STATE OF UTTARAKHANDversusYOGENDRA NATH ARORA
- Citation
- 2013 INSC 171
- Decided
- 18 March 2013
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- C K PRASAD
Holding
Repatriation does not amount to removal from office; therefore, the authority competent to remove the public servant (the Uttar Pradesh Government) is the only body that can grant sanction under Section 19(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Summary
Yogendra Nath Arora, a Deputy General Manager of a Uttar Pradesh state undertaking, was on deputation to a Uttarakhand government undertaking when he was arrested for accepting a bribe. The Uttarakhand State Government repatriated him to his parent organization and granted sanction for prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The High Court quashed the prosecution, holding that only the Uttar Pradesh Government, as the authority competent to remove him from his office, could grant the required sanction. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether repatriation amounts to removal from office within the meaning of Section 19(1)(c) of the Act. It held that repatriation does not constitute removal; the competent authority to grant sanction is the government that can remove the public servant from service, i.e., Uttar Pradesh. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the prosecution may proceed only after sanction from Uttar Pradesh is obtained.
Issues considered
- Whether the power to repatriate a deputed public servant includes the power to remove him from his office for purposes of Section 19(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
- Which government (Uttarakhand or Uttar Pradesh) is the competent authority to grant sanction for prosecution of a public servant on deputation.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 482
- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 13(1)(d), s. 13(2), s. 19(1)(c), s. 7
Subjects
Judgment
[2013) 5 S.C.R. 233
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND A
v.
YOGENDRA NATH ARORA
(Criminal Appeal No. 459 of 2013)
MARCH 18, 2013 B
[CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD AND
V. GOPALA GOWDA, JJ.]
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - s.19(1)(c) - Sanction
for prosecution - Competent authority - Employee of an C
undertaking of the State of Uttar Pradesh - Consequently
taken on deputation and posted in a undertaking of the State
of Uttarakhand - While working there, case lodged against
employee-respondent u/s. 7 rlw s. 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Act
- Respondent repatriated on the same day to his parent D
organization by the State Government of Uttarakhand which
also granted sanction for his prosecution - High Court
quashed prosecution holding that the State Government of
the Uttar Pradesh was competent to remove him and to grant
necessary sanction,_ and not the State Government of E
Uttarakhand - Whether respondent being on deputation to an
undertaking of the State Government of Uttarakhand, it had
the power to repatriate him which would mean the power of
removal from office by the State Government of Uttarakhand
- Held, No - The power to repatriate does not embrace within F
itself the power of removal from office as envisaged ul
s.19(1)(c) of the Act - The purport of taking the sanction from
the authority competent to remove a corrupt government
servant from his office is not only to remove him from his
temporary office but to remove him from government service G
- It was the State Government of the Uttar Pradesh which was
competent to remove the respondent and to grant necessary
sanction.
233 H
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 5 S.C.R.
A Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Office - Meaning of
- Repatriation - Effect of - Words and Phrases.
The accused-respondent was earlier employed in an
undertaking of the State of Uttar Pradesh. Consequent
8 upon reorganization of the State of Uttar Pradesh, he was
taken on deputation and posted in a Government
undertaking of the State of Uttarakhand. While working
there, he was arrested for accepting illegal gratification
and a case was lodged under Section 7 read with Section
C 13(1 )(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988. The respondent was repatriated on the same day
to his parent organization by the State Government of
Uttarakhand which also granted sanction for his
prosecution. By the impugned judgment, the High Court
held that the respondent being an employee of an
D undertaking of the State Government of Uttar Pradesh
and having been repatriated to his parent department, it
was the State Government of the Uttar Pradesh which
was competent to remove him and to grant necessary
sanction, and not the State Government of Uttarakhand
E and accordingly~ quashed the prosecution of the,
respondent for being without valid sanction.
The State of Uttarakhand contended before this
Court that the respondent being on deputation to an
F undertaking of the State Government of Uttarakhand, it
had the power to repatriate him which would mean the
power of removal from office by the State Government of
Uttarakhand.
G The question which therefore arose for determination
was whether removal from his office would mean
dislodging from holding that office and shifting to another
office or in other words, whether the power of the State
Government of Uttarakhand to repatriate the respondent
H tneant that it had the power to remove. ·
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND v. YOGENDRA NATH 235
ARORA
Dismissing the appeal, the Court A
HELD: 1.1. Office means a position which requires
the person holding it to perform certain duties and
discharge certain obligations and removal from his office
would mean to snap that permanently. By repatriation, the 8
person holding the office on deputation may not be
required to perform that duty and discharge the obligation
of that office, but nonetheless he continues to hold office
and by virtue thereof performs certain other duties and
discharge certain other obligations. Therefore the power c
to repatriate does not embrace within itself the power of
removal from office as envisaged under Section 19(1)(c)
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The term
removal means the act of removing from office or putting
an end to an employment. The purport of taking the 0
sanction from the authority competent to remove a
corrupt government servant from his office is not only to
remove him from his temporary office but to remove him
from government service. [Paras 11, 12] {241-B-D, F-G]
1.2. It: is common ground that without prejudice to E
the contention raised in the present appeal, the State
Government of Uttarakhand has written to the State
Government of Uttar Pradesh for granting sanction. Since
the request of the State Government of Uttarakhand for
sanction of prosecution of the accused-respondent is still F
pending before the State Government of Uttar Pradesh,
hence, it is. deemed expedient that the latter takes
decision on the request so made, if already not taken.
[Paras 6, 13] [238-C-D, 241-G-H]
G
V.K. Sharma v. State (Delhi Admn.) 1975 (1) SCC 784:
1975 (3) SCR 922 -relied on.
R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antu/ay(1984) 2 SCC 183: 1984 (2)
SCR 495 - referred to. H
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 5 S.C.R.
A Case Law Reference:
1984 (2) SCR 495 referred to Para 8
1975 (3) SCR 922 relied on Para 12
B CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 459 of 2013. ·
From the Judgment & Order dated 06.11.2006 of the High
Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Criminal Misc. Application
No. 740 of 2005.
c
Rachana Srivastava, Utkarsh Sharma for the Appellant.
R.G. Srivastava, Balraj Dewan, V.N. Raghupathy for the
Respondent.
D The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J. 1. Yogendra Nath
Arora (hereinafter referred to as "the Accused") was earlier
employed as Deputy General Manager in U.P. Industrial
E Consultants, an undertaking of the State of Uttar Pradesh.
Consequent upon reorganization of the State of Uttar Pradesh,
he was taken on deputation on 23rd January, 2003 and posted
as Deputy General Manager of the State Industrial
Development Corporation, (hereinafter referred to as
F "SIDCUL"), a Government undertaking of the State of
Uttarakhand. While working as tlie Deputy General Manager
of SIDCUL, a trap was laid on 30th of June, 2004 and he was
arrested while accepting an illegal gratification of Rs.30,000/-
. This led to lodging of Criminal Case No. 168 of 2004 at Police
Station Dalanwala, District Dehradun under Section 7 read
G with Section 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The accused
was repatriated on the same day to his parent organization by
the State Government of Uttarakhand. It also granted sanction
for his prosecution on 23rd of August, 2004 and the charge
H
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND v. YOGENDRA NATH 237
ARORA [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.)
sheet was submitted on 25th of August, 2004 in the Court of A
Special Judge, Anti-Corruption-II, Nainital. Accused prayed for
discharge, inter alia contending that the materials on record are
not sufficient for framing of the charge and further, in the
absence of valid sanction from the competent authority, as
required under Section 19(1 )(c) of the Act, the trial can not B
legally proceed. The Special Judge, by his order dated 18th
of August, 2005 rejected his contention, inter alia, observing
that there is sufficient material on record for framing of the
charge. As regard the plea of absence of sanction, the learned
Judge observed as follows: c
"... the question of sanction being merely an incident to the
trial of the case is not to be considered at this stage. It is
undoubtedly true, that the accused was an employee of the
State of Uttar Pradesh and was on deputation to the State
of Uttara11chal and under the subordination and D
administrative control of the State of Uttaranchal. Thus, the
question of sanction being incident to the trial of the case
and on perusal of the record, there is a sufficient material
on record to charge the accused, the accused shall be
charged under Section 7 read with .Section 13(a)(d} and E
13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988."
2. Accordingly, the Special Judge rejected the prayer of
the accused.
F
3. Aggrieved by the same, the accused preferred an
application under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Gode
before the High Court challenging the aforesaid order. It was
contended before the High Court that the accused being an
employee of an undertaking of the State Government of Uttar
Pradesh, the State Government of Uttarakhand is not G
competent to grant sanction. This submission found favour with
the High Court. The High Court held that the accused being an
employee of an undertaking of the. State Government of Uttar
Pradesh and having been repatriated to his parent department,
it is the State Government of the Uttar Pradesh which is H
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 5 S.C.R.
A competent to remove him and to grant necessary sanction.
Accordingly, the High Court quashed the prosecution of the
accused being without valid sanction and, while doing so,
observed that the State Government of Uttarakhand shall be at
liberty to prosecute the accused after obtaining valid sanction
B from the State Government of Uttar Pradesh.
4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the State of
Uttarakhand has filed the present special leave petition.
5. Leave granted.
c
6. It is common ground that without prejudice to the
contention raised in the present appeal, the State Government
of Uttarakhand has written to the State Government of Uttar
Pradesh for gral')ting sanction. But, till date no decision has
o been communicated.
7. Ms. Rachana Srivastava, learned counsel representing
the State of Uttarakhand concedes that sanction by the
competent State Government is necessary for prosecution of
an accused for an offence punishable under Section 7 and 13
E of the Act. She points out that the accused being on deputation
to an undertaking of the State Government of Uttarakhand, it
had the power to repatriate him which would mean the power
of removal from office by the State Government of Uttarakhand.
According to her, dislodging an accused from an office and
F repatriating him would mean removal from his office. Removal
from office, according to her, would not mean the remov.al from
service. She emphasizes that the expression used in Section
19(1 )(c) is 'removal from his office' and not 'removal from
service'. Section 19(1)(c) of the Act which is relevant for the
G purpose reads as follows:
"19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.(1)
No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable
under Sections 7,10,11,13 and 15 alleged to have,..been
committed by a public servant, except with the previous
H
STATE OF UTIARAKHAND v. YOGENDRA NATH 239
ARORA [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
sanction,-........... A
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) xxx xxx xxx
(c) in the case of any other person, of the authority B
competent to remove him from his office."
8. In support of the submission reliance has been placed
to a Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in the case of
R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, (1984) 2 SCC 183 and our C
attention has been drawn to the following passage from
paragraph 23 of the judgment which reads as follows:
" ... Each of the three clauses of sub-section(1) of Section
6 uses the expression 'office' and the power to grant
sanction is conferred on the authority competent to remove D
the public servant from his office and Section 6 requires
a sanction before taking cognizance of offences
committed by public servant. The offence would be
committed by the public servant by misusing or abusing
the power of office and jt is from that office, the authority E
must be competent to remove him so as to be entitled to
grant sanction. The removal would bring about cessation
of interrelation between the office and abuse by the holder
of the office. The link between power with opportunity to
abuse and the holder of office would be severed by F
removal from office. Therefore, when a public servant is
accused of an offence of taking gratification other than
legal remuneration for doing or forbearing to db an official
act (Section 161 IPC) or as a public servant abets
offences punishable under Sections 161 and 163 (Section G
164 IPC) or as public servant obtains a valuable thing
without consideration from person concerned in any
proceeding or business transacted by such public servant
(Section 165 IPC) or commits criminal misconduct as
defined in Section 5 of the 1947 Act, it is implicit in the
H
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 5 S.C.R.
A various offences that the public servant has misused or
abused the power of office held by him as public servant.
The expression 'office' in the three sub-clauses of Section
6(1) would clearly denote that office which the public
servant misused or abused for corrupt motives for which
B he is to be prosecuted and in respect of which a sanction
to prosecute him is necessary by the competent authority
entitled to remove him from that office which he has
abused. This interrelation between the office and its abuse
if severed would render Section 6 devoid of any meaning.
c And this interrelation clearly provides a clue to the
understanding of the provision in Section 6 providing for
sanction by a competent authority who would be able to
judge the action of the public servant before removing the
bar, by granting sanction, to the taking of the cognizance
of offences by the court against the public servant.
D
Therefore, it unquestionably follows that the sanction to
prosecute can be given by an authority competent to
remove the public servant from the office which he has
misused or abused because that authority alone would be
able to know whether there has been a misuse or abuse
E of the office by the public servant and not sorne rank
outsider."
9. In fairness to her, she concedes that power to remove
the accused from service is with the State Government of Uttar
F Pradesh and if her contention that power to repatriate would
rpean the power to remove from service d<?es not find favour,
it shall be the State Government of Uttar Pradesh which would
be competent to grant sanction.
10. Mr. R.G. Srivastava, learned counsel representing the
G accused, however, contends that the expression removal from
office would mean termination from service and undisputably
in the facts of the present case it was the State Government of
Uttar Pradesh which was competent to terminate the service
of the accused. According to him, removal from office would
H mean removal from permanent employment.
STATE OF UTIARAKHAND v. YOGENDRA NATH 241
ARORA [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
11. In view of the rival submissions, the question which falls A
for determination is as to whether the expression removal from
his office would mean dislodging him from holding that office
and shifting him to another office. In other words, the power of
the State Government of Uttarakhand to repatriate the accused
would mean that it has power to remove. In our opinion, office B
means a position which requires the person holding it to
perform certain duties and discharge certain obligations and
removal from his office would mean to snap that permanently.
By repatriation, the person holding the office on deputation may
not be required to perform that duty and discharge the obligation c
of that office, but nonetheless he continues to hold office and
by virtue thereof performs certain other duties and discharge
certain other obligations. Therefore the power to repatriate
does not embrace within itself the power of removal from office
as envisaged under Section 19(1 )(c) of the Act. The term
0
removal means the act of removing from office or putting an
end to an employment. The distinction between dismissal and
removal from service is that former ordinarily disqualifies from
future employment but the latter does not. Hence, we reject this
submission of Ms. Srivastava.
E
12. The view which we have taken finds support from the
decision of this Court in the case of V.K. Sharma v. State
(Delhi Admn.), 1975 (1) SCC 784 in which it has been held
as follows:
F
"..... The purport of taking the sanction from the authority
competent to remove a corrupt government servant from
his office is not only to remove him from his temporary
office but to remove him from government service."
13. We are told by Ms. Srivastava that the request of the G
State Government of Uttarakhand for sanction of prosecution
of the accused is still pending before the State Government of
Uttar Pradesh. Hence, we deem it expedient that the latter
takes decision on the request so made, if already not taken,
within 8 weeks from the date of communication of this order. It H
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 5 S.C.R.
A is made clear that we are not expressing any opinion in regard
to the merit of the request made by the State Government of
Utfarakhand and it shall be decided by the State Government
of Uttar Pradesh on its own merit in accordance with law.
14. Let a copy of this order be forwarded to the Chief
8
Secretary of the State Government of Uttar Pradesh for
appropriate action forthwith.
15. In the result, we do not find any merit in this appeal and
it is dismissed accordingly with the aforesaid observation.
c
B.B.B. Appeal dismissed.
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