Holding

The departmental enquiry was invalid due to bias and violation of natural‑justice principles, rendering the dismissal orders unlawful.

Summary

The case involved a temporary forest guard, Kharak Singh, who was charged with illegal felling of trees and dismissed after a departmental enquiry. The enquiry officer, who had inspected the forest himself, acted as investigator, prosecutor and judge, and recommended dismissal without allowing the employee to examine witnesses or receive the enquiry report and supporting documents. The Supreme Court held that such conduct violated the principles of natural justice and rendered the enquiry infirm. It also noted that an enquiry officer cannot prescribe punishment, which is the exclusive domain of the disciplinary authority. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court’s order quashing the dismissal and directing reinstatement, and dismissed the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether the departmental enquiry complied with the principles of natural justice, particularly regarding bias and the right to cross‑examine witnesses.
Whether an enquiry officer may act as investigator, prosecutor and judge in the same enquiry.
Whether the employee must be furnished with the enquiry report and documents before the disciplinary authority decides on guilt.
Whether the enquiry officer can recommend dismissal in his report.
Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the dismissal orders.

Subjects

departmental enquirynatural justicebiasprocedural fairnessservice lawdismissalforest guarddisciplinary action

Judgment

[2008] 12 S.C.R. 54

A STATE OF UTTARANCHAL & ORS.
+-
v.
KHARAK SINGH
(Civil Appeal No. 4531 of 2007)
AUGUST 13, 2008.
B
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN AND P. SATHASIVAM, JJ]

Service law - Departmental enquiry - Forest Guard al-
legedly involved in illegal felling of trees - Enquiry conducted
c by enquiry officer - Dismissal of employee by disciplinary au-
thority as well as appellate authority - Quashing of by High
Court - Justification of- Held: Justified since there were infir-
mities in conducting the enquiry - Enquiry Officer himself in-
spected areas in the forest and noted shortfall of trees, con-
ducted enquiry, held that charges were proved and recom-
D
mended dismissal from service - He himself acted as inves-
tigator, prosecutor and judge which is opposed to principles -t-
of natural justice - A/so, delinquent not furnished with the re-
quired documents and department's witnesses not examined
in his presence - Principles to be followed while conducting
E enquiry proceedings, culled out.

The respondent was working as a temporary forest
guard. He was charge sheeted for his involvement in the
illegal cutting of trees. The enquiry was entrusted to the
F Enquiry Officer who submitted his report. On basis thereof,
the Divisional Forest Officer dismissed the respondent. The }-
Conservator of Forest upheld the order. However, the High
Court quashed the order of the Divisional Forest Officer
as also the Conservator of Forest. It directed the appel-
lants to re-instate the respondent in service with all conse-
G
quential benefits. Hence the present appeal.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court ~

HELD: 1 From the decisions of this Court the follow-
H 54
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL & ORS. v. 55
KHARAK SINGH

---1 · ing principles would emerge as to how enquiry is to be A
conducted and which procedures are to be followed:
i) The enquiries must be conducted bona fide and
care must be taken to see that the enquiries do not be-
come empty formalities.
B
ii) If an officer is a witness to any of the incidents
which is the subject matter of the enquiry or if the enquiry
was initiated on a report of an officer, then in all fairness
he should not be the Enquiry Officer. If the said position
becomes known after the appointment of the Enquiry Of- c
ficer, during the enquiry, steps should be taken to see that
the task of holding an enquiry is assigned to some other·
officer.
iii) In an enquiry, the employer/department should
take steps first to lead evidence against the workman/de- D
Hnquent charged, give an opportunity to him to cross-ex-
amine the witnesses of the employer. Only thereafter, the
workman/delinquent be asked whether he wants to lead
any evidence and asked to give any explanation about
the evidence led against him. E
iv) On receipt of the enquiry report, before proceeding
further, it is incumbent on the part of the disciplinary/pun-
ishing authority to supply a copy of the enquiry report and
all connected materials relied on by the enquiry officer to
enable him to offer his views, if any. [Para 11] [64,B-G] F
Associated Cement Co. Ltd. vs. The Workmen and Anr.
(1964) 3 SCR 652; Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and
Others vs. B. Karunakar and Others (1993) 4 SCC 727;
Radhey Shyam Gupta vs. UP State Agro Industries Corpora- G
tion Ltd. and Another (1999) 2 SCC 21; Syndicate Bank and
Others vs. Venkatesh Gururao Kurati (2006) 3 SCC 150;
A.N.D'Silva vs. Union of India, (1962) Supp 1 SCR 968 - re-
lied on.
2.1 In the instant case, it is clear that the Enquiry Of- H
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS · [2008] 12 S.C.R.

A ficer himself has acted as the Investigator, Prosecutor and +-.
Judge. Such a procedure is opposed to principles of natu-
ral justice. Though a detailed explanation was submitted
controverting the charges levelled against the delinquent,
no enquiry was ever conducted in terms of the stated prin-
B ciples. On the other hand, as is clear from the materials,
the officer who inspected and noted the shortfall of trees,
himself conducted the enquiry, arrived at a conclusion .,._.
holding the charges proved and also strongly recom-
mended severe punishment of dismissal from service. r-
F:
c The entire action and the course adopted by the enquiry
officer cannot be accepted and is contrary to the well-
. known principles. [Paras 12 and 13] [65,F,D; 66,D]
2.2 Though there is no specific bar in offering views
by the enquiry officer, in the case on hand, the enquiry of-
D fleer exceeded his limit by saying that the officer has no
right to continue in the government service and he has to
be dismissed from service with immediate effect. Award- -t'

ing appropriate punishment is the exclusive jurisdicticm
of the punishing /disciplinary authority and it depends
E upon the nature and gravity of the proved charge/charges
and other attendant circumstances. [Para 13] (66,B-C]
2.3 A reading of the enquiry report shows that the
respondent was not furnished with the required docu-
ments. The department's witnesses were not examined
F in his presence. Though the respondent who was the writ
petitioner specifically stated so in the affidavit before the >--
High Court in the writ proceedings, those·averments were t
specifically controverted in the reply affidavit filed by the \
department. Mere denial for the sake of denial is not an
G answer to the specific allegations made in the affidavit.
Likewise, there is no evidence to show that after submis-
sion of the report by the enquiry officer to the disciplin- . +
.ary authority, the respondent was furnished with the copy
of the said report along with all the relied upon documents.
H When all these infirmities were specifically pleaded and
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL & ORS. v. 57
KHARAK SINGH [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

--1· brought to the notice of the appellate authority (i.e. For- A
est Conservator), he rejected the same but has not pointed
the relevant materials from the records of the enquiry of-
ficer and disciplinary authority to support his decision.
Hence, the appellate authority also committed an error in
dismissing the appeal of the respondent. Thus, after tak- B
ing note of all the infirmities and in the light of the various
principles enunciated by this Court, the High Court rightly
interfered and quashed the orders passed by the Divi.-
sional Forest Officer as well as order passed by the Con-
servator of Forest. [Para 14-15] [66,E-H; 67,A-B] c
Case Law Reference
(1964) 3 SCR 652 Relied on. 6
(1993) 4 sec 121 Relied on. 7
(1999) 2 sec ·21 Relied on. 8 D
(2006) 3 sec 150 Relied on. 9
(1962) Supp 1 SCR 968 Relied on. 10
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4531
of 2007 E
.
From the final Judgment and Order dated 15.5.2006 of
the High Court of Uttaranchal at Nainital in Writ Petition No.
606 of 2003 (SS)
S.S. Shamshy and P.N. Gupta for the Appellants. F
P. Vinay Kumar for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was eelivered by
P. SATHASIVAM, J. 1. This appeal is directed against
the judgment and order dated 15.5.2006 of the High Court of G
Uttaranchal at Nainital in Writ Petition No. 606 of 2003 (SS)
whereby the writ petition filed by the respondent herein was al-
lowed quashing the orders dated 5.3.1986 passed by the Divi-
sional Forest Officer, Haldwani Forest Division, Dist. Nainital
H
58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.

A and dated 27.4.1991 passed by the Conservator of Forest, -f...
Western Circle, Nainital dismissing the respondent from ser-
vice.
2. The brief facts are stated as under:
B The respondent herein was a temporary Forest Guard and
was posted in Nandhaur Range of Haldwani Forest Division,
Nainital. In 1984, when he was incharge of Asani Beat in Nandhor
Range of Haldwani Forest Division, illegal felling of 11 Sal trees
and 24 Kokat species took place in Asani Beat Nos. 1, 3 and 5
c which were allotted to the U.P. Forest Corporation for felling of
marked dead, dying and diseased trees. In the diary maintained
by the Department, during the months of March and April, 1984,
the respondent visited the above compartments regularly and
certified that there was no illicit felling of trees in his beat during
D the period under reporting. On 23.5.1984, sub-Divisional For-
est Officer, Nandhaur seized 27 logs of Sal bearing transit ham-
mer mark of Dolpokhra Transit Barrier in Haldwani. Having seen
the hamm~r marks on the seized logs, on 24.5.1984 the SDO
directed Range Officer to trace the illicit felling of trees in and
around Dolpokhra. On being questioned by the SDO, the re-
E spondent could not satisfy the SDO. Having confirmed the in-
volvement of the respondent in the illicit felling.of trees, the Divi-
sion Forest Officer, Haldwani Forest Division by letter No. 40/
25 dated 1.6.1984, suspended the respondent. On 19~12.1984,
the Division Forest Officer served the charge sheet upon the
F respondent and the respondent gave his reply on 9.4.1985.
Thereafter, enquiry was entrusted to Sri P.V. Lohni, who sub-:-
mitted his report on 16.11.1985 to the Divisional Forest Officer,
Haldwani. On the basis of the inquiry report, the Divisional For-
est Officer vide order dated 6.3.1986 dismissed the respon-
G dent herein. Feeling aggrieved, the respondent pref~rred an
appeal before the Conservator of Forest, Western Circle,
Nainital, Appellant No.2 herein and the same was dismissed
vide order dated 27.4.1981. Questioning the said order, the
respondent herein preferred writ petition before the High Court
H praying for issuing a writ of certiorari. The High Court vide or-
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL & ORS. v. 59
KHARAK SINGH [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

~ der dated 15.5.2005 issued a writ of certiorari quashing the A
orders dated 5.3.1986 passed by the Divisional Forest Officer,
Haldwani as well as order dated 27.4.1991 passed by the Con-
servator of Forest, Western Circle, Nainital. The High Court has
directed the appellants to reinstate the respondent in service
with all consequential benefits. Aggrieved by the said order, this B
appeal by special leave has been preferred by the State of
Uttaranchal, Conservator of Forest, Western Circle, Na in ital and
~
Divisional Forest Officer, Haldwani Forest Division, Nainital.
,.
3. We heard Mr. S.S. Sliamshy, learned counsel, for the
t
appellants and Mr. P. Vinay Kumar, learned counsel, for the re- c
spondent.
~ 4. Learned co'unsel appearing for the appellants mainly
contended that the High Court committed an error in quashing
the order of dismissal of the respondent on the ground that the
D
enquiry was not properly conducted and was not free from bias.
On the other hand, according to him, the enquiry was conducted
'f-
according to rules and the punishment was awarded based on
the gravity of charges proved. Per contra, learned counsel for
the respondent supported the impugned order of the High Court
by pointing out the infirmities in conducting enquiry. E

5. Before analyzing the correctness of the above submis-
sions, it is useful to refer various principles laid down by this
Court as to how enquiry is to be conducted and which proce-
dures are to be followed. F
. ), 6. The following observations and principles laid down by
this Court in Associated Cement Co. Ltd. vs. The Workmen
and Anr. (1964] 3 SCR 652 are relevant:
"...... In the present case, the first serious infirmity from
G
which the enquiry suffers proceeds from the fact that the
three enquiry officers claimed that they themselves had
-I witnessed the alleged misconductof Malak Ram. Mr. Kolah
f
contends that if the Manager and the other officers saw Malak
Ram committing the act of misconduct, that itself would n<'t
disqualify them from holding the domestic enquiry. We are H
60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.

A not prepared to accept this argument. If an officer himself
sees the misconduct of a workman, it is desirable that the
enquiry should be left to be held by some other person who
does not claim to be an eye-witness of the impugned incident.
As we have repeatedly emphasised, domestic enquiries must
be conducted honestly and bona fide with a view to determine
B whether the charge framed against a particular employee is
proved or not, and so, care must be taken to see that these
enquiries do not become empty formalities. If an officer claims
that he had himself seen the misconduct alleged against an
employee, in fairness steps should be taken to see that the
c task of holding an enquiry is assigned to some other officer.
How the knowledge claimed by the enquiry officer can vitiate
the entire proceedings of the enquiry is illustrated by the
present enquiry itself ........ .
. . . . . . . . . . It is necessary to emphasise that in domestic
D enquiries, the employer should take steps first to lead evidence
against the workman charged, give an opportunity to the
workman to cross-examine the said evidence and then should
the workman be asked whether he wants to give any
explanation about the evidence led against him. It seems to
us that it is not fair in domestic enquiries against industrial
E
employees ~hat at the very commencement of the enquiry,
the employee should be closely cross-examined even before
any other evidence is led against him. In dealing with domestic
enquiries held in such industrial matters, we cannot overlook
the fact that in a large majority of cases, employees are likely
F to be ignorant, and so, it is necessary not to expose them to
the risk of cross-examination in the manner adopted in the
present enquiry proceedings. Therefore, we are satisfied that
Mr. Sule is right in contending that the course adopted in the
present enquiry proceedings by which Malak Ram was
G elaborately cross-examined at the outset constitutes another
infirmity in this enquiry."
7. In Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Others ~
I

VS. B. Karunakar and Others, (1993) 4 sec 727' it was held:

"Where· the enquiry officer is other than the disciplinary
H
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL & ORS. v. 61
KHARAK SINGH [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

authority, the disciplinary proceedings break into two stages. A
The first stage ends when the disciplinary authority arrives at
its conclusions on the basis of the evidence, enquiry officer's
report and the delinquent employee's reply to it. The second
stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to impose
penalty on the basis of its conclusions. If the disciplinary
B
authority decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings, the
second stage is not even reached.
--\
While the right to represent against the findings in the report
is part of the reasonable opportunity available during the first
stage of the inquiry viz., before the disciplinary authority takes
into consideration the findings in the report, the right to show
c
cause against the penalty proposed belongs to the second
stage when the disciplinary authority has considered the
findings in the report and has come to the conclusion with
regard to the guilt of the employee and proposes to award
penalty on the basis of its conclusions. The first right is the D
right to prove innocence. The second right is to plead for
';"-
either no penalty or a lesser penalty although the conclusion
regarding the guilt is accepted. It is the second right exercisable
at the second stage which was taken away by the Forty-
second Amendment. The second stage consists of the
E
issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed
penalty and of considering the reply to the notice and deciding
upon the penalty. What is dispensed with is the opportunity of
making representation on the penalty proposed and not of
opportunity of making representation on the report of the
, enquiry officer. The latter right was always there. But before F
the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution, the point of
~ time at which it was to be exercised had stood deferred till the
second stage viz., the stage of considering the penalty. Till
that time, the conclusions that the disciplinary authority might
have arrived at both with regard to the guilt of the employee G
and the penalty to be imposed were only tentative. All that has
happened after the Forty-second Amendment of the
Constitution is to advance the point of time at which the
representation of the employee against the enquiry officer's
report would be considered. Now, the disciplinary authority
has to consider the representation of the employee against H
62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.

A the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his ~
guilt or innocence in respect of the charges.
Article ._311 (2) says that the employee shall be given a
"reasor:iable opportunity of being heard in respect of the
charges· against him". The findings on the charges given by
B a third person like the enquiry officer, particularly when they
are not borne out by the evidence or are arrived at by
overlooking the evidence or misconstruing it, could themselves 'r-·
constitute new unwarranted imputations. The proviso to Article i-
311 (2) in ·effect accepts two successive stages of differing
scope. Since the penalty is to be proposed after the inquiry,
c which inquiry in effect is to be carried out by the disciplinary
auttiority (the enquiry officer being only his delegate appointed
'\.
to hold the inquiry and to assist him), the employee's reply to
the enquiry officer's report and consideration of such reply by
the disciplinary authority also constitute an integral part of
D such inquiry.
Hence, when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority,
>-:'
the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the
enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority arrives
at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the.
E employee with regard to the charges levelled against him.
That right is a part of the employee's right to defend himself
~
against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the enquiry ·•
officer's report before the disciplinary authority takes its
decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity
F to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the
principles of natural justice.
,___
8. In Radhey Shyam Gupta vs. UP State Agro Indus-
tries Corporation Ltd. and Another, (1999) 2 SCC 21, it was
held:
G
· "34. But in cases where the termination is preceded by an
enquiry and evidence is received and findings as to misconduct I

of a definitive nature are arrived at behind the back of the i...
1~

officer and where on the basis of such a report, the termination
order is issued, such an order will be violative of the principles
H of natural justice inasmuch as the purpose of the enquiry is
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL & ORS. v. 63
KHARAK SINGH [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
~
to find out the truth of the allegations with a view to punish him A
and not merely to gather evidence for a future regular
departmental enquiry. In such cases, the termination is to be
treated as based or founded upon misconduct and will be
punitive. These are obviously not cases where the employer
feels that there is a mere cloud against the employee's conduct
B
but are cases where the employer has virtually accepted the
""\ definitive and clear findings of the enquiry officer, which are all
arrived at behind the back of th·e employee - even though
)
such acceptance of findings is not recorded in the order of
termination. That is why the misconduct is the foundation and
not merely the motive in such cases." c
9. In Syndicate Bank and Others vs. Venkatesh Gururao
Kurati, (2006) 3 SCC 150, the following conclusion is relevant:
"18. In our view, non-supply of documents on which the enquiry
officer does not rely during the course of enquiry does not D
.,,_ create any prejudice to the delinquent. U is only those
documents, which are relied upon by the enquiry officer to
arrive at his conclusion, the non-supply of which would cause ,
prejudice, being violative of principles of natural justice. Even
then, the non-supply of those documents prejudice the case
of the delinquent officer must be established by the delinquent E
officer. It is well-settled law that the doctrine of principles of
natural justice are not embodied rules. It cannot be put in a
straitjacket formula. It depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. To sustain the allegation of
violation of principles of natural justice, one must establish F
that prejudice has been caused to him for non-observance of
principles of natural justice."

10. In regard to the question whether an enquiry officer
can indiC?ate the proposed punishment in his report, this Court,
in a series of decisions has pointed out that it is for the punish- G
ing/disciplinary authority to impose appropriate punishment and
enquiry officer has no role in awarding punishment. It is useful
to refer to the decision of this Court in A.N.D'Silva vs. Union of
India, (1962) Supp 1 SCR 968 wherein it was held:
H
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.
)..

A "In the communication addressed by the Enquiry Officer the
punishment proposed to be imposed upon the appellant if he
was found guilty of the charges could not properly be set out.
The question of imposing punishment can only arise after
enquiry is made and the report of the Enquiry Officer is
received. It is for the punishing authority to propose the
B
punishment and not for the enquiring authority." 'r---

11. From the above decisions, the following principles
would emerge:
i) The enquiries must be conducted bona fide and care
c must be taken to see that the enquiries do not
become empty formalities.
ii) If an officer is a witness to any of the incidents which
is the subject matter of the enquiry or if the enquiry
D was initiated on a report of an officer, then in all
fairness he should not be the Enquiry Officer. If the -":

said position becomes known after the appointment
of the Enquiry Officer, during the enquiry, steps should
be taken to see that the task of holding an enquiry is
assigned to some other officer.
E
iii) In an enquiry, the employer/department should take
steps first to lead evidence against the workman/
delinquent charged, give an opportunity to him to
cross-examine the witnesses of the employer. Only
F thereafter, the workman/delinquent be asked whether ~
he wants to lead any evidence and asked to give any
explanation about the evidence led against him.
iv)" On receipt of the enquiry report, before proceeding
further, it is incumbent on the part of the disciplinary/
G punishing authority to supply a copy of the enquiry '
~
report and all connected materials relied on by the
enquiry officer to enable him to offer his views, if any.
12. Now, let us consider the merits of the case on hand
and whether the High Court is justified in quashing the orders
H
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL & ORS. v. 65
KHARAK SINGH [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

passed by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate A
authority dismissing the respondent from service. In the pro-
ceedings Letter No. 1644/8 Haldwani dated December 19,
1984 (Annexure-P1) after furnishing certain factual details, the
following charges have been levelled against the delinquent:
"Charge 1: You have concealed the illegal cutting which took B
place in Asani Block from your higher officials deliberately
which caused huge financial loss to the department.
Charge 2: You have not obeyed the orders of your higher
officials and you.have traveled leaving your working without C
any reason in arbitrary manner.
Charge 3: You have shown negligence in discharging your duties."
Though a detailed explanation has been submitted con-
troverting the above charges, no enquiry in terms of the above-
mentioned principles was ever conducted. On the other hand, D
one Mr. P.C. Lohani, Dy. Divisional Forest Officer, Nadhor act-
ing as an enquiry officer after putting certain questions and se-
curing answers submitted a report on 16.11.1985. No witnesses
were examined. Apparently there was not even a presenting
officer. A perusal of the report shows that the enquiry officer E
himself inspected the areas in the forest and after taking note
of certain alleged deficiencies secured some answers from the
delinquent by putting some questions. It is clear that the En-
quiry Officer himself has acted on the Investigator, Prosecutor
and Judge. Such a procedure is opposed to principles of natu- F
ral justice and has been frowned upon by this Court.
13. Another infirmity in the report of the enqui,.Y officer is
that he concluded the enquiry holding that all the charges have
been proved and he recommended for dismissal of the delin-
quent from service. The last paragraph of his report dated G
16.11.1985 reads as under:-
"During the course of above inquiry, such facts have come
into light from which it is proved that the employee who has
doubtful character and does not obey the order, does not H
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.

A have the right to continue in the government service and it is
recommended to dismiss him from the service with immediate
effect.".

(emphasis supplied)
Though there is no specific bar in offering views by ttie
8
enquiry officer, in the case on hand, the enquiry officer exceeded -.. ,. .__
his limit by saying that the officer has no right to continue in the
government service and he has to be dismissed from service
with immediate effect. As pointed out above, awarding appro-
C priate punishment is the exclusive jurisdiction of the punishing I
disciplinary authority and it depends upon the nature and grav-
ity of the proved charge/charges and other attended circum-
stances. It is clear from the materials, the officer, who inspected
and noted the shortfall of trees, himself conducted the enquiry,
arrived at a conclusion holding the charges proved and also
D strongly recommended severe punishment of dismissal from
servfce. ·The entire action and the course adopted by the en- )I(

quiry officer cannot be accepted acd is contrary to the well-known
principles enunciated by this Court.
·· E 14. A reading of the enquiry report also shows that the
respond~nt herein .was not furnished with the required docu-
ments. The department's witnesses were not examined in his
presence. Though the respondent who was the writ petitioner
specifically stated so in the affidavit before the High Court in
the writ proceedings, those averments were specifically con-
F troverted in the reply affidavit filed by the department. Mere de- ~-
nial for the sake of denial is not ar:i answer to the specific alle-
gations made in the affidavit. Likewise, there is no evidence to
show that after submission of the report by the enquiry officer to
the disciplinary authority, the respondent herein was furnished
G with the copy of the said report along with all the relied upon
· documents. When all these infirmities were specifically pleaded
and brought to the notice of the appellate authority (i.e. Forest
Conservator), he rejected the same but has not pointed the rel-
evant materials from the records of the enquiry officer and dis-
H
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL & ORS. v. 67
KHARAK SINGH [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

ciplinary authority to support his decision. Hence, the appellate A
authority has also committed an error in dismissing the appeal
of the respondent.
15. After taking note of all the infirmities and in the light of
the various principles enunciated by this Court, the High Court
. has rightly interfered and quashed t~e orders dated 05.03.1986 8·
passed by the Divisional Forest Officer, Haldwani as well as
order dated 27.04.1991 passed by the Conservator of Forest,
Western Circle, Nainital.
16. In view of the above discussion and conclusion, the · c
appeal fails and the same is dismissed. However, there will be
no order as to costs.
N.J. Appeal dismissed.