Holding

The Supreme Court held that the conspiracy and murder charges against the appellants were not proved and set aside their convictions.

Summary

The deceased Yadav Navkar allegedly entered into a sale agreement for his land with the appellants, but a forged General Power of Attorney was later executed by accused No.1, leading to a sale deed in favour of the appellants. After Navkar went missing, his wife filed a report, a FIR was lodged under Sections 364 and 302 IPC, and a dead body was identified as Navkar. An approver (PW1) surrendered and implicated accused No.1 in the murder, while the prosecution alleged a two‑stage conspiracy – forgery of the power of attorney and the subsequent murder – involving the appellants. The trial court and High Court convicted the appellants on the basis of the alleged agreement, the approver’s testimony and circumstantial evidence. The Supreme Court held that the alleged agreement to sell was not proved, the forged power of attorney conspiracy was not established against the appellants, and the circumstantial evidence was insufficient; suspicion cannot replace proof. Consequently, the appellants were granted the benefit of doubt and their convictions were set aside.

Issues considered

The prosecution proved a conspiracy to forge a power of attorney involving the appellants.
Whether the alleged agreement to sell land and the consideration amount are admissible as evidence.
Whether the approver's testimony and circumstantial evidence establish a pre‑concerted conspiracy for murder involving the appellants.
Whether suspicion or slander evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction under Sections 302, 364, 467, 468, 471 IPC.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedures. 164, s. 306
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 32
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 1028, s. 1208, s. 201, s. 302, s. 34, s. 364, s. 420, s. 465, s. 467, s. 468, s. 471

Subjects

conspiracyforgerymurdercircumstantial evidencebenefit of doubtpower of attorneysale deedapprover testimonyIndian Penal Codecriminal law

Judgment

A SUBHASH HARNARAYANJI LADDHA
v.
STA TE OF MAHARASHTRA

DECEMBER 5, 2006

B (S.B. SINHA AND MARKANDEY KA TJU, JJ.]

Penal Code, I 860; Ss. 302, 364, 465, 467, 47 I rlw S. I 20B:

Conspiracy and murder-Land/property belonging to deceased allegedly
C sold by accused by forging power of attorney-Hatching of conspiracy and
committed murder of the deceased misappropriated the amount received in
consideration of sale proceeds of the land/property-FIR-Charge-sheet
against accused Nos. I to 5-Trial Court found accused persons guilty of
committing crime u!ss. 302, 364, 465, 467 and 471 rlw S. I 20B and convicted
D and sentenced them accordingly-Affirmed by High Court-On appeal, Held:
In conspiracy to forge power of attorney, involvement of accused-appellants
not proved-Purported agreement to sell having not proved, contents thereof
wholly inadmissible in evidence-Therefore, no part thereof including
consideration amount specified therein could be used by the prosecution
against accused-No allegation imputed against accused-appellants in a
E report filed by the wife of the deceased-No evidence brought on record to
show involvement of accused persons-Since deal about selling of land was
stated to be settled between the deceased and PW25, inference could not be
drawn about involvement of accused in both conspiracies-Conspiracy having
not been established as regards commission offorgery, the larger conspiracy
F ofcommitting the murder could not be established/proved-Suspicion, however
grave, is no substitute for proof-Circumstantial evidence insufficient to
prove pre concert amongst the accused persons-Hence accused entitled to
benefit of doubt-Judgment of conviction and sentence set aside-Evidence-
Circumstantial evidence.

G Deceased purported to have entered into an agreement of sale in respect
of certain land with the appellants on consideration amount of fifteen lakh
rupees. An advertisement for sale of the land/properties in question was issued
.
in a newspaper on 26.7.2000. Admittedly, a Deed of Sale was executed
. by the
accused No.I in favour of the appellants for certain sale consideration on

H 40
SUBHASH HARNARA YANJI LADDHA v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 41

8.8.2000. There exists a dispute as to whether he had accepted a sum of A
Rs.75,000/- or a sum of Rs.2 lakhs by way of earnest money. A purported
General Power of Attorney is said to have been executed by the deceased in
favour of accused no.I. Accused No.5 has allegedly impersonated as the
deceased. Later, the power of attorney was found to be a forged one. As the
deceased was found missing since 3.9.2000, a report to that effect was lodged B
by his wife (PW38), but the deceased could not be traced out. She filed another
report. The High Court recorded the principal allegations contained in the
report that she was informed by her husband that a deal for selling the land/
property was settled with PW25, who had given a sum ofRs.75,000/- by way
of earnest money and in that view of the matter she suspected that Accused
No.1 might have abducted her husband and kept him confined to some place C
or might have caused danger to his life in order to grab the amount received
~y him on the basis of the forged general power of attorney. On the basis of
the report, a First Information Report was registered by the police under
Section 364 IPC. In the meanwhile a dead body was found by the Police. A
First Information Report was also recorded by the Police. On the same day
accused, PWl surrendered before the Police. He informed the investigat~ng D
officer that the deceased was murdered by Accused No.1. He turned out an
approver. In his statement he furnished details as to how the deceased had
been murdered. He also disclosed the role played by him at the instance of
accused No.I.
E
A charge-sheet was filed by the Police against accused No. I for
committing the crime under Sections 364, 302, 201, 420, 467, 468, 471 read
with Section 34 IPC and accused Nos.2 to 4 for committing the crime under
Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 read with Section 34 IPC. The statement of PWl
was recorded under Section 306 of the Code of Criminal Procedure after grant
of pardon to him. Initially charges were not framed against Accused Nos. 2 to F
4 under Sections 302 and 1028 of the Indian Penal Code but later the same
were altered by an order dated 20.7.2004. The appellants were convicted by
the Trial Judge for the offence alleged and sentenced accordingly. Aggrieved,
they filed appeals, which were dismissed by the High Court. Hence the present
appeals.
G
Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1. Purported circumstultra vires had weighed the Trial Judge
as also the High Court to arrive at a finding of guilt against the accused-
appellants revolve around execution of the sale deed as also the purported H
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 10 S.C.R.

A earnest note. (47-,GJ
1.2. The theory propounded by the prosecution was that the accused had
entered into two conspiracies, one was the smaller one being forgery of power
of attorney which was used for execution of the sale deed and the other one
leading to murder of the deceased. The smaller conspiracy appeared to have
B given rise to the larger conspiracy, namely, murder of the deceased so that
accused no.1 can appropriate the entire amount of consideration. Both the
conspiracies although might have been hatched at two different stages, were
treated to be parts of the same transaction. (48-C-D)

1.3. With a view to ascertain the involvement of accused-appellants,_ it
C is noticed that in the conspiracy to forge power of attorney, it has not been
proved that apart from accused nos.1and5 anybody else was involved. The
purported agreement to sell having not been proved, the contents thereof were
wholly inadmissible in evidence. If it was not admissible in evidence, no part
thereof far less the amount of consideration specified therein or the amount
D of earnest money stated therein could be used by the prosecution against the
accused. If the said document had not been proved, no reliance thereupon could
be placed for any purpose whatsoever. The said agreement also said to have
been cancelled. PW25, on whose deposition the High Court had relied upon,
stated that a sum of Rs.2 lakhs was paid by way of earnest money. PW38, wife
of the deceased, however, states that only a sum ofRs.75,000/- was paid. She
E further states that the original agreement was with PW25. She did not produce
the same. The Public Prosecutor did not offer any explanation whatsoever as
to why the original agreement for sale was not produced. According to PW38
she obtained a xerox copy of the said agreement of sale from the Collectorate.
At whose instance the said xerox copy was filed with the Collector of the
p District has not been established. (48-E, F, G, HJ

1.4. In her report dated 18.9.2000, PW38 did not disclose about the
agreement for sale. She did not make any allegation against the accused even
in her second report. The suspicion that the deceased was done away with
must have been crystallized by then but no allegation whatsoever was made
G against the accused. There is furthermore nothing on record to show that
they had anything to do with Accused No.1 during the period between
16.5.2000 to 30.6.2000 when the purported power of attorney was executed.
(49-BI

1.5. No evidence was brought on records to show the involvement of the
H accused persons prior to 3.9.2000~ Even no prosecution witness had stated
·-
~ ..,,,.,
SUBHASH HARNARA YANJI LADD HA v. ST ATE OF MAHARASHTRA 43
that the deceased was done away with as he came to learn about the forgery A
and that he had been deprived ofa huge sum of amount. Jfthe statement of
PW38 was correct that a deal had been made by her husband with PW25 only,
it is difficult to arrive at an inference that the accused persons were parties
to both the conspiracies. f49-D, EJ

1.6. Statement of PW 38, wife of the deceased before the court was made B
on the basis of what she had learnt from her husband. She had no direct
knowledge thereabout. Her statement was not admissible in evidence under
Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act (49-GJ

1.7. In absence of any connecting links in the chain there is no reason
to agree with the findings of the Courts below that conspiracy by the accused
c
for committing forgery of the power of attorney has been established. If

.... ingredients of conspiracy have not been established for proving the prosecution
case as regards commission of forgery, the larger conspiracy also cannot be
said to have been proved. (49-H; 50-Al
D
2.1. Except PWl nobody has deposed with regard to commission of
murder. PWl, in his statement before the police, did not even name accused
no.2. His name was disclosed by him, for the first time, in his statement made
before the Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.P.C. In his statement before the
Magistrate he merely alleged that accused no.I had taken him to a .Hotel where
accused no.2 was sitting. Why arcused no.1 took him to the hotel has not E
been explained. Why accused no.I wanted accused no.2 to pay him some money
has also not been disclosed. Even if the statement made by PWl that accused
no.I did ask the accused no.2 to pay some money, the very fact that he declined
to do so stating "who has asked him to commit murder of the deceased" is
itself pointer to the fact that even accused no.2 was not a party to the conspiracy.
F
(50-B,CJ
2.2. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it will be hazardous to
convict the appellants only on the basis of slander evidence. Suspicion
howsoever grave may be is no substitute for proof. Circumstantial evidence
which might have been brought on records are not such which can lead to a
firm conclusion that there had been a pre-concert amongst the appellants on G
the one hand and the accused no.1 on the other. There is even no allegation
far less any proof that at any point of time prior to 3.9.2000 the accused no.2
had met accused no.l. f50-D, E)

2.3. It is also noticed that even the investigating officer did not consider
H
....,.,.,
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 10 S.C.R.

A it appropriate to charge the appellants for commission of murder of the
deceased or they being party to the conspiracy. For the reasons stated, the
appellants are entitled to benefit of doubt. (50-E, F)

CRIMINAL APPELLA TAE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 844 of
2006.
B
From the final Judgment and Order dated 28-2-2006 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in Cr!. A. No. 698/2004.

Vijay Kotwal, Uday Umesh Lalit, Venkateshwara Rao Anumolu,
Meenakshi Arora and Gaurav Agrawal for the Appellant.
c Sushi! Karanjkar and Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S. B. SINHA, J. These three appeals arising out of a common judgment
of conviction and sentence, were taken up for hearing together and are being
D disposed of by this common judgment. Accused Nqs.2 to 4 before the
learned Sessions Judge are before us. Accused No. I was Ajay@ Rameshwar
Raghuram @ Sheshrao Galat Dhabekar, Accused No.5 was Baijrao @
Rawalsingh Saju Rathod. Accused No. I was convicted for commission of an
offence under Sections 302, 364, 467, 468, 471 read with Section 1208 of the
E Indian Penal Code whereas Accused No.5 was convicted for commission of
an offence under Section 465 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced
to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for two years.

The deceased was one Yadav Navkar. He was resident of Survey No.45
of Village Umri, Taluka Akola. He purported to have entered into an agreement
p of sell in respect of the said land with the appellants herein on or about
16.5.2000. The amount of consideration stipulated therein is said to be fifteen
lakhs. There exists a dispute as to whether he had accepted a sum of
Rs.75,000/- or a sum of Rs.2 lakhs by way of earnest money. A purported
General Power of Attorney is said to have been executed by the deceased in
favour of accused no. I on 30.6.2000. Accused No.5 is said to have
G impersonated as the deceased. The said power of attorney was found to be
a forged one.

An advertisement for sale was issued in a newspaper known as "Daily
Deshonnati" on 26.7.2000 stating that I .Hectare 1 Are in Survey No.45 is
available for sale. Admittedly, a Deed of Sale was executed by the accused
H No. I in favour of the appellants herein for a sale consideration of Rs.9 lakhs
SUBHASH HARNARA YANJI LADDHA v. STA TE OF MAHARASHTRA [S.B. SINHA, J.) 45

on 8.8.2000. A
As the deceased was found missing since 3.9.2000, a report to that
effect was lodged by his wife Smt.Kausha\yabai (PW38). As despite the said
report of Kaushalyabai, the deceased could not be traced out, another report
was made by her stating that her husband could not be traced since 3.9.2000.
The High Court recorded the principal allegations contained in the said report B
in the following terms:

" .... that her husband Yadav Navkar had left the house on 3rd
September, 2000 at about 9 O'clock and he had stated he will return
within half an hour but he had not returned. The missing report was
registered and search was carried out for Yadav Navkar but he was c
not traced. Meanwhile, Kausalyabai received a letter in the name of
her daughter Geeta purported to have been addressed by Yadav
Navkar informing her that he had gone to village Pandhari near Shegaon
and then he had left for Shirdi. Since Yadav Navkar was still not
traceable search was being carried out. Thereafter, Kausalyabai D
received information that the land owned by her husband bearing
Survey No. 45 of village Umri, Taluka Akola was sold by one Ajay
Galat (accused no. 1) under the garb of general power of attorney
executed by Yadav Navkar in his favour to accused nos. 2 to 4 and
that the said power of attorney was executed by Yadav Navkar in
favour of the accused no. I on 30.6.2000. She also learnt that the sale- E
deed in respect of the said land was executed on 8.8.2000 for
consideration of Rs. 9 lacs. However, since Yadav Navkar along with
his family members had gone to pilgrimage and had returned to Akola
on 1.7.2000 in the morning it was impossible for Yadav Navkar to
execute the power of attorney on 30th June, 2000. Moreover, earlier F
there was an agreement of sale executed between the deceased and
accused nos. 2 to 4 in respect of the very same property under which
Yadav Navkar had received an amount of Rs. 75,000/-. The said
agreement which was executed on 16th May, 2000 was later on
cancelled and hence there was no possibility ofYadav Navkar selling
the same land to accused nos. 2 to 4. On 14th October, 2000 G
Kausalyabai lodged a report stating all the above referred facts. She
also stated in the said report that accused no. I Ajay Galat had been
to her house on 3rd September, 2000 and her husband had gone with
him and then her husband had not returned. She suspected the role
of accused no. I in commission of murder of her husband .... "
H
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 10 S.C.R.

A It was further alleged that she was informed by her husband that the
deal was settled with a person named Suresh Deshmukh (PW25) and he had
given a sum of Rs.75,000/- by way of earnest money and in that view of the
matter she suspected that Accused No. I might have abducted her husband
and kept him confined to some place or might have caused danger to his life
B in order to grab the amount received by him on the basis of the said forged
general power of attorney.

On the basis of the said report, a First Information Report was registered
by the police under Section 364 IPC.

In the meanwhile a dead body was found by the officers of Police
C Station Bhaisdehi, Madhya Pradesh. A First Information Report was also
recorded by the officer of the said Police Station. Information with regard to
the dead body was received by the officers of Police Station Civil Lines,
Ako la on 22.10.2000. On the next day, i.e., on 23.10.2000 PW38 Kaushalyabai
along with others went to Police Station Bhaisdehi and on the basis of the
D articles purported to have been found on his dead body as also the photographs
of the dead body, she identified it to be that of her husband Yadav Nawkar.

On the same day Sunil Manmothe (PWl) surrendered before the Akola
Police. He informed the investigating officer that Yadav Nawkar was murdered
by Accused No. I. He turned as an approver and was examined by the
E prosecution in support of its case as PWI. In his statement he furnished
details as to how the deceased had been taken from Akola on 3.9.2000 to
various places and was ultimately murdered. He also disclosed the role
played by him at the instance of accused No. I after the said incidence of
murder.

F During investigation, inter alia, it was found that Accused No.5 had
executed an earnest note in respect of the land belonging to the deceased.
Rajesh Ingole and Suresh Deshmukh were called to identify Accused No.5 as
they were witnesses to the earnest note dated 16.5.2000 (Article "L"). ,.
G A charge-sheet thereafter was filed by the Police Officer incharge of
Akola Civil Lines Police Station. In the charge-sheet Accused No.1 was
alleged to have committed crime under Sections 364, 302, 201, 420, 467, 468,
471 read with Section 34 IPC and Accused Nos.2 to 4 have committed crime
under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 read with Section 34 IPC. The statement
of PWI was recorded under Section 306 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
H after grant of pardon to him on 26.12.2001. Initially charges were not framed
. /
SUBHASH HARNARA YANJI LADD HA v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [S.B. SINHA, J.] 47

against Accused Nos. 2 to 4 under Sections 302 and 1028 of the Indian Penal A
Code against the appellants but later the same were altered by an order dated
20.72004.

The prosecution, in support of its case, examined 49 witnesses. We are,
however, concerned with the evidence of those witnesses only, namely, PW
1 Ajay Galat who became the approver; PW25 Suresh Deshmukh in whose B
presence the purported agreement to sell (Article L} dated 16.5.2000 was
executed; and PW38 Kaushalyabai who was the complainant.

The appellants were convicted by the learned Trial Judge. Their appeal
before the High Court has also been dismissed by reason of the impugned C
judgment.

Accused No.1 being not before us, it is not necessary for us to scrutinize
the entire evidence on record. It is also not necessary to go into the niceties
of legal questions as regards the mode and manner in which the PWJ was
granted pardon and was made an approver by the police. Accused No.5 has D
been ~onvicted under Section 365 IPC and sentenced to two years RI. He has
accepted the verdict and did not prefer any appeal before the High Court.

The case of the prosecution, to some extent, may be held to have been
proved, namely, Accused No. I in collaboration with Accu3ed No.5 forged the
general power of attorney and he, relying on, on the basis thereof executed E
a deed of sale in favour of Accused Nos.2 to 4. Prior thereto an advertisement
was published in the newspaper and a sum of Rs.9 lakhs in cash was received
by Accused No. I from the appellants herein and out of the said sum he
deposited a sum of Rs.8 lakhs in different ~anks. His involvement i~ the
murder of the deceased is also not in dispute. The identity of the dead body
is also not in dispute before us. The mode and manner in which the deceased F
has been done away with is also accepted. The role played by the approver
Accused No. I may not also be of much significance for our purpose.

The purported circumstances which had weighed the learned Trial Judge
as also the High Court to arrive at a finding of guilt against the appellants G
herein revolve around execution of the sale deed as also the purported
earnest note (Article L). It is also not in dispute that PW! had named the
accused No.2 in his statement but had not named the accused Nos.3 and 4.

The High Court proceeded to hold that keeping in view the fact that the
prosecution did not explain non production of original Agreement to Sell H
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 10 S.C.R. '·
A dated I6.5.2000 and merely produced a xerox copy thereof, the same was not
admissible in evidence. It, however, relied upon the oral testimonies of PW25
and PW38 to form an opinion that in view of the fact that the amount of
consideration fixed in the Agreement to Sell dated I 6.5.2000 was Rs. I 5 lakhs,
the sale deed having been executed for a consideration of Rs.9 lakhs, the
B appellants herein must have conspired with the accused No. I for commission
of the said offence. It was also noticed that when the accused No. I took PW!
to Hotel Dreamland where the accused no.2 was sitting, he was asked by the '·
former to pay some amount to him but he refused to do so saying "who had
asked you to murder the deceased". It was opined that the aforementioned
circumstances are sufficient to come to the conclusion that the appellant
C herein conspired amongst themselves to commit the said crime.

The theory propounded by the prosecution was that the accused had
entered.into two conspiracies, one was the smaller one being forgery of power
of attorney which was used for execution of the sale deed and the other one
leading to murder of the deceased. The said smaller conspiracy appeared to
D have given rise to the larger conspiracy, namely, murder of the deceased so
that accused no. I can appropriate the entire amount of consideration. Both
the conspiracies although might have been hatched at two different stages,
were treated to be parts of the same transaction.

With a view to ascertain the involvement of appellants, we may notice
E that in the conspiracy to forge power of attorney, it has not been proved that
apart from accused nos. I and 5 anybody else was involved. Article L, the
purported agreement to sell having not been proved, the contents thereof
were wholly inadmissible in evidence. If it was not admissible in evidence,
no part thereof far less the amount of consideration specified therein or the
p amount of earnest money stated therein could be used by the prosecution
against the appellants. If the said document had not been proved, no reliance
thereupon could be placed for any purpose whatsoever. The said agreement
also said to have been cancelled. PW25, on whose deposition the High Court
had relied upon, stated that a sum of Rs.2 lakhs was paid by way of earnest
money. PW38, however, states that only a sum of Rs.75,000/- was paid. She
G further states that the original agreement was with PW25. He did not produce
the same. The Pub.lie Prosecutor did not offer any explanation whatsoever
as to why the original agreement for sale was not produced. According to
PW38 she obtained a xerox copy of the said agreement of sale from the
Collectorate. At whose instance the said xerox copy was filed with the Collector
H of the District has not been established.
SUBHASH HARNARA YANJI LADDHA v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [S.B. SINHA, J.) 49

Inconsistencies in the statements of PW25 and PW38 are galore. If the A
said agreement was cancelled, whether the amount of earnest money was
returned to the appellants or not has not been stated.

In her report dated 18.9.2000 PW38 did not disclose the said agreement
for sale. She did not make any allegation against the appellants herein even
in her second report. The suspicion that the deceased was done away with B
must have been crystallized by then but as indicated hereinbefore no allegation
whatsoever was made against the appellants. There is furthermore nothing
on record to show that they had anything to do with Accused No. I during
the period between 16.5.2000 to 30.6.2000 when the purported power of attorney
was executed.
c
The learned Trial Judge, in his judgment, opined that till execution of
the sale deed the appellants had nothing to do with the commission of the
offence. According to the learned Trial Judge they came in picture only at
the time of execution of the sale deed. They may be present on the date of
the execution of the sale but that by itself in our considered opinion, does D
not lead to an inference that they were parties to conspiracy. No evidence
was brought on records to show the involvement of the appellants prior to
3.9.2000. Even no prosecution witness had stated that the deceased was
done away with as he came to learn about the forgery and that he had been
deprived of a huge sum of amount. If the statement of PW38 was correct that
a deal had been made by her husband with PW25 only, it is difficult to arrive E
at an inference that the appellants were parties to b0th the conspiracies. In
her own words:

" ... He had settled the deal of agricultural land with Suresh Deshmukh
and he had immediately handed over to me an amount of Rs.75,000 F
received as an earnest money. He did not tell me about any other
transaction with anybody besides the aforesaid deal..."

Her statement before the court was made on the basis of what she had
learnt from her husband. She had no direct knowledge thereabout. Her
statement was not admissible in evidence under Section 32 of the Indian G
Evidence Act.

In absence of any connecting links in the chain we are unable to agree
with the findings of the learned Trial Judge as also the High Court that
conspiracy by the appellants for committing forgery of the power of attorney
has been established. If ingredients of conspiracy have not been established H
50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 10 S.C.R.

A for proving the prosecution case as regards commission of forgery, the larger
conspiracy also cannot be .said to have been proved.

Except PWI nobody has deposed with regard to commission of murder.
PWI, in his statement before the police, did not even name accused no.2. His
name was disclosed by him, for the first time, in his statement made before
B the Magistrate under Section I64 Cr.P.C. In his statement before the learned
Magistrate he merely alleged that accused no. I had taken him to Dreamland
Hotel where accused no.2 was sitting. Why accused no. I took him to the
hotel has not been explained. Why accused no. I wanted accused no.2 to pay
him some money has also not been disclosed. Even if the statement made
C by PWI that accused no. I did ask the accused no.2 to pay some money, the
very fact that he declined to do so stating "who has asked him to commit
murder of the deceased" is itself pointer to ·the fact that even accused no.2
was not a party to the conspiracy.

It is in the aforementioned situation, we are of the opinion that it will
D be hazardous to convict the appellants herein only on such slander evidence.
Suspicion howsoever grave may be is no substitute for proof. Circumstantial
evidence which might have been brought on records are not such which can
lead us t~_ a firm .. conclusion that there had been a pre-concert amongst the
appellants on the one hand and the accused no. I on the other. There is even
no allegation far less any proof that at any point of time prior to 3.9 .2000 the
E accused no.2 had met accused no. I.

We may also notice that even the investigating officer did not consider
it appropriate to charge the appellants herein for commission of murder of the
deceased or they being party to the conspiracy. As noticed hereinbefore only
F in 2004 the charges against the appellants were amended.

For the reasons stated above we are of the opinion that the. appellants
herein are entitled to benefit of doubt. The appeals are allowed and the
impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is set aside. The appellants
shall be set at liberty forthwith unless wanted in connection with any other
case.

S.K.S. Appeal allowed.