Holding

The appellants' convictions under Sections 302/34 and 201 IPC are affirmed, as the evidence, despite some deficiencies, is sufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Summary

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Sucha Singh and five co‑accused for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and for abetment of suicide under Section 201 IPC. The Court examined whether the relationship of prosecution witnesses to the deceased affected their credibility, and held that a familial relationship does not per se render a witness partisan. It rejected the doctrine of "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus", stating that the falsity of one part of a testimony does not automatically invalidate the whole evidence. The Court also clarified that the failure of the prosecution to explain minor injuries on the accused does not, by itself, defeat the prosecution case, and that the inaction of unarmed witnesses does not warrant discarding their testimony. Finally, it ruled that even if a major portion of evidence is deficient, the remaining reliable evidence can sustain a conviction, and the benefit of doubt must not be exaggerated to let the guilty escape.

Issues considered

The effect of a witness's relationship to the victim on his credibility
The applicability of the maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" in Indian criminal trials
Whether the prosecution must explain injuries found on the accused
The relevance of unarmed witnesses' inaction in rescuing the victim
The impact of deficient major evidence when residual evidence is sufficient for conviction
The proper application of the benefit of doubt doctrine

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 107, s. 115
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 3
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 148, s. 149, s. 201, s. 302, s. 34

Subjects

murderconvictionwitness credibilitypartisan witnessbenefit of doubtfalsus in uno falsus in omnibusIndian Evidence ActIPC sections 302 34 201criminal procedureevidence evaluation

Judgment

SUCHA SINGH AND ANR. A
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB

JULY 31, 2002

[DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.] B

Evidence Act, 1872-Section 3:

Partisan witness-Credibility of-Held: Relationship does not affect
credibility of a witness. C
Major portion of evidence deficient leading to acquittal of number of
accused-Residue sufficient to prove guilt of some accused-Credibility of-
Held: Accused can be convicted notwithstanding acquittal of number accused
since it is the duty of the Court to separate grain from the chaff
D
Criminal Trial:

Rule of benefit of doubt-Applicability of

Reasonable doubt-It is fair doubt based upon reason and common
sense and not on imaginary, trivial or nearly possible doubt-It must grow out E
of evidence in the case.

Discarding of evidence-Accused armed with deadly weapons attacking
victim-Prosecution witness unarmed and bare handed and not coming to the
rescue of victim-Held: As instinct of self preservation dominant instinct,
inaction of not coming to rescue not a ground to discard evidence.
F

Non-explanation ofinjuries on the person ofaccused-Held· Case should
not be rejected automatically without any further probe.

Prosecution version-Credibility of-Name of prosecution witness not
figuring in the inquest report or f!DR Report-Held: does not corrode G
J credibility of prosecution version when absence is explained by witnesses.

Maxim:

"Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus"-Applicability of-Discussed.
35 H
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A According to the prosecution, due to the hostility between the parties
on the fateful day accused-appellants armed with deadly weapons along
with G and R surrounded the deceased. R and G raised lalkaras.
Appellants-accused inflicted deadly injury to the deceased resulting in his
death on the spot. Thereafter, all the accused brought the dead body of
the deceased to the house of R. One of the prosecution witnesses who
B witnessed the incident lodged FIR. During trial, accused pleaded that they
were falsely implkated. However, trial court convicted the accused .. In
appeal, High Court acquitted them. Respondent-State filed appeal before
this Court. The matter was remitted to the High Court, and it convicted
the appellants-accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and
C Section 201 IPC, but acquitted R and G. Hence the present appeals.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. The trial Court and the High Court rightly came to the
conclusion that the appellants-accused are guilty under Section 302 read
D with Section 34 IPC and Section 201 IPC. [48-F)

2.1. Relationship is not a factor to affect the credibiiity of a witness.
It is more often than not that a relation would not conceal actual culprit
and make allegations against an innocent person. Foundation has to be
laid if plea of false implication is made. In such cases, the court has to
E adopt a careful approach and analyse evidence to find out whether it is
cogent and credible. Thus, it cannot be accepted that the witness being a
close relative and consequently being a partisan witness, should not be
relied upon. [43-F; 44-D)

Dalip Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab, AIR (1953) SC 364; Guli
F Chand and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, [1974) 3 SCC 698; Vadivelu Thevar
v. State of Madras, AIR (1957) SC 614; Masalti and Ors. v. State of U.P.,
AIR (965) SC 202; State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, AIR (1973) SC 2407 and
Lehna v. State of Haryana, [2002) 3 SCC 76, referred to.

3.1. Even if major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, in
G case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, notwithstanding
acquittal of number of other co-accused persons, his conviction can be
maintained. It is the duty of Court to separate grain from chaff. Where
chaff can be separated from grain, it would be open to the Court to convict
an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be
H deficient to prove guilt of other accused persons. Falsity of particular
SUCHA SINGH v. ST ATE OF PUNJAB 37
material witness or material particular would not ruin it from the A
beginning to end. Where it is not feasible to separate truth from falsehood,
because grain and chaff are inextricably mixed up and in the process of
separation an absolutely new case has to be reconstructed by divorcing
essential details presented by the prosecution completely from the context
and the background against which they are made, the only available course
to be made is to discard the evidence in toto. [45-D; 46-C-DI B
)- 3.2. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" (false in one thin:;_,
false in everything) has no application in India and the witnesses cannot
be branded as liar. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has not
received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status C
of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that
in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be
disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of
evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it
is not what may be called 'a mandatory rule of evidence'. Therefore, the
~ plea that principle of"falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" (false in one thing, D
false in everything) is applicable cannot be accepted. Moreover, this
doctrine is a dangerous one specially in India for if a whole body of the
testimony were to be rejected, because witness was evidently speaking an
untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal
justice would come to. a dead-stop. Witnesses just cannot help in giving E
embroidery to a story, however, true in the main. Therefore, it has to be
appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of
acceptance. [45-E-H; 46-Al

Nisar Ali v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR (1957) SC 366
Gurucharan Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab, AIR (1956) SC 460; Sohrab F
s/o Beli Nayata and Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1972] 3 SCC 751
and Ugar Ahir and Ors. v. The State of Bihar, AIR (1965) SC 277; Zwinglee
Ariel v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1954) SC 15 and Ba/aka Singh and
Ors. v. The State of Punjab, AIR (1975) SC 1962, relied on.

State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Ka/ki and Anr., AIR (1981) SC 1390; Krishna G
Mochi and Ors. v. State of Bihar etc., JT (2002) 4 SC 186 and State of
Rajasthan v. Teja Ram and Ors., AIR (1999) SC 1776, referred to.

4.1. Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not
nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicion and thereby destroy social
H
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let
hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting guilty escape is
not doing justice according to law. Prosecution is not required to meet
any and every hypothesis put forward by the accused. (47-C-DJ

Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh and Ors. AIR (1990) SC 209; State
B of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, AIR (1992) SC 840, relied on.
4.2. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or merely :
~lI
possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It
must grow out of the evidence in the case. If a case is proved perfectly, it
is argued that it is artificial; if a case has some flaws inevitably because
c human beings are prone to err, it is argued that it is too imperfect. One
wonders whether in the meticulous hypersensitivity to eliminate a rare
innocent from being punished, many guilty persons must be allowed to
escape. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is a guideline, not a fetish.
(47-D-E)
D ~
Inder Singh and Anr. v. State (Delhi Admn.), AIR (1978) SC 1091, relied
on.

4.3. Vague hunches cannot take place of judicial evaluation. A judge
does not preside over a criminal trial, merely to see that no innocent man
E is punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. I-
Both are public duties. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free
from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other
than truth. (47-F)

State of U.P. v. Anil Singh, AIR (1988) SC 1998; Shivaji Sahebrao
•
F Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1974) 1SCR489; State of U.P. v. Krishna
Gopal, AIR (1988) SC 2154 and Gangadhar Behera and Ors. v. State of
Orissa, (2002) 7 Supreme 276, referred to.

5. With regard to the inaction of PWs 9 and 10 in not ·coming to
rescue of deceased the trial Court and the High Court noticed that both
G of them were unarmed and bare handed and the accused persons were
armed with deadly weapons. How a person would react in a situation like
this cannot be encompassed by any rigid formula. It would depend on
many factors, like in the instant case where witnesses are unarmed, but ~-
the assailants are armed with deadly weapons. Instinct of self-preservation
H can be the dominant instinct. Thus, the inaction in not coming to rescue
SUCHA SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 39

of the deceased cannot be a ground for discarding their evidence. A
148-F-Gl

6. I. It cannot be said that in each and every case, where prosecution
fails to explain the injuries found on some of the accused, the prosecution
case. should automatically be rejected, without any further probe.I Non-
explanation of injuries by the prosecution will not affect prosecutio11 case B
where injuries sustained by the accused are minor and superficial or where
the evidence is so clear and cogent, so independent and disinterest~d, so
probable, consistent and creditworthy, that it outweighs the effect of the
omission on the part of prosecution to explain the injuries. Further, it is
for the defence to put questions to the prosecution witnesses regardihg the C
injuries of the accused persons. When that is not done, there is no occasion
for the prosecution witnesses to explain any injury on the person of an
accused. (49-A; 50-C-E)

Mohar Rai and Bharath Rai v. The State of Bihar, (1968) 3 SCR 525;
Lakshmi Singh and Ors. v. State of Bihar, (1976) 4 SCC 394; Vijayai Singh D
and Ors. v. State of U.P. AIR (1990) SC 1459; Ramlagan Singh v. State of
Bihar AIR (1972) SC 2593 and Hare Krishna Singh and Ors. v. State of Bihar
..
~
AIR (1988) SC 863, referred to.

6.2 In the instant case, trifle and superficial injuries on the accused
are of little assistance to them to throw doubt on the veraGity of E
prosecution case, particularly, when the accused who claimed to have
sustained injuries has been acquitted. (50-H)

7. The fact that name of one of the prosecution witness does not
figure in the inquest report or the DDR entry does not in any way corrode
the credibility of the prosecution version, particularly when the re~son as F
to why these were absent in the relevant documents has been plausibly
explained by the witnesses, and after consideration accepted by the trial
Court and the High Court. (51-A-B)

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. G
1015 of 2002.

From the Judgment and Order dated 24.9.1997 of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in Crl. A. No. 560(08) of 1986.

WITH
H
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Crl. A. No. 1014 of 2002.

Ranjit Kumar, A. Maria Arputham, Maninder Singh, Ms. Prathiba M.
Singh, Angad Mirdha and Ankur Talwar for the Appellants.

Bimal Roy Jad and Ms. Sunita Pandit for the Respondent.
B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Since these two appeals are inter-linked and a
common judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh is the
subject matter of challenge, they are taken up together for disposal.
c Nearly two decades ago, Surjit Singh (hereinafter referred to as the
'deceased') lost his life. Three appellants along with two others were stated
to be responsible for his homicidal death. The:: 1itigious history starts from
4.2.1986 and has seen one round of litigation before this Court. By the
impugned judgment, the three appellants have been found guilty of offence
D punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (for short the 'IPC'), and Section 201 IPC. They were each sentenced
to undergo imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.5,000 with default stipulation
of one year RI for the former and one and a half years RI and fine of Rs. 500
with default stipulation of 3 months RI for the later.
E Allegations giving birth to the prosecution are essentially as follows:

On 4.2.1986 at about 9.30 a.m. Lakhvinder Singh (PW9), his brother
Sukhvinder Singh and a relative Pritam Singh (PWlO) were returning from
their fields. When they reached turning of the street near the house of one
F Rattan Singh, deceased-Surjit Singh met them on his way towards fields.
Suddenly, they found the accused appellants Satnam Singh, Sucha Singh and
Rachpal Singh who were armed with various deadly weapons, and Gurdip
Singh and Rattan Singh (who were acquitted by the High Court) surrounded
the deceased. Rattan Singh raised a 'lalkara' saying that the deceased should
be taught a lesson for not vacating a plot. Gurdip Singh made a similar
G lalkara. All the accused persons surrounded the deceased a'nd Sucha Singh
gave two gandasa blows which hit the deceased on the temple on the right
side and on the neck below the right ear and the deceased fell down. Satnam
Singh gave kirpan blows on the nose below the chin on the right cheek on
his right deltoid and on his left hand. He also thrust the kirpan on his back.
H Rachpal Singh gave datar blows on his head and neck. The deceased breathed
SUCHASINGHv. STATEOFPUNJAB[PASAYAT.J.] 41
his last at the spot. Thereafter, all the accused persons brought the dead body A
of the deceased to the house of Rattan Singh and raised a lalkara that they
would see if anybody would come to take the dead body. These macabre acts
were witnessed by Lakhvinder Singh (PW9) and Pritam Singh (PWlO).

Report was lodged in the police station by Lakhvinder Singh (PW9).
Because of hostility between the parties, earlier security proceedings were B
initiated under Sections 1071151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in
short the 'Cr.P.C.'). Investigation was undertaken and on completion thereof,
charge sheet was filed. The accused appellants along with two acquitteq
accused persons were tried for alleged commission of offence punishable
under Sections 302, 148, 149 and 201 of IPC. It is to be noted that the post C
mortem was conducted on 4.2.1986 by Dr. R.P. Maingi (PW2). He found 16
injuries on the body of the deceased. He further opined that injuries 1 to 11
were caused by sharp edged weapon while injuries 12 to 16 were caused by
blunt weapon. To establish the accusations, thirteen witnesses were examined.
The accused persons were arrested on 4.2.1986, 5.2.1986 and 6.2.1986. At
the time of arrest, it was noticed that four injuries were present on the person D
of Rattan Singh and three of the injuries were simple and of minor nature,
and one was caused by sharp edged weapon.

During trial, the accused persons took the plea that they were innocent
and have been falsely implicated. Accused Rattan Singh took the plea that on
the date of occurrence in the morning, he was present in the lane in front of E
his house and he found the deceased coming with a kirpan in an aggressive
mood. While he was trying to run away, the deceased gave a kirpan blow on
his left arm. Both he and the deceased entered his courtyard and when he
••
cried for help, his brother-Harbans Singh armed with a dang, his servants
Ram Singh and Ramu armed with different weapons intervened and rescued F
him by causing injuries on the deceased. Rattan Singh claimed that while He
was running away, he fell down and suffered minor injuries. He alleged that
his son had gene to the police station and returned to the village with the
police. But, instead of taking action against the main culprit he and his family
members were falsely implicated.
G
Accused-appellants took the stand that they were arrested on 4.2.1986.
The police officials manipulated the records to show as if they were arrested
later on. In order to substantiate their plea, the accused persons examined
four witnesses. Dalbir Singh (DWI) .produced the record to show that
Lakhvinder Singh was studying in class 6th when he discontinued studies on H
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 2.5.1981 and his date of birth is 20.4.1968. Harbhajan Singh (DW2) produced
the school records to show that Lakhvinder Singh had studied in his school
up to class 5th. R.S. Kumar (DW3) stated that one Harbans Singh was confined
in the Sub-Jail, Dasuya under the orders of SOM in a case under Sections
107/115 of Cr.P.C. and had a injury on the person at the time of admission
B into jail. Dr. Kamlesh Kumar (DW4) stated about the injuries on Harbans
Singh.

Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Hoshiarpur held that the prosecution
has been able to establish its accusations against all the five accused persons.
The matter was carried in appeal before the High Court which held that the
C prosecution has not been able to bring home the accusations· against the
accused appellants and by judgment and order dated 2.5.1988 directed acquittal
of all the accused persons.

The State of Punjab assailed correctness of the saiq judgment before
this Court in Criminal Appeal Nos.525-526/1989. By judgment dated 24.7.1997
D the appeals were allowed and the matter was remitted to the High Court for
a fresh disposal on merits. The High Court was requested to dispose of the
appeals as early as possible preferably within a period of three months from
the date of communication of the order.

By the impugned judgment the High Court has taken the view that the
E accusations against the accused appellants h.ave been fully established; but
held the evidence to be inadequate so far as accused Rattan Singh and Gurdip
Singh are concerned. The accused-appellants assail correctness· of the said
judgment in these appeals. .f

In support of the appeals, learned counsel for the appellants submitted
F that there are several infirmities which rendered the prosecution version
vulnerable, but the Trial Court and the High Court lost sight of these vital
factors. Had these factors been considered, there was no scope for finding the
accused appellants guilty. It was, inter alia, submitted that there was no
independent witnesses examined. Only son and close relative of the deceased
G have been examined. No co-villager came to depose for the prosecution and
this is unusual. Conclusion that in a faction ridden village independent
witnesses are not easy to find is a surmise. The conclusion that the Panchayat
was siding with the accused persons is a factor in favour of accused persons.
It indicates that the defence version as projected by Rattan Singh was true
and should have been accepted. One of the so-called eye-witnesses and the
H son of the deceased Sukhvinder Singh was not examined. Body was found
SUCHA SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [PASA YAT, J.] 43
inside of the house of Rattan Singh which probabilises the defence version. A
It was the prosecution version that the body was lifted from the spot of
occurrence to the house of Rattan Singh. But no blood stains were found at
the place of occurrence from where the body was claimed to have been lifted.
Conduct of PWs 9 and I 0 in not coming to rescue of the deceased and not
even raising an alarm is rather unusual. PWIO who belongs to another village B
has not even signed the inquest report though he claimed to be present when
inquest was done. This clearly establishes that he could not have been present
as claimed. Injuries on the accused persons have not been explained. In view
of the fact that two of the accused persons against whom similar evidence
was tendered have been acquitted it would not be proper and legal to convict
rest of accused persons on the same set of evidence. Benefit of doubt should C
be given on account of co-accused's acquittal. It was submitted that the
evidence is inadequate to fasten guilt, and therefore prosecution cannot be
said to have established its case beyond doubt.

Per contra, learned counsel for the State submitted that the trial Court
and the High Court have analysed the various points now urged in detail and D
have rightly come to the conclusion that the accused appellants were guilty.
In view of the admitted position that village was faction ridden and there was
lot of hostility, it would be too much to expect non-partisan witnesses. As
noted above, there has been an elaborate analysis of the evidence of PWs 9
and 10. After carefully weighing the evidence, the trial Court and the High E
Court have come to the conclusion that their evidence suffers from no infirmity
to be viewed with suspicion.

We shall first deal with the contention regarding interestedness of the
witnesses for furthering prosecution version. Relationship is not a factor to
affect credibility of a witness. It is more often than not that a relation would p
not conceal actual culprit and make allegations against an innocent person.
Foundation has to be laid if plea of false implication is made. In such cases,
the court has to adopt a careful approach and analyse evidence to find out
whether it is cogent and credible. ·

In Dalip Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab, AIR (1953) SC 364 G
it has been laid down as under:-

"A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she
springs from sources which are likely to be tainte.d and that usually
means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused,
H
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily a close relation would be
the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent
person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause
for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person
against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but
foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of
B relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of
truth. However, we are not attempting any sweeping generalization.
Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only
made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as a
general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case
c must be limited to and be governed by its own facts."

The above decision has since been followed in Guli Chand and Ors. v.
State of Rajasthan, [1974] 3) SCC 698 in which Vadivelu Thevar v. State of
Madras, AIR (1957) SC 614 was also relied upon.

D We may also observe that the ground that the witness being a close
relative and consequently being a partisan witness, should not be relied upon,
has no substance. This theory was repelled by this Court as early as in Dalip
Singh's case (supra) in which surprise was expressed over the impression
which prevailed in the minds of the Members of the Bar that relatives were
not independent witnesses. Speaking through Vivian Bose, J. it was observed:
E
"We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court
that the testimony of the two eyewitnesses requires corroboration. If
the foundation for such an observation is based on the fact that the
witnesses are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their
testimony, we know of no such rule. If it is grounded on the reason
F that they are closely related to the deceased we are unable to concur.
This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which
another Bench of this Court endeavoured to dispel in - 'Rameshwar
v. State of Rajasthan' AIR (l 952) SC 54 at p.59. We find, however,
that it unfortunately still persists, if not in the judgments of the Courts,
G at any rate in the arguments of counsel."

Again in Masalti and Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR (1965) SC 202 this
Court observed: (p, 209-210 para 14):

"But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that evidence
H given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is
SUCHASINGHv. STATEOFPUN.IAB[PASAYAT . .1.) 45

evidence of partisan or interested witnesses ....... The mechanical A
rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would
invariably lead to failure of justice. No hard and fast rule can be laid
."' down as to how much evidence should be appreciated. Judicial
approach has to be cautious in dealing with such evidence; but the
plea that such evidence should be rejected because it is partisan cannot B
be accepted as correct."

To the same effect is the decision in State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh,
AIR (1973) SC 2407 and Lehna v. State of Haryana, [2002) 3 SCC 76. Stress
was laid by the accused-appellants on the non-acceptance of evidence tendered
by some witnesses to contend about desirability to throw out entire prosecution C
case. In essence prayer is to apply the principle of "falsus in uno falsus in
omnibus" (false in one thing, false in everything). This plea is clearly
untenable. Even if major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, in case
residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, notwithstanding acquittf}l of
number of other co-accused persons, his conviction can be maintained. It is
the duty of Court to separate grain from chaff. Where chaff can be separated D
from grain, it would be open to the Court to convict an accused notwithstanding
the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove guilt of other
accused persons. Falsity of particular material witness or material partidular
would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus
in omnibus" has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be bra11ded E
as liar. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has not received general
acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It
is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such cases
testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The
doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a C<i>urt
may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called F
'a mandatory rule of evidence'. (See Nisar Alli v. The State of Uttar Prad1sh,
AIR (1957) SC 366). Merely because some of the accused persons have been
acquitted, though evidence against all of them, so far as direct testimony
went, was the same does not lead as a necessary corollary that those who
have been convicted must also be acquitted. It is always open to a Court to
differentiate accused who had been acquitted from those who were convicted. G
(See Gurucharan Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab, AIR (1956) SC 460. The
doctrine is a dangerous one specially in India for if a whole body of the
testimony were to be rejected, because witness was evidently speaking· an
untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal
justice would come to a dead-stop. Witnesses just cannot help in giving H
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A embroidery to a story, however, true in the main. Therefore, it has to be
appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance,
and merely because in some respects the Court considers the same to be
insufficient for placing reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does not
necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects .... l
B as well. The evidence has to be shifted with care. The aforesaid dictum is not
a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose
evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration,
embroideries or embellishment. (See Sohrab slo Beli Nayata and Anr. v. The
State of Madhya Pradesh, [1972] 3 SCC 751 and Ugar Ahir and Ors. v. The
State of Bihar, AIR (1965) SC 277). An attempt has to be made to, as noted
C above, in tenns of felicitous metaphor, separate grain from the chaff, truth
from falsehood. Where it is not feasible to separate truth from falsehood,
because grain and chaff are inextricably mixed up, and in the process of
separation an absolutely new case has to be reconstructed by divorcing essential
details presented by the prosecution completely from the context and the
background against which they are made, the only available course to be
D made is to discard the evidence in toto. (See Zwinglee Ariel v. State of
Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1954) SC 15 and Ba/aka Singh and Ors. v. The State
of Punjab., AIR (1975) SC 1962). As observed by this Court in State of
Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki and Anr., AIR (1981) SC 1390, normal discrepancies
in evidence are those which are due to nonnal errors of observation, nonnal
E errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as
shock and horror at the time of occurrence and those are always there however
honest and truthful a witness may be. Material discrepancies are those which
are not normal, and not expected of a nonnal person. Courts have to label the
category to which a discrepancy may be categoi-ized. While normal
discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party's case, material
F discrepancies do so. These aspects were highlighted recently in Krishna Mochi
and Ors. v. State of Bihar etc., JT (2002) 4 SC 186. Accusations have been
rr
clearly established against accused-appellants in the case at hand. The Courts
below have categorically indicated the distinguishing features in evidence so
far as acquitted and convicted accused are concerned.
G As observed by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram and Ors.,
AIR (l 999) SC 1776 the over-insistence on witnesses having no relation with
the victims often results in criminal justice going away. When any incident
happens in a dwelling house or nearby the most natural witnesses would be
the inmates of that house. It would be unpragmatic to ignore such natural
H witnesses and insist on outsiders who would not have even seen any thing.
SUCHASINGHv. STATEOFPUNJAB[PASAYAT,J.] 47

If the Court has discerned from the evidence or even from the investigation A
records that some other independent person has witnessed any event connecting
the incident in question then there is justification for making adverse comme~ts
against non-examination of such person as prosecution witness. Otherwise,
merely on surmises the Court should not castigate a prosecution for not
examining other persons of the locality as prosecution witnesses. Prosecution B
can be expected to examine only those who have witnessed the events and
not those who have not seen it though the neighbourhood may be repl~te
,. with other residents also.

Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture
fanciful doubts or lingering suspicion and thereby destroy social defence. C
Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let hundred guilty
escape than punish an innocent. Letting guilty escape is not doing justice
according to law. [See: Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh and Ors., AIR
(1990) SC 209. Prosecution is not required to meet any and every hypothesis
put forward by the accused. [See State of UP. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava,
AIR (1992) SC 840. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or merely D
possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It
must grow out of the evidence in the case. If a case is proved perfectly, it js
argued that it is artificial; if a case has some flaws inevitable because human
beings are prone to err, it is argued that it is too imperfect. One wonders
whether in the meticulous hypersensitivity to eliminate a rare innocent from E
being punished, many guilty persons must be allowed to escape. Proof beyond
teasonable doubt is a guideline, not a fetish. [See Inder Singh and Anr. v.
State (Delhi Admn.), AIR (1978) SC 1091). Vague hunches cannot take place
of judicial evaluation. "A judge does not preside over a criminal trial, merely
to see that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a
guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties." (Per Viscount Simon in F
Stir/and v. Director of Public Prosecution, (1944) AC PC 315 quoted in
State of UP. v. Anil Singh, AIR (1988) SC 1998. Doubts would be called
reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law canno~
afford any favourite other than truth.

In matters such as this, it is appropriate to recall the observations of this G
Court in Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, [1974) 1 SCR

- 489 492-493:

" ...... The dangers of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of
doubt at the expense of social defence and to the soothing sentiment H
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A that all acquittals are always good regardless of justice to the victim
and the community, demand special emphasis in. the contemporary
context of escalating crime and escape. The judicial instrument has a
public accountability. The cherished principles or golden thread of
proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs through the web of our
law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch,
B hesitancy and degree of doubt... .... "

" ..... The evil of acquitting a guilty person light-heartedly as a
learned author Clanville Williams in 'Proof of Guilt' has sapiently
observed, goes much beyond the simple fact that, just one guilty

c person has gone unpunished. If unmerited acquittals become general, .,
they tend to lead to a cynical disregard of the law, and this in tum
leads to a public demand for harsher legal presumptions against
indicted 'persons' and more severe punishment of those who are
found guilty. Thus too frequent acquittals of the guilty may lead to
a ferocious penal law, eventually eroding the judicial protection of
D the guiltless ..... "

" ....... a miscarriage of justice may arise from the acquittal of the
guilty no less than from the conviction of the innocent... ..".

The position was again illuminatingly highlighted in State of U.P. v.
E Krishna Gopal, AIR (1988) SC 2154. Similar view was also expressed in
Gangadhar Behera and Ors. v. State of Orissa, (2002) 7 Supreme 276.

So far as inaction of PWs 9 and I 0 in not coming to rescue of deceased
is concerned, it has been noted by the trial Court and the High Court that
both of them were unarmed and bare handed and the accused persons were
F armed with deadly weapons. How a person would react in a situation like this
cannot be encompassed by any rigid formula. It would depend on many
factors, like in the present case where witnesses are unarmed, but the assailants
are armed with deadly weapons. In a given case instinct of self-preservation
can be the dominant instinct. That being the position, their inaction in not
G coming to rescue of the deceased cannot be a ground for discarding their
evidence.

One of the pleas is that the prosecution has not explained the injuries
on the accused. Issue is if there is no such explanation what would be its
effect? We are not prepared to agree with the learned counsel for the defence
-
H that in each and every case where prosecution fails to explain the injuries
SUCHA SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [PASA YAT. J.] . 49

found on some of the accused, the prosecution case should automatically be A
rejected, without any further probe. In Mohar Rai and Bharath Rai v. The
State of Bihar, [ 1968] 3 SCR 525, it was observed:

" .. .In our judgment, the failure of the prosecution to offer any
explanation in that regard shows that evidence of the prosecution
witnesses relating to the incident is not true or at any rate not wholly B
true. Further those injuries probabilise the plea taken by the appellant~."

In another important case Lakshmi Singh and Ors. v. State of Bihar, [1976]
4 SCC 394, after referring to the ratio laid down in Mohar Rai 's case (supra),
this Court observed:
c
"Where the prosecution fails to explain the injuries on the accused,
two results follow:

(I) that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is untrue; and
(2) that the injuries probabilise the plea taken by the appellants."
D
It was further observed that:

"In a murder case, the non-explanation of the injuries sustain~d
by the accused at about the time of the occurrence or in the course
of altercation is a very important circumstance from which the Court E
can draw the following inferences:

(I) that the prosecution has suppressed the genesis and the origin
of the occurrence and has thus not presented the true version;

(2) that the witnesses who have denied the presence of the injuries
on the person of the accused are lying on a most material point and, F
therefore, their evidence is unreliable;

(3) that in case there is a defence version which explains the
injuries on the person of the accused assumes much greater importanc~
where the evidence consists of interested or inimical witnesses or G
where the defence gives a version which competes in probability with
that of the prosecution one."

In Mohar Rai 's case (supra) it is made clear that failure of the prosecution
to offer any explanation regarding the injuries found on the accused may
show that the evidence related to the incident is not true or at any rate not H
50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A wholly true. Likewise in Lakshmi Singh 's case (supra) it is observed that any
non-explanation of the injuries on the accused by the prosecution may affect
the prosecution case. But such a non-explanation may assume greater
importance where the defence gives a version which competoes in probability
with that of the prosecution. But where the evidence is clear, cogent and
.B creditworthy and where the Court can distinguish the truth from falsehood
the mere fact that the injuries are not explained by the prosecution cannot by
itself be a sole basis to reject such evidence, and consequently the whole
case. Much depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. These
aspects were highlighted by this Court in Vijayee Singh and Ors. v. State of
U.P., AIR (1990) SC 1459.
c
Non-explanation of injuries by the prosecution will not affect prosecution
case where injuries sustained by the accused are minor and superficial or
where the evidence is so clear and cogent, so independent and disinterested,
so probable, consistent and creditworthy, that it outweighs the effect of the
D omission on the part of prosecution to explain the injuries. As observed by
this Court in Ramlagan Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR (1972) SC 2593 .
prosecution is not called upon in all cases to explain the injuries received by
the a.ccused persons. It is for the defence to put questions to the prosecution
witnesses regarding the injuries of the accused persons. When that is not
done, there is no occasion for the prosecution witnesses to explain any injury
E on the person of an accused. In Hare krishna Singh and Ors. v. State of
Bihar, AIR (1988) SC 863, it was observed that the obligation of the
prosecution to explain the injuries sustained by the accused in the same
occurrence inay not arise in each and every case. In other words, it is not an
invariable rule that the prosecution has to explain the injuries sustained by
F the accused in the same occurrence. If the witnesses examined on behalf of
the prosecution are believed by the Court in proof of guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, question of obligation of prosecution to explain
injuries sustained by the accused will not arise. When the prosecution comes
with a definite case that the offence has been committed by the accused and
proves its case beyond any reasonable doubt, it becomes hardly necessary for
G the prosecution to again explain how and under what circumstances injuries
have been inflicted on the person of the accused. It is more so when the
injuries are simple or superficial in nature. In the case at hand, trifle and
superficial injuries on accused are of little assistance to them to throw doubt
on veracity of prosecution case, particularly, when the accused who claimed
H to have sustained injuries has been acquitted.

l
SUCHA SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [PASA YAT, J.] 51

The fact that name of PW 10 does not figure in the inquest report or that A
the DDR entry does not contain the name of Pritam Singh does not in any
way corrode the credibility of the prosecution version, particularly when the
reason as to why these were absent in the relevant documents has been
plausibly explained by the witnesse·s, and after consideration accepted by the
trial Court and the High Court. '
B
Above being the position, the appeals are without merit and deserve
dismissal, which we direct.

N.J. Appeals dismisseq.