Holding

The order of sanction is a public document admissible under the Evidence Act, and the respondent cannot raise its admissibility for the first time on appeal; therefore the High Court’s judgment is affirmed.

Summary

The State appealed the acquittal of K. Narasimhachary, a former Mandal Revenue Inspector, who had been convicted under the Prevention of Corruption Act for taking a bribe of Rs.600. The High Court set aside the conviction on the ground that the order of sanction issued by the Governor was not proved in accordance with the Evidence Act. The Supreme Court held that the sanction order is a public document admissible under Sections 74, 76‑78 of the Indian Evidence Act and that the respondent could not raise its admissibility for the first time in the appellate court. The Court also examined the prosecution evidence on the alleged bribe, noting doubts about the phenolphthalein test but finding that the High Court’s view was not wholly improbable and that the material did not compel a reversal of the conviction. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the High Court’s judgment upheld.

Issues considered

The admissibility of the order of sanction issued under Section 197 CrPC/Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act as a public document.
Whether the order of sanction was proved in compliance with Sections 45, 47, 76‑78 of the Indian Evidence Act.
Whether the respondent could raise the admissibility of the sanction order for the first time before the appellate court.
The sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to prove the offence of taking a bribe beyond reasonable doubt.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 197
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 45, s. 47, s. 74, s. 76, s. 77, s. 78
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 13(1)(d), s. 13(2), s. 13(3), s. 19

Subjects

sanction orderpublic documentevidence admissibilityprevention of corruption actbriberycriminal appealburden of proofsection 197 CrPC

Judgment

STATE THROUGH INSPECTOR OF POLICE, A.P. A
v.
K. NARASIMHACHARY

OCTOBER 7, 2005

[S.B. SINHA AND R.V. RA VEENDRAN, JJ.]
B

- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Section 197-Sanction for
prosecution of a Government Servant given by Governor-Original order of
sanction produced in court duly authenticated by authorized officer- C
Admissibility of-Held, it is a public document and is admissible in evidence-
Any one conversant with signature of authorized officer can prove it-Proof
by experts under Sections 45, 47 of Evidence Act not necessary and High
Court wrongly held otherwise-Evidence Act, 1872-Sections 76 to 78.

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988-Sections I 3(J)(d), 13(2)-Benefit D
of doubt-Complainant applied for valuation of certificate of his property
and obtained within 4 days-Allegation that accused demanded bribe of Rs.
600 for issuance of certificate-Trap laid and sum of Rs. 600 recovered from
his pocket-Another sum of Rs. 235 also recovered from same pocket-
Conviction under the Act-Acquitted by High Court for want of evidence- E
Correcmess of-Held: Proof of giving and taking of bribe appearing
doubtful-Sum of Rs. 23 5 taken out from same pocket not subjected to test of
phenolphthalein-Complainant appearing ro be an influential person who
could obtain certificate in 4 days-Two views possible and view of High
Court cannot be said to be improbable.
F
Appeal-New plea-Plea regarding inadmissibility of document not
raised before trial court-Held: Respondent cannot be permitted to raise the
plea for the first time before the appellate court.

Prosecution's case was that on 1.3.1994, PW-1 applied for the G
property valuation certificate before the Revenue Officer PW-3. PW-3
initialed the application and asked PW-I to submit it before the
respondent. Respondent asked him to bring certain statements and
accounts which PW-1 submitted the next day. At this stage, respondent
made a demand of Rs. I 000 for issuance of the certificate. On negotiation,
the amount reduced to Rs. 600. PW-I made a complaint on 5.3.1994 and H
197
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A a trap was laid and a sum of Rs. 600 was stated to have been recovered
from the pocket of respondent. Respondent raised defence that PW-1
wanted valuation of land to be made Rs. 3 lacs and as he did not oblige,
PW-I bore grudge against him and falsely implicated him.

Special Judge held him guilty of offence punishable under Section
B 13(1) (d) read with Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
On appeal, High Court reversed the said findings, holding that the order
of sanction dated 1.5.1995 was not proved by PW-6 in accordance with
law. On merits also High Court held that the prosecution has not been
able to prove its case against the Respondent. Hence the present appeal. -
c Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. A bare perusal of the order of sanction shows that the
Government of Andhra Pradesh, who was the competent authority to
remove the respondent from the Government Service had after fully and
D care(µBy examining the material placed before them in respect of
allegations considered that he should be prosecuted in the court of law;
whereupon the order of sanction was issued in the name of the Governor.
Shri N. Madanmohan Reddy, Secretary to the Government, authenticated
the said order of sanction in the manner specified in the Rules of Executive
E Business. The authenticity of the said order has not been questioned. It
was, therefore, a public document within the meaning of Section 74 of the
Indian Evidence Act. PW-6 proved the signature of Shri N. Madanmohan
Reddy. Nothing was, thus, elicited in the cross-examination of the said
witness to show that he was not a competent witness to identify the
signature of Shri Madanmohan Reddy. The Respondent, therefore, allowed
F the said document to be exhibited without any demur. He did not question
the admissibility of the said document before the Trial Court, either when
the same was exhibited or at the final hearing before the trial court. He,
therefore, could not be permitted to question the admissibility of the said
6ocument for the first time before the appellate court.
G (202-G, H; 203-A, B, C, DJ

Ranvir Singh and Anr. v. Union of India, (2005) AIR SCW 4565, relied
on.

1.2. A public document can be proved in terms of Sections 76 to 78
H of the Evidence Act. A public document can be proved otherwise also. The
High Court, therefore, was not correct in invoking the provisions of
STATE THROUGH INSPECTOR OF POLICE, A.P. v. K. NARASJMHACHARY J99

Section 47 of the Indian Evidence Act in the instant case as it was not called A
upon to form an opinion as to by whom the said order of sanction was
written and signed. PW-6 was not examined as an expert or was required
to give his opinion as regard the correctness or otherwise of the signature
of the said N. Madanmohan Reddy. 1203-E, FJ

Guizar Ali v. State of HP., (1998) 2 SCC 192, relied on. B

R.J. Singh Ahuluwa/ia v. The State of Delhi, [19701 3 SCC 451 and
Mohd. Iqbal Ahmedv. State of Andhra Pradesh, 11979) 4 SCC 172, referred
to.

2. So far as the merit of the matter is concerned, the prosecution C
case is not entirely free from doubt. PW-1 intended to obtain a signature
as regard valuation of his lands so as to enable him to get himself registered
with the Public Works Department as a contractor. He went to PW-3. PW-
3 did not send the same to the Respondent by following the existing
procedure. He merely initialed the same and handed over it back to PW- D
I allegedly for the purpose of giving it to the Respondent who in turn asked
to take it to PW-4. lt is really curious that when PW-I handed over the
application to PW-4 on 2.3.1994, on the same day his statement as also
the statement of his grandmother were recorded and all the documents,
namely, Ext. P-2 and P-6 were handed over by him to PW-I who in turn
handed them over to the Respondent. lt was at this stage the purported E
demand was said to have been made. Strangely enough he met the
Respondent in the evening of 03.03.1994, although a demand was said to
have been made by the Respondent on 02.03.1994 in the office, presumably
after office hours and then the amount of gratification was reduced from
Rs.l,000 to Rs.600. PW-I did not make any complaint fo PW-3 on the said F
date i.e. 03.03.1994 and even on 04.03.1994, although from the conduct of
PW-I and PW-3, it is evident that they were very close to each other. PW-
3 apparently intended to help him out of the way. The valuation certificate
was sent to PW-3 by the Respondent on 04.03.1994 and was signed by PW-
3 on the same day. It was also certified by PW-4. lt is wholly unlikely that
although his demand was not met, the Respondent would forward his G
certificate to PW-3. The natural conduct of the Respondent, if he had in
fact demanded any amount by way of gratification, would have been to
wait for PW-I to meet his demand. It is not in dispute that it was PW-4,
who was to evaluate the property and it was PW-3 who was to grant the
certificate. The Respondent was merely a recommending authority. PW- H
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A 8 was the Deputy Superintendent of Police, ACB, at Tirupathi. On
05.03.1994, he was at Cuddapah. According to PW-1, he approached PW-
8 at 6.35 a.m., whereas according to PW-8, he came to him at 8.00 a.m.
The mediators were summoned and the trap was laid after making all
arrangements therefor at about 12.30 p.m. After the transaction was
completed, the Respondent was found having not only the ta!nted amount
B of Rs.600 but also a sum or'Rs.235 in different denominations and wads.
Why the said amount of Rs.235 which was recovered from the right pocket
of the accused was not subjected to phenolphthalein test is a matter of
guess. The amount of Rs.235 was kept in the same pocket of his trouser,
it must have come in contact with the tainted amount. PW-1 appears to
C be an influential person. He could approach PW-3 directly. He was in a
position to obtain a certificate, copies of various documents from PW-4
on the same day as also obtain a certificate from him on the same day.
Thus, as the valuation certificate was sent to PW-3 by the Respondent on
04.03.1994, there does not appear to be any good reason as to why PW-1
would not come to know thereabout. According to him, he came to know
D that PW-8 was at Cuddapah and he approached him in the early morning
at 6.35 on 05.03.1994. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of
this case, two views are possible and the view of the High Court cannot
be said to be wholly improbable; it cannot be said, that the materials
brought on record would lead to only one conclusion, i.e., the guilt of the
E accused. 1204-G, H; 205-A, B, C, D, E; 206-B, C, D, E, Fl

CRIMINAL APPEL LA TE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 82
of 2004.
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.3.2003 of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in Crl.A. No. i 058 of 1996.
F
P. Vinay Kumar, Mrs. 0. Bharathi Reddy and Sneha Bhaskaran for the
Appellant.
Srinivas R. Rao and Ms. Neeru Vaid for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
S.B. SINHA, J. The State is in appeal before us from a judgment of
the Andhra Pradesh High Court dated 20.03.2003 in Criminal Appeal No.1058
of 1996, recording a finding of acquittal as against the Respondent, upon
reversing a judgment passed by the Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases,
Nellore, dated 06.12.1996 convicting the Respondent herein for commission
H of offences punishable under Sections 7, 11, 13(3) read with Section 13(1)(d)
STATE THROUGH INSPECTOR OF POLICE, AP. v. K. NARASIMHACHARY [SINHA, J.J 201

of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, 'the Act') and sentencing A
him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of
Rs.1,000.

The Respondent herein was a Manda! Revenue Inspector in the office
of Manda! Revenue Office, Cuddapah in the year 1994. The complainant
(PW-I) was the owner of some immovable property situated within the B
jurisdiction of the said Manda! Office. He intended to get himself registered
as a contractor with the Public Works Department wherefor a certificate as
regard valuation of his property was necessary. An application to that effect
was filed before the Manda I Revenue Officer (PW-3) on 01.03.1994. The
Manda] Revenue Officer adopted a peculiar procedure by putting his initial C
thereon and handed over the same to PW-I himself and asked him to give

- it to the accused. When PW I handed over application to the accused on the
same day, he is said to have asked him to present the same before the Village
Administrative Officer (PW-4) and to bring cultivation accounts relating to
his lands and certain statements. PW-4 thereafter recorded the statements of
PW-I and his grandmother. He granted his own (VAO's) Statement. statement D
of PW-I, his grandmother and village elders as also certified copies of
Adangals, extracts (revenue records) marked as Exs.P-2 to P-6 to the said
PW-I. PW-I allegedly handed over the same to the Respondent on 02.03.1994.
The Respondent is said to have demanded a sum of Rs.1,000 for issuance of
• the property valuation certificate. He on the next day i.e. on 03.03.1994 met E
the Respondent at the office of PW-3 and upon negotiation, the amount of
alleged illegal gratification was reduced to Rs.600 from Rs.1000. A complaint
was made to the ACB on 05.03.1994 at 6.35 A.M. A trap was laid at 12.30
P.M. on the same day upon complying with the usual formalities. A sum of
Rs.600 in the denomination of Rs.50 is said. to have been recovered from the
Respondent allegedly kept by him in his right pocket of the trouser. F
The defence of the Respondent was that certificate valuing the
complainant's land for a sum of Rs. one lac was submitted on 04.03.1993
itself whereas PW-I wanted that the valuation of the lands should be made
three lacs; and as the Respondent did not oblige, PW-1 bore grudge against
him as a result he was falsely implicated. G
The learned Special Judge framed as many as five issues and answered
them against the Respondent by a judgment dated 6.12.1996, holding the
Respondent guilty of the offence punishable under Section 13(l)(d) read with
Section 13(2) of the Act.
H
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A On appeal, the High Court reversed the said findings, inter a/ia, holding
that the order of sanction dated 1.5. I995 was not proved by PW-6 in
accordance with law. On merit of the matter also, the High Court opined that
the prosecution has not been able to prove its case against the Respondent.

Mr. P. Vinay Kumar, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the
B Appellant, in assailing the impugned judgment, would contend that the High
Court committed an error in holding that the order of sanction was not
admissible in evidence having not been proved by PW-6 in accordance with
law.
The learned counsel also took us through the evidences of the prosecution
C witnesses and submitted that PW-3 and PW-5 corroborated the evidence of
the complainant (PW-I). It was contended that the fact that the Respondent
was merely a recommending authority and not the final authority for the
purpose of grant of a valuation certificate cannot be treated to be a ground
for disbelieving the entire prosecution case.
' ....'·,
D Mr. Srinivas R. Rao, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent, on.the other hand, would submit that the prosecution was bound
to prove the order of sanction in accordance with law. The learned counsel
in this behalf relied upon a decision of this Court in R.J. Singh Ahuluwalia
v. The State of Delhi, [1970) 3 SCC 451.
E The learned counsel would take us through the judgment ·Of the High
Court and submit that the High Court has taken into consideration all the
facts and circumstances of this case in arriving at a finding that the State has ·
not been able to prove its case against the Respondent.
The order of sanction dated 02.03 .1995 has been produced in original.
p The order of sanction is a Government Order No.GOMs. No.76 dated
02.03.1995
A bare perusal of the order of sanction shows that the allegation as .
against the Respondent herein for taking into consideration that the
Government of Andhra Pradesh, who was the competent authority to remove
G the said Sri K. Narasimha Chari, Manda! Revenue Inspector, Cuddapah, from
the Government Service, after fully and carefully examining the material
placed before them in respect of the said allegations and having regard to the
circumstances of the case considered that the Respondent should be prosecuted
in the court of law; whereupon the-order of sanction was issued in the name
of the Governor. Shri N. Madanmohan Reddy, Secretary to the Government,
H merely authenticated the said order of sanction which was issued in the name
STATE THROUGH INSPECTOR OF POLICE, AP 1•. K. NARASIMHACllARY [SINHA,J.J 203

of the Governor of Andhra Pradesh. The order of sanction was, thus, issued A
by the State in discharge of its statutory functions in terms of Section 19 of
the Act. The order of sanction was authenticated. The said order of sanction
was an executive action of a State having been issued in the name of the
Governor. It was authenticated in the manner specified in the Rules of
Executive Business. The authenticity of the said order has not been questioned. B
It was, therefore, a public document within the meaning of Section 74 of the
Indian Evidence Act. PW-6 proved the signature of Shri N. Madanmohan
Reddy. He identified his signature. He was not cross-examined on the premise
that he did not know the signature of Shri N. Madanmohan Reddy. In answer
to the only question put to him, he stated "By the time the Secretary signed
in Ex.P. I 7 I was in G.A.D." C

-
".{
.,
Nothing was, thus, elicited in the cross-examination of the said witness
to show that he was not a competent witness to identify the signature of Shri
Madanmohan Reddy.

The Respondent, therefore, allowed the said document to be exhibited D
without any demur. He did not question the admissibility of the said document
before the Trial Court, either when the same was exhibited or at the final
hearing before the trial court. He, therefore, could not be permitted to question
the admissibility of the said document for the first time before the appellate
court. [See Ranvir Singh and Anr. v. Union of India, (2005) AIR SCW 4565
: (2005) 7 SCALE 238]. E
A public document can be proved in terms of Sections 76 to 78 of the
Evidence Act. A public document can be proved otherwise also. The High
Court, therefore, was not correct in invoking the provisions of Section 4 7 of
the Indian Evidence Act in the instant case as it was not called upon to form
an opinion as to by whom the said order of sanction was written and signed. F
PW-6 was not examined as an expert or was required to give his opinion as
regard the correctness or otherwise of the signature of the said N. Madanmohan
Reddy. The authenticity of the said document was never in question.

The High Court relied upon a decision of this Court in Guizar Ali v. G
State of H.P., [ 1998] 2 SCC I 92, wherein this Court observed :

"It must be remembered that expert evidence regarding handwriting
is not the only mode by which genuineness of a document can be
established. The requirement in Section 67 of the Evidence Act is
only that the handwriting must be proved to be that of the person _H

,·
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A concerned. In order to prove the identity of the handwriting any .
mode not forbidden by law can be resorted to. Of course, two modes
are indicated by law in Sections 45 and 47 of the Evidence Act. The
former permits expert opinion to be regarded as relevant evidence
and the latter permits opinion of any person acquainted with such
handwriting to be regarded as relevant evidence. Those and some
B other provisions are subsumed under the title "Opinion of third persons,
when relevant". Opinions of third persons, other than those enumerated
in the fasciculus of provisions, would have been irrelevant. Among
the permitted opinions those mentioned in Sections 45 and 47 are
also included. So it cannot be said that identity of handwriting of a
C document can be established only by resorting to one of those two
sections. There can be other modes through which identity of the
handwriting can be established ... "

It is, therefore, evident that the High Court misread and misconstrued
the law laid down by this Court in the aforementioned decision. It also
D wrongly applied Section 47 of the Indian Evidence Act.
In R.J. Singh Ahuluwalia (supra), this Court was concerned with the
validity of the sanction; inasmuch as therein the Home Ministry, which was
the sanctioning authority did not make any sanction, as a result whereof it
was conceded by the State that in absence thereof the prosecution must fail.
E In Mohd Iqbal Ahmedv. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1979] 4 SCC 172,
the order of sanction was found to be invalid as the sanctioning authority did
not duly apply its mind.
Therein this Court held that an order of valid sanction can be proved
by the Sanctioning Authority in two ways : either ( 1) by producing the
F original sanction which itself contains the facts constituting the offence and
the grounds of satisfaction; or (2) by adducing evidence aliunde to show that
the facts were placed before the Sanctioning Authority and the satisfaction
arrived at by it. In this case, the original order of sanction has been produced.

So far as the merit of the matter is concerned, as would appear from
G the discussions made hereinbefore that the prosecution case is not entirely
free from doubt. PW- I intended to obtain a signature as regard valuation of
his lands so as to enable him to get himself registered with the Public Works
Department as a contractor. He went to PW-3. PW-3 did not send the same
to the Respondent by following the existing procedure. He merely initialed
H the same and handed over it back to PW-I allegedly for the purpose of

.,
STA TE THROUGH INSPECTOR OF POLICE, A.P. v. K. NARASIMHACHAR Y [SINHA, J.] 205

· giving it to the Respondent who in tum asked to take it to PW-4. A
It is really curious that when PW-I handed over the application to PW-
4 on 2.3.1994, on the same day his statement as also the statement of his
grandmother were recorded and all the documents, namely, Ext. P-2 and P-
6 were handed over by him to PW-I who in tum handed them over to the
Respondent. It was at this stage the purported demand was said to have been B
made. Strangely enough he met the Respondent in the evening of03.03. J994,
although a demand was said to have been made by the Respondent on
02.03.1994 in the office, presumably after office hours and then the amount
of gratification was reduced from Rs.J,000 to Rs.600. PW-I did not make
any complaint to PW-3 on the said date i.e. 03.03.1994 and even on C
04.03.1994, although from the conduct of PW-I and PW-3, it is evident that
they were very close to each other. PW-3 apparently intended to help him out
of way. The valuation certificate was sent to PW-3 by the Respondent on
04.03.1994 which was signed by PW-3 on the same day. It was also certified
by PW-4. It is wholly unlikely that although his demand was not met, the
Respondent would forward his certificate to PW-3. The natural conduct of D
the Respondent, if he had in fact demanded any amount by way of gratification,
would have been to wait for PW-I to meet his demand.

It is not in dispute that it was PW-4, who was to evaluate the property
and it was PW-3 who was to grant the certificate. The Respondent was
merely a recommending authority. In the aforementioned situation, the High E
Court has arrived at the following findings :

"..... The evidence on record in this case discloses that Ex.Pl was
submitted by PW! directly to PW3 and it has moved with almost jet
speed. The local verification, recording of statements, furnishing of F
certified copies of revenue record etc., had taken place within one
day. The file reached PW3, in all probability on 03.03.1994 and he
signed on the next day. PW3 was very much accessible to PW-I. If
he sensed and delay or if there were any hindrances, he could have
brought the same to the notice of PW.3 himself. When PW3 received
Ex.PI directly from PW. I without any objection, there should not G
have been any impediment in handing over the Ex.P.8 to PW. I
directly. The accused was neither the issuing authority nor was the
outward clerk. He figured somewhere in between. The handing over
.of Ex.PS by PW3 to the accused appears to be deliberate and planned.
Suggestions to PW3 that he was suspended for certain irregularities
H
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A on earlier occasion, he bore grudge against the accused and wanted
to implicate him gains credence in this regard."

Shri K. Kumar (PW-8) was the Deputy Superintendent of Police, ACB,
at Tirupathi. On 05.03.1994, he was at Cuddapah. According to PW-I, he
approached PW-8 at 6.35 a.m., whereas according to PW-8, he came to him
B at 8.00 a.m. The mediators were summoned and the trap was laid after making
all arrangements therefor at about 12.30 p.m. After the transaction was
completed, the Respondent was found having not only the tainted amount of
Rs.600 but also a sum of Rs.235 in different denominations and wads. Why
the said amount of Rs.23 5 which was recovered from the right pocket of the
C accused was not subjected to phenolphthalein test is a matter of guess. The
amount of Rs.235 was kept in the same pocket of his trouser, it must have
come in contact with the tainted amount.
PW-I appears to be an influential person. He could approach PW-3
directly. He was in a position to obtain a certificate, copies of various.
documents from PW-4 on the same day as also obtain a certificate from him
D on the same day. Thus, as the valuation certificate was sent to PW-3 by the
Respondent on 04.03 .1994, there does not appear to be any good reason as
to why PW-1 would not come to know thereabout. According to him, he
came to know that PW-8 was at Cuddapah and be approached him in the
early morning at 6.35 on 05.03.1994.
E Having regard to the fj!cts and circumstances of this case, we are of the
opinion that two views ate possible and the view of the High Court cannot
be· said to be wholly improbable; it cannot be said, in view of the discussions
made hereinbefore, that the materials brought on records would lead to only
one conclusion, Le., the guilt of the accused. The impugned judgment,
F therefore, is sustained.
For the reasons aforementioned, we do not intend to interfere with the
impugned judgment of the High Court. The Appeal is dismissed accordingly.

D.G. Appeal. dismissed.

.'