Supreme Court of India
SUDAM @ RAHUL KANIRAM JADHAVversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
- Citation
- 2019 INSC 1107
- Decided
- 1 October 2019
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Bench
- N V RAMANA
Holding
The Supreme Court held that review jurisdiction is confined to correcting errors apparent on the face of the record, identified such errors in the appellate judgment, and consequently commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment without remission while upholding the conviction.
Summary
Sudam @ Rahul Kaniram Jadhav was convicted under Sections 302 and 201 IPC for the murder of his wife Anita and their four children, based largely on circumstantial evidence, two extra‑judicial confessions and motive. The petitioner sought a review of the Supreme Court's affirmation of his conviction and death sentence, alleging errors apparent on the face of the record, including reliance on a rejected confession and an unsupported observation about facial injuries. The Court clarified that review jurisdiction in criminal matters is limited to correcting such apparent errors and cannot re‑appreciate the entire evidence. It found two errors – the improper reliance on PW‑6's confession and the erroneous finding about the victim’s facial injuries – and, applying the doctrine of prudence and the "rarest of rare" test, held that the death penalty could not be sustained. Consequently, the death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment without remission, while the conviction was upheld.
Issues considered
- The scope of review jurisdiction in criminal proceedings and whether it permits re‑appreciation of evidence
- Whether there were errors apparent on the face of the record in the appellate judgment
- Whether conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence and extra‑judicial confessions is valid
- Whether the death penalty can be upheld in a case relying on circumstantial evidence, considering the "rarest of rare" doctrine and doctrine of prudence
- Whether the death sentence should be commuted to life imprisonment without remission
Legislation cited
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 114
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201, s. 302
Subjects
review jurisdictioncriminal reviewdeath penaltycircumstantial evidencerarest of rare doctrinedoctrine of prudenceresidual doubtcommutationlife imprisonmentremissionerror apparent on the face of the record
Judgment
[2019] 14 S.C.R. 943 943
SUDAM @ RAHUL KANIRAM JADHAV A
v.
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
(Review Petition (Crl.) Nos.401-402 of 2012)
In B
(Criminal Appeal Nos.185-186 of 2011)
OCTOBER 01, 2019
[N.V. RAMANA, MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR AND
INDIRA BANERJEE, JJ.] C
Review Jurisdiction: Scope of review in criminal proceedings
– Held: In criminal proceedings, the scope of review jurisdiction of
Supreme Court is guided by Art.137 of the Constitution as well as
Or.XL r.10 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, which permit the Court
to correct miscarriage of justice caused by an error apparent on D
the face of the record – Supreme Court cannot re-appreciate evidence
in its entirety in the exercise of its review jurisdiction.
Penal Code, 1860: s.302 – Circumstantial evidence –
Conviction by courts below and upheld by Supreme Court – Review
petition – Held: There is no ground for interference with any finding E
of the Courts with respect to the appreciation of the testimony relating
to the “last seen” circumstance, the extra judicial confession and
the motive of the petitioner – Chain of circumstances established
the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
Sentence/Sentencing: Death sentence – Sentencing in case F
of circumstantial evidence – Though it may be a relevant
consideration in sentencing that the evidence in a given case is
circumstantial in nature, there is no bar on the award of the death
sentence in cases based upon such evidence – In such a situation,
it is upto the Court to determine whether the accused may be
sentenced to death upon the strength of circumstantial evidence, G
given the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case, while
assessing all the relevant aggravating circumstances of the crime
and mitigating circumstances of the accused.
H
943
944 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.
A Sentence/Sentencing: Death sentence – Commutation of
sentence, prayed – Held: While arriving at the conclusion that the
instant case fell into the category of the rarest of rare cases, the
Court took into account the premeditated nature of the crime, and
its brutal and barbaric nature, observing that the same was sufficient
to shock the collective conscience of the society – The Court also
B
opined that the Petitioner was a menace to society and could not be
reformed, and that lesser punishment would expose society to peril
at his hands – However, the nature of the circumstantial evidence in
this case amounts to a mitigating circumstance significant enough
to tilt the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in
C the Petitioner’s favour – Moreover, it is also possible that the incorrect
observations pertaining to deceased’s facial injuries further led
the Court to conclude in favour of imposing the death sentence on
the Petitioner – Thus, there was a reasonable probability that this
Court would have set aside the sentence of death in appeal, since
the only surviving evidence against the Petitioner pertained to his
D
motive to commit the crime, the circumstance of “last seen” and a
solitary extra-judicial confession – In other words, it cannot be
said that the punishment of life imprisonment is unquestionably
foreclosed in the instant case, in spite of the gravity and barbarity
of the offence – The award of the death penalty in the instant case,
E based on the evidence on record is not upheld – A sentence of life
imprisonment simpliciter would, however, be inadequate, given the
gruesome nature of the offence, and the menace posed to society at
large by the Petitioner, as evinced by the conduct of the Petitioner
in jail – The conduct of the Petitioner in jail was unsatisfactory,
and that he was becoming aggressive and indulging in illegal
F
activities in prison, intentionally abusing prisoners and prison staff
and provoking fights with other prisoners – It is appropriate to
impose a restriction on the Petitioner’s right to remission – Petitioner
shall, therefore, remain in prison for the remainder of his life.
Partly allowing the Review Petitions, the Court
G
HELD: 1. It is well-settled that review proceedings cannot
be treated as an appeal in disguise. Particularly, in criminal
proceedings, the scope of review jurisdiction of this Court is
guided by Article 137 of the Indian Constitution as well as Order
XL Rule 10 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, which permit the
H
SUDAM @ RAHUL KANIRAM JADHAV v. STATE OF 945
MAHARASHTRA
Court to correct miscarriage of justice caused by an error apparent A
on the face of the record. This Court cannot re-appreciate
evidence in its entirety in the exercise of its review jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the reference to “additional grounds” in the
observations in the order dated 31.10.2018 in Md. Arif @ Ashfaq
case pertains to additional grounds which could have been raised
B
by the review petitioner before this Court in the exercise of its
review jurisdiction and had not been raised when the review
petition had originally been filed before this Court. In fact, a
reading of the entire order reveals that the Court at that juncture
was dealing with a criminal miscellaneous application seeking
that the scope of the permission granted by this Court in Md. C
Arif @ Ashfaq v. The Registrar, Supreme Court to re-hear review
petitions dismissed by circulation be extended to also include
cases where a curative petition had been dismissed by circulation
after the dismissal of review, since this category of cases had
been specifically denied the relief of re-hearing by the Court.
D
With particular regard for the fact that the petitioner therein was
the only person to be denied an open Court hearing due to this
limitation, and in light of the limited grounds on which a curative
petition could be filed, which meant that the rejection of a review
petition could never be completely reconsidered in curative
jurisdiction, this Court in its order dated 31.10.2018 extended E
the relief of re-hearing to dismissed curative petitions as well. It
was while doing so that the observations that were relied upon
by the Petitioner came to be passed. In view of this, the contention
raised for the Petitioner that the above observations have created
a window for this Court to re-appreciate the entire evidence on
F
record while hearing review petitions is rejected. [Paras 6.2-
6.5] [951-H; 952-A-B; 953-A-F]
2. The entire case of the prosecution is built upon
circumstantial evidence. This Court, in appeal, affirmed the
findings of the Courts below regarding the conviction of the
Petitioner. There is no ground for interference with any finding G
of the Courts with respect to the appreciation of the testimony
relating to the “last seen” circumstance, the extra judicial
confession made to PW-9, and the motive of the Petitioner.
However, crucially, this Court, in appeal, also relied upon the
H
946 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.
A deposition of PW-6 with respect to the extra-judicial confession
made to her, inasmuch as she deposed in her examination-in-
chief that the Petitioner had confessed to her over a telephonic
call that he had murdered the deceased. However, the Court
omitted to appreciate that PW-6 had admitted in her
cross-examination that the Petitioner had not told her that he
B
had murdered the deceased, which in fact was a reason for the
Trial Court to not rely on her testimony. This Court committed
an error apparent on the face of the record in placing reliance
upon the extra judicial confession allegedly made by the Petitioner
before PW-6, by noting that such evidence had been relied upon
C by the Courts below, when in fact it had been rightly rejected by
the Trial Court. [Paras 10, 14, 14.1] [955-F; 956-F-H; 957-A-B]
3.1 This Court, in determining the correctness of the
quantum of sentence assessed by the High Court, while noting
that the offence appeared to be premeditated and well-planned,
D erroneously observed that the Petitioner had crushed the face of
the deceased the deceased woman to avoid identification. This
observation is unsupported by the medical evidence on record.
PW-4, the doctor who conducted the post-mortem on the body of
the deceased woman, only deposed to the presence of contused
lacerated wounds on her face. There is no evidence to the effect
E that her face was marred beyond recognition or that there
appeared to be any attempt to do so. This is yet another error
apparent on the face of the record. [Para 15] [957-C-D]
3.2 The evidence relied upon in the instant case is purely
circumstantial, including the motive to commit the offence, the
F circumstance of the deceased being last seen with the Petitioner,
and two extra-judicial confessions. Thus, keeping aside the extra-
judicial confession to PW-6, it is evident that evidence as to the
circumstance of motive, the “last seen” circumstance as well as
one extra-judicial confession still survive. The chain of
G circumstances establishing the guilt of the Petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt is not materially affected even if one of the two
extra-judicial confessions is discarded. Thus, this Court rightly
affirmed the conviction of the Petitioner under Sections 302 and
201, IPC, and there is no cause to interfere with such finding of
guilt in the exercise of review jurisdiction. [Para 17] [957-G-H;
H 958-A]
SUDAM @ RAHUL KANIRAM JADHAV v. STATE OF 947
MAHARASHTRA
4. Though it may be a relevant consideration in sentencing A
that the evidence in a given case is circumstantial in nature, there
is no bar on the award of the death sentence in cases based upon
such evidence. In such a situation, it is up to the Court to
determine whether the accused may be sentenced to death upon
the strength of circumstantial evidence, given the peculiar facts
B
and circumstances of each case, while assessing all the relevant
aggravating circumstances of the crime, such as its brutality,
enormity and premeditated nature, and mitigating circumstances
of the accused, such as his socio-economic background, age,
extreme emotional disturbance at the time of commission of the
offence, and so on. [Paras 18.1-18.2] [958-C-E] C
Ashok Debbarma v. State of Tripura (2014) 4 SCC
747 : [2014] 4 SCR 287 – relied on.
Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of
Maharashtra (2009) 6 SCC 498 : [2009] 9 SCR 90 ;
Sushil Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2014) 4 SCC D
317 : [2013] 16 SCR 616 ; Kalu Khan v. State of
Rajasthan (2015) 16 SCC 492 : [2015] 7 SCALE 195;
Sebastian @ Chevithiyan v. State of Kerala (2010) 1
SCC 58 ; Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2
SCC 684 – relied on. E
5. The material on record is sufficient to convince the Court
of the Petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt; however, the
nature of the circumstantial evidence in this case amounts to a
mitigating circumstance significant enough to tilt the balance of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the Petitioner’s F
favour, keeping in mind the doctrine of prudence. Moreover, it
is also possible that the incorrect observations pertaining to
deceased’s facial injuries further led the Court to conclude in
favour of imposing the death sentence on the Petitioner. Thus,
there was a reasonable probability that this Court would have set
aside the sentence of death in appeal, since the only surviving G
evidence against the Petitioner pertains to his motive to commit
the crime, the circumstance of “last seen” and a solitary extra-
judicial confession. In other words, it cannot be said that the
punishment of life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed in
the instant case, in spite of the gravity and barbarity of the offence. H
948 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.
A The award of the death penalty in the instant case, based on the
evidence on record, cannot be upheld. A sentence of life
imprisonment simpliciter would be inadequate in the instant case,
given the gruesome nature of the offence, and the menace posed
to society at large by the Petitioner, as evinced by the conduct of
the Petitioner in jail. The conduct of the Petitioner in jail has
B
been unsatisfactory, and that he gets aggressive and indulges in
illegal activities in prison, intentionally abusing prisoners and
prison staff and provoking fights with other prisoners. Two FIRs
have also been registered against the Petitioner for abusing and
threatening the Superintendent of the Nagpur Central Prison. It
C may be appropriate to impose a restriction on the Petitioner’s
right to remission. The Petitioner shall, therefore, remain in
prison for the remainder of his life. [Paras 20-21, 22, 22.1] [962-
E-H; 963-A-D]
Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka (2007) 12
D SCC 288 : [2007] 7 SCR 616; Ramesh v. State of
Rajasthan (2011) 3 SCC 685 : [2011] 4 SCR
585 – relied on.
Mohd. Arif @ Ashfaq v. Registrar, Supreme Court of
India (2014) 9 SCC 737 : [2014] 11 SCR 1009 ; Vikram
E Singh v. State of Punjab (2017) 8 SCC 518 : [2017] 8
SCR 177 ; P.N. Eswara Iyer v. The Supreme Court
(1980) 2 SCR 889 ; Suthendraraja v. State (1999) 9
SCC 323 : [1999] 3 Suppl. SCR 540; Md. Mannan @
Abdul Mannan v. State of Bihar 2019 (7) SCALE 468 ;
Swamy Shraddhananda (2) v. State of Karnataka
F (2008) 13 SCC 767 : [2008] 11 SCR 93; Union of
India v. V. Sriharan (2016) 7 SCC 1 : [2015] 14 SCR
613 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
G [2014] 11 SCR 1009 referred to Para 5
[2017] 8 SCR 177 referred to Para 6.2
(1980) 2 SCR 889 referred to Para 6.2
[1999] 3 Suppl. SCR 540 referred to Para 6.2
H [2007] 7 SCR 616 relied on Para 18.1
SUDAM @ RAHUL KANIRAM JADHAV v. STATE OF 949
MAHARASHTRA
[2011] 4 SCR 585 relied on Para 18.1 A
[2014] 4 SCR 287 relied on Para 18.2
2019 (7) SCALE 468 referred to Para 18.4
[2009] 9 SCR 90 relied on Para 18.5
[2013] 16 SCR 616 relied on Para 18.6 B
[2015] 7 SCALE 195 relied on Para 18.6
(2010) 1 SCC 58 relied on Para 18.6
(1980) 2 SCC 684 relied on Para 18.7
C
[2008] 11 SCR 93 referred to Para 22.1
[2015] 14 SCR 613 referred to Para 22.1
INHERENT JURISDICTION: Review Petition (Criminal)
Nos. 401-402 of 2012 in Criminal Appeal Nos. 185-186 of 2011 D
From the Judgment and Order dated 04.07.2011 passed by this
Hon’ble Court in Criminal Appeal Nos.185-186 of 2011
Ms. Nitya Ramakrishnan, Yash S. Vijay, Saad Uzzaman, Shadan
Farasat, Ms. Ninni Susan Thomas, Ms. Jahnavi Sindhu, Ms. Shruti
E
Narayan, Advs. for the Appellant.
Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, Anoop Kandari, Ms. Deepa
Kulkarni, Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J. F
1. The instant review proceedings pertain to Review Petition (Cri.)
No. D19901 of 2012 seeking to review the final judgment and order
dated 04.07.2011 passed by this Court in Criminal Appeal Nos. 185-86
of 2011 dismissing the appeal filed by the Review Petitioner (in short
“the Petitioner”) and confirming his conviction under Sections 201 and G
302 of the Indian Penal Code (in short, “IPC”). Vide the impugned
judgment, this Court upheld the sentence under Section 201, IPC and
the death sentence under Section 302, IPC imposed upon the Petitioner.
H
950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.
A 2. The brief facts pertaining to this case are as follows:
2.1 On the morning of 21.08.2007, the bodies of four children
were discovered floating in the village pond (known as Juna Pani talav)
in the village of Rupla Naik Tanda, District Nanded, Maharashtra. A
male child aged six years along with a female child aged ten years were
B found tied together, and a female child aged ten months along with a
male child of two to four years, were found tied separately. The body of
an unidentified woman with a mangalsutra on her neck was also
subsequently discovered below a nearby boulder by the police. The
deceased persons were eventually identified as Anita, the daughter of
one Maroti Madavi, the two children born to her from her first husband
C and the two children born to her from the Petitioner. The Petitioner was
found by the police on 24.08.2007, but is alleged to have absconded
subsequently, and was arrested only on 22.09.2007.
3. The investigation revealed that the deceased Anita had been
living with the Petitioner as his wife and had come to know about his
D marriage with PW-6 Muktabai. The deceased was opposed to this
relationship, which led to a serious dispute amongst the three of them.
The Petitioner allegedly divorced PW-6, and agreed to pay her a sum of
Rs. 15,000/-, which the deceased Anita promised to bear. Thereafter,
PW-6 went to her village, and the Petitioner, the deceased Anita and her
E four children came to the village of Juna Pani, where, because of the
strained relationship with his wife, the Petitioner murdered her and the
four children by strangulating them.
4. The principal evidence put forth by the prosecution against the
Petitioner includes the motive of the accused, the evidence put forth by
F PW-8 Prahlad that the deceased were last seen with the Petitioner, and
that of PW-6 Muktabai and PW-9 Ishwar with respect to the extra-
judicial confessions made to them by the Petitioner. The Trial Court
convicted the Petitioner for the offences stated supra on the basis of the
last seen circumstance as deposed to by PW-8; the motive of the accused
as deposed to by PW-5, the mother of the deceased Anita; the extra-
G judicial confession made by the Petitioner to PW-9 Ishwar; the fact that
the Petitioner had absconded after the commission of the offence; and
his failure to explain the circumstances leading to the homicidal deaths
of the deceased. The High Court confirmed the conviction and sentence
as awarded by the Trial Court, including the sentence of death, holding
H that the case at hand falls into the category of the rarest of rare cases
SUDAM @ RAHUL KANIRAM JADHAV v. STATE OF 951
MAHARASHTRA [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]
warranting punishment with death. This Court, in appeal, confirmed the A
same.
5. Review Petition (Cri.) No. D19901 of 2012 filed by the Petitioner
against the above judgment and order of this Court was dismissed by
circulation vide order dated 26.07.2012. A criminal miscellaneous petition
was filed by the Petitioner seeking reopening of this review petition, B
placing reliance on the decision of this Court in Mohd. Arif @ Ashfaqv.
Registrar, Supreme Court of India, (2014) 9 SCC 737, which held
that in light of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, review petitions
arising out of appeals where the death sentence had been affirmed were
required to be heard orally by a 3-Judge Bench, and specifically permitted
the reopening of review petitions in all cases where review petitions had C
been dismissed by circulation. This Court subsequently recalled the order
dated 26.07.2012 passed in Review Petition No. D19901/2012 and
permitted the re-hearing of such petition in open Court.
6. Learned counsel for the Petitioner, Ms. Nitya Ramakrishnan,
argued for the acquittal of the Petitioner, contending that there are various D
infirmities in how the material on record has been appreciated by the
Courts, in addition to highlighting errors apparent on the face of the
record. The broad thrust of her argument was that the entire case was
built on circumstantial evidence, i.e. the “last seen” evidence, two purported
extra-judicial confessions, and the motive of the Petitioner, all of which E
were erroneously relied upon.
6.1 Thus, she virtually seeks a re-appreciation of the entire
evidence, submitting that it is permissible to raise any additional ground
at the stage of review. To make this submission, learned Counsel relied
on the permission given by this Court to the petitioner in Md. Arif@ F
Ashfaq v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India, vide order dated
19.01.2016 passed in Review Petition (Criminal) No. 692 of 2015 in
Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 77 of 2014, to raise any additional ground as
may be legally permissible in the re-hearing of his review petition. The
relevant observation from the said order is reproduced below:
G
“We permit the petitioner to raise all such additional grounds in
support of the said review petition as may be legally permissible
to him.”
6.2 We would like to deal with this argument raised by learned
Counsel for the Petitioner at this juncture itself. It has been well-settled
H
952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.
A by a catena of decisions of this Court that review proceedings cannot be
treated as an appeal in disguise. Particularly, in criminal proceedings, the
scope of review jurisdiction of this Court is guided by Article 137 of the
Indian Constitution as well as Order XL Rule 10 of the Supreme Court
Rules, 1966, which permit the Court to correct miscarriage of justice
caused by an error apparent on the face of the record. In this regard, it
B
would be fruitful to refer to the decision of this Court in Vikram Singh
v. State of Punjab, (2017) 8 SCC 518, where the Court was re-hearing
a review petition against the award of the death penalty to the review
petitioner therein, pursuant to the decision in Md. Arif @ Ashfaq v. The
Registrar, Supreme Court (supra). In this decision, after
C comprehensively explaining the scope of the review jurisdiction of this
Court in criminal proceedings and revisiting its earlier decisions on this
aspect, including P.N. Eswara Iyer v. The Supreme Court, (1980) 2
SCR 889 and Suthendraraja v. State, (1999) 9 SCC 323, this Court
concluded as follows:
D “23. In view of the above, it is clear that scope, ambit and
parameters of review jurisdiction are well defined. Normally in a
criminal proceeding, review applications cannot be entertained
except on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record.
Further, the power given to this Court under Article 137 is wider
and in an appropriate case can be exercised to mitigate a manifest
E injustice. By review application an applicant cannot be allowed to
reargue the appeal on the grounds which were urged at the time
of the hearing of the criminal appeal. Even if the applicant succeeds
in establishing that there may be another view possible on the
conviction or sentence of the accused that is not a sufficient ground
F for review. This Court shall exercise its jurisdiction to review only
when a glaring omission or patent mistake has crept in the earlier
decision due to judicial fallibility. There has to be an error apparent
on the face of the record leading to miscarriage of justice to
exercise the review jurisdiction under Article 137 read with Order
40 Rule 1. There has to be a material error manifest on the face
G of the record with results in the miscarriage of justice.” (emphasis
supplied)
6.3 We prefer not to burden this judgment with further discussion
on this issue. Suffice it to say that there can be no argument that this
Court cannot re-appreciate evidence in its entirety in the exercise of its
H
SUDAM @ RAHUL KANIRAM JADHAV v. STATE OF 953
MAHARASHTRA [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]
review jurisdiction. Furthermore, it is evident that the reference to A
“additional grounds” in the observations in the order dated 19.01.2016
in Md. Arif @ Ashfaq v. The Registrar, Supreme Court (supra)
reproduced above pertains to additional grounds which could have been
raised by the review petitioner before this Court in the exercise of its
review jurisdiction and had not been raised when the review petition had
B
originally been filed before this Court.
6.4 In fact, a reading of the entire order reveals that the Court at
that juncture was dealing with a review petition seeking that the scope
of the permission granted by this Court in Md. Arif @ Ashfaq v. The
Registrar, Supreme Court (supra) to re-hear review petitions dismissed
vide circulation be extended to also include cases where a curative petition C
had been dismissed vide circulation after the dismissal of review, since
this category of cases had been specifically denied the relief of re-hearing
by the Court. With particular regard for the fact that the petitioner therein
was the only person to be denied an open Court hearing due to this
limitation, and in light of the limited grounds on which a curative petition D
could be filed, which meant that the rejection of a review petition could
never be completely reconsidered in curative jurisdiction, this Court in
its order dated 19.01.2016 extended the relief of re-hearing to dismissed
curative petitions as well. It was while doing so that the observations
that have been relied upon by learned Counsel for the Petitioner came to
be passed. E
6.5 In view of the above discussion, we are constrained to reject
the contention raised by learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the above
observations have created a window for this Court to re-appreciate the
entire evidence on record while hearing review petitions. The submissions
of learned Counsel for the Petitioner have to be considered keeping the F
above discussion in mind.
7. With respect to the evidence for the circumstance of “last
seen”, learned Counsel led us through the evidence of PW-8 Prahlad to
point out the inherent improbabilities in his testimony, pointing out that he
had testified that his statement was recorded by the police on 19.8.2007, G
whereas the bodies of the deceased were discovered only on 21.8.2007.
She argued that the Trial Court had erroneously supplied possible reasons
to explain this incongruity, which went to the root of the matter, since
PW-8 is a timeline witness, especially in the absence of any re-examination
in this regard. H
954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.
A 7.1 With regard to the evidence of PW-9 Ishwar, one of the
witnesses for the extra-judicial confessions, it was argued that since his
statement was only recorded on 30.11.2007, there was a high likelihood
of concoction of evidence, rendering it unreliable. She also contended
that there was a complete absence of any semblance of a timeline in
PW-9’s testimony, which also materially contradicted the “last seen”
B
testimony, inasmuch as PW-9 deposed that he saw the Petitioner with
his wife and children four to five days before the purported extra judicial
confession was made.
7.2 Coming to the second extra judicial confession, learned Counsel
pointed out that the High Court and this Court had erred in relying on the
C testimony of PW-6 regarding the confession made by the Petitioner to
her over a mobile phone conversation, by ignoring the admission to the
contrary made in the cross-examination. The testimony of PW-6 pertaining
to the extra-judicial confession had been correctly discarded by the Trial
Court on this basis. The Trial Court had further found such testimony
D unreliable due to non-corroboration by call records. It was contended
that the High Court and this Court had both overlooked this aspect and
wrongly relied on this extra-judicial confession, and this Court had even
gone on to incorrectly note that the Trial Court had relied on the
confession, which was an error apparent on the face of the record.
E 7.3 It was further submitted that PW-13, the Investigation Officer
had deposed that he had not obtained the call records of PW-9’s mobile
(to which the Petitioner had allegedly made calls and over which he had
allegedly made the extra-judicial confession to PW-6) even though he
deposed in the same breath that he had called for the same but could not
obtain them. In such a situation, the Court was entitled to proceed on the
F basis that such evidence had not been adduced even though it could
have been, and on that basis draw an adverse inference against the
prosecution under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
7.4 With respect to the motive, it was submitted that the motive
for the commission of the offence was weak since the dispute between
G the Petitioner and the deceased Anita regarding the Petitioner’s
relationship with PW-6 Muktabai had already been settled.
7.5 She therefore argued that there was no reliable evidence
connecting the Petitioner to the crime, in the absence of direct or forensic
evidence.
H
SUDAM @ RAHUL KANIRAM JADHAV v. STATE OF 955
MAHARASHTRA [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]
7.6 On the aspect of sentencing, learned Counsel argued that the A
Petitioner had no previous record of bad behaviour, and further that the
death penalty may not be imposed for a conviction based solely on
circumstantial evidence. It was further submitted that this Court, while
imposing the death penalty, had travelled beyond the record to observe
that the face of the deceased had been crushed with a stone, which had
B
unfairly prejudiced the Court.
8. Learned counsel for the Respondent, i.e. the State of
Maharashtra, Mr. Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, on the other
hand, argued in favour of the judgments rendered by the Courts. In
particular, he stressed that even if part of the testimony of PW-6 had
been misread by the Courts, her evidence against the Petitioner remained C
unshaken on other aspects, such as motive, since she had deposed that
the Petitioner had admitted to her that he had been harassing Anita. He
also highlighted that as per the Post Mortem Report (Exh. P-43) of the
deceased Anita, as spoken to by the examining doctor PW-4, the probable
cause of her death was asphyxia due to throttling, and PW-4 had D
specifically denied the possibility of self-strangulation.
8.1 On the aspect of sentencing, he argued that in light of the
menace posed to society, even if the death penalty were to be commuted,
a minimum mandatory sentence of 30 years must be imposed upon the
Petitioner. E
9. We have perused the record of the case after hearing the
learned Counsel on either side.
10. At the outset, it is important to note that the entire case of the
prosecution is built upon circumstantial evidence. As already mentioned
supra, this Court, in appeal, affirmed the findings of the Courts below F
regarding the conviction of the Petitioner. For the reasons already noted
above, we cannot delve into the submissions of either party that pertain
to appreciation of evidence anew. However, we deem it appropriate to
briefly refer to the evidence on record, i.e. the circumstance of the
Petitioner being last seen with the deceased as deposed by PW-8, the G
extra judicial confessions made to PWs 6 and 9, and the motive of the
Petitioner.
11. The “last seen” circumstance is spoken to by PW-8 Prahlad,
who deposed that on 19.08.2007, when he was at his house, the Petitioner
along with his wife and four children came to his house and asked for
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956 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.
A water, and further that though he requested the Petitioner to stay back,
the Petitioner left with his family.
12. PW-9 Ishwar’s testimony pertains to an extra judicial
confession, as he deposed that the Petitioner had confessed before him
that he had strangulated the four children and the deceased Anita to
B death, and thrown their bodies in the pond, as Anita was harassing him.
13. The deposition of PW-5, Anusayabai, the mother of the
deceased Anita, as well as that of PW-6 Muktabai, is pertinent with
respect to the motive of the Petitioner to commit the murders. As per
PW-5, her daughter bore two children with her first husband Anil Gedam,
C but Anita started living with the Petitioner after Anil deserted her. PW-5
deposed that the Petitioner had married PW-6 Muktabai, and that the
Petitioner had committed the murder of Anita and her children on account
of the dispute caused by the Petitioner’s marriage with PW-6.
13.1 PW-6 Muktabai, in her turn, deposed that a few days after
D her marriage with the Petitioner, while they were visiting PW-6’s parental
village, Anita had visited them, claiming that the Petitioner was her
husband and they had two children together, and went to the Police
Station with the Petitioner. However, only Anita returned, saying that
the Petitioner had run away, and subsequently stayed for a few days
with PW-6. A few days after Anita had left, the Petitioner returned to
E PW-6, and revealed that Anita was harassing him, also admitting that he
had two children with her. He later got arrested and Anita got him
released. After a few days, Anita again confronted PW-6 and the
Petitioner, who offered to maintain both women, but Anita was not
amenable to the offer. The Petitioner then wrote PW-6 a divorce, and
F Anita agreed to pay Rs. 15,000/- to PW-6.
14.We are of the considered opinion that there is no ground for
interference with any finding of the Courts with respect to the appreciation
of the testimony relating to the “last seen” circumstance, the extra judicial
confession made to PW-9, and the motive of the Petitioner.
G 14.1 However, crucially, this Court, in appeal, also relied upon the
deposition of PW-6 with respect to the extra-judicial confession made to
her, inasmuch as she deposed in her examination-in-chief that the
Petitioner had confessed to her over a telephonic call that he had
murdered the deceased. However, it is clear that the Court omitted to
appreciate that PW-6 had admitted in her cross-examination that the
H
SUDAM @ RAHUL KANIRAM JADHAV v. STATE OF 957
MAHARASHTRA [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]
Petitioner had not told her that he had murdered the deceased, which in A
fact was a reason for the Trial Court to not rely on her testimony. Thus,
we find substance in the submission of the learned Counsel for the
Petitioner that this Court committed an error apparent on the face of the
record in placing reliance upon the extra judicial confession allegedly
made by the Petitioner before PW-6, by noting that such evidence had
B
been relied upon by the Courts below, when in fact it had been rightly
rejected by the Trial Court.
15. There is yet another crucial aspect of the matter that we must
turn our attention to. We find strength in the submission made by the
Counsel for the Petitioner that this Court, in determining the correctness
of the quantum of sentence assessed by the High Court, while noting C
that the offence appeared to be premeditated and well-planned,
erroneously observed that the Petitioner had crushed the face of the
deceased Anita to avoid identification. We find that this observation is
unsupported by the medical evidence on record. PW-4, the doctor who
conducted the post-mortem (at Exh. P-25) on Anita’s body, only deposed D
to the presence of contused lacerated wounds on her face. There is no
evidence to the effect that her face was marred beyond recognition or
that there appeared to be any attempt to do so. We find that this is yet
another error apparent on the face of the record.
16. Having found there have been errors apparent on the face of E
the record in the appreciation of evidence by this Court in appeal, we
must now consider the effect thereof on the conviction as well as on the
sentence awarded. We find it worth repeating that we do not seek to
re-appreciate the evidence on record, and merely wish to determine
whether the evidence as assessed by this Court in appeal, keeping aside
the extra-judicial confession to PW-6, was sufficient to affirm the finding F
of guilt and the award of the punishment of death to the Petitioner.
17. As noted previously, the evidence relied upon in the instant
case is purely circumstantial, including the motive to commit the offence,
the circumstance of the deceased being last seen with the Petitioner,
and two extra-judicial confessions. Thus, keeping aside the extra-judicial G
confession to PW-6, it is evident that evidence as to the circumstance of
motive, the “last seen” circumstance as well as one extra-judicial
confession still survive. It is our considered view that the chain of
circumstances establishing the guilt of the Petitioner beyond reasonable
doubt is not materially affected even if we discard one of the two extra- H
958 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.
A judicial confessions. Thus, we find that this Court rightly affirmed the
conviction of the Petitioner under Sections 302 and 201, IPC, and there
is no cause for us to interfere with such finding of guilt in the exercise of
our review jurisdiction.
18. We must now turn our attention to the question of whether the
B evidence on record, apart from the extra-judicial confession to PW-6
and the observation pertaining to the facial injuries of the deceased Anita,
is sufficient to affirm the death sentence awarded to the Petitioner.
18.1 At this juncture, it must be noted that though it may be a
relevant consideration in sentencing that the evidence in a given case is
C circumstantial in nature, there is no bar on the award of the death
sentence in cases based upon such evidence (see Swamy Shraddananda
v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 12 SCC 288; Ramesh v. State of
Rajasthan, (2011) 3 SCC 685).
18.2 In such a situation, it is up to the Court to determine whether
D the accused may be sentenced to death upon the strength of circumstantial
evidence, given the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case, while
assessing all the relevant aggravating circumstances of the crime, such
as its brutality, enormity and premeditated nature, and mitigating
circumstances of the accused, such as his socio-economic background,
age, extreme emotional disturbance at the time of commission of the
E offence, and so on.
18.3 In this regard, it would also be pertinent to refer to the
discussion in Ashok Debbarma v. State of Tripura, (2014) 4 SCC 747,
where this Court elaborated upon the concept of “residual doubt”—
which simply means that in spite of being convinced of the guilt of the
F accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Court may harbour lingering or
residual doubts in its mind regarding such guilt. This Court noted that the
existence of residual doubt was a ground sometimes urged before
American Courts as a mitigating circumstance with respect to imposing
the death sentence, and noted as follows:
G “33. In California v. Brown [93 L Ed 2d 934 : 479 US 538 (1987)]
and other cases, the US courts took the view, “residual doubt” is
not a fact about the defendant or the circumstances of the crime,
but a lingering uncertainty about facts, a state of mind that exists
somewhere between “beyond a reasonable doubt” and “absolute
H
SUDAM @ RAHUL KANIRAM JADHAV v. STATE OF 959
MAHARASHTRA [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]
certainty”. The petitioner’s “residual doubt” claim is that the States A
must permit capital sentencing bodies to demand proof of guilt to
“an absolute certainty” before imposing the death sentence.
Nothing in our cases mandates the imposition of this heightened
burden of proof at capital sentencing.
34. We also, in this country, as already indicated, expect the B
prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, but not
with “absolute certainty”. But, in between “reasonable doubt” and
“absolute certainty”, a decision-maker’s mind may wander,
possibly in a given case he may go for “absolute certainty” so as
to award death sentence, short of that he may go for “beyond
reasonable doubt”. Suffice it to say, so far as the present case is C
concerned, we entertained a lingering doubt as to whether the
appellant alone could have executed the crime single-handedly,
especially when the prosecution itself says that it was the handiwork
of a large group of people. If that be so, in our view, the crime
perpetrated by a group of people in an extremely brutal, grotesque D
and dastardly manner, could not have been thrown upon the
appellant alone without charge-sheeting other group of persons
numbering around 35. All the element test as well as the residual
doubt test, in a given case, may favour the accused, as a mitigating
factor.” (emphasis added)
E
18.4 While the concept of “residual doubt” has undoubtedly not
been given much attention in Indian capital sentencing jurisprudence,
the fact remains that this Court has on several occasions held the quality
of evidence to a higher standard for passing the irrevocable sentence of
death than that which governs conviction, that is to say, it has found it
unsafe to award the death penalty for convictions based on the nature of F
the circumstantial evidence on record. In fact, this question was given
some attention in a recent decision by this Bench, in Md.Mannan @
Abdul Mannan v. State of Bihar, R.P. (Crl.) No. 308/2011 in Crl. A.
No. 379/2009 (decision dated February 14, 2019), where we found it
unsafe to affirm the death penalty awarded to the accused in light of the G
nature of the evidence on record, though the conviction had been affirmed
on the basis of circumstantial evidence.
18.5 In Md. Mannan (supra), this Court affirmed the proposition
that the quality of evidence is a relevant circumstance in the sentencing
H
960 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.
A analysis, referring to the following observations of this Court in Santosh
Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6
SCC 498:
“56. At this stage, Bachan Singh [(1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC
(Cri) 580] informs the content of the sentencing hearing. The
B court must play a proactive role to record all relevant information
at this stage. Some of the information relating to crime can be
culled out from the phase prior to sentencing hearing. This
information would include aspects relating to the nature, motive
and impact of crime, culpability of convict, etc. Quality of evidence
adduced is also a relevant factor. For instance, extent of reliance
C on circumstantial evidence or child witness plays an important
role in the sentencing analysis. But what is sorely lacking, in most
capital sentencing cases, is information relating to characteristics
and socio-economic background of the offender. This issue was
also raised in the 48th Report of the Law Commission.”
D (emphasis added)
18.6 The Court also relied on Ramesh v. State of Rajasthan
(supra) and Ram Deo Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2013) 7 SCC 725,
which follow Bariyar (supra) in this respect, and referred to Sushil
Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2014) 4 SCC 317, Kalu Khan v.
E State of Rajasthan, (2015) 16 SCC 492 and Sebastian @ Chevithiyan
v. State of Kerala, (2010) 1 SCC 58, where a similar position has been
adopted.
18.7 We find it pertinent to observe that the above trend only
affirms the “prudence doctrine” enunciated by this Court in Bachan
F Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684. In this regard, we may
refer to the following observations made in Bariyar (supra):
“149. Principle of prudence, enunciated by Bachan Singh [(1980)
2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580] is sound counsel on this count
which shall stand us in good stead—whenever in the given
G circumstances, there is difference of opinion with respect to any
sentencing prop (sic)/rationale, or subjectivity involved in the
determining factors, or lack of thoroughness in complying with
the sentencing procedure, it would be advisable to fall in favour of
the “rule” of life imprisonment rather than invoking the “exception”
of death punishment.”
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SUDAM @ RAHUL KANIRAM JADHAV v. STATE OF 961
MAHARASHTRA [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]
18.8 The Court in Bariyar (supra) further observed that the A
irrevocable punishment of death must only be imposed when there is no
other alternative, and asserted that in cases resting on circumstantial
evidence, the doctrine of prudence should be invoked:
“167. The entire prosecution case hinges on the evidence of the
approver. For the purpose of imposing death penalty, that factor B
may have to be kept in mind. We will assume that in Swamy
Shraddananda (2), this Court did not lay down a firm law that in
a case involving circumstantial evidence, imposition of death
penalty would not be permissible. But, even in relation thereto the
question which would arise would be whether in arriving at a
conclusion some surmises, some hypothesis would be necessary C
in regard to the manner in which the offence was committed as
contradistinguished from a case where the manner of occurrence
had no role to play. Even where sentence of death is to be imposed
on the basis of circumstantial evidence, the circumstantial evidence
must be such which leads to an exceptional case. D
168. We must, however, add that in a case of this nature where
the entire prosecution case revolves round the statement of an
approver or is dependent upon the circumstantial evidence, the
prudence doctrine should be invoked. For the aforementioned
purpose, at the stage of sentencing evaluation of evidence would E
not be permissible, the courts not only have to solely depend upon
the findings arrived at for the purpose of recording a judgment of
conviction, but also consider the matter keeping in view the
evidences which have been brought on record on behalf of the
parties and in particular the accused for imposition of a lesser
punishment...” F
(emphasis added)
18.9 In light of the above discussion, we find it appropriate to
gauge, in the exercise of our review jurisdiction, whether there is a
reasonable probability that this Court, in appeal, on the strength of the G
evidence on record as it stands, without the errors apparent on the face
of the record, would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances lies in favour of preserving the Petitioner’s
life. Such probability would be sufficient to set aside the sentence of
death affirmed by this Court, in light of the doctrine of prudence, which
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962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.
A really only reflects the dictum of this Court in Bachan Singh (supra)
that the Court must keep in mind while awarding the punishment of
death that the alternative option, i.e. imposition of life imprisonment, must
be unquestionablyforeclosed.
19. We make it clear that we do not wish to re-enter into an
B appreciation of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances relied upon
by the Courts until this stage to award the death sentence to the Petitioner.
However, before proceeding further, we would like to briefly revisit the
sentencing assessment already done by this Court in appeal. While
arriving at the conclusion that the instant case fell into the category of
the rarest of rare cases, this Court took into account the premeditated
C nature of the crime, and its brutal and barbaric nature, observing that the
same was sufficient to shock the collective conscience of the society.
The Court also opined that the Petitioner was a menace to society and
could not be reformed, and that lesser punishment would expose society
to peril at his hands.
D 20. Evidently, even the fact that the evidence was circumstantial
in nature did not weigh very heavily on the Court’s mind, let alone the
strength and nature of the circumstantial evidence. Be that as it may, we
find that the material on record is sufficient to convince the Court of the
Petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt; however, the nature of the
E circumstantial evidence in this case amounts to a mitigating circumstance
significant enough to tilt the balance of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in the Petitioner’s favour, keeping in mind the doctrine of
prudence. Moreover, it is also possible that the incorrect observations
pertaining to Anita’s facial injuries further led the Court to conclude in
favour of imposing the death sentence on the Petitioner. Thus, we are of
F the considered opinion that there was a reasonable probability that this
Court would have set aside the sentence of death in appeal, since the
only surviving evidence against the Petitioner herein pertains to his motive
to commit the crime, the circumstance of “last seen” and a solitary extra-
judicial confession. In other words, it cannot be said that the punishment
G of life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed in the instant case, in
spite of the gravity and barbarity of the offence.
21. We are thus compelled to conclude that the award of the
death penalty in the instant case, based on the evidence on record, cannot
be upheld.
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SUDAM @ RAHUL KANIRAM JADHAV v. STATE OF 963
MAHARASHTRA [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]
22. At the same time, we conclude that a sentence of life A
imprisonment simpliciter would be inadequate in the instant case, given
the gruesome nature of the offence, and the menace posed to society at
large by the Petitioner, as evinced by the conduct of the Petitioner in jail.
As per the report submitted in pursuance of the order of this Court dated
31.10.2018, it has been brought on record that the conduct of the Petitioner
B
in jail has been unsatisfactory, and that he gets aggressive and indulges
in illegal activities in prison, intentionally abusing prisoners and prison
staff and provoking fights with other prisoners. Two FIRs have also
been registered against the Petitioner for abusing and threatening the
Superintendent of the Nagpur Central Prison.
22.1 As this Court has already held in a catena of decisions, by C
way of a via media between life imprisonment simpliciter and the death
sentence, it may be appropriate to impose a restriction on the Petitioner’s
right to remission of the sentence of life imprisonment, which usually
works out to 14 years in prison upon remission. We may fruitfully refer
to the decisions in Swamy Shraddhananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, D
(2008) 13 SCC 767 and Union of India v. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC
1, in this regard. We therefore direct that the Petitioner shall remain in
prison for the remainder of his life.
23. In light of the above discussion, the review petitions are allowed
to the extent that the sentence of death awarded to the Petitioner is E
commuted to imprisonment for the remainder of his life sans any right to
remission.
Devika Gujral Review Petitions partly allowed.
F
G
H
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