Supreme Court of India
STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.versusJAI HIND PVT. LTD.
- Citation
- 2026 INSC 132
- Decided
- 6 February 2026
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- M M SUNDRESH
Holding
The Revenue Officer had no statutory power to review the 1971 vesting order, rendering the 2008 review order void and restoring the original vesting determination.
Summary
The State of West Bengal sought to overturn a High Court order that allowed Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd. to retain about 211 acres of land under Section 6(1)(j) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. The company had previously been denied the benefit because it failed to prove it was exclusively engaged in agricultural farming as of 1 January 1952, leading to a vesting order on 7 October 1971. The State directed the Revenue Officer to review that vesting order in 2008, resulting in a fresh order that set aside the 1971 decision. The Supreme Court held that the Revenue Officer lacked statutory power to review its own earlier order, as the WBEA Act does not confer a review jurisdiction and such power cannot be implied. The Court also found that the review failed to meet any of the limited grounds for review under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC, and that the policy‑driven motive for the review was irrelevant. Consequently, the 2008 review order was declared void ab initio and the original 1971 vesting order was restored.
Issues considered
- The Revenue Officer's jurisdiction to review its own earlier order under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953.
- Whether Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd. satisfied the conditions of Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act to retain agricultural land.
- The applicability of the limited grounds for review under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC to the 2008 review.
- The effect of the four‑decade lapse and policy considerations on the validity of the review.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 114
- Limitation Act, 1963
- West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953s. 57, s. 57A, s. 57B, s. 6(1)(j)
- West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955s. 14Q(1), s. 14T(3)
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the Revenue Officer could have reviewed the earlier order of the Revenue Officer; whether the respondent- company had fulfilled the conditions to be entitled to retain the lands u/s.6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953; and whether it was farming” as on 1st January 1952 to claim exemption from vesting under the 1971 determination. Headnotes† West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 – ss.6(1), 6(1)(j) – West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 – ss.57, 14T(3) – Power of review by Revenue
Subjects
Power of reviewQuasi‑judicial authorityLand acquisitionSection 6(1)(j) WBEASeparation of powersReview under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPCExecutive jurisdictionVesting of land
Judgment
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 497 : 2026 INSC 132
State of West Bengal & Ors.
v.
Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd.
(Civil Appeal No. 7407 of 2012)
06 February 2026
[M. M. Sundresh and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether the Revenue Officer could have reviewed
the earlier order of the Revenue Officer; whether the respondent-
company had fulfilled the conditions to be entitled to retain the lands
u/s.6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953; and whether it was “exclusively
engaged in agricultural farming” as on 1st January 1952 to claim
exemption from vesting under the 1971 determination.
Headnotes†
West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 – ss.6(1),
6(1)(j) – West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 – ss.57, 14T(3) –
Power of review by Revenue Officer – Respondent company
purchased 239 acres of land before and after coming into
force of the 1953 Act – Respondent company claimed benefit
of s.6(1)(j) to retain entire 239 acres since it was engaged in
farming – Revenue Officer by order dated 07.10.1971 held
the respondent not entitled to the benefit since it failed
to produce any evidence to prove that the company was
created exclusively for agricultural purpose – Said order
attained finality – Respondent-company stood divested of
the agricultural land held by it, the same having vested in the
State Government – Another notice issued to the respondent
u/ss.57 and 14T(3) of WBLR Act – While the writ petition
assailing the notice was pending, some amicable settlement
between the parties took place – Thereafter, earlier order of
Revenue Officer was reviewed – Revenue Officer by his final
order dated 07.05.2008 allowed the review and set aside the
earlier order dated 07.10.1971 passed by the earlier Revenue
Officer, thereby allowing the respondent to retain a total of
about 211.21 acres of land and vesting nearly 28.50 acres
in the State – Subsequently, Revenue Officer did not accept
* Author
498 [2026] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the land revenue by the respondent company – Respondent
filed application, before the tribunal which was dismissed
and quashed the review order holding that the concerned
Revenue Officer was incompetent to undertake the review
proceedings as no such power of review was specifically
given – However, High Court allowed the writ petition and
directed the Revenue Officer to accept the land revenue from
the respondent in respect of the lands which were allowed
to be retained pursuant to the review order passed by the
Revenue Officer – Challenge to:
Held: Review undertaken by the Revenue Officer culminating in the
fresh order wholly without jurisdiction and void ab initio – WBEA
Act does not confer any power of substantive review upon the
Revenue Officer, either expressly or by necessary implication –
Government Order dated 26.02.2008, even though approved at
the ministerial level, could not create or confer such jurisdiction on
the Revenue Officer – Review further fails on merits, as none of
the conditions prescribed u/Ord. XLVII r. 1 CPC satisfied – Review
order of 2008 was fundamentally misconceived, contrary to settled
principles governing the exercise of review power – Furthermore,
the decision to initiate the review was driven by considerations of
perceived economic advantage, such as prospective employment
generation, rather than by any of the grounds recognised in
law for invoking the power of review – Such considerations,
however laudable in the executive or policy domain, are wholly
extraneous to the limited and strictly circumscribed jurisdiction of
review – Concluded determination cannot be reopened on the
basis of subsequent policy preferences or economic expediency,
in the absence of a legally sustainable ground contemplated
under the law governing review – Direction issued by the State
Government vide Government Order dated 26.02.2008 to review
the earlier vesting determination was made after an inordinate
and unexplained lapse of about four decades from the passing of
the vesting order dated 07.10.1971, which had attained finality –
Reasons stated do not constitute a legally sustainable ground to
justify reopening a concluded determination after such an inordinate
lapse of time – Exercise of review jurisdiction in 2008 to reopen
a vesting determination that had attained finality decades earlier
was wholly impermissible in law – Tribunal in setting aside the
fresh review order dated 07.05.2008 and restoring the vesting
determination of 1971, rightly appreciated the statutory scheme
of the WBEA Act, and well-settled principles governing the limits
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 499
State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd.
of quasi-judicial power – Conclusion of the tribunal that the
Revenue Officer lacked jurisdiction to reopen by way of review of
a concluded vesting order is consistent with both legislative intent
and binding precedents – High Court, however, fell into error in
reversing the tribunal’s decision – It incorrectly proceeded on the
premise that the Government Order issued u/s.57A, having been
approved by the Minister-in-Charge, constituted sufficient authority
to confer review jurisdiction upon the Revenue Officer – This
approach conflated executive direction with statutory conferment
of substantive power and treated review as a mere procedural
incident of Civil Court powers – High Court also overlooked the
limits on vesting the judicial function of review power in executive
authorities – Impugned judgment of the High Court set aside –
Order of the tribunal restored, and the review order passed by
the Revenue Officer quashed – Vesting order dated 07.10.1971
to continue to operate in accordance with the law. [Paras 75-94]
Review – Power of – Exercise of power by quasi-judicial
authorities, when – Power of the Revenue Officer to review
its earlier order by relying on s.57A of the WBEA Act, 1953 –
Permissibility:
Held: Power of review is not an inherent power of the Court –
Quasi-judicial authorities can exercise only those powers which are
expressly conferred upon them by the statute – Unless a specific
provision has been made in the WBEA Act of 1953, investing the
power of review in the Revenue Officer or such other authorities
mentioned u/s.53, these authorities could not have possessed the
power or authority to review an earlier order – Omnibus expression
used in the State notification dated 09.01.1958 investing all the
Settlement Officers, Assistant Settlement Officers and Revenue
Officers with all the powers of the Civil Court, does not amount
to conferment of power of review as well to these Authorities –
s.57A of the WBEA Act cannot be construed to include vesting of
power of review in the absence of a clear statutory provision to
such quasi-judicial authority manned by an executive functionary
like the Revenue Officer, bereft of any judicial training or judicial
qualification – Further, the legislature did not intend to confer
the power of review to the authorities provided under the said
Act is evident from the proviso to sub-section (3) of s.57B which
provides that in deciding a dispute under this sub-section, the
Revenue Officer shall not re-open any matter which has already
been enquired into, investigated, determined or decided by the
500 [2026] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
State Government or any authority under any of the provisions
of this Act – 1971 vesting order passed by the Revenue Officer
after full inquiry and adjudication, constitutes such a determination
which also attained finality – Revenue Officer thus stood barred
from re-opening, revisiting, or redeciding its earlier vesting order
in view of the said proviso – Thus, the scheme of the WBEA Act,
1953 does not contemplate any executive authority reopening a
vesting determination or substituting a decision already rendered
after due inquiry – Authorities enumerated u/s.53 of the WBEA
Act, 1953, such as Revenue Officers, Settlement Officers and
Compensation Officers, among others, are vested only with such
limited adjudicatory powers as the statute expressly confers upon
them. [Paras 31, 34, 49-52]
West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 – s.6(1)(j) – Benefit
under, claim – Whether the respondent-company had fulfilled
the conditions to be entitled to retain the subject lands in
u/s.6(1)(j) – Whether it was “exclusively engaged in agricultural
farming” as on 1st January 1952 to claim exemption from
vesting under the 1971 determination:
Held: To get the benefit contemplated u/s.6(1)(j) a company
incorporated under the Companies Act, 1913 must establish that
it was engaged exclusively in farming (and in business, if any,
connected directly with such farming); and that it was so engaged
as on 1st January 1952 – On facts, the respondent company even
after being given sufficient opportunities, failed to discharge its onus
of proving the first condition before the vesting authority (Revenue
Officer) in the earlier proceedings in 1971 u/s.6(1)(j) – Careful
examination of the 1971 vesting order reveals that, although the
respondent-company sought to rely on its MOA to demonstrate
that it was engaged in agricultural activities, Revenue Officer rightly
declined to treat these clauses as conclusive proof of “exclusive”
engagement in farming – 1971 vesting order does not suffer from any
legal flaw, and it correctly concluded that the respondent-company
failed to prove the statutory precondition of s.6(1)(j), despite being
given sufficient time – Finding by the Revenue Officer that in spite
of several opportunities granted, the respondent-company could
not prove the essential statutory requirement was inevitable and
unimpeachable, and the vesting of the land in the State had to
follow as a natural consequence – Nothing brought to the notice
by the respondent-company of the existence of sufficient material
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 501
State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd.
evidence to establish the fact that it was exclusively engaged in
farming as on 01.01.1952 – Also the documents submitted by the
respondent company do not support the claim of the respondent
company that it is exclusively engaged in agricultural activities as
on 01.01.1952, as either these came into existence long after the
vesting order dated 07.10.1971 culminated or were not produced
timely by the respondent-company before the Revenue Officer at the
time of the 1971 vesting proceedings, despite multiple opportunities
being granted – Thus, these documents cannot furnish a basis
for the review of the 1971 vesting determination, especially in the
absence of any statutory provision allowing the same – Belated
reliance on such material, after a lapse of nearly four decades,
cannot constitute a legally sustainable ground for reopening a
concluded vesting determination by a Revenue Officer – Thus, the
respondent not entitled to retain the lands u/s.6(1)(j), as it could
not prove its claim that it was “exclusively engaged in agricultural
farming” as on 01.01.1952 – 1971 vesting order does not suffer
from any legal infirmity. [Paras 64-73]
Review – Allowing Revenue Officer to Review of its own
concluded quasi-judicial order – Effect:
Held: Allowing a Revenue Officer to review its own concluded
quasi-judicial order would trench upon the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers, which constitutes part of the basic structure of
the Constitution – Though vested with limited adjudicatory functions,
authorities under the WBEA Act, 1953, remain essentially members
of the executive branch and are neither part of the judicial organ nor
equipped with the institutional safeguards that attend judicial office,
such as independence from executive control – Further, the power
of review is essentially a core judicial function, and conferring such
a power upon executive authorities, absent an express legislative
mandate, would blur the constitutionally mandated demarcation
between the executive and the judiciary, permit the executive
authorities to sit in judgment over their own decisions, and erode the
rule of law by diluting finality – Any contrary construction would, be
inconsistent with legislative intent and would impermissibly encroach
upon the basic structure of the Constitution – Thus, on facts, the
fresh order of review dated 07.05.2008 by the Revenue Officer
by setting aside the 1971 vesting order is in direct contravention
of the statutory command embodied in the WBEA Act, 1953, and
hence wholly void and illegal. [Paras 56-58]
502 [2026] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.114 r/w Ord 42 r. 1 – Principles
governing law of review – Scope of Review – Grounds,
explanation:
Held: Scope of review is of a limited and narrow one, unlike the
case of appeal, where the appellate Court could revisit the entire
facts and could re-hear the complete matter on merits – Purpose
of a review is to rectify manifest or exceptional wrongs – It is not
for reappreciating facts or seeking a different conclusion – Review
is essentially to strike a balance between the rule of finality, which
is crucial for maintaining legal certainty and to avoid irremediable
injustice caused by patent mistakes, fraud, failure of natural justice
or similar exceptional situations – Review must be exercised
with great caution and only when the requisite limited criteria are
satisfied, in which the error must be evident and not one which
requires elaborate arguments to discover – Basic legal postulates
of the scope of review in s.114 r/w Ord. XLVII r.1, applied in all
proceedings in which the power of review is exercised, is the
discovery of new and important matter or evidence; mistake or
error apparent on the face of the record; or any other sufficient
reason – On facts, it cannot be believed that the crucial documents,
relied upon by the respondent-company in the 2008 review, were
not within its possession and knowledge earlier – Respondent-
company failed to produce such documents despite being afforded
several opportunities during the 1971 vesting process – Party
cannot justify a review by producing old documents lying in its own
custody, as this does not constitute “discovery” nor satisfy the “due
diligence” requirement – Furthermore, the 1971 vesting order was
passed after issuing proper notice, granting multiple adjournments
on the request of the respondent-company, conducting a full
hearing, and recording the respondent-company’s categorical
statement that it had “nothing further to produce” – Findings were
based on the respondent-company’s failure to prove exclusive
engagement in farming, which is the statutory requirement
u/s.6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act – No patent error, self-contradiction,
or legal misconception visible on the face of the record – Second
condition is also not met – Also there exists no such “sufficient
reason” within the meaning of r.1 Ord. XLVII – In view thereof, it
is evident that the respondent-company failed to satisfy any of the
conditions for review as also contemplated u/Ord. XLVII, r.1 CPC.
[Paras 60-62, 76-78, 81]
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 503
State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd.
Case Law Cited
Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania & Ors.
[2010] 10 SCR 971 : (2010) 9 SCC 437; Kiran Singh & Ors. v.
Chaman Paswan & Ors. [1955] 1 SCR 117 : (1954) 1 SCC 710;
Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. P.J. Pappu & Anr. [1966] 1 SCR
461 : 1965 SCC OnLine SC 145; Assistant Custodian E.P. & Ors. v.
Brij Kishore Agarwala & Ors. [1975] 2 SCR 359 : (1975) 1 SCC
21; Maharishi Dayanand University v. Surjeet Kaur [2010] 8 SCR
475 : (2010) 11 SCC 159; M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co.
Ltd. v. The State of UP [1979] 2 SCR 641 : (1979) 2 SCC 409;
Akhil Bhartvarshiya Marwari Agarwal Jatiya Kosh & Ors. v. Brijlal
Tibrewal & Ors. [2018] 14 SCR 870 : (2019) 2 SCC 684; Bharat
Amratlal Kothari v. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi & Ors. [2009]
15 SCR 662 : (2010) 1 SCC 234; Narmada Bachao Andolan v.
State of Madhya Pradesh [2011] 6 SCR 443 : AIR 2011 SC 3199;
R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore [1964] 6 SCR 368 : AIR 1964
SC 1823; Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji (1971) 3
SCC 844; Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania
[2010] 10 SCR 971 : (2010) 9 SCC 437; Patel Chunibhai Dajibhai v.
Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar [1965] 2 SCR 328 : AIR 1965 SC
1457; Major Chandra Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan [1979] 1
SCR 891 : (1979) 1 SCC 321; State of Orissa and Others v.
Commissioner of Land Records & Settlement, Cuttack & Others
[1998] Supp. 1 SCR 130 : (1998) 7 SCC 162; Harbhajan Singh v.
Karam Singh [1966] 1 SCR 817 : AIR 1966 SC 641; Kuntesh Gupta
(Dr.) v. Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya [1988] 1 SCR 387 : (1987) 4
SCC 525; Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala [1973] Supp.
1 SCR 1 : (1973) 4 SCC 225; Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India
[1981] 1 SCR 206 : (1980) 3 SCC 625; I.R. Coelho v. State of
T.N [2007] 1 SCR 706 : (2007) 2 SCC 1; S.P. Sampath Kumar v.
Union of India [1987] 1 SCR 435 : (1987) 1 SCC 124; R.K. Jain v.
Union of India [1993] 3 SCR 802 : (1993) 4 SCC 119; L. Chandra
Kumar v. Union of India and Others [1997] 2 SCR 1186 : (1997) 3
SCC 261; Union of India v. Madras Bar Assn. [2010] 6 SCR 857 :
(2010) 11 SCC 1; Madras Bar Association v. Union of India and
Another [2015] 6 SCR 638 : (2015) 8 SCC 583; M/s. Northern
India Caterers Limited v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi [1979] 1
SCR 557 : (1980) 2 SCC 167; Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib
[1975] 3 SCR 933 : (1975) 1 SCC 674; Thungabhadra Industries
Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. [1964] 5 SCR 174 : 1963 SCC OnLine SC
94; State (NCT of Delhi) v. K. L. Rathi Steels Ltd. [2024] 5 SCR
949 : (2024) 7 SCC 315; Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D. H. Mehta [1971]
504 [2026] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
3 SCR 748 : (1971) 3 SCC 189; Budhia Swain v. Gopinath Deb
[1999] 2 SCR 1189 : (1999) 4 SCC 396; Hira Lal Patni v. Kali
Nath [1962] 2 SCR 747 : 1961 SCC OnLine SC 42; Balvant N.
Viswamitra v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule [2004] Supp. 3 SCR 519 :
(2004) 8 SCC 706 – referred to.
Satyanarayan Banerjee v. Charge Officer and A.S.O. Birbhum,
1974 SCC OnLine Cal 1 – referred to.
Ramaprasanna Roy v. State of West Bengal, 1987 SCC OnLine
Cal 228 – approved.
Books and Periodicals Cited
The Spirit of the Laws (1748) by Montesquieu – referred to.
List of Acts
West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953; West Bengal Land
Reforms Act, 1955; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Limitation Act,
1908; West Bengal Estate Acquisition Rules, 1954.
List of Keywords
Power of review; Quasi-judicial bodies; Amicable settlement;
Review of earlier order; Scope of review in s.114 r/w with r.1 of
Ord. XLVII CPC; Agricultural farming; Allowing Revenue Officer to
Review of its own order.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7407 of
2012
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.05.2012 of the High Court
at Calcutta in WPLRT No. 43 of 2010
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant(s):
Rakesh Dwivedi, Sr. Adv., Kunal Vajani, Kunal Mimani, Parag
Chaturvedi.
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
Gaurav Mitra, Anand Shankar Jha, Ms. Meenakshi Devgan, Parvez
Rahman.
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 505
State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, J.
THE CHALLENGE
1. The present Civil Appeal has been preferred by the State of West
Bengal and Ors. (hereinafter referred to as “the appellants”), being
aggrieved by the impugned judgment and order dated 17.05.2012,
passed in WPLRT No. 43 of 2010 by a Division Bench of the High
Court of Judicature at Calcutta. The High Court, by the impugned
judgment, allowed the writ petition preferred by Jai Hind Private
Limited, the respondent–company herein, and set aside the judgment
and order dated 31.03.2010 passed by the West Bengal Land Reforms
and Tenancy Tribunal (“the Tribunal” for short), thereby allowing the
respondent-company to retain 211.21 acres of land.
2. By the said judgment, the High Court also upheld the review order
dated 07.05.2008 passed by the Block Land and Land Reforms
Officer (hereinafter referred to as “B.L. & L.R.O.”), Bharatpur–II,
Murshidabad, West Bengal, as well as the Government Order dated
26.02.2008 issued by the Principal Secretary, Land and Land Reforms
Department, Government of West Bengal. Consequently, the High
Court directed the concerned authorities, including the Revenue Officer
to accept land revenue and cess from the respondent–company in
respect of 211.21 acres of land which it had been permitted to be
retained pursuant to the order dated 07.05.2008 passed by the B.L.
& L.R.O., Bharatpur-II, Murshidabad under Sections 6(1)(j), 6(1)(a)
and 6(1)(e) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (“the
WBEA Act, 1953”, for short) and Section 14Q(1) of the West Bengal
Land Reforms Act, 1955 (“the WBLR Act, 1955” for short).
FACTUAL MATRIX
3. The dispute has arisen from the respondent–company’s claim to
retain certain lands under the provisions of the WBEA Act, 1953,
which was allowed by the High Court in the impugned judgment. The
facts in brief essential for adjudication of the present appeal are that
the respondent–company, incorporated in the year 1946 under the
506 [2026] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
provisions of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, had 23 shareholders
as on 01.01.1952. It had purchased about 205.57 acres of agricultural
land in its own name prior to 01.01.1952 and, subsequent to the
aforementioned date, purchased an additional 34.14 acres of land,
including agricultural land, homestead, ponds, etc.
4. The WBEA Act, 1953, enacted by the State of West Bengal, which
came into effect from 12.02.1954, allowed the State to acquire the
estates, the rights of intermediaries therein and certain rights of raiyats
and under-raiyats. An intermediary is defined under Section 2(i) of
the aforementioned Act as a proprietor, tenure-holder, under-tenure-
holder or any other intermediary above a raiyat or a non-agricultural
tenant and includes a service tenure-holder and, in relation to mines
and minerals, includes a lessee and a sub-lessee. Under Section 4 of
the said Act, the State Government may, by notification, declare that
all estates and the rights of intermediaries in such estates situated
in any district or part of a district as specified in the notification, shall
vest in the State free from all encumbrances. Further, Section 5 of
the WBEA Act, 1953, provides for the effect of such notification.
5. However, Section 6 (1) of the WBEA Act, 1953 preserves to
intermediaries a limited right to retain certain categories of land, inter
alia, (a) homestead land; (b) land comprised in or appertaining to
buildings and structures owned by intermediary or by any person,
not being a tenant, holding under him by leave or license; (c) non-
agricultural land in khas possession up to certain area; (d) agricultural
land in khas possession, not exceeding 25 acres in area; (e) tank
fisheries, etc. Importantly, Section 6 (1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953
which assumes utmost relevance in the present case, permits a
cooperative society registered or deemed to have been registered
under the Bengal Cooperative Society Act, 1940 or a company
incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913 and engaged
exclusively in farming to retain agricultural land that was in its khas
possession on 01.01.1952 and chosen for retention.
6. Rule 4A of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Rules, 1954 (hereinafter
referred to as “the WBEA Rules, 1954”) framed under the WBEA
Act, 1953, provides the procedure under which an intermediary
entitled to retain the land under Section 6 (1) of the 1953 Act, can
apply to the concerned authority i.e., Settlement Officer or Revenue
Officer authorised by the Settlement Officer in this behalf before the
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 507
State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd.
expiry of 30.04.1958, a statement in writing in Form ‘B’ appended
to Schedule ‘B’ appended to these Rules.
7. In exercise of this right conferred under Section 6(1)(j) of the 1953
Act, after the State Government issued the notification under Section
4 of the WBEA Act, 1953, as claimed by the respondent–company, it
submitted the duly filed Form ‘B’ on 14.08.1956 claiming entitlement
to retain the entire extent of land measuring about 239.71 acres
under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953 on the ground that
the respondent–company was engaged exclusively in farming,
which according to the respondent-company was permitted by the
concerned Revenue Officer. However, according to the appellants,
the respondent-company failed to produce any copy of the alleged
order of retention said to have been passed by the Revenue Officer,
at any stage in any of the proceedings before the High Court, or prior
to it. It may also be noted that the High Court also did not accept
the existence of any such order passed by the Revenue Officer in
1956 in favour of the respondent-company.
8. Be that as it may, the genesis of the legal proceedings with which
we are directly concerned with is the issuance of the notice dated
01.04.1968 by the Revenue Officer to the respondent-company under
Section 57 of the WBEA Act, 1953, requiring the respondent-company
to file the return in Form ‘B’, so as to determine the extent of the
land which the respondent-company was entitled to retain out of the
area vested in the State. The aforesaid notice was challenged by the
respondent-company before the High Court by filing a writ petition,
being CR No. 4256 (W) of 1968. The said writ petition was disposed of
by the High Court on 15.02.1971, holding inter alia that the impugned
notice dated 01.04.1968 was merely a notice for adjudication and
for ascertaining as to what extent the respondent-company would
be entitled to retain lands in its possession and that there can be
no ground of apprehension on the part of the respondent-company
that its right/claim for retention has been overruled by such a notice.
9. After disposal of the aforementioned writ petition, the concerned
Revenue Officer, in continuation of the earlier notice dated 01.04.1968,
issued a second notice dated 04.08.1971 requiring the respondent-
company to appear for a hearing to determine its entitlement under
Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953. In the said proceedings, being
No. 1/1971, the Revenue Officer passed an order on 07.10.1971
holding inter alia that the respondent–company failed to produce
508 [2026] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
any evidence to prove that the company was created exclusively for
agricultural purpose or for carrying on business connected directly
with agricultural farming, and accordingly it is not entitled to get the
benefit under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953.
10. The aforementioned order of the Revenue Officer was challenged
by the respondent-company before the High Court by filing a writ
petition bearing C.R. No. 3266 (W) of 1971, in which a Civil Rule
was issued, and an order directing maintenance of status quo was
passed on 02.11.1971. However, by a subsequent order dated
03.12.1971, the High Court declined to extend the status quo order,
holding that the order of the Revenue Officer was prima facie legal.
Thereafter, the respondent-company challenged the High Court’s
order dated 03.12.1971 declining to extend the status quo order by
filing an appeal bearing FMAT No. 3241 of 1971 (later re-numbered
as FMA 686 of 1971). In the said appeal, a Division Bench of the High
Court passed an order dated 14.12.1971 directing the maintenance
of the status quo.
11. Subsequently, the Civil Rule issued in the main writ petition, being
C.R. No. 3266 (W) of 1971, wherein the order of the Revenue Officer
was challenged, was discharged by the High Court, on 23.09.1975,
due to non-appearance by the respondent-company.
12. Later, the respondent-company filed a separate application seeking
restoration of the main writ petition, C.R. No. 3266 (W) of 1971,
which was dismissed for default on 23.09.1975. The said restoration
application, however, was rejected by the High Court on 11.03.1987
on the ground of inordinate delay of nearly twelve years. Against
the said dismissal of the restoration application, the respondent-
company filed an appeal, FMAT No. 791 of 1987, which also came
to be dismissed for default by the High Court on 07.02.2002.
13. Consequently, the order of the Revenue Officer dated 07.10.1971,
whereby the respondent-company was denied the benefit under
Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953, attained finality, and the
respondent-company’s judicial challenge to the said order stood
concluded. Accordingly, the respondent-company stood divested
of the agricultural land held by it, the same having vested in the
State Government under Sections 4 and 5 of the WBEA Act, 1953.
Therefore, the respondent-company ceased to have any right, title,
or interest over the said agricultural land.
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 509
State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd.
14. After the dismissal of the writ petition, CR No. 3266(W) of 1971 on
23.09.1975, the Revenue Officer, Salar, District Murshidabad, West
Bengal issued another notice on 02.02.1996 to the respondent-
company under Sections 57 and 14T(3) of the WBLR Act, 1955, on
the ground that the quantum of the land held by the respondent-
company was beyond the ceiling limit prescribed under the WBLR Act,
1955. It is to be noted that the aforesaid proceeding initiated under
the WBLR Act, 1955 were entirely separate and distinct from the
earlier proceeding under the WBEA Act, 1953, which had culminated
in 1975 upon dismissal of the writ petition on 23.09.1975 filed by the
respondent-company. The aforementioned notice under the WBLR
Act, 1955, was in respect of the land which was allowed to be retained
under the WBEA Act, 1953, but was found to be in excess of the
ceiling limit placed by the WBLR Act, 1955. This notice, challenged
by the respondent-company vide a writ petition being C.O. No. 3569
(W) of 1996, was transferred to the Tribunal and re-numbered as
T.A. No. 1410 of 2000. The Tribunal, by its order dated 09.04.2001,
dismissed the T.A. No. 1410 of 2000, reasoning that the Revenue
Officer has jurisdiction under Section 14T(3) of the WBLR Act, 1955,
to initiate proceedings and determine the ceiling area.
15. Assailing the abovementioned dismissal order of the Tribunal, the
respondent-company preferred a writ petition, WPLRT No. 763 of
2001, before the High Court. The same was admitted and remained
pending until 2008. Subsequently, it was ultimately withdrawn by the
respondent-company in 2009, after it was permitted to retain about
211.21 acres of land pursuant to a review order dated 07.05.2008,
and the said writ petition was accordingly disposed of by the High
Court as withdrawn.
16. What is of great importance is what had transpired during the
pendency of the aforesaid writ petition, on the basis of which the
said writ petition was disposed of as withdrawn, as the same would
have a direct bearing on the decision in this appeal.
17. During the pendency of the above-mentioned writ petition, WPLRT No.
763 of 2001 before the High Court, it appears that the respondent-
company submitted a proposal to Chief Minister of the State of the
West Bengal, seeking an amicable settlement of the vested land in its
favour, for setting up an eco-friendly agro-based industry, and sought
review of the order dated 07.10.1971, passed by the concerned
510 [2026] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Revenue Officer. Consequently, as claimed by the respondent-
company, the then Minister-in-Charge made a note on the file as
“Please discuss”. The erstwhile Minister-in-Charge then recorded
the following comments on the file: “Discussed. This will be possible
only when the company first withdraws all the cases”. Accordingly,
the respondent-company submitted an affidavit on 22.02.2008 to
withdraw all pending court cases, including the aforementioned writ
petition, WPLRT No. 763 of 2001, pending before the High Court.
18. Acting on the aforesaid proposal of the respondent-company which
was apparently accepted by the State government, the Land Reforms
Commissioner-cum-Principal Secretary on 26.02.2008, directed
the concerned Revenue Officer, Bharatpur -II, Murshidabad, West
Bengal, to take necessary steps for review of the proceeding No.
1 of 1971 under Sections 6(1)(j), 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(e) of the WBEA
Act, 1953. The aforementioned government order dated 26.02.2008,
being relevant, is reproduced in toto as follows:
“The Government of West Bengal
Land 85 Land Reform Department
Land Reforms Branch
Writers Buildings, Kolkata - 700001.
No. 984 – L.R. GE (M)
Dated 26.02.08
IL – 240/07 – LR…
Whereas ‘M/s. Jai Hind Private Limited a company
incorporated in the year 1946 under the Indian Companies
Act, 1913 purchased more or less 234.00 acres of land in
Block Bharatpur-II in the district of Murshidabad as revealed
from the memo no. 174/2709/C/2007 dtd. 30.8.07 of the
DLRS and Jt. LRC, West Bengal;
And whereas the said company purchased the aforesaid
234 acres of land before and after the date 01.01.1952
and that it had 23 members/shareholders as on 01.01.1952
and that the said company has produced the Panchayat
certificate and panchayat Tax receipt (for the year 2006-
07) in support of its claim of possession on 200 acres
of land as on 19.02.2007, as revealed from the memo
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 511
State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd.
no. 3362/X-6A/C/01 dated 22.6.2007 of the DL&LRO -
Murshidabad.
And whereas a proceeding bearing no. 1 of 1971 u/s 6 (1)
(J) of the WBEA Act, 1953 was drawn up and disposed of
with vesting of 205.44 acres of land of the said company
by the BL&LRO, Bharatpur-II in the year 1971 vide order
dtd: 07.10.1971;
And whereas the said land could not be distributed till
now due to series of court cases and compensation was
also not paid to the said company. The said company
is still in possession of the said land and claims that
proper opportunity of being heard was not given during
the said proceeding as revealed from the memo no.
174/2709/C/2007 dtd : 30.8.07 of the DLRS and Jt. LRC,
West Bengal;
And whereas the said company wants to establish eco-
friendly agro-based Industry on the said land to produce
‘Mentha Oil’ and ‘Mentha crystals’ and ‘Mentha Arvensis’
plants. ‘Metha oil’ is also known as ‘Peppermint Oil’ and
this cash-rich cultivation is being done for the first time
in West Bengal. This is really a good innovation in West
Bengal which cultivators may like to follow. There is a
possibility of employment generation for nearly 500 people
in the said project;
And whereas said company’s project has already been
approved by The Small Industry Services Institute’ under
the Ministry of Small Scale Industries, Govt. of India
vide report dtd. 6.6.2007. The Deptt. of Food Processing
Industries & Horticulture’, Govt. of West Bengal has also
requested for the clearance of the said company’s land
within the provision of law vide their memo no. 568/FPI &
H/0-1/580 dtd. 19.9.2007. The District Industries Centre-
Murshidabad’ has also approved the aforesaid project vide
their memo no. 356/1 (1) dtd. 15.6.2007. The Principal
Agricultural Officer-Murshidabad’ has also inspected the
Trial cultivation of ‘Menthal Arvensis’ plants on the said
land by the said company and found it to be very vigorous
and satisfactory as certified vide his memo no. 245/Dev
dtd. 28.2.07;
512 [2026] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
And whereas the ‘Local Gram Panchayat’ has already
issued ‘no objection certificate in favour of the said company
vide their letter dated 25.4.2007 recommending that the
experimental plant set up so far to extract Mentha oil/
peppermint oil is successful in the area and is accepted
by the local people. It is ‘eco friendly’ also;
And whereas the said company has already submitted
before the undersigned an undertaking to withdraw all the
pending court case (s) by way of Affidavit dated 22.2.2008.
as applicable for the withdrawal of all the pending court
cases and this may be used by L.R. officials at the relevant
forum of the court;
And whereas the said company has submitted an
undertaking by way of Affidavit dtd. 22.2.2008 to the effect
that as on 1st January 1952 neither the company nor any of
its 23 members/shareholder had owned any other landed
property in West Bengal except the aforesaid agricultural
land and that the company has all along been engaged
exclusively in agriculture farming on its aforesaid land;
And whereas the State Govt. after due consideration has
taken the decision to Review Afresh the said proceeding
bearing no. 1 of 1971 u/s 6 (1)(J) of the WBEA Act 1953
as per the applicable provisions of the WBEA Act 1953;
Now, therefore the BL&LRO, Bharatpur-II block in the
district of Murshidabad is hereby directed to take necessary
steps for fresh Review of the said proceeding for more or
less 205.57 acres of land which were purchased by the
said company before 1st January 1952 as well as more or
less 0.29 acres of homestead and also more or less 8.52
acres of pond (s) etc. for consideration for exemption u/s
6 (1) (J) read with Section 6 (1) (a) and sec. 6 (1) (e) of
the WBEA Act 1953. However, an area of more or less
19.62 acres, which were purchased by the said company
after 1.1.1952 and which do not come under the purview
of the said section of the aforesaid Act will be vested to
the State. The company may be given the opportunity to
exercise the option to earmark this more or less 19.62 acres
of land on any side of the total land and then this more
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 513
State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd.
or less 19.62 acres of land may be distributed amongst
the eligible landless persons of the area as per norms.
Sd/
(Dr. P. K. Agarwal)
L.R.C. & Principal Secretary,
Land & Land Reforms Deptt.,
Govt. of West Bengal”
19. In compliance with the above-mentioned order, the B.L. & L.R.O.
(Revenue Officer), by his final order dated 07.05.2008, allowed the
review and set aside the earlier order dated 07.10.1971 passed
by the earlier Revenue Officer, thereby allowing the respondent-
company to retain a total of about 211.21 acres of land and vesting
nearly 28.50 acres in the State. In furtherance of the review order,
the respondent-company furnished a cheque to the Revenue Officer
towards payment of land revenue, which was eventually returned
by the Revenue Officer. Aggrieved by the non-acceptance of the
land revenue, the respondent-company filed an application, being
OA No. 1463 of 2009, before the Tribunal seeking a direction to the
concerned authorities to accept the said land revenue and provide the
certified copies of the record of rights. The Tribunal, by its judgment
dated 31.03.2010, dismissed the respondent-company’s application
and quashed the review order dated 07.05.2008 by holding that the
concerned Revenue Officer was incompetent to undertake the review
proceedings as no such power of review was specifically given.
20. Assailing the said judgment of the Tribunal, the respondent-company
filed a writ petition, being WPLRT No. 43 of 2010, before the High
Court. The High Court vide impugned judgment dated 17.05.2012
allowed the said writ petition and directed the concerned Revenue
Officer to accept the land revenue and cess from the respondent-
company in respect of the lands in question, which were allowed to
be retained pursuant to the review order, dated 07.05.2008, passed
by the Revenue Officer.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS
21. The arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants can be
summarised, inter alia, as follows:
Firstly, it has been submitted that the Revenue Officer had
no jurisdiction to review the vesting order dated 07.10.1971.
514 [2026] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Relying on the judgment in Kalabharati Advertising v.
Hemant Vimalnath Narichania & Ors.1, it was argued
that the power of review must be statutorily conferred,
and in the absence of the same, the review of an earlier
order becomes ultra vires, illegal, and without jurisdiction.
Additionally, it was contended that neither Section 57A nor
any other provision of the WBEA Act, 1953, confers any
power of review on the Revenue Officer.
In addition, the appellants assailed the review order by
submitting that Sections 57A and 57B of the WBEA Act,
1953, bar the Revenue Officer from reopening/reviewing
any decision which has already been decided.
Thus, the appellants submitted that the Government Order
dated 26.02.2008 issued by the Principal Secretary and the
consequent fresh review order dated 07.05.2008 passed
by the B.L. & L.R.O., Bharatpur–II, Murshidabad, West
Bengal were illegal.
Secondly, the vesting order dated 07.10.1971 passed by
the Revenue Officer earlier could not have been reviewed
as it had attained finality once the writ petition filed by the
respondent-company challenging the same was dismissed
on 23.09.1975, its restoration rejected on 11.03.1987,
and the appeal against the same eventually dismissed
on 07.02.2002.
Thirdly, since the review order passed by the Revenue
Officer on 07.05.2008 was bereft of any jurisdiction, the
plea of invalidity of the same can be raised at any stage.
In this regard, reliance was placed on decisions in Kiran
Singh & Ors. v. Chaman Paswan & Ors.2 and Bahrein
Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. P.J. Pappu & Anr.3. Furthermore,
relying on Assistant Custodian E.P. & Ors. v. Brij Kishore
Agarwala & Ors.4, and it was argued that action taken by
an officer without jurisdiction is not binding upon the State.
1 (2010) 9 SCC 437.
2 (1954) 1 SCC 710.
3 1965 SCC OnLine SC 145.
4 (1975) 1 SCC 21.
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 515
State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd.
Moreover, it was submitted by the appellants, relying upon
the judgment in the Maharishi Dayanand University v.
Surjeet Kaur5, that the doctrine of estoppel cannot override
statutory provisions.
Fourthly, the review order dated 07.05.2008 was
passed on irrelevant considerations. As submitted by the
appellants, the respondent-company had been granted
adequate opportunities to establish its entitlement under
Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953, which it failed to do.
It was further claimed that the documents relied upon by
the respondent-company, i.e., a resolution of 25.01.1951
and a certificate dated 12.10.1979, were never produced
during the earlier vesting proceedings.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
22. In response, the respondent-company has advanced the following
submissions:
Firstly, it was submitted that the respondent-company had
always engaged exclusively in ‘agricultural farming’, as
authorised by Clause 13 of its Memorandum of Association
(MOA). To support its claim that it was engaged exclusively
in ‘agricultural farming’ as on 1 st January 1952, the
respondent-company relied upon various documents, i.e.,
a certificate of the agricultural income tax officer, audited
balance sheets of the respondent-company, auditor’s
certificates for the years from 1951, income tax scrutiny
order for 2006-2007 and special resolution of 1951.
Secondly, the respondent-company had filed a return in
Form ‘B’, claiming entitlement to retain the entire extent
of land measuring 239.71 acres under Section 6(1)(j)
of the WBEA Act, 1953, on 14.08.1956, and that it was
permitted to retain such land by the concerned Revenue
Officer. The aforementioned status, as claimed, remained
in place for more than 15 years. To substantiate the same,
5 (2010) 11 SCC 159.
516 [2026] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the respondent-company placed its reliance upon the
‘finally published’ Record of Rights, which is, as claimed,
to be presumed to be correct under Section 44(4) of the
WBEA Act, 1953.
Thirdly, the vesting order dated 7.10.1971 was passed by
the Review Officer without considering the aforementioned
documents, such as the special resolution of 1951 and
Clause 13 of the MOA.
Fourthly, assailing the 1971 vesting order, the respondent-
company submitted that the notice pursuant to the statutory
requirement of Section 10(2) of the WBEA Act, 1953,
was ‘not served’, and the possession of the said lands
was never taken over by the appellants. Moreover, the
compensation as provided for under Section 23 of the
WBEA Act, 1953, was also not paid.
Fifthly, the 1971 vesting order was erroneous and a nullity
as it was itself a review order of the 1956 determination
proceeding, recorded in the Record of Rights for which
the Revenue Officer was not even authorised by the State
government under Section 57 of the WBEA Act, 1953.
Pertinently, the 1971 order as submitted did not even set
aside the 1956 proceeding.
Sixthly, the main writ petition challenging the 1971 vesting
order was never decided on the merits.
Seventhly, the appellant-State duly recommended the
amicable settlement, which was approved by the Minister-
in-charge of the Land and Land Reforms Department.
Consequently, the B.L. & L.R.O. legally passed his order
in favour of the respondent-company. Moreover, the final
order dated 07.05.2008 and the Government order dated
26.02.2008 were never withdrawn at any point in time.
Eighthly, the appellants are hit by the doctrine of estoppel
and thus cannot retract the final order dated 07.05.2008
and the Government order dated 26.02.2008. Additionally,
the respondent-company withdrew the pending Court case
and handed over 28.50 acres of land, relying on the terms
of the amicable settlement. In support of the contentions,
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 517
State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd.
reliance was placed on M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills
Co. Ltd. v. The State of UP6.
Ninthly, the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by going
beyond the scope of prayers, as it quashed the review
order dated 07.05.2008, without any prayer or application
for the same. The respondent-company placed its reliance
on Akhil Bhartvarshiya Marwari Agarwal Jatiya Kosh &
Ors. v. Brijlal Tibrewal & Ors.7 and Bharat Amratlal Kothari v.
Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi & Ors8 in this regard.
Tenthly, the conferment of the power of review upon the
B.L. & L.R.O. under Sections 57A and 53 of the WBEA
Act, 1953, was in accordance with law.
Lastly, it was submitted that under Rule 19 of the Rules
of Business of the Government of West Bengal framed
under Article 166(3) of the Constitution, decisions relating
to a particular department are required to be taken by
the Minister-in-charge. Moreover, any omission to make
or authenticate an executive decision strictly in the form
contemplated under Article 166 does not render such
decision void or illegal. In this regard, reliance was placed
upon Narmada Bachao Andolan v. State of Madhya
Pradesh9, and R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore10.
ISSUES INVOLVED
23. As noted above, the genesis of the problem can be traced to the
act of the respondent-company in seeking to resurrect the claim
for retaining the agricultural land on the ground that the company
had been engaged exclusively in agricultural farming by making an
application before the State Authorities sometime in between 2007-
2008 after the land had already been vested in the State pursuant
to the Revenue Officer’s order dated 07.10.1971 denying any claim
6 (1979) 2 SCC 409.
7 (2019) 2 SCC 684.
8 (2010) 1 SCC 234.
9 AIR 2011 SC 3199.
10 AIR 1964 SC 1823.
518 [2026] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of the respondent-company to retain the agricultural land as it
failed to prove that it had been engaged exclusively in agricultural
activities. That apart, the attempt of the respondent-company to
judicially challenge the said order of the Revenue Officer dated
07.10.1971 also culminated in the closure of the same in 1975 after
the respondent-company’s writ petition was closed on 23.09.1975.
Subsequently, its application for restoration of the writ petition was
rejected on 11.03.1987, and its appeal against the same was also
dismissed on 07.02.2002.
24. However, the State Government directed the Revenue Officer to
review its earlier order dated 07.10.1971 by passing the order on
26.02.2008, and the concerned Revenue Officer passed the review
order on 07.05.2008, enabling the respondent-company to retain
agricultural land already vested in the State.
25. Having regard to the facts and circumstances as mentioned above,
we have to examine as to whether the B.L. & L.R.O. (Revenue
Officer) could have, by its order dated 07.05.2008, reviewed the
earlier order of the Revenue Officer dated 07.10.1971.
26. The attending and consequential issue that arises for consideration
is whether the respondent-company had fulfilled the conditions to
be entitled to retain the lands in question under Section 6(1)(j) of
the WBEA Act, 1953 — that is, whether it was “exclusively engaged
in agricultural farming” as on 1st January 1952 to claim exemption
from vesting under the 1971 determination?
THE FIRST ISSUE
27. Coming to the primary issue of whether the Revenue Officer was
competent to review its earlier order of 1971. Notably, the respondent-
company defends the power of the Revenue Officer to review its
earlier order by relying on Section 57A of the WBEA Act, 1953,
and the order of the State Government of 26.02.2008 directing the
Revenue Officer to review the earlier order. Section 57A of the Act
reads as follows:-
“57A. The State Government may by order invest any
authority referred to in section 53 with all or any of the
powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure.
1908.”
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 519
State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd.
The Authorities referred to under Section 53 are as follows:
“53. (1) There shall be the following authorities for the
purposes of this Act, namely:-
(a) The Board or Revenue;
(b) Director of Land Records and Surveys;
(c) Settlement Officers;
(d) Assistant Settlement Officers;
(e) Compensation Officers;
(f) Revenue Officers;
(ff) Officers appointed by the State Government for the
purposes of sub-clause (iv) of clause (a) of sub-section
(I) of section 16;
(g) Mining Experts for the purposes of sections 32, 33 or 34.
(2) The State Government may appoint any person as a
Compensation Officer or a Revenue Officer or may vest
any officer with the powers of a Compensation Officer or
a Revenue Officer under this Act.”
28. It appears that in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 57A
of the WBEA Act, 1953, the State Government issued a notification
bearing no. 340L, dated 09.01.1958, by which all the Settlement
Officers, Assistant Settlement Officers and Revenue Officers were
invested with all the powers of the Civil Court under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908. The said notification reads as follows:
“Land Reforms
ORDER
No.340L.Ref.-9th January 1958.- In exercise of the power
conferred by section 57A of the West Bengal Estates
Acquisition Act, 1953 (West Bengal Act I of 1954), the
Governor is pleased to invest each of the authorities
mentioned in the schedule below, being authorities referred
to in section 53 of the said Act, with all the powers of a
Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act
V of 1908):-
520 [2026] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
The schedule
1. All Settlement Officers.
2. All Assistant Settlement Officers.
3. All Revenue Officers.
By order of the Governor,
S. BANERJEE, Secy.”
29. Thus, according to the respondent-company, the Revenue Officer,
having been invested with all the powers of the Civil Court, was
competent and had jurisdiction to review the earlier order dated
07.10.1971, as also directed by the State Government vide their order
dated 26.02.2008. This is the foundational claim of the respondent-
company as regards the competency of the Revenue Officer to
review its earlier order.
30. To examine this contention, which ex-facie appears to be in order, we
must minutely examine the scope of Section 57A of the WBEA Act,
1953 and also the power of review, more particularly of quasi-judicial
authorities, keeping in mind that the Authorities mentioned under
Section 53 of the WBEA Act, 1953, are not judicial but administrative
authorities exercising certain quasi-judicial powers under the WBEA
Act, 1953, for the effective implementation of the aforesaid Act.
31. It is well-settled that the power of review is not an inherent power of
the Court. It is also equally well settled that quasi-judicial authorities
can exercise only those powers which are expressly conferred upon
them by the statute. Hence, the power of review, which is not inherent,
must be conferred upon the quasi-judicial authority by means of a
specific provision in the statute. Highlighting this principle, a three-
judge Bench of this Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman
Singhji11 had observed as follows:
“4. …It is well settled that the power to review is not
an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either
specifically or by necessary implication. No provision in
the Act was brought to our notice from which it would be
gathered that the Government had power to review its
11 (1971) 3 SCC 844.
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 521
State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd.
own order. If the Government had no power to review its
own order, it is obvious that its delegate could not have
reviewed its order….”
32. In the same vein, it was held by the Supreme Court in Kalabharati
Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania12 that,
“12. It is settled legal proposition that, unless the statute/
rules so permit, the review application is not maintainable
in case of judicial/quasi-judicial orders. In the absence
of any provision in the Act granting an express power of
review, it is manifest that a review could not be made and
the order in review, if passed, is ultra vires, illegal and
without jurisdiction…”
33. This Court has time and again, through various judgments, including
in Patel Chunibhai Dajibhai v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar13,
Major Chandra Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan14, Patel Narshi
Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji Arunsinghji15, State of Orissa and
Others v. Commissioner of Land Records & Settlement, Cuttack &
Others16, Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh17, and Kuntesh Gupta
(Dr.) v. Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya18, has underscored that an order
of review cannot be passed by a quasi-judicial authority without a
statutory jurisdiction bestowed upon it.
34. In the light of the above well-settled principle, in our opinion, unless a
specific provision has been made in the WBEA Act of 1953, investing
the power of review in the Revenue Officer or such other authorities
mentioned under Section 53 of the Act, these authorities could not
have possessed the power or authority to review an earlier order. The
omnibus expression used in the State notification dated 09.01.1958
investing all the Settlement Officers, Assistant Settlement Officers
and Revenue Officers with all the powers of the Civil Court, in our
opinion, does not amount to conferment of power of review as well
to these authorities.
12 (2010) 9 SCC 437.
13 AIR 1965 SC 1457.
14 (1979) 1 SCC 321.
15 (1971) 3 SCC 844.
16 (1998) 7 SCC 162.
17 AIR 1966 SC 641.
18 (1987) 4 SCC 525.
522 [2026] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
35. In our view, there has to be a specific conferment of the power of
review to these authorities as observed by this Court in a catena of
decisions as referred to above, which is absent in the present case.
36. In addition, there are other sound jurisprudential reasons for holding
so.
37. Separation of power and independence of the judiciary have been
considered integral parts of the basic structure of our Constitution
as propounded in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala19, and
reiterated in subsequent decisions of Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of
India20, I.R. Coelho v. State of T.N.21, etc.
38. The French Philosopher Montesquieu, in The Spirit of the Laws (1748),
while propounding the theory of separation of powers, argues that
political authority must be divided among distinct legislative, executive,
and judicial branches to protect liberty and prevent tyranny. He
proposed that each branch should have its own distinctive functions
and ideally be manned by different personnel, ensuring that no single
person or body holds all three powers, thereby creating a system of
checks and balances to safeguard against despotic rule, a concept
crucial to modern democratic Constitutions like ours. His theory finds
acceptance in the aforesaid doctrine of basic structure propounded
by this Court. Montesquieu said the following in The Spirit of Laws:
“When the legislative and executive powers are united
in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates,
there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise,
lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical
laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. Again,
there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated
from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with
the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be
exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then
the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the
judge might behave with violence and oppression. There
would be an end of everything, were the same man or
19 (1973) 4 SCC 225.
20 (1980) 3 SCC 625.
21 (2007) 2 SCC 1.
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 523
State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd.
the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to
exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of
executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes
of individuals.”
39. Closely and intrinsically linked to the aforesaid idea is the concept
of the independence of the judiciary. Separation of powers provides
the guarantee for the independence of the judiciary and also acts
as a safeguard against arbitrariness, upholding democratic values
and the rule of law.
40. The importance and applicability of these principles have been
reiterated from time to time by this Court, especially in the context
of the creation of Tribunals seeking to supplement/substitute Courts.
While tribunalisation in India has been judicially recognised, this
Court has emphasised the need to ensure independence of the
judiciary and separation of powers in the functioning of Tribunals
and, wherever this Court has found that any such tribunalisation
has violated these core principles, this Court has not hesitated to
strike down such offensive provisions or pass appropriate remedial
directions.
41. In one of the earliest decisions of this Court on the Tribunals
jurisprudence in S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India 22, the
Constitution Bench of this Court, while upholding the constitutional
validity of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which provided for
the establishment of administrative tribunals to adjudicate service
disputes of public servants, held that “the Tribunal should be a real
substitute of the High Court-not only in form and de jure but in content
and de facto”. More importantly, the Bench also decided that the
Chairman of the Tribunal “office should for all practical purposes be
equated with the office of Chief Justice of a High Court”, and that
a retiring or retired Chief Justice of a High Court or when such a
person is not available, a Senior Judge of proved ability either in
office or retired should be appointed. The Bench observed that the
position of Chairperson should not be held by an individual who
has merely served as a Secretary to the Government of India. What
weighed with the Court was the necessity that the holder of the office
must be an individual whose decision-making is informed by the
22 (1987) 1 SCC 124.
524 [2026] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
institutional discipline of the judiciary, a quality that emerges from
adequate judicial training and judicial temperament and experience
rather than mere administrative exposure.
42. In R.K. Jain v. Union of India23, a three-judge Bench of this Court
observed that the Tribunals set up under Articles 323-A and 323-B
of the Constitution or under an Act of the legislature are creations
of the legislature and in no case can claim the same status as High
Courts or their judges or parity or as substitutes of the same. It
was, however, emphasised that as the personnel appointed to hold
those offices under the State are called upon to discharge judicial or
quasi-judicial powers, they must have a judicial approach and also
knowledge and expertise in that particular branch of constitutional,
administrative and tax laws. The Court accordingly underscored
that it is necessary that those who adjudicate upon these matters
should have legal expertise, judicial experience and a modicum of
legal training.
43. Subsequently, the seven-judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the
case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Others24, held that
the High Courts’ power of judicial superintendence over all Courts
and Tribunals within their jurisdiction forms part of the basic structure
of the Constitution. The Court held that although Tribunals cannot
exercise judicial review of legislative action to the exclusion of the
High Courts or the Supreme Court, they may perform a supplementary,
though not a substitutive, role in this regard. Further, the Court held
Article 323A(2)(d) and Article 323B(3)(d) to be unconstitutional insofar
as they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts.
44. In Union of India v. Madras Bar Assn.25, this Court highlighted the
importance of the independence of the judiciary and observed as
follows:
“64. Only if continued judicial independence is assured,
tribunals can discharge judicial functions. In order to make
such independence a reality, it is fundamental that the
members of the tribunal shall be independent persons, not
civil servants. They should resemble the courts and not
23 (1993) 4 SCC 119.
24 (1997) 3 SCC 261.
25 (2010) 11 SCC 1.
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 525
State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd.
bureaucratic Boards. Even the dependence of tribunals
on the sponsoring or parent department for infrastructural
facilities or personnel may undermine the independence
of the tribunal (vide Wade & Forsyth: Administrative Law,
10th Edn., pp. 774 and 777).”
45. Further, the Supreme Court, in the above case, emphasising the
concept of separation of powers, also held that:
“107. …if a Tribunal is packed with members who are drawn
from the civil services and who continue to be employees
of different Ministries or Government Departments by 30
maintaining lien over their respective posts, it would amount
to transferring judicial functions to the executive which
would go against the doctrine of separation of power and
independence of judiciary.”
46. Later, the judgment in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India
and Another26, etc., further strengthened judicial independence
by underscoring judicial primacy in discharging judicial functions.
Thus, this Court has been emphasising the competence, ability, and
independence of the judicial mind for those who man the Tribunals
clothed with judicial functions for upholding the independence of the
judiciary and the separation of powers.
47. If we allow such executive authorities exercising quasi-judicial power
which draw their limited powers from the statutes which create them,
to review their earlier orders on merit, it will tantamount to converting
Tribunals to regular Courts which eventually will undermine the
independence of the judiciary, which will ultimately affect the justice
delivery system and be contrary to the principles evolved so far as
the functioning of Tribunals is concerned.
48. We, therefore, must eschew any such interpretation of the statute
which seeks to confer a blanket power of the Civil Court, including
the power of review to such administrative authority in the exercise
of quasi-judicial power.
49. Seen from the above judicial perspective, this Court must be
circumspect and ought not countenance any blanket investing of
all powers of the Civil Court, which would include the power of
26 (2015) 8 SCC 583.
526 [2026] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
review on such non-judicial administrative functionaries like the
Revenue Officer in terms of Section 57A of the WBEA Act, 1953,
as the respondent-company would insist. In our view, Section 57A
of the WBEA Act, 1953, cannot be construed to include vesting of
power of review in the absence of a clear statutory provision to such
quasi-judicial authority manned by an executive functionary like the
Revenue Officer, bereft of any judicial training or judicial qualification,
as it would run contrary to the aforesaid judicial position adopted
concerning Tribunals.
50. In spite of the aforesaid provision under Section 57A of the WBEA
Act, 1953, that the legislature did not intend to confer the power
of review to the authorities provided under the said Act is evident
from the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 57B of the 1953 Act
which provides that in deciding a dispute under this sub-section,
the Revenue Officer shall not re-open any matter which has already
been enquired into, investigated, determined or decided by the State
Government or any authority under any of the provisions of this Act.
Section 57B reads as follows:
“57B (1) Where an order has been made under sub-section
(1) of section 39 directing the preparation or revision of a
record-of-rights, no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or
Application for the determination or rent or determination
of the status of any tenant. Or the incidents of any tenancy
to which the record-of rights relates, and if any suit or
application, in which any of the aforesaid matters, is in
issue, is pending before a Civil Court on the date of such
order, it shall be stayed, and it shall, on the expiry of the
period prescribed for an appeal under subsection (3) of
section 44 or when an appeal has been filed under that
sub-section , as the case may be, on the disposal of such
appeal, abate so far as it relates to any of the aforesaid
matters.
(2) No Civil Court shall entertain any suit or application
concerning any land or any estate, or any right in such
estate, if it relates to---
(a) alteration of any entry in the record-of-rights finally
published, revised, made, corrected or modified under
any of the provisions of Chapter V,
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 527
State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd.
(b) a dispute involving determination of the question,
either expressly or by implication, whether a raiyat, or
an intermediary, is or is not entitled to retain under the
provisions of this Act such land or estate or right in such
estate, as the case may be, or
(c) any matter which under any of the provisions of this
Act is to be, or has already been, enquired into, decided,
dealt with or determined by the State Government or any
authority specified therein.
and any such suit or application which is pending before a
Civil Court immediately before the commencement of the
West Bengal estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act,
1973, shall abate so far as it relates to all or any of the
matters referred to in clause (a), clause (b) or clause (c).
(3) any dispute referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (2)
may be decided by a Revenue Officer not below the rank
of an Assistant Settlement Officer, specially empowered by
the State Government in this behalf, who shall dispose of
the same in such manner as may be prescribed:
Provided that in deciding a dispute under this
sub-section, the Revenue Officer shall not re-open
any matter which has already been enquired into,
investigated, determined or decided by the State
Government or any authority under any of the
provisions of this Act.
(4) Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Revenue
Officer made under sub-section (3) may appeal to the
prescribed authority not below the rank of a Settlement
Officer, within such time, in such manner and subject to
payment of such fees as may be prescribed.
(5) A decision made by an Appellate Authority under sub-
section (4) shall be final.
Explanation ----In this section, -----
(i) suit includes an appeal, and
(ii) an authority includes an authority to hear an appeal.”
528 [2026] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
51. Having regard to the above-mentioned proviso in Section 57B (3) of
the 1953 Act, it can be said that the 1971 vesting order passed by the
Revenue Officer after full inquiry and adjudication, constitutes such a
determination which also attained finality after it was unsuccessfully
challenged before the Court of law. The concerned Revenue Officer
thus stood barred from re-opening, revisiting, or re-deciding its earlier
vesting order in view of the aforesaid proviso.
52. What is thus evident is that the scheme of the WBEA Act, 1953
does not contemplate any executive authority reopening a vesting
determination or substituting a decision already rendered after due
inquiry. It is also clear that the authorities enumerated under Section
53 of the WBEA Act, 1953, such as Revenue Officers, Settlement
Officers and Compensation Officers, among others, are vested
only with such limited adjudicatory powers as the statute expressly
confers upon them. To permit these authorities to undertake a
wholesale re-adjudication of a vesting order by exercising the power
of review would be to attribute to them a power far wider than what
the legislature had envisaged. Such an interpretation would render
the carefully structured legislative framework otiose, contrary to the
settled principle that statutory authorities must operate strictly within
the bounds of the powers conferred upon them.
53. In this context, we have also considered certain decisions of the
Calcutta High Court regarding the lack of power of review qua
executive authorities, such as the Revenue Authority. The Calcutta
High Court in Satyanarayan Banerjee v. Charge Officer and A.S.O.
Birbhum27, while dealing with the question as to whether the successor
Assistant Settlement Officer could have any jurisdiction to initiate
proceedings for review for reopening an earlier order by the previous
Assistant Settlement Officer under the WBEA Act, 1953, answered
the aforesaid question in the negative. It was held that:
“5. … There can be no dispute on principle now that a
Tribunal like the Assistant Settlement Officer possesses no
inherent power of review. This position is now well settled
by the three decisions of the Supreme Court, namely,
Chunibhai v. Narayanrao, AIR 1965 SC 1457, Harbhajan
Singh v. Karam Singh, AIR 1966 SC 641 and State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Balkrishan Nathani, AIR 1967 SC 394.”
27 1974 SCC OnLine Cal 1.
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 529
State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd.
“7. … A successor Assistant Settlement Officer has certainly
no authority or jurisdiction to take a different view and
reopen the said proceeding for review on the ground that
all the lands of the endowment had not earlier been taken
into consideration…”
54. Relying on the above-mentioned judgment in the case of Satyanarayan
Banerjee in a later case of Ramaprasanna Roy v. State of West
Bengal28, the Calcutta High Court held that the successor Revenue
Officer has no power and/or jurisdiction to reopen the finding of the
earlier Revenue Office under the WBEA Act, 1953. It was held that:
“14. But firstly, since the writ petitioners have a “strong prima
facie case”. In their favour that the “successor Revenue
Officer” has no power and/or jurisdiction “to reopen” the
finding of the earlier Revenue Officer, having “concurrent
jurisdiction”, the impugned order of reopening and/or
review was wholly unwarranted since the very beginning
and should be set aside by issue of an appropriate writ in
the nature of Certiorari.
15. Secondly, in my view, as there is no provision for
“review” of the order passed under s. 5A(3)(ii) of the West
Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, pari materia to the
provisions of s. 14T(3a) of the West Bengal Land Reforms
Act, 1955, which has been inserted by way of legislative
amendment, by the West Bengal Legislature in 1978, and
as such, in the absence of any such enabling provision
a “Successor Officer” in any event is incompetent to
exercise such power of review as, such power is not
“inherent” in the Officer.
16. In this respect. I may rely on a Single Bench decision
of this Court reported in the case of Satyanarayan
Banerjee v. Charge Officer and A.S.O. Birbhum,
Suri reported in AIR 1975 Cal. 43 : (1974 CHN (N) 127)
where Anil Kumar Sen, J. (as His Lordship then was) held
that a “successor Revenue Officer” having “concurrent
jurisdiction” cannot reopen the finding of the earlier
Revenue Officer, having concurrent jurisdiction.
28 1987 SCC OnLine Cal 228.
530 [2026] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
17. I, respectfully, agree with that view and hold that the
entire move including the reopening and/or vesting of the
land by successor Revenue Officer who is sitting over the
judgment of the earlier Revenue Officer, in this matter was
unwarranted and is accordingly set aside.”
55. We are in agreement with the aforesaid view taken by the Calcutta
High Court.
56. At a more fundamental level, allowing a Revenue Officer to review
its own concluded quasi-judicial order would trench upon the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, which constitutes part
of the basic structure of the Constitution. Though vested with limited
adjudicatory functions, authorities under the WBEA Act, 1953, remain
essentially members of the executive branch and are neither part of
the judicial organ nor equipped with the institutional safeguards that
attend judicial office, such as independence from executive control.
57. The power of review is essentially a core judicial function, and
conferring such a power upon executive authorities, absent an
express legislative mandate, would blur the constitutionally mandated
demarcation between the executive and the judiciary, permit the
executive authorities to sit in judgment over their own decisions, and
erode the rule of law by diluting finality. Any contrary construction
would, therefore, be inconsistent with legislative intent and would
impermissibly encroach upon the basic structure of the Constitution.
58. Therefore, the fresh order of review dated 07.05.2008 by the
Revenue Officer by setting aside the 1971 vesting order is in direct
contravention of the statutory command embodied in the WBEA Act,
1953, and hence wholly void and illegal.
THE SECOND ISSUE
59. Even though we have held that the Revenue Officer did not have
the power of review, we have nevertheless examined the order of
review passed on 07.05.2008 to ascertain if such a review undertaken
conformed to the principles governing law of review or not.
60. As regards the scope of review, it is well settled that it is of a limited
and narrow one, unlike the case of appeal, where the appellate
Court could revisit the entire facts and could re-hear the complete
matter on merits. On the other hand, the purpose of a review is to
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 531
State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd.
rectify manifest or exceptional wrongs. It is not for reappreciating
facts or seeking a different conclusion. Thus, a review could not be
an appeal in disguise by reappreciating the evidence and grounds
which have already traversed or come to a conclusion.
61. Review is essentially to strike a balance between the rule of
finality, which is crucial for maintaining legal certainty and to avoid
irremediable injustice caused by patent mistakes, fraud, failure of
natural justice or similar exceptional situations, as was held in M/s.
Northern India Caterers Limited v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi29.
It is for this reason that the Courts have emphasised from time to
time that review must be exercised with great caution and only when
the requisite limited criteria are satisfied, in which the error must be
evident and not one which requires elaborate arguments to discover.
62. One can find the basic legal postulates of the scope of review in
Section 114 read with Rule 1 of Order XLVII of the CPC, which are
applied in all proceedings in which the power of review is exercised.
Thus, only on the following grounds, a review would lie:
i. Discovery of new and important matter or evidence; or
ii. Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or
Any other sufficient reason.
63. Before we proceed to discuss the applicability of the above principles
in the present case, we may recapitulate the background in which
the review was sought and exercised by the Revenue Officer. The
respondent-company had sought the review of the earlier order of
the Revenue Officer dated 07.10.1971 which denied the benefit
of retention of agricultural land by the respondent-company as
contemplated under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953. Section
6(1)(j) reads as follows:
“(j) where the intermediary is a co-operative society
registered or deemed to have been registered under the
Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940, or a company
incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913,
engaged exclusively in farming (and in business, if any,
connected directly with such farming), - agricultural land in
the khas possession of the society or the company on the
29 (1980) 2 SCC 167.
532 [2026] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
1st day of January, 1952, and chosen by the society or
the company, not exceeding in area the number of acres
which persons, who were the members of the society or
the company on such date, would have been entitled to
retain in the aggregate under clause (d), if every such
person were an intermediary;
Provided that where any such person retains any land under
clause (d), such person shall not be taken into account
in calculating the aggregate area of the land which the
society or the company may retain.”
64. To get the benefit contemplated under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA
Act, 1953 a company incorporated under the Indian Companies
Act, 1913 must establish, inter alia, the following two essentials: (i)
that it was engaged exclusively in farming (and in business, if any,
connected directly with such farming); and (ii) that it was so engaged
as on 1st January 1952.
65. In the instant case, records reveal that the respondent-company
even after being given sufficient opportunities, failed to discharge
its onus of proving the first condition before the vesting authority
(Revenue Officer) in the earlier proceedings in 1971 under Section
6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953. Hence, it was not granted the benefit
of exemption from vesting in the vesting order dated 07.10.1971.
Highlighting the same, the concerned Revenue Officer in the said
vesting order rightly observed:
“The representative of the company has not produced any
evidence whatsoever to show that the company after its
creation adopted any resolution for carrying on business
exclusively connected with agricultural farming.
The papers produced merely show that the company has
some agricultural lands and it is paying agricultural income
tax and others on account of the incomes that it might have
derived from such lands. These papers do not prove that
the company is not engaged with any other business or
trade in terms of memorandum and articles of association.”
66. A careful examination of the 1971 vesting order reveals that, although
the respondent-company sought to rely on its MOA — particularly
clauses 7, 8 and 13 — to demonstrate that it was engaged in
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 533
State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd.
agricultural activities, the Revenue Officer rightly declined to treat
these clauses as conclusive proof of “exclusive” engagement in
farming. Accordingly, as per the vesting order dated 07.10.1971, the
respondent-company’s about 205.44 acres of land were then vested
in the appellant-State, and an area of about 25 acres of agricultural
land, nearly 0.25 acres of non-agricultural land, and 0.24 acres of
homestead were allowed to be retained by the respondent-company.
67. In our view, the 1971 vesting order does not suffer from any legal
flaw, and it correctly concluded that the respondent-company failed
to prove the statutory pre-condition of Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA
Act, 1953, despite being given sufficient time. Most importantly, the
records reflect that the Revenue Officer afforded the respondent-
company ample opportunities to substantiate its claim. A notice dated
05.07.1971 was duly served, calling upon the respondent-company to
produce evidence in support of its assertion of exclusive engagement
in agricultural farming on the date of the hearing on 20.07.1971. At
the respondent-company’s request, the hearing was adjourned first
to 17.08.1971 and then to 30.08.1971.
68. On 30.08.1971, when the final hearing was going on, in spite of the
opportunity given again, the respondent-company failed to produce
the requisite documents, particularly its balance sheet, that it had
itself adverted to as material. Significantly, at the conclusion of
the hearing, the respondent-company expressly stated before the
Revenue Officer that it had nothing further to submit. Even on the
date when the vesting order was pronounced, the promised balance
sheet remained unproduced in spite of further opportunity granted
to do so by the Revenue Officer. In these circumstances, the finding
by the Revenue Officer that in spite of several opportunities granted,
the respondent-company could not prove the essential statutory
requirement was inevitable and unimpeachable, and the vesting of
the land in the State had to follow as a natural consequence.
69. Even before this Court, nothing has been brought to our notice by the
respondent-company of the existence of sufficient material evidence
to establish the fact that it was exclusively engaged in farming as on
01.01.1952. In its submissions before this Court, the reliance was
again placed on Clause 13 of its MOA. It reads as under:
“(13) To sell, improve, manage, develop or otherwise
exchange, lease, mortgage, disposed of turn to account
534 [2026] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
or deal in all or any part of the property and rights of the
company and to do agriculture farming and agri business.”
70. The aforementioned Clause does not establish that the respondent-
company was established exclusively for farming. It mentions
agricultural and agri-business as one of its activities. Its MOA reveals
that the respondent-company was incorporated with a host of business
objectives unrelated to agriculture, such as manufacturing or selling
of all kinds of machines, purchasing, selling, taking on lease any
movable/immovable property, patent licences, among many others.
The mere presence of agricultural objectives in a company’s MOA does
not establish that such activities were, in fact, its sole or predominant
operation, nor does it rule out the pursuit of other commercial objectives
expressly permitted by the very same document.
71. Moreover, after perusing the documents relied upon by the respondent-
company, viz., (i) Certificate of ‘Agricultural Income Tax Officer’ dated
12.10.1979, (ii) Audited Balance Sheets dated 25.07.1952, (iii)
Auditors’ Certificates dated 25.07.1952, 30.12.1971, 09.08.2007,
27.09.2007, and 11.04.2008. (iv) Income-Tax Scrutiny Order for the
assessment year 2007-2008, (v) Special-Resolution’ submitted to
ROC’ dated 25.01.1951, we are of the view, without expressing any
opinion on their veracity, that these materials majorly do not support
the claim of the respondent-company that it was exclusively engaged
in agricultural farming as on 01.01.1952, as either these came into
existence long after the vesting order dated 07.10.1971 culminated
or were not produced timely by the respondent-company before
the Revenue Officer at the time of the 1971 vesting proceedings,
despite multiple opportunities being granted. Consequently, these
documents cannot furnish a basis for the review of the 1971 vesting
determination, especially in the absence of any statutory provision
allowing the same. A belated reliance on such material, after a lapse
of nearly four decades, cannot constitute a legally sustainable ground
for reopening a concluded vesting determination by a Revenue Officer.
72. In addition to the above, the submission reiterated by the respondent-
company that it filed a return in Form ‘B’ on 14.08.1956 claiming
entitlement to retain the concerned land and that it was permitted
to retain such land by the Revenue Officer cannot be accepted, as
neither any record of acknowledgment of filing of Form ‘B’ nor any
order passed by the said Revenue Officer granting the retention of
the aforesaid land was ever produced by the respondent-company.
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 535
State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd.
In any event, such a plea was rejected by the High Court in the
impugned judgment, as no copy of such an order passed by the
Revenue Officer was produced before the High Court.
73. In view of the above discussion, it can be concluded that the
respondent-company is not entitled to retain the lands in question
under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953, as it could not prove
its claim that it was “exclusively engaged in agricultural farming” as
on 01.01.1952. Therefore, the 1971 vesting order does not suffer
from any legal infirmity.
74. Having held that the vesting order dated 07.10.1971 is legally valid,
we will now proceed to examine if any case of review is made out
or not by applying the facts of the case on the anvil of the legal
principles governing the law of review.
First, on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence.
75. A review can be sought under this ground by an aggrieved litigant
on the discovery of a certain new and important matter or evidence,
which, after exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge
or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was
passed. A review of a judgment is a drastic step, and a reluctant
resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake
or a grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A mere
repetition, through different counsel, of old and overruled arguments,
a second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of
inconsequential import, are obviously insufficient, as was rightly held
in Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib30. The provision is not meant
to give a second chance to the aggrieved party who has lost their
case due to their own negligence.
76. Now, if we apply this principle to the facts of the present case,
it cannot be believed that crucial documents such as the 1951
Resolution and Audited Balance Sheets dated 25.07.1952, relied upon
by the respondent-company in the 2008 review, were not within its
possession and knowledge earlier. The respondent-company failed to
produce such documents despite being afforded several opportunities
during the 1971 vesting process. A party cannot justify a review by
30 (1975) 1 SCC 674.
536 [2026] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
producing old documents lying in its own custody, as this does not
constitute “discovery” nor satisfy the “due diligence” requirement.
Second, on a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record.
77. This condition is also equally inapplicable in the present case. It
must be noted that the error under this ground must be self-evident
and should not require an exhaustive examination or argument to
establish it, as was held by a three-judge Bench of this Court in the
case of Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P.31 The material
portion of the judgment reads as under:
“7….A review is by no means an appeal in disguise
whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected,
but lies only for patent error. We do not consider that
this furnishes a suitable occasion for dealing with this
difference exhaustively or in any great detail, but it would
suffice for us to say that where without any elaborate
argument one could point to the error and say here is a
substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and
there could reasonably be no two opinions, entertained
about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the
record would be made out….”
78. In light of the facts and circumstances as noted above, it can be
conclusively said that the 1971 vesting order was passed after issuing
proper notice, granting multiple adjournments on the request of the
respondent-company, conducting a full hearing, and recording the
respondent-company’s categorical statement that it had “nothing
further to produce.” The findings were based on the respondent-
company’s failure to prove exclusive engagement in farming, which
is the statutory requirement under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act,
1953. No patent error, self-contradiction, or legal misconception is
visible on the face of the record. Accordingly, the second condition
is also not met.
Third, on any other sufficient reason.
79. Insofar as this ground is concerned, recently, this Court in the case
of State (NCT of Delhi) v. K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd.32, held as follows:
31 1963 SCC OnLine SC 94.
32 (2024) 7 SCC 315.
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 537
State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd.
“45. With regard to (iii) (supra), we can do no better than
refer to the traditional view in Chhajju Ram, a decision of
a Bench of seven Law Lords of the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council. It was held there that the words “any
other sufficient reason” means “a reason sufficient on
grounds at least analogous to those specified immediately
previously”, meaning thereby (i) and (ii) (supra). Notably,
Chhajju Ram has been consistently followed by this Court
in number of decision starting with Moran Mar Basselios
Catholicos V. Mar Poulose Athanasius.
……….
106. Moving on further, we find that the attempt of the review
petitioners has been to draw inspiration from the ground “any
other sufficient reason” appearing in Rule 1. There have
been decisions of this Court which have construed the words
“any other sufficient reason” expansively, like Netaji Cricket
Club and Jagmohan Singh, whereas there are decisions,
including Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos, Shatrunji,
Kamlesh Verma and S. Madhusudhan Reddy, that have
followed Chhajju Ram explaining that the ground “any other
sufficient reason” means “a reason sufficient on grounds at
least analogous to those specified immediately previously.
107. However, with utmost respect, we do not find any
of those decisions, which have taken an expansive view,
looking at such ground in the manner we propose to look,
for recording our concurrence with the view in Chhajju
Ram that has unhesitatingly been followed over the years.
If indeed “any other sufficient reason” were to take within
its embrace any situation not analogous to “discovery of
new matter or evidence” and “on account of some mistake
or error apparent on the face of the record”, we wonder
why the legislature chose to keep “any other sufficient
reason” immediately after the aforesaid two grounds. If
“any other sufficient reason” were to be read independent
of the said two grounds, we believe the long line in Rule
1 after clauses (a) to (c) need not have been drafted in
the manner it presently reads. In lieu of referring to the
538 [2026] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
said two grounds as grounds on which a review could be
sought, the legislature could well have kept it open-ended
as in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 where it is
provided, without any strings attached, that any appeal or
any application may be admitted after the prescribed period
of limitation if the appellant or applicant satisfies the court
that he had “sufficient cause” for not preferring the appeal
or the application earlier. If the intention of the legislature
were to give an expanded meaning, Order 47 Rule 1 would
have read somewhat like this: any person considering
himself aggrieved by a decree or order or decision of the
nature indicated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) for any sufficient
reason desires to obtain a review of the decree or order
made against him, may apply for a review. But that is not
what the provision says and means. Reading Order 47
Rule 1 in juxtaposition to section 5 of the Limitation Act
drives us to accept the view in Chhajju Ram as having
interpreted the law correctly and acceptance of the same by
this Court and High Courts over the years, coupled with the
fact that Parliament did not consider it necessary to amend
Rule 1 when it inserted the Explanation in 1976. Giving a
wider meaning to the ground “any other sufficient reason”
in Netaji Cricket Club and Jagmohan Singh, therefore,
must have been intended and necessitated by this Court
because the justice of the cases so demanded but the
same would have no application in a case of this nature.”
80. Further, the Courts have time and again decided what can fall under
the term “any other sufficient reason”. For instance, inter alia, where
the Court omits to notice or consider relevant statutory provisions was
held to be a sufficient reason in Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D.H. Mehta33.
Additionally, an order arising out of a lack of jurisdiction was held to
be a sufficient reason in Budhia Swain v. Gopinath Deb34. However,
in the case at hand, there exists no such “sufficient reason” within
the meaning of Rule 1 of Order XLVII of the CPC.
33 (1971) 3 SCC 189.
34 (1999) 4 SCC 396.
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 539
State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd.
81. In view of the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the respondent-
company failed to satisfy any of the conditions for review as also
contemplated under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the CPC. Consequently,
even assuming for argument’s sake that the Revenue Officer
possessed the jurisdiction to entertain a review, which he demonstrably
did not have, as already held above, the review order of 2008 was
devoid of any legal foundation. The review was thus fundamentally
misconceived, contrary to settled principles governing the exercise
of review power
82. As discussed above, the power of review is to be exercised on the
limited grounds recognised under law, as postulated under Order
XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC. In the present case, however, it is evident
that the trigger for reopening the earlier vesting order of 1971 was not
the existence of any legally permissible ground for review, but was
primarily based on the claimed “amicable settlement” between the
respondent-company and the State government. It is the respondent-
company’s own case that during the pendency of WPLRT No. 763
of 2001 before the High Court, it submitted a representation to the
Chief Minister of the State seeking reconsideration of the 1971 vesting
determination for the purpose of establishing an eco-friendly agro-
based industry, purportedly involving employment generation and
economic benefits. Acting upon this proposal, the State Government
proceeded to direct a review of the vesting order dated 07.10.1971.
The record thus clearly demonstrates that the decision to initiate
the review was driven by considerations of perceived economic
advantage, such as prospective employment generation, rather than
by any of the grounds recognised in law for invoking the power of
review. Such considerations, however laudable in the executive
or policy domain, are wholly extraneous to the limited and strictly
circumscribed jurisdiction of review. A concluded determination
cannot be reopened on the basis of subsequent policy preferences
or economic expediency, in the absence of a legally sustainable
ground contemplated under the law governing review.
83. As discussed above, it is also important to note that the direction
issued by the State Government vide Government Order dated
26.02.2008 to review the earlier vesting determination was made
after an inordinate and unexplained lapse of about four decades
from the passing of the vesting order dated 07.10.1971, which had
attained finality. While it is true that Constitutional Courts are not
540 [2026] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
strictly bound by limitation in exercising their jurisdiction, the position
is markedly different in respect of the review jurisdiction of Civil
Courts governed by the CPC. Under Article 124 of the Schedule
of the Limitation Act, 1963, an application for review is required to
be filed within a period of thirty days from the date of the decree or
order sought to be reviewed, subject only to extension upon sufficient
cause being shown. In the present case, no sufficient explanation
whatsoever has been offered for the extraordinary delay of nearly
forty years, except for the observations contained in the Government
Order dated 26.02.2008, referring, inter alia, to non-distribution of
land due to a series of Court cases, non-payment of compensation,
and the respondent-company’s continued possession of the land
apart from the potential to generate employment from the proposed
project. None of these reasons, in our view, constitutes a legally
sustainable ground to justify reopening a concluded determination
after such an inordinate lapse of time. Non-distribution of land or
continued physical possession by the respondent-company cannot
confer upon it any right, title, or interest once vesting has taken
place by operation of law. Similarly, non-payment of compensation,
even if assumed, does not invalidate vesting but merely gives rise
to a statutory entitlement to compensation. Significantly, the record
does not substantiate the assertion of any pending litigation that
prevented distribution of the land, particularly when the writ petition
challenging the vesting order was dismissed on 23.09.1975, and
subsequent attempts to revive the proceedings failed on 11.03.1987
and 07.02.2002. There was thus no subsisting judicial impediment
as far as the respondent-company was concerned. The proposed
project of the respondent–company, which had the potential to
generate employment, cannot be the reason for the review of the
earlier vesting order. In these circumstances, the exercise of review
jurisdiction in 2008 to reopen a vesting determination that had
attained finality decades earlier was wholly impermissible in law.
84. Before we conclude, we may address other issues raised by the
respondent-company. It was submitted that the Government order
dated 26.02.2008 was never recalled by the Government, and this
order was the consequence of the amicable settlement arrived at
between the respondent-company and the State Government. Hence,
it was contended that the order dated 31.03.2010 passed by the
Tribunal was illegal.
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 541
State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd.
85. As regards the Government order dated 26.02.2008 indicating the
amicable settlement, it is to be noted that there was no subsisting
dispute per se between the Government and the respondent-company
concerning the issue relating to retention of land under Section 6(1)
(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953 inasmuch as the said issue was already
settled by the earlier vesting order dated 07.10.1971 and the said
order had attained finality upon dismissal on default of the petition
filed by the respondent-company challenging the said order.
86. Thus, when the so-called amicable settlement was said to have been
arrived at, there was no subsisting dispute between the parties at
the relevant time. The claimed amicable settlement was arrived at
in a proceeding arising out of the issue of the ceiling of land under
a different statute, i.e., WBLR Act 1955. Thus, the very foundation
of the passing of the Government order dated 26.02.2008 was non-
existent. It thus becomes irrelevant as to whether such an order was
recalled by the Government or not.
87. Additionally, it was also submitted by the respondent-company that
the plea of the appellant-State is hit by the doctrine of promissory
estoppel, as the respondent-company withdrew all the pending Court
cases relying on its amicable settlement with the State. Nevertheless,
in our view, once the 2008 review by the Revenue Officer is found to
be without jurisdiction and contrary to law, the question of invoking
the doctrine of promissory estoppel does not arise.
88. Moreover, the contention advanced by the respondent-company that
the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by going beyond the scope of
prayers, as it quashed the review order dated 07.05.2008, without
any prayer or application for the same, is without merit, because it
is a well-established law that a decree passed by a Court without
jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever
and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the
stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. The Court in
the case of Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan35 held as follows:
“6. …It is a fundamental principle well established that a
decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and
that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever
35 (1954) 1 SCC 710.
542 [2026] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the
stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A
defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial,
or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the
action, strikes at the very authority of the court to pass
any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by
consent of parties…”
89. In the instant case, as the Revenue Officer did not have the jurisdiction
to review the earlier vesting determination, the 2008 review order
strikes at the very root of the matter and is a non-curable defect.
Importantly, “competence of a Court to try a case goes to the very
root of the jurisdiction, and where it is lacking, it is a case of inherent
lack of jurisdiction”, as was held in Hira Lal Patni v. Kali Nath36. A
decree or order passed by a Court which lacks inherent jurisdiction
in passing such an order or decree is non-est and void ab initio,
as was held by this Court in the case of Balvant N. Viswamitra v.
Yadav Sadashiv Mule37. In the said case, a three-judge Bench of
this Court held that:
“9…The main question which arises for our consideration
is whether the decree passed by the trial court can be said
to be “null” and “void”. In our opinion, the law on the point
is well settled. The distinction between a decree which
is void and a decree which is wrong, incorrect, irregular
or not in accordance with law cannot be overlooked or
ignored. Where a court lacks inherent jurisdiction in passing
a decree or making an order, a decree or order passed
by such court would be without jurisdiction, non est and
void ab initio. A defect of jurisdiction of the court goes to
the root of the matter and strikes at the very authority of
the court to pass a decree or make an order. Such defect
has always been treated as basic and fundamental and a
decree or order passed by a court or an authority having
no jurisdiction is a nullity. Validity of such decree or order
can be challenged at any stage, even in execution or
collateral proceedings.”
36 1961 SCC OnLine SC 42.
37 (2004) 8 SCC 706.
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 543
State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd.
90. Another submission was made by the respondent-company that the
appellant-State had not taken physical possession of the land, and
no compensation was paid to the respondent-company. This, in our
view, does not alter the nature of the status of land inasmuch as
that vesting order dated 07.10.1971 had attained finality, and mere
holding of some parts of the land would not endow any right to the
respondent-company to claim ownership or title over the same.
CONCLUSION
91. For the reasons discussed above, we hold that the review undertaken
by the Revenue Officer culminating in the fresh order dated 07.05.2008
was wholly without jurisdiction and void ab initio. The WBEA Act,
1953, does not confer any power of substantive review upon the
Revenue Officer, either expressly or by necessary implication. The
Government Order dated 26.02.2008, even though approved at the
ministerial level, could not create or confer such jurisdiction on the
Revenue Officer. The review further fails on merits, as none of the
conditions prescribed under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the CPC were
satisfied.
92. The Tribunal, in setting aside the fresh review order dated 07.05.2008
and restoring the vesting determination of 1971, rightly appreciated the
statutory scheme of the WBEA Act, 1953, and well-settled principles
governing the limits of quasi-judicial power. The conclusion of the
Tribunal that the Revenue Officer lacked jurisdiction to reopen by
way of review of a concluded vesting order is consistent with both
legislative intent and binding precedents.
93. The High Court, however, fell into error in reversing the Tribunal’s
decision. It incorrectly proceeded on the premise that the Government
Order issued under Section 57A of the WBEA Act, 1953, having been
approved by the Minister-in-Charge, constituted sufficient authority to
confer review jurisdiction upon the Revenue Officer. This approach
conflated executive direction with statutory conferment of substantive
power and treated review as a mere procedural incident of Civil Court
powers. The High Court also overlooked the limits on vesting the
judicial function of review power in executive authorities.
94. Consequently, for the reasons discussed above, the appeal filed by
the appellant-State is allowed.
544 [2026] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
The impugned judgment of the High Court dated 17.05.2012, passed
in WPLRT No. 43 of 2010, is set aside.
The order of the Tribunal dated 31.03.2010 is restored, and the
review order dated 07.05.2008 passed by the Revenue Officer
stands quashed.
The vesting order dated 07.10.1971 shall continue to operate in
accordance with the law.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
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