Holding

Under the explanation to Rule 56(c), the appointing authority may refuse a voluntary retirement request on public‑interest grounds, so the notice does not become effective automatically.

Summary

Four doctors of the Provincial Medical Service applied for voluntary retirement under Rule 56(c) of the Uttar Pradesh Fundamental Rules, but the State Government did not accept their notices. The High Court allowed the doctors' writ petitions, treating them as retired. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the explanation to Rule 56(c) requires the appointing authority to consider public interest and may refuse the request; the notice does not become effective automatically after three months. Consequently, the State's decision to decline the voluntary retirements was lawful and the High Court order was set aside.

Issues considered

The scope of Rule 56(c) of the Uttar Pradesh Fundamental Rules regarding voluntary retirement.
Whether the explanation to Rule 56(c) obliges the appointing authority to accept a voluntary retirement notice automatically after the three‑month period.
Whether the State can refuse voluntary retirement on the ground of public interest.
Whether the doctors' constitutional right to liberty under Article 19(1)(g) overrides the State's duty under Article 47 and the public‑interest clause.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Art. 14, s. Art. 19(1)(g), s. Art. 31, s. Art. 47, s. Art. 51A(g), s. Art. 51A(h)
Government of India Act, 1935s. s.241(2)(b)
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Acts. 2016
Uttar Pradesh Vigilance Establishment Acts. 1965

Subjects

voluntary retirementpublic interestservice lawUttar Pradesh Fundamental Ruleshealth administrationconstitutional lawArticle 47Article 19(1)(g)medical services scarcity

Judgment

912 [2018]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 9 S.C.R. 912 [2018] 9 S.C.R.

A STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
v.
ACHAL SINGH
(Civil Appeal No. 8421 of 2018)
B AUGUST 21, 2018
[ARUN MISHRA AND S. ABDUL NAZEER, JJ.]
Public Health Administration: Respondents-doctors members
of Provincial Medical service filed applications for voluntary
retirement – Since no order was communicated to them, respondents
C
filed writ petition seeking voluntary retirement – High Court allowed
the writ petitions – Aggrieved State Government filed instant appeal –
Held: Under r.56 as applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh, notice
of voluntary retirement does not come into effect automatically on
the expiry of the three months period – Under the said rule, the
D appointing authority has to accept the notice for voluntary retirement
or it can be refused on permissible grounds – r.56(c) does not fall
in the category where there is an absolute right on the employee to
seek voluntary retirement – The respondents claimed right to retire
under Part III of the Constitution – Such right cannot be supreme
than right to life – It has to be interpreted along with the rights of
E
the State Government in Part IV of the Constitution – Where right of
public is involved in obtaining treatment, the State Government can
decline the prayer for voluntary retirement considering the public
interest – In case all the doctors are permitted to retire, in that
situation, there would be a chaos and no doctor would be left in the
F Government hospitals, which would be against the concept of the
welfare state and injurious to public interest – It is obligatory upon
the State Government to make an endeavour under Art.47 to look
after the provisions for health and nutrition – Therefore, the decision
of State Government in declining the prayer for voluntary retirement
considering the public interest did not suffer from any vice of
G
arbitrariness – When services are required, denial of voluntary
retirement is permissible under the Rules applicable in the State of
Uttar Pradesh – Health laws – Service Law – Voluntary retirement –
Uttar Pradesh Fundamental Rules – r.56(c) – Constitution of India
– Art.47.
H
912
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ACHAL SINGH 913

Uttar Pradesh Fundamental Rules: r.56 and its Explanation – A
Explanation attached to r.56 makes it clear that the decision of the
appointing authority under clause (c) of r.56 to retire a Government
servant shall be taken if it appears to be in public interest – The
explanation is applicable to both the exigencies viz., when
Government retires an employee or when an employee seeks
B
voluntary retirement, not only when Government desires to retire an
employee in public interest – The public interest is the prime
consideration on which authority has to decide such a prayer as
per the rules applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh – Service
Law – Voluntary retirement.
Constitution of India: Principle of liberty and its curtailment – C
Respondents-doctors members of Provincial Medical service seeking
voluntary retirement – The submission made upon principle of liberty
and its curtailment, the law must be just, fair and reasonable cannot
be accepted as the Fundamental Rules are statutory rules and have
been made by the Governor under s.241(2)(b) of the Government D
of India Act, 1935 and provisions of Fundamental Rules cannot be
said to be unfair, unreasonable and oppressive – The concept of
liberty not to serve cannot be attracted when the public interest
demands as retirement can be subject to certain riders – The right
under Art. 19(1)(g) is also subject to the interest of the general
public and once service has been joined, the right can only be E
exercised as per rules and not otherwise – Such conditions of service
made in public interest cannot be said to be illegal or arbitrary or
taking away the right of liberty – In case of voluntary retirement,
gratuity, pensions, and other dues etc. are payable to the employee
in accordance with rules and when there is a requirement of the F
services of an employee, the appointing authority may exercise its
right not to accept the prayer for voluntary retirement – Service
Law – Voluntary retirement – Uttar Pradesh Fundamental Rules –
r.56(c).
Constitution of India: Art.14 – Equality – Plea of G
discrimination – Respondents-doctors members of Provincial
Medical service denied voluntary retirement – Plea that the State
Government is discriminating between the doctors in the Provincial
Medical Services with the doctors working in the State-owned
Hospitals and Medical Colleges – Held: Not correct – Doctors of
H
914 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 9 S.C.R.

A Medical Colleges are on a different footing than that of Provincial
Medical Services – Even otherwise in view of the scarcity of the
doctors, no ground of equality can be claimed and the doctors of
different services form different class, apart from that there is no
concept of negative equality that too against the public interest – In
case, such a plea is allowed, none may be left to serve public at
B
large – Public Health Administration.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. The explanation attached to Rule 56 makes it
clear that the decision of the appointing authority under clause
C (c) of Rule 56 to retire a Government servant shall be taken if it
appears to be in public interest. The explanation is applicable to
both the exigencies viz., when Government retires an employee
or when an employee seeks voluntary retirement, not only when
Government desires to retire an employee in public interest.
[Para 10] [925-F]
D
State of Bombay v. United Motors, AIR 1953 SC 252 :
1953 SCR 1069; Bengal Immunity v. State of Bihar AIR
1955 SC 661 : 1955 SCR 603; State of Haryana v.
S.K. Singhal (1999) 4 SCC 293 : [1999] 2 SCR 714 –
relied on.
E
Dinesh Chandra Sangma v. State of Assam (1977) 4
SCC 441 : [1978] 1 SCR 607 – distinguished
B.J. Shelat v. State of Gujarat (1978) 2 SCC 202 : [1978]
3 SCR 553 – held inapplicable
F Himachal Pradesh Horticultural Produce Marketing &
Processing Corporation Ltd. v. Suman Behari Sharma
(1996) 4 SCC 584 : [1996] 3 SCR 1069; Padubidri
Damodar Shenoy v. Indian Airlines Ltd. & Anr. (2009)
10 SCC 514: [2009] 14 SCR 356; C.V. Francis v. Union
of India & Ors. (2013) 14 SCC 486: [2013] 8 SCR 53;
G
Tek Chand v. Dile Ram (2001) 3 SCC 290 : [2001] 1
SCR 527 – referred to.
2.1 Under Rule 56 as applicable in the State of Uttar
Pradesh, notice of voluntary retirement does not come into effect
automatically on the expiry of the three months period. Under
H
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ACHAL SINGH 915

the rule in question, the appointing authority has to accept the A
notice for voluntary retirement or it can be refused on permissible
grounds. Rule 56(c) does not fall in the category where there is
an absolute right on the employee to seek voluntary retirement.
No doubt under Rule 56(c) there is no requirement for an
employee to give any reason, however, while considering the
B
prayer, the appointing authority has to keep in mind the public
interest as provided in the Explanation attached to F.R. 56. [Paras
25, 26, 28] [942-H; 943-A-B, E]
Mahant Dhanmir v. Madan Mohan, (1987) Supp SCC
528 : 1988 SCR 679 – relied on
C
Moti Ram Deka v. G.M., North East Frontier Railway
(1964) 5 SCR 683 – held inapplicable
2.2 There is no doubt about it that Rule 56(d) provides
that where a disciplinary enquiry is pending or contemplated and
in the case of contemplated disciplinary enquiry, the Government D
servant shall be informed before the expiry of notice that it has
not been accepted. The proviso to Rule 56(d) has no application
where a disciplinary enquiry is not contemplated or pending.
When the proviso itself is not applicable, in no case it will dilute
the provisions of Explanation with respect to exigencies
mentioned in clause (c) of Rule 56. [Para 31] [944-F-G] E

3. The concept of liberty not to serve when the public
interest requires cannot be attracted as retirement which carries
pecuniary benefits can be subject to certain riders. The general
public has the right to obtain treatment from super skilled
specialists, not second rates. [Para 33] [945-A] F
Jagadish Saran v. Union of India, (1980) 2 SCC 768:
[1980] 2 SCR 831 – relied on
4.1 The concept of public interest can also be invoked by
the Government when voluntary retirement sought by an
G
employee, would be against the public interest. The provisions
cannot be said to be violative of any of the rights. There is already
paucity of the doctors as observed by the High Court, the system
cannot be left without competent senior persons and particularly,
the High Court has itself observed that doctors are not being
attracted to join services and there is an existing scarcity of the H
916 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 9 S.C.R.

A doctors. Poorest of the poor obtain treatment at the Government
hospitals. They cannot be put at the peril, even when certain
doctors are posted against the administrative posts. It is not
that they have been posted against their seniority or to the other
cadre. Somebody has to man these administrative posts also,
which are absolutely necessary to run the medical services which
B
are part and parcel of the right to life itself. In the instant case,
where the right of the public are involved in obtaining treatment,
the State Government has taken a decision as per Explanations
to decline the prayer for voluntary retirement considering the
public interest. It cannot be said that State has committed any
C illegality or its decision suffers from any vice of arbitrariness.
[Para 34] [945-D-G]
4.2 The provisions of the rule in question cannot be said
to be against the Constitutional provisions. In case of voluntary
retirement, gratuity, pensions, and other dues etc. are payable to
D the employee in accordance with rules and when there is a
requirement of the services of an employee, the appointing
authority may exercise its right not to accept the prayer for
voluntary retirement. In case all the doctors are permitted to
retire, in that situation, there would be a chaos and no doctor
would be left in the Government hospitals, which would be against
E the concept of the welfare state and injurious to public interest.
In the case of voluntary retirement, there is a provision in Rule
56 that a Government servant may be extended benefit of an
additional period of five years then an actual period of service
rendered by him there is the corresponding obligation to serve
F in dire need. [Para 35] [946-C-E]
5. In view of the scarcity of the doctors and the unfortunate
privatisation and commercialisation of the noble medical
profession, for maintaining the efficiency of the State Medical
Services, the decision taken by the Government is permissible
G as per rules and cannot be interfered with. Unfortunately, the
High Court has given the aforesaid observations pointing out
the shortage of specialised doctors and at the same time has
ultimately decided against the State Government on wrong
interpretation without considering the Explanation attached to
Rule 56 applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The High Court
H
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ACHAL SINGH 917

ought to have rejected and not to allow the prayer of voluntary A
retirement made by the doctors. [Para 36] [946-G-H; 947-A-B]
6. Under Article 47, it is the duty of the State to improve
the public health, which is a primary duty under the Directive
Principles of the State Policy and the statutory expression which
may be enforced. It is a duty of every citizen under Article 51A(g) B
to have compassion for living creatures. To have humanism is
also contemplated under Article 51A(h) and to strive towards
excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity so
that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavours
and achievement. It cannot be done by depriving poorest of the
poor essential medical services and to leave them at the mercy C
of doctors. There cannot be an exodus from the Government
Medical Services at large, which is being projected in the instant
case, definitely this cannot be permitted to happen within four
corners of law as it has to be living organism and has to live up to
the essence and spirit of constitution and cannot ignore and D
overlook needs of poorest strata of the society. [Para 38] [947-
D-F]
7. Plea that the State Government is discriminating between
the doctors in the Provincial Medical Services with the doctors
working in the State-owned Hospitals and Medical Colleges E
cannot be accepted. Doctors of Medical Colleges are on a
different footing than that of Provincial Medical Services. Even
otherwise in view of the scarcity of the doctors, no ground of
equality can be claimed and the doctors of different services form
different class, apart from that there is no concept of negative
equality that too against the public interest. In case, such a plea F
is allowed, none may be left to serve public at large. Thus, exodus
of doctors cannot be permitted to weaken the services when the
public interest requires to serve for the sake of efficient medical
profession and fulfil Directive Principles of State Policy once they
found statutory expression in the rules cannot be made mockery. G
[Paras 39, 42] [947-G-H; 948-A, F-G]
Dr. Anil Dewan v. State of Punjab, ILR 1 Punjab & Haryana
46; State of Punjab v. Dr. Harbir Singh Dhillon, 2010 SCC
Online P&H 6159; Dr. Kalpana Singh v. State of Rajasthan,
(2014) SCC Online Raj 6253 – referred to.
H
918 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 9 S.C.R.

A Case Law Reference
[1978] 1 SCR 607 distinguished Para 8
[1978] 3 SCR 553 held inappropriate Para 16
1953 SCR 1069 relied on Para 17
B 1955 SCR 603 relied on Para 17
[1999] 2 SCR 714 relied on Para 18
[1996] 3 SCR 1069 referred to Para 21
[2009] 14 SCR 356 referred to Para 22
C
[2013] 8 SCR 53 referred to Para 23
[2001] 1 SCR 527 referred to Para 24
[1988] SCR 679 relied on Para 27
[1964] 5 SCR 683 held inapplicable Para 29
D
[1980] 2 SCR 831 relied on Para 33
ILR 1 Punjab & Haryana 46 referred to Para 40
2010 SCC Online P&H 6159 referred to Para 40
(2014) SCC Online Raj 6253 referred to Para 40
E
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 8421
of 2018
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.11.2017 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow in Writ Petition
F No. 14939 (S/B) of 2017
WITH
C.A. Nos. 8422, 8423, 8424 of 2018
P. N. Mishra, Amrendra Sharan, Rakesh Dwivedi, R. B. Singhal,
Sr. Advs., Ankur Prakash, K. Luikang Michael, Ashok Pande, R. K.
G
Sainy, Rajeev Kumar for Satyajeet Kumar, Gaurav Dhingra, Gaurav
Mehrotra, Talha Abdul Rahman, Kushagra Pandey, Sidharth Iyer,
Amrendra Kumar Mehta, Raghvendra Saini, Sanjay Mani Tripathi for
Ms. Anu Gupta, Hiral Lal, Surendra Kumar, Aditya B. Singhal, Amit
Kumar Upadyay for Aftab Ali Khan, Advs. with them for the appearing
H parties.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ACHAL SINGH 919

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
ARUN MISHRA, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. The State of Uttar Pradesh in the appeals is aggrieved by
common judgment and order dated 29.11.2017 passed by the Division
Bench of the High Court of Allahabad, allowing the writ petitions filed
by the respondents herein seeking voluntary retirement from the B
Government services. Directions were issued to treat the respondents
to have retired from Government services with effect from 30.11.2017
and 31.12.2017.
3. The main question for consideration before us is as to whether
under Rule 56 of the Uttar Pradesh Fundamental Rules (hereinafter C
referred to as the “Fundamental Rules”) as amended, an employee has
unfettered right to seek voluntary retirement by serving a notice of three
months to the State Government or whether the State Government under
the Explanation attached to Rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules, is
authorised to decline the prayer for voluntary retirement in the public D
interest under clause (c) of Rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules as applicable
to the State of Uttar Pradesh.
4. The respondent - Dr. Achal Singh was working as Joint
Director in Medical, Health and Family Welfare, Lucknow Region,
Lucknow filed an application dated 14.12.2016 for voluntary retirement E
w.e.f. 31.3.2017. Respondent – Dr. Ajay Kumar Tiwari was holding the
post of Joint Director, Medical, Health and Family Welfare, Devi Patan
Mandal, Gonda, filed an application on 28.2.2017 seeking voluntary
retirement w.e.f. 31.5.2017. Respondent - Dr. Rajendra Kumar
Srivastava was working as Senior Consultant, filed an application for
voluntary retirement on 15.4.2015 and respondent - Dr. Rajiv Chaudhary F
was working as Senior Consultant at District Hospital, Raibareli, he sought
voluntary retirement by filing an application on 3.12.2016. The applications
remained unattended and no order had been communicated, hence writ
petitions were filed in the High Court. The respondents-doctors were
members of the Provincial Medical Services. G
5. The High Court in the impugned judgment and order has
observed that it is the responsibility of the authorities to monitor the
health system in the State and they have to sincerely examine the issues
as to how the working of the Government hospitals can be improved for
the betterment of the general public and find out why doctors are opting
H
920 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 9 S.C.R.

A for voluntary retirement every day. The High Court also observed that
the doctors are not interested in joining the Government service when
fresh recruitments take place. The High Court has also noted that posts
of Medical Officers are not being filled up on account of non-availability
of candidates. The High Court has further noted that those who have
entered into Government service are continuously opting for voluntary
B
retirement from service causing serious scarcity of doctors in Government
hospitals and Primary Health Centres.
6. The High Court in the impugned judgment has also referred
to the report of the MCI and the existing proportion of one doctor per
2000 population. In fact, the number of doctors is much smaller than the
C number given in the MCI report. The High Court also observed that the
doctors are being posted, in spite of scarcity, on the administrative posts
that causes wastage of specialised talent. The High Court has also
observed that the authorities must provide adequate infrastructure,
working equipment, and a proper working environment. The hospitals
D should be made excellent centres of health care. It should be the object
of the State Government to provide doctors with good opportunities so
as to retain them in services. At the same time, the High Court has also
observed that in order to enhance the better medical facilities to the poor
and needy people, it would be appropriate to maintain a balance between
the senior and junior doctors in each Primary Health Centres in rural
E and urban areas. There is a need to provide continuing medical education
to doctors and to hold conferences and seminars to exchange the latest
views/opinions/knowledge etc. and their performance in such events
should also be considered for promotion etc. At the same time, the High
Court has allowed the writ petitions and treated the doctors to have
F retired voluntarily on the dates specified. Aggrieved thereby, the State
has come up in these appeals.
7. It was urged by Mr. P.N. Mishra, learned senior counsel
appeared on behalf of appellant that as per Explanation attached to Rule
56 of the Fundamental Rules as amended in the State of Uttar Pradesh,
G it was open to the State Government to take a decision whether to retire
an employee voluntarily under Rule 56(a) duly considering the public
interest or decline the applications for voluntary retirement. It was also
submitted that there is no automatic retirement on the expiry of the period
of notice of three months served under Rule 56 as applicable in the State
of Uttar Pradesh. There has to be an express order granting permission
H
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ACHAL SINGH 921
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

to retire voluntarily, only thereafter an employee can be said to have A
retired voluntarily.There is a scarcity of doctors in the Provincial Health
Services in the State of Uttar Pradesh, thus, the State Government has
not accepted the applications for voluntary retirement. The directions
issued by the High Court is based on a misinterpretation of Rule 56 of
the Fundamental Rules and is against the public interest.
B
8. It was contended by learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellants that in the case of Dr. Achal Singh, the State
Government has passed the order on 31.5.2017. The prayer for voluntary
retirement was rejected on the ground of lack of specialised doctors and
in public interest and the notice seeking voluntary retirement under Rule
56 was rejected and in other cases, the applications were kept pending. C
They further contended that Rule 56 contemplates a notice and not a
request for voluntary retirement. An employee is not required to give
reason while giving a notice for voluntary retirement and in any such
event, such reasons are not justiciable. It is a prerogative of the employee
to seek voluntary retirement. The right of the employee to retire D
voluntarily corresponds with the right of the State Government to retire
him in the case of deficiency in services. As held in Dinesh Chandra
Sangma vs. State of Assam, (1977) 4 SCC 441, the rule provides right
to retire and not to seek it. The acceptance of the appointing authority is
required only when the disciplinary enquiry is pending and its pendency
has been communicated to the employee. Once notice of three months E
is given, the doctor is deemed to have retired and any action of attempting
to reject the notice of voluntary retirement after the said date is ineffective
in law. The decision has to be taken within a period of three months,
otherwise, the employee is automatically deemed to have retired on the
lapse of three months’ period. It was contended that the court not to F
interfere with the principle of certainty of rule of law may be applied and
long-standing precedent of Dinesh Chandra Sangma (supra) may not
be dislodged and be applied to the cases at hand. The only condition of
voluntary retirement is fulfilled after completion of 20 years of service
and if it is allowed, it does not affect the availability of doctors. The
State has not taken care to recruit the doctors. It is not permissible to G
withhold the order of voluntary retirement. In case this Court does not
agree with the decision rendered in Dinesh Chandra Sangma (supra),
the matter may be referred to a larger Bench. The view taken by the
High Court in the impugned judgment and order may be affirmed with
the rider of an imposition of the moratorium to balance the equities. H
922 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 9 S.C.R.

A 9. In order to appreciate the rival submissions, it is necessary to
consider the Fundamental Rules as amended in the State of Uttar Pradesh.
The same is somewhat different from the rules framed in other States.
Rule 56 of Fundamental Rules as amended in the State of Uttar Pradesh,
is extracted hereunder:
B “56.(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Rule, every
Government servant other than a Government servant in inferior
service shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last day
of the month in which he attains the age of fifty eight years. He
may be retained in service after the date of compulsory retirement
with the sanction of the Government on public grounds which
C must be recorded in writing, but he must not be retained after
the age of 60 years1 except in very special circumstances.
(b) A Government servant in inferior service shall retire from
service on the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he
attains the age of sixty years. He must not be retained in service
D after that date, except in very special circumstances and with
sanction of the Government.
(c) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a) or clause
(b), the appointing authority may, at any time by notice to any
Government servant (whether permanent or temporary), without
E assigning any reason, require him to retire after he attains the
age of fifty years or such Government servant may by notice to
the appointing authority voluntarily retire at any time after attaining
the age of forty-five years or after he has completed qualifying
service of twenty years.
F (d) the period of such notice shall be three months:
Provided that-
(i) any such Government servant may by order of the appointing
authority, without such notice or by a shorter notice, be retired
forthwith at any time after attaining the age of fifty years, and
G
on such retirement the Government servant shall be entitled to

1
In the Medical, Health and Family Welfare Department in State Medical and Health
Services, the retirement age of Medical Officers in public interest has been approved as
62 years in place of 60 years with certain conditions vide Notification No.2324/SEC-
H 2-5-2017-7(237)/2014 dated 31.5.2017.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ACHAL SINGH 923
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances, A
if any, for the period of the notice, or as the case may be, for the
period by which such notice falls short of three months, at the
same rates at which he was drawing immediately before this
retirement;
(ii) it shall be open to the appointing authority to allow a B
Government servant to retire without any notice or by a shorter
notice without requiring the Government servant to pay any
penalty in lieu of notice:
Provided further that such notice given by the Government
servant against whom a disciplinary proceeding is pending or C
contemplated, shall be effective only if it is accepted by the
appointing authority, provided that in the case of a contemplated
disciplinary proceeding the Government servant shall be informed
before the expiry of his notice that it has not been accepted:
Provided also that the notice once given by a Government servant D
under clause (c) seeking voluntary retirement shall not be
withdrawn by him except with the permission of the appointing
authority.
(e) A retiring pension shall be payable and other retirement
benefits, if any, shall be available in accordance with and subject E
to the provisions of the relevant Rules to every Government
servant who retires or is required or allowed to retire under this
rule.
Provided that where a Government servant who voluntarily retires
or is allowed voluntarily to retire under this rule the appointing F
authority may allow him, for the purposes of pension and gratuity,
if any, the benefit of additional service of five years or of such
period as he would have served if he had continued till the ordinary
date of his superannuation, whichever be less;
Explanation.- (1) The decision of the appointing authority under
G
clause (c) to require the Government servant to retire as specified
therein shall be taken if it appears to the said authority to be in
public interest, but nothing herein contained shall be construed to
require any recital, in the order, of such decision having been
taken in the public interest.
H
924 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 9 S.C.R.

A (2) In order to be satisfied whether it will be in the public interest
to require a Government servant to retire under clause (c), the
appointing authority may take into consideration any material
relating to the Government servant and nothing herein contained
shall be construed to exclude from consideration –
B (a) any entries relating to any period before such Government
servant was allowed to cross any efficiency bar or before he
was promoted to any post in an officiating or substantive capacity
or on an ad hoc basis; or
(b) any entry against which a representation is pending, provided
C that the representation is also taken into consideration along with
the entry; or
(c) any report of the Vigilance Establishment constituted under
the Uttar Pradesh Vigilance Establishment Act, 1965.
(2A) Every such decision shall be deemed to have been taken in
D the public interest.
(3) The expression appointing authority means the authority which
for the time being has the power to make substantive
appointments to the post or service from which the Government
servant is required or wants to retire; and the expression
E ‘qualifying service’ shall have the same meaning as in the relevant
Rules relating to retiring pension.
(4) Every order of the appointing authority requiring a
Government servant to retire forthwith under the first proviso to
clause (d) of this rule shall have effect from the afternoon of the
F date of its issue, provided that if after the date of its issue, the
Government servant concerned, bona fide and in ignorance of
that order, performs the duties of his office his acts shall be
deemed to be valid notwithstanding the fact of his having earlier
retired.”
G Reading of the aforesaid rule makes it clear that an employee can
be retired by the Government after he attains the age of 50 years or
Government servant may voluntarily retire at any time after attaining
the age of 45 years or after he has completed qualifying service of 20
years under Rule 56(c). It is provided in the Rule 56 that Government
may retire a Government servant without any notice or by serving a
H
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ACHAL SINGH 925
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

shorter notice and on such retirement, the Government servant shall be A
entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances,
if any, for the period of notice or for the period it falls short of three
months at the same rates at which he was drawing immediately before
his retirement. It is also open to the Government to allow a Government
servant to retire without any notice or by a shorter notice without
B
requiring the Government servant to pay any penalty in lieu of notice.
The proviso to Rule 56(d) makes it clear that the notice given by the
Government servant against whom a disciplinary proceeding is pending
or contemplated, shall be effective only if it is accepted by the appointing
authority and provided that in case of a contemplated disciplinary
proceeding, the Government servant shall be informed before the expiry C
of the notice that it has not been accepted. It is also provided that once
a notice is given by a Government servant seeking voluntary retirement
shall not be withdrawn by him except with the permission of the appointing
authority.
Rule 56(e) provides that pension and other retiral benefits shall be D
available to every Government servant, who retires or is required or
allowed to retire under the rule. Proviso to Rule 56(e) provides that
appointing authority at its discretion may allow benefits of additional
service of 5 years to such employees who voluntarily retires or is allowed
voluntarily to retire under the rule for the purposes of pension and gratuity
or of such period as he would have served if he had continued till the E
ordinary date of his superannuation.
10. The explanation attached to Rule 56 makes it clear that the
decision of the appointing authority under clause (c) of Rule 56 to retire
a Government servant shall be taken if it appears to be in public interest.
The explanation is applicable to both the exigencies viz., when F
Government retires an employee or when an employee seeks voluntary
retirement, not only when Government desires to retire an employee in
public interest. The Explanation attached to Rule 56 as applicable in the
State of Uttar Pradesh is clear and precise.
11. In our opinion, whether voluntary retirement is automatic or G
an order is required to be passed would depend upon the phraseology
used in a particular rule under which retirement is to be ordered or
voluntary retirement is sought. The factual position of each and every
case has to be seen along with applicable rules while applying a dictum
of the Court interpreting any other rule it should be Pari Materia. Rule H
926 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 9 S.C.R.

A 56(2) deals with the satisfaction of the Government to require a
Government servant to retire in the public interest. For the purpose, the
Government may consider any material relating to Government servant
and may requisition any report from the Vigilance Establishment.
12. The respondents have relied on dictum in Dinesh Chandra
B Sangma vs. State of Assam, (1977) 4 SCC 441, a three-Judge Bench of
this Court observed as under:
“7. Before we proceed further we may read F. R. 56 as amended:
F.R.56(a) The date of compulsory retirement of a Government
servant is the date on which he attains the age of 55 years. He
C may be retained in service after this age with sanction of the
State Government on public grounds which must be recorded
in writing and proposals for the retention of a Government
servant in service after this age should not be made except in
very special circumstances.
D (b) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules the
appropriate authority may, if he is of the opinion that it is in the
public interest to do so, retire Government servant by giving
him notice of not less than three months in writing or three
months’ pay and allowances in lieu of such notice, after he has
E attained fifty years of age or has completed 25 years of service,
whichever is earlier.
(c) Any Government servant may, by giving notice of not less
than three months in writing to the appropriate authority, retire
from service after he has attained the age of fifty years or has
F completed 25 years of service, whichever is earlier.
It is clear from the above that under F. R. 56(b) the Government
may retire a Government servant in the public interest by giving
him three months’ notice in writing or three months’ pay and
allowances in lieu thereof after he has attained the age of fifty
years or has completed 25 years of service, whichever is earlier.
G
8. As is well-known Government servants hold office during the
pleasure of the President or the Governor, as the case may be,
under Article 310 of the Constitution. However, the pleasure
doctrine under Article 310 is limited by Article 311(2). It is clear
that the services of a permanent Government servant cannot be
H
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ACHAL SINGH 927
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

terminated except in accordance with the rules made under A
Article 309 subject to Article 311(2) of the Constitution and the
Fundamental Rights. It is also well-settled that even a temporary
Government servant or a probationer cannot be dismissed or
removed or reduced in rank except in accordance with Article
311(2). The above doctrine of pleasure is invoked by the
B
Government in the public interest after a Government servant
attains the age of 50 years or has completed 25 years of service.
This is constitutionally permissible as compulsory termination of
service under F.R. 56 (b) does not amount to removal or dismissal
by way of punishment. While the Government reserves its right
to compulsorily retire a Government servant, even against his C
wish, there is a corresponding right of the Government servant
under F. R. 56(c) to voluntarily retire from service by giving the
Government three months’ notice in writing. There is no question
of acceptance of the request for voluntary retirement by the
Government when the Government servant exercises his right
D
under F. R. 56(c). Mr. Niren De is therefore right in conceding
this position.
*** *** ***
13. F.R. 56 is one of the statutory rules which binds the
Government as well as the Government servant. The condition
of service which is envisaged in Rule 56(c) giving an option in E
absolute terms to a Government servant to voluntarily retire with
three months’ previous notice, after he reaches 50 years of age
or has completed 25 years of service, cannot therefore be equated
with a contract of employment as envisaged in Explanation 2 to
Rule 119. F
14. The field occupied by F. R. 56 is left untrammelled by
Explanation 2 to Rule 119. The words “his contract of
employment” in Explanation 2 are clinching on the point.
*** *** ***
17. The High Court committed an error on law in holding that G
consent of the Government was necessary to give legal effect
to the voluntary retirement of the appellant under F.R. 56(c).
Since the conditions of F.R. 56(c) are fulfilled in the instant case,
the appellant must be held to have lawfully retired as notified by
him with effect from August 2, 1976. H
928 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 9 S.C.R.

A 13. It was submitted that despite the absence of any identical
language, the rule involved in Dinesh Chandra Sangma (supra) is
comparable with Uttar Pradesh Fundamental Rules and therefore, the
judgment is binding. The submission based upon the same cannot be
accepted and Rule 56(b)(c) came up for consideration was somewhat
different and there was no such Explanation to Rule 56.
B
14. In Dinesh Chandra Sangma (supra) he was the District and
Sessions Judge at Dibrugarh in the State of Assam. On account of
domestic troubles, he did not want to continue after attainment of the
age of 50 years. He served a notice under Rule 56(c) as amended by
the Governor of Assam under Article 309 of the Constitution by
C notification dated 22.7.1975. The formal notice was served upon by
him. The Government allowed him to retire from the State Government
Service and then there were certain developments in the Government
and Government sought to retrace its steps and passed an order on
28.7.1976, countermanding its earlier order allowing him to retire from
D service. The High Court dismissed the writ application filed by him.
The Fundamental Rule as applicable in the State of Assam came up for
consideration. In our opinion, it was quite different. It is provided in the
Fundamental Rule 56(b) as applicable in the State of Assam that public
interest was germane when a Government servant retires. Under Rule
56(c), a Government servant may retire by giving notice of not less than
E three months. Hence it was observed that there was no question of
acceptance of the request for voluntary retirement by the Government
when the Government servant exercises his right under Rule 56(c). Not
only the rule was different it was passed on the concession also, however,
the Explanation given to Rule 56 in the State of Uttar Pradesh makes it
F completely different and the provisions in F.R.56(c) is also quite different.
The rules as applicable in Assam for the purpose of retirement by the
Government is contained in F.R.56(b) which require retirement in public
interest whereas no such rider exist in F.R.56(c) when employee seek
voluntary retirement, whereas rule in the State of Uttar Pradesh both
provisions are conjointly read not only the language is different and the
G explanation makes out the whole difference.
15. The Explanation attached to Rule 56 as applicable in the State
of Uttar Pradesh makes it clear that when a decision is taken by the
authority under clause (c) of Rule 56, the right of an employee to retire
cannot be said to be absolute as in the case of resignation, voluntary
H
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ACHAL SINGH 929
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

retirement is with retiral benefits whereas it may not necessarily follow A
in case of resignation. The decision under the rules in U.P. is to be based
upon considering the public interest, whether it is a case of retirement by
the Government or a case of a Government servant seeking voluntary
retirement. The decision rendered in Dinesh Chandra Sangma (supra)
is distinguishable and was based on the differently couched rule. The
B
Explanation added makes the provisions different in the State of Uttar
Pradesh. The decision in the case of Dinesh Chandra Sangma (supra)
cannot be said to be operative being quite distinguishable.
16. Reliance has also been placed by the learned counsel for the
respondents on the decision rendered by this Court in B.J. Shelat vs.
State of Gujarat, (1978) 2 SCC 202. The Court observed thus: C

“7. Rule 161 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules provides for
the retirement of Government servants before attaining the age
of superannuation. Rule 161(1)(aa) provides-
Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a) : D
(1) An appointing authority shall, if he is of the opinion that it is
in the public interest so to do, have the absolute right to retire
any Government servant to whom clause (a) applies by giving
him notice of not less than three months in writing or three
months’ pay and allowances in lieu of such notice: E
* * * * *
Sub-rule (2)(ii) is as follows:
Any Government servant to whom clause (a) applies may, by
giving notice of not less than three months in writing to the
F
Appointing Authority, retire from service … and in any other
case, after he has attained the age of 55 years.
There is no dispute that the Rule applicable is Rule 161 (2)(ii)
and the appellant is entitled to retire by giving a notice of not less
than 3 months after he has attained the age of 55 years. Under
Rule 161(1)(aa)(1) the appointing authority has an absolute right G
to retire any Government servant to whom clause (a) applies in
public interest by giving him notice of not less than three months
in writing or three months’ pay and allowances in lieu of such
notice. But the Government servant has no such absolute right.
H
930 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 9 S.C.R.

A A right is conferred on the Government servant under Rule
161(2)(ii) to retire by giving not less than three months’ notice on
his attaining the prescribed age. Such a right is subject to the
proviso which is incorporated to the sub-section which reads as
follows:
B Provided that it shall be open to the appointing authority to
withhold permission to retire to a Government servant who is
under suspension, or against whom departmental proceedings
are pending or contemplated, and who seeks to retire under
this sub-clause.
C But for the proviso, a Government servant would be at liberty to’
retire by giving not less than three months’ notice in writing to
the appointing authority on attaining the prescribed age. This
position has been made clear by this Court in Dinesh Chandra
Sangma v. State of Assam, (1977) 4 SCC 441, where the Court
was considering the effect of the (Assam) Fundamental Rule
D 56(c) which confers right on the Government servant to voluntary
retire. Rule 56(c) of the (Assam) Fundamental Rules runs as
follows :
(c) Any Government servant may, by giving notice of not less
than three months in writing to the appropriate authority, retire
E from service after he has attained the age of fifty years or has
completed 25 years of service, whichever is earlier.
On a construction of the Rule this Court held that the condition
of service which is envisaged in Rule 56(c) giving an option in
absolute terms to a Government servant to voluntarily retire with
F three months’ previous notice, after he reaches 50 years of age
or has completed 25 years of service, cannot be equated with a
contract of employment as envisaged in Explanation 2 to Rule
119 of the Defence of India Rules and that Rule 56 is a statutory
condition which operated in law without reference to a contract
G of employment and when once the conditions of Fundamental
Rule 56(c) are fulfilled the Government servant must be held to
have lawfully retired. But for the proviso to Rule 161(2)(ii), the
decision of this Court in the case cited above would be applicable
and the right would have been absolute. But the proviso has
restricted the right conferred on the Government servant. Under
H the proviso it is open to the appointing authority to withhold
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ACHAL SINGH 931
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

permission to retire to a Government servant when (1) he is A
under suspension, or (2) against whom departmental proceedings
are pending or contemplated. Thus the permission to retire can
be withheld by the appointing authority either when the
Government servant is under suspension or against whom
departmental proceedings are pending or contemplated. It was
B
submitted on behalf of the appellant that admittedly he was not
under suspension on the date when he attained the age of 55
years and that no departmental proceedings were pending or
contemplated against him as required under the proviso. No
departmental proceeding was pending but on the facts one cannot
say that a proceeding was not under contemplation. C
*** *** ***
9. Mr. Patel next referred us to the meaning of the word
“withhold” in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary which
is given as “hold back” and submitted that the permission should
be deemed to have been withheld if it is not communicated. We D
are not able to read the meaning of the word “withhold” as
indicating that in the absence of a communication it must be
understood as the permission having been withheld.”
The rule which came up for consideration in B.J. Shelat (supra)
was the Rule 161 of Bombay Civil Services Rules, 1959. The Rule 161(1) E
(aa) provides that appointing authority may retire a Government servant
in public interest by giving him a notice of not less than three months or
three months’ pay and allowances in lieu thereof. Rule 161(2)(ii) did not
employ the word public interest when the Government servant seeks
voluntary retirement. This has been added to the Rule applicable in the F
State of Uttar Pradesh. Neither there is any provision in the aforesaid
rules that require to pass an order to decide an application by a Government
servant seeking voluntary retirement that too considering the public
interest. Under the rules, it was open to the appointing authority to
withhold the permission to retire a Government servant who is under
suspension or against whom the departmental enquiry was pending or G
contemplated. The rules considered by this Court in B.J. Shelat (supra)
were different and did not contain the provision like Explanation as
incorporated in the Fundamental Rule 56 as applicable in the State of
Uttar Pradesh. In that context, the discussion has been made and cannot
be applied to a rule differently couched in U.P. H
932 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 9 S.C.R.

A 17. Reliance was also placed on the decision rendered by this
Court in State of Bombay vs. United Motors, AIR 1953 SC 252 and
Bengal Immunity vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661, in which it has
been observed that Explanation can be read as proviso and it explain the
scope of the main provision and the Explanation becomes part of the
main section. There is no dispute with the aforesaid proposition. The
B
Explanation in rules in question has to be applied to both the situations as
contemplated in Rule 56(c) and is applicable to both the exigencies not
only when Government decides to retire an employee, but also applicable
where voluntary retirement is sought by an employee. It cannot be said
that no further restriction by explanation has been added in a case where
C an employee has decided to obtain voluntary retirement. The public
interest is the prime consideration on which authority has to decide such
a prayer as per the rules applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh.
18. It was also urged that principles of certainty of rule of law are
squarely applicable in the present case. Reliance has been placed on
D the decision of State of Haryana vs. S.K. Singhal, (1999) 4 SCC 293.
This Court considered Rule 5.32(b) of the Punjab Civil Services Rules
and observed thus:
“6. The said rule 5.32(B) of the Punjab Civil Service Rules,
(Vol.II) reads as follows:
E “Rule 5.32(B)(1) At any time a government employee has
completed twenty years’ qualifying service, he may, by giving
notice of not less than three months in writing to the appointing
authority retire from service. However, a government employee
may make a request in writing to the appointing authority to
F accept notice of less than three months giving reason therefor.
On receipt of a request, the appointing authority may consider
such request for the curtailment of the period of notice of three
months on merits and if it is satisfied that the curtailment of the
period of notice will not cause any administrative inconvenience,
the appointing authority may relax the requirement of notice of
G three months on the condition that the government employee
shall not apply for commutation of a part of his pension before
the expiry of the period of notice of three months.
(2) The notice of voluntary retirement given under sub-rule (1)
shall require acceptance by the appointing authority subject to
H Rule 2.2, of Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol.II :
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ACHAL SINGH 933
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

Provided that where the appointing authority does not refuse A
to grant the permission for retirement before the expiry of the
period specified in sub-rule (1) supra, the retirement shall
become effective from the date of expiry of the said period:
Provided further that before a government employee gives
notice of voluntary retirement with reference to sub-rule (1) B
he should satisfy himself by means of a reference to the
appropriate authority that he has, in fact, completed twenty
years’ service qualifying for pension.”
*** *** ***
8. It will be noticed that under Rule 5.32(B), a government C
employee who has completed 20 years of qualifying service may,
by giving notice of not less than 3 months in writing to the
appointing authority, retire from service. There is provision for
requesting for relaxation of the notice period of 3 months and for
consideration thereof. As to what the appointing authority is to D
do is governed squarely by sub-rule (2). That sub-rule states
that the notice of voluntary retirement given under sub-rule (1)
“shall” require acceptance by the appointing authority subject to
Rule 2.2 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules (Vol.II). Acceptance
of the request is subject to Rule 2.2 of the Rules. But the proviso
to sub-rule (2) of Rule 5.32(B) states that if the permission to E
retire is not refused within the period specified in sub-rule (1),
the retirement shall become effective from the date of expiry of
the period. Therefore, it is clear that if a person has completed
20 years qualifying service and has given a notice under Rule
5.32(B) of 3 months (or if his request for relaxation of 3 months F
is accepted), then the request “shall” be accepted subject to
invoking the provision of Rule 2.2 of the Punjab Civil Services
Rules (Vol.II). Under Rule 2.2, the “future good conduct” of an
employee is an implied condition of every grant of pension. In
other words, what all it means is that even if the acceptance of
the voluntary retirement is mandatory, there is an obligation cast G
on the retired employee to maintain good conduct after such
retirement. The words “future good conduct” mean good conduct
after retirement. If the employee does not continue to maintain
good conduct after retirement, then the Government can withhold
or withdraw the pension or a part of it in case he is convicted of H
934 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 9 S.C.R.

A serious crime or in case he be guilty of grave misconduct. Such
a decision to withhold or withdraw the whole or part of pension
would be final and conclusive, that is to say, so far as the
governmental hierarchy is concerned. It will be noticed that Rule
2.2 does not obstruct the voluntary retirement to come into force
automatically on the expiry of 3 months and it only enables
B
withdrawal or withholding of pension subject to certain conditions,
to a retired employee.
9. The employment of government servants is governed by rules.
These rules provide a particular age as the age of superannuation.
Nonetheless, the rules confer a right on the Government to
C compulsorily retire an employee before the age of superannuation
provided the employee has reached a particular age or has
completed a particular number of years of qualifying service in
case it is found that his service has not been found to be
satisfactory. The rules also provide that an employee who has
D completed the said number of years in his age or who has
completed the prescribed number of years of qualifying service
could give notice of, say, three months that he would voluntarily
retire on the expiry of the said period of three months. Some
Rules are couched in language which results in an automatic
retirement of the employee upon expiry of the period specified
E in the employee’s notice. On the other hand, certain rules in
some other departments are couched in language which makes
it clear that even upon expiry of the period specified in the notice,
the retirement is not automatic and an express order granting
permission is required and has to be communicated. The
F relationship of master and servant in the latter type of rules
continues after the period specified in the notice till such
acceptance is communicated; refusal of permission could also
be communicated after 3 months and the employee continues to
be in service. Cases like Dinesh Chandra Sangma v. State of
Assam, (1977) 4 SCC 441, B.J. Shelat v. State of Gujarat, (1978)
G 2 SCC 202 and Union of India v. Sayed Muzaffar Mir, (1995)
Supp (1) SCC 76 belong to the former category where it is held
that upon the expiry of the period, the voluntary retirement takes
effect automatically as no order of refusal is passed within the
notice period. On the other hand H.P. Horticultural Produce
H Marketing & Processing Corpn. Ltd. v. Suman Behari Sharma,
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ACHAL SINGH 935
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

(1996) 4 SCC 584 belongs to the second category where the A
bye-laws were interpreted as not giving an option “to retire” but
only provided a limited right to “seek” retirement thereby implying
the need for a consent of the employer even if the period of the
notice has elapsed. We shall refer to these two categories in
some detail.
B
*** *** ***
13. Thus, from the aforesaid three decisions it is clear that if the
right to voluntarily retirement is conferred in absolute terms as in
Dinesh Chandra Sangma case by the relevant rules and there is
no provision in rules to withhold permission in certain C
contingencies the voluntary retirement comes into effect
automatically on the expiry of the period specified in the notice.
If, however, as in B.J. Shelat case and as in Sayed Muzaffar
Mir case, the concerned authority is empowered to withhold
permission to retire if certain conditions exist, viz., in case the
employee is under suspension or in case a departmental enquiry D
is pending or is contemplated, the mere pendency of the
suspension or departmental enquiry or its contemplation does
not result in the notice for voluntary retirement not coming into
effect on expiry of the period specified. What is further needed
is that the concerned authority concerned must pass a positive E
order withholding permission to retire and must also communicate
the same to the employee as stated in B.J. Shelat case and in
Sayed Muzaffar Mir case before the expiry of the notice period.
Consequently, there is no requirement of an order of acceptance
of the notice to be communicated to the employee nor can it be
said that non-communication of acceptance should be treated as F
amounting to withholding of permission.
*** *** ***
18. In the case before us sub-rule (1) of Rule 5.32(B)
contemplates a “notice to retire” and not a request seeking G
permission to retire. The further “request” contemplated by the
sub-rule is only for seeking exemption from the 3 months’ period.
The proviso to sub-rule (2) makes a positive provision that “where
the appointing authority does not refuse to grant the permission
for retirement before the expiry of the period specified in Sub-
rule (1), the retirement shall become effective from the date of H
936 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 9 S.C.R.

A expiry of the said period. The case before us stands on a stronger
footing than Dinesh Chandra Sangma case so far as the
employee is concerned. As already stated Rule 2.2 of Punjab
Civil Service Rules Vol.II only deals with a situation of withholding
or withdrawing pension to a person who has already retired.”
B 19. Rule 5.32(b)(2) of Punjab Rules clearly provide that where
the appointing authority does not refuse to grant the permission to retire
before the expiry of the period in sub-rule (1), the retirement shall become
effective from the date of the expiry of the said date. There is no such
provision of notice becoming effective from the date of the expiry of the
period in the Fundamental Rules as applicable to the State of Uttar
C Pradesh. In the context of the proviso, the notice becomes effective
from the date of expiry of the period, in that context this Court has made
observations in the aforesaid dictum that Rule 2.2 does not obstruct the
voluntary retirement to come into force automatically on the expiry of
three months.
D 20. In the State of Haryana (supra), this Court also observed
that some rules are couched in language, which results in an automatic
retirement of the employee upon the expiry of the period specified in the
employee’s notice. On the other hand, certain rules in some other
departments are couched in the language which makes it clear that even
E upon expiry of the period specified in the notice, the retirement is not
automatic and an express order granting permission is required and has
to be communicated. The relationship of master and servant in the latter
type of rules continues after the period specified in the notice till such
acceptance is communicated and the refusal of permission could also be
communicated after three months and the employee continues to be in
F service. It is the aforesaid later observations made by this Court, which
are squarely applicable to the rule in question as applicable in the State
of Uttar Pradesh.
21. In Himachal Pradesh Horticultural Produce Marketing
& Processing Corporation Ltd. vs. Suman Behari Sharma (1996) 4
G SCC 584, the Court considered the language employed in the applicable
bye-laws. It was observed that if the permission for voluntary retirement
is not granted, the employee would not be able to retire. The Court
observed:
“8. Clause (2) of the bye-law inter alia provides for voluntary
H retirement from service of HPMC on completion of 25 years’
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ACHAL SINGH 937
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

service or on attaining the age of 50 years whichever is earlier. A
The employee, however, has a right to make a request in that
behalf and his request would become effective only if he is
‘permitted’ to retire. The words “may be...permitted at his
request” clearly indicate that the said clause does not confer on
the employee a right to retire on completion of either 25 years’
B
service or on attaining the age of 50 years. It confers on the
employee a right to make a request to permit him to retire.
Obviously, if request is not accepted and permission is not granted
the employee will not be able to retire as desired by him. Para
(5) of the bye-law is in the nature of an exception to para (2) and
permits the employee who has not completed 25 years’ service C
or has attained 50 years of age to seek retirement if he has
completed 20 years’ satisfactory service. He can do so by giving
three months’ notice in writing. The contention of the learned
Counsel for HPMC was that though para 5 of the bye-law
relaxes the conditions prescribed by para (2), the relaxation is
D
only with respect to the period of service and attainment of age
of 50 years and it cannot be read to mean that the requirement
of permission is dispensed with. On the other hand, the learned
counsel for the respondent submitted that as para 5 opens with
the words “Notwithstanding the provision under para (2)” and
the words “may be...permitted at his request” are absent that E
would mean that the employee has a right to retire after giving
three months’ notice and no acceptance of such a request is
necessary. We cannot agree with the interpretation canvassed
by learned counsel for the respondent. The bye-law has to be
read as a whole. Para (2) thereof confers a right on the employee
F
to request for voluntary retirement on completion of 25 years’
service or on attaining the age of 50 years, but his desire would
materialise only if he is permitted to retire and not otherwise.
Ordinarily, in a matter like this an employee who has put in less
number of years of service would not be on a better fooling than
the employee who has put in longer service. It could not have G
been the intention of the rule-making authority while framing
para 5 of the bye-law to confer on such an employee a better
and a larger right to retire after giving three months’ notice in
writing. The words “seek retirement” in para 5 indicate that the
right which is conferred by it is not the right to retire but a right
H
938 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 9 S.C.R.

A to ask for retirement. The word “seek” implies a request by the
employee and corresponding acceptance or permission by
HPMC. Therefore, there cannot be automatic retirement or
snapping of service relationship on expiry of three months’
period.”
B 22. In Padubidri Damodar Shenoy vs. Indian Airlines Ltd. &
Anr. (2009) 10 SCC 514, a question arose of voluntary retirement from
service which was not acceded to by the competent authority by
according approval. The matter travelled to this Court. It was held that
voluntary retirement did not come into force. The Court observed:
C “33. There is nothing to indicate in Regulation 12 that if employer
decides to withhold approval of voluntary retirement, such refusal
of approval must be communicated to the petitioner during the
period of notice. True it is that notice of three months for voluntary
retirement given by an employee covered by Clause (b) remains
valid even if no communication is received within the notice period
D but it becomes effective only on its approval by the competent
authority. As a matter of fact, this seems to have been understood
by both the parties.
34. The appellant issued a notice of voluntary retirement under
Regulation 12(b) on 30-9-2005. The notice period was to expire
E on 31-12-2005. It is an admitted position that the competent
authority neither gave an approval nor indicated disapproval to
the appellant within the notice period of three months. The
employee never treated that there has been cessation of
employment on the expiry of three months’ notice period inasmuch
F as he continued to attend his duties after 31-12-2005 until 30-6-
2006. It is only by his letter dated 8-6-2006 that the appellant
requested the respondent to relieve him in terms of his notice
dated 30-9-2005 by 30-6-2006 and he stopped attending work
from 1-7-2006. The letter dated 8-6-2006 does not make any
material difference as the fact of the matter is that after the
G expiry of the notice period, the appellant continued to attend his
duties for many months thereafter.
35. By the letter dated 15-9-2006 the respondent communicated
to the appellant that his application for voluntary retirement under
Service Regulation 12(b) has not been acceded to by the
H competent authority. Since the notice for voluntary retirement
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ACHAL SINGH 939
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

by an employee who has not attained 55 years but has completed A
20 years of continuous service, under the proviso appended to
Regulation 12(b), is subject to approval by the competent authority
and that approval was not granted, the voluntary retirement of
the appellant never came into effect.”
23. In C.V. Francis vs. Union of India & Ors. (2013) 14 SCC B
486, this Court observed that it would depend upon the language used in
the rule whether notice for voluntary retirement would come into effect
automatically. There has to be a stipulation in the scheme providing that
even without acceptance of his application, it would be deemed that the
application for voluntary retirement had been accepted. There is no such
provision in the rules in question. In C.V. Francis (supra), this Court C
observed:
“13. It is well-established that a voluntary retirement scheme
introduced by a company, does not entitle an employee as a matter
of right to the benefits of the Scheme. Whether an employee
should be allowed to retire in terms of the scheme is a decision D
which can only be taken by the employer company, except in
cases where the scheme itself provides for retirement to take
effect when the notice period comes to an end. A voluntary
retirement scheme introduced by a company is essentially a part
of the company’s desire to weed out the deadwood. E
14. The petitioner’s contention that his application for voluntary
retirement came into effect on the expiry of the period of notice
given by him must fail, since there was no such stipulation in the
scheme that even without acceptance of his application it would
be deemed that the petitioner’s voluntary retirement application F
had been accepted. Once that is not accepted, the entire case of
the petitioner falls to the ground. The decision in Tek Chand
case (2001) 3 SCC 290 will not, therefore, have any application
to the facts of this case, particularly when the petitioner’s
application for voluntary retirement had not been accepted and
he had been asked to rejoin his services. The petitioner was fully G
aware of this position as he continued to apply for leave after
the notice period was over.”
24. Decision in Tek Chand vs. Dile Ram (2001) 3 SCC 290 has
been relied upon by the respondents. This Court considered Rule 48-
A(2) of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, proviso to said H
940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 9 S.C.R.

A rule contained a provision where the appointing authority did not refuse
to grant the permission for retirement before the expiry of the period
specified in the said notice, the retirement shall become effective from
the date of expiry of the said period. The relevant observations are
extracted hereunder:
B “31. It is not disputed that the appointing authority did not
refuse to grant the permission for retirement before expiry of
the period specified in the said application dated 5.12.1994 given
by Nikka Ram. Further, no communication whatsoever was made
to him within the said period. During the course of the argument
before the High Court, the learned counsel for the parties referred
C to Rule 48-A of the Rules, of course, placing their own
interpretation. Since the said Rule is material and has bearing on
the question to be determined, it is extracted below:

D “48-A. Retirement on completion of 20 years’ qualifying
service. - (1) At any time after a government servant has
completed twenty years’ qualifying service, he may, by giving
notice of not less than three months in writing to the appointing
authority, retire from service:

E Provided that this sub-rule shall not apply to a government
servant, including scientist or technical expert who is -
(i) on assignments under the Indian Technical and Economic
Cooperation (ITEC) Programme of the Ministry of External
Affairs and other aid programmes.
F (ii) posted abroad in foreign-based offices of the Ministries /
Departments.
(iii) on a specific contract assignment to a foreign Government,
unless, after having been transferred to India, he has resumed
the charge of the post in India and served for a period of not
G less than one year.
(2) The notice of voluntary retirement given under sub-rule (1)
shall require acceptance by the appointing authority:
Provided that where the appointing authority does not refuse
to grant the permission for retirement before the expiry of the
H
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ACHAL SINGH 941
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

period specified in the said notice, the retirement shall become A
effective from the date of expiry of the said period.”
*** *** ***
33. It is clear from sub-rule (2) of the Rule that the appointing
authority is required to accept the notice of voluntary retirement
given under sub-rule (1). It is open to the appointing authority to B
refuse also, on whatever grounds available to it, but such refusal
has to be before the expiry of the period specified in the notice.
The proviso to sub-rule (2) is clear and certain in its terms. If the
appointing authority does not refuse to grant the permission for
retirement before the expiry of the period specified in the said C
notice, the retirement sought for becomes effective from the
date of expiry of the said period. In this case, admittedly, the
appointing authority did not refuse to grant the permission for
retirement to Nikka Ram before the expiry of the period specified
in the notice dated 5.12.1994. The learned Senior Counsel for
the respondent argued that the acceptance of voluntary retirement D
by appointing authority in all cases is mandatory. In the absence
of such express acceptance the government servant continues
to be in service. In support of this submission, he drew our
attention to Rule 56(k) of Fundamental Rules. He also submitted
that acceptance may be on a later date, that is, even after the E
expiry of the period specified in the notice and the retirement
could be effective from the date specified in the notice. Since
the proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 48-A is clear in itself and the
said Rule 48-A is self-contained, in our opinion, it is unnecessary
to look to other provisions, more so in the light of law laid down
by this Court. An argument that acceptance can be even long F
after the date of the expiry of the period specified in the notice
and that the voluntary retirement may become effective from
the date specified in the notice, will lead to anomalous situation.
Take a case, if an application for voluntary retirement is accepted
few years later from the date specified in the notice and voluntary G
retirement becomes operative from the date of expiry of the
notice period itself, what would be the position or status of such
a government servant during the period from the date of expiry
of the notice period up to the date of acceptance of the voluntary
retirement by the appointing authority? One either continues in
H
942 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 9 S.C.R.

A service or does not continue in service. It cannot be both that the
voluntary retirement could be effective from the date of expiry
of the period mentioned in the notice and still a Government
servant could continue in service till the voluntary retirement is
accepted. The proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 48-A of the Rules
does not admit such situation.”
B
*** *** ***
35. In our view, this judgment fully supports the contention urged
on behalf of the appellant in this regard. In this judgment, it is
observed that there are three categories of rules relating to seeking
C of voluntary retirement after notice. In the first category,
voluntary retirement automatically comes into force on expiry of
notice period. In the second category also, retirement comes
into force unless an order is passed during notice period
withholding permission to retire and in the third category voluntary
retirement does not come into force unless permission to this
D effect is granted by the competent authority. In such a case,
refusal of permission can be communicated even after the expiry
of the notice period. It all depends upon the relevant rules. In the
case decided, the relevant Rule required acceptance of notice
by appointing authority and the proviso to the Rule further laid
E down that retirement shall come into force automatically if the
appointing authority did not refuse permission during the notice
period. Refusal was not communicated to the respondent during
the notice period and the Court held that voluntary retirement
came into force on expiry of the notice period and subsequent
order conveyed to him that he could not be deemed to have
F voluntary retired had no effect. The present case is almost
identical to the one decided by this Court in the aforesaid
decision.”
The rule which came up for consideration was entirely different.
There is no provision contained in rule in question in the case at hand like
G the proviso to Rule 48-A(2) referred to above due to which the retirement
shall become effective from the date of expiry of period of notice in
case the same was not refused.
25. In our considered opinion, under Rule 56 as applicable in the
State of Uttar Pradesh, notice of voluntary retirement does not come
H into effect automatically on the expiry of the three months period. Under
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ACHAL SINGH 943
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

the rule in question, the appointing authority has to accept the notice for A
voluntary retirement or it can be refused on permissible grounds.
26. In our opinion, the Rule 56(c) does not fall in the category
where there is an absolute right on the employee to seek voluntary
retirement. In view of the aforesaid dictum and what is held by this
Court, we find that the prayer made to make a reference to a larger B
Bench, in case this Court does not follow the earlier decision is entirely
devoid of merit as on the basis of what has been held by this Court in the
earlier decisions, we have arrived at the conclusion. This Court has
authoritatively laid down the law umpteen number of time.
27. Reliance has also been placed on behalf of respondents on C
the decision in Mahant Dhanmir vs. Madan Mohan, (1987) Supp SCC
528, in which this Court observed that law should not be unsettled unless
there are compelling reasons. There is no dispute that the said proposition
has already been held. There is no question of law unsettling the law but
is of its application, which unfortunately appears as against the interests
of the respondents in view of language employed in the rule in question. D
An attempt in vain has been made by the respondents to wriggle out of
the clutches of the various decisions by raising the aforesaid argument.
28. It was also urged that the Rule 56(c) does not require the
employee to give reasons for voluntary retirement. No doubt under Rule
56(c) there is no requirement for an employee to give any reason, however, E
while considering the prayer, the appointing authority has to keep in mind
the public interest as provided in the Explanation attached to F.R. 56.
29. Learned counsel also urged that outside the proviso to Rule
56(d), there is no general right of appointing authority to reject the notice
of voluntary retirement of an employee on the ground of public interest. F
For this purpose, threefold submission has been made. Firstly, that the
principle of liberty under the Constitution and specifically Part III of the
Constitution requires that any restriction on freedom and liberty must
have the sanction of the law and that law must be just, fair and reasonable.
Presently, there is no law as enacted under Article 309 of the Constitution. G
Secondly, the right of Government employee and that of the Government
are delineated in terms of Fundamental Rules governing State Government
employees. Thus, if any Fundamental Rules do not restrict the general
liberty of an employee or do not empower the employer to act in a
certain way, an action otherwise would be impermissible. For this
purpose, reliance has been placed on Moti Ram Deka vs. G.M., North H
944 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 9 S.C.R.

A East Frontier Railway, (1964) 5 SCR 683. It was also submitted that
public interest restriction that applies to the State in the case of compulsory
retirement, applies on account of Article 311. The Court observed:
27. In this connection, it is necessary to emphasise that the rule-
making authority contemplated by Art. 309 cannot be validly
B exercised so as to curtail or affect the rights guaranteed to public
servants under Art. 311(1). Art. 311(1) is intended to afford a
sense of security to public servants who are substantively
appointed to a permanent post and one of the principal benefits
which they are entitled to expect is the benefit of pension after
rendering public service for the period prescribed by the Rules.
C It would, we think, not be legitimate to contend that the right to
earn a pension to which a servant substantively appointed to a
permanent post is entitled can be curtailed by Rules framed under
Art. 309 so as to make the said right either ineffective or illusory.
Once the scope of Art. 311(1) and (2) is duly determined, it must
D be held that no Rule framed under Art. 309 can trespass on the
rights guaranteed by Art. 311. This position is of basic importance
and must be borne in mind in dealing with the controversy in the
present appeals.
30. The reliance placed on Moti Ram Deka (supra) is of no avail
E as it has no application to the instant case as no right conferred by Article
311 of the Constitution can be said to have been taken away and service
rule dehors of it can provide for the concept of public interest.
31. There is no doubt about it that Rule 56(d) provides that where
a disciplinary enquiry is pending or contemplated and in the case of
F contemplated disciplinary enquiry, the Government servant shall be
informed before the expiry of notice that it has not been accepted. The
proviso to Rule 56(d) has no application where a disciplinary enquiry is
not contemplated or pending. When the proviso itself is not applicable,
in no case it will dilute the provisions of Explanation with respect to
exigencies mentioned in clause (c) of Rule 56.
G
32. The submission made upon principle of liberty and its
curtailment, the law must be just, fair and reasonable can also not be
accepted as the Fundamental Rules are statutory rules and have been
made by the Governor under section 241(2)(b) of the Government of
India Act,1935 and provisions of rule in question cannot be said to be
H unfair, unreasonable and oppressive.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ACHAL SINGH 945
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

33. The concept of liberty not to serve when the public interest A
requires cannot be attracted as retirement which carries pecuniary benefits
can be subject to certain riders. The general public has the right to
obtain treatment from super skilled specialists, not second rates. In
Jagadish Saran vs. Union of India, (1980) 2 SCC 768, the Court
observed thus:
B
“44. Secondly, and more importantly, it is difficult to denounce or
renounce the merit criterion when the selection is for post-
graduate or post-doctoral courses in specialised subjects…. To
sympathise mawkishly with the weaker sections by selecting
sub-standard candidates, is to punish society as a whole by
denying the prospect of excellence say in hospital service. Even C
the poorest, when stricken by critical illness, needs the attention
of super-skilled specialists, not humdrum second-rates. So it is
that relaxation on merit, by overruling equality and quality
altogether, is a social risk where the stage is post-graduate or
post-doctoral.” D
34. The concept of public interest can also be invoked by the
Government when voluntary retirement sought by an employee, would
be against the public interest. The provisions cannot be said to be violative
of any of the rights. There is already paucity of the doctors as observed
by the High Court, the system cannot be left without competent senior E
persons and particularly, the High Court has itself observed that doctors
are not being attracted to join services and there is an existing scarcity
of the doctors. Poorest of the poor obtain treatment at the Government
hospitals. They cannot be put at the peril, even when certain doctors
are posted against the administrative posts. It is not that they have been
posted against their seniority or to the other cadre. Somebody has to F
man these administrative posts also, which are absolutely necessary to
run the medical services which are part and parcel of the right to life
itself. In the instant case, where the right of the public are involved in
obtaining treatment, the State Government has taken a decision as per
Explanations to decline the prayer for voluntary retirement considering G
the public interest. It cannot be said that State has committed any illegality
or its decision suffers from any vice of arbitrariness.
35. The decision of the Government cater to the needs of the
human life and carry the objectives of public interest. The respondents
are claiming the right to retire under Part III of the Constitution such H
946 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 9 S.C.R.

A right cannot be supreme than right to life. It has to be interpreted along
with the rights of the State Government in Part IV of the Constitution as
it is obligatory upon the State Government to make an endeavour under
Article 47 to look after the provisions for health and nutrition. The
fundamental duties itself are enshrined under Article 51(A) which require
observance. The right under Article 19(1)(g) is subject to the interest of
B
the general public and once service has been joined, the right can only
be exercised as per rules and not otherwise. Such conditions of service
made in public interest cannot be said to be illegal or arbitrary or taking
away the right of liberty. The provisions of the rule in question cannot
be said to be against the Constitutional provisions. In case of voluntary
C retirement, gratuity, pensions, and other dues etc. are payable to the
employee in accordance with rules and when there is a requirement of
the services of an employee, the appointing authority may exercise its
right not to accept the prayer for voluntary retirement. In case all the
doctors are permitted to retire, in that situation, there would be a chaos
and no doctor would be left in the Government hospitals, which would
D
be against the concept of the welfare state and injurious to public interest.
In the case of voluntary retirement, there is a provision in Rule 56 that a
Government servant may be extended benefit of an additional period of
five years then an actual period of service rendered by him there is the
corresponding obligation to serve in dire need.
E 36. It was urged that in the State of Tamil Nadu, Government has
amended the rules not to retire Government doctors, if there is any
scarcity of doctors it is open to the Government of Uttar Pradesh to
amend its rules. In India, the Government sponsored Medical Services
to cater to the needs of poorest of the poor and have-nots otherwise
F there is the commercialisation of the charitable medical profession. In
other States too, it is seen sometime that when a doctor is transferred
from one place to another, the doctor forwards application resigning
from the post or seeks voluntary retirement as he does not want to move
out and leave his lucrative private practice and joins the duty only when
he obtains posting back to the place of his choice. In such a scenario
G people cannot be deprived of the services of good doctors. In view of
the scarcity of the doctors and the unfortunate privatisation and
commercialisation of the noble medical profession, for maintaining the
efficiency of the State Medical Services, the decision taken by the
Government is permissible as per rules and cannot be interfered with.
H Unfortunately, the High Court has given the aforesaid observations pointing
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. ACHAL SINGH 947
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

out the shortage of specialised doctors and at the same time has ultimately A
decided against the State Government on wrong interpretation without
considering the Explanation attached to Rule 56 applicable in the State
of Uttar Pradesh. The preface given by the High Court is just opposite
to its conclusion. The High Court ought to have rejected and not to allow
the prayer of voluntary retirement made by the doctors.
B
37. It was urged that some of the doctors suffered from neck
pain etc. as such prayer ought to have been accepted but they have not
given any such serious ailments which may make their functioning in the
hospital difficult in any manner whatsoever. It was the pretext that was
used by them to seek voluntary retirement. It is for the Government to
consider the efficacy. Doctors too have right under the Rights of Persons C
with Disabilities Act, 2016, they can continue in services unfettered by
such ailments.
38. Under Article 47 it is the duty of the State to improve the
public health, which is a primary duty under the Directive Principles of
the State Policy and the statutory expression which may be enforced. D
When we consider Article 51A containing Fundamental Duties, it is a
duty of every citizen under Article 51A(g) to have compassion for living
creatures and to have humanism is also contemplated under Article 51A(h)
and to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective
activity so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavours E
and achievement. It cannot be done by depriving poorest of the poor
essential medical services and to leave them at the mercy of doctors.
There cannot be an exodus from the Government Medical Services at
large, which is being projected in the instant case, definitely this cannot
be permitted to happen within four corners of law as it has to be living
organism and has to live up to the essence and spirit of constitution and F
cannot ignore and overlook needs of poorest strata of the society.
39. It was urged that the State Government is discriminating
between the doctors in the Provincial Medical Services with the doctors
working in the State-owned Hospitals and Medical Colleges. In the
Medical Colleges etc. doctors are being permitted to retire. Instances G
of 7 doctors have been given, who were permitted to retire in 2016, 2017
and 2018. Doctors of Medical Colleges are on a different footing than
that of Provincial Medical Services. Even otherwise in view of the
scarcity of the doctors, no ground of equality can be claimed and the
doctors of different services form different class, apart from that there H
948 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 9 S.C.R.

A is no concept of negative equality that too against the public interest. In
case, such a plea is allowed, none may be left to serve public at large.
40. There are several decisions of the High Court, namely, Dr.
Anil Dewan vs. State of Punjab, ILR 1 Punjab & Haryana 46; State of
Punjab vs. Dr. Harbir Singh Dhillon, 2010 SCC Online P&H 6159
B and Dr. Kalpana Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, (2014) SCC Online
Raj 6253, were cited to show that the decision in Dinesh Chandra
Sangma(supra) had been followed. We have considered the aforesaid
decisions and we find that it would depend upon the scheme of the
Rules. Each and every judgment has to be considered in the light of the
provisions which came up for consideration and questionit has decided,
C language employed in the rules, and it cannot be said to be of general
application as already observed by this Court in State of Haryana
(supra).
41. It was also contended that the State of Uttar Pradesh may
amend rules, in our opinion there is no such necessity in view of the
D Explanation the State has already amended its rules so as to enable it to
pass an order with respect to retirement whether it is at the instance of
the Government or at the instance of the employee for both the public
interest is germane.
42. The submission was also made with respect to the imposition
E of moratorium period of one year on retirement and that there should be
the recruitmentof the doctors and thereafter acceptance of voluntary
retirement by the State. We do not propose to venture into it. The action
of the State Government was appropriate in disallowing the prayer
seeking voluntary retirement. The Government may fill the vacancies if
F any. But that would not bring doctors of experience at senior level and
exodus of doctors cannot be permitted to weaken the services when the
public interest requires to serve for the sake of efficient medical
profession and fulfil Directive Principles of State Policy once they found
statutory expression in the rules cannot be made mockery. When services
are required, denial of voluntary retirement is permissible under the Rules
G applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh.
43. In view of the above, we allow the civil appeals and hereby
set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court.
The applications for intervention and to implead stand allowed.
Devika Gujral Appeals allowed.
H