Holding

The conviction under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act cannot be sustained and the death sentence under IPC is excessive, so it is reduced to life imprisonment.

Summary

The appellants were convicted for murder of Harish Bhatia using a 9 mm pistol and a .38 calibre revolver, and were sentenced to death under IPC sections 302/34 and Arms Act section 27(3). The High Court upheld the death sentence, treating the weapons as prohibited arms under the Arms Act based on a government note. The Supreme Court held that the weapons did not qualify as "prohibited arms" because the required statutory notification in the Official Gazette was absent, rendering the conviction under section 27(3) unsustainable. It also found that the High Court had not recorded a valid special reason under CrPC 354(3) and that the brutality involved did not meet the "rarest of rare" standard for capital punishment. Consequently, the Court modified the death sentence to life imprisonment and dismissed the appeal.

Issues considered

The 9 mm pistol and .38 calibre revolver are "prohibited arms" within the meaning of Section 2(t)(i) of the Arms Act and Schedule I.
Whether the conviction under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act can be sustained without a statutory notification.
Whether the death sentence under IPC sections 302/34 satisfies the requirement of a special reason under CrPC 354(3).
Whether the case qualifies as a "rarest of rare" situation justifying capital punishment.

Legislation cited

Arms Act, 1959s. 27(3)
Arms (Amendment) Act, 1988
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 354(3)
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 34

Subjects

Arms ActProhibited armsDeath penaltyRarest of rare doctrineSection 27(3)IPC 302SentencingSpecial reasonsNotification requirementCapital punishment

Judgment

SUBHASH RAMKUMAR BIND@ VAKIL AND ANR. A
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

NOVEMBER 12. 2002

[UM ESH C. BANERJEE AND B.N. AGRA WAL, JJ.] B

Arms Act, 1959-Section 27(3)-Arms Rules, 1962-Rule 3-Conviction
under by Courts belou'--Death sentence-Murder caused by 9nun pistol and
38 caliber revolver-On appeal-~Held, conviction cannot be sustained-Arn1s C
in question 1vere not the prohibited arn1s under the Act.

Penal Code, 1860-Section 302134-Conviction under by courts below
-Death sentence-On appeal-Held, conviction justified but in the facts of
the case punishn1ent a1varded is in excess of the requiren1ent of the situation-
Brutality in the instant case is not ofsuch a nature so as to exercise discretion D
by passing an order of capital punishn1ent-Brutality itself l1 ould not bring
1

the case tt•ithin the a1nbit of rarest of rare cases-Sentence of death altered
to life in1prisonn1ent..

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Section 354 (3)-Special reason
for award of death sentence-Held, brutality can be an existing factor but E
cannot be tern1ed to be special reason }Or awarding such sentence-Holt' the
brutality takes place, is the relevant and necessary n1aterial to be considered.

Sentencing-Death sentence-bnposition of-Held, latt• courts should
be slolv in imposing-A reasonable proportion has to be nraintained bet1veen
the heinousness of crime and the punishment-Punishment should neither be F
disproportionately severe nor inadequate.

Interpretation ofstatutes-Statements of objects and Reasons ofstatute-
Aid offor interpretation--Admissibilil)~Held, it is not admissible as an aid
to the construction of a statute, bl!t the sa111e si111ply assists as to the necessity G
of introduction of such law--// can be looked into for a limited purpose of
ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time-Statement of Objects and
Reasons of Arms (Amendment) Act 42 of 1988.

Trial Court convicted the accused u/s 302/34 IPC and Section 27(3)
of Arms Act, 1959 and sentenced them to death for having committed H
65
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A murder ()fa person with 9 mm. Pistol and .38 caliber revolver. High Court
confirmed the order of trial Court and held that in view of Arms Act, 1959,
Arms Rules, 1962 and Rules and the Schedule I thereof, the arms seized
from the accused are prohibited arms and hence Section 27(3) is squarely
. attracted. For confirmation of death sentence it recorded the special reason
B being that gunshot injuries were caused and at that point of time the
deceased was unarmed and was taken . aback as to the whole
. situation.

In appeal to this Court appellant contended that the arms in question
cannot come within the purview of 'Prohibited Arms' as defined u/s 2(t)(i)
of the Act, because they are not automatically triggered and because there
C was no notification as required by law vide category A schedule I of the
statute; and that the note issued by Central Government pertaining to 9
mtn pistol and .•38 caliber revolver stands out to be prohibited for the
purpose of importation only and thus would not attract the general
definition as regards the prohibited weapons and ·hence the note to be
treated as an instruction and not a notification.
D
St.ate contended that the note issued by the Central Government
ought to be treated as an authorization within the meaning of the first
schedule to the statute.

Dismissing ~he appeal, the Court
E
HELD: I.I. Section 27(3) of Arms Act, 1959 provides for a definite
punishment for a definite offence : to wit, user of 11ny prohibited arms,
which results in the death of another person and in that event the Statute
has been categorical enough to prescribe that user.shall be punishable with
F death. There are thus two specific requirements of the Statute in order to
bring home the guilt of the accused within the meaning of Section 27(3):
the requirements being- (a) user of a prohibited arm; and (b) resultant
death of a person by reason of such user. (77-H; 78-A-BI

1.2. Statement of Objects and Reasons is not otherwise admissible
G as an aid to the construction of a Statute but the same simply assists as to
the necessity of introduction of such a law. Though, in case of an urgent
need of the situa~ion by reason wherefor the intent of the. legislature is to .
be assessed, the Statements arid Objects can be looked into for the limited
purpose of ascertaining the .conditions prevailing at the time which
prompted or actuated the proposer of the Bill to introduce the same and
H the extent of remedying the existing evil of the society. (80-B-C)

'
SUBHASH RAMKUMAR BIND 1J) VAKIL 1·. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA . 67

Aswini Kumar Ghosh and Anr. v. Arabinda Bose and Anr., 119531 SCR A
1, relied on

1.3. The punishment provided under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act
stands to be the severe most one and under the general law of the land it
is only in the rarest of the rare cases that such a punishment can be
inflicted on to an accused. Obviously, the intent of the legislature as B
appears from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of Arms (Amendment)
Act, 42 of 1988 cannot possibly be decried by reasons of the situation
prevalent during the period in question. The use of prohibited arms and
deadly weapons turned out to be a regular feature and the existing state
of law was not in a position to subvert these moves by the anti - national C
elements and in the event of incorporation in the Statute Book of a
legislation which stands engrafted therein to protect the society from these
unruly elements it is a bounden obligation of the law Courts to attribute
its widest possible amplitude to the words used in the legislature and
interpret the legislation in accordance therewith. Question of there being
a restrictive meaning to be attributed thus would not arise. 181-B-DI D
1.4. Notifications in common English acceptation mean and imply a
formal announcement of a legally relevant fact and in the event of a Statute
speaking of a Notification being published in the Official Gazette, the same
cannot but mean a Notification published by the authority of law in the E
Official Gazette. It is on formal declaration and publication of an order
and shall have to be in accordance with the declared policies or in the event
the requirement of the Statute then in that event in accordance therewith.
(83-A-B(
1.5. The Statute speaks of a notification in the Official Gaaette.
F
Administrative instructions cannot possibly be a substitute for a
notification which stands as a requirement of the Statute. The requirement
of the Statute is sacrosanct and since the issue shall have to be dealt with
utmost care and caution, without the issuance of a notification question
of a conviction under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act would not arise.
(84-D-F( G

Union of India and Anr. v. Charanjit S. Gill and Ors., (2000) 5 SCC
742, relied on.

2.1. Section 354(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 specifically
records that in the event of a sentence of death the Court must state special H
68 SUPREME cou.n REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A reasons for sut:h a sentence. The finding of the High Court on this score
does not satisfy the statutory requirement since the same cannot be termed
to be a special reason for imposition of such a penalty. Gunshot injuries
were caused and at that point of time the deceased was unarmed and was
taken aback as to the whole situation-in every incidence of murder,
B brutality is involved. Brutality, obviously would be an existing factor but
how the same did take place is the relevant and necessary material to be
considered. (85-B-D·El

Jai Kumar v. State of MP., (1999) 5 SCC I, distinguished.

C Dhananjoy Chatter)t!e alias Dhana v. State of W.B., (1994) 2 SCC 220,
referred to.

2.2. Ours being a civilized society-a tooth for a tooth and an eye for
an eye ought not to be the criterion and as such the question of there being
acting under any haste in regard to the capital punishment would not arise:
D . Rather our jurisprudence speaks of the factum of the law courts being
slow in that direction and it Is In that perspective a reasonable proportion
has to be maintained between the heinousness of the crime and the
punishment. While It is true that punishment disproportionately severe
ought not to be passed but that does not even clothe the law courts,
E however, with an option to award the sentence which would be manifestly
Inadequate having due regard to the nature of offence since an inadequate
sentence would not subserve the cause of justice to the society. In the
contextual facts, brutality is not of such a nature so as to exercise the
discretion of passing an order of capital punishment-undoubtedly brutality
is involved but that brutality by Itself will not bring it within the ambit of
F the rarest of the rare cases. On the wake of the aforesaid and having
regard to the nature of the offence and the methodology adopted, 'the
punishment awarded to the appellants herein is in excess of the
requirement of the situation and as such while the guilt of the accused
under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC is confirmed, the sentence of
G death is modified to that of life imprisonment. (187-B-EI
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
1818 of 2002.

· From the Judgment and Order dated 26.7.2001 of the Mumbai High
H Court in C.C. No. 4 of 2000 with Crl. A. No. 523 of 2000.
SUBHASH RAMKUMAR BIND@ VAKIL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (BANERJEE, J.) 69

Ranjit Kumar, Sushi! Karanjkar, R. Chandra Shekhar Reddy and A
Venkateswara Rao Anumolu, for the Appellants.

S.V. Deshpande, Mrs. Usha Kejariwal and Naresh Kumar for the
Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by B
BANERJEE, J. On a reference to the High Court by the Principal
Judge of the Sessions Court at Bombay for confirmation of an order of death
sentence passed against the appellants herein in Sessions Case No.477 of
1996, the High Court recorded its finding in the affirmative to the order of
conviction aod sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge. It is this order C
of confirmation which is before this Court presently under consideration.

Significantly, accused Nos.4 to 10 af\1 absconding and the matter was
dealt with thus against accused Nos. I, i and 3. Since the matter has been
argued before this Court in rather great a length, we think it fit and proper
to note the charges so framed in extenso at this juncture and before entering D
on to the arena of merits. The charges read as below :

"Firstly That you No. I along with Nos.2 and 3 above named and
absconding accused Nos.4 to I 0 Above named on the aforesaid date,
time and place and prior to it agreed to murder Harish Vallabhdas E
Bhatia hatched a criminal conspiracy to that effect and in pursuant to
the agreement you No.2 and 3 above named, did commit murder of
said Harish Vallabhdas llhatla by means of pistol and revolver and
inflicted such bullet injuries on his person as were sufficient in ordinary
course of nature to cause his death and in fact caused his death and
thereby you all committed an offence punishable u/s 120-B r/w 302 F
of l.P.C. and within my cognizance.

Secondly - Alternatively you Nos. 2 and 3 above named on or about
13th June, 1995 at 20.20 hrs., on the ground floor of Lalchand
Bungalow at Shanker Lane, Kandivali (W), Mumbai in furtherance of
common intention of you both did commit murder by causing death G
of Harish Vallabhdas Bhatia, by means of pistol and revolver causing
bullet lajury on the person of said Harish Vallabhdas Bhatia, which
were sufficient In the ordinary course of nature to cause his death and
in fact caused his death and thereby committed an offence punishable
u/s 302 riw 34 of l.P.C. and within my cognizance.
H
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Thirdly - That you Nos.2 and 3 above named, on the aforesaid date,
time and place, did possess, carried and used the fire arms to wit
committing the murder of deceased Harish Vallabhdas Bhatia by the
said fire arms and thereby committed an offence punishable u/s 27(3)
of the Arms Act and within my cognizance."

B The charge thus itself records two counts, namely, on the first count
under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and on the second count
under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act, 1959. It is at this juncture, however,
it would be convenient to advert to the true purport of the punishment of
death and the social ramifications therefor. On this score we, however, deem
C it expedient to note an earlier decision of this Court in the case of Jai Kumar
v. State of MP., [1999] 5 SCC 1 (in which one of us was a party : U.C.
Banerjee, J). In Jai Kumar (supra) this Court while considering the above
stated as below :

"Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code authorises the Court to punish
D the offender of murder with death or imprisonment for life-the statute
therefore has provided a discretion to the court to sentence the offender
either with death or with imprisonment for life: obviously, a serious
decision and a heavy burden imposed on the Court -This discretion
conferred, however, shall haw to be thus exercised in a manner and
in consonance with the concept of law so as to sub-serve the ends of
E justice and it is on this aspect of the matter that in a long catena of
cases this Court in no uncertain terms laid down that the award of
death sentence though within the ambit of jurisdiction of the courts,
but that does not clothe the courts to exercise the same in a manner
indiscriminate. This Court has been candid enough to record on more
occasions than one that it is only in the rarest of the rare cases that
F
this discretion as regards capital punishment ought to be exercised.
Ours is a civilised society-a tooth for a tooth and eye for an eye ought
not to be the criterion; the civilisation and the due process of law
coupled with social order ought not to permit us to be hasty in regard
to the award of capital punishment and as a matter of fact the Courts
G ought to be rather slow in that direction.

Justice is supreme and justice ought to be beneficial for the society
so that the society is placed in a better off situation. Law courts exist

H
for the society and ought to rise up to the occasion to do the needful
in the matter, and as such ought to act in a manner so as to sub-serve
the basic requirement of the society. It is a requirement of the society
..
SUBHASH RAMKUMAR BIND@ VAKIL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [BANERJEE. J.J 71

and the law must respond to its need. The greatest virtue of law is its A
flexibility and its adaptability, it must change from time to time so
that it answers the cry of the people, the need of the hour and the
order of the day. In the present day society, crime is now considered
a social problem and by reason therefore a tremendous change even
conceptually is being seen in the legal horizon so far as the punishment B
is concerned.

One school of thought on this score propagates that the function
of the law court is that ofa social reformer and as such in its endeavour
to act as such, question of deterring punishment would not arise since
the society would otherwise be further prone to such violent acts or C
activities by reason of the fact that with the advancement of the age
the mental frame of boys of tender age also go on changing and in
the event of any arrogance being developed or a sense of revenge
creeping into the society, the society would perish to the detriment of
its people. The other school, however, expressly recorded and rather
emphatically that unless the severest of the severe punishments are D
inflicted on an offender (obviously depending upon the nature of the
crime) the society would perish.

The other school professes that since one has taken the life of
another that does not mean that his life shall have to be taken but
during the trial if it transpires the method and manner or the nature E
of the activities which have resulted In the elimination of a human
being from this world, there should not be any laxity on the part of
the law courts, otherwise people will and in turn the society will be
engulfed in a false sense of security of life in the event of there being
the most heinous crime of the earth.
F
The law courts as a matter of fact have been rather consistent in
the approach that a reasonable proportion has to be maintained between
the seriousness of the crime and the punishment. While it is true that
a sentence disproportionately severe, ought not to be passed but that
does not even clothe the law courts with an option to award the G
sentence which would be manifestly inadequate having due regard to
the nature of the offence since an inadequate sentence would fail to
produce a deterrent effect on the society at large. Punishments are
awarded not because of the fact that it has to be an eye for an eye or
a tooth for tooth, rather having its due impact on the society: while
undue harshness is not required but inadequate punishment may lead H
72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A to sufferance of the community at large."

Turning attention on to the second count, to wit. the charge under
Section 27(3) of the Arms Act, i959 first. and for the purposes of proper
appreciation of the submissions on this count as well, we deem it fit to note
the provisions as provided in the Statute and the same reads as below :
B
"27. Punishment for using arms, etc. (I)

(2)

(3) Whoever uses any prohibited arms or prohibited ammunition or
does any act in contravention of section 7 and such use or act
c results in the death of any other person, shall be punishable with
death."

Before, however, detailing out the applicability of Section 27(3) of the
Act, we do feel it expedient to advert to the factual backdrop of the matter
presently before us. On the contextual facts it appears that on I 3th June, 1995
D at about eight o'clock in the evening, the deceased, his mother, father, maid
Pramila and Anjana were watching Television in the hall. Shortly, thereafter,
however, somebody pressed the doorbell of the house and Pramila, the maid,
went to see as to who was at the door. As the maid was coming back, Anjana
also went to gallery to see who was at the door whereupon she saw that one
E person was standing on the step near the grill and the other person was
standing below the step. She asked the person standing on the step as to who
he was. He gave his name as Arvind. She asked him as to what work he had.
He told her that he was a friend of Harishbhai and that he had some work
with Harishbhai. At that time Harish on being told by Pramila came to the
passage. He went to the grill of the gallery and he asked the person standing
F on the step as to who he was. That person was talking in a very low voice.
In order to ascertain as to what he was talking Harish leaned on the grill and
that person immediately put his hand inside the grill and caught hold of the
kurta of Harish just to give a violent jerk. He then put his second hand inside·
the grill. At that time Anjana saw that he was holding a pistol in his right
G hand and pointed it at the abdomen of Harish and started firing. At that time
the second person climbed on the grill. He also had a pistol in his hand. He
started firing on the head of Harish and Harish collapsed thereafter. This
collapse of Harish dumb-founded Anjana by reason wherefor it took about a
minute or so before Anjana started shouting and ran inside. She went to the
western balcony to see them where she heard the sound of high acceleration
H of a vehicle in which accused Nos.2 and 3 fled from the place of occurrence.
SUBHASH RAMKUMAR HINOr~f VAKIL 1'. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [BANERJEE, J.) 73

Harish was then shifted to Bhagwati Hospital, where however he was A
pronounced dead. Complaint of AnJana came to be recorded immediately
thereafter i.e. on the same day at about I 0 p.m.

The records depict that from the scene of offence empty cartridges and
bullets were recovered. Panchanama was drawn up and the empty cartridges,
bullets and two pieces of bullets recovered from the stretcher on which the B
deceased was kept were sent to the Chemical Analyser by the Police.

The further factual score depicts that on 3.7.1995 accused Nos.2 and 3
were arrested in LAC No.49 of 1995 at Goregaon and various arms and
ammunitions were recovered from them under a panchanama. Amongst them C
were one 9 mm pistol and one .38 bore imported revolver. On 14.8.1995 the
custody of the accused was obtained in DCB CR No.177 of 1995 and on
15.8.1995 judicial custody of the accused was obtained and it is on 16.8.1995
identification parade of accused Nos.2 and 3 was held in which P.W. l Anjana
and P. W.3 Pramila identified the accused.

.. As regards the injuries suffered by the deceased, PW .8 Dr. Sh inde
conducted the post-mortem examination and had the following to state :

"On my external examination I found the following injuries on
D

the person were noted by me in Column No.17 of my P.M. Report.

(I) Fire arm wound of Entry on left eye brow medical and (if side E
forehead front) 0-8 cm. Diameter with 0-5 c.m. semicircular abraded
collar on upper and outer aspect, inverted margins. No Tattooing or
singeing of hair, dried blood/clots within circular shape.

(2) Fire arm wound of Entry on right side chest front, at the level of
right nipple, 9-5 cm. from right nipple, 3-2 cm. from midline, 0-8 cm. F
Diameter with 0-1 cm. Abraded collar encircling, inverted margins.
No tattooing/singeing of hair, dried blood/clots within, circular shape.

(3) Fire arm wound of entry on left side chest front 3-5 cm from
midline, 10-0 c.m. below and medical to left nipple, 0-8 cm. Diameter G
with 0-1 cm. Abraded collar encircling inverted margins. No tattooing,
singeing of hair, dried blood/clots within circular shape.

(4) Fire arm wound of entry on right side abdomen, epigastric area,
1-5 cm. From midline 2-0 cm. Below and lateral to right costal border.
9-8 cm. Diameter with one cm. Semicircular abraded collar on upper H
74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A aspect, inverted margins. No tattooing, singeing of hair, dried blood/
elects within,· circular shape.

(5) Fire arm wound of entry on the right side chest front, two cm.
Lateral to anterior armpit line, 20-0 c.m. below right exilla/152 c.m.
Below and lateral to right nipple. 0-8 cm. Diameter with 1-4 cm.
B Semicircular abraded singeing of hair, dried blood/clots within circular
shape.

(6) Fire arm wound of entry on the left side abdomen front., pelvic/
fossa, 15-1 cm. From midline, 16-0 cm. Below and lateral to umbillicus
0-8 cm. Diameter with 0-2 cm. Semicircular abraded collar on medical
c aspect (medically) inverted margins. No tattooing/singeing of hair,
dried blood/ clots within circular shape.

(7) fire arm wound of entry on the left side abdomen front, iliac
fossa, 17-2 (17-2 cm) from midline, 0-8 cm. Diameter with 0-5 cm .
.Semicircular or singeing of hair; dried blood/clots within circular
D shape.

(8) Fire arm wound of exit on the left side chest back, 31-0 cm.
...
Below neck throat junction 3.5 cm. From midline, I.I cm. x 1.10 cm.
Everted margins, blood oozes out, oval shape.

E (9) Fire arm wound of exit on the left side trunk back 4I-O cm.
Below left shoulder belt, I4.0 cm. From midline, 2.0 cm. x 1.4 cm.
Everted margins oval shape.

( 10) Fire arm wound of exit on the left side trunk back, 6-1 cm.
Below and medial to ext. injury No. (9) (Nine) I3.5 cm. From midline,
F 2-0 cm. x I .6 cm. Everted margins, oval shape.

(I I) Grazed abrasion on the left side trunk back extending from
lower border of ext. injury No. IO (Ten) to ext. injury No.9 (Nine) to
left side chest back, length 22.0 cm. Breadth one c.m. Red colour
tapering towards chest of breadth 0.5 cm.
G
(12) Fire arm wound of entry on the left thigh lower l/3 medially, 8.0
cm. Above. left knee joint, 0-8 cm. Diameter with 0-5 cm. Semi
·circular abraded collar on lower and front aspect, inverted margins.
No tattooing or singeing of hair, dried blood/clots within circular
shape.
H
SUBHASH RAMKUMAR BIND@VAKIL v. ST ATE OF MAHARASHTRA [BANERJEE. J.j 75

(13) Fire arm wound of exit on the left thigh upper 1/3 back, midline, A
2.0 cm. x 1.4 cm. Everted margins, oval shaped. blood oozes out.
Also 1nultiple puncture \vounds \Vithin everted irregular 1nargins,
extending from left buttock lower part to left thigh middle 1/3 back
of size varying fro1n 0.8 c1n. x 0.5 cn1. To x 0.3 c1n. x 0.2 c1n. \Vith
a copper piece retrieved from left buttock lower medial part and four B
small lead pieces retrieved from left thigh skin underneath.

(14) Multiple puncture wounds with inverted irregular margins. over
right thigh upper 1/3 to middle 1/3 on back, of size varying from 0.4
cm. x 0.3 cm. to 0.2 cm. x 0.1 cm. with three small lead pieces
retrieved from right thigh skin underneath.
c
(15) Fire arm wound of entry on the right lower arm (Forearm) middle
1/3 back (level of little finger) 0.8 cm. Diameter with 0.5 cm.
, Semicircular abraded collar on lower aspect (towards hand), inverted
margins. No tattooing or singeing of hair, dried blood/clots within
circular shape. D
(16) Fire arm wound of exit on the right lower arm (forearm) front
8.0 cm. (Eight cm.) below right cabital fossa, 1.3 cm. x 1.1 cm. Oval
shape everted margins, blood oozes out.

(17) Abrassion red colour on the left lower leg below knee, middle
1.3, front 1.4 cm. x 1.3 cm. E
On the internal examination the doctor found the following internal
injuries :

(I) Corresponding with ext. injury No. One (I) Perforated skin and
muscles underneath, passes through· left nose to right side nose with F
perforated nasal septum, perforated and passes through tight maxillarly
sinus to palate right side perforated. Passes and perforated right side
tongue fossa and pharyngeal fossa muscles to right side neck muscles
laterally with injured and perforated right carotid sheath of cervical
fourth and fifty vertebra intervertebral disc. with its contains i.e. right G
common carotid artery, right internal jugular veins, nerve
accompanying with haemorrhage into adjacent muscles of neck, passes
to right side chest back muscles with perforated 1st inter-costal space
on right side chest back near vertebra, perforated right Jung upper
lobe. Haemorrhage along passage of bullet. A copper jacketed .lead
long (slender) bullet retrieved from right side chest cavity in blood/ H
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A clots.

(2) Corresponding with ext. injury No.2 (2) :-Perforated skin and
nn1scle wnderneath with haematoma underneath. Perforated 4th rib
(fourth rib) cost<1l l;artilage. perforated pericardium, perforated right
ventricle through and through, perforated pericardium perforated right
B pleura, perforated right limb, lower lobe through and through,
perforated right pleura, perforated 11th rib with fracture 11th rib
right side chest back. Penetrate right side chest back muscles.
Haemorrhage along passage of bullet. A copperjacketed lead small
bullet retrieved from right side chest back muscles at 1 Ith rib level
with haematoma and haemorrhage wound.
c
(3) Corresponding with Ext. injury No. three (3). Perforated skin and
muscles underneath with haematoma underneath. Perforated 7th rib
costal cartilage at left side chest front, perforated diaphragm, perforated
stomach through and through upper part, perforated diaphragm,
perforated 11th inter-costal space on left side chest. Perforated left
D
side chest back muscles with exit wound corresponding to ext. injury
no. eight_ (8). Haemorrhage along passage of bullet.

(4) Corresponding with ext. Injury No. four (4) Perforated right side
abdomen skin and muscles underneath with haemotoma underneath.
Perforated peritoneum, perforated ilea coils at two places through and
E
through with mesentery with its vessels and nerves. Perforated
peritoneum, perforated bladder through and through penetrate and
passes right pelvic floor muscles to buttock muscles. Haemorrhage
along passage of bullet. A copper jacketed lead small bullet retrieved
from right buttock muscles lower medial quadrant with haemorrhage
F and haematoma around.

(5) Corresponding with ext. Injury No.five (5) Perforated· right side
chest laterally skin and muscles underneath with haematoma
underneath. Perforated 9th inter-costal space on right side chest
laterally, perforated diaphragm, perforated right lobe of liver through
G and through. Perforated diaphragm, perforated 11th inter-costal space
on right side chest back, penetrate right side chest back muscles.
· Haemorrhage along passage of bullet. A copper jacketed lead along
(slender) bullet retrieved from right side chest back muscles at 12th
rib level with haemorrhage and haematoma around.
H (6) Corresponding with Ext. Injury No.Six (6) Ext. Injury No.Six
SUBHASH RAMKUMAR BIND@ VAKIL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [BANERJEE. J.] 77

Entry passes through muscles. A
Ext. Injury No. Nine exist Haemorrhage along passage.

(7) Corresponding with Ext. Injury No. twelve (12)

Ext. Injury No.Twelve passes left thigh lower entry.

Ext. injury No. thirteen
B
Exist 1/3 medial muscles to left thigh back upper 1/3. Muscles with
injured and perforated left femoral artery and vein underneath.
Haemorrhage along passage of bullet.
(8) Corresponding with Ext. Injury No. fifteen (15) c
Ext. Injury No. fifteen passes through underneath.
Entry: muscles only Haemorrhage
Ext. Injury No. Sixteen along passage of bullet exist."

It is in this context Ballistic Expert's Report seems to go a long way D
as regards the pistol and revolver recovered from the accused persons'
/
possession (marked with article Nos.19 and 20 respectively). The Report
indicated that the bullets and pieces of bullets retrieved from the body of the
deceased on 14.6.1995 were fired from 9 mm pistol and .38 caliber revolver.
Bullets and empties seized under panchanama Exhibit 63 from the scene of E
offence tallied with bullets and pieces of bullets retrieved from the body of
the deceased and they were fired from 9 mm and .38 revolver. Bullets retrieved
from the body of the deceased and those bullets and empties recovered from
the scene of offence were fired from articles 19 and 20.

At this juncture, however, it be noticed that the submissions in support F
of the appeal can thus be summarised under two specific counts, namely, (i)
• submi.ssions pertaining to the Arms Act, 1959; and (ii) under the provisions
of Indian Penal Code. Admittedly, the provisions, both under the Arms Act
as also under the Indian Penal Code prescribe death sentence. It would thus
be convenient to deal with the above noted two several aspects in two distinct G
manners since one is strictly statutory and technical in nature and the other
is to be borne out on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the matter
under consideration.

Re: Arms Act, 1959
Referring at this stage to Section 27(3) of the Arms Act, 1959 it appears H
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A that the statutory provision provides for a definite punishment for a definite
offence : to wit, user of any prohibited arms, which results in the death of
another person and in that event the Statute has been categorical enough to
pr~scribe that user shall be punishable with death. There an: thus two specific
requirements of the Statute in order to bring home the guilt of the accused
B within the meaning of Section 27(3) : the requirements being (a) user of a
prohibited arm; and (b) resultant death of a person by reason of such user.
Incidentally, prohibited arms as defined under Section 2 (I) (i) of the Arms
Act means -

"(i) firearms so designed or adapted that, if pressure is applied to the
trigger, missiles continue to be discharged until pressure is
c removed from the trigger or the magazine containing the missiles
is empty, or

(ii) weapons of any description designed or adapted for the discharge
of any noxious liquid, gas or other such thing, and includes
artillery, anti-aircraft and anti-tank firearms and such other arms
D as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official
.Gazette, specify to be prohibited arms."

Rule 3 of the Arms Rules, 1962 prescribes that for the purposes of the
Arm~ Act, 1959 and the Rules, "arms" and "ammunition" shall be of the
E categories specified in Columns 2 and 3 respectively of Schedule I.

The relevant extract of Schedule I stands as under:

SCHEDULE I

Category Arms Ammunition
F
2 3

(a) Prohibited arms as defined in Prohibited arms as defined in
Section 2(1) (i) and other arms Section 2(1 )(h) and such other
G as the Central Government may, articles as the Central Government
by Notification in the official may, by Notification in the official
Gazette, specify to be prohibited Gazette, specify to be prohibited
arms .. ammunition.

(b) Semi-automatic firearms, Ammunition for arms of category
H other than those included in (b)
SUBHASH RAMKUMAR BIND@ VAKIL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (BANERJEE, J.] 79

categories l(c) and iii (a) A
smooth bore guns having
barrel of less than 20" in
length.

(c) Blot action or semi· Ammunition for fire-arms of
automatic fires of 303" or category l(c) B
7.62 mm. Bore or any other
bore which can chamber
and fire service ammunition
of 303" or 7.62 m.m.
calibre; muskets of .41 O"
musket ammunition
c
pistols, revolvers or
carbines of any bore which
can chamber .380" or .455"
·rimmed cartridges or
service 9 m.m. or .445" D
rimless cartridges.

(d)

E
Ill Firearms other those in Ammunition for fire-arms other
categories !,II .and IV, than those in categories I, lJ and
namely: IV, namely:

(a) Revolvers and pistols
Ammunition for fire-arms of F
category III (a).

His on this score that Mr. Ranjit Kumar has been rather emphatic that
since weapons of offences have been alleged to be a 9 mm pistol and a .38 G
revolver and since. they are not automatically triggered but use of both these
arms would depict that only one shot can be fired by the pull of trigger and
for firing the second shot, the trigger has to be released first and pulled again,
the arms in question cannot come within the purview of 'Prohibited Arms'
as defined under Section 2(1 )(i) of the Act of I 959. It is on this score the
Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Legislation has been referred to by H
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Mr. Ranjit Kumar in aid of his submissions. But before recording such a
submission be it noted that the Statement of Objects and Reasons is not
otherwise admissible as an aid to the construction of a Statute but the same
simply assists as to the necessity of introduction of such a law and since the
decision of this Court in Asl1'ini Kumar Ghosh and Anr. v. Arabinda Bose
and Anr. [I 953) SCR I, the law seems to be well settled without a contra
-·s note being sounded till now that while construing the clear terms of an Act
the Court is not required to ascertain the object of the enactment. We, however,
hasten to add that though, in case of an urgent need of the situation by reason
wherefor the intent of the legislature is to be assessed, the Statements and
Objects can be looked into for the limited purpose of ascertaining the
C conditions prevailing at the time which prompted or actcated the proposer of
the Bill to introduce the same and the extent of remedying the existing evil
of the society.

Be that as it may apropos the Statement of Objects and Reasons and
having felt the necessity of considering the same by reason of the factum of
D introduction of deterrent punishment for offences relating to prohibited arms
and ammunitions and to meet the challenges from anti-national elements, we
do feel it expedient to note the same in extenso.

"Statement of Objects and Reasons of Arms (Amendment) Act, 42 of
1988-The Arms Act, 1959, had been amended to provide for
E enhanced escalating terrorist and anti-national activities. However, it
was reported that terrorist and anti-national elements, particularly in
Punjab, had in the recent past acquired automatic firearms, machine
guns of various types, rockets and rocket launchers. Although the
definitions of the expressions "arms", "ammunitions", "prohibited
F rrms" and '·prohibited ammunitions" included in the Act are adequate
to cover the aforesaid lethal weapons in the matter of punishments
for offences relating to arms, the Act did not make any distinction
between offences involving ordinary arms and the more kthal
prohibited arms and prohibited ammunitions. Further, while the Act
provided for punishment of persons in possession of arms and
G ammunition with intent to use them for any. unlawful purpose, it did
not provide for any penalties for the actual use of illegal arms. To
overcome these deficiencies, it was proposed to amend the Act by
providing for deterrent punishment for offences relating to prohibited
arms and ammunition and for the illegal use of firearms and
H ammunition so as to effectively meet the challenges from the terrorist
SUBHASH RAM KUMAR BIND@ VAKIL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [BANERJEE. J.) 81

and anti-national elements. Accordingly. the Arms (Amendment) A
Ordinance, 1988, was promulgated by the President on the 27th May,
1988.""

The punishment provided stands to be the severe most one and under
the general law of the land it is only in the rarest of the rare cases that such
a punishment can be inflicted on to an accused. Obviously, the intent of the B
legislature as appears from the Statement of Objects and Reasons cannot
possibly be decried by reason of the situation prevalent during the period in
question. In more than one State of the country it was rather a dismal picture.
The use of prohibited arms and deadly weapons turned out to be a regular
feature and the existing state of law was not in a position to subvert t!1ese C
moves by the anti-national elements and in the event of incorporation in the
Statute Book of a legislation whi.ch stands engrafted therein to protect the
society from these unruly elements, it is a bounden obligation of the law
Courts to attribute its widest possible amplitude to the words used in the
legislature and interpret the legislation in accordance therewith. Question of
there being a restrictive meaning to be attributed thus would not arise. It is D
on the basis as noticed above that Mr. Ranjit Kumar's submission that in fact
there was no notification as required by law (vide Category A, Schedule I
noticed above), in the absence of which the articles being marked 19 and 20
ought to be treated within category 'C' noted above and thus cannot be
termed to be a prohibited item shall have to be considered.
E
Incidentally, there is on record a note in the form of instructions to all
the States. Before delving on to the same the note is extracted hereinbelow:

1 "l am directed to say that in accordance with Rule 7(a) (iii) on the
Indian Arms Rules, I 95 I the import into India of .38 bore Pistols/
revolvers is prohibited. Representations have been received that .38 F
bore pistols which are not m use in the Armed Services may be
excluded from the classification of prohibited bore weapons, import
of which is prohibited under the Indian Arms Act. Some doubts also
been raised as to the whether .38 bore Pistols/Revolvers for this
purpose. The Govt. of India has been advised by their technical experts G
that .38 or .380 bore pistols (self loaded or automatic Colt) which fire
.38 Rimies cartridges are not in use in the Armed Services. It has
accordingly been decided that these pistols should not be treated as
weapons of prohibited bores falling under Rule of the Indian Arms

- Rules.
H
82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A 2. It has fttrth~t beeh decided that the following weapons of prohibited
bore, im~firt tJf which shall not be granted under Rule 7 of the lndi11n
Arms Rules, nantel¥ ·:
I. .380 bore revolver.
2. 9.65 MM Caliber Revolvers (This should be equivalent to .38
B bore Revolvers).
3. All weapons firing rimmed cartridges having bore diameter across
lattds in the range between .340 to .365 and
4. All 9 MM caliber pistol which can load and fire service cartridges
C rifles 9 MM."

3. The State Govt. are already aware that the question of revision of
the Indian Arms Act & Rule is under consideration of the Govt. of
India and it is intended to incorporate the classifications mentioned
above in the Indian Arms Rules when revised . In the meantime, I am
D to request that the other State Govt. may give effect to the above
decision at once." (As per the. paper book filed).

The High Court on this score stated :

"On a fair interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Arms Act;
E the rules made thereunder; the relevant schedule and in the light of
the above letter, we are of the opinion that Articles 19 and 20, seized
from the accused are prohibited arms within the meaning of Arms
Act, 1959 and hence Section 27(3) thereof is squarely attracted to the
facts of the present case."

F The submission of the State, however, has been that the note issued by
the Central Government as noticed above, ought to be treated as an
authorisation within the meaning of the first schedule to the Statute. Mr.
Ranjit Kumar vis-a-vis the note had a two pronged attack on the score : On
the first count, it has been contended that the note pertaining to the 9 mm
G pistol and .38 bore imported revolver stands out to be prohibited for the
purposes of importation only, as such the general definition as regards the
prohibited weapons would not in any way thus stand attracted and hence the
note to be treated as an instruction and not a notification, thus does not
authorise a punishment under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act. We find,
however, that there is some justification in such a contenti0n but the second
H count is rather important inasmuch as the requirement of the Statute is the
SUBHASH RAM KUMAR BIND® VAKIL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [BANERJEE. J.J 83

issuance of a notification. Notification in con1111on English acceptation 1nean A
and imply a formal announcement of a legally relevant fact and in the event
of a Statute speaking of a Notification being published in the Official Gazette,
the same cannot but mean a Notification published by the authority of law
in the Official Gazette.

It is on formal declaration and publication of an order and shall have B
to be in accordance \Vith the declared policies or in the event the require1nent
of the Statute then in that event in accordance therewith. It is on this score
the observations of this Court in Union of India and Am·. v. Charan) it S. Gill
end Ors., [2000] 5 SCC 742 may be of some relevance. This Court while
dealing with the Army Act, 1950 and the Court Martials thereunder observed C
that the "Notes" have been issued by the authorities of the Armed Forces for
the guidance of the officers connected with the implementation of the
provisions of the Act and the Rules and not with the object of supplementing
or superseding the statutory Rules by ad1T,inistrative instructions thus more or
less on similar situation as is presently under consideration since the "Note"
cannot but be termed to be an administrative instruction. This Court in D
Charanjit S. Gill (supra) on the basis of the aforesaid stated that the
administrative instructions issued or the notes attached to the Rules which are
not referable to any statutory authority cannot be permitted to bring about a
result which may take away the rights vested in a person goverPed by the Act
we do record our coQcurrence with such a statement since in our view question E
of issuance of an administrative order or a note pertaining to special type of
weapons to bring it within the ambit of the Arms Act which was hitherto not
being included therein cannot be said to be included in the manner as it has
sought to have been so done. Section 27(3) of the Arms Act prescribes a
death penalty in the event the arm or weapon concerned stands out to be a
prohibited arm, user of which results in a death a rather stringent provision. F
A person, howsoever graver the offence may be, cannot be punished more
than as is prescribed under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act. On a comparative
analysis of Section 302, there is some amount of laxity involved as regards
the resultant death of a person by reason of a deliberate act of the accused
it is on this score the legislature prescribes two objects, namely, imprisonment G
of life or death thus leaving it to the wisdom of the Court to pass the sentence
in accordance with the gravity of the nature of offence and the methodology
used to bring an end to the life of the assassin. It is in this perspective that
the law is settled enough to record that it is only in the rarest of the rare cases
that the maximum penalty, namely, the death sentence ought to be levied
since that would be a barbarous act as that would run counter to the civilised H
84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A notion and concept of the justice delivery system. True, a man's life comes
to an end but would the justice delivery system require that he should equally
be puni:shetl itt the same fashion and manner. This issue has been answered
ll\ the negative with a rider that in the event, however, the methodology
adopted by the accused cannot but be termed to be rarest of the rare, this
B court would be at liberty to punish the offender with a death penalty. The
jurisprudential system has developed in the country on this backdrop and it
is in this perspective this possible attraction of Section 27(3) of the Arms Act
shall also have to be dealt with. The Court must use the greatest amount of
caution in the matter of exercise of jurisdiction under Section 27(3) and
unless1 needless to record that the issue in question stands covered in all its
C perspective and no two opinions can be had thereon, the Court will not be
justified to bring home the charge under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act.
Liberty is precious but life is more precious than liberty and the latter cannot
possibly be taken away, if one does not cross the limits even at the cost of
unforensic language in judicial phraseology on 'the drop of a hat' but one
needs to bring home the attributes without any doubt as regards Section 27(3)
D of the Arms Act. The Statute speaks of a notification in the Official Gazette
can an administrative note in relation to importation of a prohibited arm be
termed to be sufficient so as to come within the ambit of the statutory
requirement of a notification in the Official Gazette the answer cannot but be
in the negative. Administrative instructions cannot possibly be a substitute
E for a notification which stands as a requirement of the Statute.

On the wake of the aforesaid, question of there being any notification
even in the guise of an administrative order does not and cannot arise. The
requirement of the Statute is sacrosanct and since the issue shall have to be
dealt with utmost care and caution, without the issuance of a notification
F question of a conviction under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act would not
arise. We are thus unable to record our concurrence with the submissions of
the 'State that the administrative instructions ought to be treated as a
notification-the same cannot be sustained for reasons noticed hereinbefore
and by reason of the stringency of the provision as laid down in Section
G 27(3), we do find some justification in the criticism of the judgment of the
High Court as regards the acceptability of the administrative note.

In that view of the matter, the first contention of Mr. Ranjit Kumar in
support of the appeal succeeds that conviction under Section 27(3) cannot be
sustained.
H Turning attention on to the offence under the general law of the land,
SUBHASH RAM KUMAR BIND@ VAKIL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [BANERJEE, J.] 85
... the High Court thought it fit to confirm the death sentence as granted by the A
learned Sessions Judge. Be it noted that Section 354(3) of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 specifically records that in the event of a sentence of
death the Court must state special reasons for such a sentence. Let us, however,
at this juncture see for ourselves as to whether in fact the High Court
confirming the death sentence have recorded any speoial reasons therefor. In B
paragraph 83 of the judgment, the High Court recorded as below :

"Deceased Harish Bhatia was only trying to recover legitimate dues
of the brother-in-law P.W.6 Rajesh by persuasion and requests. He
was a respectable person not involved in any crimes. When the incident
occurred he was totally defenQ~less. He was shot at in a most brutal
manner. Depravity orthe accus~ is evident from the way in which C
they fired at the deceased by Slllng to his door steps when he was
unarmed. We have no manner of do"bt that this is one of the rarest
of rare cases which warrant impositl1in of death penalty."

This, however, in our view, does not satisfy the statutory requirement D
as noticed hereinbefore since the same cannot be termed to be a special
reason for imposition of such a penalty. Gunshot injuries were caused and at
that point of time the deceased was unarmed and was taken aback as to the
whole situation in every incidence of murder brutality is involved. It is not
as that what we find on the factual score in Jai Kumar (supra). Brutality,
obviously would be an existing factor but how the same did take place is the E
relevant and necessary material to be considered. Jn Jai Kumar (supra) the
accused was trying to commit rape on his brother's wife and having failed
to achieve the object committed a brutal murder by severing her head from
the body and hanging her head on the tree. The accused further committed
a murder of the 8 years old daughter of deceased sister-in-law who had F
witnessed the incident and the facts establish the depravity and criminality of
the accused in no uncertain terms that has been the factual finding in Jai
Kumar (supra) and the Court confirmed the sentence of death : Is it with the
same brutality or can the acts be termed to be similar in nature so far as
brutality is concerned, the answer cannot but be in the negative. The High
Court placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Dhananjoy (Dhana,Yoy G
Chatterjee alias Dh(Jna v. State of W.B., [1994) 2 S2C 220 and in particular
relied upon the following observation :

"In our opinion, measure of punishment in a given case must depend
upon the atrocity of the crime; the conduct of the criminal and the
defenceless and unprotected state of the victim. Imposition of H
86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A appropriate punishment is the manner in which the courts respond to
the society's cry for justice against the criminals. Justice demands
that courts should impose punishment befitting the crime so that the
courts reflect public abhorrence of the crime. The courts must not
only keep in view the rights of the criminal but also the rights of the
victim of crime and the society at large while considering imposition
B of appropriate punishment."

In the last noticed decision the factual score prompted this Court to
confirm the death sentence. Paragraph 16 of the judgment gives us a glimpse
thereof and as such the same is set out hereinbelow :
c "The sordid episode of the security guard, whose sacred duty was
to ensure the protection and welfare of the inhabitants of the flats in
the apartment, should have subjected the deceased, a resident of one
of the flats, to gratify his lust and murder her in retaliation for his
transfer on her complaint, makes the crime even more heinous.
D Keeping in view the medical evidence and the state in which the
body of the deceased was found, it is obvious that a most heinous
type of barbaric rape and murder was committed on a helpless aud
defenceless school-going girl of 18 years. If the security guards behave
in this manner who will guard the guards? The faith of the society by
such a barbaric act of the guard, gets totally shaken and its cry for
E justice becomes loud and clear. The offence was not only inhuman
and barbaric but it was a totally ruthless crime of rape followed by
cold blooded murder and an affront to the human dignity of the
society. The savage nature of the crime has shocked our judicial
conscience. There are no extenuating or mitigating circumstances
whatsoever in the case. We agree that a real and abiding concern for
F
the dignity of human life is required to be kept in mind by the courts
while considering the confirmation of the sentence of death but a
cold blooded preplanned brutal murder, without any provocation, after
committing rape on an innocent and defenceless young girl of 18
years, by the security guard certainly makes this case a "rarest of the
G rare" cases which calls for no punishment other than the capital
punishment and we accordingly confirm the sentence of death imposed
upon the appellant for the offence under section 302 IPC. The order
of sentence imposed on the appellant by the Courts below for offences
under Sections 376 and 380 IPC are also confirmed along with the
directions relating thereto as in the event of the execution of the
H
SUBHASH RA MK UM AR BIND@ VAKIL v. ST A, Tl' (If MAHARASHTRA (BANERJEE,!.] 87

appellant, those sentences Wl\Yhl 001¥ Nmaln of academic interest. A
Thk appeal fails and is here\\¥ l!ismissed."

Ours being a civilised socie1¥· 11 \ooth for a tooth and an eye for an eye
0ught not to be the criterion. ~ml Ill' ~YQh \hQ q"estion of there being acting
under any haste in regard 111 thQ eapital pYni~hment would not arise : Rather
our jurisprudence speaks of the f11~111m \lf thQ law courts being slow in that B
direction and it is in t!i~1 1wrspectiw 11 reasonable proportion has to be
maintained between the ll~in\1\lsnQs~ of the Qrime and the punishment. While
it is true punishment dispmp\lrtim111tely sevtre ought not to be passed but that
does not even clo\lle tlw law QllYfl~, h@wever, with an option to award the
sentence which wou!g 11@ monifl'lstly inadequate having due regard to the C
nature of offence sin~Q on in11d@q11ate ientence would not subserve the cause
of justice to the socie\y, In llw QQnte11t11al facts, we do not find the brutality
of such a nature so as 111 @~QfQiSQ Ille discretion of passing an order of capital
punishment und1wllt@dly llrutality is involved but that brutality by itself will
not brin~ ii within th@ amllll Qf the mest of the rare cases. On the wake of
lh~ arnresaid ijn\I hovin!! r~1111ra to the nature of the offence and the D
!lle\hAl!lllll!IY ~llllpl@ll, w@ ON eunvlncod that the punishment awarded to the
appellants !i•fein i§ in @l\Q@H of the requirement of the situation and as such
while .re~prl!in!,! gyr Q\ln@YrN1ieo with the finding as recorded by the High
Court in the jlll'l!lm@nt impu1111ud, as regards the guilt of the accused under
Section 3\)7. f"llll wilh !io~\l(ln 34 of the Indian Penal Code, we are inclined E
Ill mmHfy lh@ §elltt>n~e of death to that of life imprisonment under Section
~Q~ rn?ll wi!h !!@@\ion H gf the lnlli~n Penal Code as against the appellants
h@rllin, Qnl! ii i§ m@@r@ll ftQQm@in11ly: Except however, as above, this appeal
fuiis aml i~ t!i§mi§§@\I,
K.K,,T. Appeals dismissed F