Holding

The High Court was not justified in interfering with the trial court’s charge; the charge under s.302 IPC against Dilip stands, and the discharge of Nathumal is affirmed.

Summary

Chanda, a newly married woman, died from severe burns after a fire broke out in her in-laws' house; neighbours rescued her but she later succumbed to her injuries. Her parents alleged dowry harassment and filed a police report; the investigation led to a charge sheet under s.306 IPC read with s.34 against her brother Dilip and father Nathumal. The trial court, after evaluating forensic evidence (kerosene residue, post‑mortem contusions) and witness statements, held that the death was homicidal and framed a charge under s.302 IPC against Dilip, while discharging Nathumal. The Bombay High Court interfered, discharging Dilip on the basis that he was merely passive and that there was no case to charge him under s.306 IPC, and upheld the discharge of Nathumal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the trial court’s charge, emphasizing the limited scope of s.227/228 CrPC and the need for a prima facie case, and reinstated the charge against Dilip while confirming Nathumal’s discharge. Consequently, the appeals were allowed in part: Dilip’s charge was restored and the appeal against Nathumal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The propriety of the High Court's interference with the charge framed by the Sessions Court under s.227/228 CrPC.
Whether the material on record established a prima facie case to frame a charge under s.302 IPC against Dilip.
Whether the father, Nathumal, could be charged under s.306 IPC based solely on his moral obligation as family manager.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 227, s. 228
Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 113-A
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 304B, s. 306, s. 34, s. 498A

Subjects

dowry deathhomicidecharge framingCrPC 227CrPC 228Section 302 IPCSection 306 IPChigh court interferencewomen's rights

Judgment

A STREE ATYACHAR VIRODHI PARISHAD ETC. ETC.
v.
DILIP NATHUMAL CHORDIA & ANR.

FEBRUARY 8, 1989

B IB.C. RAY AND K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, JJ.]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973: ss. 227 & 228: Sessions Judge
framing charge and making order in support thereof-High Court
whether has jurisdiction to interfere-Law must be allowed to take its
own course unless glaring injustice found.
c Indian Penal Code, 1860: ss. 304B & 498A-Dowry offence-
All round attempt to cover up by family members than to expose it-
Necessity for investigating agency to penetrate every dark corner and
collect all evidence-Courts to display greater sensibility to criminality
• and avoid soft justice.
o·
The deceased was seen in flames on the first floor of her in-laws
house crying for help within five days of her marriage with the younger
brother of the respondent. While neighbours rushed to her rescue and
extinguished the flames, the inmates of the house did not render any
such help. The respondent who was on the flrst floor was seen coming
E down the stairs. The deceased succumbed to the buru injuries in the
hospital on the same day. In her dying declaration recorded by the
Executive Magistrate, she stated that when she was preparing tea in the
,.
kitchen her saree caught fire accidently. ·

The parents of the deceased suspected foul play by her in-laws and
F lodged a report with the police. An investigation.of the case revealed
that the deceased had met hostile atmosphere soon after her marriage.
The parents gave statements that the in-laws demanded unreasonable
dowry which could not be complied with and that at the wedding cere-
mony they had behaved badly on the payment of insufficient dowry.
Her brother who had gone to bring her back home was not permitted to
G meet her. The maid servant sent along with her was also sent back.

The respondent and his father were charge sheeted under s. 306
read withs. 34 I.P.C. The trial court came to a prima fade conclusion
that it was not a suicide but homicidal death. Accordingly, a charge
under s. 302 I.P .C. was framed against the respondent. The respon-
H dent's father was, however, discharged.
560
STREE ATYACHAR v. D.N. CHORDIA 561

The High Court dismissed the revision petition of the State against
A
the respondent's father. While accepting the respondent's revision it
took the view that the fact that the accused was passive was of no
consequence that it all depends upon the mental response and reaction
of an individual whether he faces the risk and attempts to extinguish the
flames or quietly watches the incident, that it does not show that the
accused actively committed the act of burning or actively added the B
commission of suicide, and held that the charge under s. 302 against
him was not made out, and there was not even a case against him to
frame charge under s. 306 I.P.C.
. )

---r
.

The appellant, a social welfare organisation and the State prefer-
·' red appeals to the Supreme Court.
c
On the question: Whether the High Court was justified in
interfering with the charge framed by the trial court against the respon-
dent, and whether it was necessary to put his father also on trial with
the material on record.
D
Partly allowing the criminal appeals,

HELD: l. The High Court was not justified in interfering
with the charge framed by the trial court against .the respondent
accused.
E
2. The trial court had considered every material on recqrd in
support of the charge framed. It had also given reasons why a charge
under s. 302 I.P.C. was warranted against the respondent even though
the police had charge-sheeted him under s. 306 I.P.C. Section 227
Cr.P.C. which confers power to discharge an accused was designed to
prevent harassment to an innocent person by the arduous trial or the F
ordeal of prosecution. The power has been entrusted to the Sessions
Judge who brings to bear his knowledge and experience in criminal
trials. If he after hearing the parties frames a charge and also makes an
order in support thereof, the law must be allowed to take its own
course.
G
State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, [1978] l SCR 257 and ·union of
India v. Prafulla Kumar Sama/ & Anr., [1979] 2 SCR .229 at 234-35,
referred to.

3. Self restraint on the part of the High Court should be the rule
unless there is glaring injustice staring the Court in the face. In the H
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 1 S.C.R.

A instant case, it had discharged the respondent mainly relying on the
dying declaration as if it has been conclusively proved to be the true and
faithful version of the deceased. It did not advert to the report of the
Chemical Analyser in which he found kerosene residue on each and
every garment of the deceased, and the post-mortem report which indi-
cated that besides burn injuries the deceased had sustained contusions
B on the back shoulders which might have been caused with a blunt round
object. The events that preceded the death of the deceased also did not
receive any consideration. The statements of brother, father and the
maid servant of the deceased have been ignored. The respondent was
seen coming down from the staircase when the deceased was crying for
help. The manner. in which he went on at that time, if true, did not
C bring him credit. The approach made by the High Court, therefore,
cannot be accepted. [569C; 5668; 567 A-Cl

4. Although it was the moral obligation of respondent's father as
manager of the family to protect the deceased and safeguard her life
and he had failed to perform that obligation, that by itself without
D anything more is not sufficient to frame a charge against him. The
discretion exercised by the trial court in discharging him was, there-
fore, correct. [569E]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
Nos. 486 to 489of1984.
E
From the Judgment and Order dated 5.4.1984 of the Bombay
High Court in Criminal Revision Application No. 166/83 and Criminal
Revision No. 234of1983 respectively.

M.C. Bhandare, A.M. Khanwilkar and Mrs. H. Wahi for the
F Appellants. J~,·,.,.
...,.
1
S.B. Bhasme and R.A. Gupta for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

G K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. These four appeals, by leave,
arise out of the common judgment of Bombay High Court dated April
5, 1984 in Criminal Revision Applications 166 and 234 of 1983. Crimi- :'"'
nal Appeal Nos. 486 and 487 of 1984 have been preferred by an
Organisation called "Stree Atyachaar Virodhi Parishad". It is an
association committed to prevent atrocities on women. Criminal
H Appeal Nos. 488 and 489 of 1984 are by the State of Maharashtra.
STREE ATYACHAR v. D.N. CHORDIA.ISHETTY, J.] 563

The case relates to the death of a newly married girl called
A
Chanda. On Ju~e 15, 1981, Chanda was married to Ramesh. The elder
brother of Ramesh is called Dilip and Nathumal is their father. The
marriage of Ramesh and Chanda took place at N.erparsopant, District
Yavatmal.

On the next day of the marriage, the bride and groom returned B
to the house of the latter at Arvi. On June.19, 1981, they had gone to
Amravati to have prayers in the Devi Tample. They came back in the
same evening. The day following w.~s a fateful day. At about 2.30 PM

-~~--
on June 20, 1981, Chanda was seen with flames on the first floor of the
residential building, with frantically crying for help. That attracted
.r some of the neighbours from the ground floor. They rushed to rescue
Chanda. Three of them are: Bhanrao, Ballu alias Nandu and Ramdas.
c
They extinguished the flame .which was practically engulfing Chanda.
The inmates in the house, however, did not render any such help.
Dilip who was on t.he first floor was seen coming down the stairs.
Shortly, thereafter two doctors came and the police also arrived.
Chanda was taken to Ervin Hospital at Amravati in an unconscious D
condition. She died in the hospital at about 9.00 pm on the same day.
Before the death, her dying declaration was said to have been. re~
corded by. the Executive Magistrate. It was stated therein that when
she was preparing tea in the kitchen, her saree caught fire accidentally
and consequently she received the bum injuries.
E
The parents of Chanda were informed of the death. They sus-
pected foul play by the in-laws of Chanda. They lodged a report at
Amravati Police Station complaining that Chanda's death might have
been the outc-0me of tension due to. demand of dowry. The Crime
~~Branch of the CID investigated the case and charge-sheeted Dilip and
_ Nathumal under sec. 306 read with sec. 34 IPC. It was alleged that the F
Chanda has committed suicide by burning herself and Dilip and
Nathumal abetted her.

An investigation of the case revealed that Chanda had hostile
atmosphere soon after her marriage. She was not treated well in her
. husband's house. Vijay, her brother and Mani Chand, father have G
given statements that the in-laws demanded· unreasonable dowry
'
>--, which could not be complied with. Even at the wedding ceremony, it
seems, that they behaved badly on the payment of insufficient dowry.
After the marriage, when Vijay came to take his sister back home as
per custom, he was not even permitted to meet her. Kamala Bai, the
maid servant accompanying Chanda was also sent back. She has also H
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19891 1 S.C.R.

A given detailed version about the unfavourable atmosphere around · '+
Chanda.

In addition to the statements of witnesses, there is a report of the
Chemical Analyser and post-mortem report. These indicate that the
-Oeath of Chanda could not be by accidental fire.
B
The trial court afte; considering all the facts and circumstances
appearing on record and after hearing the counsel for accused and
Public Prosecutor was of prima facie opinion that it was not a suicide
but homicidal death. Accordingly, the charge under sec. 302 IPC was
framed against Dilip. Nathumal, however, was discharged holding that
C the allegations against him do not justify the framing of any charge.

There were two revision applications before the High Court of
Bombay. The State filed a revision challenging the validity of dis-
charge of Nathumal. Dilip on his part questioned the correctness of
the charge framed against him and demanded his discharge also. The
D High Court dismissed the revision preferred by the State while accept-
ing the revision of Dilip. The High Court was of opinion that the
charge under sec. 302 against Dilip was misconceived.and there is not
even a case against him to frame charge under sec. 306 IPC. He was
accordingly discharged.

E The primary question for consideration before us, is whether the
High Court was justified in interfering with the charge framed by the
trial court against Dilip? The next question to be considered is whether
it is necessary to put Nathumal also on trial with the material on
record. 1
_;t..41
F We have perused the judgments of the courts below and heard l'
counsel on both sides. We gave our anxious consideration.to the mate-
rial on record.

Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure having bearing on
the contentions urged for the parties, provides:
G
"227. Discharge-If, upon consideration of the
record of the case and the documents submitted therewith,
and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the
""'.
'

prosecution in this behalf, the judge considers that there is
no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he
H shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so
doing."
STREE ATYACHAR v: D.N. CHORDIA (SHETfY, J.] 565

+ there Section 228 requires the judge to frame charge if he consider that
is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the
A
offence. The interaction of these !Wo sections has alfeady been the
subject matter of consideration by this Court. In State of Bihar v.
Ramesh Singh, [1978) 1 SCR 257, Untwalia, J., while explaining the
scope of the said sections observed (at 259):
B
J.. "Reading the two .provisions together in juxta posi-
tion, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the
beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity
and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to
·--r adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any
weight to be attached to the probable defence of the
c
accused. It is not obligatory for the judge at that stage of
the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in. a sensitive
balance whether the facts, if provec(, would be incompati-
ble with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard
finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is
not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter D
under sec. 227 or sec. 228 of the Code. At that stage the
.court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for
conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end
_... in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if
the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take
the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. E
But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which
.. leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming
that the accused has committed an offence then it is not
open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused." .
~ In Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Sama/ & Anr., [1979) 2 SCR
I'.
229 at234-35, Fazal Ali, J., summarised some of the principles:

"(1) That the Judge while considering the question
of framing the charges under sec. 227 of the Code has the
undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the G
limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie
h. case against the accused had been made out.

(2) Where the material placed before the Court dis-
close grave suspicion against the accused which has not
been properly explained, the Court will be fully justified in H
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 1 S.C.R.

framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. cf
A
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would
naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is diffi-
cult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and
large, however, if two views are 'qually possible and the
B Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him ).
while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion
against the accused, he will be fully within his right to dis-
charge the accused.

c
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under the pre-
sent Code is a senior and experienced Judge cannot act
i-'
merely as a Post Officer or a mouth-piece of the prosecu-
tion, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case,
1'
the total effect of the evidence and the documents pro-
duced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in
the case and so on. This however, does not mean that the
D Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons
of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conduct-
ing a trial."

These two decisions do not lay down different principles. 4
Prafulla Kumar case has only reiterated what has been stated in
E Ramesh Singh case. In fact, sec. 227 itself contains enough guidelines
as to the scope of enquiry for the purpose of discharging an accused. It
provides that "the Judge shall discharge when he considers that there "~
is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused". The
'ground' in the context is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for
putting the accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence
F of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of ·-,,.·~ '
charge. The Court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate en-
quiry in sifting and weighing the material. Nor it is necessary to delve
deep into various aspects. All that the Court has to consider is whether
the evidenciary material on record if generally accepted, would
reasonably connect the accused with the crime. No more need be
G enquired into.
,...._
So much is, we think, established law. To be fair to the accused,
we have examined the material on record and also perused the state-
ments of some of the witnesses. From the report of the Chemical
Analyser, it will be seen that kerosene residue was found on each and
H every garment of the deceased. The post-mortem report also indicates,
::<:

• STREE ATYACHAR v. D.N. CHORDIA [SHETTY, J.J 567

t besides bum injuries, that Chanda had sustained contusions on the
back shoulders. According to the doctor who conducted the post- A
mortem, those .contusions might have been caused with the blunt
rounded object. The learned Judge of the High Court has not adverted
t.o these facts although the contention of the Public Prosecutor in this
·regard has been noticed. Not merely that, the events that preceeded
the death of Chanda did not receive any consideration. The statements B
.~
of brother and father of Chanda and also that of Kamala Bai-the
maid se_rvant of Chanda have been ignored. The conduct of Dilip
which was highlighted in the context and circumstances, was brushed
~i aside with little significance. It is said that Dilip was coming down from
the staircase when Chanda was crying for help. The manner in which
' he went on at that time, if true, did not bring him credit. The High
Court, however, said: c
~
"That the accu.sed was passive is neither here nor
there. It all depends upon the mental response and reaction
of an individual whether he faces the risk and attempt to
extinguish the flames or quietly watches the incident. By no D
interpretation could it be stretched to show that the
accused either actively committed the act of burning or

.. actively aided the commission of suicide."

Counsel for the State was very critical of the attitude adopted by
the High Court in dealing with the case. His criticism to some extent is E
. not unjustified .

It may not be out of place to mention that "dowry" which is a
deep rooted social evil appears to be the cause of ever so many
. unfortunate death of young ladies. It is an offence brutal and barbaric .
'--t"'- It is generally committed inside the house and more often with a F
circumstance to give an impression that it was a suicidal death. There
will be all round attempt to cover up such offence by the family mem-
bers rather than to expose it. The Government has come forward with
legislations from time to time to protect women and to punish those
who commit attrocities on them. In 1961 the Dowry Prohibition Act
(Act 28 of 1961) was passed prohibiting the taking or giving dowry. By G
the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act 46 of 1983)
,.\-<.
Chapter XX-A was introduced in the Penal Code with sec. 498-A
creating a new offence of cruelty. It provides for punishment to
husband or his relatives if they harass a woman with a view to coerce
her to meet any unlawful demand for property. Section 174 of the
Criminal Procedure Code was also amended to secure post-mortem in H
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 1 S.C.R.

.A case of suicide or death of a woman within seven years of her marriage .
Section 113-A has been introduced in the Evidence Act, 1872 raising
presumption of cruelty as defined under sec. 498-A !PC against the
husband or his relatives if the wife commits suicide'within a period of
seven years from the date of her marriage. These provisions reflect the
anxiety of the representatives of our people to deal firmly the menace
B of dowry deaths. Again, there are sweeping changes made in the
Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1984. A new offence called
'Dowry death' has been created by introducing sec. 304-B in the Penal
Code. It raised presumption of culpability against the husband or rela-
tive hitherto unknown to our jurisprudence. It ·provides that where the
death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or otherwise
c than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage
and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty
or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for or in
connection with any demand for dowry, such death shall be called
'dowry death'. The section also provides that such husband or relative
shall be deemed to have caused her death and shall be punished with
D imprisonment for a minimum of seven years but which may extend to
life imprisonment.

We are referring to these provisions not that they are attracted to
the present case. It is only to emphasize that it is not enough if the
legal order with sanction alone moves 'orward for protection of
E women and preservation of societal values. The criminal justice system
must equally respond to the needs and notions of the society. The
investigating agency must display a live concern and sharpen their
,.
wits. They must penetrate into every dark corner and collect all the
evidence. The Court must also display greater sensitivity to criminality
and avoid on all counts "soft justice".
F
In the instant case the trial court has considered every material
on record in support of the charge framed. The trial court has also
given reasons why a charge under sec. 302 !PC is warranted against
Dilip even though the police charge sheeted him under sec. 306 lPC.
The High Court has gone on a tangent mainly relying on the dying
G declaration as if it has been conclusively proved to be the true and
faithful version of the deceased. Apart from that, we are unable to _....._
compromise ourselves with the approach made and the opinion expre-
ssed by the High Court in respect of many of the matters.

We wish to add a word regarding interference by the High court
H against a charge framed by the Sessions Court. Section 227 which
STREE ATYACHAR v. D.k CHORDIA [SHETTY, J.[ 569

confers power to discharge an accused was designed to prevent harass- A
ment to an innocent person by the arduous trial or the ordeal of pro-
secution. How that intention is to be achieved is reasonably clear in
the section i,,df. The power has been entrusted to the Sessions Judge
who brings to bear his knowledge and experience· in criminal trials.
Sesides, he has the assistance of counsel for the accused and Public B
Prosecutor. He is required to hear both sides before framing any
charge against the accused or for discharging him. If the Sessions
Judge after hearing the parties frames a charge and· also makes an
order. in· support ·thereof,: the· law must be allowed to take its own
course. Self restraint on the part of the High Court should be the rule
unless there is a glaring in justice stares the Court in the face. The
opinion on any matter may differ depending upon the person who C
views it. There may be as many opinions on a particular matter as
there are courts but it is no ground for the High Court to interdict the
trial. It would be better for the High Court to allow the trial to
proceed.
D
The counsel for the State was equally critical upon the discharge
of Nathumal. It was argued that Nathumal being the manager of the
family ought to have taken C:are of Chanda and without his connivance,
none would have demanded dowry and put Chanda on fire. It is true
that it is his obligation as manager of the family to protect Chanda and
safeguard her rights. We have no doubt that he has failed to perform
E
his moral obligation. But that by itself without anything more is not
sufficient to frame a charge against him. We, therefore, agree with the
discretion exercised by the trial court and leave it at that.·

• In the result and for the reasons stated, we allow the criminal
,r- appeals to the extent indicated only as against Dilip: We set aside the F
) order of the High Court and restore that of the trial cotirt. The appeals
' against Nathumal are dismissed. His discharge is confirmed. We direct
the court to proceed with the trial expeditiously. ·•

Before parting with the case, we must place on record the useful
service rendered by 'Stri Atyachar Virodhi Parishad' in this.case. It is
G
a social welfare organisation; It has come up to this Court spending its
own money by preferring the appeals. We very much appreciate the··
object of the organisation and the assistance rendered ..

P.S.S. Appeals allowed partly.