Holding

Statements made by an accused under Section 313 CrPC are admissible and may be considered, and the benefit of Exception I to Section 300 IPC can be granted based on the evidence even if not expressly pleaded, leading to conviction under Section 304 Part I IPC.

Summary

The husband, Lakhmi, was alleged to have killed his young wife by striking her head with a spade (phali) and a blunt instrument (kunda). Several eyewitnesses saw the assault, and the accused, when examined under Section 313 of the CrPC, admitted killing his wife with a kunda, denying the use of the phali. The trial court convicted him under Section 302 IPC, but the Allahabad High Court acquitted him, holding that the prosecution had not proved the weapon used and that the accused's admission under Section 313 could not be relied upon. The Supreme Court held that statements made under Section 313 are to be given due weight, that the lack of a post‑mortem report does not defeat the prosecution when the accused admits homicide, and that the benefit of Exception I to Section 300 IPC may be granted even if the accused does not expressly plead it, provided the court can infer the requisite circumstances. Consequently, the conviction was altered to Section 304 Part I IPC and the accused was sentenced to six years of rigorous imprisonment.

Issues considered

The admissibility and evidentiary value of an accused's statements made under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
Whether the absence of a post‑mortem report defeats the prosecution in a murder case.
The applicability of Exception I to Section 300 IPC when the accused does not expressly raise it, and the allocation of the burden of proof for that exception.
The appropriate conviction—Section 302 IPC versus Section 304 Part I IPC—based on the evidence and admissions.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313(4)
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 300, s. 302, s. 304, s. 84

Subjects

Section 313 CrPCincriminating admissionpost‑mortem evidenceException I Section 300 IPCunsound mind defenceburden of proofconviction under Section 304 IPCevidence evaluation

Judgment

A STATE OF U.P.
v.
LAKHMI

FEBRUARY 12, 1998

B [M.M. PUNCHHI CJI., K.T. THOMAS AND M. SRINIVASAN, JJ.]
""..

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973-S. 313-Examination of Accused:.._
Incu/patory admissions-Sub-section (4)-Words "may be taken into
C consideration in such enquiry or trai/"--Scope of

Indian Penal Code, 1860--S.300-Accused adopting alternative defence
during ,examination under Section 313, Criminal Procedure Code of
unsoundness of mind-Exception I to S.300 not pleaded-When could the
accused be denied benefit of the exception.
D S.300-Exception I-Burden of proof-On accused-Accused entitled
to discharge burden either through defence evidence or through prosecution
evidence showing preponderance of probability.
-
S.300-A1urder Trial-Post mortem-Non-examination of doctor-Effect
E of-Held,, not fatal in the instant case on account of accused admitting case
was one of homicide.

S.300-Exception /-Benefit of-Entitlement of accused-When.

The deceased was the young wife of the respondent-Accused. With
F their two little children, they were living in the house of the accused.
Intermittent skirmishes used to erupt between them as the deceased used to
accuse the respondent-Accused for dissipating money on alcoholic'drinks.
During the wee hours of 8.2.1970 accused inflicted blows with a Phali (a
spade like agricultural implement) on the head of the deceased, her skull
was smashed and she died on the spot Hearing the screams of the deceaseli--'
G Wife, P.W. 2 who was working in the adjacent field, rushed up and peeped
through the window and witnessed the accused thrashing his wife with the
said weapon.

In the trial, the doctor who conducted the post-mortem was not examined
H by the prosecution. The accused did not dispute the fact that bis wife (deceased)
- ~o
STATE OF U.P. v. LAKHMI 851

was murdered by inflicting blows on her head. The accused gave an answer A
_,...1._ to a question put to him in examination under Section 313 of the Criminal
"' Procedure Code which contained his admission of killing his wife with
Kunda. The Sessions Judge repelled the defence under Section 84 of the
Indian Penal Code that the accused was a person of unsound mind and by
reason of such impairment did not know the nature of the act committed by
him, and convicted the accused under Section 302, I.P.C. and sentenced him B
to imprisonment for life.

The accused preferred appeal in the High Court which was allowed.
Hence this appeal by the State, contending that the High Court had gone
wrong in not attaching any importance to the statement of the accused made C
under S. 313 Cr. P.C .. The contention of the respondent was that-I the doctor
who conducted the post-mortem examination was not examined and in the
absence of legally proved medical evidence there could be no finding that the
deceased died due to blows inflicted with "Phali", 2 that the accused was a
person of unsound mind and should be afforded the benefit under Section 84
I.P.C. D
Allowing the appeal, this Court
HELD : l. The High Court has gone wrong in holding that the
prosecution has failed to prove that the deceased was murdered by the
accused. It has not given due regard to the cogent circumstances leading to E
the only conclusion that the deceased was slashed to death by the accused.
[854-D)
2. The need of law for examining the accused with reference to
incriminating circumstances appearing against him in prosecution evidence
is not for observance of a ritual in a trial, nor is it a mere formality. It has F
a salutary purpose. It enables the Court to be apprised of what the indicted
person has to say about the circumstances pitted .against him by the
prosecution. It helps the court to effectively appreciate and evaluate the
evidence in the case. If an accused admits any incriminating circumstance
appearing in evidence against him there is no warrant that those admissions
should altogether be ignored merely on the ground that such admissions G
were advanced as a defence strategy. [854-F-Hf

3. Sub-Section (4) of Section 313 of the Code contains necessary
support to the legal position that answers given by the accused during such
examination are intended to be considered by the Court. The words "may be
taken into consideration in such enquiry or trial" in sub-section (4) would H
\
852 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] I S.C.R.

A amount to a legislative guideline for the Court to give due weight to such
answers; though it does not mean that such answers, though it does not mean
that such answers could be made the sole basis of any finding. 1855-A-BI

Sampath Singh v. The State of Rajasthan, 1196911 SCC 367; Jethamal
Pithajiv. The Assistant Collector of Customs, Bombay and Another, 119741
B 3 SCC393 and Rattan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 119971 4 SCC
161, relied on.

4. lt is the duty of the prosecution to prove post-mortem findings in
murder cases, if they are available. Absence of such proof in the prosecution
evidence in a murder case is a drawback for prosecution. But the instant
C case was not allowed to be visited with fatal consequences on account of this
lapse because the accused has admitted that death of the deceased was a case
of homicide. 1856-D I

5. The law is that burden of proving an exception to section 300 I.P.C.
D is on the accused. But the mere fact that accused adopted another alternative
defence during his examination under Section 313 of the Code without
referring to Exception No. 1 of Section 300 I.P.C. is not enough to deny him
of the benefit of the Exception, if the Court can cull out materials from
evidence pointing to the existence of circumstances leading to that exception.
It is not the law that failure to set up such a defence would foreclose the right
E to rely ?n the exception once and for all. It is axiomatic that burden on the
accused to prove any fact can be discharged either through defence evidence
or even through prose~ution evidence by showing a preponderance of
probability. 1856-H; 857-AI

6.' In the instant case the evidence positively suggests that the accused
F would have seen something lascivious between his wife and P.W. 2 just when
he entered the house from the field. If the accused had witnessed any such
scene, his mind would have become suddenly deranged. It is not·necessary
that a husband should have been hot-tempered or hypersensitive to lose his
equanimity by witnessing such scenes. Any ordinary man with normal senses
G or even·sang-froid would be outraged at such a scene. The accused is
therefore afforded the benefit of Exception I to Section 300 l.P.C. and is found
guilty only under S:-304 (Part-I), I.P.C. and is sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of six years.1857-D-GI

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 234
H ofl993.
STATE OF U.P. v. LAKHMI [THOMAS, J.] 853

From the Judgment and Order dated 25.9.91 of the Allahabad High Court A
in Cr!. A. No. 3363of1978.

Viswajit Singh for A.S. Pundir for the Appellant

Ms. S Janani, (A.C.) for the Respondent.
B
The Judgment cf the Court was delivered by

THOMAS, J. Iu this case of uxoricide the husband was found guilty
by the Sessions Court but the High Court found him not guilty and acquitted
him. That judgment of the High Court is in challenge in this appeal by special
leave. · C
Prosecution case can be compendiously stated thus. The deceased
"Omwati" was the young wife of the respondent-accused. They with their two
little children were living together in tl1e house of the respondent. Intermittent
skirmishes used to erupt betw,een them as the wife was accusing the husband
for dissipating his money on alcoholic drinks. DUting the wee hours of D
8.2.1970 n:spondent inflicted blows witl1 a Phali (a spade like agricultural
implement) on tl1e head of the deceased. Her skull was smashed and she die~
on the spot. PW2 (Ramey) who was working in the adjacent field, on hearing
the screams of the deceased, rushed up and peeped through t11e window and
witnessed respondent thrashing his wife with tile said weapon. PW2 made a E
hue and cry and some of tile neighbours who heard the noise, ran to tile place
or occurrence. As tile door of the room was bolted from inside tiley broke
it open, over-powered tile berserk assailant and trussed him up on a pole witl1
a rope.

FIR was lodged by PWl Baljeet who was one of the persons rushed p
to tile place of occurrence on hearing the noise of PW2 (Ramey). Police after
registering tile case, reached the place of occurrence and took the tetilcred
assailant into custody and proceeded to conduct investigation.

As tile respondent too did not dispute tile fact that his wife (deceased)
was murdered by inflicting blows on her head it is unnecessary to further G
consider tile question whether deatil of the deceased was a case of hQmicide.

Learned Se-ssions Judge, on evaluation of t11e prosecution evidence,
found tilat the accused had killed tile deceased and then considered whether
he did the act without knowing tile nature of it by reason of any unsoundness
of mind. Though the trial Judge felt tilat accused was not quite a normal H
854 ·SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] l S.C.R.

A person it was not possible to conclude that his cognitive faculties were as
impaired as to deprive him of the capacity to know the nature of his acts. .'>-- -
Accordingly, learned Sessions Judge convicted him under Section 302, IPC
and sentenced him to imprisonment for life.

But a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court which heard his
B appeal felt that the evidence of PW2 (Ramey), which is of crucial importance
in this case, was not credit-worthy and at any rate it was not supported by
other reliable evidence. The Division Bench did not attach any importance to
the statement of the respondent which he made while being examined under
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ('Code' for short) wherein he
practically'admitted that he murdered his wife. Learned Judges took the view
C that the prosecution cannot succeed on the strength of what the accused said
during exan1ination under Section 313 of the code. Accordingly, the High
Court sent, the verdict of acquittal.

This being an appeal against acquittal we heard learned counsel for
D both sides in detail and scrutinised the evidence. In our considered opinion
the High Court has gone wrong in holding that prosecution has failed to
prove that the deceased was murdered by the accused. High Court has not
given due 'regard to the cogent circumstances leading to the only conclusion
that deceased was slashed to death by the accused.

E As a legal proposition we cannot agree with the High Court that
statement of an accused recorded under Section 313 of the code does not
deserve any value or utility if it contains inculpatory admission. The need of
law for examining the accused with reference to incriminating circumstances
appearing against him in prosecution evidence is not for observance of a
ritual in a trial, nor is it a mere fom1ality. It has a salutary pmpose. It enables
F the Court t6 be apprised of what the indicted person has to say about the
circumstances pitted against him by the prosecution. Answers to the questions ...
may sometimes be flat denial or outright repudiation of those circumstances.
In certain cases accused would offer some explanations to incriminating
circumstan~es. In very rare instances accused may even admit or own
G . incriminating circumstances adduced against him, perhaps for the purpose of
adopting legally recognised defences. In all such cases the Court gets the
advantage of knowing his version about those aspects and it helps the Court
to effectively appreciate and evaluate the evidence in the case. If an accused
admits any incriminating circumstance appearing in evidence against him
there is no warrant that those admissions should altogether be ignored merely
H on the ground that such admissions were advanced as a defence strategy.
STATE OFU.P. v. LAKHMI [THOMAS, J.] 855
Sub-Section (4) of Section 313 of the Code contains necessary support A
-~
to the legal position that answers given by the accused during such
examination are intended to be considered by the Court. The words "may be
taken into consideration in such enquiry or trial" in sub-Section (4) would
amount to a legislative guideline for the Court to give due weight to such
answers, though it does not mean that such answers could be made the sole
basis of any finding. B

Time and again, this Court has pointed out that such answers of the
accused can well be taken into consideration in deciding whether the
prosecution evidence can be relied on, and whether the accused is liable to
be convicted of the offences charged against him; vide: Sampath Singh v.
The State of Rajasthan, [1969] l SCC 367; Jethamal Pithaji v. The Assistant
c
Collector of Customs. Bo111bay and another [1974] 3 SCC 393 and Rattan
Singh v. State of Hi111achal Pradesh, [1997] 4 SCC 161.

We make it clear that answers of the accused, when they contain
--< admission of circumstances against him are not by themselves, delinked from D
,
the evidence be used for arriving at a finding that the accused had committed
the offence.

In this case, PW2 (Ramey) said that while he was working in the field
he heard a loud cry from inside the house of the deceased and when he
peeped through the window he witnessed accused thrashing his wife with E
Phali. PW3 (Bhudia) and PW4 (Raje) have stated in their evidence that they
too heard the sound of cry and rushed to the s.cene and then they saw the
accused standing with Phali and Kunda near the deceased who was lying on
• her bed with bleeding head injury and that the room was bolted from inside .

.... r' One answer which the accused gave to the following question put to F
him in the examination under Section 31J of the Code is said to contain his
admission of a very vital circumstance against him.

The question was this:

"What have you to say about the evidence of Ramey cPW2) that he G
~ peeped through the window and saw you standing near her bed and
you killed her with Phali (Ex. Kal) and Kunda (Ex. Ka2)?"

The answer of the accused to the said question was this:

"It was not like that. I murdered her with Kunda and not with Phali." H

•
856 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 1 S.C.R.

A The above answer would certainly help in appreciating the statement of
the prosecution witnesses who saw the accused standing near the bed of the
>--...
deceased \Vith a Phali and Kunda and that the deceased was bleeding wit11
injuries then. We are not disposed to by-pass t11e impact of the aforesaid
answer of the accused in detem1ining as to who would have caused t11e deat11
of tl1e deceased.
B
Learned counsel for the respondent however, pointed out that as t11e
doctor who conducted post-mortem examination on t11e dead body was not
put in the witness box in this case and it was argued on its strengfu that in
the absence of legally proved medical evidence no finding can be reached
C t11at the deceased died due to blows inflicted with "Phali." No reason is seen
noted by the trial court or the High Court for the non-examination of the
doctor who conducted the autopsy. No doubt it is the duty of the prosecution
to prove post-mortem findings in murder cases, if t11ey are available. Absence
of such proof in the prosecution evidence in a murder case is a drawback for
prosecution. However, we are not disposed to allow this case to be visited
D with fatal c.onsequences on account of such a lapse because t11e accused has
admitted that death of the deceased was a case of homicide.

From t11e above circumstances, there is no escape from the conclusion
that deceased had died at the hands of the accused. Still, that finding is not
enough to 'dispose of this appeal. Accused attempted for a defence presumably
E under Section 84 of tlle Indian Penal Code by examining DW2, his mother to
show tllat he was of unsolU!d mind. But the trial judge had, according to us
rightly, repelled the said defence since he did not succeed in making out. tllat
he had such a mental case when he committed the act and further that he did
not know the nature of the acts committed by him by reason of such mental
impaim1ent. However, we have noticed tllat accused had adopted another
F alternative defence which has been suggested during cross-examination of
prosecutirin witnesses i.e. his wife and PW2 (Ramey) were together on the
bed during the early hours of the date of occurrence. If that suggestion
reserves consideration we have to tum to the question whetller the benefit
of Exception I to Section 300 of the IPC should be extended to him?
G The law is that burden of proving such an exception is on the accused.
But t11e mere fact that accused adopted another alternative defence during his
examination under Section 313 of the IPC without referring to Exception No.
I of Section 300 of IPC is not enough to deny him of the benefit of the
Exception, if tlle Court can cull out materials from evidence pointing to the
H existence of circumstances leading to that exception. It is not the law that
STATE OF U.P. v. LAKHMI [THOMAS, J.] 857
failure to set up such a defence would foreclose the right to rely on the A
exception once and for all. It is axiomatic that burden on the accused to prove
any fact can be discharged either through defence evidence or even thr?ugh
prosecution evidence by showing a preponderance of probability. · ·

In the above context, we deem it useful to ascertain what possibly
would have prompted the accused to kill his wife. The prosecution case as B
noted above, is that the accused was not well-disposed to his wife as she
was always speaking against his drinking habits. We are inclined to think that,
while considering the manner in v·hich he had suddenly pounced upon his
young wife who bore two children to him and smashed her head during the
early hours, he would have had some other strong cause which probably · C
would have taken place within a short time prior to the murder. Certain broad
features looming large in evidence help us in that line of thinking.

The defence counsel put a definite suggestion to PW-2 (Ramey), during
cross-examination, that the incident was preceded by a liaison between Omvati,
the deceased and Ramey (PW-2). The suggestion was, of course, rebuffed by
~
D
the witness. One of the defence witnesses (DW-1) was examined to say that
the accused was working in his field till 4 A.M. on the night in question. As
that version was not inconsistent with the prosecution story, the aforesaid
evidence ofDW-1 was not rejected by the trial court. lfthat version is correct,
he would have gone back to his bedroom some time thereafter, In this
connection, we refer to the evidence of PW-3 who said even during chief E
examination itself that when he saw the accused standing near the bed side
of his wife, the witness asked him what did he do, to which he snorted out
that l1e would not spare Ramey (PW-2) also. That evidence of PW-3 (Bhondia)
was binding on the prosecution which has a very significant impact on the
, plea based on the First Exception to Section 300. It indicates that the motive
F
'r for the accused to murder his wife had some nexus with Ramey (PW-2).
.- According to PW-4 (Raje), he rushed to the house of the accused and saw
PW-2 scampering away and then saw the accused inside the bedroom muttering
that Ramey had done foul acts with his wife and that he would murder him.
Though the Public Prosecutor challenged that part of the witness's testimony,
he did not treat the witness as hostile for the prosecution. G
i-. The above features positively suggest that the accused would have
~
seen something lascivious between his wife an'd PW2 just when he entered
the house froin the field.

There can be little doubt that if the accused had witnessed any such H
858 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] 1 S.C.R.

A scene, his mind would have become suddenly deranged. It is not necessary
that a husband should have been hot-tempered or hypersensitive to lose his
equanimity by witnessing such scenes. Any ordinary man with normal senses
or even sangfroid would be outraged at such a scene.

We are, therefore, inclined to afford to the respondent accused benefit
B of Exception I to Section 300 IPC. As the corollary, we find the respondent
guilty only under Section 304 (Part I) IPC.
,·
In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the
High Court, but in alteration of the conviction passed by the Sessions Court,
C we convict him under Section 304 (Part I), IPC. We sentence him to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for a period of six years. We direct the Sessions Judge,
Meerut to take steps to put the accused in jail for undergoing the remaining
portion of the imprisonment term in accordance with the sentence imposed
on him now.

D A.K.T. · Appeal allowed.

,/