Holding

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding that the evidence proved the appellant committed murder and that he failed to establish the defence of insanity under Section 84 of the IPC.

Summary

The appellant, Sudhakar, was accused of murdering his wife by striking her on the neck with a chopper, an act witnessed by neighbours who saw him carrying the blood‑stained weapon and his infant child. The trial court and the Kerala High Court convicted him under Section 302 IPC, rejecting his claim of insanity under Section 84 IPC. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the forensic, ocular and medical evidence and found it established the appellant's participation in the killing. The Court held that the medical evidence did not demonstrate unsoundness of mind at the time of the offence, and the burden of proving insanity rested on the appellant. Consequently, the Court affirmed the conviction and dismissed the appeal.

Issues considered

The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant committed murder under Section 302 IPC.
Whether the appellant successfully established the defence of insanity under Section 84 IPC.
What is the burden of proof and standard of proof required to invoke the defence of insanity.
Whether the medical and psychiatric evidence showed the appellant was incapable of understanding the nature of his act at the time of the crime.

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 101, s. 105, s. 4
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 299, s. 302, s. 84

Subjects

murderinsanity defenceSection 84 IPCburden of proofmental illnessforensic evidencecriminal law

Judgment

[2010] 12 S.C.R. 873

SUDHAKARAN A
v.
STATE OF KERALA
(Criminal Appeal No. 389 of 2007)
OCTOBER 26, 2010
B
[B. SUDERSHAN REDDY AND SURINDER SINGH
NIJJAR, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860:
c
ss. 302 and 84 - Murder - Husband inflicting fatal
assault on wife with chopper on her neck - Husband claiming
defence of insanity - Conviction uls. 302 by courts below -
Interference with - Held: Not called for - Ocular evidence
corroborated by medical evidence -All circumstances point 0
towards the guilt of the accused - No evidence that accused
was suffering from mental illness at the crucial time as a/so
before and after the incident - Evidence.

s. 84 - Defence of insanity - Claim of - Held: While
claiming such defence, claimant has to prove that his E
cognitive faculties were so impaired, at the time when the
crime was committed, as not to know the nature of the act.

According to the prosecution case, the appellant
assaulted his wife with a chopper on her neck in the F
bedroom of his house, resulting in her death. The
appellant took the defence of insanity. The trial court
convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC and
sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for life. The
High Court upheld the order passed by the trial court. G
Therefore, the appellant filed the instant case.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. As regards the actual physical murder, all
873 H
874 SUPREM E COURT REPORTS [20HJ) 12 S.C.R.

A the circumstances point towards the guilt of the appellant.
PW1 and PW5 clearly stated how the appellant had
approached them with a chopper soaked in blood in one
hand and his 8 months old son in other arm. The blood
stained chopper remained in the possession of the
s appellant till he was asked to put the same on the ground.
PW1 actually saw the blood stained chopper in the hand
of the appellant when he pointed the torchlight on the
appellant through the window. After entrusting the child
to PW3, the appellant went away. The dead body of his
c wife was discovered by the neighbours which was
soaked in blood. According to PW3, there was so much
blood on the body. The ocular evidence was
corroborated by medical evidence. The doctor~PW9 , who
conducted the post mortem clearly stated that the injuries
found on the body of the deceased could have been
0
caused with the weapon which was. seized from the
appellant. Therefore , the courts below correctly
concluded that the circumstances lead to the only
conclusion that the appellant committed the murder of his
E wife. [Paras 14 and .15] [883~A-E]

2.1 In most cases, in India, the defence of insanity
seems to be pleaded where the offender is said to be
suffering from the disease of Schizophrenia. Section 84
IPC clearly gives statutory recognition to the defence of
F insanity. A bare perusal of the Section 84 would show
that in order to succeed, the appellant would have to
prove that by reason of unsoundness of mind, he was
incapable of knowing the nature of the act committed by
him. In the alternate case, he would have to prove that
G he was incapable of knowing that he was ,doing what is
either wrong or contrary to law. [Para 17] [884-D; 885-E-
G]
R. vs. Daniel Me Naughten 1843 RR 59: 8ER 718(HL)
- referred to.
!-1
SUDHAKARAN v. STATE OF KERALA 875

Modi's Medicaf ,Jurisprudence and Toxicology 23rd edn. A
1077 - referred to.

2.2 The plea taken in the instant case was also that
the appellant was suffering from "paranoid
schizophrenia". The medical profession would 8
undoubtedly treat the appellant as a mentally sick
person. However, for the purposes of claiming the benefit
of the defence of insanity in law, the appellant would have
to prove that his cognitive faculties were so impaired, at
the time when the crime was committed, as not to know C
the nature of the act. Thus, the crucial point of time for
ascertaining the existence of circumstances bringing the
case within the purview of Section 84 is the time when
the offence is committed. [Paras 17 and 19] [884-D-E; 885-
D-E; 893-F]
D
2.3 Regarding the defence under Section 84 IPC,
there is no reason to differ with the opinion expressed
by the trial court as also the High Court. The evidence
given by DW1, Assistant Surgeon of the Hospital was
rightly discarded by the High Court. The entire medical E
evidence produced was not sufficient to show that at the
time of the commission of the murder the appellant was
medically insane and incapable of understanding the
nature of the consequences of the act performed by him.
[Para 16] [883-F; 884-B] F

Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar vs. State of Gujarat
AIR 1964 SC 1563; Ratan La/ vs. State of Madhya Pradesh
1970 '(3) sec 533 - referred to.

·2.4 The High Court took into consideration the totality G
of the circumstances and came to the conclusion that
there was no evidence indicating that appellant was
suffering from mental illness . at the crucial time, that
would enable him to take benefit of Section 84 IPC. The
only evidence placed on record shows that the appellant H
876 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R.

A had been treated in a psychiatric hospital for 13 days in
the year 1985 even at that time the doctor had diagnosed
the disease as psychotic disorder. The record did not
indicate that the patient was suffering from such mental
disability which incapacitated him to know the nature of
B the act that he had committed. The High Court held that
there was no evidence to indicate that the appellant
suffered from mental illness post 1985. Thus, the High
Court rightly concluded that the appellant was capable
of knowing the nature of the act and the consequences
c thereof on the date of the alleged incident. Whilst he had
brutally and callously committed the murder of his wife,
he did not cause any hurt or discomfort to the child.
Rather he made up his mind to ensure that the child be
put into proper care and custody after the murder. The
0 conduct of the appellant before and after the incident was
sufficient to negate any notion that he was mentally
insane, so as not to be possessed of the necessary mens
rea, for committing the murder of his wife. Thus, there is
no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings
E recorded by the courts below. [Paras 20, 21 and 22] [894-
A-C-G]

Case Law Reference:
1843 RR 59: 8ER 718(HL) Referred to Para 14
F AIR 1964 SC 1563 Referred to Para 18
1970 (3) sec 533 Referred to Para 19

CRIMINAL APPELA TE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 389 of 2007.
G
From the Judgment & Order dated 21.10.2005 of the High
Court of Kerala at Erankulam in Crl. A.No . 1092 of 2003.

T.V. George, Manjula Gupta for the Appellant

H Shishir Pinaki, P.V. Dinesh for the Respondent.
SUDHAKARAN v. STATE OF KERALA 877

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A

SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J. 1. The present appeal is
directed against the judgment and final order in Criminal Appeal
No. 1092 of 2003 dated 21 .10.2005 whereby the High Court
of Kerala at Ernakulum dismissed the criminal appeal filed by B
the appellant and thereby affirmed his conviction under Section
302 IPC as held by the trial court vide judgment dated
30.11 .2002.

2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts essential for
adjudication of the present appeal are: C

The appellant herein was convicted and sentenced to
rigorous imprisonment for life under Section 302 IPC for
murdering his wife on 3.11.2000 at about 7.30 p.m. He had
killed his wife by assaulting her with a chopper on her neck in 0
the bedroom of his house. There is no direct evidence of the
murder. However, the factum of death of the appellant's wife
by the injuries noticed in post mortem report (Exb.P5) is not
disputed. The appellant had taken the defence of insanity based
on Section 84 IPC. He had examined four witnesses in support E
of his defence. Now, the appellant had claimed the defence of
insanity at the time of murder; no such plea was taken at the
time of the trial. Aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court,
the appellant had approached the High Court in Criminal
Appeal No.1092 of 2003. The aforesaid appeal was dismissed
by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court by the judgment F
dated 21.10.2005. It is this judgment which is impugned before
us in the present appeal.
1
3 . We may now notice the prosecution version as it
emerges through the evidence of PW1 and PW5. It was G
alleged that on 3.11.2000 at about 7.30 p.m. The appellant with
the intention of killing his wife, namely, Ajitha @ Poonamma
had struck her on her neck with a chopper when she was in
the bedroom of his house which is named 'Kallumkuzhi',
bearing No.289 situated in ward No. IX of Kanjikuzhy H
878 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R.

A panchayat. After committing the murder, the appellant came out
of the house and met PW1 and PWS who were sitting in front
of their house. PW1 is the son of PWS. At the time when the
appellant approached them he was carrying his child in one
arm. He asked PWS as to whether he could hold the child.
B When PWS stepped towards the appellant to take the child , he
saw that the appellant was carrying a chopper in the other hand.
Immediately PW1 and his father rushed into their house and
closed the door. At that time the appellant was seen roaming
around their house. He was trying to lay down the child in a lean-
C to attached to their house. At that stage, PW1 had pointed the
· beam of a torch on to the appellant, through the window. He
saw, in the torch light, that the shirt of the appellant was blood
stained and he was also carrying a blood stained chopper.
PW1 then came out of his housG and went to the nearby house
of PW2 and narrated the entire incident to him. Thereafter PW1
0
and PW2 together went to the adjacent house of PW3. When
they came back together. they saw that appellant had left the
house of PW1 . At that stage they were told by PWS that the
appellant had come after killing his wife. According to PWS,
the appellant had confessed to the crime. Thereafter all the
E people in the nearby houses got together and went to the house
of the appellant whe re they found that his wife Ajitha was lying
on a cot in her bedroqm with blood splattered all over her. They
also found that there was no movement in the body of Ajitha. It
is further the case of the prosecution that when all the
F neighbours had gathered in the house of the appellant he had
confessed to all of them that he had killed his wife.

4. The FIR was registered on the basis of the statement
Exb.P1 made by PW1 wherein he narrated the incident as
G stated above. This witness PW1 has also identified M.0.1 knife
which he had seen in the hand of the appellant on the evening
of 3.11 .2000. PW2 also gave a similar statement. He further
stated that the appellant had come to him and asked him to
look after the child as he was going to the police station. He is
H alleged to have stated to PW2 that -
SUDHAKARAN v. STATE OF KERALA 879
[SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
"I have child in my hand. Kindly hold him. I am going to the A
police station."

5. PW2 further stated that the appellant had put the knife
on the ground in the verandah on being asked by one of the
neighbours. While putting the knife down the appellant said "till
8
today she had been cheating upon me." After putting the knife
down the appellant went to the house of PW3. He is stated to
have entrusted th.e child to PW3. Thereafter the appellant had
gone to a place named Aippara City. PW4 is another
neighbour who stated that the appellant had come to the house
of PW1 with his 8 months old child in one hand and the knife~,C
in the other hand. He came to know about the incident when
PW1 artd PW2 came to his house and narrated the story.
Thereafter he saw the appellant in the residential compound of
Poonamakkal Thomas. He also deposed that on the request
of his father and Narayan, appellant had put the knife on the
floor. PW5 also corroborated the statement given by PW1 to
PW4. PW6 is another witness who came to know about the
incident while he was in the Aippara City. According to him ,
he came to know about the murder of the wife of appellant at
about 8 o'clock on 3.11 .2000. According to PW11, Sub·
Inspector of Police Kanjikuzhi police, the appellant was
produced early in the morning by PW2, 3 and 4. He was
arrested by PW12, C.l. of Police.

6 . The trial court notices that the prosecution has relied on
the oral evidences given by PW1 to PW12. The prosecution
had also produced the blood stained chopper which had been
recovered from the appellant. After examining the c;jead body
of the deceased, inquest report was prepared by PW11 in the
presence of the witnesses. The chopper had been seized by
him as per Ext.P2 Mahaska. Ext.P3 is the Mahaska prepared
by him for seizure of the shirt and dhoti worn by the appellant.
These materials were produced before the court as Ext.P7 and
P8. The articles recovered from the body of the deceased were
produced as M.0 .3 to 10 and 10(a). These included night gown,
880 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010}12 S.C.R.

A and other under garments , gold ornaments worn by the
deceased at the time of the murder. All the recovered articles
were sent for Forensic Examination. The Forensic Report was
relied upon by the prosecution at the trial. Ext.P1 0 is the
Forensic Science Report. This report revealed that all the items
B examined, contained human blood belonging to group A.

7. Taking note of the evidence adduced by the prosecution,
the trial court noticed that Ext. P5 post mortem certificate
revealed nine injuries on the body of the deceased. These
injuries may be tabulated as under :-
C
1. Incised wound, 14x4x6 em horizontal, on the
middle of ~ack of neck, 6 em below occipital
protuberance. The muscles of the back of
neck found but and vertebral column was
D found cut and separated between 2nd and
3rd ceNical vertebra. Spinal cord underneath
and vertebral arteries were found several.

2. Incised wound 9x2x2cm oblique, on right side
of back of head upper inner end at the level
E of occipital protuberance and lower outer
and just above right ear.

3. Incised wound 5x1 x1 em oblique on right side
of neck, upper outer end just below right ear
F and lower inner end 1cm, below right angle
of mandible.

4. Incised wound, 2x1 em oblique on pine of
right ear involving its entire thickness.
G 5. Incised wound 5x1x2 em oblique on the back
of chest over right shoulder blade.

6. Incised wound 2x1 x0.5 em oblique on the
outer aspect of left shoulder.
H
SUDHAKARAN v. STATE OFKERALA .. _, _ 881.
[SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
7. - Incised wound 3x1x0.5 em oblique·on the out A
: aspect of left shoulder 2 em below injury
, .. . No.6. ' ..,--· - <

8.. __. _Incised 'wa,u_nd 5.5~1 em. oblique on the back
of left little finger, 3 em abqve its trip with: 8
- distal potion conne'cted by skin only. :. -

9 . . , _tncis~d woul)9. 5x4)(1cm onthe left palmate
the root,of thumb.~ . -. ~ _..

·- 8. PW9,-the docto~ who ·conducted th,e post morterrl'._ c
opined_ that the injuries noted by him could be caused by an·
attack with a chopper such as :iv1:o.1.'The doctor also opined
( that there were wounds on'palm and fingers of the deceased.
This would indicate thafshe was defending herself, therefore,
she was· attacked while she was awake and not when she was DJ
- asleep: The injuries noted by the doc~or in Ext:P5 also indicate
that the app-ellant had caused the death of his wife by attacking ·
_her with chopper M.0.1. -: · -- - · ·, ~ ; :, ···' ·
\ -.. .. i;; . - - ·.- ·~)(>~ ~- !

'i,, ..The" trial court upon consideration of the entire eviden~ _ E
obserVed. that the entire sequence of events led to the only.
conclusion that the appellant had killed his wife by striking her .
on her neck with a chopper. The trial court specifically held that;
it did not' find an};-missing link fatal to the prosecution case. ·.
J __ / - '. - . ' ' ,/ . ' ..• . . v - • '

. 9~: The:trial court- thereafter considered the defen'ce'; Fl
pleaded bY" the appellant under Section 84 I PC. Upon-
examination of 'the/entire medical evidence, the trial court
concluded that ther~ is no material to indicate,that at the time·
ofttie commission of the offence or' immediately before the'·
occurremce .of the incident, the appellant was suffering from any G .
m~ntal illness. Although he had taken some treatment_ in. the
·. year ,1985 for mental illness but he had fully recovered from that..
Sub-sequently, long after that he had married .the de.ceased.
Eve·n -though they were living a d.isturbed married life,_ child- a
wa? born out of the wedlock. The child was 8 months old at the H .
/ . . _.
'.
882 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R.

A time when the crime was committed. The trial court also noticed
that, although the appellant was irregular, he used to take on
casual jobs for his sustenance. The trial court concluded that
even after taking note of the evidence produced by the defence.
the conclusion was that the appellant was capable of
B understanding the nature of the act and the consequences
thereof.

10. The High Court, in appeal, re-examined the entire
issue and concluded that the evidence given by PW1 to PWS
is unimpeachable. Therefore, the conclusions reached by the
C trial court were duly affirmed by the Division Bench of the High
Court. The defence under Section 84 was held to be not
proved.

11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
D
12. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
entire story is unbelievable. The appellant was living with his
wife in a thickly populated locality . The houses of the
neighbours are in a close proximity. The defence of the
E appellant has been illegally discarded by the trial court as well
as by the High Court. The appellant had produced expert
witnesses. In support of the medical history of his mental illness,
DW2 and DW4 had produced the record relied upon by them
which shows that the appellant had been treated for paranoid
F schizophrenia, 11 days after the alleged murder. Even during
the trial , the appellant had to be taken to the mental hospital
on 15.11 .2000.

13. According to the learned counsel, both the courts below
have failed to appreciate the exact natu re of the disease
G "paranoid schizophrenia" . Such patients experience an
extremely rapid change of emotion within a matter of seconds
and minutes, they may be angry, depresses. perplexed.
ecstatic and anxious. Therefore, it is not possible to say that
at the time of the murder the appellant was in his senses.
H
SUDHAKARAN v. STATE OF KERALA 883
[SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
14. We are unable to accept the submissions made by the A
learned counsel for the appellant. So far as the actual physical
murder is concerned, all the circumstances adverted to above,
chillingly point towards the guilt of the appellant. PW1 and PW5
have clearly stated how the appellant had approached them
with a chopper soaked in blood in one hand and his 8 months B
old son in other arm. The blood stained chopper remained in
the possession of the appellant till he was asked to put the
same on the ground. PW1 actually saw the blood stained
chopper in the hand of the appellant when he pointed the
torchlight on the appellant through the window. After entrusting c
the child to PW3, the appellant went away. The dead body of
his wife was discovered by the neighbours which was soaked
in blood. According to the PW3 there was so much blood on
the body that she seemed to have taken a bath in a pool of
blood. The ocular evidence has been corroborated by medical
0
evidence. The doctor, PW9, who conducted the post mortem,
has clearly stated that the injuries which were found on the·body
of the deceased could have been caused with a weapon which
was seized from the appellant.

15. Therefore, in our opinion, both the courts below have E
correctly concluded that the circumstances lead to the only
conclusion that the appellant has committed the murder of his
wife.

16. As far as, the defence under Section 84 is concerned, F
we also see no reason to differ with the opinion expressed by
the trial court as also the High Court. The evidence given by
DW1 , Assistant Surgeon of ldduki District Hospital has been
rightly discarded by the High Court. It is true that DW1 had
stated on the basis of the out patient register that the appellant G
had come for consultation. However, no records were produced
as to what treatment had been given to him. Even the out patient
ticket was not produced. Ultimately, this doctor admitted that
he cannot say that the appellant had come there for psychiatric

H
884 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R.

A treatment. He did not even remember the medicine which had
been given to the appellant. Similarly, the evidence of
Superintendent of Jail DW2 also only indicates that the
appellant had been sent to Medical Health Centre. Even the
evidence of the Health Centre was incomplete and wholly
B unreliable. The entire medical evidence produced was not
sufficient to show that at the time of the commission of the
murder the appellant was medically insane and incapable of
understanding the nature of the consequences of the act
performed by him.
c 17. The defence of insanity has been well known in the
English Legal System for many centuries. In the earlier times,
it was usually advanced as a justification for seeking pardon.
Over a period of time, it was used as a complete defence to
criminal liability in offences involving mens rea. It is also
D accepted that insanity in medical terms is distinguishable from
legal insanity. In most cases , in India, the defence of insanity
seems to be pleaded where the offender is said to be suffering
from the disease of Schizophrenia . The plea taken in the
present case was also that the appellant was suffering from
E "paranoid schizophren ia". The term has been defined in Modi's
Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicologyl as follows :

"Paranoia is now regarded as a mild form of paranoid
schizophrenia. It occurs more in males than in females. The
F main characteristic of this illness is a well-elaborated
delusional system in a personality taat is otherwise well
preserved. The delusions are of persecutory type . The true
nature of th is illness may go unrecognized for a long time
because the personality is well preserved, and some of
these paranoiacs may pass off as a social reformers or
G
founders of queer pseudo-religious sects. The classical
picture is rare and generally takes a chronic course.

Paranoid Schizophrenia, in the vast majority of case, starts
in the fourth decade and develops insidiously.
H Suspiciousness is the characteristic symptom of the early
SUDHAKARAN v. STATE OF KERALA 885
[SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.}

stage. Ideas of reference occur, which gradually develop A
into delusions of persecution. Auditory hallucinations follow
which in the beginning, start as sound or noises in the ears,
but later change into abuses or insults. Delusions are at
first indefinite, but gradually they become fixed and definite,
to lead the patient to believe that he is persecuted by B
some unknown person or some superhuman agency. He
believes that his food is being poisoned, some noxious
gases are blown into his room and people are plotting
against him to ruin him. Disturbances of general sensation
give rise to hallucinations which are attributed to ~he effects c
of hypnotism , electricity, wireless telegraphy or atomic
agencies. The patient gets very irritated and excited owing
to these painful and disagreeable hallucinations and
delusions. "

The medical profession would undoubtedly treat the appellant D
herein as a mentally sick person. However, for the purposes
of claiming the benefit of the defence of insanity in law, the
appellant would have to prove that his cognitive faculties were
so impaired, at the time when the crime was committed, as not
to know the nature of the act. Section 84 of the Indian Penal E
Code recognizes the defence of insanity. It is defined as under:-

"Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who at
the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is
incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is F
doing what is either wrong or contrary· to law."

A bare perusal of the aforesaid section would show that in order
to succeed, the appellant would have to prove that by reason
of unsoundness of mind, he was incapable of knowing the
nature of the act committed by him. In the alternate case, he G
would have to prove that he was incapable of knowing that he
was doing what is either wrong or contrary to law. The aforesaid
section clearly gives statutory recognition to the defence of
1. [23rd Ed. Page 1077]
H
886 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R.

A insanity as developed by the Common Law of England in a
decision of the House of Lords rendered in the case of R. Vs.
Daniel Me Naughten 2 . In that case, the House of Lords
formulated the famous Me Naughten Rules on the basis of the
five questions, which had been referred to them with regard to
B the defence of insanity. The reference came to be made in a
case where Me Naug_hten was charged with the murder by
shooting of Edward Drummond, who was the Pvt. Secretary of
the then Prime Minister of England Sir Robert Peel. The
accused Me Naughten produced medical evidence to prove
c that, he was not, at the time of committing the act, in a sound
state of mind. He claimed that he was suffering from an insane
delusion that the Prime Minister was the only reason for all his
problems. He had also ·claimed that as a result of the insane
delusion, he mistook Drummond for the Prime Minister and
D committed his murder by shooting him. The plea of insanity was
accepted and Me Naughten was found not guilty, on the ground
of insanity. The aforesaid verdict became the subject of debate
in the House of Lords. Therefore, it was determined to take the
opinion of all the judges on the law governing such cases. Five
E questions were subsequently put to the Law Lords. The
questions as well as the answers delivered by Lord Chief
Justice Tindal were as under:-

"Q .1 What is the law respecting alleged crimes
committed by persons afflicted with insane
F delusion in respect of one or more particular
subjects or persons: as, for instance, where
at the time of the commission of the alleged
crime the accused knew he was acting
contrary to law, but did the act complained
G of with a view, under the influence of insane
delusion, of redressing a revenging some
supposed grievance or injury, or of producing
some public benefit?

H 2. 1843 RR 59: 8ER 718(Hl )]
SUDHAKARAN v. STATE OF KERALA 887
[SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
Answer A

"Assuming that your lordships' inquiries are confined to
those persons who labour under such partial delusions only,
and are not in other respects insane, we are of opinion,
that, notwithstanding the party did the act complained of
8
with a view, under the influence of insane delusion, of
redressing· or revenging some supposed grievance or
injury, or of producing some public benefit, he is
nevertheless punishable, according to the nature of the
crime committed, if he knew, at the time of committing such C
crime, that he was acting contrary to law, by which
expression we understand your lordships to mean the law
of the land.

0 .2. What are the proper questions to be
submitted to the jury when a person alleged 0
to be afflicted with insane delusion
respecting one or more particular subjects or
persons, is charged with the commission of
a crime. (murder, for example), and insanity
is set up as a defence? E

0.3. In what terms ought the question to be left to
the jury as to the prisoner's state of mind at
the time when the act was committed?

Answers - to the second and third questions F

That the jury ought to be told in all cases that every man is
presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree
of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary
be proved to the~atisfaction ; and that, to establish a G
defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved
that, at the time {)f the committing of the act, the party
accused was labouring under such a defect of reason ,
from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and
H
888 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010)12 S.C.R.

A quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he
did not know he was doing what was wrong. The mode of
putting the latter part of the question to the jury on these
occasions has generally been, whether the accused, at the
time of doing the act, knew the difference between right
B and wrong, which mode, though rarely, if ever, leading to
any mistake with the jury, is not, as we conceive, so
accurate when put generally, and in the abstract, as when
put as to the party's knowledge of right and wrong in
respect to the very act with which he is charged. If the
c question were to be put as to the knowledge of the
accused, solely and exclusively with reference to the law
of the land, it might tend to confound the jury, by inducing
them to believe that an actual knowledge of the law of the
land was essential in order to lead to a conviction, whereas
the law is administered upon the principle that every one
D
must be taken conclusively to know it without proof that he
does know it. If the accused was conscious that the act
was one which he ought not to do, and if that act was at
the same time contrary to the law of the land, he is
punishable; and the usual course, therefore, has been to
E leave the question to the jury, whether the party accused
had a sufficient degree of reason to know that he was doing
an act that was wrong: and this course, we think, is correct,
accompanied with such observations and explanations as
the circumstances of each particular case may require.
F
Q.4. If a person under an insane delusion as to
the existing facts commits and offence in
consequence thereof, is he thereby excused?

Answer
G
The answer must, of course, depend on the nature of the
delusion, but making the same assumption as we did
before, that he labours under such partial delusion only,
and is not in other respects insane, we think he must be
H considered in the same situation as to responsibility as if
SUDHAKARAN v. STATE OF KERALA 889
[SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were A
real. For example, if, under the influence of his delusion,
he supposes another man to be in the act of attempting
to take away his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes
in self~defence , he would be exempted from punishment.
If his delusion was that the deceased had inflicted a B
serious injury to his character and fortune. and he killed him
in revenge for such supposed injury, he would be liable to
pu_nishment.

Q.S. Can a medical man, conversant with the
disease of insan ity, who never saw the C
prisoner previously to the trial , but who was
present during the whole trial , and the
examination of all the witnesses, be asked
his opinion as to the state of the prisoner's
mind at the time of the commission of the D
alleged crime , or his opinion whether the
prisoner was conscious, at the time of doing
the act, that he was acting contrary to law, or
whether he was labouring under any and
what delusion at the time? E

Answer

We think the medical man, under the circumstances
supposed, cannot in strictness be asked his opinion in the
· terms above stated, because each of those questions F
involves the determination of the truth of the facts deposed
to, which it is for the j ury to decide; and the questions are
not mere questions upon a matter of science. in which case
such evidence is admissible. But where the facts are
adm itted or not disputed , and the question becomes G
substantially one of science only, it may be convenient to
allow the question to be put in that general form, though
the same cannot be insisted on as a matter of right." 3

3. Archbold 2010 Ed. Pg. No. 1880-1881] H
890 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R.

A A comparison of answers to question no. 2 and 3 and the
provision contained in Section 84 of the IPC would clearly
indicate that the Section is modeled on the aforesaid answers.

18. This Court has on several occasions examined the
8 standard of proof that is required to be discharged by the
appellant to get the benefit of Section 84 IPC. We may make
a reference here to the observation made in Dahyabhai
Chhaganbhai Thakkar Vs. State of Gujaraf4. The relevant
aspects of the law and the material provisions relating to the
C plea of insanity were noticed and considered as follows :-

"lndian Penal Code

299 . Whoever causes death by doing an act with the
intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing
D such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the
knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death ,
commits the offence of culpable homicide.

84. Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who,
at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind,
E is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is
doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.

Indian Evidence Act

105. When a person is accused of any offence, the burden
F
of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the
case within any of the General Exceptions in the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860) or within any special exception
or proviso contained in any other part of the same Code,
or in any law defining the offence, is upon him, and the
G Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.

4. St all presume. -Whenever it is directed by this Act that
the Court shall presume a fact, it shall regard such facts

H 4. AIR 1964 SC 1563}
SUDHAKARAN v. STATE OF KERALA 891
[SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
as proved unless and until it is disproved. A

Proved .-A fact is said to be 'proved ' when after
considering the matters before it, the Court either believes
it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a
prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the
B
particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists.

Disproved.-A fact is said to be disproved when , after
considering the matters before it, the Court either believes
that it does not exist, or considers its non-existence so
probable that a prudent man ought, under the C
circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the
supposition that it does not exist.

101 . Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to
any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of fact 0
which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist.

When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact,
it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person."

It is a fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that E
an accused is presumed to be innocent and, therefore, the
burden lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution,
therefore, in a case of homicide shall prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused caused death with the f
requisite intention described in Section 299 of the Indian
Penal Code. This general burden never shifts and it always
rests on the prosecution. But, as SeGtion 84 of the Indian
Penal Code provides that nothing is an offence if the
accused at the time of doing that act, by reason of G
unsoundness of mind was incapable of knowing the nature
of his act or what he was doing was either wrong or
contrary to law. This being an exception, under Section
105 of the Evidence Act the burden of proving the
existence of circumstances bringing the case within the
H
892 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R.

A said exception lies on the accused; and the court shall
presume the absence of such circumstances. Under
Section 105 of the Evidence Act, read with the definition
of "shall presume" in Section 4 thereof, the court shall
regard the absence of such circumstances as proved
B unless, after considering the matters before it, it believes
that said circumstances existed or their existence was so
probable that a prudent man ought , under the
circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the
supposition that they did exist. To put it in other words , the
c accused will have to rebut the presumption that such
circumstances did not exist, by placing material before the
court sufficient to make it consider the existence of the
said circumstances so probable that a prudent man would
act upon tham. The accused has to satisfy the standard
of a "prudent man". If the material placed before the court
D
such , as, oral and documentary evidence, presumptions,
admissions or even the prosecution evidence, satisfies the
test of "prudent man". the accused will have discharged his
burden. The evidence so placed may not be sufficient to
discharge the burden under Section 105 of the Evidence
E Act, but it may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of a
judge as regards one or other of the necessary ingredients
of the offence itself. It may, for instance, raise a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the judge whether the accused had
the requisite intention laid down in Section 299 of the Indian
F Penal Code. If the judge has such reasonable doubt, he
has to acquit the accused, for in that event the prosecution
will have failed to prove conclusively the guilt of the
accused. There is no conflict between the general burden,
which is always on the prosecution and which never shifts,
G and the special burden that rests on the accused to make
out his defence of insanity."

Thereafter, upon further consideration , this Court defined the
doctrine of burden of proof in the context of the plea of insanity
H in the following propositions:-
SUDHAKARAN v. STATE OF KERALA 893
[SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J .]
"(1) The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt A
that the appellant had committed the offence with the
requisite mens rea; and the burden of proving that always
rests on·the prosecution from the beginning to the end of
the trial.
B
(2) There is a rebuttable presumption that the appellant
was not insane, when he committed the crime, in the sense
laid down by Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code: the
appellant may rebut it by placing before the court all the
relevant evidence - oral, documentary or circumstantial,
but the burden of proof upon him is no higher than that rests C
upon a party to civil proceedings.

(3) Even if the appellant was not able to establish
conclusively that he was insane at the time he committed
the offence, the evidence placed before the court by the D
appellant or by the prosecution may raise a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as regards one or more of
the ingredients of the offence, including mens rea of the
appellant and in that case the court would be entitled to
acquit the appellant on the ground that the general·burden E
of proof resting on the prosecution was not discharged."

19. It is also a settled proposition of law that the crucial
point of time for ascertaining the existence of circumstances
bringing the case within the purview of Section 84 is the time
when the offence is committed . We may notice here the F
observations made by this Court in the case of Ratan Lal Vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh 5 . In Paragraph 2 of the aforesaid
judgment, it is held as follows :-

"lt is now well-settled that the crucial point of time at which G
unsoundness of mind should be established is the time
when the crime is actually committed and the burden of
proving this lies on the appellant."

5. [1970J (3) sec 533)
H
894 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010]12 S.C.R.

A 20. The High Court on examination of the evidence before
it. came to the conclusion that the appellant had failed to prove
that he was suffering from such mental illness that would enable
him to take benefit of Section 84 IPC.

21 . The High Court took into consideration the totality of
8
the circumstances and came to the conclusion that there was
no evidence indicating that appellant was suffering from mental
illness at the crucial time. The only evidence placed on record
shows that the appellant had been treated in a Psychiatric
Hospital for 13 days in the year 1985 even at that time the
C doctor had diagnosed the disease as psychotic disorder. The
record did not indicate that the patient was suffering from such
mental disability which incapacitated him to know the nature of
the act that he had committed. The High Court further observed
that there wa<3 no evidence to indicate that the appellant
D suffered from mental illness post 1985. The High Court, in our
opinion, rightly concluded that the appellant was capable of
knowing the nature of the act and the consequences thereof on
the date of the alleged incident. Whilst he had brutally and
callously committed the murder of his wife, he did not cause
E any hurt or discomfort to the child. Rather he made up his mind
to insure that the child be put into proper care and custody after
the murder. The conduct of the appellant before and after the
incident was sufficient to negate any notion that he was mentally
insane, so as not to be possessed of the necessary mens rea,
F for committing the murder of his wife.

22. In such view of the matter, we see no reason to interfere
with the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below. The
appeal is dismissed.

G N.J. Appeal dismissed.