Supreme Court of India
STATE OF UTTARANCHALversusBALWANT SINGH CHAUFAL & OTHERS
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 47
- Decided
- 18 January 2010
- Disposal
- Hearing Adjourned
- Bench
- DALVEER BHANDARI
Holding
An Advocate General may be appointed after attaining the age of 62, and the writ petition challenging such an appointment is an abuse of process and must be dismissed with costs.
Summary
The State of Uttarakhand appealed against a High Court order that had entertained a public‑interest writ challenging the appointment of L.P. Nathani as Advocate General on the ground that he was over 62 years old. The Supreme Court examined whether Article 165 in conjunction with Article 217 of the Constitution imposes an age ceiling for the Advocate General, and held that the position is governed by the specific provision in Article 165(3) and may be filled by a person who has attained the age of 62, just as the Attorney General may be appointed after 65. Since this rule has been settled for over half a century, the Court found the petition to be an abuse of the public‑interest litigation process, quashed the writ, imposed exemplary costs on the petitioners and issued comprehensive guidelines to curb frivolous PILs. The State’s appeal was allowed and the High Court order set aside.
Issues considered
- The constitutionality of an age limit of 62 years for appointment of the Advocate General under Articles 165 and 217
- Whether the writ petition filed as a public‑interest litigation is maintainable when the legal question is already settled (res integra)
- Whether exemplary costs can be imposed for filing a frivolous PIL
- What procedural safeguards should be introduced to prevent abuse of PIL
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 165, s. Article 217, s. Article 226
Subjects
Advocate GeneralPublic Interest LitigationAbuse of ProcessAge LimitArticle 165Article 217Exemplary CostsJudicial GuidelinesStandingRes Integra
Judgment
[2010] 1 S.C.R. 678
A STATE OF UTIARANCHAL
v.
BALWANT SINGH CHAUFAL & OTHERS
(Civil Appeal Nos.1134-1135 of 2002)
JANUARY 18, 2010
B
[DALVEER BHANDARI AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM
SHARMA, JJ.]
Constitution of India, 1950:
c
Article 165, 217 and 226 - Advocate General for the
State - Eligibility - Age - HELD: It is fully settled that the
Advocate General for the State can be appointed after he/she
attains the age of 62 years - Similarly, the Attorney General
0 for India can be appointed after he/she attains the age of 65
years - Public Interest Litigation.
Public Interest Litigation:
Appointment of Advocate General for the State -
E Challenged by way of writ petition before High Court on the
ground that incumbent before his appointment to the post had
crossed 62 years of age - HELD: The issue having been
settled half a century ago by a judgment of the constitution
Bench of the Supreme Court and the position having been
F reiterated in several decisions of High Courts and Supreme
Court thereafter, filing of writ petition by practicing advocate
on an issue which is no longer res integra, is a clear abuse
of process of the Court for extraneous considerations - This
tendency has to be curbed effectively - Exemplary cost .
G imposed on writ petitioners - Significance and evolution of
public interest litigation - Explained - In order to preserve
purity and sanctity of PIL, guidelines laid down - Constitution
of India, 1950 -Article 165, 217 and 226 - Practice and
Procedure.
H 678
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 679
CHAUFAL & ORS.
Precedent: A
When an issue is no longer res integra, fifing of
indiscriminate petitions raising the controversy repeatedly
creates unnecessary strain on judicial system and leads to
inordinate delay in disposal of genuine and bona fide cases B
- It is the bounden duty of Courts to ensure that controversy
once settled by an authoritative pronouncement should not
be reopened unless there are extra-ordinary reasons for doing
so - Though a petitioner can ask the Court to review its own
judgment, but that should be in a bona fide presentation with
listing of all relevant cases in a chronological order and a brief C
description of what the judicial opinion has been,- and why
there should be re-consideration of the existing law.
'Words and Phrases:
D
Expression 'public interest litigation' - Defined.
A writ petition was filed as public interest litigation by
the respondents in the High Court challenging the
appointment of the Advoca~ General for the State on the
ground that the incumbent ·flad crossed the age of 62 E
years before his appointmentto the post and, therefore,
he was not eligible to hold the post. The High Court
directed the State Government to take decision on the
issue within the time stipulated i'n the order. Aggrieved,
the State Government filed the app~als. F
Giving directions to High Courts and adjourning the
appeals for compliance thereof, the Court
HELD: 1.1. In view of the clear enunciation of law in
various judgments, the controversy has been fully settled G
that the Advocate General for the State can be appointed
after he/she attains the age of 62 years. Similarly, the
Attorney General for India can be appointed after he/she
attains the age of 65 years. In a number of other cases
regarding the appointment of other authorities, courts H
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A have consistently taken the similar view. [Para 15) (706-
H; 707-A-B]
Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. Sonepat v. Their Workmen
1962 Supp. (3) SCR 89; Binay Kant Mani Tripathi v. Union
B of India & Others (1993) 4 SCC 49, relied on.
G.D. Karkare v. T.L. Shevde & Others AIR 1952 Nagpur
330, Ghanshyam Chandra Mathur v. The State of Rajasthan
& Others 1979 Weekly Law Notes 773; Dr. Chandra Bhan
Singh v. State of Rajasthan & Others AIR 1983 Raj. 149;
C Manendra Nath Rai & Another v. Virendra Bhatia & Others
AIR 2004 All. 133; Prem Chandra Sharma & Others v. Milan
Banerji & Others 2005 (3) ESC 2001 and Baishnab Patnaik
& Others v. The State AIR 1952 Orissa 60 and Gurpal Singh
v. State of Punjab & Others (2005) 5 SCC 136, referred to.
D
1.2. When the controversy is no longer res integra,
the filing of indiscriminate petitions raising the
controversy repeatedly, creates unnecessary straln on
the judicial system and consequently leads to inordinate
E delay in disposal of genuine and bona fide cases. [Para
9 and 24] [709-G-H; 704-E]
1.3. In the instant case, one of the petitioners before
the High Court was a local practicing lawyer. The State
of Uttrakhand was a part of the State of U.P. a few years
F ago. In the State of U.P., a large number of Advocate
Generals appointed were beyond 62 years of age at the
time of their appointment. The petitioner, ought to have
bestowed some care before filing the writ petition in
public interest under Article 226 of the Constitution.
G Similarly, it is the bounden duty of the court to ensure that
the controversy once settled by an authoritative judgment
should not be reopened unless there are extraordinary
reasons for doing so. [Para 20, 21 and 23) [708-C-E; 709-
E-F]
H
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 681
CHAUFAL & ORS.
2.1. Public interest litigation has been defined by this A
Court* as a cooperative or collaborative effort by the
petitioner, the State or public authority and the judiciary
to secure observance of constitutional or basic human
rights, benefits and privileges upon poor, downtrodden
and vulnerable sections of the society. [Para 30) [711-D- B
E]
*People's Union for Democratic Rights & Others v. Union
of India & Others (1982) 3 sec 235, relied on.
Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edition); Advanced Law c
Lexicon; The Council for Public Interest Law, report of Public
Interest Law, USA, 1976, referred to.
2.2. Public interest litigation is an extremely important
jurisdiction exercised by the Supreme Court and the o
High Courts. It is the product of realization of the
constitutional obligation of the court. The Courts in a
number of cases have given important directions and
passed orders which have brought positive changes in
the country. Public interest litigation is upshot and E
product of this court's deep and intense urge to fulfill its
bounden duty and constitutional obligation. The Courts'
directions have immensely benefited marginalized
sections of the society in a number of cases. It has also
helped in protection and preservation of ecology, F
environment, forests, marine life, wildlife etc. etc. The
court's directions to some extent have helped in
maintaining probity and transparency in the public life.
[Para 31 and 33] [711-E-F; 712-C-E]
2.3. This court while exercising its jurisdiction of G
judicial review realized that a very large section of the
society because of extreme poverty, ignorance,
discrimination and illiteracy had been denied justice for
time immemorial and in fact they have no access to
justice. Pre-dominantly, to provide access to justice to the H
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A poor, deprived, vulnerable, discriminated and
marginalized sections of the society, this court has
initiated, encouraged and propelled the public interest
litigation. [Para 34) [712-C-E]
Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) v.
8
Union of India & Others AIR 1981 SC 298; Bandhua Mukti
Morcha v. Union of India & Others AIR 1984 SC 802, referred
to.
2.4. Public interest litigation is not in the nature of
C adversary litigation but it is a challenge and an
opportunity to the government and its officers to make
basic human rights meaningful to the deprived and
vulnerable sections of the community and to assure them
social and economic justice which is the signature tune
D of our Constitution. The Government and its officers must
welcome public interest litigation because it would
provide them an occasion to examine whether the poor
and the down-trodden are getting their social and
economic entitlements or whether they are continuing to
E remain victims of deception and exploitation at the hands
of strong and powerful sections of the community and
whether social and economic justice has become a
meaningful reality for them or it has remained merely a
teasing illusion and a promise of unreattt,y, so that in case
F the complaint in the public interest litigation is found to
be true, they can in discharge of their constitutional
obligation root out exploitation and injustice and ensure
to the weaker sections their rights and entitlements. [Para
39] [713-H; 714-C-E]
G Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union (Regd., Sindri &
Others v. Union of India & Others AIR 1981 SC 844;
Ramsharan Autyanuprasi & Another v. Union of India &
Others AIR 1989 SC 549, referred to.
H
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 683
CHAUFAL & ORS.
EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION A
3.1. The development of public interest litigation has
been extremely significant development in the history of
the Indian jurisprudence and it can be broadly divided in
three phases. The decisions of the Supreme Court in the
8
first phase in the 1970's loosened the strict locus standi
requiremehts to permit filing of petitions on behalf of
marginalized and deprived sections of the society by
public spirited individuals, institutions and/or bodies.
Most of the public interest litigation cases which were
entertained by the courts are pertaining to enforcement C
of fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution,
of marginalized and deprived sections of the society. The
Supreme Court broadened the traditional rule of standing
and the definition of "person aggrieved". [Para 43 and 45]
[715-D-H; 716-A] D
M. C. Mehta & Another v. Union of India & Others AIR
1987 SC 1086; Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar,
Haji Bashir Ahmed & Others (1976) 1 SCC 671 ; Bar Council
of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar & Others 1976 SCR 306; E
The Mumbai Kamgar Sabha, Bombay v. Abdulbhai
Faizu//abhai & Others AIR 1976 SC 1455; Sunil Batra v. Delhi
Administration & Others AIR 1978 SC 1675; Hussainara
Khatoon & Others v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna
AIR 1979 SC 1369; Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi F
Administration AIR 1980 SC 1535; Municipal Council, Rat/am
v. Vardhichand & Others AIR 1980 SC 1622; S.P. Gupta v.
President of India & Others AIR 1982 SC 149; Anil Yadav &
Others v. State of Bihar and Bachcho Lal Das, Superintendent,
Central Jail, Bhagalpur, Bihar (1982) 2 SCC 195; Munna & G
Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, (1982) 1 SCC 545;
Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1983 SC 378; Dr.
Upendra Baxi(/) v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another 1983 (2)
SCC 308 ; Veena Sethi (Mrs.) v. State of Bihar & Others AIR
1983 SC 339; Labourers Working on Sala/ Hydro Project v.
State of Jammu & Kashmir & Others AIR 1984 SC 177; Shri H
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A Sechidanand Pandey & Another v. The State of West Bengal
& Others (1987) 2 SCC 295; B. R. Kapoor & Anotherv. Union
of India & Others AIR 1990 SC 752 ; Smt. Nilabati Behera
alias Laltfa Behera v. State of Orissa & Others AIR 1993 SC
1960; Punjab and Haryana High Court Bar Association,
B Chandigarh through its Secretary v. State of Punjab & Others
(1994) 1 SCC 616; Navkiran Singh & Others v. State of
Punjab through Chief Secretary & Another (1995) 4 SCC 591;
Delhi Domestic Working Women's Forum v. Union of India
& Others (1995) 1 SCC 14; Citizens for Democracy v. State
C of Assam & Others (1995) 3 SCC 743; Paramjit Kaur (Mrs.)
v. State of Punjab & Others (1996) 7 SCC 20; M. C. Mehta
v. State of Tamil Nadu & Others (1996) 6 SCC 756; D. K.
Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) 1 SCC 416; Vishaka &
Others v. State of Rajasthan & Others (1997) 6 SCC 241;
D Prajwala v. Union of India & Others (2009) 4 SCC 798;
Avinash Mehrotra v. Union of India & Others (2009) 6 SCC
398, referred to.
3.2. The second phase of public interest litigation
started sometime in the 1980's and it related to the courts'
E innovation and creativity, where directions were given to
protect ecology and environment, forests, marine life,
wild life, mountains, rivers and historical monuments etc.
with special attention to the problem of air pollution,
water pollution, environmental degradation. tpara 45 and
F 81) [729-F-G; 716-D]
M.C. Mehta & Another v. Union of India & Others AIR
1987 SC 1086; Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra,
Dehradun & Others v. State of U.P. & Others AIR 1985 SC
652; Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti v. State
G of U.P. & Others AIR 1990 SC 2060; Subhash Kumar v. State
of Bihar & Others AIR 1991 SC 420; M.C. Mehta v. Union of
India & Others (1988) 1 SCC 471; Ve/lore Citizens Welfare
Forum v. Union of'lndia & Others AIR 1996 SC 2715; M.C.
Mehta v. Union of India & Others AIR 1988 SC 1037; M.C.
H Mehta v. Union of India & Others AIR 1997 SC 734; A. P.
STATE OF UTIARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 685
CHAUFAL & ORS.
Pollution Control Board v. Prof M. V. Nayadu (Retd.) & Others A
(1999) 2 SCC 718; Essar Oil Ltd. v. Halar Utkarsh Samiti &
Others AIR 2004 SC 1834, Karnataka Industrial Areas
Development Board v. Sri C. Kenchappa & Others AIR 2006
SC 2038; MC. Mehta v. Kamal Nath & Others (2000) 6 SCC
213; Managing Director, A.P.S.R. T.C. v. S. P. Satyanarayana B
AIR 1998 SC 2962; Re. Noise Pollution AIR 2005 SC 3136;
Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India &
Others (1996) 5 SCC 281; and S. Jagannath v. Union of India
& Others (1997) 2 SCC 87, referred to.
3.3. In the third phase in the 1990' s, the Supreme C
Court expanded the ambit and scope of public interest
litigation further, and passed a number of judgments,
orders or directions to unearth corruption and maintain
probity, transparency, integrity and morality in the
governance of the State. The probity in governance is a D
sine qua non for an efficient system of administration and
for the development of the country and an important
requirement for ensuring probity in governance is the
absence of corruption. The High Courts also under
Article 226 followed the Supreme Court. (Para 106) (739- E
E-G]
Vineet Narain & Others v. Union of India & Another AIR
1998 SC 889; Rajiv Ranjan Singh 'La/an' & Another v. Union
of India & Others (2006) 6 SCC 613.; M.C. Mehta v. Union F
of India & Others (2007) 1 SCC 110; M.C. Mehta v. Union of
India & Others (2007) 12 SCALE 91; Centre for Public
Interest Litigation v. Union of India & Another AIR 2003 SC
3277; Pareena Swarup v. Union of India (2008) 13 SCALE
84; L. Chandrakumar v. Union of India & Others (1997) 3 SCC G
261, referred to.
3.4. The Indian courts may have taken some
inspiration from the group or class interest litigation of
the United States of America and other countries but the
shape of the public interest litigation as we see now is H
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A predominantly indigenously developed jurisprudence.
The public interest litigation as developed in various
facets and various branches is unparalleled. The Indian
Courts by its judicial craftsmanship, creativity and urge
to provide access to justice to the deprived, discriminated
B and otherwise vulnerable sections of society have
touched almost every aspect of human life while dealing
with cases filed in the label of the public interest litigation.
The credibility of the superior courts of India has been
tremendously enhanced because of some vital and
C important directions given by the courts. The courts'
contribution in helping the poorer sections of the society
by giving new definition to life and liberty and to protect
ecology, environment and forests are extremely
significant. [Para 159 and 160] [754-B-E]
D Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72
: (1998) 152 ALR 83; Oliver Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka 347 U.S. 483, 489-493 (1954); Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations v. William B. Camp 397
U.S. 150 (1970); Olive B. Barrows v. Leola Jackson 346 U.S.
E 249 (1953), 73 S.Ct. 1031; United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) 412
US 669 (1973); Paul J. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company 409 U.S. 205 (1972) ; Thomas E.
Singleton v. George J. L. Wulff 428 U.S. 106 (1976); Caplin
F v. Drysdale 491 U.S. 617, 623-24 n. 3 (1989); Robett Watth
v. Ira Seldin 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975); James B. Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S.
333, 343 (1977); Re. Reed, Bowen & Co. (1887) 19 QBD 174;
Attorney-General of the Gambia v. Pierre Sarr N'Jie (1961)
G AC 617; Regina v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis,
Ex patte Blackburn [1968] 2 W.L.R. 893 ("Blackburn I");
Blackburn v. Attorney-General [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1037); Regina
v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Ex parte
Blackburn [1973] Q.B. 241; Regina v. Greater London
H Council ex parte. Blackbum [1976] 1 W.L.R. 550; Attorney
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 687
CHAUFAL & ORS.
General Ex rel McWhirter v. Independent Broadcasting A
Authority, (1973) Q.B. 629; Gouriet v. Union of Post Office
Workers [1978] A.C. 435; Inland Revenue Commissioners v.
National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses
Ltd. [1982) A.C. 617; Regina v. Secretary of State for the
Environment, Ex parte Rose Theatre Trust Co. (1990) 1 Q.B. B
504; Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal, 1998
(1) SA 765 (CC); Ferreira v. Levin NO & Others 1996 (1) SA
984 (CC); S v. Twala (South African Human Rights
Commission Intervening), 2000 (1) SA 879; Xinwa & Others
v. Volkswagen of South Africa (PTY) Ltd. 2003 (4) SA 390, c
referred to.
3.5. The development of public interest litigation in
India has had an impact on the judicial systems of
neighbouring countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka,
Nepal and Pakistan and other countries. [Para 146) [750- D
B-C]
General Secretary, West Pakistan Salt Miners Labour
Union (CBA) Khewra, Jhelum v. The Director, Industries and
Mneral Development, Punjab, Lahore 1994 SCMR 2061 E
(Supreme Court of Pakistan) ; Ms. Shehla Zia v. WAPDA
PLO 1994 Supreme Court 693, referr-ed to.
ABUSE OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION:
4.1. Unfortunately, of late, it has been noticed that F
such an important jurisdiction which has been carefully
carved out, created and nurtured with great care and
caution by the courts, is being blatantly abused by filing
some petitions with oblique motives. Time has come
when genuine and bona fide public interest litigation G
must be encouraged whereas frivolous public interest
litigation should be discouraged. In considered opinion
of the Court this important jurisdiction has to be
protected and preserved in the larger interest of the
people of this country but for this purpose, effective H
688 SOPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 1 S.C.R.
A steps have to be taken to prevent and cure its abuse on
the basis of monetary and non-monetary directions by
the courts. [Para 161 and 162] [754-F-H]
BALCO Employees· Union (Regd.) v. Union -0f India &
Others AIR 2002 SC 350; Neetu v. State of Pubjab & Others
8
AIR 2007 SC 758; S.P. Anand v. HD. Deve Gowda & Others
AIR 1997 SC 272; Sanjeev Bhatnagar v. Union of India &
Others AIR 2005 SC 2841; Charan Lal Sahu & Others v.
Giani Zail Singh & Another AIR 1984 SC 309; J. Jayalalitha
v. Government of Tamil Nadu & Others (1999) 1 SCC 53;
C Holicow Pictures Pvt. Ltd. v. Prem Chandra Mishra & Others
AIR 2008 SC 913, referred to.
Everywoman's Health Centre Society v. Bridges 54
B.C.L.R. (2nd Edn.) 294; Harris v. Marsh 679 F.Supp. 1204
D (E.D.N.C. 1987); Frye v. Pena 199 F.3d 1332 (Table), 1999
WL 974170, referred to.
4.2. The court should be careful that its jurisdiction
is not abused by a person or a body of persons to further
E his or their personal causes or to satisfy his or their
personal grudge or grudges. The stream of justice should
not be allowed to be polluted by unscrupulous litigants.
[Para 186] [763-A-B]
Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra &
F Others (2005) 1 SCC 590, referred to.
4.3. In the instant case, a practicing lawyer has made
a serious attempt to demean an important constitutional
office. The petitioner ought to have known that the
G controversy which he has been raising in the petition
stands concluded half a century ago by a Constitution
Bench of this Court and the controversy involved in this
case is no longer res integra. A degree of precision and
purity in presentation is a sine qua non for a petition filed
H by a member of the Bar under the label of public interest
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT S1rJGH 689
CHAUFAL & ORS.
litigation. It is expected from a member of the Bar to at A
least carry out the basic research whether the point
raised by him is res integra or not. The lawyer who files
such a petition cannot plead ignorance. The petitioner
ought to have refrained from filing such a frivolous
petition. This case is a clear case of the abuse of the B
process of the court in the name of public interest
litigation. This tendency has to be curbed effectively.
[Para 189 and 190] [763-C-E-H; 764-A-B]
4.4. It is made it clear that the petitioner can ask the C
court to review its own judgment because of flaws and
lacunae, but that should have been a bona fide
presentation with listing of all relevant cases in a
chronological order and a brief description of what
judicial opinion has been and cogent and clear request
why there should be re-consideration of the existing law. D
Unfortunately, the petitioner has not done this exercise.
[Para 191] [764-C-E]
4.5. It may be pertinent to mention that, despite the
service of notice, the respondents, who had initially filed E
the writ petition before the High Court challenging the
appointment of the Advocate General, did not appear
before this Court. This clearly demonstrates the non-
seriousness and non-commitment of the respondents in
filing the petition. [Para 4] [697-C] F
4.6. On consideration of the totality of the facts and
circumstan~es of the case, the proceedings of the writ
petition filed in the High Court are quashed. The
respondents-writ petitioners are directed to pay costs of
Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) in the name of Registrar G
General of the High Court. Chief Justice of the High Court
would create a fund in the name of Uttarakhand High
Court Lawyers Welfare Fund, if not already. in existence.
It is abundantly made clear that 1the Court is not
discouraging the public interest litigation in any manner, H
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 O] 1 S.C.R.
A what the Court is trying to curb is its misuse and abuse.
[Para 192 to 194] [764-F-H; 765-A-C]
5. In order to preserve the purity and sanctity of the
PIL, it has become imperative to issue the following
8 directions:-
(1 j The courts must encourage genuine and bona
fide PIL and effectively discourage and curb
the PIL filed for extraneous considerations.
c (2) Instead of every individual judge devising his
own procedure for dealing with the public
Interest litigation, it would be appropriate for
each High Court to properly formulate rules for
encouraging the genuine PIL and
D discouraging the PIL filed with oblique
motives. Consequently, the High Courts who
have not yet framed the rules, should frame the
rules within three months. The Registrar
General of each High Court is directed to
ensure that a copy of the Rules prepared by
E
the High Court is sent to the Secretary General
of this Court immediately thereafter.
(3) The courts should prima facie verify the
credentials of the petitioner before entertaining
F a P.1.L.
(4) The court should be prima facie satisfied
regarding the correctness of the contents of
the pP-tition before entertaining a PIL.
G (5) The court should be fully satisfied that
substantial public interest is involved before
entertaining the petition.
(6) The court should ensure that the petition
H which involves larger public interest, gravity
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGf'I 691
CHAUFAL & ORS.
and urgency must be given priority over other A
petitions.
(7) The courts before entertaining the PIL should
ensure that the PIL is aimed at redressal of
genuine public harm or public injury. The
B
court should also ensure that there is no
personal gain, private motive or oblique
motive behind filing the public Interest
litigation.
(8) The court should also ensure that the petitions c
filed by busybodies for extraneous and ulterior
motives must be discouraged by Imposing
exemplary costs or by adopting similar novel
methods to curb friv~lous petitions and the
petitions filed for extraneous considerations. D
[Para 198] [765-G-H; 766-A-H; 767-A·B]
Case Law Reference:
1962 Supp. (3) SCR 89 relied on para 8
E
AIR 1952 Nagpur 330 referred to para 8
1979 Weekly Law
Notes 773 referred to para 11
AIR 1983 Raj. 149 referred to para 12 F
AIR 2004 All. 133 referred to para 13
2005 (3) ESC 2001 referred to para 14
(1993) 4 sec 49 relied on para 16
G
AIR 1952 Orissa 60 referred to para 17
(2oos) 5 sec 136 . referred to para 18
(1982) 3 sec 235 relied on para 30
H
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A AIR 1981 SC 298 referred to para 36
AIR 1984 SC 802 referred to para 37
AIR 1981 SC 844 referred to para 40
AIR 1989 SC 549 referred to para 41
B
AIR 1987 SC 1086 referred to µara 42
(1976) 1 sec 671 referred to para 47
1976 SCR 306 referred to para 48
c AIR 1976 SC 1455 referred to para 50
AIR 1978 SC 1675 referred to para 51
AIR 1979 SC 1369 referred to para 52
D AIR 1980 SC 1535 referred to para 53
AIR 1980 SC 1622 referred to para 54
AIR 1982 SC 149 referred to para 57
E (1982) 2 sec 195 referred to para 59
(1982) 1 sec 545 referred to para 60
AIR 1983 SC 378 referred to para 62
1983 (2) sec 308 referred to para 63
F
AIR 1983 SC 339 referred to para 64
AIR 1984 SC 177 referred to para 65
(1987) 2 sec 295 referred to para 66
G AIR 1990 SC 752 referred to para 67
AIR 1993 SC 1960 referred to para 68
(1994) 1 sec 616 referred to para 69
H (1995) 4 sec 591 referred to para 70
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 693
CHAUFAL & ORS.
(1995) 1 sec 14 referred to para 71 A
(1995) 3 sec 743 referred to para 72
(1996) 1 sec 20 referred to para 73
(1996) 6 sec 756 referred to para 74 B
(1997) 1 sec 416 referred to para 75
(1997) 6 sec 241 referred to para 76
(2009) 4 sec 798 referred to para 77
c
(2009) 6 sec 398 referred to para 78
AIR 1987 SC 1086 referred to para 86
AIR 1985 SC 652 referred to para 87
AIR 1990 SC 2060 referred to para 88 D
AIR 1991 SC 420 referred to para 89
(1988) 1 sec 471 referred to para 90
AIR 1996 SC 2715 referred to para 91 E
AIR 1988 SC 1037 referred to para 92
AIR 1997 SC 734 referred to para 93
(1999) 2 sec 718 referred to para 94
F
AIR 2004 SC 1834 referred to para 96
AIR 2006 SC 2038 referred to para 97
(2000) 6 sec 213 referred to para 98
G
AIR 1998 SC 2962 referred to para 100
AIR 2005 SC 3136 referred to para 101
(1996) 5 sec 281 referred to para 102
(1997) 2 sec a1 referred to para 103 H
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A AIR 1998 SC 889 referred to para 107
(2006) & sec 613 referred to para 108
(2001) 1 sec 110 referred to para 109
(2007) 12 SCALE 91 referred to para 111
B
AIR 2003 SC 3277 referred to para 112
(2008) 13 SCALE 84 referred to para 115
(1997) 3 sec 261 referred to para 115
c
(1998) 193 CLR 72 :
(1998) 152 ALR 83 referred to para 119
347 U.S. 483, 489-493
(1954) referred to para 121
D 397 U.S. 150 (1970) referred to para 122
346 U.S. 249 (1953),
73 S.Ct. 1031 referred to para 123
412 us 669 (1973) referred to para 125
E
409 U.S. 205 (1972) referred to para 126
428 U.S. 106 (1976) referred to para 128
491 U.S. 617, 623-24
F n. 3 (1989) referred to para 128
422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975) referred to para 129
432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) referred to para 129
(1887) 19 QBD 174 referred to para 131
G
(1961) AC 617 referred to para 132
[1968] 2 W.L.R. 893
("Blackburn I referred to para 133
H [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1037 referred to para 135
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 695
CHAUFAL & ORS.
[1973] Q.B. 241 referred to para 136 A
(1976] 1 W.L.R. 550 referred to para 137
(1973) Q.B. 629 referred to para 138
(1978] A.C. 435 referred to para 138
B
[1982] A.C. 617 referred to para 139
(1990) 1 Q.B. 504 referred to para 140
1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) referred to para 141
c
1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) referred to para 143
2000 (1) SA 879 referred to para 144
2003 (4) SA 390 referred to para 145
1994 SCMR 2061 D
(Supreme Court
of Pakistan) referred to para 150
PLO 1994 Supreme
Court 693 referred to para 164 E
AIR 2002 SC 350 referred to para 163
AIR 2007 SC 758 referred to para 166
AIR 1997 SC 272 referred to para 167
F
AIR 2005 SC 2841 referred to para 168
c2oos) 1 sec 590 referred to para 169
AIR 1984 SC 309 referred to para 170
(1999) 1 sec 53 referred to para 171 G
AIR 2008 SC 913 referred to para 176
54 B.C.L.R. (2nd Edn.) 294 referred to para 177
H
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A 679 F.Supp. 1204 (E.D.N.C.
1987) referred to para 178
199 F.3d 1332 (Table),
1999 WL 974170 referred to para 180
B (1992) 4 sec 305 relied on para 184
(2003) 1 sec 546 relied on para 185
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
1134-1135 of 2002.
c
From the Judgment & Order dated 12. 7.2001 & 1.8.2001
of the High Court of Uttaranchal at Nainital in Civil Misc. Writ
Petition No. 689 M/B of 2001.
Dinesh Dwivedi, S.S. Shamshery, Rachna Srivastava for
D the Appellant.
P.N. Gupta for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E DALVEER BHANDARI, J. 1. These appeals have been
filed by the State of Uttaranchal (now Uttarakhand) against the
orders dated 12. 7.2001 and 1.8.2001 passed by the Division
Bench of the High Court of Uttaranchal at Nainital in Civil
Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 689 (M/B) of 2001.
F
2. The appointment of L. P. Nathani was challenged before
the High Court in a Public Interest Litigation on the ground that
he could not hold the august Office of the Advocate General of
Uttarakhand in view of Article 165 read with Article 217 of the
G Constitution. According to the respondent, Mr. Nathani was
ineligible to be appointed as the Advocate General because
he had attained the age of 62 years much before he was
appointed as the Advocate General. The High Court entertained
the petition and directed the State Government to take decision
H
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 697
CHAUFAL & ORS. [OALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
on the issue raised within 15 days and apprise the same to the A
High Court.
3. The State of Uttaranchal preferred special leave
petitions before this Court on 6.8.2001. This Court vide order
dated 9.8.2001 stayed the operation of the impugned judgment 8
of the High Court. Thereafter on 11.2.2002, this Court granted
leave and directed that the stay already granted shall continue.
4. It may be pertinent to mention that, despite the service
of notice, the respondents who had initially filed the writ petition
before the High Court challenging the appointment of Nathani C
as the Advocate General did not appear before this Court. This
clearly demonstrates the non-seriousness and non-commitment
of the respondents in filing the petition.
5. Before we proceed to examine the controversy involved o
in this case, we deem it appropriate to set out Articles 165 and
217 of the Constitution dealing with the post of the Advocate
General and the qualifications for appointment to this post in
the Constitution. Article 165 which deals with the appointment
of the Advocate General for the States is reproduced as under: E
"165. The Advocate-General for the State.-(1) The
Governor of each State shall appoint a person who is
qualified to be appointed a Judge of a High Court to be
Advocate-General for the State.
F
(2) It shall be the duty of the Advocate-General to give
advice to the Government of the State upon such legal
matters, and to perform such other duties of a legal
character, as may from time to time be referred or
assigned to him by the Governor, and to discharge the G
functions conferred on him by or under this Constitution or
any other law for the time being in force.
(3) The Advocate-General shall hold office during the
pleasure of the Governor, and shall receive such
remuneration as the Governor may determine. H
698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 1 S.C.R.
A 6. Article 217 which deals with the appointment and the
conditions of the office of a Judge of a High Court is set out
as under:
217 - Appointment and conditions of the office of a Judge
of a High Court.- (1) Every Judge of a High Court shall
B
be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand
and seal after consultation with the Chief Justice of India,
the Governor of the State, and, in the case of appointment
of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice
of the High court, and shall hold office, in the case of an
c additional or acting Judge, as provided in article 224, and
in any other case, until he attains the age of sixty-two years:
Provided that-
D (a) a Judge may, by writing under his hand addressed to
the President, resign his office;
(b) a Judge may be removed from his office by the
President in the manner provided in clause (4) of article
124 for the removal of a Judge of the Supreme Court;
E
(c) the office of a Judge shall be vacated by his being
appointed by the President to be a Judge of the Supreme
Court or by his being transferred by the President to any
other High Court within the territory of India.
F
(2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a
Judge of a High Court unless he is a citizen of India and-
(a) has for at least ten years held a judicial office in the
territory of India; or
G
(b) has for at least ten years been an advocate of a High
Court or of two or more such courts in succession;
Explanation: For the purposes of this clause-
H
STATE OF UTIARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 699
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
(a) in computing the period during which a person has held A
judicial office in the territory of India, there shall be included
any period, after he has held any judicial office, during
which the person has been an advocate of a High Court
or has held the office of a member of a tribunal or any post,
under the Union or a State, requiring special knowledge B
of law;
(aa) in computing the period during which a person has
been an advocate of a High Court, there shall be included
any period during which the person has held judicial office C
or the office of a member of a tribunal or any post, under
the Union or a State, requiring special knowledge of law
after he became an advocate;
(b) in computing the period during which a person has held
judicial office in the territory of India or been an advocate D
of High Court, there shall be included any period before
the commencement of this Constitution during which he
has held judicial office in any area which was comprised
before the fifteenth day of August, 1947, within India as
defined by the Government of India Act, 1935, or has been E
an advocate of any High Court in any such area, as the
case may be.
(3) If any question arises as to the age of a Judge of a
High Court, the question shall be decided by the President
after consultation with the Chief Justice of India and the
F
decision of the President shall be final."
7. The Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned
judgment observed that the first clause of Article 165 insists
that the Governor shall appoint a person as the Advocate G
General who is qualified to be appointed as a Judge of a High
Court. The qualifications for the appointment of a Judge of a
High Court are prescribed in the second clause of Article 217.
It is true that the first clause of Article 217 says that a Judge of
a High Court "shall hold office until he attains the age of 60 H
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010) 1 S.C.R.
A years" (at the relevant time the age of retirement of a Judge of
the High Court was 60 years and now it is 62 years). The
Division Bench further held that the real question then was
whether this provision is to be construed as one prescribing a
qualification or as one prescribing the duration of the
s appointment of a Judge of a High Court. It was further held that
as the provision does not occur in the second clause, it can
only be construed as one prescribing the duration of the
appointment of a Judge of a High Court. The Court further
observed that the provisions about duration in the first clause
C of Article 217 cannot be made applicable to the Advocate
General because the Constitution contains a specific provision
about the duration of the appointment of the Advocate General
in the third clause of Article 165 which says that the Advocate
General shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor.
D This provision does not limit the duration of the appointment
by reference to any particular age, as in the case of a Judge,
it is not permissible to import into it the words "until he attains
the age of sixty years". The specific provision in the Constitution
must, therefore, be given effect to without any limitation. If a
person is appointed as an Advocate General, say at the age
E of fifty-five years, there is no warrant for holding that he must
cease to hold his office on his attaining sixty two years because
it is so stated about a Judge of a High court in the first clause
of Article 217. If that be a true position, as we hold it is, then
the appointment is not bad because the person is past sixty
F two years, so long as he has the qualifications prescribed in
the second clause of Article 217.
8. Shri Dinesh Dwivedi, the learned senior counsel
appearing for the State of Uttarakhand submitted that, over half
G a century ago, in G.D. Karkare v. T.L. Shevde & Others AIR
1952 Nagpur 330, this controversy has been settled by the
Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court and the said judgment
was approved by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case
of Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. Sonepat v. Their Workmen 1967
H Supp. (3) SCR 89. In Karkare's case (supra), it w~s observed
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 701
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
as follows: A
"25. It is obvious that all the provisions relating to a Judge
of a High Court cannot be made applicable to the
Advocate-General. The provisions about remuneration are
different for the two offices. A Judge of the High Court is B
governed by Art. 221. The Advocate-General is governed
by clause (3) of Art. 165 and receives such remuneration
as the Governor may determine.
26. What the first clause of Art. 165 insists is that the
Governor shall appoint a person who is qualified to be C
appointed a Judge of a High Court to be Advocate-
General for the State. The qualifications for the
appointment of a Judge of a High Court are prescribed in
the second clause of Art. 217. It is true that the first clause
of Art 217 says that a Judge of a High Court "shall hold D
office until he attains the age of 60 years". The real
question then is whether this provision is to be construed
as one prescribing a qualification or as one prescribing
the duration of the appointment of a Judge of a High Court.
As the provision does not occur in the second clause, it E
can only be construed as one prescribing the duration of
the appointment of a Judge of a High Court.
27. The provision about duration in the first clause of Art.
217 cannot be made applicable to the Advocate-General
because the Constitution contains a specific provision
F
about the duration of the appointment of the Advocate-
General in the third clause of Art. 165 which says that the
Advocate-General shall hold office during the pleasure of
the Governor. As this provision does not limit the duration
of the appointment by reference to any particular age, as G
in the case of a Judge, it is not permissible to import into
it the words "until he attains the age of sixty years". The
specific provision in the Constitution must therefore be
given effect to without any lir.f!ation. If a person is
appointed Advocate~General, say.at the age of fifty-five, H
' .
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A there is no warrant for holding that he must cease to hold
his office on this attaining sixty years because it is so stated
about a Judge of a High Court in the first clause of Art.
217. If that be the true position, as we hold it is, then the
appointment is not bad because the person is past sixty
B years, so long as he has the qualifications prescribed in
the second clause of Art. 217. It was not suggested that
the non-applicant does not possess the qualifications
prescribed in that clause.
28. The provision that every Judge of a High Court "shall
c hold office until he attains the age of sixty years" has two
aspects to it. While in one aspect it can be viewed as a
guarantee of tenure during good behaviour to a person
appointed as a Judge of a High Court until he attains the
age of sixty, in another aspect it can be viewed as a
D disability in that a Judge cannot hold his office as of right
after he attains the age of sixty years.
29. We say as of right because under Art. 224 a person
who has retired as a Judge of a High Court may be
E requested to sit and act as a Judge of a High court. The
attainment of the age of sixty by a person cannot therefore
be regarded as a disqualification for performing the
functions of a Judge. But the learned counsel for the
applicant tried to distinguish between the case of a person
F qualified to be appointed a Judge of a High Court under
Article 217 and the case of a person requested to sit and
act as a Judge under Article 224.
The distinction between the case of a person
qualified to be appointed a Judge of a High Court under
G Article 217 and the case of a person requested to sit and
act under Article 224 is not with respect to the qualifications
for performing the functions of a Judge, but with respect
to the matters provided by Article 221, 222, 223, etc. In
the language of the Constitution a Judge does not lose the
H qualifications prescribed in the second clause of Article
STATE OF UT.TARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 703
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
217 on the attainment of the age of sixty years. A person A
who attains that age cannot be appointed as a Judge not
because he is not qualified to be so appointed within the
meaning of the second clause of Article 217, but because
the first clause of that Article expressly provides that a
Judge shall hold office until he attains the age of sixty B
years.
(30) If the provision in the first clause of Article 217 viewed
as a guarantee of tenure of office until the age of sixty is
not available to the Advocate-General because he holds C
office during the pleasure of the Governor, we see no
compelling reason why the same provision construed as
a disability should be made applicable to him. We are,
therefore, of the view that the first clause of Article 217
cannot be read with the first clause of Article 165 so as to
disqualify a person from being appointed Advocate- D
General after the age of sixty years. We have no doubt on
the point. Even if the question be considered as not free
from doubt, as the applicant desires to construe the first
clause of Article 217 as a disabling provision against the
non-applicant, we cannot forget that provisions entailing E
disabilities have to be construed strictly: 'Parameshwaram
Pillai Bhaskara Pillai v. State', 1950-5 Dom LR (Trav) 382.
The canon of construction approved by their Lordships of
the Privy Council is that if there be any ambiguity as to the
meaning of a disabling provision, the construction which F
is in favour of the freedom of the individual should be given
effect to: 'David v. De'si/va', (1934) AC 106 at p. 114.
(31) There is no force in the contention that the non-
applicant could not have been appointed Advocate- G
General because he had retired as a Judge of the High
Court. The learned counsel referred us to Clause (4)(a) of
Article 22 of the Constitution and submitted that the
Constitution makes a distinction between a person who
has been a Judge and one who i" qualified to be appointed H
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A as a Judge of a High Court. The provision in our view only
makes an exhaustive enumeration of the classes of
persons who can constitute an Advisory Board. Such
persons must either be or must have been or must be
qualified to be appointed as Judges of a High Court. The
B provision has therefore no bearing on the question whether
the first clause of Article 165 has to be read with the first
clause of Article 217, which question we have already
answered in the negative. The case of the non-applicant
is unique. Article 220 is not applicable to him because he
c did not hold office as a Judge of the High Court after the
commencement of the Constitution. So the bar contained
in that Article also does not come in his way."
9. Despite the fact that the controversy has been fully
settled by a judgment of this Court, it has been raised from time
D to time in a number of writ petitions before the various High
Courts. We would reproduce some of the judgments to
demonstrate that after the controversy has been finally settled
by this Court, the filing of indiscriminate petitions with the same
relief creates unnecessary strain on the judicial system and
E consequently leads to inordinate delay in disposal of genuine
and bona fide cases. ·
10. The following cases would demonstrate that, in how
many High Courts, the similar controversy has been raised after
F the matter was finally settled by this Court:
11. In Ghanshyam Chandra Mathur v. The State of
Rajasthan & Others 1979 Weekly Law Notes 773, the
appointment of the Advocate General was once again
challenged. The court held that "... no age of superannuation has
G been mentioned in Article 165 of the Constitution of India. This
clearly means that the age of superannuation which applies to
a High Court Judge, does not apply to the office of the Advocate
General".
H 12. In Dr. Chandra Bhan Singh v. State of Rajasthan &
- STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 705
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
Others AIR 1983 Raj. 149, the question regarding the validity A
of the appointment of the Advocate General was challenged.
The Court in this case had held that the age of superannuation
of a High Court Judge did not apply to the post of the Advocate
General. The court noted that all provisions in the Constitution
for High Court Judges, s~ch as remuneration and tenure of B
office do not apply to the post of the Advocate General.
13. In Manendra Nath Rai & Another v. Virendra Bhatia
& Others AIR L004 All. 133, the appointment of the Advocate
General was yet again challenged. The Court held as under:
c
"The argument that the provision of Sub-claw~e (1) of
Article 217 of the Constitution should be followed in the
matter of appointment of Advocate General is wholly
misconceived. Article 217 of the Constitution deals with the
appointment and conditions of the office of a Judge of a D
High Court. The consultation with the Chief Justice of the
State in the matter of appointment of a Judge of the High
Court cannot be made a requirement in the matter of the
appointment of Advocate General. The appointment of
Advocate General is not governed by the aforesaid Article E
which falls in Chapter-V Part-6 of the Constitution whereas
Article 165, which deals with the appointment of Advocate
General for the State falls in Chapter II of Part 6. The
scheme of the Constitution for the appointment of Advocate
General as well as for appointment of a Judge of the ~igh F
Court is totally different."
14. In a Division Bench judgment dated 4.2.2005 of the
Allahabad High Court in Prem Chandra Sharma & Others v.
Milan Banerji & Others in writ petition No. 716 (M/B) of 2005
reported in 2005 (3) ESC 2001, the appointment of the Attorney G
General for India was challenged and a prayer was made to
issue a writ in the nature of quo warranto, because according
to the petitioner, the respondent Milan Ban.erji had already
attained the age of 65 years and he could not be appointed
as the Attorney General for India. In that case, the Division H
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A Bench relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of the
Nagpur High Court in G.D. Karkare·s case (supra). The Court
held as under:
"Having examined various provisions of the
Constitution, it is quite clear that the Constitution of India
B does not provide the retirement age of various
constitutional appointees. No outer age limit has been
provided for the appointment of the Attorney General,
Solicitor General and Advocate General in the State. In the
democratic system; prevailing in our country the Attorney
c General is appointed on the recommendation of the Prime
Minister by the President of India and traditionally, he
resigns along with the Prime Minister. Learned Counsel
for the petitioner could not show any law relating to the age
of retirement of Attorney General or embargo provided in
D Constitution on appointment of a person as Attorney
General, who has already attained the age of 65 years. We
are of the considered opinion that the letter and spirit of
the Constitution as far as appointment of the Attorney
General is concerned, looking to significance,
E responsibility and high status of the post, it lays down
certain requirements for a Member of Bar to be appointed
as Attorney General of India. It is in this backdrop that the
framers of the Constitution thought it necessary to
prescribe minimum requisite qualification by laying that a
F person who is qualified to be appointed as Judge of the
Hon'ble Court can be appointed as Attorney-General of
India. This situation, however, cannot lead us to the
conclusion by any stretch of imagination that the Attorney
General cannot hold his office after the age of 65 years.
As already indicated herein-above there are various
G
constitutional functionaries where no outer age limit is
provided to hold the office."
15. In view of the clear enunciation of law in the aforesaid
judgments, the controversy has been fully settled that the
H Advocate General for the State can be appointed after he/she
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 707
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
attains the age of 62 years. Similarly, the Attorney General for A
India can be appointed after he/she attains the age of 65 years.
In a number of other cases regarding the appointment of other
authorities, the Courts have consistently taken the similar view.
16. This Court in Binay Kant Mani Tripathi v. Union of B
India & Others (1993) 4 SCC 49 has re-affirmed this position.
The Court pointed out that the decision of appointing D.K.
Aggarwal to the position of the Vice-chairman of the Central
Administrative Tribunal could not be held to be illegal or wrong
on the ground that he was more than sixty two years old.
c
17. In Baishnab Patnaik & Others v. The State AIR 1952
Orissa 60, the appointment of a person to the Advisory Board
under the Preventive Detention Act was challenged on the
grounds that he was older than 60 years (the age of
superannuation for High Court judges at that time). The court D
pointed out:
"If the makers of the Constitution thought that the age limit
was one of the qualifications for appointment as a Judge
of a High Court they would not have specified it in Clause E
(1) of Article 217 but would have included it in Clause (2)
of the said Article."
18. In Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab & Others (2005) 5
SCC 136, the appointment of the appellant as Auction
Recorder was challenged. The Court held that the scope of F
entertaining a petition styled as a public interest litigation and
locus standi of the petitioner particularly in matters involving
service of an employee has been examined by this Court in
various cases. The Court observed that before entertaining the
petition, the Court must be satisfied about (a) the credentials G
of the applicant; (b) the prima facie correctness or nature of
information given by him; (c) the information being not vague
and indefinite. The information should show gravity and
seriousness involved. The court has to strike balance between
two conflicting interests; (i) nobody should be allowed to indulge H
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of
others; and (ii) avoidance of public mischief and to avoid
mischievous petitions seeking to assail. for oblique motives.
justifiable executive actions.
8 19. The aforementioned cases clearly give us the picture
how the judicial process has been abused from time to time
and after the controversy was finally settled by a Constitution
Bench of this Court, repeatedly the petitions were filed in the
various courts.
C 20. In the instant case, one of the petitioners before the
High Court is a practicing lawyer of the court. He has invoked
the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court in this matter. It
was expected from a Hon'ble member of the noble profession
not to invoke the jurisdiction of the court in a matter where the
D controversy itself is no longer res integra.
21. Similarly, it is the bounden duty of the court to ensure
that the controversy once settled by an authoritative judgment
should not be reopened unless there are extraordinary reasons
E for doing so.
22. In the instant case, the High Court entertained the
petition despite the fact that the controversy involved in the case
was no longer res integra. In reply to that writ petition, the Chief
Standing Counsel of Uttrakhand also filed a Miscellaneous
F Application before the High Court. The relevant portion of the
application reads as under:
"3. That the following Attorney Generals appointed under
Article 76 of the Constitution were appointed when they
G were appointed as Attorney General were beyond
prescribed age for appointment as Supreme Court of
India.
(I) Sri M. C. Setalvad
H (II) Sri C. K. Dapatary
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 709
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
(Ill) Shri Niren De A
(IV) Sri Lal Narain Singh
(V) Sri K. Parasaran
(VI) Sri Soli Sorabjee . B
4. That the appointment of present Attorney General (Mr.
Milon Banerjee) was challenged before the Delhi High
Court and the petitiOn was dismissed in limine. The
appointment of Mr. RP. Goel, Advocate General of U.P. c
who has passed the age of 62 at the time of appointment
was also dismissed.
5. That in the Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad Sri JV. K.S. Chaudhary, Sir Rishi Ram, Pt.
Kanhaiya Lal Mishra, Sri Shanti Swaroop Bhatnagar and D
several others were appointed as Advocate General after
crossing the age of 62 years. There were several Advocate
Generals in India who were appointed after 62 years."
23. The State of Uttrakhand was a part of the State of U.P. E
a few years ago. In the State of U.P., a large number of
Advocate Generals appointed were beyond 62 years of age
at the time of their appointment. The petitioner, a local
practicing lawyer, ought to have bestowed some care before
filing this writ petition in public interest under Article 226 of the F
Constitution.
24. The controversy raised by the petitioner in this case
was decided 58 years ago in the judgment of Karkare (supra}
which was approved by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme
Court way back in 1962. Unfortunately, the same controversy G
has been repeatedly raised from time to time in various High
Courts. When the controversy is no longer res-integra and the
same controversy is raised repeatedly, then it not only wastes
the precious time of the Court and prevent the Court from
deciding other deserving cases, but also has the immense H
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A potentiality of demeaning a very important constitutional office
and person who has been appointed to that office.
25. In our considered view, it is a clear case of the abuse
of process of court in the name of the Public Interest Litigation.
In order to curb this tendency effectively, it has now become
8
imperative to examine all connected issues of public interest
litigation by an authoritative judgment in the hope that in future
no such petition would be filed and/or entertained by the Court.
26. To settle the controversy, we deem it appropriate to
C deal with different definitions of the Public Interest Litigation in
various countries. We would also examine the evolution of the
public interest litigation.
DEFINITIONS OF PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
D 27. Public Interest Litigation has been defined in the
Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edition) as under:-
"Public Interest - Something in which the public, the
community at large, has some pecuniary interest, or some
E interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected.
It does not mean anything so narrow as mere curiosity, or
as the interests of the particular localities, which may be
affected by the matters in question. Interest shared by
citizens generally in affairs of local, state or national
F governmen t...."
28. Advanced Law Lexicon has defined 'Public lnteres1
Litigation' as under:-
"The expression 'PIL' means a legal action initiated in a
G Court of law for the enforcement of public interest or
general interest in which the public or a class of the
community has pecuniary interest or some interest by
which their legal rights or liabilities are affected."
H 29. The Council for Public Interest Law set up by the Fore
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 711
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
Foundation in USA defined "public interest litigation" in its A
report of Public Interest Law, USA. 1976 as follows:
"Public Interest Law is the name that has recently been
given to efforts provide legal representation to previously
unrepresented groups and interests. Such efforts have 8
been undertaken in the recognition that ordinary market
place for legal services fails to provide such services to
significant segments of the population and to significant
interests. Such groups and interests include the proper
environmentalists, consumers, racial and ethnic minorities C
and others." (M/s Holicow Pictures Pvt. Ltd. v. Prem
Chandra Mishra & Ors. -AIR 2008 SC 913, para 19).
30. This court in People's Union for Democratic Rights &
Others v. Union of India & Others (1982) 3 SCC 235 defined
'Public Interest Litigation' and observed that the "Public interest D
litigation is a cooperative or collaborative effort by the petitioner,
the State of public authority and the judiciary to secure
observance of constitutional or basic human rights, benefits and
privileges upon poor, downtrodden and vulnerable sections of
the society". E
ORIGIN OF PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION:
31. The public interest litigation is the product of realization
of the constitutional obligation of the court.
F
32. All these petitions are filed under the big banner of the
public interest litigation. In this view of the matter, it has become
imperative to examine what are the contours of the public
interest litigation? What is the utility and importance of the public
interest litigation? Whether similar jurisdiction exists in other G
countries or this is an indigenously developed jurisprudence?
Looking to the special conditions prevalent in our country,
whether the public interest litigation should be encouraged or
discouraged by the courts? These are some of the questions
which we would endeavour to answer in this judgment. H
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 ~.C.R.
A 33. According to our opinion, the public interest litigation
is an extremely important jurisdiction exercised by the Supreme
Court and the High Courts. The Courts in a number of cases
have given important directions and passed orders which have
brought positive changes in the country. The Courts' directions
B have immensely benefited marginalized sections of the society
in a number of cases. It has also helped in protection and
preservation of ecology, environment, forests, marine life,
wildlife etc. etc. The court's directions to some extent have
helped in maintaining probity and transparency in the public life.
c 34. This court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial
review realized that a very large section of the society because
of extreme poverty, ignorance, discrimination and illiteracy had
been denied justice for time immemorial and in fact they have
no access to justice. Pre-dominantly, to provide access to
D justice to the poor, deprived, vulnerable, discriminated and
marginalized sections of the society, this court has initiated,
encouraged and propelled the public interest litigation. The
litigation is upshot and product of this court's deep and intense
urge to fulfill its bounded duty and constitutional obligation.
E
35. The High Courts followed this Court and exercised
similar jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution. The
courts expanded the meaning of right to life and liberty
guaranteed under article 21 of the Constitution. The rule of
F locus standi was diluted and the traditional meaning of
'aggrieved person' was broadened to provide access to justice
to a very large section of the society which was otherwise not
getting any benefit from the judicial system. We would like to
term this as the first phase or the golden era of the public
G interest litigation. We would briefly deal with important cases
decided by this Court in the first phase after broadening the
definition of 'aggrieved person'. We would also deal with cases
how this Court prevented any abuse of the public interest
litigation?
H 36. This Court in Akhi/ Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 713
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J ]
Sangh (Railway) v. Union of India & Others AIR 1981 SC 298 A
at page 317, held that our current processual jurisprudence is
not of individualistic Anglo-Indian mould. It is broad-based and
people-oriented, and envisions access to justice through 'class
actions', 'public interest litigation', and 'representative
proceedings'. Indeed, little Indians in large numbers seeking B
remedies in courts through collective proceedings, instead of
being driven to an expensive plurality of litigations, is an
affirmation of participative justice in our democracy. We have
no hesitation in holding that the narrow concepts of 'cause of
action', 'person aggrieved' and individual litigation are c
becoming obsolescent in some jurisdictions.
37. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India & Others
AIR 1984 SC 802, this court entertained a petition even of
unregistered Association espousing the cause of over down-
trodden or its members observing that the cause of "little D
Indians" can be espoused by any person having no interest in
the matter.
38. In the said case, this court further held that where a
public interest litigation alleging that certain workmen are living E
in bondage and under inhuman conditions is initiated it is not
expected of the Government that it should raise preliminary
objection that no fundamental rights of the petitioners or the
workmen on whose behalf the petition has been filed, have
been infringed. On the contrary, the Government should F
welcome an inquiry by the Court, so that if it is found that there
are in fact bonded labourers or even if the workers are not
bonded in the strict sense of the term as defined in the Bonded
Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 but they are made to
provide forced labour or any consigned to a life of utter G
deprivation and degradation, such a situation can be set right
by the Government.
39. Public interest litigation is not in the nature of adversary
litigation but it is a challenge and an opportunity to the
government and its officers to make basic human rights H
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 1 S.C.R.
A meaningful to the deprived and vulnerable sections of the
community and to assure them social and economic justice
which is the signature tune of our Constitution. The Government
and its officers must welcome public interest litigation because
it would provide them an occasion to examine whether the poor
B and the down-trodden are getting their social and economic
entitlements or whether they are continuing to remain victims
of deception and exploitation at the hands of strong and
powerful sections of the community and whether social and
economic justice has become a meaningful reality for them or
c it has remained merely a teasing illusion and a promise of
unreality, so that in case the complaint in the public interest
litigation is found to be true, they can in discharge of their
constitutional obligation root out exploitation and injustice and
ensure to the weaker sections their rights and entitlements.
D 40. In Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union (Regd.,
Sindri & Others v. Union of India & Others AIR 1981 SC 844,
this court observed that "public interest litigation is part of the
process of participative justice and 'standing' in civil litigation
of that pattern must have liberal reception at the judicial
E doorsteps".
41. In Ramsharan Autyanuprasi & Another v. Union of
India & Others AIR 1989 SC 549, this court observed that the
public interest litigation is for making basic human rights
F meaningful to the deprived and vulnerable sections of the
community and to assure them social, economic and political
justice.
EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN
INDIA
G
42. The origin and evolution of Public Interest Litigation in
India emanated from realization of constitutional obligation by
the Judiciary towards the vast sections of the society - the poor
and the marginalized sections of the society. This jurisdiction
H has been created and carved out by the judicial creativity and
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 715
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
craftsmanship. In M. C. Mehta & Another v. Union of India & A
Others AIR 1987 SC 1086, this Court observed that Article 32
does not merely confer power on this Court to issue direction,
order or writ for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Instead,
it also lays a constitutional obligation on this Court to protect
the fundamental rights of the people. The court asserted that, B
in realization of this constitutional obligation, "it has all
incidental and ancillary powers including the power to forge new
remedies and fashion new strategies designed to enforce the
fundamental rights". The Court realized that because of extreme
poverty, a large number of sections of society cannot approach c
the court. The fundamental rights have no meaning for them and
in order to preserve and protect the fundamental rights of the
marginalized section of society by judicial innovation, the courts
by judicial innovation and creativity started giving necessary
directions and passing orders in the public interest.
D
43. The development of public interest litigation has been
extremely significant development in the history of the Indian
jurisprudence. The decisions of the Supreme Court in the
1970's loosened the strict locus standi requirements to permit
filing of petitions on behalf of marginalized and deprived E
sections of the society by public spirited individuals, institutions
and/or bodies. The higher Courts exercised wide powers given
to them under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. The sort
of remedies sought from the courts in the public interest
litigation goes beyond award of remedies to the affected F
individuals and groups. In suitable cases, the courts have also
given guidelines and directions. The courts have monitored
implementation of legislation and even formulated guidelines
in absence of legislation. If the cases of the decades of 70s
and 80s are analyzed, most of the public interest litigation cases G
which were entertained by the courts are pertaining to
enforcement of fundamental rights of marginalized and deprived
sections of the society. This can be termed as the first phase
of the public interest litigation in India.
H
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A 44. The Indian Supreme Court broadened the traditional
rule of standing and the definition of "person aggrieved".
45. In this judgment, we would like to deal with the origin
and development of public interest litigation. We deem it
appropriate to broadly divide the public interest litigation in three
8
phases.
Phase-l:lt deals with cases of this Court where
directions and orders were passed primarily to
protect fundamental rights under Article 21 of the
c marginalized groups and sections of the society
who because of extreme poverty, illiteracy and
ignorance cannot approach this court or the High
Cou.rts.
Phase-ll:lt deals with the cases relating to
D
protection, preservation of ecology, environment,
forests, marine life, wildlife, mountains, rivers,
historical monuments etc. etc.
Phase-lll:lt deals with the directions issued by the
E Courts in maintaining the probity, transparency and
integrity in governance.
46. Thereafter, we also propose to deal with the aspects
of abuse of the Public Interest Litigation and remedial
F measures by which its misuse can be prevented or curbed.
DISCUSSION OF SOME IMPORTANT CASES OF PHASE-
!
47. The court while interpreting the words "person
G aggrieved" in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haj1
Bashir Ahmed & Others (1976) 1 SCC 671 observed that "the
traditional rule is flexible enough to take in those cases where
the applicant has been prejudicially affected by an act or
omission of an authority, even though he has no proprietary or
H even a fiduciary interest in the subject-matter. That apart, ir
STATE OF UTIARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 717
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
exceptional cases even a stranger or a person who was not a A
party to the proceedings before the authority, but has a
substantial and genuine interest in the subject-matter of the
proceedings will be covered by this rule".
48. The rule of locus standi was relaxed in Bar Council 8
of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar ~ Others 1976 SCR 306.
The court observed as under:
"Traditionally used to the adversary system, we search for •
individual persons aggrieved. But a new class of litigation
public interest litigation-where a section or whole of the C
community is involved (such as consumers' organisations
or NAACP-National Association for Advancement of
Coloured People-in America), emerges in a developing
country like ours, this pattern of public oriented litigation
better fulfils the rule of law if it is to run close to the rule of D
life.
xxx xxx xxx
"The possible apprehension that widening legal standing
with a public connotation may unloose a flood of litigation E
which may overwhelm the judges is misplaced because
public resort to court to suppress public mischief is a
tribute to the justice system."
49. The court in this case observed that "procedural F
prescriptions are handmaids, not mistresses of justice and
failure of fair play is the spirit in which Courts must view
procession deviances."
50. In The Mumbai Kamgar Sabha, Bombay v. Abdulbhai
Faizul/abhai & Others AIR 1976 SC 1455, this Court made G
conscious efforts to improve the judicial access for the masses
by relaxing the traditional rule of locus standi.
51. In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration & Others AIR
1978 SC 1675, the Court departed from the traditional rule of H
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A standing by authorizing community litigation. The Court
entertained a writ petition from a prisoner, a disinterested party,
objecting to the torture of a fellow prisoner. The Court
entertained the writ after reasoning that "these 'martyr' litigations
possess a beneficent potency beyond the individual litigant and
B their consideration on the wider representative basis
strengthens the rule of law." Significantly, citing "people's
vicarious involvement in our justice system with a broad-based
concept of locus standi so necessary in a democracy where
the masses are in many senses weak," the Court permitted a
c human rights organization to intervene in the case on behalf of
the victim.
52. In Hussainara Khatoon & Others v. Home Secretary,
State of Bihar, Patna AIR 1979 SC 1369, P. N. Bhagwati, J.
has observed that "today, unfortunately, in our country the poor
D are priced out of the judicial system with the result that they are
losing faith in the capacity of our legal system to (sic) about
changes in their life conditions and to deliver justice to them.
The poor in their contact with the legal system have always
been on the wrong side of the line. They have always come
E across 'law for the poor'' rather than law of the poor'. The law
is regarded by them as something mysterious and forbidding-
always taking something away from them and not as a positive
and constructive social device for changing the social economic
order and improving their life conditions by conferring rights and
F benefits on them. The result is that the legal system has lost its
credibility for the weaker section of the community.
53. In Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration AIR
1980 SC 1535, a prisoner sent a telegram to a judge
G complaining of forced handcuff on him and demanded implicit
protection against humiliation and torture. The court gave
necessary directions by relaxing the strict rule of locus standi.
54. In Municipal Council, Rat/am v. Vardhichand & Others
AIR 1980 SC 1622, Krishna Iyer, J. relaxed the rule of locus
H standi:
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 719
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
"The truth is that a few profound issues of processual A
jurisprudence of great strategic significance to our legal
system face us and we must zero-in on them as they
involve problems of access to justice for the people
beyond the blinkered rules of 'standing' of British Indian
vintage. If the center of gravity of justice is to shift, as the B
Preamble to the Constitution mandates, from the traditional
individualism of locus standi to the community orientation
of public interest litigation, these issues must be
considered .....
)()()( )()()( xxx c
)()()( )()()( )()()(
Why drive common people to public interest action? Where
Directive Principles have found statutory expression in D
Do's and Don'ts the court will not sit idly by and allow
municipal government to become a statutory mockery. The
law will relentlessly be enforced and the plea of poor
finance will be poor alibi when people in misery cry for
justice ...... "
E
55. In Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (supra)
Krishna Iyer, J. and Bhagwati, J. had to answer in affirmative
as to whether the workers in a factory owned by government
had locus standi to question the legality of sale of the factory.
They concluded with a quote: 'Henry Peter Brougham: Nieman F
Reports, April 1956 as under:
"It was the boast of Augustus that he found Rome of brick
and left it of marble. But how much nobler will be the
sovereign's boast when he shall have it to say that he G
found law dear and left it cheap; found it a sealed book
and left it a living letter; found it the patrimony of the rich
and left it the inheritance of the poor; found it the two-edged
sword of craft and oppression and left it the staff of honesty
and the shield of innocence."
H
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 1 S.C.R.
A 56. In People's Union for Democratic Rights & Others
(supra), this Court observed as under:
"that public interest litigation which is a strategic arm of the
legal aid movement and which is intended to bring justice
within the reach of the poor masses, who constitute the low
B
visibility area of humanity, is a totally different kind of
litigation from the ordinary traditional litigation which is
essentially of an adversary character where there is a
dispute between two litigating parties, one making claim
or seeking relief against the other and that other opposing
c such claim or resisting such relief. Public interest litigation
is brought before the court not for the purpose of enforcing
the right of one individual against another as happens in
the case of ordinary litigation, but it is intended to promote
and vindicate public interest which demands that violations
D of constitutional or legal rights of large numbers of people
who are poor, ignorant or in a socially or economically
disadvantaged position should not go unnoticed and un-
redressed. That would be destructive of the Rule of Law
which forms one of the essential elements of public interest
E in any democratic form of government. The Rule of Law
does not mean that the protection of the law must be
available only to a fortunate few or that the law should be
allowed to be prostituted by the vested interests for
protecting and upholding the status quo under the guise
F of enforcement of their civil and political rights. The poor
too have civil and political rights and the Rule of Law is
meant for them also, though today it exists only on paper
and not in reality. If the sugar barons and the alcohol kings
have the Fundamental Right to carry on their business and
G to fatten their purses by exploiting the consuming public,
have the 'chamars' belonging to the lowest strata of society
no Fundamental Right to earn an honest living through their
sweat and toil? The former can approach the courts with
a formidable army of distinguished lawyers paid in four or
five figures per day and if their right of exploit is upheld
H
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGt; 721
CHAUFAL & ORS. [OALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
against the government under the label of Fundamental A
Right, the courts are praised for their boldness and
courage and their independence and fearlessness are
applauded and acclaimed. But, if the Fundamental Right
of the poor and helpless victims of injustice is sought to
be enforced by public interest litigation, the so called B
champions of human rights frown upon it as waste of time
of the highest court in the land, which, according to them,
should not engage itself in such small and trifling matters.
Moreover, these self-styled human rights activists forget
that civil and political rights, priceless and invaluable as c
they are for freedom and democracy, simply do not exist
for the vast masses of our people. Large numbers of men,
women and children who constitute the bulk of our
population are today living a sub-human existence in
conditions of abject poverty: utter grinding poverty has 0
broken their back and sapped their moral fibre. They have
no faith in the existing social and economic system. What
civil and political rights are these poor and deprived
sections of humanity going to enforce?
57. Justice Bhagwati of this court in his judgment in S.P. E
Gupta v. President of India & Others AIR 1982 SC 149
altogether dismissed the traditional rule of standing, and
replaced it with a liberalized modern rule. In this case, the Court
awarded standing to advocates challenging the transfer of
judges during Emergency. Describing the traditional rule as an F
"ancient vintage" of "an era when private law dominated the
legal scene and public law had not been born," the Court
concluded that the traditional rule of standing was obsolete. In
its place, the Court prescribed the modern rule on standing:
G
"where a legal wrong or a legal injury is caused to a person
or to a determinate class of persons by reason of violation
of any constitutional or legal right or any burden is imposed
in contravention of any constitutional or legal provision or
without authority of law or any such legal wrong or legal
H
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A injury or illegal burden is threatened and such person or
determinate class of persons is by reason of poverty,
helplessness or disability or socially or economically
disadvantaged position, unable to approach the Court for
relief, any member of the public can maintain an
B application for an appropriate direction, order or writ, in
the High Court under Article 226, and in case of breach
of any fundamental right, in this Court under Article 32."
58. Finding that the practicing advocates "are vitally
C interested in the maintenance of a fearless and an independent
Judiciary," the Court granted standing to the advocates under
the modern rule to bring cases challenging the transfer of judges
during Emergency. In this case, this Court further observed as
under:
D "...... it must now be regarded as well settled law where a
person who has suffered a legal wrong or a legal injury or
whose legal right or legally protected interest is violated,
is unable to approach the Court on account of some
disability or it is not practicable for him to move the Court
E for some other sufficient reasons, such as his socially or
economically disadvantaged position, some other person
can invoke assistance of the Court for the purpose of
providing judicial redress to the person wronged or injured,
so that the legal wrong or injury caused to such person
F does not go un-redressed and justice is done to him.
)()()( )()()( )()()(
)()()( )()()( )()()(
G ...... Today a vast revolution is taking place in the judicial
process; the theatre of the law is fast changing and the
problems of the poor are coming to the forefront. The Court
has to innovate new methods and devise new strategies
for the purpose of providing access to justice to large
masses of people who are denied their basic human rights
H
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGl1 723
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
and to whom freedom and liberty have no meaning. The A
only way in which this can be done is by entertaining writ
petitions and even letters from public spirited individuals
seeking judicial redress for the benefit of persons who
have suffered a legal wrong or a legal injury or whose
constitutional or legal right has been violated but who by B
reason of their poverty or socially or economically
disadvantaged position are unable to approach the Court
for relief. It is in this spirit that the Court has been
entertaining letters for Judicial redress and treating them
as writ petitions and we hope and trust that the High Courts c
of the country will also adopt this pro-active, goal-oriented
approach."
59. In Anil Yadav & Others v. State of Bihar and Bachcho
Lal Das, Superintendent, Central Jail, Bhagalpur, Bihar (1982)
2 sec 195, a petition was filed regarding blinding of under- D
trial prisoners at Bhagalpur in the State of Bihar. According to
the allegation, their eyes were pierced with needles and acid
poured into them. The Court had sent a team of the Registrar
and Assistant Registrar to visit the Central Jail, Bhagalpur and
submit a report to the Court. The Court passed comprehensive E
orders to ensure that such barbarous and inhuman acts are not
repeated.
60. In Munna & Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others,
(1982) 1 SCC 545, the allegation was that the juvenile under- F
trial prisoners have been sent in the Kanpur Central Jail instead
of Children's Home in Kanpur and those children were sexually
exploited by the adult prisoners. This Court ruled that in no case
except the exceptional ones mentioned in the Act, a child can
be sent to jail. The Court further observed that the children G
below the age of 16 years must be detained only in the
Children's Homes or other place of safety. The Court also
observed that "a Nation which is not concerned with the welfare
of the children cannot look forward to a bright future."
61. Thereafter, in a series of cases, the Court treated Post H
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A Cards and letters as writ petitions and gave directions and
orders.
62. In Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1983 SC
378, Sheela Barse, a journalist, complained of custodial
violence to women prisoners in Bombay. Her letter was treated
8
as a writ petition and the directions were given by the court.
63. In Dr. Upendra Baxi (I) v. State of Uttar Pradesh &
Another 1983 (2) SCC 308 two distinguished law Professors
of the Delhi University addressed a letter to this court regarding
C inhuman conditions which were prevalent in Agra Protective
Home for Women. The court heard the petition on a number of
days and gave important directions by which the living
conditions of the inmates were significantly improved in the
Agra Protective Home for Women.
D
64. In Veena Sethi (Mrs.) v. State of Bihar & Others AIR
1983 SC 339, some prisoners were detained in jail for a
period ranging from 37 years to 19 years. They were arrested
in connection with certain offences and were declared insane
E at the time of their trial and were put in Central Jail with
directions to submit half-yearly medical reports. Some were
convicted, some acquitted and trials were pending against
some of them. After they were declared sane no action for their
release was taken by the authorities. This Court ruled that the
prisoners remained in jail for no fault of theirs and because of
F the callous and lethargic attitude of the authorities. Even if they
are proved guilty the period they had undergone would exceed
the maximum imprisonment that they might be awarded.
65. In Labourers Working on Sala/ Hydro Project v. State
G of Jammu & Kashmir & Others AIR 1984 SC 177, on the basis
of a news item in the Indian Express regarding condition of the
construction workers, this Court took notice and observed that
the construction work is a hazardous employment and no child
below the age of 14 years can therefore be allowed to be
H employed in construction work by reason of the prohibition
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 725
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
enacted in Article 24 and this constitutional prohibition must be A
enforced by the Central Government.
66. In Shri Sachidanand Pandey & Another v. The State
of West Bengal & Others (1987) 2 sec 295, in the concurring
judgment, Justice Khalid, J. observed that the public interest B
litigation should be encouraged when the Courts are apprised
of gross violation of fundamental rights by a group or a class
action or when basic human rights are invaded or when there
are complaints of such acts as shock the judicial conscience
that the courts, especially this Court, should leave aside
procedural shackles and hear such petitions and extend its
c
jurisdiction under all available provisions for remedying the
hardships and miseries of the needy, the underdog and tne
neglected.
67. The case of B. R. Kapoor & Another v. Union of India D
& Others AIR 1990 SC 752 relates to public interest litigation
1
regarding mismanagement of the hospital for mental diseases
located at Shahdara, Delhi. This Court appointed a Committee
of Experts which highlighted the problems of availability of
water, existing sanitary conditions, food, kitchen, medical and E
nursing care, ill-treatment of patients, attempts of inmates to
commit suicide, death of patients in hospital, availability of
doctors and nurses etc. The Court went on to recommend the
Union of India to take over the hospital and model it on the lines ...
~
of NIMHANS at Bangalore. F
68. In Smt. Nilabati Behera alias Lalita Behera v. State
of Orissa & Others AIR 1993 SC 1960, this Court gave
directions that for contravention of human rights and
fundamental freedoms by the State and its agencies, a claim
for monetary compensation in petition under Article 32 or 226 G
is justified. In a concurring judgment, Anand, J. (as he then was)
observed as under:
"The old doctrine of only relegating the aggrieved to
the remedies available in civil law limits the role of the H
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A courts too much as protector and guarantor of the
indefeasible rights of the citizens. The courts have the
obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens
because the courts and the law are for the people and
expected to respond to their aspirations "
B
69. In Punjab and Haryana High Court Bar Association.
Chandigarh through its Secretary v. State of Punjab & Others
(1994) 1 sec 616, the allegation was that a practicing
advocate, his wife and a child aged about two years were
abducted and murdered. This Court directed the Director of the
C CBI to investigate and report to the Court.
70. In Navkiran Singh & Others v. State of Punjab through
Chief Secretary & Another (1995) 4 SCC 591, in a letter
petition the advocates from the Punjab & Haryana High Court
D expressed concerned about the kidnapping/elimination of
advocates in the State of Punjab. This Court directed the CBI
to investigate the matter and also directed the State of Punjab
to provide security to those advocates who genuinely
apprehend danger to their lives from militants/anti-social
E elements. The Court also observed that if the request for security
is recommended by the District Judge or the Registrar of the
High Court, it may be treated as genuine and the State
Government may consider the same sympathetically.
F 71. In Delhi Domestic Working Women's Forum v. Union
of India & Others (1995) 1 SCC 14, the Court expressed
serious concern about the violence against women. The Court
gave significant directions and observed that compensation for
victims shall be awarded by the court on conviction of the
offender and by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board
G whether or not a conviction has taken place. The Board will take
into account pain, suffering and shock as well as loss of
earnings due to pregnancy and the expenses of child birth if
this occurred as a result of the rape.
H 72. In Citizens for Democracy v. State of Assam & Others
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 727
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
(1995) 3 SCC 743, this Court held that handcuffing and tying A
with ropes is inhuman and in utter violation of human rights
guaranteed under the international law and the law of the land.
The Court in para 15 observed as under:
"15. .. ... The handcuffing and in addition tying with ropes B
of the patient-prisoners who are lodged in the hospital is,
the least we can say, inhuman and in utter violation of the
human rights guaranteed to an individual under the
international law and the law of the land. We are, therefore,
of the view that the action of the respondents was wholly C
unjustified and against law. We direct that the detenus -
in case they are still in hospital - be relieved from the
fetters and the ropes with immediate effect."
73. In Paramjit Kaur (Mrs.) v. State of Punjab & Others
(1996) 7 sec 20, a telegram was sent to a Judge of this Court D
which was treated as a habeas corpus petition. The allegation
was that the husband of the appellant was kidnapped by some
persons in police uniform from a busy residential area of
Amritsar. The Court took serious note of it and directed the
investigation of the case by the Central Bureau of Investigation. E
74. In M. C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu & Others (1996)
6 SCC 756, the Court was dealing with the cases of child
labour and the Court found that the child labour emanates from
extreme poverty, lack of opportunity for gainful employment and
intermittency of income and low standards of living. The Court F
observed that it is possible to identify child labour in the
organized sector, which forms a minuscule of the total child
labour, the problem relates mainly to the unorganized sector
where utmost attention needs to be paid.
G
75. In D. K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) 1 SCC
416, this Court observed that the custodial death is perhaps
one of the worst crimes in a civilized society governed by the
rule of law. The rights inherent in Articles 21 and 22(1) of the
Constitution require to be jealously and scrupulously protected. H
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A The expression "life or personal liberty" in Article 21 includes
the right to live with human dignity and thus it would also include
within itself a guarantee against torture and assault by the State
or its functionaries. The precious right guaranteed by Article 21
cannot be denied to convicts, undertrials, detenus and other
B prisoners in custody, except according to the procedure
established by law by placing such reasonable restrictions as
are permitted by law. The Court gave very significant directidns
which are mandatory for all concerned to follow.
76. In Vishaka & Others v. State of Rajasthan & Others
C (1997) 6 SCC 241, this Court gave directions regarding
enforcement of the fundamental rights of the working women
under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. The Court gave
comprehensive guidelines and norms and directed for
protection and enforcement of these rights of the women at their
D workplaces.
77. In a recently decided case Prajwala v. Union of India
& Others (2009) 4 SCC 798, a petition was filed in this Court
in which it was realized that despite commencement of the
E Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of
Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, disabled people are
not given preferential treatment. The Court directed the State
Governments/local authorities to allot land for various purposes
indicated in section 43 of the Act and various items indicated
F in section 43, preferential treatment be given to the disabled
people and the land shall be given at concessional rates. The
percentage of reservation may be left to the discretion of the
State Governments. However, total percentage of disabled
persons shall be taken into account while deciding the
G percentar ·.
78. In Avinash Mehrotra v. Union of India & Others (2009)
6 sec 398, a public interest litigation was filed, when 93
children were burnt alive in a fire at a private school in Tamil
Nadu. This happened because the school did not have the
H minimum safety standard measures. The court, in order to
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 729
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
protect future tragedies in all such schools, gave directions that A
it is the fundamental right of each and every child to receive
education free from fear of security and safety, hence the
Government should implement National Building Code and
comply with the said orders in constructions of schools for
children. B
79. All these abovementioned cases demonstrate that the
courts, in order to protect and preserve the fundamental rights
of citizens, while relaxing the rule of locus standi, passed a
number of directions to the concerned authorities.
c
80. We would not like to overburden the judgment by
multiplying these cases, but brief resume of these cases
demonstrate that in order to preserve and protect the
fundamental rights of marginalized, deprived and poor sections
of the society, the courts relaxed the traditional rule of locus D
standi and broadened the definition of aggrieved persons and
gave directions and orders. We would like to term cases of this
period where the court relaxed the rule of locus standi as the
first phase of the public interest litigation. The Supreme Court
and the High Courts earned great respect and acquired great E
credibility in the eyes of public because of their innovative efforts
to protect and preserve the fundamental rights of people
belonging to the poor and marginalized sections of the society.
PHASE-II - DIRECTIONS TO PRESERVE AND PROTECT
F
ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT
81. The second phase of public interest litigation started
sometime in the 1980's and it related to the courts' innovation
and creativity, where directions were given to protect ecology
and environment. G
82. There are a number of cases where the court tried to
protect forest cover, ecology and environment and orders have
been passed in that respect. As a matter of fact, the Supreme
Court has a regular Forest Bench (Green Bench) and regularly H
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A passes orders and directions regarding various forest cover,
illegal mining, destruction of marine life and wild life etc.
Reference of some cases is given just for illustration.
83. In the second phas_e, the Supreme Court under Article
32 and the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution
8
passed a number of orders and directions in this respect.
84. The recent example is the conversion of all public
transport in the Metropolitan City of Delhi from diesel engine
to CNG engine on the basis of the order of the High Court of
C Delhi to ensure thpt the pollution level is curtailed and this is
being completely observed for the last several years. Only CNG
vehicles are permitted to ply on Delhi roads for public transport.
85. Louise Erdrich Bigogress, an environmentalist has
D aptly observed that "grass and sky are two canvasses into
which the rich details of the earth are drawn." In 1980s, this
court paid special attention to the problem of air pollution, water
pollution, environmental degradation and passed a number of
directions and orders to ensure that environment ecology,
E wildlife should be saved, preserved and protected. According
to court, the scale of injustice occurring on the Indian soil is
catastrophic. Each day hundreds of thousands of factories are
functioning without pollution control devices. Thousands of
Indians go to mines and undertake hazardous work without
F proper safety protection. Everyday millions of litres of untreated
raw effluents are dumped into our rivers and millions of tons of
hazardous waste are simply dumped on the earth. The
environment has become so degraded that instead of nurturing
us it is poisoning us. In this scenario, in a large number of
cases, the Supreme Court intervened in the matter and issued
G innumerable directions.
86. We give brief resume of some of the important cases
decided by this court. One of the earliest cases brought before
the Supreme Court related to oJeum gas leakage in Delhi. In
H order to prevent the damage being done to environment and
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 731
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
the life and the health of the people, the court passed number A
of orders. This is well-known as M. C. Mehta & Another v.
Union of India & Others AIR 1987 SC 1086. The court in this
case has clearly laid down that an €.1terprise which is engaged
in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry which poses
a potential threat to the health and safety of the persons working B
in the factory and residing in the surrounding area owes an
absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure
that no such harm results to anyone on account of hazardous
or inherently dangerous nature of the activity which it has
undertaken. The court directed that the enterprise must adopt c
highest standards of safety and if any harm results on account
of such activity, the enterprise must be absolutely liable to
compensate for such harm and it should be no answer to the
enterprise to say that it had taken all reasonable care and that
the harm occurred without any negligence on its part.
D
87. In Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra, Oehradun
& Others v. State of UP. & Others AIR 1985 SC 652 the
Supreme Court ordered closure of all lime-stone quarries in
the Doon Valley taking notice of the fact that lime-stone
quarries and excavation in the area had adversely affected E
water springs and environmental ecology. While commenting
on the closure of the lime-stone quarries, the court stated that
this would undoubtedly cause hardship to owners of the lime-
stone quarries, but it is the price that has to be paid for
protecting and safeguarding the right of the people to live in F
healthy environment with minimal disturbance of ecological
balance and without avoidable hazard to them and to their
cattle, homes and agricultural land and undue affectation of air,
water and environment.
G
88. Environmental PIL has emerged because of the court's
interpretation of Article 21 of the Constitution. The court in
Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti v. State of UP.
& Others AIR 1990 SC 2060 observed that every citizen has
fundamental right to have the enjoyment of quality of life and
H
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 1 S.C.R.
A living as contemplated by Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
Anything which endangers or impairs by conduct of anybody
either in violation or in derogation of laws, that quality of life and
living by the people is entitled to take recourse to Article 32 of
the Constitution.
8
89. This court in Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar &
Others AIR 1991 SC 420 observed that under Article 21 of the
Constitution people have the right of enjoyment of pollution free
water and air for full enjoyment of life. If anything endangers or
impairs that quality of life in derogation of laws, a citizen has
C right to have recourse to Article 32 of the Constitution for
removing the pollution of water or air which may be detrimental
to the quality of life.
90. The case of M. C. Mehta v. Union of India & Others
D (1988) 1 sec 471, relates to pollution caused by the trade
effluents discharged by tanneries into Ganga river in Kanpur.
The court called for the report of the Committee of experts and
gave directions to save the environment and ecology. It was
held that "in Common Law the Municipal Corporation can be
E restrained by an injunction in an action brought by a riparian
owner who has suffered on account of the pollution of the water
in a river caused by the Corporation by discharging into the
river insufficiently treated sewage from di,Scharging such
sewage into the river. But in the present case the petitioner is
F not a riparian owner. He is a person interested in protecting
the lives of the people who make use of the water flowing in
the river Ganga and his right to maintain the petition cannot be
disputed. The nuisance caused by the pollution of the river
Ganga is a public nuisance, which is widerspread in range and
G indiscriminate in its effect and it would not be reasonable to
expect any particular person to take proceedings to stop it as
distinct from the community at large. The petition has been
entertained as a Public Interest Litigation. On the facts and in
the circumstances of the case, the petitioner is entitled to move
the Supreme Court in order to enforce the statutory provisions
H
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 733
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
which impose duties on the municipal authorities and the A
Boards constituted under the Water (Prevention and Control of
Pollution) Act, 1974".
91. In Ve/lore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India
& Others AIR 1996 SC 2715, this court ruled that precautionary 8
principle and the polluter pays principle are part of the
environmental law of the country. This court declared Articles
47, 48A and 51A(g) to be part of the constitutional mandate to
protect and improve the environment.
92. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India & Others AIR 1988 C
SC 1037, this court observed that the effluent discharged in
river Ganga from a tannery is ten times noxious when compared
with the domestic sewage water which flows into the river from
any urban area on its banks. The court further observed that
the financial capacity of the tanneries should be considered as D
irrelevant without requiring them to establish primary treatment ·
plants. Just like an industry which cannot pay minimum wages
to its workers cannot be allowed to exist, a tannery which
cannot set up a primary treatment plant cannot be permitted to
continue to be in existence for the adverse effect on the public E
at large.
93. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India & Others AIR 1997
SC 734, this court observed that in order to preserve and
protect the ancient monument Taj Mahal from sulphurdioxide
emission by industries near Taj Mahal, the court ordered 299
F
industries to ban the use of coke/coal. The court further directed
them to shift-over to Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) or re-
locate them.
94. In A. P. Pollution Control Board v. Prof. M. V. Nayadu G
(Retd.) & Others (1999) 2 SCC 718, this Court quoted A.
Fritsch, "Environmental Ethics: Choices for Concerned Citizens".
The same is reproduced as under:
"The basic insight of ecology is that all living things exist H
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A in interrelated systems; nothing exists in isolation. The
world system in weblike; to pluck one strand is to cause
all to vibrate; whatever happens to one part has
ramifications for all the rest. Our actions are not individual
but social; they reverberate throughout the whole
B ecosystem". [Science Action Coalition by A. Fritsch,
Environmental Ethics: Choices for Concerned Citizens 3-
4 (1980)]: (1988) Vol. 12 Harv. Env. L. Rev. at 313)."
95. The court in this case gave emphasis that the
directions of the court should meet the requirements of public
C interest, environmental protection, elimination of pollution and
sustainable development. While ensuring sustainable
development, it must be kept in view that there is no danger to
the environment or to the ecology.
D 96. In Essar Oil Ltd. v. Halar Utkarsh Samiti & Others AIR
2004 SC 1834, while maintaining the balance between
economic development and environmental protection, the court
observed as under:
"26. Certain principles were enunciated in the Stockholm
E
Declaration giving broad parameters and guidelines for the
purposes of sustaining humanity and its environment. Of
these parameters, a few principles are extracted which are
of relevance to the present debate. Principle 2 provides
that the natural resources of the earth including the air,
F water, land, flora and fauna especially representative
samples of natural eco-systems must be safeguarded for
the benefit of present and future generations through careful
planning and management as appropriate. In the same
vein, the 4th principle says "man has special responsibility
G to safeguard and wisely manage the heritage of wild life
and its habitat which are now gravely imperiled by a
combination of adverse factors. Nature conservation
including wild life must, therefore, receive importance in
planning for economic developments". These two
H principles highlight the need to factor in considerations of
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 735
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
the environment while providing for economic A
development. The need for economic development has
been dealt with in Principle 8 where it is said that
"economic and social development is essential for
ensuring a favourable living and working environment for
man and for creating conditions on earth that are B
necessary for improvement of the quality of life"."
97. On sustainable development, one of us (Bhandari, J.)
in Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board v. Sri C.
Kenchappa & Others AIR 2006 SC 2038, observed that there
has to be balance between sustainable development and C
environment. This Court observed that before acquisition of
lands for development, the consequence and adverse impact
of development on environment must be properly
comprehended and the lands be acquired for development that
they do not gravely impair the ecology and environment; State D
Industrial Areas Development Board to incorporate the
condition of allotment to obtain clearance from the Karnataka
State Pollution Control Board before the land is allotted for
development. The said directory condition of allotment of lands
be converted into a mandatory condition for all the projects to E
be sanctioned in.future.
98. In another important decision of this Court in the case
of M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath & Others (2000) 6 SCC 213,
this Court was of the opinion that Articles 48A and 51-A(g) have F
to be considered in the light of Article 21 of the Constitution.
Any disturbance of the basic environment elements, namely air,
water and soil, which are necessary for "life", would be
hazardous to "life" within the meaning of Article 21. In the matter
of enforcement of rights under Article 21, this Court, besides G
enforcing the provisions of the Acts referred to above, has also
given effect to Fundamental Rights under Articles 14 and 21
and has held that if those rights are violated by disturbing the
environment, it can award damages not only for the restoration
of the ecological balance, but also for the victims who have H
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A suffered due to that disturbance. In order to protect the "life", in
order to protect "environment" and in order to protect "air, water
and soil" from pollution, this Court, through its various judgments
has given effect to the rights available, to the citizens and
persons alike, under Article 21.
B
99. The court also laid emphasis on the principle of
Polluter-pays. According to the court, pollution is a civil wrong.
It is a tort committed against the community as a whole. A
person, therefore, who is guilty of causing pollution has to pay
damages or compensation for restoration of the environment
C and ecology.
100. In Managing Director, A.P.S.R. T.C. v. S. P.
Satyanarayana AIR 1998 SC 2962, this Court referred to the
White Paper published by the Government of India that the
D vehicular pollution contributes 70% of the air pollution as
compared to 20% in 1970. This Court gave comprehensive
directions to reduce the air pollution on the recommendation
of an Expert Committee of Bhure Lal appointed by this Court.
E 101. In Re. Noise Pollution AIR 2005 SC 3136, this Court
was dealing with the issue of noise pollution. This Court was
of the opinion that there is need for creating general awareness
towards the hazardous effects of noise pollution. Particularly,
in our country the people generally lack consciousness of the
ill effects which noise pollution creates and how the society
F including they themselves stand to benefit by preventing
generation and emission of noise pollution.
102. In Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union
of India & Others (1996) 5 SCC 281 the main grievance in the
G petition is that a notification dated 19.2.1991 declaring coastal
stretches as Coastal Regulation Zones which regulates the
activities in the said zones has not been implemented or
enforced. This has led to continued degradation of ecology in
the said coastal areas. The court observed that while economic
H
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGrl 737
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
development should not be allowed to take place at the cost A
of ecology or by causing widespread environment destruction
and violation; at the same time, the necessity to preserve
ecology and environment should not hamper economic and
other developments. Both development and environment must
go hand in hand, in other words, there should not be B
development at the cost of environment and vice versa, but there
should be development while taking due care and ensuring the
protection of environment.
103. In S. Jagannath v. Union of India & Others (1997) 2 C
SCC 87, this Court dealt with a public interest petition filed by
the Gram Swaraj Movement, a voluntary organization working
for the upliftment of the weaker section of society, wherein the
petitioner sought the enforcement of Coastal Zone Regulation
Notification dated 19.2.1991 and stoppage of intensive and
semi-intensive type of prawn farming in the ecologically fragile D
coastal areas. This Court passed significant directions as
under:
1. The Central Government shall constitute an authority
conferring on the said authority all the powers E
necessary to protect the ecologically fragile coastal
areas, seashore, waterfront and other coastal
areas and specially to deal with the situation
created by the shrimp culture industry in coastal
States. F
2. The authority so constituted by the Central
Government shall implement "the Precautionary
principle" and "the Polluter Pays" principles.
3. The shrimp culture industry/the shrimp ponds are G
covered by the prohibition contained in para 2(i) of
the CRZ Notification. No shrimp culture pond can
be constructed or set up within the coastal
regulation zone as defined in the CRZ notification.
H
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 OJ 1 S.C.R.
A This shall be applicable to all seas, bays, estuaries,
creeks rivers and backwaters. This direction shall
not apply to traditional and improved traditional
types of technologies (as defined in Alagarswami
report) which are practised in the coastal low lying
B areas.
4. All acquaculture industries/shrimp culture industries/
shrimp culture ponds operating/set up in the coastal
regulation zone as defined under the CRZ
Notification shall be demolished and removed from
c the said area before March 31, 1997.
5. The agricultural lands, salt pan lands, mangroves,
wet lands, forest lands, land for village common
purpose and the land meant for public purposes
D shall not be used/converted for construction of the
shrimp culture ponds.
6. No acquaculture industry/shrimp culture industry/
shrimp culture ponds shall be constructed/set up
within 1000 meter of Chilka lake and Pulicat lake
E
(including Bird Sanctuaries namely Yadurapattu
and Nelapattu).
7. Acquaculture industry/shrimp culture industry/shrimp
culture ponds already operating and functioning in
F the said area of 1000 meter shall be closed and
demolished before March 31, 1997.
8. The Court also directed that the shrimp industries
functioning within 1000 meter from the Coastal
G Regulation Zone shall be liable to compensate the
affected persons on the basis of the "polluter pays"
principle.
9. The authority was directed to compute the
compensation under two heads namely, for
H
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 739
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.)
reversing the ecology and for payment to A
individuals.
10. The compensation amount recovered from the
polluters shall be deposited under a sep~rate head
called "Environment Protection Fund" and shall be
8
utilised for compensating the affected persons as
identified by the authority and also for restoring the
damaged environment.
104. The Court also granted substantial costs to the
petitioners. C
105. The courts because of vast destruction of
environment, ecology, forests, marine life, wildlife etc. etc. gave
directions in a large number of cases in the larger public
interest. The courts made a serious endeavour to protect and
0
preserve ecology, environment, forests, hills, rivers, marine life,
wildlife etc. etc. This can be called the second phase of the
public interest litigation in India.
THE TRANSPARENCY AND PROBITY IN GOVERNANCE
- PHASE-Ill OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION E
106. In the 1990's, the Supreme Court expanded the ambit
and scope of public interest litigation further. The High Courts
also under Article 226 followed the Supreme Court and passed
a number of judgments, orders or directions to unearth F
corruption and maintain probity and morality in the governance
of the State. The probity in governance is a sine qua non for
an efficient system of administration and for the development
of the country and an important requirement for ensuring probity
in governance is the absence of corruption. This may broadly G
be called as the third phase of the Public Interest Litigation. The
Supreme Court and High Courts have passed significant
orders.
107. The case of Vineet Narain & Others v. Union of India
& Another AIR 1998 SC 889 is an example of its kind. In that H
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A case, the petitioner, who was a journalist, filed a public interest
litigation. According to him, the prime investigating agencies
like the Central Bureau of Investigation and the Revenue
authorities failed to perform their legal obligation and take
appropriate action when they found, during investigation with
B a terrorist, detailed accounts of vast payments, called 'Jain
diaries', made to influential politicians and bureaucrats and
direction was also sought in case of a similar nature that may
occur hereafter. A number of directions were issued by the
Supreme Court. The Court in that case observed that "it is trite
C that the holders of public offices are entrusted with certain power
to be exercised in public interest alone and, therefore, the office
is held by them in trust for the people."
108. Another significant case is Rajiv Ranjan Singh
'La/an' & Another v. Union of India & Others (2006) 6 SCC
D 613. This public interest litigation relates to the large scale
defalcation of public funds and falsification of accounts involving
hundreds of crores of rupees in the Department of Animal
Husbandry in the State of Bihar. It was said that the
respondents had interfered with the appointment of the public
E prosecutor. This court gave significant directions in this case.
109. In yet another case of M. C. Mehta v. Union of India
& Others (2007) 1 SCC 110, a project known as "Taj Heritage
Corridor Project" was initiated by the Government of Uttar
Pradesh. One of the main purpose for which the same was
F undertaken was to divert the River Yamuna and to reclaim 75
acres of land between Agra Fort and the Taj Mahal and use
the reclaimed land for constructing food plazas, shops and
amusement activities. The Court directed for a detailed enquiry
which was carried out by the Central Bureau of Investigation
G (CBI). On the basis of the CBI report, the Court directed
registration of FIR and made further investigation in the matter.
The court questioned the role played by the concerned Minister
for Environment, Government of Uttar Pradesh and the Chief
Minister, Government of Uttar Pradesh. By the intervention of
H this Court, the said project was stalled.
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 741
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
110. These are some of the matters where the efficacy, A
efhics and morality of the governmental authorities to perform
their statutory duties was directed under the scanner of the
Supreme Court and the High Courts.
111. In M. C. Mehta v. Union of India & Others (2007) 12 B
SCALE 91, in another public interest litigation, a question was
raised before the court whether the Apex Court should consider
the correctness of the order passed by the Governor of Uttar
Pradesh refusing to grant sanction for prosecution of the Chief
Minister and Environment Minister after they were found C
responsible in 'Taj Heritage Corridor Project". It was held that
the judiciary can step in where it finds the actions on the part
of the legislature or the executive to be illegal or unconstitutional.
112. In Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of
India & Another AIR 2003 SC 3277, two writ petitions were D
filed in public interest by the petitioner calling in the question
of decision of the government to sell majority of shares in
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited and Bharat
Petroleum Corporation Limited to private parties without
Parliamentary approval or sanction as being contrary to and E
violative of the provisions of the ESSO (Acquisition of
Undertaking in India) Act, 1974, the Burma Shell (Acquisition
of Undertaking in India) Act, 1976 and Caltex (Acquisition of
Shares of Caltex Oil Refining India Limited and all the
undertakings in India for Caltex India Limited) Act, 1977. The F
court upheld the petitions until the statutes are amended
appropriately.
113. These are some of the cases where the Supreme
Court and the High Courts broadened the scope of public
interest litigation and also entertained petitions to ensure that G
in governance of the State, there is transparency and no
extraneous considerations are taken into consideration except
the public interest. These cases regarding probity in
governance or corruption in public life dealt with by the courts
can be placed in the third phase of public interest litigation. H
742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 1 S.C.R.
A 114. We would also like to deal with some cases where
the court gave direction to the executives and the legislature
to ensure that the existing laws are fully implemented.
115. In Pareena Swarup v. Union of India (2008) 13
SCALE 84, a member of the Bar of this court filed a public
8
interest litigation seeking to declare various sections of the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 as ultra vires to the
Constitution as they do not provide for independent judiciary
to decide the cases but the members and chairperson to be
selected by the Selection Committee headed by the Revenue
C Secretary. According to the petitioner, following the case of L.
Chandrakumar v. Union of India & Others (1997) 3 SCC 261
undermines separation of powers as envisaged by the
Constitution.
D 116. We have endeavoured to give broad picture of the
public interest litigation of 1st, llnd and Ill rd phases decided by
our courts.
117. We would briefly like to discuss evolution of the public
E interest litigation in other judicial systems.
EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC INTERST LITIGATION IN OTHER
JUDICIAL SYSTEMS NAMELY, USA, U.K., AUSTRALIA
AND SOUTH AFRICA.
F AUSTRALIA
118. In Australia also for protecting environment, the
Australian court has diluted the principle of 'aggrieved person'.
119. In Australia, Public Interest Litigation has been a
G method of protecting the environment. The courts have not given
a definition of 'Public Interest Litigation', but in Oshlack v
Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 : (1998) 152
ALR 83, the High Court of Australia (apex court) upheld the
concept and pointed out the essential requirements. McHugh
H J., quoted Stein J., from the lower court:
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 743
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
"In summary I find the litigation to be properly characterised A
as public interest litigation. The basis of the challenge was
arguable, raising serious and significant issues resulting
in important interpretation of new provisions relating to the
protection of endangered fauna. The application
concerned a publicly notorious site amidst continuing B
controversy. Mr. Oshlack had nothing to gain from the
litigation other than the worthy motive of seeking to uphold
environmental law and the preservation of endangered
fauna."
120. To the court it was important that the petitioner did C
not have any other motive than the stated one of protecting the
environment. The test therefore in Australia seems to be that
the petitioner when filing a public interest litigation, should not
stand to gain in some way.
D
U.S.A.
121. The US Supreme Court realized the constitutional
obligation of reaching to all segments of society particularly the
black Americans of African origin. The courts' craftsmanship E
and innovation is reflected in one of the most celebrated path-
breaking judgment of the US Supreme Court in Oliver Brown
v. Board of Education of Topeka 347 U.S. 483, 489-493
(1954). Perhaps, it would accomplish the constitutional
obligation and goal. In this case, the courts have carried out
their own investigation and in the judgment it is observed that F
"Armed with our own investigation" the courts held that all
Americans including Americans of African origin can study in
all public educational institutions. This was the most significant
development in the history of American judiciary.
G
122. The US Supreme Court dismissed the traditional rule
of Standing in Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations v. William B. Camp 397 U.S. 150 (1970). The
court observed that a plaintiff may be granted standing
H
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A whenever he/she suffers an "injury in fact" - "economic or
otherwise".
123. In another celebrated case Olive B. Barrows v. Leola
Jackson 346 U.S. 249 (1953), 73 S.Ct. 1031 the court
observed as under:-
B
"But in the instant case, we are faced with a unique
situation in which it is the action of the state court which
might result in a denial of constitutional rights and in which
it would be difficult if not impossible for the persons whose
C rights are asserted to present their grievance before any
court. Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, we
believe the reasons which underlie our rule denying
standing to raise another's rights, which is only a rule of
practice, are outweighed by the need to protect the
o fundamental rights which would be denied by permitting the
damages action to be maintained."
124. In environment cases, the US Supreme Court has
diluted the stance and allowed organizations dedicated to
protection of environment to fight cases even though such
E societies are not directly armed by the action.
125. In United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP) 412 US 669 (1973), the court
allowed a group of students to challenge the action of the
F railroad which would have led to environmental loss.
126. In Paul J. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company 409 U.S. 205 (1972) the Court held that a landlord's
racially discriminatory practices towards non-whites inflicted an
injury in fact upon the plaintiffs, two tenants of an apartment
G complex, by depriving them of the "social benefits of living in
an integrated community."
127. Similarly, the Suprem~ Court of the United States has
granted standing in certain situi:itions to a plaintiff to challenge
H
STATE OF UTTARAl'ilCH-AL v.-BAlWANT SINGH 745
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
injuries sustained by a third party with whom he/she shares a A
"close" relationship.
128. In Thomas E. Singleton v. George J. L. Wulff 428
U.S. 106 (1976), the Court granted standing to two physicians
challenging the constitutionality of a state statute limiting 8
abortions. Similarly, in Caplin v. Drysdale 491 U.S. 617, 623-
24 n. 3 (1989), the Court granted standing to an attorney to
challenge a drug forfeiture law that would deprive his client of
the means to retain counsel.
129. The Supreme Court has also granted organizational C
standing. In Robert Warth v. Ira Seldin 422 U.S. 490, 511
(1975), the Court declared that "even in the absence of injury
to itself, an association may have standing solely as the
representative of its members." This judgment had far reaching
consequence. In James B. Hunt v. Washington State Apple D
Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977), the Court
elaborated the parameters for organizational standing where
an organization or association "has standing to bring suit on
behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise
have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks E
to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; (c)
neither the claim asserted, nor the relief requested, requires the
participation of individual members in the lawsuit".
ENGLAND
F
130. The use of PIL in England has been comparably
limited. The limited development in PIL has occurred through
broadening the rules of standing.
Broad Rules of Standing G
131. In Re. Reed, Bowen & Co. (1887) 19 QBD 174 to
facilitate vindication of public interest, the English judiciary
prescribed broad rules of standing. Under the traditional rule
of standing, judicial redress was only available to a 'person
H
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 1 S.C.R.
A aggrieved' - one "who has suffered a legal grievance, a man
against whom a decision has, been pronounced which has
wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him
something or wrongfully affected his title to something."
However, the traditional rule no longer governs standing in the
B English Courts.
132. One of the most distinguished and respected English
Judge Lord Denning initiated the broadening of standing in the
English Courts with his suggestion that the "words 'person
aggrieved' are of wide import and should not be subjected to
C a restrictive interpretation." - Attorney-General of the Gambia
v. Pierre Sarr N'Jie (1961) AC 617.
133. The Blackbum Cases broadened the rule of standing
in actions seeking remedy through prerogative writs brought by
D individuals against public officials for breach of a private right.
(e.g., mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari). Under the
Blackbum standard, "any person who was adversely affected"
by the action of a government official in making a mistaken
policy decision was eligible to be granted standing before the
E Court for seeking remedy through prerogative writs - Regina
v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Ex parte
Blackburn [1968) 2 W.L.R. 893 ("Blackburn I").
134. In Blackburn I, the Court of Appeal granted standing
F to Blackburn to seek a writ of mandamus to compel the Police
Commissioner to enforce a betting and gambling statute
against gambling clubs.
135. In Blackburn II, the Court of Appeal found no defects
in Blackburn's standing to challenge the Government's decision
G to join a common market. Blackburn v. Attorney-General
(1971) 1 W.L.R. 1037). ·
136. In Blackbum///, the Court of Appeal granted standing
to Blackburn to seek a writ of mandamus to compel the
H Metropolitan Police to enforce laws ~gainst obscene
STATE OF UTIARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 747
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
publications. Regina v. Commissioner of Police of the A
Metropolis, Ex parte Blackbum [1973] 0.8. 241.
137. In Blackbum IV, the Court of Appeal granted standing
to Blackburn to seek a writ of prohibition directed at the
Greater London Council for failing to properly use their 8
censorship powers with regard to pornographic films. Regina
v. Greater London Council ex parte. Blackburn [1976] 1
W.L.R. 550.
138. The English judiciary was hesitant in applying this
broadened rule of standing to actions seeking remedy through C
relator claims - Relator claims are remedies brought by the
Attorney General to remedy a breach of a public right. (e.g.,
declaration and injunction). Initially, Lord Denning extended the
broadeQed rule of standing in actions seeking, remedy through
prerogative writs to actions seeking remedyithrough relator D
claims. In Attorney General Ex rel McWhirter v. Independent
Broadcasting Authority, (1973) Q.B. 629 the Court stipulated
that, "in the last resort, if the Attorney-General refuses leave in
a proper case, or improperly or unreasonably delays in giving
leave, or his machinery works too slowly, then a member of the E
public who has a sufficient interest can himself apply to the
court." This rule was promptly overturned by the House of Lords
in Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers [1978] A.C. 435. In
this case, the House of Lords held that in relator claims, the
Attorney General holds absolute discretion in deciding whether F
to grant leave to a case. Thus, the English judiciary did not
grant standing to an individual seeking remedy through relator
claims.
139. Finally, an amendment to the Rules of the Supreme
Court in 1978 through Order 53 overcame the English G
judiciary's hesitation in applying a broadened rule of standing
to relatot claims. Order 53 applied the broadened rule of
standing to both actions seeking remedy through prerogative
writs and actions seeking remedy through relator claims. Rule
H
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A 3(5) of Order 53 stipulates that the Court shall not grant leave
for judicial review "unless it considers that the applicant has a
sufficient interest in the matter to which the applicant relates." -
ORDER 53, RULES OF THE SUPT. CT. (1981). In Inland
Revenue Commissioners v. National Federation of Se/f-
8 Employed and Small Businesses Ltd. (1982] A.C. 617, the
Court explained that "fairness and justice are tests to be
applied" when determining if a party has a sufficient interest.
140. In Regina v. Secretary of State for the Environment,
Ex parte Rose Theatre Trust Co. (1990) 1 Q.B. 504, the Court
C elaborated that "direct financial or legal interest is not required"
to find sufficient interest. Thus, under the new rule of standing
embodied in Order 53, individuals can challenge actions of
public officials if they are found to have "sufficient interest" - a
flexible standard.
D
SOUTH AFRICA
141. The South African Constitution has adopted with a
commitment to "transform the society into one in which there
E will be human dignity, freedom and equality." - See:
Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Nata/, 1998 (1)
SA 765 (CC), p. 5. Thus, improving access to justice falls
squarely within the mandate of this Constitution. In furtherance
of this objective, the South African legal framework takes a
F favorable stance towards PIL by prescribing broad rules of
standing and relaxing pleading requirements.
(A) Broad Rules of Standing
142. Section 38 of the Constitution broadly grants standing
G to approach a competent court for allegations of infringement
of a right in the bill of rights to:
"(a) anyone acting in their own interest;
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who
H cannot act in their own name;
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 749
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, A
a group or class of persons;
(d) anyone acting in the public interest;
(e) an association acting in the interest of its
members." 8
143. In expressly permitting class actions and third-party
actions, Section 38 prescribes broad rules of standing for
constitutional claims. Interpreting the language of Section 38,
the Constitutional Court elaborated in Ferreira v. Levin NO & C
Others 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC), p. 241 that a broad approach
to standing should be applied to constitutional claims to ensure
that constitutional rights are given the full measure of protection
to which they are entitled. In the said judgment by a separate
concurring judgment, Justice O'Regan suggested that a "wider o
net for standing" should be extended to all "litigation of a public
character."
(8) Relaxing Formal Requirements of Pleadings
144. The Constitutional Court has been prompt to relax E
formal pleading requirements in appropriate cases. In S v.
Twala (South African Human Rights Commission
Intervening), 2000 (1) SA 879, the President of the Court
directed that a hand written letter received from a prisoner
complaining about his frustration in exercising his right to F
appeal be treated as an application for leave to appeal.
145. In Xinwa & Others v. Volkswagen of South Africa
(PTY) Ltd. 2003 (4) SA 390 (CC), p. 8 the Court cemented the
Twala principle that "form must give way to substance" in public
interest litigation. The Court explained that "pleadings prepared G
by lay persons must be construed generously and in the light
most favourable to the litigant. Lay litigants should not be held
to the same standard of accuracy, skill and precision in the
presentation of their case required 1f lawyers. In construing
H
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (201 O] 1 S.C.R.
A such pleadings, regard must be had to the purpose of the
pleading as gathered not only from the content of the pleadings
but also from the context in which the pleading is prepared."
IMPACT OF PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION ON
B NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES
146. The development of public interest litigation in India
has had an impact on the judicial systems of neighbouring
countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Pakistan and
other countries.
c
p,1\KISTAN:
147. By a recent path-breaking historical judgment of the
Pakistan Supreme Court at Islamabad dated 31st July, 2009
delivered in public interest litigation bearing Constitution
0 Petition No.9 of 2009 filed by Sindh High Court Bar
Association through its Secretary and Constitution Petition
No.8 of 2009 filed by Nadeem Ahmed Advocate, both
petitions filed against Federation of Pakistan through
Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Islamabad & Others,
E the entire superior judiciary which was sacked by the previous
political regime has now been restored.
148. Another path breaking judgment delivered very
recently on 16th December, 2009 by all the 17 judges of the
F Pakistan Supreme Court in Constitution Petition Nos.76 to 80
of 2007 and 59 of 2009 and another Civil Appeal No.1094 of
2009 also has far-reaching implications.
149. In this judgment, the National Reconciliation
Ordinance (No.XV) 2007 came under challenge by which
G amendments were made in the Criminal Procedure Code,
1898 and the Representation of the People Act, 1976 and the
National Accountability Ordinance of 1999. The National
Accountability Ordinance, 1999 (for short, NAO) was designed
to give immunity of the consequences of the offences .
H committed by the constitutional authorities and other authorities
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 751
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
in power and (NRO) was.declareq void ab initio being ultra A
vires and violative ofc:otistltutional provisions including 4, 8, 25,
62(f), 63(i)(p ), 89, 175 and 227 of the Constitution. This
judgment was also delivered largely in public interest.
150. In an important judgment delivered by the Supreme
8
Court of Pakistan in Genera/ Secrerary, West Pakistan Salt
Mineral Labour Union (CBA) Khewra, Jhelum v. The Director,
Industries and Mineral Development, Punjab, Lahore reported
in 1994 SCMR 2061 (Supreme Court of Pakistan) in Human
Right Case No.120 of 1993 on 12th July, 1994 gave significant C
directions largely based on the judgments of this court.
151. The petitioners in the said petition sought
enforcement of the rights of the residents to have clean and
unpolluted water. Their apprehension was that in case the
miners are allowed to continue their activities, which are D
extended in the water catchment area, the watercourse,
reservoir and the pipelines would get contaminated. According
to the court, water has been considered source of life in this
world. Without water there can be no life. History bears
testimony that due to famine and scarcity of water, civilization E
have vanished, green lands have turned into deserts and arid
goes completely destroying the life not any of human being, but
animal life as well. Therefore, water, which is necessary for
existence of life, if polluted, or contaminated, will cause serious
threat to human existence. F
152: The court gave significant directions including
stopping the functioning of factory which created pollution and
environmental degradation.
153. Another significant aspect which has been decided G
in this case was to widen the definition of the 'aggrieved
person'. The court observed that in public interest litigation,
procedural trappings and restrictions of being an aggrieved
person and other similar technical ou:ections cannot bar the
jurisdiction of the court. The Supreme .;ourt also observed that H
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A the Court has vast power under Article 183(3) to investigate into
question of fact as well independently by recording evidence.
154. In another important case Ms. Shehla Zia v. WAPDA
PLO 1994 Supreme Court 693, a three-Judge Bench headed
by the Chief Justice gave significant directions. In the said
8
petition four residents of Street No. 35, F~6/1, Islamabad
protested to WAPDA against construction of a grid station in
F-6/1, Islamabad. A letter to this effect was written to the
Chairman on 15.1.1992 conveying the complaint and
apprehensions of tr.e residents of the area in respect of
C construction of a grid station allegedly located in the green-belt
of a residential locality. They pointed out that the
electromagnetic field by the presence of the high voltage
transmission lines at the grid station would pose a serious
health hazard to the residents of the area particularly the
D children, the infirm and the Dhobi-ghat families that live; the
immediate vicinity. The presence of electrical installations and
transmission lines would also be highly dangerous to the
citizens particularly the children who play outside in the area. It
would damage the greenbelt and affect the environment. It was
E also alleged that it violates the principles of planning in
Islamabad where the green belts are considered an essential
component of the city for environmental and aesthetic reasons.
155. The Supreme Court observed that where life of
F citizens is degraded, the quality of life is adversely affected and
health hazards created are affecting a large number of people.
The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction may grant
relief to the extent of stopping the functioning of such units that
create pollution and environmental degradation.
G SRI LANKA:
156. There has been great impact of Public Interest
Litigation on other countries. In Bulankulama and six others
v. Secretary, Ministry of Industrial Development and seven
H others (Eppawala case), the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka gave
STATE OF UTIARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 753
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
significant directions in public interest litigation. In the said A
case, 'Mineral Investment Agreement was entered between the
Government and the private company for rapid exploitation of
rock phosphate reserves at Eppawala in Sri Lanka's agriculture
rich North Central Province - High intensity mining operation
plus establishment of a processing plant on Trincomalee coast B
was set up which would produce phosphoric and sulphuric acid.
Six residents of the area of whose agricultural lands stood to
be affected filed a petition before the court in public interest. It
was stated in the petition that the project was not for a public
purpose but for the benefit of a private company and would not c
bring substantial economic benefit to Sri Lanka. The petitioners
claimed imminent infringement of their fundamental rights under
various provisions of the Constitution. The court invoked the
public trust theory as applied in the United States and in our
country in the case of M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath (1997) 1 D
SCC 388. The court upheld the petitioners' fundamental rights.
The respondents were restrained from entering into any contract
relating to the Eppawala phosphate deposit. The court allowed
the petition and the respondents were directed to give costs
to the petitioners. The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka protected E
environmental degradation by giving important directions in this
case.
NEPAL:
157. A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court of Nepal F
in Surya Prasad Sharma Dhungle v. Godawari Marble
Industries in writ petition No.35 of 1992 passed significant
directions. It was alleged in the petition that Godawari Marble
Industries have been causing serious environmental
degradation to Godawari forest and its surrounding which is rich G
in natural grandeur and historical and religious enshrinement
are being destroyed by the respondents. In the petition it was
mentioned that the illegal activities of the respondent Godawari
Marble Indus.tries have caused a huge public losses.
H
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A 158. The Supreme Court of Nepal gave significant
directions to protect degradation of environment and ecology.
The court adopted the concept of sustainable development.
159. The Indian courts may have taken some Inspiration
8 from the group or class interest litigation of the United States
of America and other countries but the shape of the public
interest litigation f!S we see now Is predominantly indigenously
developed jurisprudence.
160. The public interest litigation as developed in various
C facets and various branches is unparalleled. The Indian Courts
by its judicial craftsmanship, creativity and urge to provide
access to justice to the deprived, discriminated and otherwise
vulnerable sections of society have touched almost every
aspect of human life while dealing with cases filed in the label
D of the public interest litigation. The credibility of the superior
courts of India has been tremendously enhanced because of
soma vital and important directions given by the courts. The
courts' contribution In halplng the poorer sections of the society
by giving new definition to life and liberty and to protect ecology,
e environment and forests are extremely significant.
ABUSE OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION:
161. Unfortunately, of late, it has been noticed that such
an important jurisdiction which has been carefully carved out,
F created and nurtured with great care and caution by the courts,
is being blatantly abused by filing some petitions with oblique
motives. We think time has come when genuine and bona fide
public interest litigation must be encouraged whereas frivolous
public interest litigation should be discouraged.
G
162. In our considered opinion, we have to protect and
pre1erve this Important jurisdiction In the larger interest of the
people of this country but we must take effective steps to
prevent and cure Its abuse on the basis of monetary and non-
H monetary directions by the courts.
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BAL.WANT SINGH 7~f>
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DAl-VEE:R aHANOARI, J,]
163. In SALCO Employef's' Union (Re~d.) v. Union of A
India & Others AIR 2002 SC 360, thl~ Court recognized that
there have been, in recent times, increpsing instances of abuse
of public interest litigation. Accordingly, the court has devised
a number of strategies to ensure that the attractive brand name
of public interest litigation should not be @llowed to be used for B
suspicious products of mischief. Firstly, the Supreme Court has·
limited standing in PIL to individuals "acting bonafide."
Secondly, the Supreme Court has sanctioned the imposition
of "exemplary costs" as a deterrent against frivolous and
vexatious public interest litigations. Thirdly, the Supreme Court c
has instructed the High Courts to be more selective in
entertaining the public interest litigations.
164. In S. P. Gupta's case (supra), this Court has found
that this liberal standard makes it critical to limit standing to
individuals "acting bona fide. To avoid entertaining frivolous and D
vexatious petitions under the guise of Pll.. , the Court has
excluded two groups of persons from obtaining standing in PIL
petitions. First. the Supreme Court has rejected Jwarding
standing to "meddlesome interlopers". Second, the Court has
denied standing to lnterveners bringing pµblie intere§t litigation E
for personal gain.
165. In Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti
(supra), the Court withheld standing from the applicant on
grounds that the applicant brought the suit motivated by enmity F
between the parties. Thus, the Supreme Court has attempted
to create a body of jurisprudence that accords broad enollgh
standing to admit genuine PIL petitions, but nonetheless limits
standing to thwart frivolous and vexations petitions.
166. The Supreme Court broadly tried to curtail the G
frivolous public Interest litigation petitions by two methods ,.,.. one
monetary and second, non,monetary. The first category of
cases is that where the court Qn filing frivolous public interest
litigation petitions, dismissed the petitions with exemplary
costs. In Neetu v. State of Pubjab & Others AIR 2007 SC 758, H
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A the Court concluded that it is necessary to impose exemplary
costs to ensure that the message goes in the right direction that
petitions filed with oblique motive do not have the approval of
the Courts.
167. In S.P. Anand v. HD. Deve Gowda & Others AIR
8
1997 SC 272, the Court warned that it is of utmost importance
that those who invoke the jurisdiction of this Court seeking a
waiver of the locus standi rule must exercise restraint in moving
the Court by not plunging in areas wherein they are not well-
versed.
c
168. In Sanjeev Bhatnagar v. Union of India & Others AIR
2005 SC 2841, this Court went a step further by imposing a
monetary penalty against an Advocate for filing a frivolous and
vexatious PIL petition. The Court found that the petition was
o devoid of public interest, and instead labelled it as "publicity
interest litigation." Thus, the Court dismissed the petition with
costs of Rs.10,000/-.
169. Similarly, in Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of
E Maharashtra & Others (2005) 1 SCC 590, the Supreme Court
affirmed the High Court's monetary penalty against a member
of the Bar for filing a frivolous and vexatious PIL petition. Th~
Court found that the petition was nothing but a camouflage to
foster personal dispute. Observing that no one should be
permitted to bring disgrace to the noble profession, the Court
F concluded that the imposition of the penalty of Rs. 25,000 by
the High Court was appropriate. Evidently, the Supreme Court
has set clear precedent validating the imposition of monetary
penalties against frivolous and vexatious PIL petitions,
especially when filed by Advocates.
G
170. This Court, in the second category of cases, even
passed harsher orders. In Charan Lal Sahu & Others v. Giani
Zail Singh & Another AIR 1984 SC 309, the Supreme Court
observed that, "we would have been justified in passing a heavy
H order of costs against the two petitioners" for filing a "light-
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 757
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
hearted and indifferent" PIL petition. However, to prevent A
"nipping in the bud a well-founded claim on a future occasion,"
the Court opted against imposing monetary costs on the
petitioners." In this case, this Court concluded that the petition
was careless, meaningless, clumsy and against public interest.
Therefore, the Court ordered the Registry to initiate prosecution B
proceedings against the petitioner under the Contempt of
Courts Act. Additionally, the court forbade the Registry from
entertaining any future PIL petitions filed by the petitioner, who
was an advocate in this case.
171. In J. Jayalalitha v. Government of Tamil Nadu &
c
Others (1999) 1 SCC 53, this court laid down that public
interest litigation can be filed by any person challenging the
misuse or improper use of any public property including the
political party in power for the reason that interest of individuals
cannot be placed above or preferred to a larger public interest. D
172. This court has been quite conscious that the forum
of this court should not be abused by any one for personal gain
or for any oblique motive.
E
173. In BALCO (supra), this court held that the jurisdiction
is being abused by unscrupulous persons for their personal
gain. Therefore, the court must take care that the forum be not
abused by any person for personal gain.
174. In Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware (supra), this court F
expressed its anguish on misuse of the forum of the court under
the garb of public interest litigation and observed that the public
interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great
care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely
careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest, G
an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity seeking
is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon in the
armoury of law for delivering social justice to the citizens. The
court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique
considerations. H
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A 175. In Thaware's case (supra), the Court encouraged the
Imposition of a non-monetary penalty against a PIL petition filed
by a member of the bar. The Court directed the Bar Councils
and Bar Associations to ensure that no member of the Bar
becomes party as petitioner or in aiding and/or abetting files
B frivolous petitions carrying the attractive brand name of Public
Interest Litigation. This direction impels the Bar Councils and
Bar Associations to disbar members found guilty of filing
frivolous and vexatious PIL petitions.
176. In Holicow Pictures Pvt. Ltd. v. Prem Chandra
C Mishra & Others AIR 2008 SC 913, this Court observed as
under:
'It is depressing to note that on account of such trumpery
proceedings initiated before the Courts, innumerable days
D are wasted, the time which otherwise could have been
spent for disposal of cases of the genuine litigants. Though
we spare no efforts in fostering and developing the
laudable concept of PIL and extending our long arm of
sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the oppressed and the
E needy, whose fundamental rights are infringed and violated
and whose grievances go unnoticed, un-represented and
unheard; yet we cannot avoid but express our opinion that
while genuine litigants with legitimate grievances relating
to civil matters involving properties worth hundreds of
F millions of rupees and criminal cases in which persons
sentenced to death facing gallows under untold agony and
persons sentenced to life imprisonment and kept in
incarceration for long years, persons suffering from undue
delay in service matters -government or private, persons
awaiting the disposal of cases wherein huge amounts of
G
public revenue or unauthorized collection of tax amounts
are locked up, detenu expecting their release from the
detention orders etc. etc. are all standing in a long
serpentine queue for years with the fond hope of getting
into the Courts and having their grievances redressed, the
H
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 759
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.)
busybodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or A
officious interveners having absolutely no public interest
except for personal gain or private profit either of
themselves or as a proxy of others or for any other
extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity break the
queue muffing their faces by wearing the mask of public 8
interest litigation and get into the Courts by filing vexatious
and frivolous petitions and thus criminally waste the
valuable time of the Courts and as a result of which the
queue standing outside the doors of the Courts never
nioves, which piquant situation creates frustration in the c
minds of the genuine litigants and resultantly they loose
faith in the administration of our judicial system."
The Court cautioned by observing that:
"Public iriterest litigation is a weapon which has to be used D
with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has
to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil
of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest
and/or publicity seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as
an effective weapon in the armory of law for delivering E
social justice to the citizens. The attractive brand name of
public interest litigation should not be used for suspicious
products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of
genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity
oriented or founded on personal vendetta. F
)()()()()()()()()(
)()()()()()()()()(
The Court has to be satisfied about (a) the credentials of G
the applicant; (b) the prima facie correctness or nature of
information given by him; (c) the information being not
vague and indefinite. The information should show gravity
and seriousness involved. Court has to strike balance
between two conflicting interests; (i) nobody should be H
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 OJ 1 S.C.R.
A allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations
besmirching the character of others; and (ii) avoidance of
public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking
to assail, for oblique motives, justifiable executive actions.
In such case, however, the Court cannot afford to be
B liberal. It has to be extremely careful to see that under the
guise of redressing a public grievance, it does not
encroach upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution to
the Executive and the Legislature. The Court has to act
ruthlessly while dealing with imposters and busybodies or
c meddlesome interlopers impersonating as public-spirited
holy men. They masquerade as crusaders of justice. They
pretend to act in the name of Pro Bono Publico though
they have no interest of the public or even of their own to
protect."
D 177. The malice of frivolous and vexatious petitions did not
originate in India. The jurisprudence developed by the Indian
judiciary regarding the imposition of exemplary costs upon
frivolous and vexatious PIL petitions is consistent with
jurisprudence developed in other countries. U.S. Federal Courts
E and Canadian Courts have also imposed monetary penalties
upon public interest claims regarded as frivolous. The courts
also imposed non-monetary penalties upon Advocates for filing
frivolous claims. In Everywoman's Health Centre Society v.
Bridges 54 B.C.L.R. (2nd Edn.) 294, the British Columbia
F Court of Appeal granted special costs against the Appellants
for bringing a meritless appeal.
178. U.S. Federal Courts too have imposed monetary
penalties against plaintiffs for bringing frivolous public interest
G claims. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
("FRCP") permits Courts to apply an "appropriate sanction" on
any party for filing frivolous claims. Federal Courts have relied
on this rule to impose monetary penalties upon frivolous public
interest claims. For example, in Harris v. Marsh 679 F.Supp.
H 1204 (E.D.N.C. 1987), the District Court for the Eastern District
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 761
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
of North Carolina imposed a monetary sancnon upon two civil A
rights plaintiffs for bringing a frivolous, vexatious, and meritless
employment discrimination claim. The Court explained that "the
increasingly crowded dockets of the federal courts cannot
accept or tolerate the heavy burden posed by factually baseless
and claims that drain judicial resources." As a deterrent against B
such wasteful claims, the Court levied a cost of $83,913.62 upon
two individual civil rights plaintiffs and their legal counsel for
abusing the judicial process. Case law in Canadian Courts and
U.S. Federal Courts exhibits that the imposition of monetary
penalties upon frivolous public interest claims is not unique to c
Indian jurisprudence.
179. Additionally, U.S. Federal Courts have imposed non-
monetary penalties upon Attorneys for bringing frivolous claims.
Federal rules and case law leave the door open for such non-
monetary penalties to be applied equally in private claims and D
public interest claims. Rule 11 of the FRCP additionally permits
Courts to apply an "appropriate sanction" on Attorneys for filing
frivolous claims on behalf of their clients. U.S. Federal Courts
have imposed non-monetary sanctions upon Attorneys for
bringing frivolous claims under Rule 11. E
180. In Frye v. Pena 199 F.3d 1332 (Table), 1999 WL
974170, for example, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's order to disbar an
Attorney for having "brought and pressed frivolous claims, made F
personal attacks on various government officials in bad faith
and for the purpose of harassment, and demonstrated a lack
of candor to, and contempt for, the court." This judicial stance
endorses the ethical obligation embodied in Rule 3.1 of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("MRPC"): "a lawyer shall G
not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an
issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing
so that is not frivolous." Together, the FRCP, U.S. federal case
law, and the MRPC endorse the imposition of non-monetary
penalties upon attorneys for bringing frivolous private claims or H
public interest claims.
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C R.
A 181. In Bar Council of Maharashtra (supra) this court was
apprehensive that by widening the legal standing there may be
flood of litigation but loosening the definition is also essential
in the larger public interest. To arrest the mischief is the
obligation and tribute to the judicial system.
B
182. In SP Gupta (supra) the court cautioned that important
jurisdiction of public interest litigation may be confined to legal
wrongs and legal injuries for a group of people or class of
persons. It should not be used for individual wrongs because
individuals can always seek redress from legal aid
C organizations. This is a matter of prudence and not as a rule
of law.
183. In Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti
(supra) this court again emphasized that Article 32 is a great
D and salutary safeguard for preservation of fundamental rights
of the citizens. The superior courts have to ensure that this
weapon under Article 32 should not be misused or abused by
any individual or organization.
E 184. In Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Others (1992)
4 SCC 305, the court rightly cautioned that expanded role of
courts in modern 'social' state demand for great~r judicial
responsibility. The PIL has given new hope of justice-starved
millions of people of this country. The court must encourage
F genuine PIL and discard PIL filed with oblique motives.
185. In Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee &
Another v. C.K. Rajan & Others (2003) 7 SCC 546, it was
reiterated that the court must ensure that its process is not
abused and in order to prevent abuse of the process, the court
G would be justified in insisting on furnishing of security before
granting injunction in appropriate cases. The courts may
impose heavy costs to ensure that judicial process is not
misused.
186. In Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware (supra) this court again
H
STATE OF UTIARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 763
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
cautioned and observed that the court must look into the A
petition carefully and ensure that there is genuine public interest
involved in the case before invoking its jurisdiction. The court
should be careful that its jurisdiction is not abused by a perso'1
or a body of persons to further his or their personal causes or
to satisfy his or their personal grudge or grudges. The stream B
of justice should not be allowed to be polluted by unscrupulous
litigants.
187. In Neetu (supra) this court observed that under the
guise of redressing a public grievance the public interest C
litigation should not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the
Constitution to the Executive and the Legislature.
188. In Mis. Holicow Pictures Pvt. Ltd. (supra) this court
observed that the judges who exercise the jurisdiction should
be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil D
of PIL, an ugly private malice, vested interest and/o
publicity-seeking is not lurking. The court should ensure that
there is no abuse of the process of the court.
189. When we revert to the facts of the present then the
conclusion is obvious that this case is a classic case of the E
abuse of the process of the court. In the present case a
practicing lawyer has deliberately abused the process of the
court. In that process, he has· made a serious attempt to
demean an important constitutional office. The petitioner o'ught
to have known that the controversy which he has been raising F
in the petition stands concluded half a century ago and by a
Division Bench judgment of Nagpur High Court in the case of
Karkare (supra) the said case was approved by a Constitution
Bench of this court. The controversy involved in this case is no
longer res integra. It is unfortunate that even after such a clear G
enunciation of the legal position, a large number of similar
petitions have been filed from time to time in various High
Courts. The petitioner ought to have refrained from filing such
a frivolous petition.
H
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (201 OJ 1 S.C.R.
A 190. A degree of precision and purity in presentation is a
sine qua non for a petition filed by a member of the Bar under
the label of public interest litigation. It is expected from a
member of the Bar to at least carry out the basic research
whether the point raised by him is res integra or not. The lawyer
B who files such a petition cannot plead ignorance.
191. We would like to make it clear that we are not saying
that the petitioner cannot ask the court to review its own
judgment because of flaws and lacunae, but that should have
been a bona fide presentation with listing of all relevant cases
C in a chronological order and that a brief description of what
judicial opinion has been and cogent and clear request why
where should be re-consideration of the existing law.
Unfortunately, the petitioner has not done this exercise. The
petition which has been filed in the High Court is a clear abuse ·
D of the process of law and we have no doubt that the petition
has been filed for extraneous considerations. The petition also
has the potentiality of demeaning a very important constitutional
office. Such petition deserves to be discarded and
discouraged so that no one in future would attempt to file a
E similar petition.
192. On consideration of the totality of the facts and
circumstances of the case, we allow the appeals filed by the
State and quash the proceedings of the Civil Miscellaneous Writ
F Petition No. 689 (M/B) of 2001 filed in the Uttaranchal High
Court. We further direct that the respondents (who were the
petitioners before the High Court) to pay costs of Rs.1,00,000/
- (Rupees One Lakh) in the name of Registrar General of the
High court of Uttarakhand. The costs to be paid by the
G respondents within two months. If the costs is not deposited
within two months, the same would be recovered as the arrears
of the Land Revenue.
193. We request the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Uttrakhand
High Court to create a fund in the name of Uttarakhand High
H
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 765
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J]
Court Lawyers Welfare Fund if not already in existence. The A
fund could be utilized for providing necessary help to deserving
young lawyers by the Chief Justice of Uttarakhand in
consultation with the President of the Bar.
194. We must abundantly make it clear that we are not 8
discouraging the public interest litigation in any manner, what
we are trying to curb is its misuse and abuse. According to us,
this is a very important branch and, in a large number of PIL
petitions, significant directions have been given by the courts
for improving ecology and environment, and directions helped C
in preservation of forests, wildlife, marine life etc. etc. It is the
bounden duty and obligation of the courts to encourage
genuine bona fide PIL petitions and pass directions and orders
in the public interest which are in consonance with the
Constitution and the Laws.
D
195. The Public Interest Litigation, which has been in
existence in our country for more than four decades, has a
glorious record. This Court and the High Courts by their judicial
creativity and craftsmanship have passed a number of
directions in the larger public interest in consonance with the . E
inherent spirits of the Constitution. The conditions of
marginalized and vulnerable section of society have significantly
improved on ac~ount of courts directions in the P.l.L.
196. In our considered view, now it has become
F
imperative to streamline the P.l.L.
197. We have carefully considered the facts of the present
case. We have also examined the law declared by this court
and other courts in a number of judgments.
G
198. In order to preserve the purity and sanctity of the PIL,
it has become imperative to issue the following directions:-
(1) The courts must encourage genuine and bona fide
PIL and effectively discourage and curb the PIL filed
for extraneous considerations. H
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R
A (2) Instead of every individual judge devising his own
procedure for dealing with the public interest
litigation, it would be appropriate for each High
Court to properly formulate rules for encouraging
the genuine PIL and discouraging the PIL filed with
B oblique motives. Consequently, we request that the
High Courts who have not yet framed the rules,
should frame the rules within three months. The
Registrar General of each High Court is directed
to ensure that a copy of the Rules prepared by the
c High Court is sent to the Secretary General of this
court immediately thereafter.
(3) The courts should prima facie verify the credentials
of the petitioner before entertaining a P.l.L.
D (4) The court should be prima facie satisfied regarding
the correctness of the contents of the petition before
entertaining a PIL.
(5) The court should be fully satisfied that substantial
public interest is involved before entertaining the
E
petition.
(6) The court should ensure that the petition which
involves larger public interest, gravity and urgency
must be given priority over other petitions.
F
(7) The courts before entertaining the PIL should
ensure that the PIL is aimed at redressal of genuine
public harm or public injury. The court should also
ensure that there is no personal gain, private motive
G or oblique motive behind filing the public interest
litigation.
(8) The court should also ensure that the petitions filed
by busybodies for extraneous and ulterior motives
must be discouraged by imposing exemplary costs
H
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. BALWANT SINGH 767
CHAUFAL & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
or by adopting similar novel methods to curb A
frivolous petitions and the petitions filed for
extraneous considerations.
199. Copies of this judgment be sent to the Registrar
Generals of all the High Courts within one week.
B
200. These appeals are listed on 03.05.2010 to ensure
compliance of our order.
R.P. Appeals adjourned.
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