STATE OF UTTARANCHAL AND ANOTHERversusSRI SHIV CHARAN SINGH BHANDARI AND OTHERS

                    [2013] 9 S.C.R. 609


      STATE OF UTIARANCHAL AND ANOTHER                        A
                           v.
  SRI SHIV CHARAN SINGH BHANDARI AND OTHERS
         (Civil Appeal Nos.7328-7329 of 2013)
                    AUGUST 23, 2013.
                                                              B
        [ANIL R. DAVE AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]

    SERVICE LAW:

      Ad hoc promotion - Granted to junior - Held: A senior c
has right to be considered even for adhoc promotion -- If
seniors are eligible as per the rules and there is no legal
justification to ignore them, the employer, at his whim or
caprice, cannot extend the promotional benefit to a junior on
 ad hoc basis.                                                D
      Ad hoc promotion - Granted to junior - Belated claim by
seniors to promote them from the date their junior was granted
ad hoc promotion - However on regular promotion, their
seniority in promotional post maintained - Held: Though
claim of promotion is based on the concept of equality and E
equitabifity, relief has to be claimed within a reasonable time
-- In the instant case, cause of action had arisen for assailing
the order when junior employee was promoted on ad hoc basis
-- A stale claim of getting promotional benefits should not
have been entertained by Tribunal and accepted by High F
Court -- Direction given by Tribunal which has been concurred
with by High Court, being unsustainable in law, is set aside -
Delayl/aches.

     Service matters - Limitation - Held: The issue of G
limitation or delay and /aches should be considered with
reference to the original cause of action -- A mere submission
of representation to competent authority does not arrest time.

                            609                               H
    610      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A        One of the juniors to the respondents, namely, 'MS'
    was given ad hoc promotion from Subordinate
    Agricultural Services (SAS) Group Ill to SAS Group II, by
    the Deputy Director of Agriculture on 15.11.1983.
    Thereafter the respondents and 'MS' were promoted on
B   regular basis in Group II posts. In the final seniority list
    issued on 12.2.1994 in respect of promotional cadre, the
    respondents were shown senior to 'MS'. On 14.10.2003,
    the respondents filed a petition before the Public Services
    Tribunal claiming that they were entitled to promotion
c   from SAS Group Ill to SAS Group II with effect from
    15.11.1983, the date on which their junior, 'MS', was
    promoted and, accordingly, to get their pay fixed along
    with other consequential benefits. The Tribunal allowed
    the claim and held that the respondents would be entitled
    to notional promotional benefits from 15.11.1983. The
0
    High Court upheld the order.

         In the instant appeals filed by the State Government,
    it was contended for the appellants that both, the Tribunal
    and the High Court, failed to appreciate that the claim of
E   the respondents was hit by the doctrine of delay and
    laches. It was submitted that the grant of notional
    promotion along with other consequential benefits to the
    respondents solely on the ground that the junior
    functioned in the promotional post from a prior date, was
F   not justified. The respondents, on the other hand,
    contended that they had been submitting representations
    since 1984 till they approached the Tribunal.

          Allowing the appeals, the Court
G        HELD: 1.1. If senior incumbents are eligible as per the
    rules and there is no legal justification to ignore them, the
    employer cannot extend the promotional benefit to a junior
    on ad hoc basis at his whim or caprice; and the person
    aggrieved can always challenge the same in an
H   appropriate forum, for he has a right to be considered even
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. SHIV CHARAN SINGH 611
                BHANDARI
for ad hoc promotion and a junior cannot be allowed to        A
march over him solely on the ground that the promotion
granted is ad hoc in nature. [para 12] [617-D-F]

    1.2. Although the claim of promotion is based on the
concept of equality and equitability, yet the relief has to
                                                              8
be claimed within a reasonable time. [Para 19] [620-C-D]

     Ghu/am Rasool Lone v. State of Jammu and Kashmir
                                =
and another 2009 (1 O) SCR 591 (2009) 15 sec 321; New
Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and others 2007 (3)
SCR 711   = (2007) 9 SCC 278; P. S. Sadasivasway v. State C
of Tamil Nadu 1975 (2)SCR 356 = (1975) 1 SCC 152 - relied
on

    1.3. The issue of limitation or delay and laches should
be considered with reference to the original cause of 0
action and not with reference to the date on which an
order is passed in compliance with a court's direction.
Even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of
representations relating to a stale claim or dead
grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. E
A mere submission of representation to the competent
authority does not arrest time. [Paras 14-15] [618-G-H;
619-B-C]

    State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantaray (1977) 3 SCC
396; State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar Patnaik 1976 (0) Suppl. F
        =
SCR 59 (1976) 3 SCC 579; Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited
                                                  =
v. Ghanshyam Dass and others 2011 (4) SCR 380 (2011)
4 SCC 374; Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana (1977) 6 SCC
                                                  =
538; State of T.N. v. Seshachalam 2007 (10) SCR 53 (2007)
10 SCC 137; Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. through its G
Chairman & Managing Director v. K. Thangappan and
                          =
another 2006 (3) SCR 783 (2006) 4 SCC 322; C. Jacob v.
Director of Geology and Mining and another 2008 (14) SCR
634 = (2008) 10 SCC 115; Union of India and others v. M.K.
Sarkar 2009 (16) SCR 249 = (2010) 2 SCC 59 - referred to H
    612     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2013) 9 S.C.R.


A        1.4. In the instant case, the cause of action had arisen
    for assailing the order when the junior employee was
    promoted on ad hoc basis on 15.11.1983. The
    respondents could have challenged the ad hoc
    promotion conferred on the junior employee at the
s   relevant time. However, they chose to sleep over the
    matter and any one who sleeps over his right is bound
    to suffer. Neither the Tribunal nor the High Court has
    appreciated these aspects in proper perspective; they
    proceeded on the base that a junior was promoted and,
c   therefore, the seniors cannot be denied the promotion.
    Remaining oblivious to the factum of delay and laches
    and granting relief is contrary to all settled principles and
    even would not remotely attract the concept of discretion.
    However, the same may not be applicable in all
D   circumstances where certain categories of fundamental
    rights are infringed. But, a stale claim of getting
    promotional benefits definitely should not have been
    entertained by the Tribunal and accepted by the High
    Court. True it is, notional promotional benefits have been
    granted but the same is likely to affect the State
E   exchequer regard being had to the fixation of pay and the
    pension. These aspects have not been taken into
    consideration. Equality has to be claimed at the right
    juncture and not after expiry of two decades. There may
    not be any provision providing for limitation but a
F   grievance relating to promotion cannot be given a new
    lease of life at any point of time. [Para 13 and 22] [617-G;
    618-B; 621-D-H; 622-A]

      1.5. The direction given by the Tribunal which has
G been concurred with by the High Court being
  unsustainable in law is set aside. [Para 23] [622-F]
                         Case Law Reference:
          2008 (14) SCR 634         referred to        Para 13
H         2009 (16) SCR 249         referred to        Para 14
 STATE OF UTIARANCHAL v. SHIV CHARAN SINGH 613
                 BHANDARI
    2006 (3) SCR 783             referred to       Para 15      A
    (1977) 3 sec 396             referred to       Para 16
    1976 (0) Suppl. SCR 59       referred to       Para 16
    2011 (4) SCR 380             referred to       Para 17
                                                                B
    (1977) 6 sec 538             referred to       Para 17
    2007 (10) SCR 53             referred to       Para 18
    2009 (10) SCR 591            relied on         Para 19
                                                                c
    2007 (3) SCR 711             relied on         Para 20
    1975 (2) SCR 356             relied on         Para 21

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.
7328-7329 of 2013.                                              D
    From the Judgment & Order dated 02.03.2012 of the High
Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Review Petition No. 82 of
2012 and Judgment & Order dated 04.11.2009 in Writ Petition
No. 133 of 2006.
       c                                                        E
    Rachana Srivastava, Utkarsh Sharma for the Appellants.
    Gaurav Goel, Rajesh Kumar (for E.C. Agrawala) for the
Respondents.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                  F
    DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. Delay condoned.
    2. Leave granted in both the special leave petitions.
     3. The respondents were appointed in Group Ill posts in
Subordinate Agricultural Services (SAS) in the Department of G
Agriculture in the undivided State of Uttar Pradesh. Some of
them were appointed in 1974 and some in the year 1975. A
provisii:>nal seniority list in the cadre of SAS Group Ill was
prepared where they were shown senior to one Madhav Singh
Tadagi. The said Madhav Singh Tadagi, who was working ~s H
    614      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A   Agriculture Plant Protection Supervisor, Group Ill, was given ad
    hoc promotion to the post of Assistant Development Officer
    (Plant Protection, Group II) by the Deputy Director of Agriculture
    on 15.11.1983. In the year 1983 a Selection Committee was
    constituted for making promotion to Group II posts on the basis
B   of seniority-cum-fitness from amongst the employees of Group
    Ill posts and in the said selection process the respondents as
    well as Madhav Singh Tadagi were promoted on regular basis
    in Group II posts. After regular promotion was made, a seniority
    list was finalized in respect of promotional cadre and the
c   respondents were shown senior to Madhav Singh Tadagi. The
    final seniority list was issued on 12.2.1994.

         4. On 9.11.2000, under U.P. Reorganization Act, 2000 the
    State of Uttaranchal (presently State of Uttarakhand) was
    created. The respondents as well as Madhav Singh Tadagi
D   were allocated to the State of Uttarakhand. On 14.10.2003, the
    respondents filed a claim petition No. 154 of 2003 before the
    Public Services Tribunal-bf Uttarakhand at Dehradun (for short
    "the tribunal") claiming that they were entitled to promotion from
    SAS Group Ill to SAS Group II with effect from 15.11.1983 the
E   date on which the junior was promoted and, accordingly, to get
    their pay fixed along with other consequential benefits, namely,
    arrears of salary and interest thereof. Be it noted, the
    respondents had submitted number of representations during
    the period from July, 2002 to June, 2003 but the said
F   representations were not dealt with.

        5. The claims put forth by the respondents were resisted
  by the State and its functionaries contending, inter alia, that
  promotion to Madhav Singh Tadagi was given by an officer who
G was not competent to promote any incumbent from SAS Group
  Ill to SAS Group II post; that the promotion was made without
  prejudice to the seniority of other employees; and that the
  grievance put forth was hit by limitation. The tribunal, after
  hearing the rival submissions urged before it, came to hold that
  as a junior person was extended the benefits of promotion in
H
 STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. SHIV CHARAN SINGH 615
          BHANDARI [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
the year 1983, the seniors could not be deprived of the said A
promotional benefits and, hence, they are entitled to get
promotion from the said date. Being of this view, the tribunal
directed that the respondents shall be given benefits of
promotion with effect from November, 1983 and as they had
already been promoted in the year 1989, they would be entitled B
to notional promotional benefits from 15.11.1983.

     6. Assailing the order of the tribunal the State of
Uttarakhand and its functionaries preferred Writ Petition No.
133 of 2006 before the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital.
The High Court opined that Madhav Singh Tadagi was C
promoted on ad hoc basis, continued in the said post and was
allowed increments and the promotional pay-scale till his regular
promotion, and the claimants though seniors, were promoted
on a later date on regular basis and, therefore, the directions
issued by the tribunal could not be found fault with. After D
disposal of the writ petition, an application for review was filed
with did not find favour with the High Court and accordingly it
dismissed the same by order dated 2.3.2012. Hence, the
present appeals by special leave have been preferred
challenging the said orders.                                       E

    7. We have heard Ms. Rachna Srivastava, learned counsel
appearing for the appellants, and Mr. Gaurav Goel, learned
counsel appearing for the respondents.

     8. It is urged by learned counsel for the appellants that both F
the tribunal and the High Court have failed to appreciate that
the claim put forth before the tribunal did not merit any
consideration being hit by the doctrine of delay and laches
inasmuch as the respondents did not challenge the grant of ad
hoc promotion to the junior employee from 15.11.1983 till G
14.10.2003. It is her further submission that the respondents
really cannot have any grievance in praesenti as said Madhav
Singh Tadagi's promotion from 1983 has been cancelled during
the pendency of the special leave petition by the competent
authority of the State Government, and quite apart from that H
    616     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A   when the junior employee was only given ad hoc promotion and
    continued in the said post but not conferred seniority in the
    promotional grade when regular promotions took place in
    1989. The learned counsel for the State would further submit
    that the grant of notional promotion along with other
B   consequential benefits to the claimant-respondents solely on
    the ground that the junior functioned in the promotional post from
    a prior date, is not justified.

         9. Mr. Gaurav Goel, learned counsel appearing for the
C   respondents, in oppugnation to the aforesaid proponements,
    would contend that the respondents had raised their grievance
    by bringing it to the notice of the Competent Authority in the year
    1984 but they fell in deaf ears. Thereafter, they submitted
    number of representations but when sphinx like silence was
    maintained by the State which is totally unexpected from a
D   model employer, they approached the tribunal and, in the
    obtaining factual matrix, the tribunal has appositely not thrown
    their claim overboard on the ground of delay and laches and,
    hence, the order passed by the tribunal, which has been given -
    the stamp of approval by the High Court, cannot be flawed. It
E   is canvassed by him that the submission that Madhav Singh
    Tadagi's promotion has been cancelled and, therefore, the
    grievance of the respondents stands mitigated, has no legs to
    stand upon, and that apart the order of cancellation has already
    been assailed before the High Court and an order of stay is in
F   vogue. A submission has also been propounded that setting
    aside of the order would be inequitable as the junior has
    already received the benefit and the seniors have been
    deprived of the same.

G         10. At the very outset, we would like to make it clear that
    we are not going to deal with the cancellation of promotion of
    the said Madhav Singh Tadagi as the same is sub-judice before
    the High Court and an order of stay has been passed. We may
    further clarify that advertence to the same by us is not required
H   for the adjudication of the controversy involved in these appeals.
STATE OF UTIARANCHAL v. SHIV CHARAN SINGH 617
         BHANDARI [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
     11. The centripodal issue that really warrants to be dwelled    A
upon is whether the respondents could have been allowed to
maintain a claim petition before the tribunal after a lapse of
almost two decades inasmuch as the said Madhav Singh
Tadagi, a junior employee, was conferred the benefit of ad hoc
promotion from 15.11.1983. It is not in dispute that the             B
respondents were aware of the same. There is no cavil over
the fact that they were senior to Madhav Singh Tadagi in the
SAS Group Ill and all of them were considered for regular
promotion in the year 1989 and after their regular promotion
their seniority position had been maintained. We have stated         c
so as their inter-se seniority in the promotional cadre has not
been affected. Therefore, the grievance in singularity is non-
conferment of promotional benefit from the date when the junior
was promoted on ad hoc basis on 15.11.1983.'

     12. It can be stated with certitude that when a junior in the   D
cadre is conferred with the benefit of promotion ignoring the
seniority of an employee without any rational basis the person
aggrieved can always challenge the same in an appropriate
forum, for he has a right to be considered even for ad hoc
promotion and a junior cannot be allowed to march over him           E
solely on the ground that the promotion granted is ad hoc in
nature. Needless to emphasise that if the senior is found unfit
for some reason or other, the matter would be quite different.
But, if senior incumbents are eligible as per the rules and there
is no legal justification to ignore them, the employer cannot        F
extend the promotional benefit to a junior on ad hoc basis at
his whim or caprice. That is not permissible.

     13. We have no trace of doubt that the respondents could
have challenged the ad hoc promotion conferred on the junior         G
employee at the relevant time. They chose not to do so for six
years and the junior employee held the promotional post for six
years till regular promotion took place. The submission of the
learned counsel for the respondents is that they had given
representations at the relevant time but the same fell in deaf       H
    618        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013) 9 S.C.R.


A ears. It is interesting to note that when the regular selection took
  place, they accepted the position solely because the seniority
  was maintained and, thereafter, they knocked at the doors of
  the tribunal only in 2003. It is clear as noon day that the cause
  of action had arisen for assailing the order when the junior
B employee was promoted on ad hoc basis on 15.11.1983. In C.
  Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining and Another, 1 a two-
  Judge Bench was dealing with the concept of representations
  and the directions issued by the court or tribunal to consider
  the representations and the challenge to the said rejection
c thereafter. In that context, the court has expressed thus: -

          "Every representation to the Government for relief, may not
          be replied on merits. Representations relating to matters
          which have become stale or barred by limitation, can be
          rejected on that ground alone, without examining the merits
D         of the claim. In regard to representations unrelated to the
          Department, the reply may be only to inform that the matter
          did not concern the Department or to inform the
          appropriate Department. Representations with incomplete
          particulars may be replied by seeking relevant particulars.
E         The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a fresh
          cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim."

       14. In Union of India and Others v. M.K. Sarkar, 2 this Court,
  after referring to C. Jacob (supra} has ruled that when a belated
F representation in regard to a "stale" or "dead" issue/dispute is
  considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the
  court/tribunal to do so, the date of such decision cannot be
  considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the
  "dead" issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of limitation or
G delay and laches should be considered with reference to the
  original cause of action and not with reference to the date on
  which an order is passed in compliance with a court's direction.
  Neither a court's direction to consider a representation issued
    1.   c2ooa) 10 sec 115 ..
H 2. c2010) 2 sec 59.
 STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. SHIV CHARAN SINGH 619
          BHANDARI [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
without examining the merits, nor a decision given in                 A
compliance with such direction, will extend the limitation, or
erase the delay and laches.

     15. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that
even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of
representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance it        B
does not give rise to a fresh cause of action.
The dead cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly,
a mere submission of representation to the competent authority
does not arrest time. In Kamataka Power Corpn. Ltd. through
its Chairman & Managing Director v. K. Thangappan and                 C
Another, 3 the Court took note of the factual position and laid
down that when nearly for two decades the respondent-
workmen therein had remained silent mere making of
representations could not justify a belated approach.
                                                                      D
      16. In State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantaray4 it has
been opined that making of repeated representations is not a
satisfactory explanation of delay. The said principle was
reiterated in State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar Patnaik. 5

      17. In Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Ghanshyam                E
Dass (2) and Others, 6 a three-Judge Bench of this Court
reiterated the principle stated in Jagdish Lal v. State of
Haryana7 and proceeded to observe that as the respondents
therein preferred to sleep over their rights and approached the
tribunal in 1997, they would not get the benefit of the order dated   F
7.7.1992.
    18. In State of T.N. v. Seshachalam, 8 this Court, testing
the equality clause on the bedrock of delay and laches
3.   (2006) 4 sec 322.                                                G
4.   (1977) 3 sec 396.
5.   (1976) 3 sec 579.
6.   c2011) 4 sec 374.
1.   (1977) 6 sec 538.
8.   c2007) 10 sec 137.                                               H
    620       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A   pertaining to grant of service benefit, has ruled thus: -

          ".... filing of representations alone would not save the period
          of limitation. Delay or laches is a relevant factor for a court
          of law to determine the question as to whether the claim
          made by an applicant deserves consideration. Delay and/
8         or laches on the part of a government servant may deprive
          him of the benefit which had been given to others. Article
          14 of the Constitution of India would not, in a situation of
          that nature, be attracted as it is well known that law leans
          in favour of those who are alert and vigilant."
c
          19. There can be no cavil over the fact that the claim of
    promotion is based on the concept of equality and equitability,
    but the said relief has to be claimed within a reasonable time.
    The said principle has been stated in Ghulam Rasool Lone
D v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Another. 9
        20. In New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and
  Others, 10 the Court has opined that though there is no period
  of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226
  of the Constitution of India, yet ordinarily a writ petition should
E be filed within a reasonable time. In the said case the
  respondents had filed the writ petition after seventeen years
  and the court, as stated earlier, took note of the delay and
  laches as relevant factors and set aside the order passed by
  the High Court which had exercised the discretionary
F jurisdiction.

      21. Presently, sitting in a time machine, we may refer to a
  two-Judge Bench decision in P.S. Sadasivasway v. State of
  Tamil Nadu, 11 wherein it has been laid down that a person
G aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head
  should approach the Court at least within six months or at the
  most a year of such promotion. It is not that there is any period
    9.   c2009) 15 sec 321.
    10. c2001) 9 sec 21a.
H   11. (1975) 1sec152.
  STATE OF UTTARANCHAL v. SHIV CHARAN SINGH 621
           BHANDARI [DIPAK MISRA, J.)
of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article   fo:
226 nor is it that there can never be .a case wbere the Courts
cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length
of time, but it woula be a sound and wise exercise of discretion
for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers
under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach          B
it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to
happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims
and try to unsettle settled matters.

        22. We are absolutely conscious that in the case at hand C
  the seniority has not been disturbed in the promotional cadre
  and no promotions may be unsettled. There may not be
  unsettlement of the settled position but, a pregnant one, the
  respondents chose to sleep like Rip Van Winkle and got up
  from their slumber at their own leisure, for some reason which
  is fathomable to them only. But such fathoming of re~sons by D
  oneself is not countenanced in law. Any one who sleeps over
  his right is bound to suffer. As we perceive neither the tribunal
  nor the High Court has appreciated these aspects in proper
  perspective and proceeded on the base that a junior was
  promoted and, therefore, the seniors cannot be denied the E
  promotion. Remaining oblivious to the factum of delay and
  laches and granting relief is contrary to all settled principles and
. even would not remotely attract the concept of discretion. We
  may hasten to add that the same may not be applicable in all
  circumstances where certain categories of fundamental rights F
  are infringed. But, a stale claim of getting promotional benefits
  definitely should not have been entertained by the tribunal and
  accepted by the High Court. True it is, notional promotional
  benefits have been granted but the same is likely to affect the
  State exchequer regard being hadLto the fixation of pay and the G
  pension. These aspects have not been taken into consideration.
 What is urged before us by the teamed counsel for the
  respondents is that they should have been equally treated with
  Madhav Singh Tadagi. But equality has to be claimed at the right
 juncture and not after expiry of two decades. Not for nothing, it H
     622     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013) 9 S.C.R.

A    has been said that~verything may stop but not the time, f9r all
     are in a way slaves of time. There may not be any provision
     providing for limitation but a grievance relating to promotion
     cannot be given a new lease of life at any point of time.

 8
       23. We will be failing in our duty if we do not state
  something about the benefit of promotion conferred on the
  junior employee. We have been apprised by the learned
  counsel for the State that the promotion extended to him on
  15.11.1983 has been cancelled and, as further put forth by the
C learned counsel for the respondents, the same is under assail
  before the High Court. The said Madhav Singh Tadagi was
  neither a party before the tribunal nor before the High Court and
  he is also not a party before this Court. As presently advised,
  we refrain ourselves from expressing any opinion on the
  cancellation of promotion and the repercussions of the same.
D As the matter is sub-judice before the High Court, suffice it to
  say that the High Court shall deal with the same in accordance
  with the settled principles of law in that regard. We say no more
  on the said score. However, we irrefragably come to hold that
  the direction given by the tribunal which has been concurred
E with by the High Court being absolutely unsustainable in law is
  bound to be axed and we so do.

         24. Consequently, the appeals are allowed and the orders
     passed by the High Court and that of the tribunal are set aside.
     There shall be no order as to costs.       ·
IF
     R.P.                                         Appeals allowed.