Holding

The condition limiting permits to vehicles not more than seven years old is intra vires and valid under Section 51(2)(x) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.

Summary

The petition challenged a condition imposed by the Regional Transport Authority that contract carriage permits could not be renewed for buses older than seven years, alleging it was ultra vires Section 51(2)(x) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and violated Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court examined whether the RTA had the statutory authority to prescribe such an age limit for the purpose of public safety. Relying on the broad language of Section 51(2)(x), which permits the imposition of any condition having a nexus with the statutory purpose, the Court held that vehicle age is a relevant safety factor. The Court rejected the argument of lexical legalism and emphasized the need to protect road users, concluding that the condition is intra vires and consistent with the Act’s objective. Consequently, the special leave petition was dismissed, upholding the validity of the age restriction.

Issues considered

Whether a condition limiting the age of vehicles to seven years under Section 51(2)(x) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is ultra vires the Act and violates Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
Whether the Regional Transport Authority has jurisdiction to impose such a condition for the purpose of public safety.
Whether the condition has a sufficient nexus with the statutory purpose of Section 51(2).

Legislation cited

Motor Vehicles Act, 1939s. 51

Subjects

Motor Vehicles ActSection 51Regional Transport Authoritypermit conditionvehicle age limitpublic safetyArticle 19(1)(g)ultra viresintra viresconstitutional challenge

Judgment

102.J

A SUBHASH CHANDRA A."lD ORS.
v.
STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.
February 12, 1980
[V. R KRISHNA !YER AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.J
B
Motor V~hicles Act, 1939, Section 51(2)-Wlzether Regional Transport
Authority in1posing a condition that no permit shall be renelved in respect
of vehicles wlticli are 7 years old is ultra-vires Article 19(1) (g) of the
Constitution-Con1peterzcy of the R.T.A. to inzpose such a condition.
Dismissing the special leave petition, the Court
HELD : 1. J\lere lexical legalism cannot sterilise the sensible humanism
c writ large on s. 51(2) (x). If Indian life is not ultra vires Indian law every
condition to save life and limb is intra vires such salvationary provision.
[1025G]
2. Section 51(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, is geared to public
safety, not piivate profit and casts a solemn duty not to be deterred by
any pressure except the pressure of social justice to Indian lives moving in
D buses, \Valking on roads or even standing on margins. If the top killer-
•
road nccident-is to be awarded death sentence, s. 51 and like provisions
must receive severe enforcement. In this spirit-although backtracking from
4-year-old models to 7-year-old models-the state imposed condition. 18. •
Section 51(2)(x) authorises the imp6st of "any condition" of course having
a nexus with the statutory purpose. Human safety is one such purpose.
(10250-F, H]
E 3. From the point of view of the human rights of road users, the condi- -~ ~-

tion regarding the model of the permitted bus is within jurisdic~
tion and not to prescribed such safety clauses is abdication of statutory duty.
There is no conflict between a vehicle being fit to ride and the condition
as an additional requirement a.nd safety factor in the shape of the year and
the model. This i<; an extra measure, a further insurance against machine
failure and cannot contradict the 'fitness' provision. [11260, 1027A-B]
F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition No. 1262 .. I
•
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of 1980.
From the Judgment and Order dated 19-2-1979 of the Allahabad
High Court in C.M.W.P. No. 184 of 1975.
G S. N. Kaicker, Mrs. S. Markendeya and S. Markendeya for the
Petitioners.
The Order of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA IYER, J.-An order draped in relative brevity is sufficient
since we are refusing leave to appeal although the issue raised is the
vires of a provision.
After due fulfilment of the obligation for oral hearing, we have con-
sidered the impact of two earlier decisions cited by Shri Kaicker sup-
SUBHllSH CHANDER v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 1025

1Posedly striking a nate conlrary to the judgment un<ler attack but feel I\.
free-why, bound-to dismiss th' petition for special leave not merely
''1 ·because the High Court is right but because justice to the travelling
public-a lost cause 011 our made roads-conscientises to that course.
Tersely put, the petitioner is the grantee of permits to ply mini-
buses as contract carriages and in the grant a condition has .been
fastened that the vehicle shall not be more than seven years old. B
Condition No. 18, relating to Mini-Buses Contract Carriage permits,
.and the source of power, s. 51 (2 )(x) read thus :
• That the vehicle covered by the permit shall be not more
than fO'ur years old counted from the date of registration at
any time during \he validity of the permit. c
51 (2) The Regional Transport Authority, if it decides to
grant a contract carriage permit, may, subject to any rules
that may be made under this Act, attach to the permit any
one or more of the following conditions, namely : - •
(x) any other conditions which may be prnscribed.
' Section 51 (2) (x) any other. D
"Four years' have been relaxed to seven years since September 23,
• 1978, the beneficiaries being the bus owners and the potential victims
being the unknown casualties who have no 'poor lobby' power. The
State must remember that it has responsibilities not merely to mini-bus
owners, but also to avoid the daily tragedies on the Indian high E
ways under the lethal wheels of these whirling carriages. Section 51 (2)
of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, is geared to public safety, not private
profit and casts a solemn duty not to be deterred by any pressure ex-
cept the pressure of social justice to India'n lives moving in buses, walk-
ing on roads or even standing on margins. If the top killer-road

~·
.accident-is to be awarded death sentence, s. 51 and like provisions F
mnst receive severe enforcement. In this spirit--although backtrack-
ing from 4-year·old models to 7-year-old models-the state imposed
-condition 18. This was challenged artfully but unsuccessfully before.
the High Court and is attacked before us as ultra vires s. 51 (2) of the
Act. We will examine briefly the submission to reach the conclusion
that mere lexical legalism cannot sterilise the sensible humanism writ G
large on s. 51 (2) (x). If Indian life is not ultra vires Indian Jaw every
condition to save life and limb is intra vires such salvationary provision.
This perspective of social justice simplifies the problem and upholds the
High Court.
Section 51 (2)'(x) anthorises the impost of any condition, of course, H
having a nexus with the statutory purpose. It is undeniable that human
safety is Olle sucli purpose. The State's neglect in this area of policing
1026 i<UPREME COURT REPORT;i [1980] 2 s.c.R;

A public transport is deplorable but when it does act by prescribing a
condition the court cannot be persuaded into little legalism and harmful'
negativism. The short question is whether the prescription that the bus
shall be at a seven-year old model one is relevant to the condition of
the vehicle and i\s passengers' comparative safety and comfort on our
chaotic highways. Obviously, it is. The older the model, the less the
B chances of the latest safety measures being built into the vehicle. Every
new model incorporates new devices to reduce danger and promote
comfort. Every new model assures its age to be young, fresh and
strong, less likely to suffer sudden failures and breakages, less suscepti-
,
ble to wear and tear and moral fatigue leading to unexpected collapse.
When we buy a car or any other machine why do we look for the latest
c model ? Vintage vehicles are good for centenarian display of curios
and cannot but be mobile menaces on our notoriously neglected high-
ways. We have no hesitation to hold, from the point of view of the
human rights of road users, that the condition regarding the model of
the permitted bus is within jurisdiction, and not to prescribe s11ch safety
D clauses is abdication of statutory duty.

Two decisions-Masi Ullah v. State Tribunal Appellate(') and·
In re: Ramesh Chandra Tewari etc.(') were cited as striking a con-· •
trary note. The first deals withs. 48(3) of the Act and prescription of
the model or year of the make was held ultra vires because, lexically
E read, it was held that the expression specified description in s. 48(3)
did not cover, according to dictionaries, the year of manufacture of the
vehicle. We extract Black's Law Dictionary on 'description' to show
how the model of a vehicle is obviously a facet of its description ..
'Description' means : (")
A delineation or account of a particular subject by the
F
recital of its characteristic accidents and qualities.

So, dictionary versus dictionary leaves the matter at large, apart from·
the plain function of the court to gather the meaning, not nnder the
dictatorship of dictionaries but guided by the statutory purpose with- .
out being deflected by logamachic exercises, the mischief to be count-
G
ered and the public interest to be advanced. We are clear that a later
model is a better safeguard and, more relevantly to the point, the year
of the make and the particulars of the model are part of the descrip-
tion.
------
(1) AIR 1967 All. 129.
H (2) Civil Misc. Writ No. 7317 of 1975 of Allahab~d High eourt (un-
reported).
(3) p, 532.
SUBHASH CHANDER v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 1027

The unreported ruling in Civil Writ No. 7317 of 1975 interprets A
'l!.38 of the Act and the non-issuance of the fitness certificate because
the model was not recent enough. May be the vehicle, regardless of
the year of its make, may be fit and the refusal to certify fithess
merely because it is old may not always be right. But we see no con-
flict between a vehicle being fit to ride and the condition, as an addi-
tional requirement and safety factor, in the shape of the year of the B
model. This is an extra measure, a further insurance against machine
failure and cannot contradict the 'fitness' provision.
More reasons are, superogatory, less discussion will leave the Jaw
-0bscure. We hold the ratio df the impugned ruling to be right and
refuse leave to appeal. c
:S.R. Petition dismissed.

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