rd~tim>J in Great 8 itnfn p. 5~-59, referred to. 8
.. . . • (.
Jn the instJnt ca<•. the appcll~~t filed the ~uit alkging t~af he wa~ entitled
tOpl)·m<nt of ~"'tu ity o~ co:nplc•thon _or scrv1c~ fo_r,the pertod _prescribed. He
~
:·.. ~!ltgtd it and the Hr~h_C''.U't accept,·~ tt as _B condn1on of sery;ce. Its breach
•®ld give rise to a CIVIl dr.<putc nnd crv1l sUit would be the only remedy. In the
weofv.orkmcn t:ov.•rnerl by th~ lnd"'trinl Dispute< Act, 19-l7, Sec. 33(c)(2)
,.,y provide an aJditional forum to reCO\'Cr monetary benefit. It is n~t sugges- c r:
u41hat appellant wa< ·a wo,kman_governcd by the Industrial Disputes Act. The
· tlilh Court wa~, :herdore, in error in holding that the remedy was o nly by
.-ayoran indu!lrial dispute a nd not by a civil suit, [JJ 7C-D] ·
(
The Court while interpr:ting nnd enforcing the relevant gratuity rules will
IIJvtto be.:ir in mind th~ co1cePt of gratuity. The fundaJllental principle under·
(,
D
!~inc ar.uuity i~ that it it a rctir~ment benefit for long service as a provision Cor
~ld •et· Deri1ands of socia! '' curity and social j ustice made it necess~ry to ·
,..,.;de for payme••t of gratuity. On the enactment of the Payment of Gratuity
Act, 1972 a statutory llabiluy was cast on the employer to pay gratuity.
.. . . . . [3JSC·D1
Pauion and ,ratuity which have much in common are well·recognised retirol
lrmrfi11 n musurt:! of soda! scc~rity. It Is now wctl-,.n led that pension is a
IJht lnd payment O( it docs not depend UpOn the discretion Of the employer,
'-It~ C.ln I* denied at the sweet will or fancy of the employer. If pension 080
::;e:o.-cred through civil su:t, there js no jultilication In treating gratuity on a
"'"~ foot inc. Pension and gratuity in the muller of retirnl benefits and for
~110&the\Ome must be put on par.l339G -H; 340AJ. .·
UJ ::vha~Pi'r Tapti Mil/, Lid. v. 8;1rltanpur Tapll Mil/$ McJ:door Sm~gll: [1965]
I 'll ~ 4 ~3• Dtukinundun PraJotl v. Slille of Bihar & o,.., [1971] Supp. 'SCR
o,,: v.
~t <{ Pun}ob & ~"'· f<tbal S/nftlr, [1976)3 SCR 360, D.S. Nakara ..1
l
' ·. nlun of India, [198}] 2 SCR 16~; referred to. •
lrtht,ur.,~ . • s •· · G
0,41 or P•Y>t:ent of gratuity become incorporated in the tanum&
llllJdtheL . " f • R
•lbrtrary dto· ""Y lcqulrctl the status of tho statutory condH 10n o servtCC. a :
rt}C{tfd ~otl rcfer~l>lt to whim fu ncy or ~wect will or the employer n•ust bo
f)~ t\lli.~' l<bitrary, S~c. 4 oC ;he 19~6 Act whkh confers power on the ttrti•
t· '~ltnt,j .ef or the lppcllacc a uthority to adjudicate Ul"-ln the fulrn<'>> or reason.
•Mr.'!) or the Provisions would cnabl• thh Court to r~j"ct that part t>f Rule IO
!'""d
«>nr~rs ,__ . " ·
. ~""'lute discretion on the employer to pay 11rntu•ty even I It IS
·r · ·
H
,.,•~t,tsabr
trr!Cittr.b so Ute di<crction a~ ullerly unr<asonable, ·IOC n:f ec !YC and
"'l.,ro, le.·Th;at Part or Rulo 10' mu•t therefore be 1reated ns ineffective D.lld
tfib~. l3.10c.o] • •
328 , SUPREME COURT REPORTS
U984J 3 s.c.lt..
A Tbc claim to absolute discretion not to pay gtatuity even When it is t:l "
.~ · is a bang o\ltr of the /oiJstZ fa ire days and utterly inconsistent with the mOdrne.J
notion of fair industrial relations and, therefore, it must be rejected as inctr.;rn
and beoce unenforceable. [340H) ~
. .
Wuttrn India Match Company Ltd. v. Workmen, [1974] I SCR {l-4 ~
B referred to.
Our Con~titution envisages a society governed by rule of law. A~o!ute dis-
cretion uncontrolled by guidelines "'hich may permit denial of equality bcfo~
Jaw is the anti-thesis of rule of law. Absolute discretion not )\ldicinlly rc\'icwabl~
inheres the pernicious tendency to be arbitrary and is, tb<refor~. violative of
Art. !4. Equality before law and absolute discretion to grant or deny bcncGt of
c the law iue di3metrically opposed to each other and cannot co-exist. Thcn:for<.
also the conferment or ab!olute discretion by Rule 10 of the Gratuity Rules to-
ai've or deny the benefit of the rules cannot be upheld and mu•t be rejected :u.
uneoforceable.I34JA-CT
CIVIL ArPrLLA.TlO JURISlJICTJON :Civil Appeal
D
No. 1803 of 1070
From the Judgment and Order ·dated 6.8.1968 of Pijtna High.
in
Court first appeal No. .444 of 1967. -
E D.N. Mukhe~iu, Ronjun· Mukherjee, A.K. Gonguli & S.C.
· Ghosh for the appellant•.
R.B. Da!ar and Ms. Vina Tamta for the respondents. .
The Judgment of the Court was· delivered by
F
. Dv.sJ J. Appellant, an employee of Tata Jron nnd Suet
Company. Limited ('Company' for short) bas bee a chasing n mirag~:
to wit !o recover a paltry sum of . Rs 14040 bemg the amount of
gratuity to which he was entitled for the. continuous service rcnMr·
.; G ed by him from D~cember 31, 1929 till Augu~t 31. 1959 under wiHtt
are styled as Retiring. Gratuity Rules, 1!137 ('Gratuity Ruks' f~r
sbort) from the Company and in this wholly unequal tight he 1;rlll
down his life before enjoying the pillance to which he wus cnti~l"t
after three d~cades of loy11l service. What a dreadful return for abJect
loyally'! ~h(n the appellant retired by resignation from service ~~
H was patd hts provident fund dues but gratuity which he wus cntttl
to be paid under the relevant · rules was not paid to him. WheO th~
appellant cl~imed payment of gratuity, the respond~nt turned dca
' .
..
' I
S.C. SARK~R V. TATA IRON & .STEEL CO. (Desai, J.) . 329
'·
ears to it. Appellant sevred a notice dated September 6, 1981 call~
ing_ upon the r.espondent to pay· the amount of gratuity being Rs. ·.
14040~. The Company did not respond to the notice. Thereupon
the appellant 'file<l,.M .S. No. 452 of 1962 in the court of Subordinate
Judge at Jamshedpur.
The respondent appeared and CO!J.tested the snit inter-alia con-
1·
tending that 'in terms of the contract of service and particul.arly hav-
ing regard t? the relevant rules under which gratuity can be claimed,
the same -is payahle. on certi~cation of sntisfactory service by the
' hea~ of-the department; and it is payable at the absolute ·discretion
of the Company irrespective of whether the employee ha.s or has not . C
performed all or any. of the conditions stated in the 'rules and no
employee howsoever ·otherwise eligible is entitled as of right to any
payment under the rules.'
The learned trial Judge framed the issues bn which parties .
were at variance. Th~ learned Judge held that the plaint does dis-* D•
close a cause of action and the. plaintiff was entitled to claim and'
recover the amont of gratuity with interest thereon. Accordingly,
the suit was decre<;d against the Company directing it t_o pay the
amount claimed in the plaipt with future interest at 6% per an11um
.4 with costs. · E.
...
The respondent Company preferred Fi~st Appeal No: 444 of
1963 in the ·High Court of Judicature at Patna. A Division Bench
of the High Court h'eld : ~) that ·the service conditions of the plain:
tiff were governed by the. Works Standing Orders and that It was
an implied condition of service .·that the pal in tiff could get gratuity
in accordance with the Gratuity RuleS ; (ii) that in view of Rule 6,
......-.. an employee governed · by the Gratuity Rules. is not entitled
.to claim the same as a matter of right but he merely attains
the benefit of eligibility or suitability f9r the retiring gratuity and
not the rigqt ~iii) that until and unless the Company has deci~ed to G..
pay the gratuity in accordance with Rule 7 or otherwise, the mere
fact of the employee becoming eligible to get it under the.relevant
rules which can be enforced in a civil court because the matter ?f
, payment of gratuity is at· the aqso!t1te discretion of the Company as
-1 provided in Rule 10, and the employee, howsoever;unfortunate the
position may be under the mod ern stage of the society is not entitled H
to ct'airn it as a matter of ·right because · even though payment of
gptuity underOthe Grat~ity Rules is an implied _condition of service,
-+
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1984) 3 S.C.R. l
A yet tlie c~ndition
. .
is further conditioned
.. by the provisio~s made in the.
Rules and is subject to them; .iv) that such a claim may be enforced
before the Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Dispu.tes Act, ·
1947 brit it is not possible to hold . that the law ~contract or the
law of master and servant which is the only law to be enforced in a
civil court can justify orr interpretation of the Gratuity Rules jn
question that the' plaintiff can be gran fed decree for payment of
gratuity on the footing that it 'f3S ~he unconditional or uncondition- ·
ed contractu~! obligation of. the employer to pa)' such a money ; v)
. the 'payment of gratuity money is not a gift-pur~ and simple, but ·
under the relevant rules lt IS in the nature of an incohate claim Of
c interest·and not a right enforceable by a· Suit in COUtt, because under
the contrac~ of service, the grant of gratuity has been left.to the sole
discretion of the emp1oyer· as the relevant rules provided that no
employee howsoever othcr~vise eligible shaH be.deemcd to be'·entitlcd
as· of right to any payment under the rules. Accordingly the appeal
was allowed and the,judgm ent and decree of the tdal court were set
_.aside and ~he plaintiff's suit was dismissed, directipg the parties to
bear their costs.
.~·
tJ ence this appeal by the ptaint~ff by special leave:
.E At the o~t~e.t it is nec~ssary to n~tice the relevant rules rtlied. ·~
upcn by the respondcpt in support of
its submission that the gra-
tuity cannot be 'Claimed as a matter of right and the c1aim to gratuity
can.not be enforced in the civil court. The Reti~ing Gratuity Rules
·came into force with effect from April.}, 1937 and at the relevant
time, the rules as Bi11ended in 1948 were in. 9peration. Rule 5
provides for retirem~nt of every uncovenanted employe~ of tl1e
1
··F
Company on attaining the .age of 60 years 'subject to the right of the
is
company to grant extension. This rule a mere incorpo'ration pf /-1
S.O. 54 which provides for retirement on attaining tl'te age of 60.
Rule.s 6, 7 and 1_0 may be.Cxtracted : · ·
''6. (a) Subjed to the conditions· referred to in these
rules, evl!ry per mapcnt unconvenanted employee.of the Com~
pany, whether paid on _monthly, weekly or on daily basis,
inpluding those borne on the pay rolls of the Company of
the Collieries and <tt Ore Mines and Quarries, will~ eligible
.. for a retiring gratuity wh.ich shall be equal to half a month's
salary or wag;s for every completed year of continuous sel'vice~~
S.C. S,l..RKAR v. TATA :iRoN & STEEL CO. (Desai, J.) 331
•
·subject to•a maximum of twenty months salary or wages in A
:all,
(b) Provided that when an employee di~s. retires or is
·4ischarged under Rule · ll(2)(ii) and (iii) hereof, before he.
· 'has.served the Company for a continuous period of 15 years~
V'
·a gratuity ordinarily limited to half a month's sala~y or
B
.,..
I
·wages for each qualifying year ma'y be paid subject, however,
·to a maximum of 6 n\onths' sa1ary OJ wages in an.
.
'
(Amended vide {3oard Resolution No. VII 'dated 2nd
.. July, 1953.) C
•
. (c). The retiring gratuity will be bas~d on the rate of
<the salary or wages applicable to the employee in: .the last
mont~ of ~ctive service or if the employee has retired while.
<On· leave, in the last month prior to the employee going on
1Ieave . .
(d) In the case. of an uncovenanted employee wl\o h~s
'been transferred to another Tat a concern, the retiring •gra-
tuity payable to him under Rule (4) 8 (a) heretlnder will be
based on the rate of the salary or wages :applicable to the
E
-employte in the last·montlr of'service with the Company,
On fo~cc from 1.4.1-946 as per Board Resolution
,.<fated 8.4.1948.)
. 7. Notwithstanding at~ything contained in these Rules F
:a gratuity shall become due and be payable and shall always
'have been deemed to have become due and payable only in ·
:such instalments an.d over such period or· periods as may •
be fixed. by the Board of Directors of the Com2any or subject
.to. the direction ·of the Board
' . by the Managing· Agents. Until .
' (
:any such instalment shall become {)r have become due and·
·payable, .the employee· or any dependent who qualifies for
:paynicnt under the Gratuity Rules shall not be eligible to
receive or be paid any such instalment of the gratuity.
l 0. AU retiring gratuities granted under these Rules I
·nther than special gratuity to be paid l}rider the provision~ of
:Rule 22 hereof shall be at the absolute discretion of the· Com-
•
332
. . .
. .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
. . . [I984] 3 s.c.!tl
pany Irrespective of whether an employee .has S)r has not
. ~)
performed ail or any of the conditions herein after stated,
and no employee howsoever otherwise eligible shall be deem~ ·
ed to be" entitled as of right to any pamyent under these -
Rule~
.(Amended vide Board ..R~so!ution No. v dated 25 S~
... 1955)."
The contentio~ of the- resp~ndent is thatthe plaintiff did not
retire from servi?e but ·he left the serviCe, o~ the CQmpany by resign-
c~
ing his post. ·This aspect to some extent agitated the mind of the-
I
·• . "High Court. It may be dealt with first. It is not only not in dis-
. pute, ·but is in fact conceded that 'the plaintiff did render continuous..
service from Deccmber.31, 1929 till August31, 1959·. On exact com-
putation, the plaintiff rendered service for 29 years and 8 months. Rule·
6(a) which prescrjbed the eliglbility criterio'n for payment of gratuity •
D
provides that every -perman~n·t uncovena11tetl employee of the Com-·
pany whether paid on monthly, weekly or daily basis will be eligible for
retiring gratuity which shall be equal to half a month salary or wages·
for ever.y ~omp]etedyear of continuous service subject io a maximum.
of 20 months sala,ry or· wages in· all provided that when an employee
dies, n~tires or isdischa;ged under Rule 11(2)(ii) and ~iil) before he has.
served the Company for a continu,us period of 15 years he shall be
paid a gratuity at. ~he rate, therein mentioned. The expression ..
"retirement' has been d~fin_ed in Rule 1 (g), to mean 'the termi'nation,;
· of.service. by reason of any cause other than removal by diseh argc
due to misconduct'. It is ~dmitted that the plaintiff was a perilla-- ·
•I? ·... nent unconvena'ted employee of· the Company paid on rrionthly'
. . basis and he rendered service for over 29 years and his service. came
. to an end by reason of his tendering resjgnation which was uncondi~-
. tionally accepted. It is not suggested that he was removed by dis-
cl~rge due to misconduct. Unquestionably, therefore, the plaintiff-
..
., re.tired from service because by the letter Annexure 'B' dated· Au'gust
26, 1959, the resignation tendered by the plaintiff as per his letter
dated July,. 27, 195.9 was accepted and he was released from his
service with effect from September 1,1959, The tetminatio.{l of'
service was thus on account of resignation of the plaint.iff being,
accepted by the respondent. . The plaintiff has, within the meaining,.
of the eJ~.pression, thus r.:tired from service of the respondent .and-A
·. h~ is qualified for payment of gratuity in terms of Rule 6.
.·
S.C•. SARKAR. v. TATA IRON & STEEL CO. (Desal, J) 333
Rule 7, i~ our opinion, has hardly any relevance because it ~
enables the Company to pa,y gratuity by iilstalments.
It is Rule 10 which is material for the purpose. It provides
that'payment of retiring gratuity under the Gratuity Rules, oth~r .
. than special gratuity to be paid under the provisions of Rule 22
which is not the case herein, shall be at the absolute discretion of
the Company irrespectiv~! of whether an employee has or ·has not
performed all or any of the •condition<; hereinafter stated, and no
employee howsover otherwise eligible shall be deemed ·to be entitled
· as of right to any p~yment under th~ rules. The stand taken by
the respondent to deny gratuity to the pl\lntiff is that gratuity pay~ c:
able under the rules is a matter of employer's largesse to be distri-
buteJ atthe absolute discretion of the Company and cannot be clai-
.med as a matter of right even if the concerned employees has fulfil-
led the eligibility criteria. It is the interpretation of this Rule
which would govern the outcome of this appeal.
·~
It 'may be mentioned that the High Court which ultimately
upheld the cqntention of the respondent has.specifically held that
gratuity was an implied condition of service of the p1aintiff in accor·
dance with the relevant -rules. The High Court reach.ed this .con-
clusion by first· referring to Works Standing Orders framed by the
Comp~ny which govern t.he conditions ofservice of the plaintiff.
In other words accmding to the High Court, the service conditio11s
of the plaintiff wsre g9verned by the Works Standing Orde,rs. It
is therefore necessary to determine the character of the· Works
' Standing Orders Exh. C framed by the Company. This aspect was
uverlooked by the High Cow-t with the consequence that tne High F-
Court found it difficult to enforce the claim of gratuity against the
respondent by a decree of the court. What then is the character of
the W otks Standing Orders framed by the Company '? Are .they
mere unenforceable rules or arc they statutory in character or have
a statutory flavour'? If they are statutory in character and they form
part of'the contract of service of every employee governed by the
same, then the question would be whether its br~ch can be 'repair-
ed or enforced by a civil suit ? -
The Parlaimet{t enacted the lnudstrial Employment (Standing
Orders) Act, 1946 ('1946 Act' for short). 'fhe long·title of the Act, Ht
providys that it was an act to require employers in industrial esta~
blishments formally to define conditions of employment under them.
_SUI'{(EMe CO~JRT REPORTS [1984]3 s .
334
'""•·..
' !.~ Tile pr~amble of "the Act· pr9vides that it is expedicni t~ ' · .
, . , . d fi . require
employers m ~~~ustnal est~bhshments to e ne With suffieitnt Prcci-
. sion th!! condtttons of employment under. t)lem and to malce.th
said conditipns known
. to workmen employed by theni. Bv. Scc11-~.e
3, a duty was c_ast on the employer , governed by the Act to submit
to the Certifying Officer draft standtn.g orders proposed by him for
adoption in his industrial establishment. After going througlt tlJe
procedure prescribed in the Act, the Certif) ing Officer ha~ to mtifv
the draft standing orders. . _Section 8 requires the Certifying Oflicw
to keep a copy of standing orders as finally certified under the Act ·
· in a register to be maintained for the purpose. Sub-sec. 2 of Sec-
... tion I~ Imposes a pe~alty on employer who does any act in
contravention of the standing· orders finally certifi~d under
the Act. The act was a lcgi<lative response to the /oisse: f~irs rul¢
of hire and fire at swed will. It was an ·a ttempt at fm;Jo>ing a statu-
tory contract of service between A'II"' parties unequal to negoti3te,
on the footing of equality. This wa~ vividly noticed by tilis Court
in w~s/em India MIIUI: Company Ltd. v. lVorkmenL a; und:r:
"In the sunny ·. days of the market economy theory
· people ~incercly believed thut the economic law·bf demand and
. · supply in the labour marl;ct would settle a mutua!ly b:neliciJI
IE . bargain between the employer and the workmen •• Such a
ba•jpinth)!Y took it for granted, would, sccun: f;~ir terms nnd
conditions of employment to the work man. This \a IV the~ v~nc·
! .. . rated as n~turallaw, They had an ubiding fjith in thcv~rity·_
of this law. But the experience of !he working of this law .
over a long period has belied their faith. ••
If "
The intcndmcJ;t underlying the Act and ihe provisions of the
Act enacted to · give clfcct to the intcndm~nt and the scheme of
the Act leave no.· room for doubt tliat the Standing Orders
ccrtJ~c_d unucr the 19~6 Act become part o(the ~tatutory t,rms and
<G · conLIHtons of" >crvicc: between the employer and his cmploy~e 30J
they &<>Vern t~e rd.ttionship between the p.trtics. Jl'orJ·m,·n pf
M~nrJ Ftrc'..tvtu TJr~ & Ru?h~r Ca. uf Jrrdiu (P) Lrtl. v, Manas("
111 11 11 1
~' ' " OfT.' Workrwtl in B t ~klrtglttm cr·1.1 C.mt&Jtic Mills M<~J(IJS
v, B.~tki,gha''' Ulll/ Curmulc Mlll.f~ .mtd M/J GI<I.~:J LJ1bcJratrHit"J (/l
(!) )197~J I SCR 43-1.
ll) 111173) 3 SCR S87 at612.
(lJ [1970) ~ ~bour Liw Joornal 26 at 29.
S.C SARKAR v. TATA lRO~ AND STI!£L CO. (.tJesai; f.)' .
.Lfd. v. Y:he Presiding Officer, Labour·coart, Meerut & Ors. 1
The High Gourt recorded the finding that servic·e conditions of
the plaintiff were governed by_ the Works Standing Orders. No
exception has been taJ<.en to this finding . .a may at once be noted
that the . Works Standing Orders of the Company are Certified
Standing Orders, under the 1946 Act evidenced by Certificate No. 45
dated. March 18, 1950. S. 0. 54 provides that every uncovenanted
employee of the Company shalt retire from service on attaining the
age of 60. y~ars. This S.O. 54 is bodily incorporated in Rule 5 of
the Gratuity..Rules. Relying.'on S.O. 54 and the evidence 'recorded
in the case, the High Court reached the conclusion that payment of
gratuity was an implied condition of service of the pbintiff. Rule
6(a) provides that 'st\hject to the conditions prescribed in the
:rules, every permanent uncovenanted employee of the Company will:
in
be eligi b1e for a retiring gratuiLy the manner and to the extent
for a retiring gratuity in the manner and to the ex\ent inentioned
therein. Re~iring gratuity becomes payable on retircm~nt, w\lich
means termination of" service ·by reason. of any cause other than
removal by discharge due to misconduct. On a combined reading of
S.O. 54 an~ the Rule 5 of the Gratuity Rules the High Courtrightly
concluded that payment of gratuity was a condition of. service but
somehow the High Court . qualified it by saying that it was an
implied condition of service. It is weU-s-ettled by a catena of deci-
sions, that Certified Standing Orders bind all those in employment
at the time of service as well as thos.e who arc appointed thereafter.,
Agra Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. Sri Alladilz & Ors. 2 Now upon a
combined reading. of S.O. 54 along with Rule 5 and 6(a) of th~
Gratuity Rules, it becomes distinctly cl~ar that payment-of gratuity
..
·
was an express or statutory condition of service and. ro this
limited extent the finding of the High Court has. to be ;. modi-
fie9.
If payment of gratuity is thus shown to be a statutory or express
condition of governing the relationship between the plaintiff and the
company, ·it would be obligatory t.1pon the company to pay the ·
gratuity on retirement of the_plaintiff. If the company declines or
refuses to pay or discharge its statutory obligation, could the claim
be enforce..d by a civil suit? The High "court was of the opinion
R.
(1) [1984] lSCC 1
(2) · (1970]1 S.C.R. 806.
.,
336 SUPREME.COURT REPORTS. [l984j 3 S.C;·R ·
-If . that even though payment of gratuity was a C<}ndition of service. in ·
view of the· provision contained in Rule 10, the same cannot be .
of
claimed as .a matter rig4t or its recovery canno.t be enforced by a·
civiJ suit. The High Court was constrained to observe that Rule 10
· wh1ch 'confers absolute discretion on tl1e Company to pay the
.! )
gratuity at its sweet .will is' unconscionable and incompatible with the
modern notions or cpnditions whic;:h ought to -govern .the. relations
-bet\veen employer and tha~ upon an i_ndustrial dispute being rais(!d, ·-y
the lndt!Strial Tribunal may be in ·a posjtio!i to award the gratu~ty ....
as a matter· or right even under tlre existing rules, but according to :
High Couit, it cannot be enforced by a civil suit. In reaching this
conclusion the High. Court · overlooked the effect"' of certified
Sta-nding OrderS' a~d the inter-relation between the Retiring Gratuity
Rules and S.O._54. .
At this stage it would be appropriate to examine the effe<.(t of
.a breach of condition of service which is either. statutory in 'characte_r
or has. the statutory flavour: When under 1946 Act, an obligation
is cast on the employer to specifically and precisely lay down the
conditions of s-ervice, See:' 13(2) subjects the employer to a peQalty if
any act is d-one in contravention of the Standing Orders certified
under the Act. It woJJld appear that such conditions ·of service pres·
.cribed in Standing Orders get incorporated in the contract of service
of e.ach employee with his employer . . A facet of collective bargaining
is that any' sett1einent. arrived at between the parties would ·be .J.....
·treated as incorporated in the contract of service of each employee
governed by the settlement. Similarly certified Standing- Orders
·which statutotily prescrib.e the 9onditi~ns o(service shall be deemed
to be inco~:ported in the contract of employment of each . employee
with his emploYer.· As far as ·the incorporat~ori -of the results of
. collective bargaining into the individual contract of. employmen~ .
-is concerned, the courts h a~e --in . effect created a presumption·
of more or less systematic translation of the results of collective
bargaining. into individual contracts where these results . are in
practice operative and effective in co~trolling the ter"ms on . which:
' . '
employment takes place : (Labour Law Text and Materials bJPaul.
Davies and Mark · Freedland p. 233) 0 Kahn Freund describes.
collective bargaining as -ctystalised custom to be imported into· con·
tracts of employn1ent on t--he same basis. as trade custom· (System
of Industrial-Relations in• Great Britain p. 58-59)~ This w.9uld be all
the mo~e true of ctrtified Standing .Orders governing conditions of
seryic'e between workman and his employer. If the· e~ployer -com·
·mits a breach of the· .contract ef ~mpJoyment; the -same' c~n be en-
'I S.C. SA~K'AR v. TATA IRON AND STEEL CO. (Desai, J.) 337
:forced or remedied depending upon .the relief sought by a civil suit. A
. lf contract for personal service is sought to be specific<~lly enforced
by a decree or civil court, the court will have to keep in view the
provisions of S~c. 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 which ·provid- .
es that contract for personal service cannot be specifically enforced.
We are not concerned with the ex<oeptions to this rule such as the
power of Industrial Tribunal to grant relief of reinstatement. We B
are co.ncerned with the jurisdiction of civil court, The jurisdiction
of civil court amongst others is determined by the nature Of relief
claimed .. Now if the relief claimed is a money decree by enforcing
statutory conditions of service, the civil c~urt would certainly have
jurisdiction to grant the relief. Plaintiff filed the suit alleging that c
he was entitled to paytrient of gratuity on completion Of service for
th.e period prescribed. He alleged it and the High Court accepted
it as a condition of service. Its breach would give rise to a civil dis-
pute and civil suit would be the only rem·edy. In the case of work~
man governed-by the Industria( Disputes · Act, 1947, Sec. 33(c)(2)
may provide an additional. forum to recover monetar)' benefit. Jt · n
,is not sugg~sted that plaintiff was a workman governed by the
Industrial Disputes Act. The High Court was, therefore, in error
in holding that the remedy was only by way of an industrial dispute
aJld not by a civil suit. In reaching this conclusion, th'e Court Higlt
cl~sed the door of justice to every employee though entitled to
gr:atuity but would not be a workman within the meaning of the Ind-
ustrial Di·sputes Act, 1947 to recover the same, except' where a pro~
secution ~an be successfutly launched for an offence .under Sec. 13(2)
against the employer.
One more difficulty the High Court experienced in the way of F
.the plaintiff maintaining the suit· and recovering the amount of
gratuity was that under Rule 10 gratuity was payable at the absolute
dispretion of Company and cannot be claimed as a matter of right ..
Undoubtedly, Rule 10 confers· discretion on the c61~pany to pay the
gratuity even if the same is earned by satisfying the condition3 sub-
ject·to wbich gratuity becomes payable.· Rule 10 provides that G
~ail retiring gratuities .grantyd tinder the rules shall be at the
absolute discretion of the Company- irrespective of whether an e1n-
. ployee has or has not performed all or any of the conditions set out in
the rules and ilo employee howsoever otherwise eligiblefshidl be dee-
med to be entitled as of right to any pay~ent under the rules.' Such
H
·absolute discretion is wholly destructive of the chatacter of gratuity
as a retiral benefit. It is satisfactorily established and the High
338 . SVfRI;~T; COURT REPORLS (1984] 3 S.C.R~.
A C~urt has so rp.l~p tb,at P~Yni~_pt of gratuity was a condition of"
service ~·lbeit implied cpndition or's~rvice.which part .does not stand
. scrutiny. · 1946 Act was . amended spe~ifically_ in 1956 by. Amend--
.ing Act 36 of 1956 by whi.cli power was c'onferred upon the ·Certify-
ing Officer or appellate authority to adjudicate.upon the fairness ·or
B reasonableness of the' provisions of any standing orders. If is not.
. clear. whether the Rule JO w~ich apppears to h;tVe been framed in
the heyday or laissez faire has been recast, modified or alnended to.
··bring the same in conformity with the. modern notions of social
justice and Part 1V of the Cqnstitution. Assuming it is not done,
the court while interpreting and enforcing the relevant rules wili
c have to l:iear in mind the ~oncept of gratuity. The fundamental
principte'underlying gratuity is t,hat it is a retirement b~nefit for long.
· · service as a provision for old age. Demands· of social security and
so.cial justice made it neoessaty to provide for payment of gratuity.
On the enactment of Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 a statutory
liability was cast on the employer to pay gratuity.
D
Pens~ob a'!id gratuity coupled with contributory Provident
Fund are \Velhecognised retiral b~nefits. '{hese retiral benefit&
are·now·governed by various . statutes such as the Employees Provi-
dent Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, the Paym.::nt of
E Gratuity Act, l972. These stati1tes were legislativf? responses tO-
the developfng notions of fair ~nd lnnnane conditions of work, be··
ing the promise Of Part IV of the Constitution. Art. 37. provides that
'the-provisions contained jil Part·IV·Directive PrinciP.les of State
Policy, shall not be enforceable by. any court, but the principles·
therein laid down are nevertheless -fundamental in the governance
F of the country and it shall be the duty of the Stu(e to apply, these
_ principles in ~aking laws." Art. 41 provides that 'the State shall•
. within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make
effective provision for securing the right to work, to education and
· to publi_c assistance in "pases of unemployment, old_ age,• sicknesS:
G
and disablement, and in othet cases of undeserved want.' Art. 43
obligates the State to s'ec·ure, by suitable legislation to all
workers, a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decen.t stan-
-
~
dJ:lrd oflife anti full enjoyment of leisure ...... :··' The State discharg·
ed its obligation by enacting these laws, But much before the State
~nacted relevant legislation, tlw trade unions ·either by e'?llective ·
H bargaining .. or by statutory adjudication acquired certain benefits,
gratuity being one of them. Pension and gratuity are botli retiral
benefits ensuring that the workman _who haS. spent his useful s~an
•
S C. SARKAR v. TATA lRO'N AND S.TE::L CO. {D.!;ai; 1.) 339.
of life in rendering service ·ancl who never got a living wage, which
would h<we enabled him to save for a. rainy. day, should not 6e re~
. duced to destitution and p ~nury in his old age. As a return of long
service he should be assured social security to some· extent in the
fonn. of eithe'r pension' gratu'ity or provident' fund whichever retiral
ber;lefit is operative i"n the industrial .·establishment. Jt must not be
'forgotten that it is not a ·grati.tious payment, it has to be earne-d by
l?ng·and continuous service . .
·<'in such social security measures be denuded of'its efficacy
and enforcement by so interpreting t~~ relevant rules that the work~
man could be denied the same at the absolute discretion of the em~
ploycr notwithstanding the fact that lle or she has earned the sn~e by
c
as
long continuou~ service? If Rule 10 is interpreted has been done
by the High Court, such wohld pe . the stark albeit unpalatable out-
com~ ... It is therefore necessary to take a leaf out of history bear~
ing 0:1 the. question of ret ira! benefits like pension to which gratuity
···~;
i$ equated. In B<trhanpur Tapti 'Mills Ltd.. v. B:trhanpur. Tupti Mills
Mazdoor Sangh(1 ) wherein thiS Court observed that:" a Scheme of..
gratuit.v and a ;cheme of pensio.o1 have much in tomr,non. Gratuity i~·
a lump sum payment white pecision is a period payment of a
stated sum." Undoubtedly both have to be earned .try long and
continli<;ms service. ·
E
For c~nturies th~courts swung·in favour of the view that pension
is either a bounty or a gratitious payment for local service render·
ed. dep~nqing upon the sweet will or grace or'thc employer not claim~
able as a right and therefore, no right to pension c.ari be enforced.
through court. This view held the field. and a suit to recover pension
· F
was held not maintainable. With the modern notions of social justice
and social security, concept ofpens!on underwent a rad.i:.:al change
and it is no,w well~settled that pension is a right a'nd payment of it
does not depend upon the discretion of the employer, nor can it be
denie.d at the sweet will or fancy of the employer.. Deokinandan
Prasad v. State · of Bihar & Ors.,(2) State of Punjab & Anr. v. Iqbal G.
'Singhe) and D.S. Naka;a & Ors. v. Union of India(~). If pension which
Is the. retiral
.
benefit as a measure of
( .social security can be recovered
.
(L) [1965] 1 LLJ 453.
(2) . (1971] Supp. SCR 634. H
(3) ( 19761 3 SC'R 360.
0) [1983] 2 SC R 165
340 . 'ruPREME COURT REPORTS [l984J3 S.C.R.
.A through civil suit, we seeno justitlcation in treating gratuity on a .
different footing. Pension a.nd gratuity in. tlie matter of retirat
benefits and •for recovering the same must
. ' -
be
put on par .
The question then is : C::tn the court ignore Rule 10- 7 If gra-
tuity is a retiral benefit :!ild can be earned as a mauer ofright on ;
fulfilling the conditions subJect to which it is.earned-;· any rule co;.
feriqg absolute discretiol,l not testable 'on reason, justice or fair~play ''t
...
must be treated as utterly arbitrary and u~reasonable and discarded.
Jf rules for payrn,ent of gratt~ity became incorporated in the Standing
Orders and thereby acquired the status of statutory condition of ser-
·_vice, iJ,n arbitrary denial ref.erable to whim, fancy or sweet will of the
employer must be rejected as arbitrary. Sec. 4 oftbe 1946 Act which:
. c<:mfers power on· rhe Certifying Officer or <_~ppellate authority to ad~
judicate upon 1-he fairness or reasonableness of the p(oVisiqns would
.enabie this Court to reject that pa1t of Rule 10 conferring absolute
· discretion ·on the.employer to pay or not to pay the gratuity evt:,n
~·-
' :'
D . if it is earned as utterly unreas6nable and unfair. It must be treated
as.ineffective and unenforceable. It is well-settled that if the Certify.
ing Officer and the appellate authority under the 1946 Act while
.certifying tj.1e Standing Orders has power to .adjudicate upon the
fairness or reasonableness ofthe provisions -of any standing orders,
E this C'..ourt in appeal under Ait. 136 sh~ll have the power to do the
· same thing when especially it is called upon to enforce the unreason-
-able and unfair pa'rt of the Standing Order. It therefore follows '
It-
that part of Rule 10 which confers absolute discretion on the em~
ployer to ,Pay gratuity~ even if it is' earned, at its absolute discretion
is·ine'ifective and· unenforceable. This approach does not acquire .
F. anY. precedent but. if one is needed· the decision of this Court in
Westem India Match Company Ltd. case clearly rules'to that effect.
In that Cilse, the company reliec;\ on a special agreement which was ,.
to some extent in _derogation of the provisions of the certified Stan-
.ding Order:. The Court observed that to uphold such special agree~
· rnent would. mean giving a go-by to the principle· of three party
particip,iltion, -in the settlement of the terms· of employment, as
· represented by the certified Standing Orders and the[eforc, the
· incons~tani part of special agreement is ineffective and unenforce.
able. Tile claim to absolute· discreti<;ln n,ot to pay gratuity even
when it is earned is a hangover of the laissez faire days and utterly
.,... inconsistant with the· modern notions of fair industrial relations and
H therefore, it must be rejected as ineffective and hence unenfor....
able.
S.Q, SARIAR I!'; T/I,TA IRON AND STSEL CO~ (De~aiJ J.)
Viewed from·a sliahtly different angle, our Constitution envisa-
ges a society governed by rule of law. Absolute discretion un-
-Controlled by guidelines -.,hich may permit denial of equality ~efore
Jaw is the anti-thesis of rule of law, Absolute discretion· U()t
judicially reviewable inher~s.the_ pernicious tendency to be arbitrary
.and is therefore viol~tive of Art. 14. Equality before law and absolute
<l.i9Cretion to grant or. deny benefit of the law are diametrically ·a
.opposed to each other and ·cannot co-exist. Therefore; also the •
.conferment of absolute discretio~ by Rule- 10 of the Gratuity Rules
to give or deny t.he benefit of the rules cannot be upheJd .and must
.be rejected as unenforceable.
The High Court reversed the·decree of the trial colirt on t1te ·a
.sole ground that Rule 10 confers an absolute discretion on the .
-respondent-company to pay or notto pay gratuity at its sweet will.
Qnce Rule 10 is out of the way, the judgment of the High Court
.lJ.as to.be reserved. Accordingly, this appeal succeeds and will have
-19 be allowed.
D
I
The trial court decreed the plaintiff's suit with
,-costs and. with interest at 6% per annum. Interest at 6<ya.per
~nnum has become utt~rly irrelevant in these days with devaluation
..()f the- rupee. further in our opinion, the company declined to meet
.it~ obligation on an utterly unreasonable . stand apd denied to' the
•plaintifff or a period of a quarter of a century what the plaintiff •
was legitimately entitled with01.1t the slightest shadow of. doubt.
·Therefore, while allowing the appeal in order to compensate the loss
·s;ffered by the plaintiff who died before enjoying the fruits of his
.Jecree, we direct that the· interest shall be paid at 15% per aimum . ·
and full costs throughout. •
Accord iogly, this appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree
-of the High Court are set aside and the decree of the trial court is
restored with thi~ modification that the interest shall be paid on the
. principal amo~nt of ,Rs 14,04~ at 15% fr~m-1.7.1959 till payr:ne?t
and full costs throughout be paid to the plamtlff. The costs plamtiif
a
.in this Court is quantifie~ at Rs 5,000. The payment shall be made
~ithin a period of two months from today.
ll
R.S.K~ •
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