Holding

A single‑judge bench of a High Court cannot entertain a second writ petition on the same matter after an earlier dismissal by a Division Bench, even if the dismissal was on the ground of non‑exhaustion of an alternate remedy, unless the earlier order is reviewed.

Summary

Labh Chand, an executive engineer of the Uttar Pradesh Government, sought voluntary retirement but was compulsorily retired by the Governor under Financial Rule 56. He first approached the Allahabad High Court with a writ petition, which a Division Bench dismissed for not exhausting the alternative remedy before the Uttar Pradesh Public Services Tribunal. He then filed a second writ petition before a single judge of the same High Court, who set aside the compulsory retirement order and directed voluntary retirement. The State appealed, arguing that the single judge could not entertain a second petition on the same matter after an earlier dismissal by a Division Bench, even if the dismissal was on the ground of non‑exhaustion of an alternate statutory remedy. The Supreme Court held that a single‑judge bench must respect the earlier dismissal and cannot bypass it, as doing so would defeat the rule of finality and encourage abuse of writ jurisdiction. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the single judge’s order was set aside and the writ petition dismissed, though the respondent was not barred from approaching the Public Services Tribunal.

Issues considered

Whether a High Court single‑judge bench can entertain a second writ petition under Article 226 on the same subject matter after an earlier dismissal by a Division Bench on the ground of non‑exhaustion of an alternative statutory remedy.
Whether the rule of judicial practice prohibiting such second petitions applies even when the earlier dismissal was in limine.
Whether the Uttar Pradesh Public Services Tribunal provides an adequate and efficacious alternative remedy.
Whether the Governor’s order of compulsory retirement under Financial Rule 56 can be challenged without first approaching the Tribunal.

Legislation cited

Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976s. 3, s. 4, s. 5, s. 6, s. 7

Subjects

Article 226writ jurisdictionalternative remedypublic service tribunalcompulsory retirementsingle judge benchdivision benchjudicial practicenon‑exhaustion of remedyUttar PradeshFinancial Rule 56

Judgment

A STATE OF U.P. AND ANR.
v.
LABH CHAND

FEBRUARY 9, 1993

B [L.M. SHARMA, CJ AND N. VENKATACHALA, J.]

Constitution of India, 1950 : Article 22&-Availability of altemative
remedy-Admissibility of Writ Petition without exhausting legal remedy
al'Oilable-Order of Single Judge bye-passing findings of the Division Bench
C not sustainable.

The respondent served a notice on the Secretary U.P. Government,
for settling his outstanding claims to enable him to seek voluntary
retirement. But the Governor by his order, compulsorily retired him from
service with immediate effect. Aggrieved by the order of the Governor, the '
D respondent directly filed a writ petition in the High Court. The same was
dismissed on the ground that the respondent bye-passed the alternate
remedy available to him. The respondent filed another writ petition in the
High Court which was heard by the Single Judge, was, bye-passing the
order of the Division Bench allowed the writ petition and quashed the
E impugned order the directed the U.P. Government to treat the respondent
as having retired voluntarily.

Challenging the said order, the appellants have contended that the
Single Judge could not have over-ruled the preliminary objections raised

F
on behalf of the appellants; that since the Division Bench of the same High
Court dismissed the Petition of the respondent for not exhausting the
alternate remedy available, the Single Judge had no jurisdiction to
-
entertain that wTit petition; that respondent's issuance of a notice to the
Government seeking permission for the voluntary retirement in the
meantime was untenable; and that the view of the Single Judge that a
G departmental disciplinary enquiry pending against the respondent
inhibited the Government from compulsorily retiring him was also
untenable.

Allowing the appeal this Court,

H HELD : 1.1. That when a Judge of a Single Judge Bench of a High
878

..
4
STATE OF U.P. 1•. LABH CHA>'ID [VENKATACHALA, J.] 879

Court is required to entertain a second writ petition of a person on a A
matter, he cannot, as a matter of course, entertain such petition, if an
earlier writ petition of the same person on the same matter had been
dismissed already by another Single Bench or Division Bench of the same
High Court, even if such dismissal was on the ground of !aches or on the
ground of non-availing of alternate remedy. (8890]
B
1.2. This judgment should not be understood as coming in the way
··( of the respondent in approaching t_he U.P. Public Service Tribunal for
necessary relief in the matter, if he is so entitled. [890F]
•
77ia1t Si1tgh Nathmal & Ors. v. Mazid, Superillte1tdellt of Taxes, (1964] C
655 SCR, relied.

B. Prabhakar Rao & Ors. v. State of Andl1ra Pradesh and Ors. etc., AIR
1986 SC 219, 227; Da1tjagu & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 1457,
1466 and L. Hirday Narai1t v. i!lcome Tax Officer, Bareitly, AIR 1971 SC 33,
36, referred to. D
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 498 of
1993.

From the Judgment and order dated 19.2.92 of the Allahabad High
Court in W.P. No. 7498/90. E

A.K. Goel for the Appellants.

Labh Chand (In-person) for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by F

VENKATACHALA, J. Leave granted.

Respondent who was in the service of the U.P. Government as an
Executive Engineer, Minor Irrigation, Banda, served a notice dated
December 19, 1989 on the Secretary, Area Dcvelopmcnl-2, U.P. Govern- G
ment, Lucknow seeking from the Government, settlement of his outstand-
ing claims by March 31, 1990 and grant of permission to him lo retire from
service voluntarily from that date. It was stated in that notice that the
respondent's outstanding claims remaining unsettled by the Government
before March 31, 1990, shall be settled before June 30, 1990 and he shall H
880 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 1 S.C.R.

A then be allowed to retire voluntarily. However, changing his stance, the
respondent wrote a letter dated December 20, 1989 to the self-same y-~
Secretary seeking grant of the Government's permission to retire voluntari-
ly from March 31, 1990 even if his outstanding claims with it were not
settled by that date. But, the Government, did not grant permission to the
respondent to voluntarily retire from its service with effect from March 31,
B 1990 as had been sought by him. Instead, the Governor of U.P. purporting
to exercise his powers under F.R. 56 of the Financial Hand Book, Volume
II, Part II-IV, as alllended upto date (to be referred to as 'F.R. 56'), issued
an Order dated January 6, 1990 compulsorily retiring the respondent from
the. Government service with effect from 6.1.1990 and giving him the benefit
c of three months' wages at the last drawn rates. No doubt, that order of
compulsory retirement of the respondent was challenged by him in a Writ
Petition, W.P. No. 1980 of 1990 filed before the High Court of Judicature
-
at Allahabad. But, a Division Bench of that Court, refused to entertain that
Writ Petition and dismissed it by its Order dated March 29, 1990, which
D read:
"Learned Counsel for the State has produced the record
and has also filed counter affidavit to which rejoinder
affidavit has been filed. However, after looking into the
record we are of the opinion that it is not a fit case in which
E the petitioner should be allowed to bye-pass the alternative
remedy available to him before the U.P. Public Services
Tribunal. On account of this alternative remedy being
available to the petitioner this petition is dismissed in
limine. Interim order if any to vacate."

F
The validity of the said order of dismissal of the Writ Petition made
by the Division Bench of the High Court was not questioned by the ..,,.
respondent in any appeal or any other legal proceeding. The respondent
did not also choose to aproach the U.P. Public Services Tribuna~ to seek
reliefs respecting the order of his compulsory retirement although the
G Division Bench of the High Court had dismissed his Writ Petition for not
availing of the alternative remedy before that Tribunal ..

Curiously, the respondent resorted to the course of filing a second
Writ Petition before the same High Court challenging over again the. very
H Order of the U.P. Government by which he had been compulsorily retired
STATE OF U.P. v. LABH CHAND [VENKATACHALA, J.J 8Sl

and sought reliefs thereto. That second Writ Petition registered as W.P. A
~-~ No. 7498 of 1990, it appears, did not come up for hearing before a Division
Bench of the High Court as had happened with the earlier dismissed Writ
Petition. lnstead, it has come up for hearing before a single Judge Bench
of the High Court. By his Order dated February 19, 1992 the learned single
Judge constituting that single Judge Bench allowed the Writ Petition,
B
quashed the impugned order by which the respondent (the Writ Petitioner)
had been compulsorily retired under F.R. 56 and directed the U.P. Govern-
··{ ment to treat the respondent as having retired vol\Jntarily from March 31,
1990 and to pay his salary for the period elapsed between the date of his
compulsory retirement and the date from which he wished to voluntary

- retire. It is the sustainability of this Order of the learned single Judge made
in the second Writ Petition of the respondent which is challenged by the
State of U.P. and its Chief Engineer in the present appeal by the Special
Leave.
c

'r Mr. A.K. Goel, the learned counsel for the appellants assailed the
D
Order under appeal on diverse grounds. First, he urged that the learned
single Judge of the High Court could not have overruled the preliminary
objection raised on behalf of the appellants that the second Writ Petition
of the respondent impugning the Order by which he had been compulsorily
_..J... retired was liable to the rejected in limine when his first Writ Petition by
which he had impugned the self-same Order, had been dismissed by a E
Division Bench of the same Court for having sought .to invoke the writ
jurisdiction of the High Court without availing of the alternate remedy
before the U.P. Public Services Tribunal. Secondly, he urged that the view
of the learned single Judge of the High Court that the respondent's
issuance of a notice to the Government seeking permission for his voluntary F
"1'. retirement from a future date made the Government loose its· power to
compulsorily retire him in the meantime, was untenable. Thirdly, he urged
that the view of the learned single Judge of the High Court that a
departmental disciplinary enquiry pending against the respondent inhibit~d
the Government from compulsorily retiring him under F.R. 56, was again G
untenable. The respondent who appeared in person could not meet the
_.___ grounds on which the Order under appeal was assailed. Nor does his
written submissions could be regarded as helpful in meeting those grounds.

The first ground urged in support of the appeal, if merits our H
882 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] 1 S.C.R.

A acceptance that that ground by itself would be sufficient for disposal of this
appeal, cannot be disputed. However, we are not oblivious to the fact that y ~
that ground, to merit our acceptance, has to be necessarily founded on
valid reasons. Hence our endeavour here would be to find whether the said
ground is founded on reasons and if so, whether they are valid.

B There are two reasons on which the first ground is founded. They
are:

(i) The learned Judge of the High Court, as a High Court
even if assumed to have had discretionary power to
c entertain a second Writ Petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution notwithstanding the fact that an ear-
lier similar Writ Petition had not been entertained by
the sa= Court because of the non-exhaustion of an
alternate statutory remedy available to the petitioner
in the matter, he could not have entertained the second
D
Writ Petition unless it was found that the discretion
already exercised by the High Court in refusing to
entertain the earlier Writ Petition was either arbitrary
or otherwise unwarranted.

E (ii) The learned single Judge of the High Court, by enter-
taining a second Writ Petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution on the subject matter which was covered
by an earlier Writ Petiton dismissed by the Division
Bench of the same Court had given a go-bye to the
F well-established salutary rule of judicial practice and
procedure that an order of a single Judge Bench much
less of Judges of larger Bench of a High Court refusing
to entertain the earlier Writ Petition in /iniine even on
the ground of !aches or on the ground of non-availing
of alternate remedy ought not to be interfered with by
G an other single Judge or Judges of larger Benches,
except in review or appeal, if permitted.
)·- '
As the first ground urged in the support of the appeal is founded on
the said two reasons, our endeavour here would be to find whether they
H are valid enough to sustain the same.
STATE OF U.P. v. LABH CHAND [VENKATACHALA, J.] 883

Reason (i) :- Entertaining by the High Court of a second A
Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution,
filed by a person whose earlier Writ Petition on the
same subject-matter is dismissed for non-exhaustion of
alternate remedy.

When a Statutory Forum or Tribunal is specially created by a statute B
for redressal of specified grievances of persons on certain matters, the High
Court should not normally permit such persons to ventilate their specified
grievances before it by entertaining petitions under Article 226 of the
Constitution is a legal position which is too well-settled. A Constitution
Bench of this Court in Thansigh Nathmal and Ors. v. A. Mazid, Superinten- c
dent of Taxes, (1964] 6 SCR, 655, when had the occasion to deal with the
question as to how the discretionary jurisdiction of a High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution, was required to be exercised respecting a
petition filed there-under by a person coming before it bye-passing a
statutory alternate remedy available to him for obaining redressal of his D
grievance ventilated in the petition, has given expression to the said well-
settle legal position, speaking through Shah, J ., as he then was, thus :

"The jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the
Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise
thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the ter- E
ritorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the
Article. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary;
it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. They
very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will
ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed F
limitations. .... ... Where it is open to the aggrieved
petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in
another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner
provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not
a
permit, by entertaining petition under Art. 226 of the
Constitution, the machinery created under the Statute to
be by-passed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek
resort to the machinery so set up." (Pages 661-662)

The order of a Division Bench of the High Court refusing to enter-
tain the earlier Writ Petition of the respondent here filed under Article 226 H
884 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) 1 S.C.R.

A of the Constitution bad been made in exercise of its discretionary jurisdic-
tion on its view that the petitioner therein had for redressal of his grievance
in that petition an alternate statutory remedy before the U.P." Public
Services Tribunal, an adjudicatory machinery specially created for redres-
sal of such grievances, cannot be disputed. What remains, therefore, to be
seen is whether the discretion exercised by the Division Bench in refusing
B
to entertain the earlier Writ Petition for non-availing of alternate remedy
and dismissing it, could be said to be an unwarranted exercise of discretion
in the light of the said well-settled legal position governing such matters.
As the alternate remedy which according to the Division Bench was not
availed of by the respondent here before the filing of Ills earlier Writ
c Petition, being that available before the the Forum of the U.P. Public
Services Tribunal, it becomes necessary for us to see whether that Forum
did provide to the respondent here a remedy which was both adequate and
efficacious. We shall now look into. the relevant provisions of the U.P.
Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976 (for short 'the Act') creating the U.P.
D Public Services Tribunal and the rules made thereunder as they would the
needed light on the exact nature of the Tribunal, and the adequacy and
efficaciousness of the remedy available with it.

Preamble to the Act, declares that it is enacted to provide for the
constitution of tribunals to adjudicate upon disputes in respect of matters
E relating to employment of all public servants of the State of Uttar Pradesh.
Sub-section {1) of Section 3 of the Act provides for constitution by the
State Government two or more State Public Service Tribunals, each called
a State Public Service Tribunal. Sub-section (2) thereof requires that each
Tribunal shall consist of a Judicial Member and an Administrative Mem-
ber. Sub-section (3) thereof requires that the Judicial Member shall be a
F
serving Judge of the High. Court or a person qualified to be appointed as
a High Court Judge wlllle the Administrative Member shall be a person
who holds or has held the post of, or any post equivalent to, Commissioner
of a Division. Section 4 of the Act, which provides for reference of claims
to Tribunal for their adjudiciation reads:
G
"4. Reference of claims to Tribunal - If any person who is
or has been a public servant claims that in any matter
relating to employment as such public servant his employer
or any officer or authority subordinate to the employer has
H dealt with him in a manner which is not in conformity with
STATE OF U.P. v. LABH CHAND [VENKATACHALA, J.] 885

any contract, or - A
(a) in the case of a Government servant, with the
provisions of Article 16 or Article 311 of the Constitu-
tion or with any rules or law having force under Article
309 or Article 313 of the Constitution;
B
{b) in the case of a servant of a local authority or a
statutory corporation, with Article 16 of the Constitu-
tion or with any rules or regulations having force under
any Act or Legislature constituting such authority or
corporation;
c
- he shall refer such claim to the Tribunal, and the decision
of the Tribunal thereon shall, subject to the provisions of
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, be final :

>---- Provided that no reference shall, subject to the terms
D
of any contract, be made in respect of a claim arising out
of the transfer of a public servant :

Provided further that no reference shall ordinarily be
entertained by the Tribunal until the claimant has ex-
hausted his departmental remedies under the roles ap- E
plicable to him.

Expla0ation. - For the purposes of this proviso, it shall no
be ne9essary to require the claimant (in the case of a
Government servant) to avail also of the remedy of
memorial to the Governor before referring his claim to the F
Tribunal.'

Section 5 of the Act requires the Tribunal to be guided by principles
of natural. justice in the matter of consideration. of the references, making
it clear that it is not bound by the procedure laid down in the Code in Civil G
Procedure, 1908 or the rules of evidence contained in the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872.

Section 6 of the Act expressly bars the filing of suits· respecting
matters to be referred for adjudication under Section 4 of the Act. Section
7 of the Act empowers the State Government to make roles for carrying H
886 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 1 S.C.R.

A all the purposes of the Act.
-y·~
The U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) Rules, 1975 (to be referred to
as 'the Rules') which are made by the State Government contain elaborate
procedural rules, needed for effective adjudication of matters by the
Tribunal.
B
As is seen from the said Preamble, the provisions in the Act and the
Rules, the U.P. Public Services Tribunal is intended to be an exclusive and r
and exhaustive machinery or forum for adjudication of claims of all public
servants including the persons in the service or pay of the State Govern-
c ment, in matters of their employment, inasmuch as, suits in such matters
are specifically barred by the provisions in Section 6 of the Act. That
Tribunal since composes of a Judicial Member who is a serving Judge of
-
the High Court or is qualified to become such Judge and an Administrative
Member who holds or has held the post of, or any post equivalent to,
~
Commissioner of a Division, it is a statutory Tribunal of the State possessed
D
of expertise to adjudicate claims of public servants in matters of their
employment. That the Tribunal in its enquiries being not bound by the
technical rules of procedure under the Civil Procedure Code and the
.)
technical r'!les of evidence under the Evidence Act, it could avail of its vast
powers of enquiry to redress grievances of public servants concerning
E matters of their employment adequately and efficaciously. The fact that ~-

Section 4 of the Act declares that the decision of the Tribunal is final
subject to the provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution itself
shows the nature of high judicial senctity attached by statute to such
decision.
F
The respondent had, since filed in the High Court of Judicature at
y
Allahabad, his first Wrti Petition, W.P. No. 1980 of 1990, challenging the
validity of the Order of the State Government by which he had been
compulsorily retired from Government service and claimed several relief
thereto against the State Government, we have to find whether the U.P.
G Public Ser.ice Tribunal if had been approached by the respondent here,
could not have, if warranted, invalidated the Order challenged in the Writ
Petition and given the reliefs sought for therein. If we have regard to the )- •
high status of the members constituting the Tribunal, expertise possessed
by such members to consider the claims of employees in matters of their
H employment, vast powers invested in them to hold exhaustive enquiries and
STATE OF U.P. v. LABH CHAND [VENKATACHALA, J.] 887
~
to grant full reliefs in matters relating to their employment, we cannot but A
hold that that Tribunal is the highest forum created by the Act to give full
and complete relief to public servants in matters of their employment, that
too, with expedition. The claims in the Writ Petition since related purely
to matters relating to employment of the respondent under the State
Government, the Division Bench of the High Court refused to entertain
B
the Writ Petition on its view that it had been filed by the respondent here
bye-passing the U.P. Public Services Tribunal. When the Division Bench
had refused to entertain the Wrti Petition of the respondent, in exercise of
its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution on its
view that the respondent could not have invoked its extraordinary jurisdic-
•
tion under Article 226 of the Constitution for the redressal of his grievan- c
ces, bye-passing the special forum created specifically by a statute for
redressal of such grievances, efficaciously and adequately, it is not possible
for us to think that such exercise of discretion was unwarranted, particulary
when we have due regard to the settled legal position governing such
matters, to which we have already adverted.
D
When the second Writ Petition, W.P. No. 7498 of 1990 filed by the
respondent before the said High Court challenging over again the very
Order of the State Government by which he was compulsorily retired came
up for hearing before a learned single Judge, that learned single Judge
notwithstanding the dismissal by a Division Bench of the same High Court E
of his similar Writ Petition filed earlier on the ground of non-exhaustion
of alternate statutory remedy, the appellants who were respondents in the
second Writ Petition, as was rightly expected of them, raised a preliminary
objection as to its maintainability relying on the dismissal Order of the said
earlier Writ Petition by a Division Bench of the same Court. But, the
F
learned single Judge who overruled that preliminary objection in the course
of his Order now under appeal, entertained the second Writ Petition on
his view that the earlier Writ Petition dismissed on the ground of non-avail-
ing of alternate remedy by a person was no ba!" to entertain a subsequent
Writ Petiton filed by such person, and sought to derive support therefore
from the decisions of this Court in (i) Daryao and Others v. State of U.P. G
and Others, AIR 1961SC1457, 1466; (ii) B. Prabhakar Rao and Others etc.
v. State of Andlira Pradesh and Others etc. etc., AIR 1986 SC 210, 227 and
(iii) L. Hirday Narain v. Income-tax Officer, Bareilly, AIR 1971 SC 33, 36.

It is true that the decisions to which the learned single Judge has H
888 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] 1 S.C.R.

A referred, have ruled that the dismissal of a Writ Petition ill Iimine on the
alternate remely being available to a petitioner, does not bar the jurisdic-
tion of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution or the
Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution to entertain sub-
sequent Writ Petition of the same party in relation to the same subject-
matter. But, what has escaped the notice of the learned single Judgi: is that
B they do not lay dowu that the discretion of the High Court to refuse to
entertain the first Writ Petition on the ground of non-exhaustion by him of
a statutory remedy, when had been rightly and properly exercised, the same
could be ignored by the same high Court when the party whose Writ
Petiton was dismissed on the ground of non-exhaustion of a statutory
C remedy files a second Writ petition respecting the same subject-matter and
such second Writ Petition could be entertained. Hence, this reason is quite .
valid and fully supports the first ground urged in support of the appeal.

- 1;;1: Entertaining by the High Court of a second
Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, filed
D
by a person notwithstanding the order of dismissal of his
earlier Writ Petition, on the same matter.

This is one of the two reasons on which the first ground urged in
support of the appeal, is founded. This reason is not concerned with the
.,
E discretionary power of the Judge 01 Judges of the High Court under Article
226 of the Constitution to entertain a second Writ Petition of a person, ·
whose earlier Writ Petition was dismissed on the ground of non-exhaustion
of alternate remedy but of such Judge or Judges having not followed the
well-established salutary rnle of judicial practice and procedure that an
F order of a single Judge Bench or of a larger Bench of the same High Court
dismising· the Writ Petition either on the ground of !aches or non-exhaus-
tion of alternate remedy, as well, shall not be bye-passed by a single Judge
Bench or Judges of a larger Bench except in exercise of review or appellate
powers possessed by it. In the case on hand, a Division Bench of the High
Court of Allahabad dismissed the respondent's Writ Petition challenging
G the sustainability of the order of bis compulsory retirement from the U.P.
(}o.vemment service, while exercising its discretionary jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution in that it took the view that the respondent
had the alternate remedy in the matter before.-the forum of lJ.P. Police
Services Tribunal constituted wider. the Act. There cannot be any doubt
H that that Order of dismissal of the Writ Petition could have been reviewed
STATE OF U.P. v. LABH CHAND [VENKATACHALA, J.] 889

by the same Division Bench, in exercise of the recognised power of review A
possessed by it. But, as a learned single Judge constituting a single Judge
Bench of the same Court, who has, in the purported exercise of his
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution bye-passed the Order of
dismissal of the Writ Petition made by a Division Bench by entertaining a
second Writ Petition filed by the respondent in respect of the subject-mat-
ter which was the subject-matter of earlier Writ Petition, the question is,
B
whether the well-established salutary rule of judicial practice and proce-
dure governing such matters permitted the learned single Judge to bye-pass
the Order of the Division Bench on the excuse that High Court has
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to entertain a second
Writ Petition since the earlier Writ Petition of the same person had been c
dismissed on the ground of non-availing of alternate remedy and not on
merits.

When a Judge of single Judge Bench of a High Court is required to
entertain a second Writ Petition of a person on a matter, he cannot, as a D
matter of.course, entertain such petition, if an earlier Writ Petition of the
same person on the same matter had been dismissed already by another
single Judge Bench or a Division Bench of the same High Court, even if
such dismissal was on the ground of !aches or on the ground of non-availing
of alternate remedy. Second Writ Petition cannot be, so entertained not
because the learned single Judge has no jurisdiction to entertain the same, E
but because entertaining of such a second Writ Petition would render the
_ order of the same Court dismissing the earlier Writ Petition redundant and
nugatory, although not reviewed by it in exercise of the recognised power.
Besides, if a learned single .Judge could entertain a second Writ Petition
of a person respecting a matter on which his first Writ Petition was F
dismissed i11 limine by another learned single Judge or a Division Bench
of the same Court, it would encourage an unsuccessful Writ Petitioner to
go on filing Writ Petition after Writ Petition in the same matter in the same
High Court, and have it brought up for consideration before one Judge
after another. Such a thing, if is allowed to happen, it could result in giving
full scope and encouragement to an unscrupulous litigant to abuse the G
process of the High Court exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution in that any order of any Bench of such Court refusing
to entertain a Writ Petition could be ignored by him with impunity and
relief sought in the same matter by filing a fresh Writ Petition. This would
only lead to introuduction of disorder, confusion and chaos relatin~ to H
•
890 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] 1 S.C.R.

A exercise of writ jurisdiction by Judges of the High Court for there could .~
m
be no finality for an order of the Court refusing to entertain a Writ Petition. ·-
It is why, the Rule of judicial practice and procedure that a second Writ
Petition shall not be entertained by the High Court on the subject-matter ~
respecting which the first Writ Petition of the same person was dismissed
by the same Court even if the Order of such dismissal was in limine, be it
B on the ground of !aches or on the ground of non-exhaustion of alternate
remedy, has come to be accepted and followed as salutary Rule in exercise
of writ jurisdiction of Courts.

Hence, we are of the view that this reason which supports the first
C ground urged in support of the appeal, to wit, that the learned single Judge
ought not have entertained a second Writ Petition in respect of the Order
of compulsmy retirement of the respondent, when a Division Bench of the
same Court had refused to entertain a Writ Petition of the same respon-
--
dent filed respecting the same subject-matter for non-availing of the alter-
nate remedy before the forum of U.P. Public Services Tribunal, is also a
D valid reason.

As the said valid reasons fully support the first ground urged in
support of the appeal by which the order of a learned single Judge of the
High court is assailed, that order is liable to be interfered with and set

E
aside. •.
In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside the Order of the
learned single Judge under appeal and dismiss the Writ Petition. However,
in the facts and circumstances of the case, this judgment shall not be
understood as coming in the way of the respondent in approaching the U .P.
F Public Services Tribunal for necessary relief. in the matter, if he is so
entitled in law. No costs.

J.R.J. Appeal allowed.

>-- -