Holding

Plea bargaining is not recognised under Indian criminal law and is contrary to public policy; therefore a court cannot dispose of a criminal case or alter its sentence on the basis of a plea bargain.

Summary

The respondent Chandrika and two others were charged with murder under IPC sections 302, 307 and 34. The Sessions Court convicted Chandrika under section 304 and sentenced him to eight years' rigorous imprisonment. On appeal, Chandrika did not contest the conviction but sought a plea bargain on the sentence; the Allahabad High Court accepted the bargain, reduced the sentence to time already served plus a fine, and upheld the conviction. The State of Uttar Pradesh appealed, questioning the legality of plea bargaining in a serious criminal case. The Supreme Court held that plea bargaining is not recognised under Indian criminal law, is contrary to public policy, and cannot be used to dispose of a criminal case or to alter a sentence without a fresh appreciation of evidence. Consequently, the High Court's order was declared illegal and set aside, and the case was remitted for determination on its merits.

Issues considered

Whether plea bargaining is permissible under Indian criminal law, particularly for serious offences such as murder.
Whether a court can alter a sentence on the basis of a plea bargain without re‑appreciating the evidence.
Whether Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code allows any form of negotiated settlement beyond statutory compounding.
Whether the practice of plea bargaining violates public policy and the constitutional right to a fair trial under Article 21.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 320
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 304, s. 307, s. 34

Subjects

plea bargainingcriminal procedurepublic policysentencingconvictionIndian Penal CodeCriminal Procedure CodeArticle 21compoundingcriminal justice

Judgment

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH A
v.
CHANDRIKA

OCTOBER 29, 1999

[K.T. THOMAS AND M.B. SHAH, JJ] B

Criminal trial-Criminal case-Disposal on the basis of plea
bargaining-Held, not permissible.

Indian Penal Code, 1860: Sections 302, 304, 307 and 34-Murder- C
Accused-Conviction by Trial Court under section 304-Appeal-Acceptance
of plea bargaining by High Court--Conviction of accused under section 304
upheld but sentence altered to the period of imprisonment already undergone-
Appeal before High Court-Acceptance of plea bargaining by High Court
held illegal and erroneous--Concept of plea bargaining held against public D
policy--Court should decide case on merits-if accused corifesses his guilt
Court should impose appropriate sentence-Mere acceptance of guilt by
accused is no ground to reduce sentence.

The respondent along with two other accused persons was charged
under Section 302 read with sections 307 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, E
1860. The Sessions Judge convil:ted him under Section 304 and sentenced
him to undergo eight years' rigorous imprisonment. ID this appeal to the High
Court the re.pondent opted not to challenge the findings of conviction recorded
by the High Court with a view to bargain on the question of sentence. The
High Court accepted the plea bargain and maintained the conviction of
respondent under section 304 Part I, but altered the sentence to the period of F
imprisonment already undergone plus a fine of Rs. 5000 and in default of
payment rigorous imprisonment for six months. In its judgment the High
Court did not state as to what was the actual period of imprisonment undergone
by the respondent but observed that as the incident had taken place long back
and since the appellant had been in jail for sometime both as undertrial G
prisoner and as a convict it was desirable to substitute his remaining period
of jail sentence awarded by the Trial Court.

In State's appeals to this Court, on the legality of 'plea bargaining':

239 H
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD : 1, The order passed by the High Court is on the face of it, illegal
and erroneous. The concept of 'plea bargaining' is not recognised and is
against public policy under criminal justice system. Section 320 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 provides for compounding or certain offences
B with the permission of the Court and certain others even without permission
of the Court. Except the above, the concept of negotiated settlement in criminal
cases is not permissible. This method of short circuiting the hearing and
deciding the criminal appeals or cases involving serious offences requires
no encouragement. Neither the State nor the public prosecutor nor even the
.C Judge can bargain that evidence would not be led or appreciated in
consideration of getting Oee bite sentence by pleading guilty.
(241-H; 242-A, BJ

2. 1t' is settled law that on the basis of plea bargaining Court cannot
dispose of the criminal cases. The Court has to decide it on merits. If accused
D confesses his guilt, appropriate sentence is required to be imposed. Further,
the approach of the Court in appeal or revision should be to find out whether
the accused is guilty or not on the basis of evidence on record. If he is guilty,
appropriate sentence is required to be imposed or maintained. If the appellant
or his counsel submits that he is not challenging the order of conviction, as
E there is sufficient evidence to connect the accused with the crime, then also
the Court's conscience must be satisfied before passing final order that the
said concession is based on the evidence on record. In such cases, sentence
commensurating with the crime committed by the accused is required to be
imposed. Mere acceptance or admission of the guilt should not be a ground
for reduction of sentence. Nor can the accused bargain with the Court that as
F he is pleading guilty sentence be reduced. Consequently, the impugned order
passed by the High Court is quashed and set aside. The High Court is directed
to decide the appeals on merits in accordance with law. (245-E-F-G; 246-A)
Madan/al Ram Chandra Daga etc. v. State of Maharashtra, (1968) 3
SCR 34; Murlidhar Meghraj Loya v. State of Maharashtra, [1976) 3 SCC
G 684; Ganeshmal Jashraj v. Government of Gujarat and Anr., (1980) 1 sec
363; Thippaswamy v. State of Karnataka, [1983) 1 SCC 194 and Kucchia
Patel Shanti/al Kader/al v. State of Gujarat and another, [1980) 3 SCC 120,
relied on.

H Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978) 1 SCC 248, cited.
STATE v. CHANDRIKA [SHAH, J.] 241
Arnold: Law Enforcement-An Attempt at Social Dissection, 42 Yale, A
LJ 19 (1932), referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos.
1131-32 of 1999.

From the Judgment and Order dated 28.11.97 of the Allahabad High B
Court in Cr!. A. No. 2747 of 1980.

Vishwajit Singh and A.S. Pundir for the Appellant.

R.D. Upadhyay, K.L. Gautam and Girdhar G. Upadhyay, Advs. for the C
Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SHAH, J. Leave granted.
D
These appeals by special leave are filed by the State of U.P. against the
judgment and order dated 28 November, 1997 passed by the High Court of

- Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal Nos. 2747-48of1980 whereby the
High Court accepted the plea bargain and maintained the conviction of the
respondent under Section 304 part I, l.P.C. but altered the sentence to the
period of imprisonment already undergone (without stating ~ctual period of E
imprisonment undergone by the respondent) plus a fine of~'. 5000 in default
of payment R.I. for six months. The respondent along .~ith two others was
charged under Section 302 read with Sections 307 and 341.P.C. for committing
the murder of one Shyamadeo in Sessions Case No. 233 of 1980. The Sessions
Judge, Ballia by his judgment and order dated 28.11.J 980 convicted the F
respondent under Section 304 I.P.C. and sentenced him to undergo eight
years R.I. Aggrieved by the said order, respondent preferre_d an appeal before
the High Court and at the time of hearing opted not to challenge the findings
of conviction recorded by the trial Court with a view to bargain on the
question of sentence. Learned Single Judge, (Malaviya, J.) accepted the
bargain and allowed the appeal by observing inter alia that as the incident G
had taken place long back and since the appellant had been in jail for
sometime both as undertrial prisoner and as 'a. convict, it was desirable to
substitute his remaining period of jail sentence as awarded by the trial court
and altered the sentence as stated above. The State has challenged that
judgment and order by filing these appeals. H
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A It is apparent that the order passed by the High Court is, on the face
of it, illegal and erroneous. It appears that the learned Judge has overlooked
the settled law or is unaware that concept of 'plea bargaining' is not recognised
and is against public policy under our criminal justice system. Section 320 Cr.
P.C. provides for compounding of certain offences with the permission of the
B Court and certain others even without permission of the Court. Except the
above, the concept of negotiated settlement in criminal cases is not permissible.
This method of short circuiting the hearing and deciding the criminal appeals
or cases involving serious offences requires no encouragement. Neither the
State nor the public prosecutor nor even the Judge can bargain that evidence
would not be led or appreciated 'in consideration of getting flee bite sentence
C by pleading guilty.

For this purpose, we would first refer to the decision in Madan/al Ram
ChandraDaga etc. v. State of Maharashtra, [1968] 3 SCR 34 (Page No. 39),
wherein this Court held :- -
D "In our opinion, it is very wrong for a court to enter into a bargain
of this character. Offences should be tried and punished according to
the guilt of the accused. If the Court thinks that leniency can be
shown on the facts of the case it may impose a lighter sentence. But

E
the court should never be a party to a bargain by which money is
recovered for the complainant through their agency. We do not approve
-
of the action adopted by the High Court .."

Again the question of plea bargain was considered by this Court in
Murlidhar Meghraj Loya v. State ofMaharashtra, [1976) 3 SCC 684 (Para 13),
and disapproved by following succinct observation:-
F
"To begin with, we are free to confess to a hunch that the appellants
had hastened with their pleas of guilty hopefully induced by an
informal, 'tripartite understanding of light sentence in lieu of nolo
contendere stance. Many economic offenders resort to practices the
Americans call 'plea bargaining', 'plea negotiation', 'trading out' and
G 'compromise in criminal cases' and the trial magistrate drowned by a
docket burden nods assent to the sub rosa ante-room settlement. The
businessman culprit, confronted by a sure prospect of the agony and
ignominy of tenancy of a prison cell, 'trades out' of the situation, the
-
bargain being a plea of guilt, coupled with a promise of 'no jail'.
H These advance arrangements please everyone except the distant
STATE v. CHANDRIKA [SHAH, J.) 243
victim, the silent society. The prosecutor is relieved of the long A
process of proof, legal technicalities and long arguments, punctuated
by revisional excursions to higher courts, the court sighs relief that
its ordeal, surrounded by a crowd of papers and persons, is avoided

- by one case less and the accused is happy that even if legalistic
battles might have held out some astrological hope of abstract acquittal
in the expensive hierarchy of the justice-system he is free early in the
B

day to pursue his old profession. It is idle to speculate on the virtue
of negotiated settlements of criminal cases, as obtains in the United
States but in our jurisdiction, especially in the area of dangerous
economic crimes and food offences, this practice intrudes on society's
interest by opposing society's decision expressed through C
predetermined legislative fixation of minimum sentences and by subtly
subverting the mandate of the law. The jurists across the Atlantic
partly condemn the bad odour of purchased pleas of guilt and partly
justify it philosophically as a sentence concession tc a defendant who
has by his plea 'aided in ensuring the prompt and certain application D
of correctional measures to him' :

In civil cases we find compromises actually encouraged as a more
satisfactory method of settling disputes between individuals than an
actual trial. However, if the dispute ..... finds itself in the field of criminal
law, "Law Enforcement'' repudiates the idea ofcompromise as immoral, E
or at best a necessary evil. The "State" can never compromise. It
must "enforce the law". Therefore open methods of compromise are
impossible. [Arnold : Law Enforcement-An attempt at Social
Dissection, 42 Yale, L.J.L 19 (1932)]"
(Emphasis Added) F

In Ganeshmal Jashraj v. Government of Gujarat and Another, [ 1980] 1
SCC 363 and Thippaswamy v. State of Karnataka, (1983] 1 SCC 194, this
Court set-aside the order passed by t~e High Court enhancing the sentence
and remanded the matter to the Judicial Magistrate for trial of the accused in G
accordance with the Jaw, as conviction and sentence were based on admission
of guilt as a result of plea bargaining. In Ganeshmal Jashraj (Supra), the
High Court had enhanced the sentence for the offence punishable under
Section 16(l)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 by holding
that it was patently in breach of the requirement of the said Section, which
provided for a minimum sentence of imprisonment for three months (now six H
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A months). This Court set aside that order by holding that there can be no
doubt that when there is an admission of guilt made by the accused as a
result of plea bargaining or otherwise, the evaluation of the evidence by the
Court is likely to become a little superficial and perfunctory and the Court may
be disposed to refer to the evidence not critically with a view to assessing
B its credibility but mechanically as a matter of formality in support of the
admission of guilt. The entire approach of the Court to the assessment of the
evidence would be likely to be different when there is an admission of guilt
by the accused. Similarly, in Thippaswamy v. State of Karnataka, (1983) 1
SCC 194, Court observed that it would be violative of Article 21 of the
Constitution to induce or lead an accused to plead guilty under a promise or
C assurance that he would be let off lightly and then in appeal or revision, to
enhance that sentence. In such cases, the Court of appeal or revision should
set aside the conviction and sentence of the accused and remand the case
to the trial court so that the accused can, if he so wishes defend himself
against the charge and if he is found guilty, proper sentence can be passed
D against him.

This Court strongly disapproved the practice of plea bargain in Kachhia
Patel Shanti/al Kader/al v. State a/Gujarat and another, [1980] 3 SCC 120.
The Court held that practice of plea bargaining is unconstitutional, illegal and
would tend to encourage corruption, collusion and pollute the pure fount of
E justice. In that case accused was convicted under Section 16(1 )(a)(i) read with
Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 by the Magistrate
on the basis of plea bargaining which took place between prosecution, the
defence and the learned Magistrate and accused was let-off with a nominal
sentence of imprisonment till rising of the Court and a small fine. The High
F Court on its attention being drawn towards the order passed by the learned
Magistrate initiated suo motu proceeding in the revision by issuing notice to
the accused to show cause why the sentence imposed on him should not be
enhanced. The High Court enhanced the sentence and sentenced the accused /

to imprisonment for a term of three months and a fine of Rs. 500. That order
was challenged before this Court. The 'Court held that the conviction of the
G accused was based solely on the plea of guilty entered by the appellant as.
a result of plea bargaining between the prosecution, the defence and the
learned Magistrate. The Court observed that :-

"It is obvious that such conviction based on the plea of guilty
H entered by the appellant as a result of plea bargaining cannot be
STATE v. CHANDRIKA [SHAH, J.] 245
-?· sustained. It is to our mind contrary to public policy to allow a A
conviction to be recorded against an accused by inducing him to
confess to a plea of guilty on an allurement being held out to him that
if enters a plea of guilty, he will be let off very lightly. Such a
procedure would be clearly unreasonable, unfair and unjust and would
be violative of the new activist dimension of Article 21 of Constitution B
unfolded in the case of Mane/ca Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978] I
SCC 248. It would have the effect of polluting the pure fount of
justice, because it might induce an innocent accused to plead guilty
to suffer a light and inconsequential punishment rather than go through
a long and arduous criminal trial which, having regard to our cumbrous
and unsatisfactory system of administration of justice, is not only C
long drawn out and ruinous in terms of time and money, but also •
uncertain and unpredictable in its result and the judge also might be
likely to be deflected from the path of duty to do justice and he might
either convict an innocent accused by accepting the plea of guilty or
let off a guilty accused with a light sentence, thus, subverting the D
process of law and frustrating the social objective and purpose of the
/
anti-adulteration statute. This practice would also tend to encourage
corruption and collusion and as a direct consequence, contribute to
the lowering of the standard of justice. There is no doubt in our mind
that the conviction of an accused based on a plea of guilty entered
by him as a result of plea bargaining with the prosecution and the E
magistrate must be held to be unconstitutional and illegal."

Hence, it is settled law that on the basis of plea bargaining Court cannot
dispose of the criminal cases. The Court has to decide it on merits. If accused
confesses his guilt, appropriate sentence is required to be imposed. Further, F
the approach of the Court in appeal or revisions should be to find out whether
the accused is guilty or not on the basis of evidence on record. If he is guilty,
appropriate sentence is required to be imposed or maintained. If the appellant
or his counsel submits that he is not challenging the order of conviction, as
there is suffiCient evidence to connect the accused with the crime, then also
the Courfs conscious must be satisfied before passing final order that the G
-. said concession is based on the evidence on record. In such cases, sentence
commensurating with the crime committed ~y the accused is required to be
imposed. Mere acceptance or admission of the guilt should not be a ground
for reduction of sentence. Nor can the accused bargain with the Court that
as he is pleading guilty sentence be reduced. H
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A In the result, appeals are allowed. Impugned order dated 28 November,
1997 passed by the High Court is quashed and set aside. The High Court is
directed to decide the appeals on merits in accordance with law.

T.N.A. Appeals allowed. ---

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