SUBRAMANIversusSTATE OF KARNATAKA

                 [2026] 3 S.C.R. 576 : 2026 INSC 249

                                Subramani
                                     v.
                            State of Karnataka
                    (Criminal Appeal No. 2432 of 2010)
                                17 March 2026
                [Pankaj Mithal* and S.V.N Bhatti, JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Whether the appellant is guilty of the offences u/ss.302 and 498A of
       IPC and whether the sentence (two years of simple imprisonment
       along with fine of Rs.2,000/- and in default in payment of the same,
       with a further three months of simple imprisonment u/s.498A IPC
       and sentence of life imprisonment u/s.302 IPC) awarded to him
       is justified.

                                  Headnotes†
       Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302 and 498A – Allegation against
       appellant that he poured kerosene on his wife, lit a candle
       and threw it upon her – Victim died due to severe burn
       injuries – FIR registered u/ss.302 and 498A – The Trial Court
       acquitted appellant on the ground that the bathroom where
       the incident took place was very small where two persons
       could not have been accommodated – Trial Court also held
       that dying declaration of the victim was unreliable as deceased
       had received more than 80 to 90 percent burn injuries and
       as such she may not be in a mental state to depose or state
       anything – However, the High Court convicted the appellant –
       Correctness:
       Held: It has come on record through evidence that the appellant
       used to beat and treat the deceased with cruelty – There were
       regular demands for money by him – PW-3, eldest daughter of
       appellant, an eye-witness, had clearly deposed that on the fateful
       night after a quarrel, appellant went out and brought kerosene,
       poured it on her mother and set her on fire – PW-4-Doctor,
       categorically stated that the death occurred due to septicaemia
       as a result of burn injuries sustained by victim – Another witness,


* Author
[2026] 3 S.C.R.                                                               577

                     Subramani v. State of Karnataka


     PW-10-Doctor, recorded in his statement that victim informed
     him about the incident and a noting to that effect was also made
     in case sheet – PW-11, another doctor witness, stated that in
     the morning of 21.07.2000, the patient was conscious and in a
     position to give the statement, he gave permission to the police
     to record her statement – The dying declaration of the deceased
     was recorded by the Head Constable as PW-15 – Considering
     the circumstances and the evidence of PW-3, PW4, PW-10 and
     PW-11, there is no reason to disbelieve the dying declaration – This
     apart, the police had recovered a matchbox, a kerosene tin and
     burnt cloth pieces from the site of the incident immediately – In
     view of the above clinching pieces of evidence, there is hardly any
     scope for the acquittal of the appellant – The Trial Court was not
     justified in acquitting the appellant – The opinion of the High Court
     is perfectly justified. [Paras 9, 10, 12-14, 18, 20-24]

                                 List of Acts
     Penal Code, 1860.

                              List of Keywords
     Murder; Cruelty; Demand of money; Dying declaration; Burn
     injuries; Pieces of evidence; Motive to kill; Medical opinion; credible
     evidence.

                             Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
     2432 of 2010
     From the Judgment and Order dated 20.09.2010 of the High Court
     of Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRLA No. 1104 of 2004

                          Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Appellant(s):
     Shekhar G Devasa, Sr. Adv., Manish Tiwari, Mrs. Thashmitha
     Muthanna, Rakesh Kini, Shashi Bhushan Nagar, M/s. Devasa
     & Co.
     Advs. for the Respondent(s):
     Sanchit Garga, Kunal Rana, Shashwat Jaiswal, Ms. Aarohi Garg.
578                                                            [2026] 3 S.C.R.

                               Supreme Court Reports


                        Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                     Judgment

       Pankaj Mithal, J.

1.     The appellant - Subramani and the deceased Chennamma were
       husband and wife. They were married for seventeen years before
       the date of the incident. They had two daughters and two sons. The
       eldest daughter was aged about sixteen years at the relevant time.
       They had lived a happy married life for about three years. Thereafter,
       their relations became strained, and it is alleged that the appellant
       started ill-treating the deceased and kept on raising demands for
       money, which the father of the deceased fulfilled most of the time.
       The appellant had even started treating her with cruelty.
2.     On the night of 20.07.2000, the appellant and the deceased as usual
       again picked up a quarrel. The appellant, in anger, went out and
       fetched some kerosene. The kerosene was poured on the deceased
       in a bathroom, the appellant lit a candle and threw it upon her,
       causing serious burn injuries. The appellant, after burning her, left the
       house. On the alarm raised by the deceased, the neighbours came
       and tried to save her. They doused the fire by pouring water. The
       deceased was taken to the Victoria Hospital by the neighbours and
       the mother of the appellant. She was admitted at around midnight
       and died after three days on 24.07.2000 in the hospital due to severe
       burn injuries received by her.
3.     An FIR No. 194 of 2000 under Section 302 and Section 498A of the
       Indian Penal Code1 was lodged by the father of the deceased on
       24.07.2000 after she had died. The police inspector Shiva Murthy,
       upon investigation submitted a chargesheet against the appellant for
       committing offences punishable under Section 498A and 302 IPC.
4.     The appellant was put to trial. The Trial Court acquitted him primarily
       on the ground that the bathroom where the incident took place was
       very small where two persons could not have been accommodated.
       The testimonies of the family witnesses were inconsistent and
       unreliable. The medical evidence suggested that deceased had


1    For short, ‘IPC’
[2026] 3 S.C.R.                                                           579

                     Subramani v. State of Karnataka


     received more than 80 to 90 percent burn injuries and as such she
     may not be in a mental state to depose or state anything either to
     the doctor or the police. The dying declaration, if any, was therefore
     unreliable.
5.   On an appeal by the State to the High Court, the Division Bench
     reversed the judgment and order of the Trial Court. The acquittal was
     set aside, and the appellant was convicted under both the above
     provisions. He was sentenced to two years of simple imprisonment
     along with fine of Rs.2,000/- and in default in payment of the same,
     with a further three months of simple imprisonment under Section
     498A. He was also convicted under Section 302 IPC for killing the
     deceased and was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of
     Rs.10,000/-, and in default, to undergo a further one month of simple
     imprisonment.
6.   Aggrieved by the aforesaid conviction and sentence, the appellant
     preferred a Criminal Appeal under Section 379 of Cr.P.C which
     was admitted on 13.12.2010 after the delay in filing the same was
     condoned. Thus, the appeal is before us for consideration as to
     whether the appellant is guilty of the offences under Section 302 and
     498A of IPC and whether the sentence awarded to him is justified.
7.   We have heard Shri Shekhar G. Devasa, learned senior counsel
     for the appellant-Subramani and Shri Sanchit Garga, Advocate on
     record for the respondent-State of Karnataka.
8.   Learned senior counsel for the appellant argued that the High Court
     was not justified in interfering with the order of acquittal passed by the
     Trial Court, more particularly when the acquittal had been recorded on
     cogent and valid reasons after considering every piece of the evidence
     on record. It was submitted that apart from the inconsistencies in
     the statements of the material witnesses, particularly PW-7 and PW-
     16, who categorically stated that the deceased was unconscious
     and not in a position to speak, there was no credible evidence to
     prove that the appellant had committed the offence as alleged. It
     was also submitted that the prosecution failed to prove any motive
     for homicidal death. It was inherently improbable that the offence
     could have been committed inside the small bathroom, and that no
     independent neighbour was examined to prove the commission of
     the offence. The alleged dying declaration was unreliable, as it was
580                                                            [2026] 3 S.C.R.

                           Supreme Court Reports


       unsupported by any medical certificate and stood contradicted by
       hospital documents, which record a history of self-inflicted burns.
       Furthermore, the deceased had admittedly received more than 80
       to 90 percent burn injuries and was under heavy sedation. She was
       not in a position to make any statement. Therefore, the conviction
       based upon the alleged dying declaration of the deceased was
       wholly illegal.
9.     There is no dispute as to the fact that the parties were married 17
       years prior to the date of the incident and that there used to be frequent
       quarrels between them with regard to money. It has also come on
       record through evidence that the appellant used to beat and treat
       the deceased with cruelty. There were regular demands for money
       by him. The aforesaid facts and the evidence clearly establish that
       the appellant was not a satisfied man who suffered from frustration
       and as such had a motive to kill the deceased.
10. The testimony of PW-3, Niresha, the eldest daughter of the appellant
    and the deceased who was aged about 16 year is very crucial and
    material. She had clearly deposed that on the fateful night, she, her
    mother, sister and brothers were in their house. Her father came and
    questioned the mother that when he had sent her to her paternal home
    to get money, why she had sent her father to counsel and advise
    him. Thus, they picked up a quarrel and her father threatened her
    mother to wait and see what he was going to do. He went out and
    brought kerosene, poured it on her mother and set her on fire. This
    was done at around 11:00 p.m. in the night and thereafter, he ran
    away from the house. On the screams of her mother, the neighbours
    came and extinguished the fire. Her grandmother and one another
    person took her mother to the hospital in the burnt state. Her mother
    remained in the hospital for three days, undergoing treatment, and
    thereafter, she died.
11. The aforesaid witness PW-3 is an eyewitness. She has narrated
    the incident as was seen by her. There is no inconsistency in her
    statement and there is no reason to disbelieve her. There is no material
    on record to show as to why she would falsely depose against her
    father. Her evidence clinchingly proves that the appellant brought
    kerosene, poured it on her mother and lit the fire.
12. The other crucial witness in the case is PW-4, Dr. S. Rudramurthy who
    had conducted the post-mortem upon the deceased. He categorically
[2026] 3 S.C.R.                                                        581

                    Subramani v. State of Karnataka


     stated that the death occurred due to septicaemia as a result of
     burn injuries sustained by her. He proved the postmortem report
     ‘Exhibit P-2’ and his signatures on it. He further stated that the burn
     injuries were antemortem and were to the extent of 85 to 90 percent.
     He reported that septicaemia naturally occurs with such high burn
     injuries. He opined that the burn injuries received by the deceased
     were superficial in nature. He further opined that even if the deceased
     was given proper and best treatment, her chances of survival were
     minimal. Hence, the postmortem report and the statement of PW-4
     as such establish that the deceased died of septicaemia as a result
     of 80-90% burn injuries which were superficial.
13. There is another witness named Dr. Gurumurthy, whose statement
    was recorded as PW-10. He was the doctor who had treated the
    deceased after she was admitted in the Victoria Hospital, Bangalore.
    He stated that he was the in-charge of burns ward of the hospital.
    The deceased was brought to the hospital on 20.07.2000 at around
    11.15 p.m. with a history of burns. She was admitted in the hospital
    at 12:00 midnight. According to the deceased, as informed to him,
    her husband used to quarrel with her frequently. On 20.07.2000, he
    came home at around 11.00 p.m., assaulted her and then poured
    diesel over her, set her on fire and ran away. He stated that there is a
    note to the above effect in the case sheet as well. He had examined
    the deceased on 23.07.2000 and she made the said statement at
    around 12.30 p.m. on the same day. He even proved ‘Exhibit P-11’,
    the statement of the deceased and his signatures upon it. He further
    stated that the deceased was in hospital up to 24.07.2000 and expired
    at 9.35 a.m. on the said date.
14. One doctor named Dr. HC Ramanna, PW-11, also treated the
    deceased when she was admitted to the Victoria Hospital. He stated
    that on 20.07.2000 while he was working in the aforesaid hospital, a
    patient by name Chennamma was brought to the hospital in a burnt
    state. He had examined the patient and had noticed that she had
    9 per cent burns on the face and neck, 18 per cent burns on the
    chest and abdomen, 9 per cent on the upper right and left limbs,
    10 per cent on the lower right and left limbs and that the total burns
    received by her were to the extent of 80 per cent. The patient was
    conscious when he had examined her. She was admitted by him to
    the burns ward. On the morning of 21.07.2000 at about 02:45 am
582                                                            [2026] 3 S.C.R.

                           Supreme Court Reports


       (i.e. in the night itself), the police of S.R. Nagar came to the hospital
       and requested him to give permission to record the statement of the
       patient. Since the patient was conscious and in a position to give the
       statement, he gave permission to the police to record her statement.
       The statement was recorded as Exhibit P-12 and he had made an
       endorsement on it under his signatures that the patient was in a fit
       condition to give a statement. He even proved the endorsement and
       his signatures on Exhibit P-12. In his cross-examination, nothing
       material turned up except that he admitted that in the OPD slip, it
       is mentioned that she herself had poured kerosene and had set fire
       to herself, but he does not know who recorded the said statement
       on the OPD slip/case sheet (Exhibit P-11). He further admitted that
       though according to his examination the burns were to the extent
       of 80 per cent but he does not know why the burns were recorded
       to be 98 per cent. He denied the suggestion that the endorsement
       on Exhibit P-12 was made by him to support the prosecution under
       any pressure.
15. The aforesaid evidence of the two doctors who examined the
    deceased clearly proves that the deceased was admitted to the
    hospital as alleged on 20.07.2000 and that despite serious injuries,
    she was in a conscious state. The attending doctors have certified
    that she was in a fit position to make a statement and, therefore,
    permission was granted to the police to record her statement which
    is Exhibit P-12 which bear the endorsement and signature of the
    doctor. We see no reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW-4,
    PW-10 and PW-11.
16. The dying declaration of the deceased was recorded by the Head
    Constable working in the SR Nagar Police Station. His statement
    was recorded as PW-15. He categorically stated that he had
    remained posted in the aforesaid police station from 1997 to May,
    2003 meaning thereby that he was posted at the aforesaid police
    station at the time the alleged incident took place and the deceased
    was taken and admitted to the hospital. He further stated that on
    the said date he was on night duty and at about 01:30 am, the
    Station House Officer having received information of the deceased
    being admitted in the hospital, had asked him to go and record her
    statement. He as such reached the hospital at 02:00 am and met
    the doctor of the burns ward of the hospital. He informed him that
[2026] 3 S.C.R.                                                       583

                    Subramani v. State of Karnataka


     he had come to record the statement of the deceased. The doctor
     after talking to the deceased for about two minutes informed him
     that the patient was in a position to give the statement. He permitted
     him to record the statement, whereupon he recorded her statement
     for about half an hour. The deceased put her thumb (LTI) on the
     statement recorded by him as she was not in a position to put her
     signatures. The statement was endorsed by the doctor who certified
     the condition of the deceased and signed the statement. He proved
     the statement Exhibit P-12, the endorsement and the certificate of
     the doctor and his signatures upon it.
17. The translated copy of the statement (Exhibit P-12) was not placed
    before us, though the original in vernacular language exists in the
    record. The same was proved by PW-15, as stated earlier. He stated
    that the deceased told him that she was married to the appellant
    and had lived happily with him for about 2-3 years but thereafter
    the appellant had started quarrelling with her demanding her to
    bring more money from her parents. He started treating her cruelly
    by abusing and beating her. On 20.07.2000, he quarrelled with her
    and forced her to get more money from her parents. In the night,
    he again picked up a quarrel with her and assaulted her. He then
    abused her and even threatened to kill her. He poured kerosene
    on her body and set her on fire. At that time her four children were
    sleeping in the house and on hearing her cries, they went to their
    grandmother’s house and called her.
18. Considering the circumstances and the evidence of PW-3, PW-4,
    PW-10 and PW-11 coupled with the fact that there is no adverse
    material to doubt the above dying declaration or to suggest that it
    was not actually or properly recorded or that the deceased was not
    in a state to make such a statement, there is no reason to disbelieve
    the dying declaration.
19. The fact that the aforesaid PW-15 admitted that there was no nurse
    present at the hospital when he recorded the statement, is not enough
    to belie the above dying declaration. The same was recorded in the
    night at about 02:00-02:30 am with the permission of the doctor who
    has accepted having granted the permission on being satisfied that
    the deceased was in a fit state to make the statement. In the light
    of the above statements of the doctors and the police officer, the
    oral evidence of PW-7 and PW-16 that she was not conscious to
584                                                        [2026] 3 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


       give any statement, is not reliable. The deceased, may have been
       momentarily in an unconscious state due to the effect of sedatives,
       however, by and large, as the burn injuries were superficial, though
       to great extent, she was conscious most of the time and was in a
       fit state of mind to get her dying declaration recorded.
20. This apart, the police had recovered a matchbox, a kerosene tin
    and burnt cloth pieces from the site of the incident immediately. The
    Recovery Memo was duly prepared in the form of Exhibit P-1. The
    said exhibit was proved by the PW-6, D. Rangaswamy, one of the
    neighbours who had visited the house of the deceased immediately
    on the occurrence of the incident. He has stated that the matchbox,
    kerosene tin and burnt cloths were lying at the scene, a mahazar
    was prepared on the spot and the aforesaid items were collected and
    seized by the police. He had signed the mahazar prepared by the
    police which is before him as Exhibit P-1 and bears his signatures.
    He denied the suggestion that he was making a false statement.
21. The fact of recovery of the kerosene tin, matchbox and burnt cloth
    pieces from the scene of the incident, the deposition of PW-3, the
    daughter of the appellant and the deceased that she had seen her
    father bringing kerosene tin, pouring it on her mother and putting
    her on fire, coupled with the dying declaration and the statements of
    the doctors PW-10, PW-11 who examined and treated the deceased
    and PW-4 who conducted the post-mortem, in unequivocal terms
    prove that the appellant alone is responsible for the commission
    of the aforesaid offences. He is the person who picked up quarrel
    with his deceased wife, poured kerosene and burnt her and that his
    wife died due to the burn injuries after consciously making a dying
    declaration and naming the appellant as the main culprit.
22. In view of the above clinching pieces of evidence, there is hardly
    any scope for the acquittal of the appellant.
23. The Trial Court was not justified in acquitting the appellant on slight
    discrepancies in the statements of some of the witnesses, particularly
    PW-7 and PW-16. PW-7 is a person who carried the deceased to
    the hospital and his statement is not very trustworthy. He has not
    deposed about her condition in the hospital. PW-16 is the police
    inspector who conducted the investigation. He might have deposed
    that the deceased was not in a conscious state of mind but that would
[2026] 3 S.C.R.                                                      585

                       Subramani v. State of Karnataka


     not override the statement of the doctors who treated the deceased,
     especially the one who was on duty and had permitted the police
     to record the statement of the deceased on being satisfied that she
     was in a fit condition to make a statement.
24. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the
    opinion that the High Court is perfectly justified in the facts and
    circumstances of the case that the appellant is guilty of commission
    of offences both under Sections 498A and 302 IPC and has rightly
    been convicted and sentenced to the imprisonment awarded.
25. The appeal, as such, is devoid of merit and is dismissed. The
    appellant is on bail. He is directed to surrender forthwith to undergo
    the remaining part of the sentence.
26. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.


     Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan