STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANR.versusSURENDRA NATH BHATTACHARYA AND ANR.

                                                                               783

                            STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANR.                                  A
                                               v.
                SURENDRA NATH BHATTACHARYA AND ANR.
                                       April 24, 1980
                     [S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.]                        B
•
            Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by Act 31 of 1962, Sec-
        tion 40(aa)-lnterpre'ilation of Section 40(aa) Gnd also Section 7 of the
•       Amending Act of 1962-Acquisition of land for company engaged in industry
        or werk ·which is for public purpose is valid and does not offend Article 14
        of the Constitution-Section 44B of the Act is prospective and does not relate
        to Qcquisitiol'I.                                                                  c
            Respondent 2 known as Calcutta Mineral Supply Company having its office
        at 31, Jack.son Lane, Calcutta was carrying on the businesa of manufacturl.Oi
        sodium silicate, plaster of paris etc., which were formerly imported on a very
        large scale from foreign countries. The manufactured goods of the Company
        are widely used all over India saving considerable foreign exchange which
        otherwise would have had to be spent in importing these materials. With a          D
        view tO extend its business and i\(lprove the standard of its manufacture but
        tor waat of space for big underground storage tanks, the Company was
        handi""J>ped, the Company applied to the Collector for acquiring for public
        purpoee, the lands in dispute which were contiguous to the lands on which
         the existing factory of the company stood was best suited. Consequent to
        the application :.in agreement was executed between the Government and the
. J.-    Compaliy on the 29th of November 1954. On December 9, 1954, a notifica-           E
         tion under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was published and
         the first respondent filed his objection which was rejected and was foJJowed
         by a ~otification under section 9 of the Act.

             After, the land acquisition proceedings were complete a writ petition was
        filed by the first respondent before tlte High Court on January 14, 1957
        which was dismissed by a single Judge of the High Court and therefore the          F
        first respondent filed an "Ppeal to the Division Bench of tlte High Court on
        Felml&"y 21, 1957. While the appeal was pending before the High Court tlte
        Collector made an Award dated 14-10-1957 and after taking possession from
         the owners of the land, delivered the same to the company-respondent No.
         2 on October 22. 1957. The first respondent filed an application for per-
         mission to urge additional grounds before the High Court which was per-
         mitted and ultimately the Division Bench of the High Court by the order               G
         under appeal allowed the appeal and quashed the Land acquisition proceed-
         ings taken under the Act. Hence, this appeal before this Court after getting
         a certilieate from the High Court.

              Allowing the appeal by certificate. tlte Court

             HEW: I. Analysing tlte ratio of the decision of this Court in (Second)            H
          R. Li Arora v. State of U.P., [1964] 6 S.C.R. and followed in Himalayan 1'iles
          & Marbles v. Francis Victor Continho (dead) by I.rs .. [1980] 3 S.C.R. 235,
           784                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [19 80] 3 S.C.lt.

A         the following conditions must be satisfied before an acquisition made prior
          to July 20, 1962 could be said to be constitutionally valid-

                 (a) that the acquisition bad taken place before July 20, 1962,         the
                     date 'vhen the Amending Act came into force;

                 (b) that the said acquisition should have been fully compleled in
                     that property said to have been acquired had vested absolutely in
B                    the Government;

                 (c) that the acquisition was made for purposes mentioned in clause
                      (aa) of the amended clause added to s. 40;
                                                                                                •
                 (d) that if these conditions were satisfied, then any acquisitioo pro-
                     ceeding, order, agreement or action in connection with much
    c                acquisition would be deemed to have. been valid as if the arnooded
                     provisions were in force at the time when the acquisition was
                     made. [788 E-0]

              Tl>o facts of the present case squarely fall within the ambit of the coodi-
          tions laid down by section 7 of the Amending Act and hence the cballenge
          on the ground of the constitutional validity of the acquisition must neceeuri-
    D     ly fail. Tl>o proceedings for acquisition were started long before July 20,
          1962 that is, as early as December 9, 1?54 when notification under sec-
          tion 6 of the Act was issued. After inviting objections an Award was made
          by the Collector on October 14, 1957 and after the property in dispute fully
          rested in the Government, the Collector then delivered the same to the
          Company-respondent 2 on October 22, 1957. [789 A-BJ

               Himalayan Tiles and Mmbles v. Francis Victor Countinho (dead) by I.rs ..
    '.E    [1980] 3 SCR 235; applied.

             2. To hold that section 40(aa) of the Act also requires proof of public
          purpose in the restricted iense in that it must be for the general good of
          the people at large, then the very object sought to be achieved bY the
          amendment would be completely frustrated and the provisions of Secti01t 7. would
          become otiose. [789 D-FJ                                               · .
    1
               3. The words "public purpose" are not to be interpreted in a restrictive -....   ~
           sense but take colour from thei nature of the industry itse1f, the uticles it        _.
           manufactures and the benefit to the people that it subscrves. The land
           should be acquired for building or work. which would serve the J'Ublic
           purpo~ of th~ Company and not public purpose as it is generally understood.
           [791 C-D]
    G
                 In the instant case the articles produced by the Company are    vsed   for
             the benefit of the people and as it saves a lot of foreign exchange, it is
             unmistakably for the general good of the country particularly frooi the
             economic point of view. The obje.ct of the Company in extending its opera-
             tions by enlarging the area of its prcxluction was for the public pu.rpciee of
             the Company. Taking an overall picture of the nature of the prooucts of
n            tbe company, its various activities, the general public good that it seeks
          · to achieve and the great benefit that the people derive, the acquisition was
            for a public purpose. [791 C-FJ                                       · ··
         'lllEST BENGAL   v. s. N. BHATTACHARY.A (Fazal Ali, J.)           785


       4. Section 44B of lhe Land ·Acquisition Act is purely prospective in        A
    character and has absolutely no application to acquisition proceedings taken
    before July 20, 1962, tho date when the amendment was enacted. [791 F·G]
+       5. Section 40(aa) of the Act does not violate Article 14 of the Consti-
    tution, by permitting acquisition of land for a Company but not for an
    individual or a private Company through these persons may also be engaged
    in an industry which was for a public purpose. [792 A-BJ                       B

        P. GirdhoJ'aJ1 Prasad Missair and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Anr., Al.R.
    1968 Pat 77; Chhotubhat Babarbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and Anr.,
    1.L.R. Gujarat 1964 p. 472; approved.                 ·

       R. L. Arora (II) v. State of U.P., [1964] 6 S.C.R. 784; followed.
                                                                                   c
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 140 of 1969.
       From the Judgment and Order dated 3-5-1966 of the Calcutta High
     Court in F.M.A. No. 71/57.
        P. K. Chatterjee & Rathin Dass for the Appellant.
        V. S. Desai, S. C. Majumdar and Miss Kirobi Banerjee for                   D
     Respondent No. I.
        P. K. Mukherji for Respondent No. 2.
        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        FAZAL Au, J.-This appeal is directed against a judgment dated              B
    May 3, 1966 of the Calcutta High Court quashing the acquisition pro-
    ceedings taken as also the notifications made by the State of West
    Bengal under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (here-
    inafter referred to as the 'Act') in respect of the lands in dispute which
    comprised ·73 acres in village Kanpura, P.S. Dum Dum.
                                                                                   F
         Although the case had a rather chf'quered career and was preceded
    by a full-fledged litigation starting from the trial court and ending with
    the High Court regarding the question of title, we are not, however,
    concerned with the past history in view of the short point on the basis
     of which the appeal was decided by the Division Bench of the High
    Court. The case of the Government was that on December 16, 1949,               G
     respondent No. 2 known as Calcutta Mineral Supply Company having
    its office at 31, Jackson Lane, Calcutta, appli£d to the Collector for
    acquiring the land in question in order to extend its business. The
    ·company was carrying on the business of manufacturing sodium
    silicate, plaster of Paris, etc., which were form£rly imported on a very
    large scale from foreign countries. The manufactured goods of the              H
    Company are widely used all over India saving considerable foreign
    .exchange which otherwise would have had to he spent in impcrting
         786                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [1980} 3 s.c.R.

A        these materials. The company pleaded that it wanted to extenci its
         business and improve the standards of its manufacture but for want of
         space for big underground storage tanks, the company was seriously
         handicapped. The company, therefore, prayed that the lands in dis-
         pute which were contiguous to the lands on which the existing factory
          of the company stood was best suited for this purpose and hence tile
B         Collector was requested to acquire the lands for public purpose.
                                                                                       •
          Consequent to the application, an agreement was executed between the
          Government and the company on the 29th of November 1954. On
          December 9, 1954, a notification under s. 6 of the Act was published
        ·and the first respondent filed his objection which was rejected               •
                                                                                       I
          and was followed by a notification under s. 9 of the Act. After the land
c                                                                                      ~
         acquisition proceedings were complete a writ petitiol) was filed by the
          first'respondent before the High Court on January 14, 1957 which was
          dismissed by a single Judge ou the High Court and therefore the first
          respondent filed an appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court on
          February 21, 1957. While the appeal was pending before the High
          Court the Collector made an Award dated 14-10-1957 and after taking
D
          possession from the owners of the land, delivered the same to the
          company-respondent No. 2 on October 23, 1957. The first respondent
         "filed an application for permission to urge additional grounds before
          the High Court which was permitted and ultimately the Divisioa
           Bench of the High Court by the Order under appeal allowed the appeal
    E      and quashed the land acquisition proceedings taken under the Act.
          Hence, this appeal before this Court after getting a certificate from the
          High Court.

             The only point that has been canvassed before us by counsel
         for the parties is as to whether or not the acquisition of the land in
         dispute was valid in law. The appellant contended that in view of the
F
         amertdment of section 40 by Act. No. 31 of 1962, acquisition ofland for
         the purpose of the company was validated and all acquisitions made
         before the amendment were validated retrospectively provided certain              •
         conditions laid down under s. 7 of the Amending Act were fulfilled.

    G
             We might mention here that prioF to the amendment, this Court
         in R. L. Arora v. State of U.P. (1) had held that any acquisition under
         the Act for purposes of a Private Company would not be a public pur-
         pose and would, therefore, be void. It was on the basis of this decision,
         which is usually known as the 'first Arora case', that the first respondent
         filed a petition in the High Court for quashing the land acquisition
    H    proceedings. The legislature, however, intervened by the Amending
         Act, as mentioned aforesaid, and removed the basis of the judgment of
            (1) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 149.
        WEST BENGAL v.      s. N. BHATTACHARYA (Fazal Ali, J.)            787

    this Court by adding clause (aa) to s. 40 of the Act so as to validate all   A
    acquisitions of private lands for purposes of a private company pro-
    vided the conditions laid down in s. 7 were fulfilled. This amendment
    was also challenged before this Court in what is known as the 'second
    Arora case' (2) where this Court by majority of 4 : I held that the
    Amending Act was valid and that under s. 40(aa) an acquisition could
    be made even for a private company if it was engaged in an industry
•   which was for a public purpose. We are not concerned with the other
    amendments made which do not apply to the facts of the present case .

•      The High Court undoubetdly referred to the "first Arora case"
    as also to the "second Arora case" but, with due respect, we might
    obsel'Ve that the High Court relied mainly on the observations made in       c
    the "first Arora case" and has not correctly interpreted the later deci-
    sion of this Court and the effect of the amendment which completely
    superseded the ''first Arora case". The argument of the learned
    Gounsel before us centered round the interpretation of s. 40(aa) as
    amended by the amendment as also s. 7 of the Amending Act. In
    order to understand the scope of the argument it may be necessary to
    extract both s. 40(aa) and s. 7 of the Amending Act, which run thus :
          .. 7. Validation of certain acquisitions.-Notwithstanding any
       judgment, decree or order of any court, every acquisition of land
       for a company made or purporting to have been made under
       Part VII of the principal Act before the 20th day of July 1962,
       shall, in so far as such acquisition is not for any of the pur-
       pose• mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (I) of
       section 40 of the principal Act, be deemed to have been made for
       the purpose mentioned in clause (aa) of the said sub-section, and
       accordingly every such acquisition and any proceeding, order,
       agreement or action in connection with such acquisition shall             F
       be, and shall be deemed always to have been, as valid as if the
       provisions of sections 40 and 41 of the principal Act, as amended
       by this Act, were in force at all material times when such acqui-
       sition was made or proceeding was held or order was made or
       agreement was entered into or action was taken.
         Explanation-In this section "Company" has the same mean-                G
       ing as in clause (e) of section 3 of the principal Act, as amended
       by this Act."
         "40(aa) that such acquisition is needed for the construction of
       wme building or work for a Company which is engaged or is tak-
       ing steps for engaging itself in any industry or work which is for a
       public purpose;"
      (2) ·[1964] 6 S.C.R 784.
       788                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS               (1980] 3 s.c.R.

.A       In this connection, this Court observed as follows:-
            "Therefore before s. 7 can validate an acquisition made
         before July 20, 1962, it must first be shown that the acquisition
         is complete and the land acquired has vested in Government.
         This means that the land acquired has vested in Government
         eitherunders.16ors.17(1)oftheAct. Thuss. ?of the Amend-
B
         ment Act validates such acquisitions in which property has vested
         absolutely in Government either under s.16 ors. 17(1). Second-
         ly's. 7 of the Amendment Act provides that where acquisition
         hasbeenmadeforacompanybefore July 20, 1962 or purport-                    •
         ed to have been made under cl. (a) or cl. (b)ofs. 40(l)and those
 c       clauses do not apply in view of the interpretation put thereon in
         R. L. Arora's case (1962 Supp. 2 SCR 149), it shall be deemed
         that the acquisition was for the purpose mentioned in cl. (aa) as
         inserted in s. 40(1) of the Act by the Amenment.
         Act. Thirdly, s. 7 of the Amendment Act provides that every
         such acquisition and auy prodeeding, order, agreement or
 .D       action in connection with such acquisition shall be, and shall be
         deemed always to have been, as valid as if the provisions of ss. 40
         and 41 of the Act as amended by the Amendment act were in
         force at all material times when any action was taken for such
         acquisition. Finally, this validity is given to such acquisitions
         and to all actions taken in connection therewith notwithstanding
         any judgment, decree or order of any court".

         Thus, analysing the ratio or the "second Arora case",' the: follow-
      ing conditions must be satisfied before an acquisition made prior to
      July 20, 1962 could be said to be constitutionally valid-
             (a) that the acquisition had taken place before July 20;
                 1962, the date when the Amending Act came into force;
             (b) that the said acquisition should have been fully completed
                 in that the property said to have been acquired had:vesteq
                 absolutely in the Government;
             (c) that the acquisition was made for purposes mentioned in
·G               clause (aa) of the amended clause added to s. 40;
             (d) that if these conditions were staisfied, then any acquisition
                 proceeding, order, agreement or action in connection with
                 such acquisition would be deemed to have been valid as if
                 the amended provisions were in force at the time when the
                 acquisition was made.
11
         On this aspect of the matter, the view taken by this Court in the
      "second Arora case" was followed in a recent decision of this Court· in
        WEST BENGAL '" s. N •.BHATTACBARYA          (Fazal Ali, /.)       7 89


    Himalayan Tiles and Marbles v. Francis Victor Coutinho (dead) by               A.
    Lrs (I). In the instant case, it is not disputed that the proceedings for
+   acquisition were started long before July 20, 1962, that is to say, as early
    as December 9, 1954 when notification under s. 6 of the Act was issued.
    Secondly, it is also not disputed that after inviting objections, etc., an
    Award was made by the Collector on October 14, 1957 and after the
•   property in dispute fully vested in the Government, the Collector              B.
    then delivered the same to the company-respondent No. 2 on October
     23, 1957. For these reasons, the facts of the present case squarely fall
•    within the ambit of the conditions laid down by s. 7 of the Amending
     Act and hence the challenge on the ground of the constitutional validity
     of the acquisition must necessarily fail.
                                                                                    c
           Mr. V. S. Desai, appearing for respondent No. I, however, sub-
     mitted that s. 7 itself wa.s violative of Art. 31(2) of the Constitution.
     It is not neceS>ary to examine this argument in detail because a similar
     argument was urged in the "second Arora case" (supra) and rejected.

          It was then contended that even if we assume that s. 7 validated              D'
     the present land acquisition proceedings, the conditions prescribed in
     clause (aa) of s. 40 were not fulfilled in this case inasmuch as the acqui-
     sition could not be said to be for a public purpose. It was submitted
     by the counsel for respondent No. I that as the company was a private
     one and there is nothing to show that there was any direct connection
     or close nexus between the articles produced by the company and the                I
      general good of the public, it could not be said that the acquisition was
      made for a company which was engaged in an industry which was for
      a public purpose. This argument, in our opinion, is based on a mis-
      conception of the concept of the Amending Act and the introduction
      of clauses (aa) to s. 40. If we are persuaded to hold that s. 40 (aa)
      also requires proof of a public purpose in the restricted sense, in that          F
      it must be for the general good of the people at large, then the very
      object sought to be achieved by the amendment would be completely
      frustrated and the provisions of s. 7 would become otiose. A similar
      argument was advanced in the "second Arora case" (supra) and was
      fully considered by this Court which observed as follows :-·
                                                                                        G
             "Jn approaching the question of construction of this clause,
          it cannot be forgotten that the amendment was made in conse-
          quence of the decision of this Court in R. L. Arora's case (1962
          Supp. 2 SCR 149) and the intention of Parliament was to fill the
          lacuna, which, according to that decision, existed in the Act in the
          matter of acquisitions for a company .... Further, a literal                      H
          interpretation is not always the only interpretation of a provision
         (!) [19801 3 S.C.R.235.
    790                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [1980] 3 S.C.R.

      in a statute and the court has to look at the setting in which the
      words are used and the circumstances in which the law came to
      be passed to decide whether there is something implicit behind the
      words actually used which would control the literal meaning of
      the words used in a provision of the statute.

B              •                    •                        •
         Therefore, we have to see whether the provision in cl. (aa)
      bears another construction also in the setting in which it appears
      and in the circumstances in which it was put on the statute
      book and also in view of the language used in the clause. The
      circumstances in which the amendment came to be made have
      already been mentioned by us and the intention of Parliament
      clearly was to fill up the lacuna in the Act.which became evident
      on the decision of this Court in R. L. Arora's case (!962 Supp.
      2 SCR 149) ...... It was only for such a company that land was
      to be acquired compulsorily and the acquisition was for the
      construction of some .building or work for such a company, i.e.,
      a company engaged or about to be engaged in some industry or
      work which is for a public purpose. In this setting it seems
      to ns reasonable to hold that the intention of Parliament
      could only have been that land should be acquired for such building
      or work for a company as would subserve the public purpose of the
      company; it could not have been intended, considering the setting
      in which cl. (aa) was introduced, that land could be acquired for
      a building or work which would not subserve the public purpose
      of the company .... Further, acquisition is for the construction
      of some building or work for a company and the nature of that
      company is that it is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself
      in any industry or work which is for a public purpose. When
      therefore the building or work is for such a company it seems to
      us that it is reasonable to hold that the nature of the building or
      work to be constructed takes colour from the nature of the
      company for which it is to be constructed. We are therefore
G     of opinion that the literal and mechanical construction for which
      the petitioner contends is neither the only nor the true construc-
      tion of cl. (aa) and that when cl. (aa) provides for acquisition of
      land needed for construction of some building or work it impli-
      citly intends that the building or work which is to be constructed
      must be such as to subserve the public purpose of the industry
H     or work in which the company is engaged or is about to be engaged.
      In short, the words "building or work" used in cl. (aa) take their
      colour from the adjectival clause which governs the company
       WEST .BENGAL v.     s. N. BHATTACHARYA (Fazal Ali, !.)              791


      for which the building or work is being constructed .... It is only             A
      in these cases where the company is engaged in an industry
      or work of that kind and where the building or work is also
       constructed for a purpose of that kind, which is a public purpose,
       that acquisition can be made under cl. (aa). As we read the
       clause we are of opinion that the public purpose of the company
•      for which acquisition is to be made cannot be divorced from                    B
       the purpose of the building or work and it is not open for such
        a company to acquire land under cl. (aa) for a building or work
        which will not subserve the public purpose of the company."
                                                             .(Emphasis ours)

            The effect of the observations made above leads to the irresistible       c
    .conclusion that the words 'public purpose' are not to be interpreted
     in a restricted sense but take colour from the nature of the industry
     itself, the articles that it manufactures and the benefit to the people
     that it subserves. This Court clearly indicated that the land should
      be acquired for building or work which would serve the public purpose           D
      of the company and not public purpose as it is generally understood.
      In the instant case, we have also set out the nature of the products of
      the company and have stressed the fact that the articles produced by
      the company are used for the benefit of the people and as it saves lot
      of foreign exchange, it is unmistakably for the general good of the
      country particularly from the economic point of view. In these cir-                 E
      cumstances, it cannot be said that the object of the company in extend-
      ing its operations by enlarging the area of its production was not for
       the public purpose of the company. Taking an overall picture of the
       nature of the products of the company, its various activities, the general
       public gpod that it seeks to achieve and the great benefit that the people
       derive, it cannot be said that the acquisition, in the present case, was           F
        not for a public purpose. According to the test laid down by this Court
        it is sufficient if it is shown that the building sought to be built or the
        work undertaken subserves the public purpose of the company which
        is completely fulfilled in this case. The High Court seems'to have been
        impressed by the argument advanced before it that the land acqui-
         sition proceedings in the instant case are hit by s. 44B of the Act.             G
         The High Court, however, has failed to consider that s. 44B is purely
        prospective in character and has absolutely no application to acqui-
         sition proceedings taken before July 20, 1962, the date when the amend-
         ment was enacted.

            The High Court also seems to have accepted the argument of the                H
      first respondent that s. 40(aa) violates Art. 14 of the Constitution
      inasmuch as it permits acquisition of laud for a company but


                                                                     •
    792                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [1980] 3 S.C.R.
                                                                                      I
    not for an individual or a private company though these persons may
    also be engaged in an industry which was for a public purpose. This         J.
    argument was repelled by this Court and it was held that s. 40(aa)          r--
    was not violative of Art. 14. In this connection, this Court observed
    as follows :-
         "Therefore a distinction in the matter of acquisition of
B      land between public companies and Government companies
       on the one hand and private individuals and private companies
       on the other is in our opinion justified, considering the object
       behind cl. (aa) as introduced into the Act. The contention under
       this head must therefore also fail."
C       Some of the High Courts also have takeu a similar view which has
    found favour with!us in view of the second Arora case, referred to above.
    In the case of P. Girdharan Prasad Missir and Anr. v. State of Bihar
    & Anr. (1) a Division Bench of the Patna High Court while dealing with
    this question observed as follows :-
D         "Thirdly, it was urged that the acquisition was not for a
       public purpose but merely for the purpose of helping a person
       (here the company) to make profits. This argument, however,
       is no longer available. It is well knewn that sugar industry is
       one of the importam industries of India engaged in the production
       of an essential commodity, and the fostering of the growth of that
E      industry is undoubtedly for a public purpose. A company
       engaged in the manufacture of sugar would, therefore, come
       within the scope of clause (a) of sub-section (!) of section 40
       of the Act."

        A Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Chhotubhai Babar-
    bhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and Anr. (2) while construing the second
    Arora case referred to above clearly held that s. 40(aa) contemplated
    that the building or work which the company intended to construct
    was to subserve the public purpose of the industry or work for which
    it was being constructed. In that case also, the company concerned
    was manufacturing caustic soda, dyes, chemicals, colours and drugs
G   (caustic soda is one of the products of the company in the instant case
    also). Dwelling on the importance of the public purpose of the industry
    concerned in that case, Shela!, C. J., observed as follows:-
          "Taking all these factors into consideration, it is not possible
       to deny that the industry in which the second;respondent company
H      is already engaged and is about to be engaged in, and for the
       (I) A.I. R. 1968 Patna 77.
       (2) I. L. R. Gujarat 1964, 472.



                 •
              WEST BENGAL v. s. N. BHATTACHARYA (Fazal Ali, J.)               793


            buildings or works for which the lands .in question are being·~~          A
            acquired is such that it will promote public purpose and will be in
            the interest of the public."
             We find ourselves in complete agreemenf with the aforesaid obser-
          vations of the learned Chief Justice.
                                                                                      8
•            Finally, even in the second Arora case, it would appear that the
          company in question was engaged in the production of textile machi-
          nery and its parts which were for the use of the general public. This
•         was held by this Court to be a definite public purpose behind the
          acquisition. In this connection, this Court observed as follows :-
                "We are concerned here with acquisition for a public purpose,         c
             which is undisputed. This is not a case of a house of one person
             being requisitioned for another; this is a case of constructing
             some work which will be useful to the public and will subserve
             the public purpose of the production of textile machinery and
             its parts for the use of the general public. In the circumstances
             we are of opinion that there being a definite public purpose behind          0
             the acquisition in the present case, the acquisition would be justi-
             fied under the Act irrespective of the intention of the previous
              owner of the land to use it for son1e other public purpose."
              The industrial venture in which respondent No. 2 was engaged
          was undoubtedly of much greater use than a company producing tex-           E
          tile machinery because apart from being useful to the people at large
          and producing chemicals it has also resulted in saving lot of foreign
          exchange and thus improving the economy of our country so as to be
          an efficient instrument of economic benefit. We are satisfied that
          all the conditions of s. 7 of the Amending Act as also that of s. 40(aa)
          have been fulfilled in the instant case and the High Court was wrong        F
    -~-   in law in quashing the said proceedings. The appeal is accordingly
    •     allowed, the judgment of the High Court is quashed and the Award
          of the Collector as also the proceedings before the Award are restored.
          In the circumstances of the case, the appellant will be entitled to costs
          in this Court against respondent No. 1.
                                                                                      G

           S. R.                                                   Appeal allowed.




          l2-463SC!.80