STATE OF WEST BENGALversusSRI ORILAL JAISWAL AND ANR.

                      STATE OF WEST BENGAL                                      A
                                     v.
                  SRI ORILAL JAISWAL AND ANR.

                          SEPTEMBER 23, 1993
                                                                                B
         ( K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY AND G.N. RAY, JJ.)


      Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 306, read with Section 34, Section
498-A read with Section 34-Husband and mother-in-law of newly young
married girl subjecting her to cruelty-Suicide by bride within a year of mar-   C
riage-Held, deceased has been subjected to humiliation and physical as well
as mental torture throughout-Acts of accused were quite likely to destroy
nonnal frame of mind of deceased and to drive her to frustration and mental
agony and to end her life by committing suicide-Both accused convicted of
offence under section 498A benefit of doubt given under Section 306.
                                                                                D
      Explanation to Section 4~8-A-!'Cruelty"-Wilful conduct of husband
and mother-in-law driving bride to commit suicide-Degree of sensivity ex-
amined-Held, victim jilted from nonnal frame of mind due to cruelty meted
out to her-Acts of accused covered under expression "Cruelty".
                                                                                E
       Criminal Trial-Suicide by a young married girl within a year of her
marriage-Charge of cruelty-Standard ofproof-Depends upon the facts and
circumstances of the case, quality of evidence adduced, materials placed on
record.
                                                                                F
      Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Section 113-A--Presumption as to abetment
of suicide by a ma"ied woman-Held : requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not stand altered even after introduction of Section
498-A Indian Penal Code and Section 113- A.

       Respondents No. 1 and 2 were charged with the offences under G
Section 306 read with Section 34 IPC and Section 498-A read with Section
34 I.P.C. The prosecution's case was that Respondent No. l's wife, who was
on twenty years' age was treated cruelly and tortured both mentally and
physically by the two Respondents, viz., her husband and mother-in-law,
as a. result of which she committed suicide, within a year of her marriage. H
                                    461
    462                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A         The Sessions Judge covicted both the respondents of the offences
    charge, and sentenced each of them to 5 year's rigorous imprffiionment
    and fine of Rs. 1,080 and 1 year's rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.
    1,000 on both the counts respectively. On appeal by the respondents, the
    High Court enumerated a number of circumstances, namely: there was no
B   satisfactory explanation of delay in lodging the F .I.R., there was no dying
    declaration or suicidal note, there was no letter during the subsistence of
    marriage, there was no letter addressed to the mother who used to live
    outside the city most of the time, there was no complaint either by the
    father or father-in-law of the victim, there was no evidence regarding the
    injuries received by the deceased or the mat-treatment, no specific date
c   was given when the deceased had allegedly told her mother about the
    demand for dowery or the mat-treatment and no specific date or time was
    given for making such demand; although the adult members of the family
    of the deceased consisting of four brothers, sisters and brothers-in-law and
    father were the residents of Calcutta, the deceased had never complained
D   anything to them, and held that these circumstances gave rise to a great
    doubt against the prosecution's story and that the prosecution had failed
    to establish the charges against the respondents and cruelty as
    enumerated in Section 498-A had not been established, that the presump·
    tion under Section 113A of the India Evidence Act, could not be pressed
E   in to service, and accordingly, Section 306 l.P.C. also could not be invoked,
    and that since there was no independent evidence ofinducement to commit
    suicide either by the mother-in-law or by the husband of the deceased, the
    conviction of the accused persons was unwarranted. Accordingly, it set
    aside the conviction and sentences and passed an order of acquittal in
p   favour of both the ·accused.


          In appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant·
    State that the High Court took a very unreasonable view completely.
    overlooking the clinching evidence about the complicity of both the accused
    in the offences charged against them, that the High Court erred in not
G   appreciating the factors so far as timely lodging of the F .I.R. was con-
    cerned, and it failed to consider evidence indicating that both the accused,
    the husband and mother-in-law of the deceased, had treated her with
    cruelty almost from the very beginning of her married life and she was
    subjected to both physical and mental torture by various acts and abetted
H   her to commit suicide.
                            STATE v. JAISWAL                             463

      On behalf of respondents it was contended that (i) in a criminal trial,   A
the offence charged against the accused must be proved beyond any
reasonable doubt and however grave and intriguing may be the cir-
cumstances the Court should ensure that
                                     I
                                          the burden of strict proof on the
prosecution is not covertly substituted by surmises and conjecture (ii)
there was no evidence against the husband that he had induced or sug-
gested that the deceased should end her life, (iii) that no tenant or
                                                                                B
neighbour/disinterested witness had deposed that either of the accused
used to abuse or assault the deceased.

      Allowing the appeal partly, this Court

     HELD: U. The Judgment of acquittal passed. by the High Court
                                                                                c
cannot be justified and the same is against the weight of the evidence
adduced in the case. [478-G]

      1.2. It cannot be said that there has been unjustified inordinate delay
in lodging the F.l.R. The High Court failed to note that the elder brother D
of the deceased had in fact made a written complaint on the very same day
to the police but the same was not treated as FIR by the Police and he also
made a statement before the Police on the next day wherein the allegation
of cruelty meted out to his sister were clearly indicated. [480-D]

       1.3. There could be no dying declaration when it was nobody's case E
that the deceased was alive so as to make a dying declaratfon. Absence of
a suicidal note was not an important factor in deciding the case. There was
evidence to support the prosecution case that the deceased had been
complaining about the cruel treatment meted out to her, that the deceased
had been subjected to mental and physical torture and she remained F
unhappy in the house of in-laws, and such acts of cruelty, in ordinary
course, were likely to disturb the mental frame of the deceased and cause
sufficient impulses to commit suicide. [480-F]

      1.4. In view of the circumstances, exchange of letters between the
deceased and her relations on parents side should not have been reasonab- G
ly expected. Beside her parents, other members of the family were per-
manent residents of the City itself and although the mother used to leave
the City at times, she often used to come to the city and it is the positive
case of the mother and also the elder brother of the deceased that on a
number of occasions when the deceased had come to their house she had H
    464                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A met the mother and the other members of the family. (480-G-H, 481-A]
          1.5. It is the evidence of the mother of the deceased that she had
    spoken to respondent No. 2, namely, the mother-in-law about the mat-treat-
    ment meted out to her da11.ghter and she also implored before the mother-
    in-Iaw that the daughter should not be subjected to any abuses or
B   humiliations. It is the Drosecution case that mother-in-law abused the
    daughter-in-law by saying that she was a woman of evil luck and had
    brought mis-fortune to the family. It is, therefore, quite natural that the
    mother of the deceased had made complaints to her mother-in-law and had
    requested her not to abuse and humiliate her daughter. Hence, the question
C   of complaint by the father was neither expected nor necessary. (481-C-D]

          1.6. The High Court was not right in holding that there was no
    evidence about mal·treatment give to the deceased or there was absence of
    any evidence of injuries sustained by the deceased before her death. The
    mother, elder brother, sister and other relations of the deceased have
D   deposed about the mal-treatment and physical assault of the deceased. The
    doctor conducting the post-mortem has noted some injuries which were
    ante-mortem on the person of the deceased. (481-D-EJ

          1.7. There is positive evidence of the mother and elder brother of the
E deceased that when after about a month of the marriage, the deceased
    came to her parental house, she had narrated about cruelty and mental
    torture sutrered by her in the house of the accused, and she specifically
    complained that within a few days after her marriage the father-in-law of
    respondent No. 2 had died and in view of such death, she was abused and
    treated with cruelty by the accused No. 2. Thereafter, on other occasion
F   also whenever she had come to the parental house, she had talked about
    such mal-treatment. The deceased was alive only for about 10 months after
    marriage and it is nobody's case that the deceased complained about the
    mal-treatment given in remote past or only on specific occasions so that
    exact date was required to be mentioned. (481-G-H, 482-A]
G         1.8. The High Court was not right in holding that the deceased did
    not complain to her close relations. Such a finding is contrary to the
    evidence in the case. The prosecution case was not properly investigated
    by the police for which the Sessions judge has rightly commented on the
    lapses on the part of the Investigating Officer, who has failed and neglected
H   to examine the members of the family and as such, in fairness, the
                           STATE v. JAISWAL                              465

evidences of the sister and other close relations of the deceased were not      A
taken into consideration by the Session Judge and he has mainly relied on
the evidence of the mother in basing his finding. For a newly married
woman, her mis-fortune in the house of in-laws was not expected to be
made public and confiding to the mother was only natural. [482-C-E]

      1.9. Ordinarily, it is not expected that physical torture or the abuses   B
hurled on the wife by the husband and the mother- in-law should be made
in such a way as to be noticed by the tenants living in the adjoining
portions of the house, It is also not the case of the prosecution that the
neighbours came to know about such assault, or that abuses used to be
hurled loudly so that the tenants had occasions to hear them. It was,           c
therefore, not necessarily to examine neighbour or tenants to prove the
prosecution case. [482-H, 483-A]

      2. The evidence about physical and mental torture of the deceased
has come from the mother, elder brother other close relations. Such
depositions by close relations, who may be interested in the prosecution of D
the accused, need not be discarded simply on the score of the absence of
corroboration by independent witness. Whether evidence of interested
witness is worthy of credence is to be judged in the special facts of the case.
                                                                       (483-B]
      3.1 It is true that in a criminal trial, the degree of proof is stricter
than what is required in a civil proceedings. However intriguing may be
facts and circumstances of the case, the charges made against the accused
must be proved beyond all reasonable doubts and the requirement of proof
cannot lie in the realm of surmises and conjectures. The requirement of
proof beyond reasonable doubt does not stand altered even after the intro· F
duction of Section 498-A IPC and Section 113-A of India Evidence Act.
Although the conscious of the court must be satisfied that the accused is
not held guilty when there are reasonable doubts about the complicity of
the accused in respect of the offences alleged, there is no absolute standard
for proof in a criminal trial and the question whether the charges made G
against the accused have been proved beyond all reasonable doubts must
depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case and the quality of the .
evidence adduced in the case and the materials' placed on record. [483-D-F]

      Bater v. Bate1; [1950] 2 All ER 458 and Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal
Singh & Ors.; A.1.R. (1990) S.C. 209, referred to.                      H
    466                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A         3.2. The court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and
    circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the
    purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact
    induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the
    Court that a victim committing suicide was hyper sensitive to ordinary
    petulance dischord and differences in domestic life quite common to the
B   society to which the victim belonged and such petulance dischord and
    differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced in-
    dividual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court
    should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of
    abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty. [484-D-F]
c
           3.3. In the instant case, there is no material worthy of evidence to hold
    that the deceased w~s hyper-sensitive and that for other reasons and not
    on account of cruelty she had lost normal frame of mind and being over-
    come by unusual psychic imbalance, decide to end her life by committing
D   suicide. The evidence adduced in the case has clearly established that the
    deceased was subjected to abuses, humiliation and mental torture from the
    very beginning of her married life. The deceased was abused by her mother-
    in-Iaw/respondent No. 2 by saying that the deceased was a woman of evil
    luck only because an elderly member in the family had died after her
    marriage. The evidence in the case reveals an act of extreme form of cruelty
E   by telling the unfortunate mother/deceased that she was vile enough to
    swallow her own baby and she should commit suicide. There was also
    evidence in the case that the husband used to come home drunk and abuse
    her and also nse to assault her on occasions. The bridal presents brought
    by her were branded as goods of inferior quality and she was asked to take
F   the said articles back to her parental home. There is no manner of doubt
    that the evidence of mother rightly accepted by the Sessions Judge, and
    there being no reason to discard the same, clearly establishes that the
     deceased has been subjected to physical and mental torture all throughout.
     Respondent No.1, the husband, also treated the deceased with cruelty. Such
    acts, to say the least, were very unkind and a newly married woman is bound
G    to suffer a great mental pain and humiliation. [484-G-H, 485-C-E]


           3.4 The acts of the accused were quite likely to destroy the normal
     frame of mind of the deceased and to drive her to frustration and mental
     agony and to end her life by committing suicide and amounted to cruelty
H    as envisaged by Explanation (a) to Section 498-A LP .C. In the circumstan-
                      STATE v.JAISWAL[RAY,J.]                          467

ces offence under Section 498-A, l.P.C. is clearly established against both· A
the accused. [485-G-H]

      4. Although there are materials on record to indicate that both the
accused were also guilty under Section 306 l.P.C., but they are acquitted
of the charge, giving them benefit of doubt. [486-C]
                                                                              B
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
734/91.

     From the Judgment and Order dated the 14th May 1990 of the High
Court of Calcutta at Calcutta in Cr!. Appeal No. 95/90.
                                                                              c
      P.S. Pati and D.N. Mukherjee for the Appellant.

      R.K. Jain, S.G. Ghosh, Ashim Mehrotra and B.B. Tarwakley for the
respondents.

      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                              D

       G.N. RAY, J. This appeal has been preferred by the State of West
Bengal against the judgment of acquittal dated May 14, 1990 passed by the
Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 195 of
1990. By the aforesaid judgment, the conviction and sentences against the     E
accused, Sri Orilal Jaiswal and his mother, Smt. Gujarati Debi Jaiswal,
passed by the learned Sessions Judge, 12th Bench of the City Sessions
Court, Calcutta on February 29, 1990 in Sessions Trial Nu.1 of 1990 was
set aside by the High Court and the accused were acquitted of the convic-
tion under Section 306 read with Section 34 I.P.C. and sentence of 5 years'   F
rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1000 in default simple imprisonment
for 3 months and conviction under Section 498 read with Section 34 I.P.C.
an sentence of one year rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1000 in
default to suffer simple imprisonment for three months.

       The prosecution case in short is that Usha Jaiswal had committed G
suicide by hanging on April 19, 1986 in the house of her husband and the
in-laws within a year from the date of marriage which was solemnised
between Usha Jaiswal and accused No. 1., Orilal Jaiswal on May 31, 1985.
It is the case of the prosecution that it was a negotiated marriage and
according to the demand of the accused persons and other members of the H
    468                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) SUPP. 25.C.R.

A family of in-laws sufficient dowry including colour T.V., motor cycle, gold
  ornaments etc. had been given a,t the time of marriage. The prosecution
  case is that the deceased, Usha Jaiswal, who was only 20 years old had
  been treated cruelly and had been tortured both mentally and physically
  by the accused. It has been alleged that within a few days after the
B marriage, the father-in-law of the accused No. 2 had died and the accused
  No. 2 had treated the deceased cruelly by telling her that she was a woman
  of evil luck (alakshrni) and because of her evil luck, the father-in-law had
  died shortly after the marriage. It has also been alleged that after the
  marriage, the deceased, Usha Jaiswal, had conceived but there had been
C an abortion after being admitted in the hospital. The accused No. 2, the
  mother-in-law of Usha J aiswal caused severe mental pain by telling her in
  the hospital itself she was a woman of evil luck and that she had swallowed
  her baby and she should commit suicide. It has also been alleged that the
  accused No.1 the husband of the deceased often used to come home drunk
D and physically assault the deceased. Both the husband and his mother had
  also caused severe mental torture to the deceased by telling that she had
  brought bridal presents of sub-standard quality and such articles should be
  taken back and dowry gifts of good quality should be brought. It has been
  alleged by the prosecution that as a result of such physical and mental
  torture by the accused persons, the deceased became unhappy and on
E several occasions when she had come to her father's house, she complained
  that she had been maltreated and tortured both physically and mentally .
  with cruelty by the husband and mother-in-law in the manner aforesaid. It
  has also been alleged that even on the day when the deceased had com-
  mitted suicide, namely, on April 19, 1986, the accused No. 1, Orilal Jaiswal,
F came to the .parental house of the deceased at about 10.00 a.m. and
  informed the mother of the deceased that his wife and mother had been
  quarrelling and she should go to his house for settlement but the mother
  of the deceased then informed the accused No. 1 that she would send her
  son the next day to the house of the accused but shortly thereafter, a
G brother of the deceased came to the house and informed the other brother
   and the mother that something had happened to his elder sister, namely,
   the deceased and she had been taken to the hospital. The elder brother
   and thereafter parents and other relations of the deceased rushed to the
   hospital when they were informed that the deceased Usha Jaiswal had
H committed suicide.
                      STATE v.JAISWAL[RAY,J.)                           469

      The brother of the deceased, Om Prakash, however, made a state- A
ment in the police station that his sister had been murdered but his
statement was not treated as F.I.R. The next day, namely, on April 20, 1986
the mother of the deceased made a statement before the police which was
recorded and treated as F.I.R.
                                                                               B
      It transpires from the post mortem report that sign of death by
hanging were present and according to the doctor conducting the post
mortem examination the deceased had died due to hanging. The doctor
also noted a few marks of abrasions on the cheek and also on the other
parts of the body which according to the doctor were ante mortem in            C
nature. On being questioned at the time of deposition the doctor had also
stated that the mark of injury on the cheek of the deceased was likely to
be caused by a slap and other injuries were also likely to be caused by fist
and blows. The doctor, however, stated on being cross-examined that such
injuries could also be caused if the deceased had dashed against a hard        D
substance and the injury on the neck could be caused by the friction of the
nylon rope.

      After considering the evidences adduced in the case and other
materials on record the learned Sessions Judge held that the case was not
properly investigated by police officer in charge and there were lapses on E
the part of the Investigating Officer and witnesses for prosecution had not
been examined by the Police at an early date. The learned Sessions Judge
commented on the performance of P.W. 14 Sri Bimal Chander Biswas, a
Sub-Inspector of Calcutta Police who was the Investigation Officer in the
case. The learned Session Judge observed that the Investigation Officer F
had deviated from his normal duties of investigation in a serious case and
most of his statement which was given out at the time of cross-examination
could not be treated as a substantive statement either for the prosecution
or for the defence. P:.W.2, Kamla Jaiswal, the mother of the deceased,
stated that on May 31,1985, the deceased was given in marriage with the
accused No.l, Orilal Jaiswal and sufficient dowry had been given at the G
time of marriage as per demands of the parents of Orilal. P.W.2 further
stated in her deposition that after one month of the marriage, the deceased,
Usha Jaiswa~ came to their residence but she had noticed her daughter in
anxiety and she had been crying all the time. She has enquired about the
reason and then she was told by the deceased that since the father-in-law H
     470                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A of her mother-in-law had died after three-four days of the marriage, the
  mother-in-law had abused her by telling that she was 'alakshmi' and
  brought misfortune. On other occasions also the deceased had stated that
  lier husband used to come drunk and abuse her and he had maltreated her
  and even assaulted her physically and had been telling her to take back all
  the bridal presents as the same were of inferior quality and bring goods of
B better quality. P.W.2 Kamla had also stated that her youngest daughter
  used to visit the matrimonial home of the deceased and having came to
  learn from her that the deceased had not been keeping well, she was
  brought to their house and thereafter she was admitted to the hospital
  where she had delivered a dead child. The mother-in-law of the deceased
C came to the hospital to see the deceased and she told the deceased that
  she was a woman of bad omen and vile even to the extent of swallowing
  her baby. The mother-in-law had also told to her daughter that she should
   commit suicide. In her deposition, the mother of the deceased also stated
  that the in-laws also demanded fresh dowries of articles such as Fridge etc.
D She also stated that a few days before the occurrence, the deceased had
   come to her residence and was telling that she would not go to her
   husband's place since the husband and mother-in-law had been treating
   her cruelly. She also stated that on the day of committing suicide the
   accused, Orilal Jaiswal, came to her house at about 10.00 AM. and told
   her to go to their house since her daughter had been quarrelling with his
E mother. When she requested Orilal Jaiswal to convince her mother Orilal
   replied that he was unable to say anything to her mother. P.W.2 Kamla told
   Orilal Jaiswal that on the next day she would sent her son to their house.
   Shortly thereafter, in between 12.00 P.M., she had received the information
   that there had been something with her daughter who had been taken to
F the hospital. Immediately his son, Om Prakash, went to the hospital and
   thereafter she and other members of the family went to the hospital where
   she was told that her daughter had killed herself by hanging. She stated in
   her deposition that she became shocked on hearing the news of death of
   her daughter and was not in a position to make any statement. She was
   taken to home and she also became unconscious. Next day, she requested
G her husband to take her to the police station to make a statement. Accord-
   ingly, on the next day she had been taken to the police station and she
    made statement which was written in Bengali and such statement was
    treated as F.1.R. by the Police.

 H         Kumari Asha Jaiswal the youngest sister of the deceased was also
                      STATE v. JAISWAL[RAY,J.]                       471

 examined as P.W. 5, and she had also stated that the mother-in- law of her A
 deceased sister had maltreated her and used to tell her that she was the
 reason for the death of her father-in-law and she used to describe he as a
woman of evil luck and that she should not live. She also stated that on the
day when her sister had committed suicide, Orilal Jaiswal came at about
10.00 A.M. to their house and told her mother that her deceased sister and B
her. mother-in-law were quarrelling and Orilal J aiswal requested her
mother-in-law to go to their residence .•The mother expressed her inability
to go but that she would send her eldest son, Om Prakash, to the house of
the accused on the next day. At about 12 noon, on the very same day they
got the information that something had happened to her sister. Therefore C
they had been to the hospital where they got the information that the sister
had died by hanging. She has stated that she had told the Police that the
accused, Orilal Jaiswal, under the influence of liquor used to tell her
deceased sister to take back the bridal presents because such articles were
of bad quality and he also used to beat her. The elder brother of tlie D
deceased Om Prakash was also examined as a prosecution witness (P.W.6).
He had also stated that his deceased sister was subjected to physical and
mental cruelty by the accused. It appears that besides the elder brother of
the deceased Om Prakash P.W.6, other relations of the deceased were also
examined by the prosecution but since such persons were not examined at E
an early date it was suggested by the defence that their evidence should
not be taken into consideration.

      The learned Sessions Judge inter alia came to the finding that there
was no unreasonable delay in lodging the F.l.R. by the mother of the
deceased. It appears that the learned Sessions Judge has accepted the F
explanation of the mother of the deceased that on hearing the news of
death of her daughter by committing suicide, she became unwell and was
not in a position to make any statement on 19th but on the next day she
made a statement to the police and such statement to the police was
treated as F.l.R. The learned Sessions Judge has also noted that the G
brother of the deceased on the very same day made statement before the
police wherein he stated that his sister had been treated cruelly by the
accused persons ever since the marriage. The learned Sessions Judge has
also noted that the injuries by way of abrasion noted on the person of the
deceased by the doctor conducting post mortem examination was likely to H
    472                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A be caused by slaps and fists. The learned Sessions Judge has observed that
  although in the cross-examination, the doctor conducting the post mortem
  examination had stated in answer to the suggestion given by the learned
  counsel for the accused that such injuries were also possible due to impact
  against a hard substance and the abrasion noted on the neck of the
B deceased could be caused by a friction from a nylon rope which was a
  rough substance, such injuries were ante mortem in nature it was not likely
  that the said injuries would be caused on the person of the deceased by
  hitting against wall or other hard object after she had committed suicide.
  The learned Sessions Judge was of the view that there was a positive
C evidence from the side of the prosecution that shortly after the marriage,
  the deceased has been treated cruelly and mother-in-law had described her
  as a woman of evil luck and held her responsible for the death of her
  father-in-law. The mother-in-law had also abused the deceased when she
  had lost her child by saying that she was a woman of evil luck who had
D even swallowed her own baby and she should commit suicide. The learned
  Session Judge was of the view that there were evidences to the effect that
  the deceased had been subjected to physical and mental torture by the
  accused and she was asked to take back the bridal presents by indicating
  that the articles were of sub-standard quality. The learned Sessions judge
E has noted although the evidences about the cruelty have been given by very
  close relations of the deceased but simply on that score the same were no
  liable to be discarded. The learned Sessions Judge has also noted that
  under Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act there was legal presump-
   tion that the accused had abetted the commission of suicide and such
   presumption has not been rebutted by any reliable evidence adduced on
F behalf of the accused persons. The learned Sessions Judge has also noted
   that the deceased had committed suicide within a year from the date of
   her marriage and in view of the evidence that the deceased had been
   subjected to cruelty and mental .and physical torture the provision of
   Section 498A I.P.C. was also attracted in the case.
G
            The learned Sessions Judge therefore came to the finding that even
     if the evidences of P.W.5 to were left out of consideration, there was no
     reason to doubt the veracity of the evidences of the mother, P.W.2 regard-
     ing the complicity of the accused persons and from such evidence it          !
H    transpired that the accused persons had systematically abused deceased
                       STATE v.JAISWAL[RAY,J.]                           473

Usha Jaiswal sometime by calling her as a woman of bad omen and                A
sometime asking for taking back bridal presents of inferior quality and she
was also abused for the failure to bring further dowry from her parental
house. It was due to such systematic abuses caused on the deceased that
she had zilted from her normal mental frame and she was forced to end
her life by hanging. In that view of the matter, the learned Session Judge     B
held that both the accused persons were guilty of the offences under
Section 306 read with Section 34 l.P.C. and under Section 498A read with
Secti<m 34 I.P.C. and accordingly he passed the order of conviction and
sentence as indicated hereinbefore.

       The High Court, however, came to the finding inter alia that there
                                                                               c
 was no convincing evidence of systematic cruelty or physical or mental
 torture of the deceased by the accused persons. The High Court has noted
 that although prosecution has examined 19 witnesses but the conviction was
 based upon thP, evidences of P.W.2 and P.W.6 namely the mother and elder
 brother of the deceased. The High Court has held that only allegation D
 made in the F.I.R. was that the accused No. 2, mother-in-law of the
 deceased had tortured her mentally by calling her woman of evil luck and
 the deceased was mentally torture by telling that the marriage gifts were
 of sub-standard quality and the same should be returned. The High Court
 has not also accepted the prosecution case that Usha had committed E
 suicide because of such mental torture. The High Court has not also
 accepted the explanation given by the mother of the deceased, P.W.2, for
not making the F.l.R. on the day of occurrence. It has been held by the
learned judges of the High Court that if the mother had become uncon-
scious, one of her sons could have gone to the police station to file a written
                                                                                F
complaint and it is not known why the father of the victim and other grown
up sons of P.W.2 did not go to the police station to make the F.1.R. A
decision of this Court in the case of Ganesh Patel v. State of Maharashtra,
AIR (1971) SC 135 has been referred to by the learned Judges of the High
Court for holding that the delay in recording the statement of material
witnesses caused a cloud of suspicion and the credibility of the entire warn G
and woof of the prosecution story. The High Court has also held that from
the F.1.R. it transpired that the accused No. 2, Smt. Gujarati Debi, had
tortured the deceased mentally by saying 'alakshmi' but such description
of the deceased had been made on two occasion only. There is no allega-
tion against the accused No. 1 that he had ever induced her commit suicide. H
    474                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Hence, there was no case under Section 306 of the I.P.C. against accused
  No. 1, Orilal Jaiswal. The High Court has also held that although the
  mother of the deceased, P.W.2, had stated in her deposition that a demand
  was made for fresh articles such as fridge etc. such case was not indicated
  in the F.l.R. and P.W.2 had also not stated such fact to the Investigating
B Officer about demand of further dowry. The High Court has also held that
  although allegation had been made against the accused No. 1 that he used
  to come home intoxicated and used to physically torture Usha Jaiswal but
  there is no independent and reliable evidence that Orilal Jaiswal came
  drunk and tortured her physically and no circumstantial evidence to that
  effect can be l'bund. The High Court has also held that the evidence of
c P.W.6, Om Prakash, about the ill-treatment meted out to the deceased
  should not be accepted because he had not heard any thing directly from
  the deceased but only heard such allegations from her mother. Hence,
  deposition of P.W.6 Om Prakash was only hearsay evidence and no reliance
  should be placed on that. The High Court has also drawn an adverse
D inference against the prosecution case for not examining the father of the
  deceased. It has been indicated by the High Court that although a medical
  certificate has been produced to indicate that the father was cancer patient
  when the trial had started but there is no evidence to indicate whether the
  condition of the father had deteriorated between the date of occurrence
E and the date of trial. The High Court has noted as a matter of fact, the
  father has accompanied P.W.2 and P.W.6 at Muchapara Police Station at
  the time of lodging the F.l.R. Hence, he was able to move at that time. The
  High Court has noted that there is no evidence as to how and in what
  manner the victim had received injuries noted by the doctor holding post
  mortem examination. The High Court has held that there is no evidence
F
  as to who has caused such injuries. On the contrary, there is evidence that
  such injuries could have been caused by hitting against a hard substance.
  The High Court has come to the finding that the prosecution had failed to
   establish the charges against the appellants and the cruelty as enumerated
   in Section 498A l.P.C. had net been established and if such cruelty had not
G been established, the presumption under Section 113A of the Indian
   Evidence Act can. not be pressed into service. Accordingly, Section 306
   I.P.C. also can not be invoked. Since there is no independent evidence of
   inducement to commit suicide either by the mother-in-law or by the
   husband of the deceased the conviction of the accused persons was unwar-
H ranted. In that view of the matter the High Court set aside the conviction
                     STATE v. JAISWAL[RAY,J.]                       475

and sentences and passed the order of acquittal in favour of both the A
accused.

       The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the High Court
has taken a very unreasonable view completely overlooking the clinching
evidences about the complicity of both the accused for the offences B
charged against them. It has been contended by the learned counsel for
the appellant that on 19th April itself the elder brother of the deceased
Om Parkash Jaiswal apprehending that the accused had murdered his
sister reported to the police station about such offence. A written com-
plaint was filed in the Muchipara Police Station which was acknowledged· C
by a receipt granted by the police officer. Such complaint was simply
ignored and it. is stated that such report was sent to the Assistant Commis-
sioner of Police at the Police Head Quarters at Lalbazar. It has transpired
from the evidence of P.W.6 Om Parkash that later on at the request of
police authorities zeroxed copy of the said complaint was supplied by Om
Parkash. The mother of the deceased Karnla Jaiswal P.W.2 made a state- D
ment before the police officer in Muchipara Police Station next day. Such
statement was reduced to writing by the police officer and was treated as
F.I.R. Om Parkash was also examined by the police on 20th April. By that
time, Om Parkash came to learn that his sister was not murdered by the
accused but she had ended her life by committing suicide. Hence, he made E
statement to the effect. It is apparent from the F.l.R. and also from the
statement of Om Parkash to the Police that the husband and mother-in-law
of the deceased namely both the accused had treated the deceased with
cruelty almost form the very beginning of her married life and she was ·
subjected to both physical and mental torture by various acts like abusing F
her as woman of evil luck and suggesting that she should better end her
live by committing suicide. Such abuse was not just made once in the
beginning but when there was miscarriage of first pregnancy in the hospital
the accused No. 2 again abused the unfortunate daughter-in-law by calling
her vile woman of evil luck (alakshmi) who even swallowed her own child G
and suggested that she should end her life by committing suicide. The poor
daughter-in-law was humiliated by telling her that the bridal presents were
of inferior quality and should be taken back. She was oppressed by making
further dowry demands for Fridge, V.C.R., etc. It is the positive case made
in F.1.R. and in the statement of Om Parkash to the Police that the H
    476                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A   deceased Usha became unhappy from the very beginning of her married
    life and she was being abused, humiliated and subjected to mental cruelty
    and physical assault till she had ended her life. Even shortly before she has
    committed suicide, there was quarrel between the deceased and the ac-
    cused No.2. The doctor conducting post mortem examination had noted
B   there was injuries on her person which according to the doctor were anti
    mortem in nature. During his examination the doctor has stated that such
    injuries were likely to be caused by slap and fist and blow. Although in the
    cross examination, the doctor has stated that such injuries are also likely
    to be caused by dashing against hard object and the injury on the neck
C   could be caused by a friction with rough nylon rope, the learned Session
    Judge has given a very cogent reason as to why the possibility of sustaining
    such injuries, which were anti mortem in nature, by dashing against hard
    object should be discarded. It is only unfortunate that the High Court has
    not considered such reasonings of the learned Sessions Judge in their
D   proper perspective. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted
    that completely overlooking the fact that the brother Om Parkash made a
    written complaint in the police station on the date of incident itself, the
    High Court drew an adverse inference against the case of the prosecution
    on the ground that even if mother became unwell after hearing the death
    news of the daughter and could not make statement, father, brother or
E   other elder member of the family ought to have lodged F.I.R. without any
    delay and there was no reason for lodging the F.I.R. by the mother the next
    day. He has submitted that the family of the deceased was under a great
    shock because of the tragic end of Usha within about ten months of her
    marriage. It is quite natural that the mother had suffered great mental
F   shock and as such she was not in a position to make any statement to the
     police on the date of incident. There was nothing unnatural in her conduct.
    The learned Sessions Judge has rightly held that there was a very
    reasonable explanation for the mother making statement to the Police on
     the next day. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the appel-
G   !ant that Usha lived only for about ten months after her marriage. During
     such a short period, she had been abuse and mentally and physically
     tortured all the time. The High Court was not at all justified in holding that
     there was no evidence of cruelty and abuse from the husband and evidence
     of abuse from the mother-in-law related to two occasions only. The High
H    Court has ignored the positive evidence that she was subjected to physical
                     STATE v. JAISWAL[RAY,J.]                       477

and mental torture all throughout her wedded life and several instances of A
abuse and torture were mentioned. The learned counsel for the appellant
has submitted that the deceased was expected to tell to her mother and
other close relations about her unfortunate experience in the house of
in-laws. Necessarily, mother and close relations would be witnesses of the
cruel treatment meted out to the deceased. Despite clear and unambiguous B
evidences about cruelty the High Court unjustly and on flimsy grounds did
not accept the prosecution case and set aside the well reasoned judgment
of the learned Sessions Judge. The learned counsel for the appellant has
submitted that the reasonings of the High Court in basing its finding are
strained and against the clinching evidences adduced in the case. The C
impugued judgment has resulted in gross failure of justice and ~hould be
set aside and the conviction and sentences imposed by the learned Sessions
Judge should be upheld by this Court.

       The learned counsel appearing for the accused Respondents, how-
ever, disputed the aforesaid contentions. It has been submitted by the D
learned counsel for the Respondents that in a criminal trial, the offence
charged against the accused must be proved beyond any reasonable doubt.
However grave and intriguing may be the circumstances, the court shcnl~!
ensure that the burden of strict proof on the prosecution is not covertly
substituted by surmise and conjecture. Drawing our attention to the find- E
ings of the High Court and the reasonings given therefor, the learned
counsel for the Respondents has submitted that it is unfortunate that Usha
ended her life within a year of her maciage but such incident, however
lamentable, should not outweigh the proper analysis of the facts established
in the case. It has been submitted that against the husband, there is no
evidence that he had even induced or suggested that the deceased should F
end her life. Allegation of physical and mental torture by the husband are
only wild allegations. It has not been established by any convincing
evidence by disinterested persons that the husband used to come home
drunk and then abuse and assault the wife. Such incident would have been
noticed in a tenanted house having common passage as the High Court has G
rightly pointed out. Demand for a further dowry was not indicated by the
mother in F.I.R. and such case was in embellishment at a later stage so as
to bring the prosecution case within the provision of Section 498A I.P.C.
The High Court has rightly not accepted such false allegation by giving
cogent reasons and no exception should be made to the findings of the
High Court against the mother-in-law namely the accused No.2, it has been H
    478                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A alleged that she had addressed the deceased as woman of evil luck
  ( alakshmi) only on two occasions and on such occasions, suggestion for
  committing suicide was also given to the deceased. For good reasons High
  Court has not accepted such case. Om Parkash (P.W.6) firstly alleged that
  it was case of murder but when he understood that such false allegation
  would be of no consequence, he made a statement to the police on the next
B day making various false allegations. The F.1.R. lodged by mother was a
  belated one and a cool and calculated manner various false allegations
  were introduced in F.I.R .. Such unjustified delay in lodging F.I.R with
  consequential cooking up a false case is not countenanced favourably by
  law courts. The High Court relying on decision of this Court in a case of
c belated F.l.R. declined to place any reliance on the F.I.R. No tenant or
  neighbour has deposed that the husband or mother-in-law used to abuse
  or assault the deceased. There is no evidence from any disinterested
  witnesses that at 10.00 A.M. or around that time on the date of incident
  there was any quarrel between the deceased and her mother-in-law or any
  other member of the family. In the aforesaid circumstances, there was no
D occasion to assume that marks of simple injuries on the person of the
   deceased since noted by the doctor holding post mortem examination, has
  been caused by slap and fist and blow particularly when the doctor has
   categorically stated that such injuries could be caused by hitting against
  hard object and on account of friction from a nylon rope. It came out from
E the evidence of the mother of the deceased Kamla (PW2) that she had not
   been staying in Calcutta but she used to come to Calcutta on occasions. In
   such circumstances, it was expected to have some letters written by the
   deceased to her parents staying outside Calcutta containing allegations of
   mal-treatment and acts of cruelty. The High Court has rightly noted that
   excepting depositions by very close relations with embellishments, there is
F no reliable corroborative evidence. Hence, the prosecution case was not
   established beyond all reasonable doubts and the accused were entitled to
   well recognised principle of giving benefit of doubt. The learned counsel
   has, therefore, submitted that the judgment of acquittal based on cogent
   reasons does not warrant any interference by this Court. After giving our
   anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case and the
G rival contentions made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, it
   appears to us that the judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court after
   setting aside the order of conviction and sentences passed by the learned
   Sessions Judge, City Sessions Court, Calcutta cannot be justified and the
   same is against the weight of the evidence adduced in the case. We have
H already indicated the reasonings of the High Court in some detail. We may
                      STATE v. JAISWAL[RAY,J.]                          479

indicate here that the High Court has summed up the following circumstan- A
ces for the purpose of holding that a grave doubt has been raised against
the prosecution story:

        (i)   there is no satisfactory explanation of delay in lodging the
              F.I.R.
                                                                               B
        (ii) there is no dying declaration or suicidal note.

        (iii) there is no letter during the subsistence of marriage.

        (iv) there is no letter addressed to the mother who used to live
             outside Calcutta most of the time.                                c
        (v) there is no complaint either by the father or father-in-law of
            the victim.

        (iv) there is no evidence regarding the injuries received by the
             deceased or the mal-treatment.                                    D
        (vii) no specific date has been given when the deceased Usha had
              allegedly told her mother about the demand for dowry of the
              mal- treatment and no specific date or time has been given
              for making such demand.
                                                                               E
        (viii) although the adult members of the family of the deceased
               consisting of four brothers, sisters and brother-in-law and
               father are though the residents of Calcutta, the deceased had
               never complained anything to them.

        (ix) the neighbour or tenants have not also been examined.             F

       It is, therefore, necessary to consider the correctness of such reason-
ings. So far as the explanation for the delay in lodging the F.I.R. is
concerned, the learned Sessions Judge has held that the mother has givr .
a satisfactory explanation as to why she made statement to the police on G
the day next to the date of incident in question. It transpires from the
evidence of the mother that sometime between 12.00 to 1.00 P .M. the
mother and the other family members got the information that something
had happened to Usha for which she had been removed to the hospital.
The elder brother Om Parkash immediately left for the hospital and
thereafter the mother, father and other family members of the deceased H
    480                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A rushed to the hospital where they came to learn that .their daughter had
    died by committing suicide in the house of the in-laws. There is no difficulty
    to imagine that such news had caused a great mental shock to the mother
    particularly when the deceased had to end her life within 10 months from
    the date of marriage. If on getting the news of suicide being committing Ly
    the daughter, mother becomes unwell and is not in a proper mental frame
B   to made any statement to the police, no exception can be taken to such
    conduct. It should be borne in mind that the elder brother of the deceased
    gave a written complaint to the police on the very day of the incident by
    indicating that t,here has not been any natural death of his sister and he
    felt that his sister has been murdered by her in- law. On the very next date,
C   the mother made a statement to the police indicating the .plight of her
    deceased daughter and the physical and mental torture to which she was ·
    subjected to by the accused. Such statement of the mother has been treated
    as an F.l.R. in the case. In the aforesaid circumstances, it cannot be held
    that there has been unjustified inordinate delay in lodging the F.I.R. and
    even if the mother had became unwell after hearing the news of the
D   daughter's death other adult members of the family could have lodged the
    complaint with the Police. It appears to us that the High Court has failed
    to note that the elder brother of the deceased had in fact made a written
    complaint on the very same day to the police but the same was not treated
    as F.I.R. by the police and he also made a statement before the Police on
E   the next day wherein the allegations of cruelty meted out to his sister were
    clearly indicated. So far as the absence of dying declaration and suicidal
    note is concerned, we fail to appreciate how there would be a dying
    declaration when it is nobody's case that Usha was alive so as to make a
    dying declaration. The absence of suicidal note does not appear to us an
    important factor in deciding the case. It is evidence in the case that the
F   deceased had been complaining about the cruel treatment meted out to
    her. There are clinching evidences to support the prosecution case that
     Usha had been subjected to mental and physical torture and she remained
     unhappy in the house of in-laws, and acts of cruelty, in ordinary course,
    were likely to disturb the mental frame of the deceased and cause sufficient
G    impulses to commit suicide. Coming to the question of absence of exchange
     of letters between Usha and the members of the parental family during the
     subsistence of marriage, we may indicate that barring the parents other
     members of the family were permanent residents of Calcutta itself and
     although the mother used to leave Calcutta at times, she often used to come
     to Calcutta and it is the positive case of the mother and also the elder
H    brother of the deceased that on a number of occasions when Usha had
                       STATE v. JAJSWAL[RAY,J.]                        481

come to their house in Calcutta from the house of her in-laws, she had met   A
the mother and the other members of the family. Hence it should not be
held that exchange of letters was reasonably expected.

       Coming to the question of absence of complaint either by the father
 or by the father-in-law of the victim, we have failed to appreciate what was
 meant by the learned Judges of the High Court by the absence of complaint
                                                                               B
 made by father-in-law of the victim. So far as the complaint by the father
 is concerned, it may be indicated that it is the evidence of the mother that
 she had spoken to the accused No.2 namely the mother-in-law about the
ma! treatment meted out to her daughter and she also implored before the
mother-in-law that the daughter should not be subjected to any abuses or     c
humiliations. It is the prosecution case that mother-in-law abused the
 daughter-in-law by saying that she was a woman of evil luck and had
brought mis-fortune to the family. It is therefore quite natural that the
mother of the deceased had made complaints to her mother-in-law and
had requested her not to abuse and humiliate her daughter. Hence, the D
question of complaint by the father was neither expected nor necessary.
Coming to the finding made by the High Court that there is no evidence
regarding the injuries received by Usha or the ma! treatment made to her,
it may be indicated that the mother, elder brother, sister and other relations
of the deceased have deposed about the mal-treatment and physical assault
of the deceased. The doctor conducting the post mortem has noted some E
injuries which were anti mortem on the person of the deceased. Where
such evidences are to be accepted or not accepted or not and whether the
injuries, anti mortem in nature found on the person of the deceased can
be explained or not are different considerations but it will not be correct
to hold that there is no evidence about ma! treatment given to Usha or F
there is absence of any evidence of injuries sustained by her before death.


      Coming to the finding that no specific date has been given when the
deceased had allegedly told her mother about the demand oLdowry and
mal-treatment to the deceased it may be indicated that although exact date G
has not been given, there is positive evidence of the mother and the elder
brother of the deceased that when after about a month of the marriage,
Usha came to her parental house, she had narrated about cruelty and
mental torture suffered by her in the house of the accused. She specifically
complained that within a few days after her marriage the father- in-law of
the accused No. 2 had died and in view of such death, she was abused and H
    482                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A treated with cruelty by the accused No.2 Thereafter, on other occasions
   also whenever she had come to the parental house, she had talked about
   such mal-treatment. Usha was alive only for about 10 months after mar-
   riage and it is nobody's case that the deceased complained about the ma!
   treatment given in remote past or only on specific occasions so that exact
   date was required to be mentioned. Coming to the finding of the High
B Court that the adult member of the family of the deceased consisting of
   four brothers, sisters and brothers-in-law and the father were residents of
   Calcutta but Usha had not complained anything to them and non-com-
   plaint to such close relations was not in conformity with the human con-
   duct, we may indicate that there is no basis for such finding and such
C finding is contrary to the evidences adduced in the case. We have already
   pointed out that the deceased had complained to the mother and other
   members of the family about the ma! treatment and the members of the
    family have deposed to that effect. The prosecution case was not properly
    investigated by the police for which the learned Sessions Judge has rightly
    commented on the lapses on the part of the Investigating Officer, Sri Bimal
D Chandra Biswas, Sub-Inspector of Police. As the Investigating Officer
    failed and neglected to examine the members of the family of the deceased
    at an early date, the learned Sessions Judge, in fairness, ha~ not taken into
    consideration the evidences of the sister and other close relations of the
    deceased and has mainly relied on the evidence of the mother in basing
E his finding. Even if it held that the deceased had complained to her mother
     only about cruel treatment meted out to her, we think that for a newly
    married woman, her misfortune in the house of in-laws was not expected
     to be made public and confiding to the mothers was only natural. Coming
     to the observation of the High Court that the neighbours or the tenants
     have not been examined, it appears to us that in the facts of the case, no
F adverse inference can be drawn for such non-examination. The abuse and
     insult hurled on the daughter-in-law usually are not expected to be made
     public so that the neighbours may have occasions to criticise the improper
     conduct of the accused and hold them with disrespect and contempt. The
     High court has expressed doubts about the genuineness of the case of
G physical torture and abuses made by the husband and the deceased for the
     absence of any independent evidence given by the neighbours and co-
     tenants about such physical assault or the abuses hurled on the wife by the
     accused. We have indicated that ordinarily it is not expected that physical
     torture or the abuses hurled on the wife by the husband and the mother-
     in-law should be made in such a way as to be noticed by the tenants living
 H in the adjoining portions of the house. It is also not the case of the
                      STATE v. JAISWAL[RAY,J.]                        483

prosecution that the deceased was physically assaulted so violently that the A
neighbours came to know about such assault. It is also not the case that
abuses used to be hurled loudly so that the tenants had occasions to hear
them. It was therefore not necessary to examine neighbour or tenants to
prove the prosecution case. In the instant case, the evidence about physical
and mental torture of the deceased has come from the mother, elder
brother and other close relations. Such depositions by close relations, who B
may be interested in the prosecution of the accused, need not be discarded
simply on the score of the absence of corroboration by independent
witness. Whether the evidence of interested witness is worthy of credence
is to be judged in the special facts of the case. In our view, the acts of
cruelty by the accused were expected to be known by the very close C
relations like mother, brother, sister, etc. The evidence of the mother has
been accepted by the learned Session Judge as worthy of credence and we
do not think th!it same should be discarded, in the facts of the case.

       We are not oblivious that in a criminal trial the degree of proof is
stricter than what is required in the civil proceedings. In a criminal trial D
however intriguing may be facts and circumstances of the case, the charges
made against the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubts
and the requirement of proof cannot lie in the realm of surmises and
conjectures. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not
stand altered even after the introduction of Section 498A l.P.C. and Section
113A of Indian Evidence Act. Although, the court's conscience must be E
satisfied that the accused is not held guilty when there are reasonable
doubts about the complicity of the accused in respect of the offences
alleged, it should be borne in mind that there is no absolute standard for
proof in a criminal trial and the question whether the charges made
against the accused have been proved beyond all reasonable doubt must F
depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case and the quality of the
evidences adduced in the case and the materials placed on record. Lord
Denning in Bater v. Bater, (1950) 2 All ER 458 at p.459 has observed that
the doubt must be of a reasonable man and the standard adopted must be
a standard adopted by a reasonable and just man for coming to a con- G
clusion considering the particular subject matter.

       In Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh and others, AIR (1990) SC 209,
Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji (as he then was) has very rightly indicated
that the conscience of the Court can never be bound by any rule but that
is coming itself dictates the consciousness and prudent exercise of the H
    484                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A judgment. Reasonable doubt is simply that degree of doubt which would
    permit a reasonable and just man to come to a conclusion. Reasonableness
    of the doubt must be commensurate with the nature of the offence to be
    investigated. Exaggerated devotion to the role of benefit of doubt must not
    nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicions and thereby destroy social
    defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let
B   hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting guilty escape is not
    doing justice, according to law.

                                                          (Emphasis supplied)

c         In the instant case, the learned Sessions Judge has come to the
  finding that the charges levelled against the accused have been proved by
  indicating cogent reasons therefor. We have already indicated that the
  learned Judge of the High Court have entertained a grave doubt about the
  correctness of the prosecution story for the circumstances indicated herein-
D before. We have analysed those circumstances and in our view the said
  grounds do not stand scrutiny and they are against the weight of the
  evidence. We may add here that the Court should be extremely careful in
  assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence ad-
  duced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out
  to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide.
E If it transpires to the court that a victim committing suicide was hyper-
  sensitive to ordinary petulance dischord and differences in domestic life
  quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such
  petulance dischord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly
  circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the con-
F science   of the Court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the
  accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty.
  But in the facts and circumstances of the case, there is no material worthy
  of credence to hold that Usha was hyper-sensitive and that for other
  reasons and not on account of cruelty she had lost normal frame of mind
  and being overcome by unusual phschic imbalance, decided to end her life
G by· committing suicide. The evidence adduced in the case has clearly
  established that Usha was subjected to abuses, humiliation and mental·
  torture from the very beginning of her married life. Within a few days after
  the marriage when a newly married bride would reasonably expects love
  and affection from the in-laws, she was abused by the mother-in-law, the
H accused No. 2 by saying that the deceased was a woman of evil luck only
                       STATE v. .JAJSWJ\L[RAYJ.]                        485

   because an elderly member in the family has died after her marriage. A
  According to the evidence given by the mother of the deceased, the
  accused No. 2 even suggested that being a woman of evil luck (alakshmi)
  the deceased, should not live and end her life. When Usha conceived for
  the first time she had the misfortune of abortion. When the unfortunate
  daughter-in-law would reasonably expect sympathy and consolation from
  the mother-in-law, the evidence in this case is that the mother-in-law
                                                                                B
  abused the deceased in the hospital by telling that she was a woman of evil
  luck. The evidence in the case reveals an act of extreme form of cruelty by
 telling the unfortunate mother that she was vile enough to swallow her own
 baby and she should commit suicide. There is also evidence in the case that
  the husband used to come home drunk and abuse her and also used to          c
 assault her on occasions. The bridal presents brought by her were branded
  as goods of inferior quality and she was asked to take the said articles back
 to her parental home. Such acts, to say the least, were very unkind and
 newly married woman is.bound to suffer a great mental pain and humilia-
 tion. Even if we do not take into consideration the demand for further D
 dowry gifts since the case of such demand had not been indicated in the
 earlier statement made by the mother which was treated as F.1.R., there is
 no manner of doubt that the evidence of the mother which has been
 accepted by the learned Sessions Judge and in our view there is no reason
 to discard the same, clearly establishes that the deceased had been sub-
jected to physical and mental torture all throughout. It is only unfortunate E
 that the accused No. 1, the husband, instead of giving her solace against
 the humiliation and abuses hurled by the mother-in-law, either kept silent
or expressed his inability to give good counselling to the mother and to
 protest against act of mental torture and humiliation. On the contrary, he
also treated the wife with cruelty by telling her to take the bridal gifts back F
to her parental home and also by physically assaulting her. Such acts, in
our view, were quite likely to destroy the normal frame of mind of the
deceased and to drive her to frustration and mental agony and to end her
life by committing suicide. Under explanation (a) of Section 498A I.P.C:,
"cruelty" means - "any wilful conduct which is of such nature as is likely to
drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to G
life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman."

       In the aforesaid circumstances, the offence under Section 498A
l.P.C. clearly established against both the accused. We therefore allow the
appeal in part by setting aside the order of acquittal under Section 498A H
    486                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A   I.P.C. We convict both the accused namely Orilal Jaiswal and Gujarati
    Debi under Section 498A I.P.C. but considering the age of Accused No. 2,
    Gujarati Debi, we impose sentence on he to suffer rigorous imprisonment
    for 2 years and a fine of Rs. 2,000 in default to suffer further imprisonment
    for four months. The accused No.l Orilal Jaiswal is sentenced to suffer
    rigorous imprisonment for 3 years and a fine of Rs. 2,000 in default to
B   suffer further rigorous imprisonment of four months under Section 498A
    I.P.C. Although there are materials on record to indicate that both the
    accuses were also guilty under Section 306 I.P.C. but we are inclined to
    give them benefit of doubt so far as the charge u/s 306 I.P.C. is concerned
    and they are acquitted of the said charge. The impugned judgment of the
C   High Court stands altered to the above extent.

    S.K.                                                        Appeal allowed.