Holding

The High Court's acquittal was erroneous; the fingerprint and handwriting specimens were admissible, departmental exoneration does not preclude criminal liability, and the evidence proved the guilt of both accused, leading to reinstatement of conviction and sentencing.

Summary

The State, represented by the Special Police Establishment and the CBI, appealed against the High Court's acquittal of a bank manager (M. Krishna Mohan) and a field officer for forging loan documents, forging thumb impressions and misappropriating loan proceeds. The trial court had convicted both, but the High Court set them free on the ground that fingerprint and handwriting specimens could not be taken without violating constitutional rights and that the field officer had been exonerated in a departmental inquiry. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court erred in rejecting admissibility of the specimens under the Identification of Prisoners Act, and whether departmental exoneration could bar criminal liability. It held that the specimens were lawfully obtained, the departmental exoneration was irrelevant to the criminal trial, and the evidence established the guilt of both accused. Consequently, the Court set aside the acquittal, upheld the manager's conviction, and imposed a three‑month rigorous imprisonment and a fine on the field officer. The appeals were allowed, and the sentences were confirmed.

Issues considered

The admissibility of fingerprint and handwriting specimens taken under the Identification of Prisoners Act despite claims of violation of Article 20(3).
Whether exoneration in a departmental inquiry can be used as a defence to secure acquittal in a criminal proceeding.
Whether an appellate court may interfere with a judgment of acquittal when the evidence points to only one possible conclusion.
The liability of a field officer who prepared appraisal reports but did not directly forge documents, under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
The sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence (fingerprints, handwritings, witness testimony) to sustain conviction.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920s. 5, s. 6
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120-B, s. 409, s. 420, s. 467, s. 477-A
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947s. 5(1), s. 5(2)

Subjects

forgerymisappropriationbank loansfingerprint evidenceIdentification of Prisoners Actdepartmental inquiryappeal against acquittalPrevention of Corruption Actpresumption of innocence

Judgment

r
A STATE THROUGH SPE & CBI, AP
v.
M. KRISHNA MOHAN AND ANR.

OCTOBER 12, 2007
B
[S.B. SINHA AND HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ.)

Penal Code, 1860:

c ss. 409, 420, 467, 477-A r/w 120-B-Forgeryandmisappropriation
of bank loans-Bank Manager and Field Officer in conspiracy with
each other sanctioned and disbursed loans in names offictitious
persons-Trial Court holding both guilty and sentencing them-
Acquittal by High Court-HELD: Prosecution has brought ample
D material on record which led to only one conclusion that accused
committed the offences-Exoneration of one of the accused in
departmental inquiry initiated only against him having concluded
before police investigation stated in the case, would be ofno avail as
)-
Inquiry Officer did not have benefit of the evidence that was made
E available in the criminal proceedings-Besides, the inquiry report was
not brought on record and factum of exoneration in departmental
proceedings was taken as a defence, it was for the accused to bring
on record the relevant material, which was not done-High Court also
erred in purporting to hold that specimen finger print and handwritings
F could not have been taken from accused-ss. 5 and 6 ofIdentification
ofPrisoners Act, clearly provides for such a contingency-High Court
completely misdirected itself in passing a judgment of acquittal-
Judgment of High Court set aside-Prevention of Corruption Act,
1944-ss. 5(1) and 5(2)-Code ofCriminal Procedure, 1973-Appeal
G against acquittal-Identification ofPrisoners Act, 1920-ss. 5 and 6.
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947:

s. 5(1) rlw s.5(2), proviso-Bank Manager and Field Officer
forging loans in names offictitious persons-Both held guilty by trial
H 570
)
STATE THROUGH SPE & CBI, AP v. M. KRISHNA 571
MOHAN

court-Acquittal by High Court-HELD: Bank Manager completing A
allformalities required to be complied with for grant ofloan including
obtaining appraisal report from Field Officer, sanction and
disbursement ofloan on date offiling ofloan application itself-Entire
prosecution relating to forgery and misappropriation having been
attributed to the Manager, and he having used the appraisal reports B
prepared by Field Officer, a case is made out to invoke the proviso
appended to sub-s. (2) of s.5 in the case of Field Officer-Therefore,
while upholding conviction and sentence awarded by trial court as
against the Manager, sentence of rigorous imprisonment of three
months is imposed on Field Officer-Penal Code, 1860-ss. 409, 420, C
467 and 477-A r/w 120-B !PC

Code ofCriminal Procedure, 1973:
Appeal against acquittal-Jurisdiction of appellate Court-
HELD: an appellate court, while entertaining an appeal against D
acquittal, would be entitled to consider the evidence brought on record
_}
and arrive at its own conclusion-Interference with a judgment of
acquittal may not be made when two views are possible to be taken
but when only one view is possible to be taken, appellate court would
not hesitate to interfere with judgment ofacquittal-Jn the instant case E
',
no two views are possible to be taken-Accused were rightly heldguilty
of the offences charged-High Court misdirected itself in passing
judgment of acquittal-Judgment of High Court set aside-Penal
Code, 1860-ss. 409, 420, 467, 477-A rlw s.120-B-Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947-ss. 5(1), (2). F
'y

RespondentA-1 and respondent A-2, whowereManagerandField
Officer respectively of the appellant Bank, were prosecuted under ss.
409, 420, 467 and 477-A read with s.120-B IPC and s.5 read with s.5(2)
ofthe Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The allegations against them G
were that during the period 7.12.1984to14.8.1986, they conspired with
each other in matter of sanctioning and disbursing 6 Crop Loans of
Rs.5000/- each in the names of fictitious persons by forging signatures
and thumb impressions of proposed borrowers in documents resulting
H
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R.

f
A in misappropriation ofthe proceeds ofRs.30,000/-. The trial court held
both the accused guilty of the offences charged and sentenced both of
them to rigorous imprisonment for six moths. It rejected the plea of
respondent A-2 that in view of the departmental procee4~1,1g~ against
him resulting in his exoneration he was entitled to be acquitted. On
~ j - ~ -- .JI;

B appeal, the High Court acquitted the accused observing, i'!~e[q!ia, ~hat
the procedure adopted for obtaining finger prints being ~~,"1~ry to
fundamental rights of the accused, the same was not ad~i~s~~le, in
evidence; that neither the Bank received any complaint from- loanees
. ..;

nor did the prosecution bring any corroborative material on i;-e~ord.
c In the instant appeals filed by the Bank, it was contended for
respondent A-2 that he merely prepared the appraisal report.and he
was not involved in any forgery; that he joined the service only in 1984
and was transferred on or about 14.8.1986, and subsequent renewals
ofloans having been prepared in 1987, he was entitled to acquittal.
D
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1. In the instant case, evidently, the formalities required
to be complied with for grant ofloan, appraisal report recommendation
I ~ I . ,

E prepared by respondent A-2 and sanction and disbursement ofloan by
respondent A-1 were completed on the very same day o~ which <

application for grant ofloan was filed. It has furthermore been brought
on record that PW-21 and PW-22 on whose behalfloan was applied,
were known to respondent A-1. They stated that theywt:r~.re,sid~nts
F of a district different than that shown in their applications. T~is clearly
establishes that the transactions were manipulated by mpiiiClent'A.~1.
"'<
PW-3, in her deposition, in no uncertain line, stated that all ~~s~Ctions
right from application to disposal took place in the afternoon of a day
and all the documents used to be processed during the lunch 'hour,
G whereas as per to the procedure, the disbu..Sement ofloan'couldtake
place only upon proper verification thereof. The modus operandi of
respondent A-1 appeared to be that he had affixed his own~thumb
impression instead of those of the loanees. Upon sanction of the·said
loan, the accountant concerned paid the amount ofloan ~o ~ccµsed A-
H
)
STA TE THROUGH SPE & CBI, AP v. M. KRISHNA 573
. MOHAN
1. The said loans were also renewed for the years 1986 and 1987. A
[Paras 12, 14, 24 and 25] [581-C; 582-B-C-D; 584-B-C)
1.2. The finger print expert (PW-17), in his evidence, proved that
specimen fingerprints tallied with the disputed fingerprints. PW-17 is a
qualified and experienced fingerprint expert. There is no reason to
discredit his testimony. Apart from the fingerprints, the prosecution also B
obtained the specimen handwritings of respondent A-1. Handwritings
on the said loan documents/applications for grant ofloan was found to
be that ofaccused No.I. The High Court also committed a manifest error
in purporting to hold that the specimen fingerprints and handwritings ·
could not have been taken from respondent A-1. Sections 5 and 6 of C
the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920 clearly provides for such a
contingency.
[Paras 15, 17, 18,34 and 35] (582-E, G; 583-A-B; 586-F-G)
State ofBombayv. Kathi Kalu Oghad, AIR(1961) SC 1808, relied 0
on.
1.3. It may be true that there was no documentary evidence to show
that the amount had actually been paid in cash to the respondent A-1.
But then no documentary evidence would be available as it was for the
respondent A-1, as Manager of the Bank, to hand over the amount in E
cash to the loanees upon receiving the same from PW-3. Besides, PW-
5 also stated that debit vouchers (Ext. P-6) contained only one stamp
showing as cash paid but it did not contain his signature, although it
purported to have been shown to be his. Ext P-6 was, therefore, a forged
document. [Paras20and21] [583-E-F,D) F ·
1.4. PWs 3 and 5 who had been working in the same branch of the
bank with the respondents have proved the procedure adopted in the
matter of grant of loan. There cannot, therefore, be any doubt
whatsoever that ample materials have been brought on record by the G
prosecution which led to only one conclusion that the accused were
responsible therefor. (Para 22] [583-G]
1.5. It may be that no act offorgery and misappropriation has been
attributed to respondent A-2, but he was the one who had prepared the
appraisal report. After preparation of such appraisal report, the loan H
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R.

' ' '
A amounts were sanctioned and the amountofloan purported to liave been
paid to the loanees and, therefore, he was also guilty of~o.ni~i~~i'on of
the said otfences. [Para 23) (583-H; 584-AJ _ - ·-· · -_'
... ., ~ ., .J' ! . ~

2. The High Court purported to have laid emphasis on exoneration
B of respondent A-2 in departmental enquiry. The departmental enquiry
was initiated only against respondent A-2 and was completed even
before the police investigation in the case started. The enquiry officer
did not have the occasion to consider all the materials brought on
. ' record .,,~

by the prosecution which dearly established the involvemeit! of the
C respondents. Exoneration of respondent A-2 in the departmental
proceedings cannot, therefore, lead to the conclusion that he was not
guilty of commission of the offences wherefor he was charged.
Furthermore, the enquiry report has not been brought on record.
Besides, the factum of exoneration of respondent A-2 in the
D departmental proceedings was raised by way of defence. It was,
therefore, obligatory on his part to bring on record all the relevant
documents, including the findings ofthe Enquiry Officer.
[Paras 27, 28, 29 and 33) [574-E-F; 584-G-H; 585-A; 586-D-E)

P.S. Rajya v. State ofBihar, (1996] 9 SCC 1, distinguished.
E
State ofHaryana v. Bhajan Lal, [1990] 3 SCR 259=[1992) Supp. 1
SCC 335 and Superintendent ofPolice (CBI) v. Deepak Chowdhary &
Ors., [1995) 6 SCC 225, referred to.
F 3. The High Court, therefore, completely misdirecte~jtst:lf in
passing a judgment of acquittal in favour of the respondents. The trial
judge had assigned cogent reasons in support ofits fmdings ..T~e.High
Court did not meet the said reasoning. The impugned judgm~nt of the
High Court cannot be sustained. [Paras 26 and 37) [584-D; SS9-B] -
' J ,,.., - • -4
G _4. The Court is not oblivious of the fact that presumption of
innocence is a human right and when an accused is acquitted by'i ~o~rt,
such presumption becomes stronger. It is, however, a trite l~w th~t· an
appellate court, while entertaining an appeal from a judgment of
acquittal, would also be entitled to consider the evidences brought on
H
)
STATE THROUGH SPE & CBI, AP v. M. KRISHNA 575
MOHAN
record by both the prosecution and the defence and arrive at its own A
decision. Interference with a judgment of acquittal may not be made
when two views are possible to be taken, but when on appraisal thereof,.
only one view is possible, the appellate court would not hesitate to·
interfere with the judgment ofacquittal. In this case, the Court is firmly·
of the view that no two views are possible to be taken. ·B
(Paras 37 and 38) [589-B, D, E)
y
State o/Haryanav. Sher Singh & Ors., [2002) 9 SCC 356; Narender
Singh&Anr. v.StateofMP., [2004) lOSCC699andBudhSingh& Ors.
v. State ofUP., [2006) 9 SCC 731, referred to.
c
5. The entire prosecution case relating to charges offorgery and
misappropriation has been attributed to respondent A-1 alone. Thus, a
case has been made out to invoke the proviso appended to sub-section
(2) of Section 5 of the Prevention ofCorruption Act, 1947 in the case of ·
resp0ndent A-2. Furthermore, he worked in the bank for a short period D
and was still undergoing probation. Forgery and misappropriation was
committed by respondent A-1 even thereafter. The appraisal reports
prepared by respondent A-2 _were used by respondent A-1 also for the
subsequent period, namely, 1987 when respondent A-2 was no longer
working in the said branch. Therefore, while upholding the conviction E
and sentence awarded by the trial judge as against respondent A-1, in
view of the special reasons recorded in the judgment, a sentence of
rigorous imprisonment ofthree months is imposed on respondent A-2.
He shall, however, be liable to pay a fme ofRs.20,000/-(Rupees twenty
y thousand only) and in default shall undergo a sentence ofthree months. F
[Paras40,41 and42l (589-G; 590-A-C\
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
Nos. 1394-1395 of 2004.
From the Judgment & Order dated 5.11.2002 of the High Court of G
Judicature Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal Appeal Nos. 12
and 13/1997.
A Sharan, ASG., Amit Anand Tiwari and P. Parmeswaran for the
Appellants. H
)t=
I

(
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R.
~

A L.N. Rao, R. Santhan Krishnan, K. Radha Rani, P. Vijaya Kumar
and D. ·Mahesh Babu for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.8. SINHA, J. 1. Correctness of a judgm.ent of acquittal passed
B by the High Court of Judicature at Andhra Pradesh is in question in this
appeal whereby and whereunder an appeal from a judgment of conviction
dated 13.12.1996 by Special Judge, FO CBI Cases, Visakhapatnam in y
C.C. No.I I of 1994 has been allowed. . ;; '

,
c 2. Respondents herein were Manager and Field Officer of Chaitanya
Grameena Banlc, Penumaka Branch, Guntur District Allegations against
}
them were that they conspired with each other in the matter of sanctioning
and disbursing loans ofRs.5,000/- each under Crop Loan Ale. No.85/
23, 86/221, 87/10, 85/95, 86/224 and 87/12 as contained in Exhibits
D P-1 to P-6 in the names of fictitious persons by forging signatures and
thumb impressions of the proposed borrowers in the documents ~ulting
~
in misappropriation of the proceeds of Rs.30,000/-. The offences in
question allegedly took place during the period 7.12.1984 to 14.8.1986.
Respondent No.2 hereinjoined his services on 7.12.1984 as a Field
E Officer on probation. He was allegedly transferred to another branch on
15.8.1986. The First Information Report was lodged on 31.12.1991 under /

Sections 409, 420 467 and 477-A read with Section 120-B of the Indian
Penal Code and Section 5 read ~th Section 5(2) of the Preventi~n of
I f'I , j ~

Corruption Act, 1947. ,,,

,; .) ;:;~
F 3. Investigations were made into the said allegations .. The -,/
prosecution, in support of its case, examined as many as 22 witnesses. '·

4. PW-21, K.V.V. Satyanarayana and PW-22, KollUri Seetha . - are
husband and wife. They purported to have applied for loan which was
G sanctioned on the samt! day. The loan granted to both of them was
renewed for two subsequent years. It was the prosecutioµ. case ihat'they
were residents of Ramamindaram Street, Satyanarayana Puram,
-.
...
Vijayawada, whereas they were shown to be residents of Penumaka in ·--
the District of Guntur. PW-4, Meka Kotireddy, was the village Sarpanch
H who proved that the loans were granted in the name of fictitious persons
)
STATE THROUGH SPE & CBI, AP v. M. KRISHNA 577
MOHAN [SINHA, J.]
' and that Exhibits marked as P-1, P-2 and P-5 were not the residents of A
village Seethanagaram. PW-3, U. Jayaprada Kumari, was the accountant
of the bank who had paid the amount of loan in cash to respondent No. l.
PW-5, M. Mallikarjuna Rao, was another accountant who said that the
amount ofloan was paid in cash to Respondent No.l. PW-7, B.M.S.
Peter, was the post man who also proved that loan was sanctioned in the B
name of fictitious persons. PW-17, is a finger print expert who proved
--.., that thump· impressions appearing on the loan account were that of
accused No.I.
5. The learned Trial Judge on analyzing the evidences brought on
records opined :
c
"As per the addresses given in the loan applications covered by
Exs. P. l to P.6 the loanees are the residents of Seethanagaram
village. But the evidence of P. Ws. 21 and 22 show that they are
residing at Vijayawada and they have no lands. As per the evidence D
'> of P. W. l, A2 recommended the loans in the loan documents
Exs.P.l and P.2 and A.I sanctioned. P.W.3, U. Jayapradaha

- '(·
Kumari, who worked as Cashier for about 3 years along with Al
and A2 has stated that the debit voucher for Rs.1,000/- dated
5.5.87 in Ex.P.3 loan documents passed for payment by Al and E
she paid the amount. She received the debit voucher for Rs.1,000/
- and put her initial on the relevant entry marked as Ex.P26 and
Al put his initial against the entry in respect of crop loans Ale.
/ No.87 /10. She entered the payment in respect of crop loan 87I
y 10 in the rough chitta. Ex.P.27 is the relevant entry. In Ex.P.6 loan F
documents both appraisal report and the sanctioning authority
....
signed by A. l and the debit voucher for Rs. l 000/- passed by A. l
and the amount was paid by her. Ex.P.28 is the relevant entry in
the payment scroll and contains her initials and A.I. She paid the
cash of Rs. l 000/- each under two debit vouchers in the loan G
-1.
docuinents Exs. P.3 and P.6 to A.1. P.W.5, M. Mallikarjunarao
who worked as Clerk-cum-Cashier, when A. I and A.2 worked,
has stated that the crop loans covered by Exs. P.1, P.2, P.4 and
P.5 were sanctioned by A. l and the appraisal report was signed
by A. l. He paid the amount to Al in respect of said loans. H
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R.

A xxx xxx xxx
So the entire evidence referred above show that the persons
whose photos affixed to the loan applications and the names of
the persons mentioned in the loan applications were never resided
in Seethanagaram Village and the evidence of P.Ws. 21and22
B
the husband and wife, who originally took the gold loans from
Panumaka Branch of Chaitanya Grameena Bank is corroborated
by the evidence referred abovewitnesses that they never resided
in Seethanagaram Village."
C 6. Before the learned Trial Judge, a contention was raised that the
departmental proceeding has been initiated against respondent No.2 herein
resulted in exoneration and, thus, he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal.
The said contention of accused No.2 was rejected by the learned Trial
Judge opining that the report of the enquiry officer who enquired into the
D charges had not been brought on record.
7. The High Court, however, reversed the said judgment of the
learned Trial Judge holding that the procedure adopted for obtaining
fingerprints being contrary to the fundamental rights of the accused, the
E same was not admissible in evidence. It was observed that the Bank did
· not receive any complaint from the loanees and the prosecution having
not brought any corroborative material on record, the impugned judgment
of the Trial Judge cannot be sustained. Furthermore respondent No.2
having been exonerated in the departmental proceeding, a different view
F could not be taken by the criminal court.
8. We may notice the views of the High Court in this behalf which
is in the benefit to the following effect :
"The procedure as adopted by the prosecution especially during
G the investigation by the investigation officer by taking the signatures
and thumb impressions of the Manager itself is not valid and
.inadmissible in evidence. Except the report of the officer of the
Bank, there is no complaint of whatsoever nature from the loanees
as to non-receipt from any proper quarters at any point of time.
H Therefore, in the absence of proper evidence being available, it is
STATE THROUGH SPE & CBI, AP v. M. KRISHNA 579
MOHAN (SINHA, J.]
too difficult to accept the mere statement of P.W.4, the Sarpanch A
especially for showing the non-existence of the loanees and draw
any presumption as to falsifying the record and misappropriation
of the amounts by the appellants herein. There is absolutely no
acceptable evidence to show that at the time of verification, the
loanees were not present before the Field Officer. In the absence B
of any documentary evidence in its support, it is not safe to simply
place reliance on the oral testimony of P.W.4. Admittedly, as per
the cashier, she has made due entries and a rough chitta in regard
to the receipt of the payments."
c
9. Mr. Amerendra Sharan, learned Additional Solicitor General,
appearing on behalf of the appellants, interalia, would submit that :
I. In view of the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in
State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad AIR (1961) SC
1808, the High Court committed a serious error in opining that D
accused persons could not have asked to give their specimen
left thumb impression or signatures.
2. Keeping in view the fact that the loan had been sanctioned in
form of non-existing persons, the question of their coming E
forward to lodge any complaint in relation thereto did not arise
and, in fact, PW-21 and PW-22, in whose name, the loans
were sanctioned, came forward and deposed before the
learned Trial Judge stating that they had not obtained any loan.
3. The High Court furthermore committed a serious error in F
passing the impugned judgment in so far as it failed to take
into consideration that the prosecution had proved, beyond all
reasonable doubts, its case on the basis of the testimonies of
PW3, PW-4, PW-5, PW-7, PW-17, PW-21 and PW-22.
4. Exoneration of Respondent No.2 in the departmental enquiry G
could not have been a ground for recording a judgment of
acquittal.
10. Mr. Prabhakar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
H
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R.

A respondent No. l, on the other hand, submitted :
1. PW-3 and PW-5 were not trustworthy witnesses as both of
them had accepted that there was no documentary evidence
to show that they had paid the amount to accused No. I.
'
B 2. Accused No.1 being the Manager of the Bank, could not have
sanctioned the loan save and except on the basis of appraisal
report issued by Accused No.2, who was the Field Officer.
3. The amount ofloan being only Rs.5,000/- purported to have
been paid each to PW-21 and PW-22 and the same having
c been only renewed in subsequent years, this Court should draw
the presumption that the loanees have been repaying the foan
amount
4. The report of the fingerprint expert should not have been
D accepted by the learned Trial Judge as the thumb impression
of the right middle finger had been taken and not the left thumb
. .
nnpressmn.
11. Mr. Nageshwar Rao, senior counsel appearing on behalf of
accused No.2, urged that respondent No.2 was entitled to a judgment
E of acquittal inasmuch as :
n
1. The prosecution case is that all acts of forgeries which had
been done by accused No.I and the accused No.2 was only
a witness thereto.
F 2. The only charge against Respondent No.2 being that he was
the one who prepared the appraisal report, which being only
a procedural requirement, he could not have been convicted
for the offence of forgery.
3. Respondent No.2 having joined the services only in the year
G
1984 and having been transferred on or about 14.8.1986 and
subsequent renewal of loans having been processed in 1987, J:
he must be held to be wholly innocent.
4. The departmental proceedings against Respondent No.2
H having resulted in his exoneration, he could not have been
STATE THROUGH SPE & CBI, AP v. M. KRISHNA 581
MOHAN [SINHA, J.]
convicted in the criminal case. A
12. Following facts emerge from the records:
On 20.5.1985 one K.Venkata Satyanarayana (PW-21) applied for
crop loan of Rs.5,000/-. In the said application, he was shown to be the
resident of village Seetanagaram, district Guntur. In his deposition, PW- ij
21 stated that he was a resident of District Vijayawada.
The appraisal report was prepared by the Field Officer on 20.5 .1985
itself whereupon the Manager made recommendations and sanctioned the
loan on the very same day, i.e., 20.5.1985. The amount ofloan was also C
disbursed on the same day.
On 14.6.1986, loan ofK. Venkata Satyanarayana was renewed and
all the formalities, i.e., from the stage of filing application to disbursement
on renewal were completed on the very same day.
D
) On 14.6.1986, Mrs. K. Seeta (PW-22) wife of K. Venkata
Satyanarayana, also purported to have applied for a crop loan of ,
Rs.5,000/-. In her application also, her residence was shown as village
Seetanagaram, District Guntur, while in her deposition, she stated that she
was a resident of District Vijayawada. On this occasion also, all the i;;:

..
formalities for grant of loan were completed on 14.6.1986 itself and '
amount of the loan was disbursed on the very same day .
On 4.5.1987, loan of K. Venkata Satyanarayana was again
renewed. On the basis of the existing appraisal report, sanction of loan
was granted by the Manager and the loan amount was also disbursed on F
the same day.
Evidently, the formalities required to be complied with for grant of
loan, appraisal report recommendation, sanction and disbursement ofloan :
were completed on the very same day on which application for grant of G
loan was filed.
PW-4, the village Sarpanch, in his deposition also stated that PW-
21 andPW-22 in whose favour the abovesaid loans were sanctioned were
not the resident of village Seetanagaram.
H
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] I I S.C.R.

A 13. Both PW-3 and PW-5, in their depositions before the learned
Trial Court stated about the procedure for grant ofloan followed in the
bank. It appears that the accused No. I for all intent and purport used to
do everything himself which were required offering for the pmpose of grant
ofloan. It has furthennore been brought on record that PW-2I and PW-
B 22 were known to the Manager of the Bank, i.e. Respondent No. I. They
were residents of a different district, namely, Vijayawada They had taken
loan from the said bank on deposit of gold ornaments on an earlier
occasion. They redeemed the said loan and took their ornaments back.
They were known to the respondent No.I since then.
c I 4. The modus operandi of respondent No. I appeared to be that
he had affixed his own thumb impression instead of the those of the
loanees, viz. PW-21 and PW-22 respectively. Upon sanction of the said
loan, 'the accountant concerned paid the amount of loan to accused No.I.
D Loan was purported to have been sanctioned either on the same day or
within a few day~ from the date of purported applications. The said loans,
as noticed hereinbefore, were also renewed for the years I 986 and I 987.
15. The finger print expert, in his evidence, proved that specimen
fingerprints marked as S-I to S-4 in Exhibit P-38 tallied with the disputed
E fingerprints marked as Q- I 66, Q- I 69, Q- I 70, Q- I 71 and Q- I 72 with
the specimen right middle finger impressions marked as S-4-11 on the
F.P. slip marked as S-4.
16. Our attention, however, has been drawn by Mr. Prabhakar to
F the statement that the finger impressions marked as S-4 were more clear
than the finger impressions marked as S-1 to S-3, to contend that the
said specimen impressions were not clear.
I 7. PW-17, Mr. Venkateswara Rao, is a fingerprint expert. He had
been working in Finger Bureau as Finger Print Searcher since 1971. He
G had passed All India Finger Print Expert's Examination conducted by
Central Finger Print Bureau, Calcutta. He was promoted as Finger Print
.1:
Expert in the year I 975 and was furthennore promoted as Finger Print
Inspector in 1979. He had deposed in a number of civil and criminal cases
as an expert.
H
)
STATE THROUGH SPE & CBI, AP v. M. KRISHNA 583
MOHAN [SINHA, J.]
18. We do not find any reason to discredit the testimony of the said A
expert. He was a qualified Finger Print Examiner. Apart from the
fingerprints, the prosecution had also obtained the specimen handwritings
of Respondent No. l. Handwritings on the said loan documents/
applications for grant of loan was found to be that of accused No.1.
B
19. PW-3, U. Jayaprada Kumari, in her deposition, stated:
"Both myself and A-2 were directly appointed to Penumaka
branch. After receiving the loan documents from the borrowers all
the documents will be filled up by the bank officials during lunch
hour. The loan documents will be filled up after the disbursement C
the loan amounts to the borrowers. The Branch Manager used to
obtain the signatures and that thumb impression of the borrowers
on loan application."
20. PW-5, Mallikarjuna Rao, also stated that debit vouchers of D
Rs.4,000/- in Exhibit P-6 loan document contained only one stamp
showing as cash paid but it did not contain his signature although, it
purported to have been shown to be his. Ext. P-6 was, therefore, was a
forged document.
21. It may be true, as has been contended by Mr. Prabhakar that E
there was no documentary evidence to show that the amount had actually
been paid in cash to the accused No. l. But then no documentary
evidence would be available as it was for the respondent No. l, as
Manager of the Bank to hand over the amount in cash to the loanees upon
receiving the same from PW-3. F
22. The aforementioned two witnesses who had been working in
the same branch of the bank with the respondents herein have proved
the procedures adopted in the matter of grant of loan. There cannot,
therefore, be any doubt whatsoever that ample materials have been brought G
on record by the prosecution which led to only one conclusion that the
accused were responsible therefor.
23. It may be true that no act of forgery and misappropriation has
been attributed to Respondent No.2, but he was the one who had
H
584 SUPREME_ GOURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R.

A prepared the appraisal report. After preparation of such appraiSal report,
the loan amount having been sanctioned and the amount ofloan·piliported
to have been paid to the loanees and, hence, we are oftheropihion that
he was also guilty of commission of the said offence. · • , i• '•
! (.I .. _ ~ ., j ~

24. Documents pertaining to the loan transactions beaf tfie' same date,
B Le., process of application, technical recommendation,' pr~~~~tion of
I~ ' J J ' "

appraisal report, sanction and disbursement of loan. All transactions,
therefore, took place on the same date which clearly establishes that they
were manipulated by Respondent No. I. -. . ... '11
C 25. PW-3, in her deposition, in no uncertain line, 'state9. that all
transactions right from application to disposal took place in the afternoon
of a day and all the documents used to be processed during~the lunch
hour, whereas as per to the procedure, the disbursement' of loan could
take place only upon proper verification thereof
D
26. The High Court, therefore, in our opinion, completely misdirected
itself in passing a judgment of acquittal in favour of the respondents. The
learned Trial Judge had assigned cogent reasons in support ofits findings.
The High Court did not meet the said reasonings.
E 27. It purported to have laid emphasis on exoneration of respondent
No.2 in departmental enquiry.
28. The departmental enquiry was completed even before the
investigation in this case started. The Investigating Officer (pW-23), in
F his evidence, stated :
"I am not aware whether the Departmental enquiry was conducted
against A.2 and it was completed even before I started my
investigation."

G 29. Furthermore, the enquiry report has not been broughtpn
~ .,
record.
. ). ~

The factum of exoneration of respondent No.2 in the departmental
proceedings was raised by way of defence. It was, therefore, obligatory
on his part to bring on record all the relevant documents, namely, the
charge-sheet, the other materials brought on record by the department
:H
j
STATE THROUGH SPE & CBI, AP v. M. KRISHNA 585
MOHAN [SINHA, J.]
and the findings of the Enquiry Officer. Ifthe statement of the Investigating A
Officer (PW-23) is to be accepted and there is absolutely no reason as
to why it should not be; there was no occasion for the enquiry officer to
have the benefit of the depositions of the purported loanees, namely, PW-
21 and PW-22, the opinion of the fingerprint expert and other material
brought on record by the prosecution which clearly established the B
involvement of the respondents herein.
30. Mr. Nageshwar Rao relied upon a decision of this Court in P.S.
Rajya v. State of Bihar, [1996] 9 SCC 1. The fact situation obtaining
therein was absolutely different. In that case, in the vigilance report, the C
delinquent officer was shown to be innocent. It was at that juncture, an
application for quashing of the proceedings was filed before the High Cowt
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which was allowed
relying on State of Ha1yana v. Bhajan Lal, [1992] Supp. 1 SCC 335,
holding:
D
"23. Even though all these facts including the Report of the Central
> Vigilance Commission were brought to the notice of the High Court,
unfortunately, the High Court took a view that the issues raise(;:l
had to be gone into in the final proceedings and the Report of th~
Central Vigilance Commission, exonerating the appellant of th¢ E
same charge in departmental proceedings would not conclude the
criminal case against the appellant. We have already held that for
the reasons given, on the peculiar facts ofthis case, the criminal
proceedings initiated against the appellant cannot be pursued. "
F
(Underlining is ours for emphasis)
31. The said decision was, therefore, rendered on the facts obtaining '
therein and cannot be said to be an authority for the proposition that
exoneration in departmental proceeding ipso facto would lead to a
judgment of acquittal in a criminal trial G

;;J. 32. In Superintendent of Police (CBI) v. Deepak Chowdhaty &
Ors., [1995] 6 SCC 225, this Court while considering a matter of sanction,
vis-a-vis, exoneration in a departmental proceedings, held:
H
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 11 S.C.R.

A "We find force in the contention. The grant of sanction is only an
administrative function, though it is true that the accused may be
saddled with the liability to be prosecuted in a court oflaw. What
is material at that time is that the necessary facts collected during
investigation constituting the offence have to be placed before the
B sanctioning authority and it has to consider the material. Prima facie,
the authority is required to reach the satisfaction that the relevant
facts would constitute the offence and then either grant or refuse
to grant sanction. The grant of sanction, therefore, being
administrative act the need to provide an opportunity of hearing
C to the accused before according sanction does not arise. The High
Court, therefore, was clearly in error in holding that the order of
sanction is vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice."
33. In a case of this nature where departmental proceeding was
D initiated only as against respondent No.2, the enquiry officer did not have
the benefit to consider all the materials which could be brought on record
by the Department in the light of the investigation made by a specializ.ed {
investigating agency, the evidence of experts and deposition of witnesses
to show that forgery of document has been committed by forging thumb
E impression and handwriting, we are of the opinion that exoneration of
respondent No.2 in the departmental proceedings cannot lead to the
conclusion that he was not guilty of commission of the offences wherefor
he was charged.
34. The High Court also committed a manifest error in purporting
F to hold that the specimen fingerprints and handwritings could not have
been taken from Respondent No. I.
35. Sections 5 and 6 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920
clearly provides for such a contingency and read as under :
G "5. ·Power ofMagistrate to order a person to be measured or
photographed.-If a Magistrate is satisfied that, for the purposes
· of any investigation of proceeding under the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898) it is expedient to direct any person
to allow his measurements or photograph to be taken, he may
)
STATE THROUGH SPE & CBI, AP v. M. KRISHNA 587
"' MOHAN [SINHA, J.]
make an order to that effect, and in that case the person to whom A
the order relates shall be produced or shall attend at the time and
place specified in the order and shall allow his measurements or
photograph to be taken, as the case may be, by a police officer:
Provided that no order shall be made directing any person to be B
photographed except by a magistrate of the first class:
Provided further, that no order shall be made under this section
unless the person has at some time been arrested in connection
with such investigation or proceeding.
c
6. Resistance to the taking measurements, etc.-(1) If any
person who under this Act is required to allow his measurements
or photograph to be taken resists or refuses to allow the taking of
the same, it shall be lawful to use all means necessary to secure
the taking thereof. D
(2) Resistance to or refusal to allow taking of measurements or
photograph under this Act shall be deemed to be an offence under
section 186 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45of1860)."
36. A Constitution Bench of this Court in State ofBombay v. Kathi E
, Kalu Oghad, AIR ( 1961) SC 1808, examined the question in regard to
the application of the aforementioned provisions, vis-a-vis the constitutional
mandate that nobody shall be compelled to be a witness against himself
as contemplated in Article 20 of the Constitution of India in great details.
It was clearly held : p
"I 0. "To be a witness" may be equivalent to "furnishing evidence"
in the sense of making oral or written statements, but not in the
larger sense of the expression so as to.include giving of thumb
impression or impression of palm or foot or fingers or specimen
writing or exposing a part of the body by an accused person for 0'
purpose of identification. "Furnishing evidence" in the latter sense
could not have been within the contemplation of the Constitution
makers for the simple reason that - though they may have
intended to protect an accused person from the hazards of self-
H
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R.

A incriminatio~ in the light of the English law on the subject- they
could not have intended to put obstacles in the way of efficient
and effective investigation into crime and of bringing criminals to
justice. The taking of impressions of parts of the body of an
accused person very often becomes necessary to help the
B investigation of a crime. It is as much necessary to protect an
accused person against being compelled to incriminate hims elf, as
to arm the agents oflaw and the law courts with legitimate po~ers
to bring offenders to justice. Furthennore it must be assumed'that
the Constitution-makers were aware of the existing law, for
C example, Section 73 of the Evidence Act or Sections 5 and 6 of
·the Identification of Prisoners Act (33 of 1920). Section 5
authorises a Magistrate to direct any person to allow his
measurements or photographs to be taken, ifhe is satisfied that it
is expedient for the purposes of any investigation or pro ceeding
·D under the Code of Criminal Procedure to do so: "Measurements"
include finger impressions and foot-print impressions. If any such
person who is directed by a Magistrate, under Section 5 of the
Act, to allow his measurements or photographs to be taken resists
or refuses to allow the taking of the measurements or photographs,
E it has been declared lawful by Section 6 to use all necessary means
to secure. the taking of the required measurements or photographs.
Similarly, Section 73 of the Evidence Act authorises the court to
permit the taking of finger impression or a specimen handwriting
or signature of a person present in court, if necessary for the
F purpose of comparison.
11. When an accused person is called upon by the court or any
other authority holding an investigation to give his finger impression
or signature or a specimen of his handwriting, he is not giving any
G testimony of the nature of a "personal testimony". The giving of a
"personal testimony" must depend upon his volition. He can make
any kind of statement or may refuse to make any statement. But
his finger impressions or his handwriting, in spite of efforts at
concealing the true nature of it by dissimulation cannot change their
H intrinsic character. Thus, the giving of finger impressions or of
)
STATE THROUGH SPE & CBI, AP v. M. KRISHNA 589
-. MOHAN [SINHA, J.]
specimen writing or of signatures by an accused person, though it A
may amount to furnishing evidence in the larger sense, is not
included within the expression "to be a witness".
37. For the views we have taken, the impugned judgment of the High
Court cannot be sustained. We are not oblivious of the fact that B
presumption of innocence is a human right and when an accused is
acquitted by a court, such presumption becomes stronger. We are
furthermore not oblivious that a superior court, ordinarily, would not
interfere with a finding of acquittal, if two views are possible as has been
held by this Court in State of Haryana v. Sher Singh & Ors., [2002] 9 C
SCC 356; Narender Singh & Anr. v. State of MP., [2004] 10 SCC
699 and Budh Singh & Ors. v. State of UP., [2006] 9 SCC 731
whereupon Mr. Nageshwar Rao has placed strong reliance.
38. It is, however, a trite law that an appellate court, while
entertaining an appeal from a judgment of acquittal, would also be entitled D 1

to consider the evidences brought on record by both the prosecution and
the defence and arrive at its own decision. Interference with a judgment
of acquittal may not be made when two views are possible to be taken,
but when on appraisal thereof, only one view is possible, the appellate
court would not hesitate to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. E
In this case, we are finnly of the view that no two views are possible
to be taken.
39. Mr. Rao, however, would submit that involvement of respondent
No.2 is minimal. He had proposed an appraisal report but there is nothing F
to show that he had obtained any monetory benefit.
40. The entire prosecution case relating to charges of forgery and
misappropriation has been attributed to respondent No. l alone. He was
the one who had put on shelves all the procedural requirements. Not only G
he, during the luncheon hours, filled up the application forms, but even
prior thereto he had purported to have received the documents, sanctioned
the loan and obtained the amount ofloan in cash. PW-21 and PW-22
were known to him and not to the respondent No.2.
H
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] I I S.C.R.

A 41. We, therefore, are of the opinion that a case has been made
out to invoke the proviso appended to sub-section (2) of Section 5 of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, I947 in the case ofrespondent No.2
Furthermore, he worked in the bank for a short period and was still
undergoing probation. Forgery and misappropriation was committed by
B respondent no. I even thereafter. The appraisal reports prepared by
respondent No.2 were used by respondent No. I also for the subsequent
period, namely, I 987 when respondent No.2 was no longer working in
the said branch.
C 42. For the reasons aforementioned, while upholding the conviction
and sentence as awarded by learned Trial Judge as against respondent
No.'l (accused No.I), in view of the special reasons recorded
hereinbefore, we impose a sentence of rigorous imprisonment of three
months on respondent No.2. He shall, however, be liable to pay a fine of
D Rs.20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand only) and in default shall undergo
a sentence of three months. ·
43. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed with the aforementioned
directions. The respondents may be takei1 into custody for serving out
the respective remaining sentences.
E ...
RP. Appeals allowed. .

-