STATE OF U.P.versusKRISHNA MASTER & ORS.

                  [2010] 9 S.C.R. 563


                        STATE OF U.P.                                A
                               v.
                KRISHNA MASTER & ORS.
            (Criminal Appeal No. 1180 of 2004)

                       AUGUST 3, 2010
                                                                     B
    [HARJIT SINGH BEDI AND J.M. PANCHAL, JJ.]

     Penal Code, 1860 - s. 302134 - Homicidal death of six
persons - Conviction u/s. 302134 and imposition of death
sentence by trial court - Acquittal by High Court - On appeal,       C
held: Evidence of two eye-witnesses as well a$ doctor, who
conducted post mortem, that six persons died homicidal
death on account of firearm injuries - Evidence of eye
witnesses, first informant, who lost his brother; and minor child,
who lost five members of his family is trustworthy and               D
unimpeachable - Evidence does not suffer from major
contradictions and/or improvements nor noticeable
embellishment made - FIR was lodged promptly .:... Sufficient
electricity at the place of the incident and witnesses were able
to witness the incident - Motive established by prosecution -        E
Oral declaration by one of the deceased before his real
brother-first informant implicating the accused - Thus, order
of acquittal by High Court set aside and judgment of trial court
restored as regards the conviction - Accused sentenced to
rigorous imprisonment for life· - Evidence - Criminal Law -          F
Motive - Sentence/sentencing.

     Evidence:

     Oral evidence - Criteria for appreciation - Explained.
                                                                     G
     Rustic witness - Appreciation of evidence - Relevant
factors - Held: Evidence of such witness who is not educated
and comes from a poor strata of society, should be
appreciated as a whole - Rustic witness cannot be expected
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    564     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A to have an exact sense of time and lay down with precision
  the chain of events - Some discrepancies are bound to take
    place if a witness is cross-examined at length for days together
    - Such discrepancies should not be blown out of proportion.

       FIR - Purpose of - Held: Is to enable a police officer to
8
  satisfy himself as to whether commission of cognizable
  offences is indicated so that further investigation can be
  undertaken by him - FIR is to set criminal law in motion - It
  need not be an encyclopedia of all the facts and
C circumstances on which the prosecution relies - It is never
  treated as a substantive piece of evidence and has a limited
  use.

        Evidence Act, 1872 - 134 - Number of witness -
  Requirement of - Held: s. 134 provides that no particular
D number of witnesses is required for the proof of any fact -
  Reliance can be placed on the solitary statement of a witness
  if his statement is true and correct version of the prosecution
  case.

E        According to the prosecution case, respondent no.
  1 was on inimical terms with 'G' and 'J' (PW 1) because
  of friendly relations between his daughter and the son of
  PW1. On the fateful day, respondent nos. 1 to 3 armed
  with firearms entered the house of 'G' and fired shots
F indiscriminately resulting in death of 'G', his wife and
  three sons G' s another son (PW 2), a child aged 6 years,
  witnessed the entire incident. He was sleeping and after
  hearing the gun shots hid himself under the cot. PW 1 and
  his wife on seeing this ghastly incident left the place of
  incident. The respondents searched PW 1 and his family
G members but did not find them in the house. They
  dragged 'B'-brother of PW 1 and shot him dead. PW 1
  lodged a first information report. Investigation was carried
  C':Jt. The respondents were charged for commission of

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    STATE OF U.P. v. KRISHNA MASTER & ORS.             565


offences u/s. 30.2/34 IPC. The trial court convicted the      A
respondents u/s. 302/34 IPC and awarded them death
sentence. The High Court acquitted the respondents and
rejected the reference made by the trial court for
confirmation of death sentence. Therefore, the appellant-
State filed the instant appeal.                               B

    Disposing of the appeal, the Court

    HELD: 1. On the facts and in the circumstances of
the case, it is firmly established by the prosecution that
the respondents are the persons who had committed six         C
murders and, therefore, liable to be convicted u/s.302/34
IPC. [Para 18] [603-G]

     2. From the evidence of two eye-witnesses as well as
of PW 4, who conducted autopsy on the dead bodies of          o
six deceased persons, there is no manner of doubt that
the six deceased persons died homicidal death on
account of firearm injuries. All the murders were
committed in the night of August 10, 1991. The said
finding recorded by the trial court and upheld by the High    E
Court, being eminently just, is upheld. [Paras 6 and 7]
[581-F-H; 582-A-B]

      3.1 While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the
approach must be whether the evidence of the witness
read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that    F
impression is found, it is necessary for the court to
scrutinize the evidence more particularly keeping in view
the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in
the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out
whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence and   G
whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken
as to render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on
trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper-

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    566    SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 9 S.C.R.

A technical approach by taking sentences torn out of
  context here or there from the evidence, attaching
  importance to some technical error committed by the
  investigating officer not going to the root of the matter
  would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as
B a whole. If the court before whom the witness gives
  evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about
  the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness,
  the appellate court which had not this benefit will have
  to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by
c the trial court and unless the reasons are weighty and
  formidable, it would not be proper for the appellate court
  to reject the evidence on the ground of variations or
  infirmities in the matter of trivial details. [Para 8) [582-C-
    G]
D      3.2 Minor omissions in the police statements are
  never considered to be fatal. The statements given by the
  witnesses before the Police are meant to be brief
  statements and could not take place of evidence in the
  court. Small/trivial omissions would not justify a finding
E by court that the witnesses concerned are liars. The
  prosecution evidence may suffer from inconsistencies
  here and discrepancies there, but that is a short-coming
  from which no criminal case is free. These discrepancies
  are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of
F memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition,
  shock and horror at the time of occurrence and threat to
  the life. [Para 8) [582-G-H; 583-A-C]

       3.3 The first and firm impression which one gathers
G on reading the testimony of PW 1 is that he is a rustic
  witness. A rustic witness, who is subjected to fatiguing,
  taxing and tiring cross-examination for days together, is
  bound to get confused and make some inconsistent
  statements. Some discrepancies are bound to take place
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    STATE OF U.P. v. KRISHNA MASTER & ORS.             567


if a witness is cross-examined at length for days together.   A
Therefore, the discrepancies noticed in the evidence of
a rustic witness who is subjected to grilling cross-
examination should not be blown out of proportion. To
do so is to ignore hard realities of village life and give
undeserved benefit to the accused who have perpetrated        8
heinous crime. The basic principle of appreciation of
evidence of a rustic witness who is not educated and
comes from a poor strata of society is that the evidence
of such a witness should be appreciated as a whole. The
rustic witness as compared to an educated witness is          C
not expected to remember every small detail of the
incident and the manner in which the incident had
happened more particularly when his evidence is
recorded after a lapse of time. A witness is bound to face
shock of the untimely death of his near relative(s).
Therefore, the court must keep in mind all these relevant     D
factors while appreciating the evidence of a rustic
witness. [Para 10] [585-F-H; 586-A-C]
     3.4 In the instant case, when the respondents were
firing from their respective fire arms, the High Court        E
should not have expected PW 1 to mention description
of the whole episode which had happened in a few
minutes. The rustic witnesses cannot be expected to
have an exact sense of time and so cannot be expected
to lay down with precision the chain of events. The High      F
Court gravely erred in not accepting evidence of PW 1
who being a rustic witness is not expected to always
have an alert mind and so have an idea of direction, area
and distance with precision from which -he had
witnessed the incident. In his examination in chief, PW 1     G
never claimed that he was standing by the side of the wall
of courtyard nor was it claimed by him that he had
witnessed the incident through mokhana, i.e. holes in the
intervening walls. Though the witness was cross-
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    568      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A examined for days together, he was never confronted
  with his statement recorded u/s. 161 Cr.P.C. wherein he
  had allegedly stated before the Police Officer that he had
  witnessed the incident through holes in the intervening
  wall. It cannot be understood as to how the said statement
8 allegedly made before the police during the investigation
  could have been pressed into service by the High Court
  to reject the substantive evidence of PW 1 tendered
  before the court wherein it was specifically asserted that
  while in his house, he had witnessed the incident of
C killing of five members of G's family by the respondents
  by firing gun shots. The prosecution satisfactorily
  established that 'B' the brother of PW 1, lost his life
  because of gun shots fired at him. The suggestion made
  by the defence to the witness that he was making a false
  claim that 'B' was alive and that on enquiry by him, 'B'
D had told him that the respondents had assaulted him with
  fire arms, as he was tutored by the police outside the
  court room was emphatically denied by him. [Para 10)
  [586-C-H; 587 -A-CJ

E      3.5 PW 1 was cross-examined for days together on
  the point as to where and in which direction houses of
  'K', 'RS', 'D' etc. were situated. Such an attempt by
  defence lawyer can hardly be approved. On re-
  appreciation of evidence of PW 1, it is found that he did
F not make major improvements in his testimony before the
  court; and the so-called discrepancies which are blown
  out of proportion by the High Court are minor in nature
  and do not relate to the substratum of the prosecution
  story. The approach of the High Court in appreciating the
G evidence of PW 1, who was a rustic witness, is not only
  contrary to the well settled principles governing
  appreciation of evidence of a rustic witness but is
  perverse also. [Para 10) [587-C-F]

          State of UP. v. Anil Singh AIR 1988 SC 1998 - relied
H on.
    STATE OF U.P. v. KRISHNA MASTER & ORS.               569


     4.1 Section 134 of the Evidence Act specifically           A
provides that no particular number of witnesses shall, in
any case, be required for the proof of any fact. Reliance
can be placed on the solitary statement of a witness if the
court comes to the conclusion that the said statement is
the true and correct version of the case of the                 B
prosecution. The courts are concerned with the merit
and the statement of a particular witness and not with the
number of witnesses examined by the prosecution. The
time-honoured rule of appreciating evidence is that it has
to be weighed and not counted. The law of evidence does         c
not require any particular number of witnesses to be
examined in proof of a given fact. However, where the
court finds that the testimony of solitary witness is neither
wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable, it r11ay, in given set
of facts, seek corroboration but to disbelieve reliable         0
testimony of a solitary witness on the ground that others
have not been examined is to do complete injustice to the
prosecution. [Para 15) [594-E-H; 595-A-B]

     4.2 With regard to the testimony of PW 2, a child aged
6 years, it cannot be understood as to on what principle        E
and on which experience in real life, the High Court made
an observation that it is inconceivable that a child of his
understanding would be able to recapitulate facts in his
memory witnessed by him long ago. There is no principle
ot'law that it is inconceivable that a child of tender age      F
would not be able to recapitulate facts in his memory
witnessed by him long ago. PW2 claimed on oath before
the court that he had seen five members of his family
being ruthlessly killed by the respondents by firing gun
shots. When a child of tender age witnesses gruesome            G
murder of his father, mother, brothers etc. he is not likely
to forget the incident for his whole life and would
certainly recapitulate facts in his memory w,hen asked
about the same at any point of time, notwithstanding the
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    570    SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A gap of about ten years between the incident and
  recording of his evidence. It would be doing injustice to
  a child witness possessing sharp memory to say that it
  is inconceivable for him to recapitulate facts in his
  memory witnessed by him long ago. A child of tender age
B is always receptive to abnormal events which take place
  in its life and would never forget those events for the rest
  of his life. The child would be able to recapitulate
  correctly and exactly when asked about the same in
  future. Therefore, the ground on which the reliable
c testimony of PW 2 came to be disbelieved, can hardly be
  upheld. [Para 13] [591-A-H; 592-A-G]

        4.3 On re-appreciation of evidence, it is found that the
  testimony of PW 2 is cogent, consistent and reliable.
  Taking into consideration the manner in which he testified
D before the Court and the fact that nothing could be
  elicited in·his lengthy cross-examination for days together
  to impeach his credibility, his testimony is reliable and
  can be accepted without any reservations. Therefore,
  n9n-examination of his brother or sister or few others
E who had gathered near the house of deceased 'GL' after
  the incident is of no significance and does not affect
  credibility of testimony of PW 2. The High Court was not
  justified in brushing aside testimony of PW 2 while
  considering case of the prosecution against the
F respondents. [Para 15] [595-8-E]

        5. In the first information report, it is clearly
   mentioned that at the time of occurrence, there was
   electricity light at the place of incident and with the help
G of the said light, the first informant (PW 1) was able to
   witness the incident wherein five members of deceased
   G's family came to be murdered by the respondents. PW
   1 stated that his brother 'B', who was sleeping in his shop
 . was dragged out from the shop by the respondents by

H
    STATE OF U.P. v. KRISHNA MASTER & ORS.            571

breaking open the door of the shop and thereafter was A
murdered by them by firing gun shots. Regarding murder
of 'B', it is mentioned in the FIR that electric bulb was
burning at his house at the time of occurrence and,
therefore, PW 1 was able to witness the murder of his
brother 'B'. PW 2 stated that his father, mother and three B
real brothers were murdered by the respondents by firing
gun shots and had asserted that at the time of the incident
one bulb was burning on the main gate of his house
whereas another bulb was burning on the thatched roof,
i.e., near the place where the deceased had slept during     c
the night of the incident. Though both the witnesses were
cross-examined at great length, nothing significant could
be brought on record from which one can, with certainty,
deduce that there was no light of electricity bulbs at the
place of the incident. The assertion made by the two eye-
                                                              0
witnesses that they were able to witness the incident
because of availability of sufficient electricity light gets
corroboration from contemporaneous document. The
contradiction and/or omission in the statement of PW 2
 recorded u/s. 161 Cr. P.C. could not be brought cm the
 record of the case. The reliable evidence of PW 1 and PW E
2 cannot be brushed aside on the ground that the
 Investigating Officer had not taken into possession the
 bulbs hanging on the place of incident. The High Court
 was not justified in holding that there was no electric
 power in the whole village and that there was complete F
 darkness on account of Amavasya of rainy season due
 to which it was impossible for the eye-witnesses to
 witness the incident. The visibility capacity of urban
 people ~s not the standard to be applied to the villagers.
 If the light available was sufficient for the accused G
 persons to identify their targets for firing shots, there is
 no reason why the witnesses would not be able to
 identify the respondents as the assailants. [Para 15] [595-
 G-H; 596-A-H; 598-D-G]
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    572     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A        6.1 The FIR need not be an encyclopedia of all the
    facts and circumstances on which the prosecution relies.
    The main purpose of the FIR is to enable a police officer
    to satisfy himself as to whether commission of
    cognizable offences is indicated so that further
B   investigation can be undertaken by him. The purpose of
    the FIR is to set the criminal law in motion and it is not
    customary to mention every minute detail of the
    prosecution case in the FIR. The FIR is never treated as
    a substantive piece of evidence and has a limited use, i.e.,
c   it can be used for corroborating or contradicting the
    maker of it. Law requires the FIR to contain basic
    prosecution case and not minute details. The law
    developed on the subject is that even if an accused is not
    named in the FIR he can be held guilty if prosecution
    leads reliable and satisfactory evidence which proves his
0
    participation in the crime. Similarly, the witnesses whose
    names are not mentioned in the FIR but examined during
    the course of trial can be relied upon for the purpose of
    basing conviction against the accused. Non-mentioning
    of motive in the FIR cannot be regarded as omission to
E   state important and material fact. The omission to give
    details in the FIR as to the manner in which a weapon was
    used by accused is not material omission amounting to
    contradiction. In the instant case, the FIR was filed by a
    rustic man and, therefore, non-mentioning of motive in
F   the FIR cannot be attached much importance. [Para 15]
    [600-E-H; 601-A-C]

       6.2 The FIR is not the last word in the prosecution
  case and in some cases detailed FIR could be a ground
G for suspicion. What is relevant to find out is whether the
  FIR was lodged promptly or whether it is actuated by
  mala tides. The record of the instant case indicates that
  the FIR regarding gruesome murder of six persons was
  filed promptly and without any avoidable delay and,
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    STATE OF U.P. v. KRISHNA MASTER & ORS.              573


therefore, false1 implication of any of the respondents in     A
such a grievous case stands ruled out. There is nothing
on the record to show that the FIR was result of
deliberation by the first informant with other persons. As
the FIR was lodged promptly, the informant's evidence
containing minor variations not affecting substratum of        B
prosecution story cannot be discarded on the ground
that motive which prompted the respondents to kill six
persons was not mentioned in the FIR. The prosecution
is not supposed to prove motive when it relies on direct
evidence, i.e., evidence of eye-witnesses. The                 c
prosecution examined first informant as PW1 who lost
his brother in the incident as well as PW2 who lost five
members of his family. Their evidence is found to be
trustworthy and unimpeachable. Their evidence does not
suffer from major contradictions and/or improvements           D
nor noticeable embellishment have been made by them.
As the prosecution has led acceptable eye-witness
account of the incident, the failure to establish motive
would not entitle the respondents to claim acquittal. [Para
15] [601-C-H; 602-A]
                                                               E
    Superintendent of Police, CBI and Ors. vs. Tapan Kumar
Singh AIR 2003 SC 4140 - referred to.

  . 6.3 A conjoint and purposeful reading of the FIR with
the reliable testimony of PW1 and that of PW2 makes it         F
very clear that the respondents were agitated and angry
when the daughter of respondent No.1 had eloped with
the son of the first informant. The evidence on record
shows that during the time of first elopement, on one day
son of the first informant-'AS' was spotted in the village     G
and on learning about the fact that son of the first
informant was seen in the village, the respondents were
prepared to take revenge to what is known as to maintain
honour of the family. However, the fact that 'AS' was likely
to be assaulted by the respondents had become known
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    574    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [201 O] 9 S.C.R.

A to wife of 'G' who had fore-warned 'AS' and 'AS' had,
  therefore, left the village to save his life. The evidence also
  indicates that the fact that 'AS' had left the village all of a
  sudden because of information conveyed by wife of
  deceased 'G' that th~ respondents were to assault him
B was later on learnt by the respondents and, therefore, the
  respondents were bearing a grudge against 'G' and his
  wife. The record further shows that when the daughter
  of respondent no.1 had returned to the village, 'G' in the
  presence of the first informant had made a suggestion to
c respondent no.1 that he should get his daughter married
  with the son of the first informant upon which respondent
  no.1 took an objection and asked 'G' not to play with the
  honour of his family. Sufficient evidence was led by the
  prosecution to establish motive which prompted the
  respondents to kill five members of family of deceased
0
  'G'. What weighed with the High Court in disbelieving the
  motive suggested by the prosecution was the fact that
  in the FIR lodged by PW 1, it was not stated that because
  wife of 'G' had forewarned 'AS' about impending assault
E on him by the respondents, they were not able to take
  revenge against 'AS' and that 'G' had suggested to
  respondent no.1 to get his daughter married with son of
  PW 1./ The High Court held that such story was
  developed for the first time during trial by PW 1 who was
  admittedly on inimical terms with the respondents. [Para
F 15] [599-D-H; 600-A-D]

        6.4 The High Court committed serious error in
  disbelieving the oral dying declaration made by
  deceased '8' before his real brother PW 1 implicating the
G respondents as his assailants. The reasons given by the
  High Court for disbelieving the oral dying declaration was
  tha't it was not mentioned by PW 1 either in his FIR or in
  his statement recorded u/s. 161 of Cr.P.C. [Para 16] [602-
  8-C]
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    STATE OF U.P. v. KRISHNA MASTER & ORS.               575

     6.5 Six brutal and gruesome murders had taken place        A
wherein fire arms were used. The hard reality of life is that
the persons who lost their kith and kin in horrific incident
are likely to suffer great shock and, therefore, law would
not expect them to mention minutest details either in the
FIR or statements u/s. 161. The question before the Court       B
is whether the assertion made by PW 1 that soon after
the incident he had gone to the place where his injured
brother was lying and on enquiry by him, his brother had
told him that the respondents were his assailants,
inspires confidence of the Court. Reading the evidence          c
of the witness as a whole, it has ring of truth in it. There
is nothing improbable if a brother approaches his injured
brother and tries to know from him as to how he had
received the injuries nor is it improbable that on an
enquiry being made the injured brother would not give
                                                                0
reply/information sought from him. The assertion by
PW 1 that after the incident was over he went near his
injured brother and tried to know as to who were his
assailants, whereupon his injured brother replied that the
respondents had caused injuries to him, could not be
effectively challenged during cross-examination of the          E
witness nor could it be brought on record that because
of the nature of the injuries received by 'B' he would not
 have survived even for few minutes and must have died
 immediately on the receipt of the injuries. [Para 16] [602-
 D-H; 603-A-B]                                                  F

     7.1 The High Court acquitted the respondents who
were charged for commission of six murders in a casual
and slipshod manner. The approach of the High Court in
appreciating the evidence is not only contrary to the well      G
settled principles of appreciation of evidence but quite
contrary to the ground realities of life. The High Court
recorded reasons for acquittal of the respondents which
are not borne out from the record and are quite contrary
to the evidences adduced by the reliable eye-witnesses.         H·
    576      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             (20\1 OJ 9 S.C.R.


A The High Court was not justified in upsetting the well
  reasoned conviction of the respondents recorded by the
  trial court which after observing demenour of the eye-
  witnesses had placed reliance on their testimony. The
  High Court did not take into consideration the full text of
B the evidence adduced by the witnesses and picked up
  sentences here and there from the testimony of the
  witnesses. [Para 17] [603-C-F]

       7.2 There is no manner of doubt that killing six
  persons and wiping out almost the whole family on flimsy
C ground of honour saving of the family would fall within
  the rarest of rare case and, therefore, the trial court was
  perfectly justified in imposing capital punishment on the
  respondents. However, the incident had roughly taken
  place before 20 years, i.e., on August 10/11, 1991. The
D High Court had acquitted the respondents by judgment
  dated April 12, 2002. After April 12, 2002 till this date,
  nothing adverse against any of the respondents is
  reported to this Court. To sentence the respondents to
  death after their acquittal in the year 2002 would not be
E justified on the facts and in the circumstances of the
  case. [Para 19] [604-B-D]

       7.3 The judgment passed by the High Court,
  acquitting the respondents of the offences punishable u/
F s. 302/34 IPC is set aside. The judgment of the trial court
  convicting each of the respondents u/s. 302/34 IPC is
  restored. Each respondent is sentenced to RI for life and
  fine of Rs.25,000/- each. Out of the amount of fine, if paid,
  a sum of Rs.50,000/- be paid to PW2, as compensation
G in view of the provisions of s. 357 Cr.P.C. [Para 20] [604-
  E-H]
                        Case Law Refence:
          AIR 1988 SC 1998      Referred to.         Para 10
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               '
    STATE OF!LJ.P. v. KRISHNA MASTER & ORS.                577


    AIR 2003 SC 4140           Referred to.          Para 15       A
    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 1180 of 2004.

     From the Judgment & Order dated 12.04.2002 of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No. 574        B
of 2001.

    Ratnakar Dass, Shekhar Raj Sharma, Chandra Prakash
Pandey for the Appellant.

      lmtiaz Ahmed, Naghma lmtiaz (for Enquity Lex Associates)     C
for the Respondents.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     J.M. PANCHAL, J. 1. The State of Uttar Pradesh has            D
questioned legality of judgment dated April 12, 2002 rendered
by Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No.574 of 2001
by which judgment dated February 20, 2001 passed· by the
learned Special Judge (EC Act)/Additional District Judge,
Farrukhabad in Sessions Trial No.17 of 1992 convicting the         E
three respondents herein under Section 302 IPC and
sentencing each of them to death with fine of Rs.10,000/- in
default RI for two years for commission of murder of six persons
is reversed and they are acquitted.

    2. The facts emerging from the record of the case are as       F
under:

     The incident in question took place on August 10/11, 1991.
The first informant is one Jhabbulal. He, as well as the
respondents, are residents of Village Lakhanpur, District, G
Farrukhabad, Uttar Pradesh. About one year before the date
of incident, Sontara, daughter of the respondent No.1 had
eloped with Amar Singh, son of Jhabbulal. On one day, Amar
Singh was spotted in the village and on learning that Amar
Singh was back in village, the respondents had made an H
    578     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A attempt to find him out to assault him and to take revenge.
  However, Ramwati, wife of Guljari, had learnt about the plans
  of respondents. She was neighbour of Jhabbulal. Therefore, she
  had given prior intimation to Amar Singh about the ill designs
  of respondents to assault him. Thereupon Amar Singh had left
B the village and this is how his life was saved. Later on, the
  respondents had learnt that because of the intimation given by
  Ramwati, Amar Singh had left the village and he could not be
  targeted. Since then, the respondents were bearing a grudge
  against Ramwati. It may be mentioned that after 3-4 days
  Sontara and Amar Singh had returned to the village. It is the
c prosecution case that at that time, Guljari Lal, husband of
  Ramwati had suggested the Respondent No. 1, in presence
  of first informant Jhabbulal to get his daughter married to the
  son of Jhabbulal. Thereupon, respondent No.1 had taken
  exception and told Guljari Lal not to play with the honour of his
0 family. Because of the suggestion made by Guljari Lal, the
  respondent No.1 was highly agitated and had animus against
  Guljari Lal and first informant. Jhabbulal.

        Some 10 to 15 days prior to the date of incident, Sontara
E had again eloped with Amar Singh. Due to this reason the
  respondents had become restive and uneasy with the family of
  Jhabbu Lal and his neighbour Gulzari Lal. The respondent No.1,
  Sri Krishna Master had gone to meet Jhabbulal and told
  Jhabbulal that Sontara must come back to him by Sunday
F failing which no one in the world would be able to save him and
  family of Guljari. Because of the threat given by respondent
  No.1, Jhabbulal had gone to the residence of his relatives in
  search of his son ang daughter of the respondent No.1, but he
  was unable to trace the missing boy and the girl.
G
          3. On August 10, 1991, Ram Sewak, announced while
    sitting on Chabutra of Ram Sewak that, at all costs, the girl
    Sontara should come back. Otherwise, no one would be kept
    alive even for the name sake. Sontara did not come back to
    the village. In the midnight of August 10/11, 1991, at about 12
H
    STATE OF U.P. v. KRISHNA MASTER & ORS.                    579
               [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
hours, the respondent No.1, i.e., Shrikrishna, the respondent         A
No.2 Ram Sewak and the respondent No.3 Kishori carrying
country made pistols in their hands entered the house of
Guljarilal by jumping the southern wall of the house. After
entering into the house of Guljari, the respondents started firing
shots indiscriminately. Because of the gun shots, Guljari,            B
Ramwati, wife of Guljari, Rakesh, Umesh and Dharmendra sons
of Guljarilal, were injured. PW2 (Madan Lal) who was sleeping
at the place of incident, got up after hearing gun shots and hid
himself under the cot. He witnessed the whole incident from
there. First Informant Jhabbulal and his wife Lilawati, on seeing     C
this ghastly incident, left their house and while making hue and
cry entered the house of Khemkaran. The respondents after
killing Guljari and his family made search for the complainant
and his family members but they did not find them present in
the house. At that very time, Baburam, brother of the first
informant, who had entered his shop out of fear, was also
                                                                      0
dragged out by the respondents from the shop and shot dead.
After resorting to indiscriminate firing, the respondents left the
village and went towards the south by making two fires in the
air.
                                                                      E
     At the time of incident, the respondents were carrying
firearms and, therefore, no one dared to go near them. In the
incident, Umesh and Oharmendra who had received injuries
were removed to hospital but later on they also succumbed to
their injuries. The written report relating to the incident was got   F
scribed by Jhabbulal through a person named Radhey Shyam
and it was submitted at the police station at about 3.30 a.m.
on 11.8.1991. The Investigating Officer, Mr. Gajraj Singh
recorded statements of those who were found to be conversant
with the facts of the case. During the course of investigation,       G
he took into possession Ban (the thread by which cot is
woven), bed sheets etc. and prepared a memo. He also picked
up 315 bore bullet lying near the dead body of Rakesh. Similarly,
bullets of 315 bore lying near the cot on which Oharmendra and
Umesh slept were also seized. He inspected the place of               H
   580      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2010] 9 S.C.R.


A incident and prepared the sketch. The incriminating articles
  seized were sent to forensic science laboratory for analysis. He
  held inquest on the dead bodies and made arrangements for
  sending the dead body of four persons to hospital for post
  mortem examination. On completion of investigation, the three
8 respondents were charged sheeted in the court of learned Chief
  Judicial Magistrate, Farrukhabad for commission of offences
  punishable under Section 302 read with 34 IPC. In due course,
  the case was committed to Sessions Court for trial.

       The learned Additional Sessions Judge to whom the case
C was made over for trial framed charges against the respondents
  under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal
  Code 1860. The charge was read over and explained to them.
  However, the respondents denied the same and claimed to be
  tried. The prosecution, therefore, in all, examined nine
D witnesses including two eye-witnesses and produced
  documents to prove its case. After the recording of evidence
  of prosecution witnesses was over, the respondents were
  explained by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, the
  circumstances appearing against them in the evidence of the
E witnesses and recorded their statements under Section 313 of
  the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In their further
  statements, case of each of the respondent was that he was
  falsely implicated in the case and, therefore, should be
  acquitted.
F
       The learned Judge of the Trial Court discussed the
  evidence of the witnesses in great detail and found that the
  evidence of the two eye-witnesses was trustworthy, cogent,
  consistent and reliable. On the b~sis of testimony of the two
G eye-witnesses, the Trial Court by judgment dated February 20,
  2001 convicted each of the respondents under Section 302
  read with Section 34 IPC. The respondents were thereafter
  heard by the learned Judge regarding sentence to be imposed
  on them for commission of offences punishable under Section
  302 read with Section 34 IPC. After hearing the respondents,
H
    STATE OF U.P. v. KRISHNA MASTER & ORS.                 581
               [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
the learned Judge awarded capital punishment to each of the A
three respondents and fine of Rs.10,000/- in default RI for two
years. A direction was given not to execute capital punishment
until the same was confirmed by the High Court. It was also
directed that the amount of fine paid by the respondents, be
given to Madan Lal who was PW2 and son of deceased Guljari B
as compensation. The learned Additional District Judge,
Farrukhabad under a reference sent the documents to the High
Court for confirmation of the capital punishment imposed on the
respondents.

     4. Feeling aggrieved, the respondents preferred Criminal C
Appeal No.574 of 2001. The reference made by the trial court
for confirmation of the death sentence awarded to the
respondents, was heard along with the appeal filed by the
respondents. The High Court by the impugned judgment has
acquitted the respondents and rejected the reference made by D
the trial court, for confirmation of the death sentence, giving rise
to the instant appeal.

     5. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties
at length and in great detail. This Court has also considered      E
the documents forming part of the record.

    6. The fact that each of the six deceased had died
homicidal death is not disputed before this Court. The said fact
was also not disputed by any of the respondents before the High
Court or the trial court. From the evidence of two eye-witnesses F
as well as that of Dr. S.K. Gupta, PW4, who had conducted
autopsy on the dead body of six deceased persons and on
perusal of their respective post-mortem notes, there is no
manner of doubt that the six deceased persons had died
homicidal death on account of firearm injuries. The said finding G
recorded by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court,
being emine~Uy just, is hereby upheld.

     7. The time of occurrence is also not disputed by the
learned counsel of the respondents. It is admitted before this     H
    582     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2010] 9 S.C.R.


A Court that all the murders were committed in the night of August
  10, 1991. However, it was maintained by the learned counsel
  for the respondents that none of the respondents were
  assailants and, therefore, acquittal of the respondents recorded
  by the High Court should not be lightly interfered with by this
B Court.

          8. Before appreciating evidence of the witnesses
    examined in the case, it would be instructive to refer to the
    criteria for appreciation of oral evidence. While appreciating
    the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the
C   evidence of witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of
    truth. Once that impression is found, it is undoubtedly necessary
    for the Court to scrutinize the evidence more particularly
    keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities
    pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to
D   find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence
    and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken
    as to render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on trivial
    matters not touching the core of the case, hyper-technical
    approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there
E   from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error
    committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of
    the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence
    as a whole. If the court before whom the witness gives evidence
    had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor
F   of the evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which
    tiad not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the
    appreciation of evidence by the Trial Court and unless the
    reasons are weighty and formidable, it would not be proper for
    the appellate court to reject the evidence on the ground of
G   variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. Minor
    omissions in the police statements are never considered to be
    fatal. The statements given by the witnesses before the Police
    are meant to be brief statements and could not take place of
    evidence in the court. Small/trivial omissions would not justify
H   a finding by court that the witnesses concerned are liars. The
    STATE OF U.P. v. KRISHNA MASTER & ORS.                   583
               [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
prosecution evidence may suffer"from' inconsistencies here and       A
discrepancies there, but that is a short-coming from which no
criminal case is free. The main thing to be seen is whether those
inconsistencies go to the root of the matter or pertain to
insignificant aspects thereof. In the former case, the defence
may be justified in seeking advantage of incongruities obtaining     B
in the evidence. In the latter, however, no such benefit may be
available to it. In the deposition of witnesses, there are always
normal discrepancies, howsoever, honest and truthful they may
be. These discrepancies are due to normal errors of
observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due       c
to mental disposition, shock and horror at the time of
occurrence and threat to the life. It is not unoften that
improvements in earlier version are made at the trial in order
to give a boost to the prosecution case albeit foolishly.
Therefore, it is the duty of the Court to separate falsehood from
                                                                     0
the truth. In sifting the evidence, the Court has to attempt to
separate the chaff from the grains in every case and this
attempJ cannot be abandoned on the ground that the case is
baffling unless the evidence is really so confusing or conflicting
that the process cannot reasonably be carried out. In the light
of these principles, this Court will have to determine whether       E
the evidence of eye-witnesses examined in this case proves
the prosecution case.

     9. From the impugned judgment, it becomes evident that
the High Court took into consideration the evidence tendered         F
by PW1 Jhabbulal and PW2 Madan Lal. The High Court, at the
very outset examined the evidence adduced by the prosecution
with regard to five murders committed in the house of Guljari
Lal and scanned the evidence of PW1, Jhabbulal. After noting
that his house was undisputedly situated to the north of house       G
of Guljari and that both the houses were separated by an
intervening wall running East to West, the High Court analysed
the evidence of PW1 Jhabbulal. The High Court took into
consideration the claim of PW1 Jhabbulal that at the time of
the incident, he was sleeping in the courtyard of his house and      H
    584     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A   that he had woken up on hearing sounds of gun shots and was
    scared as a result of which he stood by the side of the wall of
    courtyard to save himself. On scrutiny of this witness, the High
    Court came to the conclusion that on his own showing, it was
    not possible for PW1, Jhabbulal to have witnessed the incident
B   which occurred inside the house of Guljari, more particularly
    when the two houses were separated by a wall having height
    of more than that of a normal person. The High Court thereafter
    proceeded to examine the site plan Exhibit- Ka14 and
    concluded that when the investigating officer had made
c   inspection of the scene of occurrence, PW1, Jhabbulal had
    claimed to have seen the incident through holes (mokhana) in
    the intervening wall, but in his substantive evidence tendered
    before the Court, Jhabbulal had not claimed to have seen the
    incident through the holes in the intervening walls. Thereafter,
    the High Court again took notice of the statement made by
0
    PW1, Jhabbulal that he was standing by the side of the wall of
    courtyard and finally concluded that it was highly doubtful that
    Jhabbulal who was present inside his own house had seen the
    incident which occurred inside the house of Guljari.

E       10. This Court finds that the abovestated reasons are the
  only reasons specified by the High Court to disbelieve the eye-
  witness account given by PW1, Jhabbulal. In order to find out
  whether the reasons assigned by the High Court to disbelieve
  the episode of five murders narrated by witness Jhabbulal, are
F sound, this Court has undertaken the exercise of going through
  the entire testimony of witness Jhabbulal recorded before the
  Trial Court. As far as the incident which had taken place in the
  house of Guljari is concerned, it was mentioned therein that at
  about 12 O'clock, in the night, Master Shri Krishna holding ponia
G gun and Ram Sewak as well as Kishori holding country-made
  pistols tresspassed into the house of Guljari after jumping over
  southern side wall of the house of Gulzari and committed murder
  of Guljari, his wife Ramwati and son Rakesh by firing gun shots.
  He also mentioned in his testimony that because of the firing
H of gun-shots Umesh and Dharmendra who were sons of Gulzari
    STATE OF U.P. v. KRISHNA MASTER & ORS.                     585
               [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
were injured. According to him, on witnessing the said incident,       A
he with his wife Leelawati left his home and went into the house
of Khemkaran rasing hue and cry. It was further mentioned by
the witness that the respondents had tried to trace his family
and they had gone inside the shop of his brother Baburam and
gunned him down after dragging him out of the shop. What was           B
claimed by this witness was that the incident was also
witnessed by Sarla Devi, daughter of Guljari, Rakesh and
Madan Lal, sons of Guljari and his brothers Mohanlal, Rajaram
and Kailash who were sons of Jiwan. It was asserted by him
that he had witnessed the incident in the light of electric bulb. It   c
was frankly admitted by him that no one had dared to go near
to the respondents because they were carrying with fire arms.

     It was further asserted by him that after the respondents
had left the place opposite the shop of his brother, he had gone
near his injured brother who was alive and had tried to learn          D
from Baburam as to who had assaulted him and thereupon his
brother had informed him that Shrikrishna (respondent No.1 ),
Ram Sewak (Respondent No.2) and Kishori (Respondent No.
3) had assaulted him with fire arms. It is also mentioned by him
that at his instance, FIR was reduced into writing by Radhey           E
Shyarn as dictated by him and that he had filed the same at
the police station. The record of the case shows that this witness
was cross-examined at great ll.,.gth. He was subjected to
grueling cross-examination which runs into 31 pages. The first
and firm impression which one gathers on reading the testimony         F
of this witness is that he is a rustic witness. A rustic witness,
who is subjected to fatiguing, taxing and tiring cross-
examination for days together, is bound to get confused and
make some inconsistent statements. Some discrepancies are
bound to take place if a witness is cross-examined at length           G
for days together. Therefore, the discrepancies noticed in the
evidence of a rustic witness who is subjected to grueling cross-
examination should not be blown out of proportion. To do so is
to ignore hard realities of village life and give undeserved
benefit to the accused who have perpetrated heinous crime.             H
    586     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A   The basic principle of appreciation of evidence of a rustic
    witness who is not educated and comes from a poor strata of
    society is that the evidence of such a witness should be
    appreciated as a whole. The rustic witness as compared to an
    educated witness is not expected to remember every small
B   detail of the incident and the manner in which the incident had
    happened more particularly when his evidence is recorded after
    a lapse of time. Further, a witness is bound to face shock of
    the untimely death of his near relative(s). Therefore, the court
    must keep in mind all these relevant factors while appreciating
c   evidence of a rustic witness. When the respondents were firing
    from their respective fire arms, the High Court should not have
    expected PW1 Jhabbulal to mention description of the whole
    episode which had happened in a few minutes. The rustic
    witnesses cannot be expected to have an exact sense of time
    and so cannot be expected to lay down with precision the chain
0
    of events. In the instant case, this Court is of the firm opinion
    that the High Court gravely erred in not accepting evidence of
    PW1, Jhabbulal. Jhabbulal being a rustic witness is not
    expected to always have an alert mind and so have an idea of
    direction, area and distance with precision from which he had
E   witnessed the incident. It is well to notice that in his examination
    in chief, Jhabbulal never claimed that he was standing by the
    side of the wall of courtyard nor it was claimed by him that he
    had witnessed the incident through mokhana, i.e. holes in the
    intervening walls. Though the witness was cross-examined for
F   days together, he was never confronted with his statement
    recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
    wherein he had allegedly stated before the Police Officer that
    he had witnessed the incident through holes in the intervening
    wall. The witness having not been confronted with his earlier
G   police statement wherein he had reportedly stated that he had
    seen the incident through the holes in the intervening wall, this
    Court fails to understand as to how the said statement allegedly
    made before the police during the investigation could have been
    pressed into service by the High Court to reject the substantive
H   evidence of this witness tendered before the Court wherein it
    STATE OF U.P. v. KRISHNA MASTER & ORS.                   587
               [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

was specifically asserted that while in his house, he had A
witnessed the incident of killing of five members of Guljari's
family by the respondents by firing gun shots. The prosecution
has satisfactorily established that Baburam who was brother
of Jhabbulal, PW1, had lost his life because of gun shots fired
at him. The suggestion made by the defence to the witness that B
he was making a false claim that Baburam was alive and that
on enquiry by him, Baburam had told him that the respondents
had assaulted him with fire arms, as he was tutored by the
police outside the court room was emphatically denied by him.
It is interesting to note that to confuse this witness he was cross- c
examined for days together on the point as to where and in
which direction houses of Kailash, Rajaram Subedar, Darbari
etc. were situated. Such an attempt by defence lawyer can
hardly be approved. On re-appreciation of evidence of
Jhabbulal, this Court finds that he has not made major
                                                                     0
improvements in his testimony before the Court and the so-
called discrepancies which are blown out of proportion by the
High Court are minor in nature and do not relate to the
substratum of the prosecution story. To say the least, this Court
finds that the approach of the High Court in appreciating
evidence of PW1 Jhabbulal who was a rustic witness is not only E
contrary to the well settled principles governing appreciation of
evidence of a rustic witness but is p -verse. At this stage, it
would be well to recall to the memory the weighty observations
made by this Court as early as in the yea·r 1988 relating to
appreciation of evidence and the duties expected of a Judge F
presiding over a criminal trial. In State of UP. v. Anil singh,
AIR 1988 SC 1998, it is observed as under:

     "In the great majority of cases, the prosecution version is
     rejected either for want of corroboration by independent       G
     witnesses, or for some falsehood stated or embroidery
     added by witnesses. In some cases, the entire prosecution
     case is doubted for not examining all witnesses to the
     occurrence. The indifferent attitude of the public in the
     investigation of crimes could also be pointed. The public      H
    588       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2010] 9 S.C.R.


A         are generally reluctant to come forward to depose before
          the Court. It is, therefore, not correct to reject the
          prosecution version only on the ground that all witnesses
          to the occurrence have not been examined. It is also not
          proper to reject the case for want of corroboration by
B         independent witnesses if the case made out is otherwise
          true and acceptable. With regard to falsehood stated or
          embellishments added by the prosecution witnesses, it is
          well to remember that there is a tendency amongst
          witnesses in our country to back up a good case by false
c         or exaggerated version. It is also experienced that
          invariably the witnesses add embroidery to prosecution
          story, perhaps for the fear of being disbelieved. But that
          is no ground to throw the case overboard, if true, in the
          main. lfthere is a ring of truth in the main, the case should
          not be rejected. It is the duty of the Court to cull out the
D
          nuggets of truth from the evidence unless there is reason
          to believe that the inconsistencies or falsehood are so
          glaring as utterly to destroy confidence in the witnesses. It
          is necessary to remember that a Judge does not preside
          over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is
E         punished. A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man
          does not escape. One is as important as the other. Both
          are public duties which the Judge has to perform."

       11. There appears to be substance in the argument of the
F learned counsel for the State that the feeble and insubstantial
  reasons have been given to disbelieve the trustworthy evidence
  of eye-witness, Jhabbulal as High Court had decided to give
  undeserved benefit of doubt to the respondents and had
  appreciated the evidence of PW1 Jhabbulal to find out
G drawbacks and shortcomings in his evidence when, in fact,
  there were none.

         12. Coming to the appreciation of evidence of another eye-
    witness, Madan Lal, this Court finds that the first fact kept in
    mind by the High Court was that at the time of occurrence, this
H
    STATE OF U.P. v. KRISHNA MASTER & ORS.                    589
               [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
witness was aged about six years and that his examination in          A
chief was recorded almost after ten years from the date of
occurrence, because at the time of recording of his
examination in chief before the Trial Court, he had mentioned
his age to be 16 years. It was highlighted by the High Court
that in his examination in chief, it was claimed by this witness      B
that he was sleeping on a cot along with his two brothers, i.e.,
deceased Umesh and deceased Dharmendra whereas his
mother was sleeping on another cot and that when the accused
had started firing he had slipped beneath the cot over which
he was sleeping, but at another place it was stated by him that       c
he was sleeping with his mother and had taken shelter under
the said cot and therefore, the witness was not consistent as
to the place from where he had witnessed the incident. The
High Court adverted to the statement made by this witness that
his elder sister, Sarla and elder brother Rajesh were also
                                                                      0
sleeping under the Chhapper but had managed to run away and
Sarla had concealed herself behind a heap of woods lying on
the western side in the courtyard itself. After examining site plan
Exhibit- "ka" 14 the High Court observed that in the site plan,
place where Sarla had allegedly taken shelter was not indicated
nor any heap of woods was shown, and finally came to the              E
conclusion that the witness was not reliable. The High Court
took into consideration the statement made by this witness that
when he had come out from beneath the cot, he had seen Sarla
in the house and that many persons had assembled at his
house after the occurrence but he was not able to identify them       F
as he was a small child nor any of the persons assembled near
his house had asked him as to who were the assailants and
what they had done and therefore the High Court deduced that
this witness was not present in the house at the time of the
occurrence. A strange reasoning was adopted by the High               G
Court to come to the conclusion that the witness was not a
reliable one because he was a child of about six years of age
at the time of occurrence. His statement in the trial court was
recorded after a gap of about 1O years. It is inconceivable that
child of his understanding would recapitulate facts in his            H
    590     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A memory witnessed by him long ago. One of the reasons
  assigned by the High Court to disbelieve this witness was that
  Rajesh and Smt. Sarla who were of matured age and were in
  a better position to depose about the incident were not
  produced before the Trial Court for which no explanation
s whatsoever was given by the prosecution. The High Court
  readily accepted submission made by the counsel for the
  respondents that Rajesh and Smt. Sarla were not produced
  before the Court because obviously they were not prepared to
  support the false story set up by PW1, Jhabbulal in the FIR
c which was lodged by him against the respondents on account
  of his personal animosity. The High Court also found weight in
  the submission advanced by the advocate for the respondents
  that had these witnesses been produced before the Court, their
  evidence would have gone against the prosecution. The High
  Court again took notice of the fact that according to witness
0
  Madan Lal he had taken shelter under the cot over which he
  was sleeping along with his two brothers Umesh and
  Dharmendra who were killed by the assailants in the incident
  and concluded that it was ridiculous to believe that this witness
  who was younger than his two deceased brothers had taken
E shelter under the same cot without his presence being noticed
  by the assailants. After noticing that Smt. Sarla and Rajesh who
  were elder to the witness Madan Lal were not alleged to have
  sustained any injury, the High Court proceeded to record a
  finding of fact that these three children were not present inside
F the house at the time of occurrence on the spacious plea that
  if Madan Lal, PW2, and Rajesh as well as Smt. Sarla had been
  present, they would not have been spared by the assailants and
  that the theory set up at the trial that all these three children had
  concealed themselves at different places is not only an
G improvement but does not find support from the evidence on
   record as well as the spot inspection made by the investigating
  officer.

        13. (fhe abovestated reasons are the only grounds on
H   which testimony of witness Madan Lal is disbelieved by the High
    STATE OF U.P. v. KRISHNA MASTER & ORS.                    591
               [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

Court. This Court fails to understand as to on what principle and A
on which experience in real life, the High Court made a
sweeping observation that it is inconceivable that a child of
Madan Lal's understanding would be able to recapitulate facts
in his memory witnessed by him long ago. There is no principle
of law known to this Court that it is inconceivable that a child of B
tender age would not be able to recapitulate facts in his memory
witnessed by him long ago. This witness has claimed on oath
before the Court that he had seen five members of his family
being ruthlessly killed by the respondents by firing gun shots.
When a child of tender age witnesses gruesome m,urder of his        c
father, mother, brothers etc. he is not likely to forget the incident
for his whole life and would certainly recapitulate facts in his
memory when asked about the same at any point of time,
notwithstanding the gap of about ten years between the incident
and recording of his evidence. This Court is of the firm opinion
                                                                      0
that it would be doing injustice to a child witness possessing
sharp memory to say that it is inconceivable for him to
recapitulate facts in his memory witnessed by him long ago. A
child of tender age is always receptive to abnormal events
which take place in its life and would never forget those events
for the rest of his life. The child would be able to recapitulate . E
correctly and exactly when asked about the same in future.
Therefore, the spacious ground on which the reliable testimony
of PW2, Madan Lal came to be disbelieved can hardly be
affirmed by this Court. One of the reasons given by the High
Court to disbelieve testimony of witness Madan Lal is that F
Rajesh and Smt. Sarla who were of mature age and were in a
better position to depose about the incident were not produced
before the Court. It is nobody's case that witness Madan lal was
in charge of prosecution case. The Public Prosecutor was in
charge of the case and it was for him to d.ecide whether Rajesh G
and/or Smt. Sarla should be examined or not. The evidence of
witness Madan Lal, in no uncertain terms, discloses that his
brother Rajesh and sister Smt. Sarla were ready to depose
before the Court about the incident. However, for non-
production of his brother Rajesh and his sister Sarla before the H
    592      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010) 9 S.C.R.


A Court. witness Madan Lal was never responsible. He had not
  taken any decision for examining his brother Rajesh and Smt.
  Sarla. It was the discretion and decision of the Public
  Prosecutor due to which his brother and sister were not
  examined as witnesses. At no stage of the trial, the defence
B had made a request to the Trial Court to call upon the Public
  Prosecutor to examine Rajesh and Smt. Sarla as witnesses. It
  is the case of the defence that Rajesh and Smt. Sarla had
  witnessed the incident and if they had been examined as
  witnesses, they would have deposed against the prosecution
c case that the respondents were not responsible for murders of
  five family members of Guljari and brother of the first informant.
   In such circumstances, it was incumbent upon and open to the
  defence to examine Rajesh and/or Smt. Sarla as defence
  witness. No prayer was made by the defence to examine
  Rajesh and Smt. Sarla even as court witnesses. Therefore, for
0
  non-examination of Rajesh and/or Smt. Sarla, witness Madan
   Lal could not have been blamed nor his evidence could have
  been brushed aside in a casual manner. The acceptance of
  submission made by the counsel for the respondents that
   Rajesh and Smt. Sarla were not produced because they were
E not prepared to support the false story set up by PW1 . Jhabbulal
   in his FIR against the respondents on account of his personal
   animosity, is not understandable at all and appears to be
  figment of imagination of the defence. Nothing could be brought
   on record or elicited from the cross-examination of either PW1
F Jhabbulal or PW2 Madan Lal to show that they were ready and
   willing to allow reai culprits who had committed heinous crime
   and virtually wiped off family of Guljari and murdered real brother
   of the first informant to go scot free and implicate the
   respondents falsely in such a serious case.
G
       14. On.e of the reasons given by the High Court for
  disbelieving testimony of PW2, Madan Lal is that the evidence
  indicated that a large number of villagers had gathered outside
  the door of Gulzari Lal's house but not even one of them was
H examined to justify that PW2 Madan Lal was present in his
    STATE OF U.P. v. KRISHNA MASTER & ORS.                    593
               [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

house. The High Court has further held that presence of witness       A
Madan Lal in his house becomes doubtful because if he had
been present inside the house at the time of occurrence, his
presence would have been noticed by the assailants and he
would not have been spared by them. To say the least, these
reasons are not tenable at all. As noticed earlier, the case of       B
witness Madan !al is that on hearing sound of gun shots, he had
slipped beneath the cot and from there witnessed the whole
incident. This story appears to be probable because the
incident had taken place during night time in the house and
therefore it was possible for the witness to slip beneath the cot     c
without being noticed by the assailants. It is nobody's case that
the respondents, while killing Guljari and his family, had seen
below the cot to find out whether any other member of Guljari's
family was alive or not. Therefore, to say that Madanlal must
not have been inside the room otherwise he would have been
                                                                      0
killed by the assailants is a far fitted reason which does not
appeal to this Court. It is true that it has come in evidence that
a large number of villagers had gathered outside the door of
Guljari Lal's house. But this Court is of the opinion that it was
not necessary for the prosecution to examine any of the
witnesses to prove that he had seen PW2 Madan Lal in Madan            E
Lal's house. PW2 Madan Lal himself is competent to state
before the Court whether he was present in his house at the
time of incident. Witness Madan Lal has given evidence in a
simple manner without making any noticeable improvements
and/or embellishments and, therefore, it was not necessary for        F
the court to seek corroboration to his assertion that he was in
his house when the incident had taken place. What is relevant
to notice is that the court cannot forget the fact that at the time
of incident, PW2 Madan Lal was a tender aged child. Normally,
a child aged six years is not expected to be out of house at          G
the dead of night and he is expected to be in the company of
his parents. Moreover, the testimony of witness Lajveer Singh,
PW3, who was posted at Police Station, Kayamganj,
Farrukhabad shows that after registration of offences, ASI
Gajraj Singh had recorded statements of those persons who             H
   594     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A were found to be conversant with the facts of the case and
  Gajraj Singh had also recorded statement of witness Madan
  Lal on August 11, 1991. If witness Madan lal had not been
  present in his house at the time when the incident had taken
  place, his police statement would not have been recorded by
B ASI Gajraj Singh at all. Thus, the reasons on which presence
  of PW2, Madan Lal is doubted is against the weight of
  evidence, human conduct and preponderance of probabilities.
  Further, at the time of incident, PW2, Madan Lal was of tender
  age and, therefore, incapable of nurturing any grudge against
c any of the respondents. No evidence co.uld be produced nor
  any suggestion was made to witness Madan Lal during his
  cross-examination that something serious had happened
  between the date of incident and recording of evidence of
  witness Madan Lal in court, between Madan Lal and the
  respondents that Madan Lal was out to implicate the
0
  respondents falsely in such a serious case.

        15. One of the grounds mentioned by the High Court in the
  impugned judgment for disbelieving the case of the prosecution
  is that Rajesh who was brother of PW2, Madan Lal and Smt.
E Sarla who is sister of witness Madan Lal as well as few of those
  who had collected near the door of the house of Guljari after
  the incident were not examined as witnesses in this case. As
  far as this ground is concerned, the Court notices that Section
  134 of the Indian Evidence Act specifically provides that no
F particular number of witnesses shall, in any case, be required
  for the proof of any fact. It is well known principal of law that
  reliance can be placed on the solitary statement of a witness if
  the court comes to the conclusion that the said statement is the
  true and correct version of the case of the prosecution. The
G courts are concerned with the merit and the statement of a
  particular witness and not at all concerned with the number of
  witnesses examined by the prosecution. The time-honoured rule
  of appreciating evidence is that it has to be weighed and not
  counted. The law of evidence does not require any particular
H number of witnesses to be examined in proof of a given fact.
    STATE OF U.P. v. KRISHNA MASTER & ORS.                    595
               [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
However, where, the court finds that the testimony of solitary        A
witness is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable, it may,
in given set of facts, seek corroboration but to disbelieve
reliable testimony of a solitary witness on the ground that others
have not been examined is to do complete injustice to the
prosecution. This Court, on re-appreciation of evidence, finds        B
that the testimony of witness Madan Lal is cogent, consistent
and reliable. Taking into consideration the manner in which
witness Madan Lal had testified before the Court and the fact
that nothing could be elicited in his lengthy cross-examination
for days together to impeach his credibility, this Court is of the    c
view that his testimony is reliable and can be accepted without
any reservations. Therefore, non-examination of his brolher or
sister or few others who had gathered near the house of
deceased Guljari Lal after the incident is of no significance and
does not affect credibility of testimony of the said witness.
                                                                      D
     Cumulative effect of the above discussion is that the High
Court was not justified in brushing aside testimony of PW2,
Madan Lal while considering case of the prosecution against
the respondents.
                                                                      E
      Yet another ground assigned by the High Court for
disbelieving the testimony of first informant Jhabbulal and that
of PW2 Madan Lal is that there was no electricity light in the
village and, therefore, the claim made by both the witnesses
that they had witnessed the incident in the light of electricity is
                                                                      F
untrustworthy. To begin with, this Court proposes to refer to the
First Information Report lodged by witness Jhabbulal. The said
report was brought on the record as Exhibit Ka-1. In the report,
it is clearly mentioned that at the time of occurrence of the
incident, there was electricity light at the place of incident and
with the help of the said light, the first informant was able to      G
witness the incident wherein five members of deceased
Guljari's family came to be murdered by the respondents. The
witness Jhabbulal has further stated that his brother Babu Ram,
who was sleeping in his shop was dragged out from the shop
                                                                      H
    596      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A by the respondents by breaking open the door of the shop and
  thereafter was murdered by them by firing gun shots. Regarding
  murder of Babu Ram also, it is mentioned in the First
  Information Report that electric bulb was burning at his house
  at the time of occurrence of the incident and, therefore, he was
B able to witness the murder of his brother Babu Ram. PW2,
  Madan Lal has stated that his father, mother and three real
  brothers were murdered by the respondents by firing gun shots
  and had asserted that at the time of the incident one bulb was
  burning on the main gate of his house whereas another bulb
c was burning on the thatched roof, i.e., near the place where the
  deceased had slept during the night of the incident. Though both
  the witnesses were cross-examined at great length by the
  learned counsel for the defence, nothing significant could be
  brought on record from which one can, with certainty deduce
  that there was no light of electricity bulbs at the place of the
0
  incident. Apart from what is mentioned by the two eye-witnesses
  regarding sufficiency of electricity light in which they had
  witnessed the incident, the sketch of the spot prepared by the
  Investigating Officer on August 11, 1991 in the presence of
E independent witnesses and produced as Exhibit Ka-14 shows
  that point 'L' mentioned in the panchnama of place of
  occurrence, a bulb has been shown burning at the main gate
  of the house of PW2 Madan Lal whereas another bulb is shown
  burning at the place mentioned as 'AL'. Thus, assertion made
  by the two eye-witnesses that they were able to witness the
F incident because of availability of sufficient electricity light gets
  corroboration from contemporaneous document, namely,
   Exhibit Ka-14. According to the High Cour., the place pointed
  by PW2, Madan Lal where an electric bulb was hanging has
   not been shown in the site plan and on the contrary it has been
G shown at a different place. Even if it is assumed that the place
  mentioned by PW2, Madan Lal where an electric bulb was
   hanging is different from the place shown in the site plan, the
  fact remains that an electric bulb was hanging at the place of
  incident which is completely ignored by the High Court. It is
H relevant to notice that PW2, during the course of recording of
    STATE OF U.P. v. KRISHNA MASTER & ORS.                     597
               [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
his· statement before the Court had mentioned that he had              A
shown to the Investigating Officer the place where the bulb was
hanging but he was not in a position to specify the reason as
to why the place shown by him to the Investigating Officer was
not mentioned in the site plan. It may be mentioned that the
Investigating Officer ASI Gajraj Singh, unfortunately, expired         B
before the commencement of the trial and, therefore, another
officer was examined. who had taken a little part in the
investigation. Thus, the contradiction and/or omission ·in the
statement of the witness recorded under Section 161 of the
Criminal Procedure Code could not be brought on the record             c
of the case. In such circumstances, there was no reason for the
High Court to disbelieve the claim made by PW2 Madan lal that
he had shown to the Investigating Officer the place where the
bulb was hanging. Jhabbulal had stated in this evidence that
Guljari had taken electric line illegally be putting a wire on the
                                                                       0
main line which proceeded to the tube well of Suresh Chand
DW1. The High Court relied upon the testimony of Suresh
Chand that no villager had taken electricity from his tube well
line and thereafter concluded that there was complete darkness
in the whole village on account of Amavasya of rainy season
and, therefore, it was not possible for the two eye-witnesses          E
to witness the incident. It becomes absolutely necessary for this
Court to scan the evidence of DW1. DW1 in his evidence
before the Court stated that he was having a tubewell in village
Lakhanpur prior to the date of incident and that tubewell was
being operated with the electric power. It was also mentioned          F
by him that the electricity connection was in running condition
and that the electricity line passes through the village. What is
stated by the witness is that during the night of the incident, he
was not present in his village Lakhanpur but had gone to his
sister's house situated in another village and that he had come        G
back to his village on the third day of the date of the incident. If
this witness was not present on the date of incident, he was
)east competent to depose before the Court as to whether on
the date of incident there was electricity light in the village or
 not. A specific question as to whether on the fateful night           H
    598     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A electricity was taken illegally by putting Katiya to his wire was
  put to this witness. This witness was not able to answer this
  specific query naturally because he had admitted that on the
  date of incident he was not present in the village. The Trial Court
  rightly observed that it was not concerned with the question
B whether the electric power was being consumed by the villagers
  legally or illegally and that the Court was only concerned with
  the question whether there was sufficient light on the date of
  incident to enable the witnesses to see the incident. The High
  Court has misread the evidence of DW1 Suresh Chand as well
c as that of PW2 Madan Lal, wherein it was asserted by him that
  he had also ta~en illegal electricity connection and was
  consuming the same through the bulbs which according to him
  were burning on the date of incident. Thus the reliable evidence
  of PW1 and PW2 cannot be brushed aside on the ground that
  Investigating Officer had not taken into possession the bulbs
0
  hanging on the place of incident. Thus, the High Court was not
  justified in holding that there was no electric power in the whole
  village and that there was complete darkness on account of
  Amavasya of rainy season due to which it was impossible for
E the eye-witnesses to witness the incident. Further, the visibility
  capacity of urban people is not the standard to be applied to
  the villagers. PW2 Madan Lal has stated that the respondents
  had brought with them torches but as light of electricity was
  available in the house, torches were not put on. Thus, according
  to PW2 Madan Lal the respondents had in the light of electric
F bulb recognized the deceased persons and had fired gun shots
  on them. Further, if light available was sufficient for the accused
  persons to identify their targets for firing shots, there is no
  reason why the witnesses would not be able to identify the
  respondents as the assailants. The statement of PW1 Jhabbulal
G that Guljari had taken electric line illegally by putting a wire on
  the main line which proceeded to the tube well was disbelieved
  by the High Court on the ground that the Investigating Officer
   had not mentioned either in the site plan or in the inspection
  note that electric line had been taken in an unauthorized manner
H from the main line which proceeded to the tube-well of Surf'lsh
    STATE OF U.P. v. KRISHNA MASTER & ORS.                    599
               [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

Chand. It is common experience of one and all that site plan          A
or panchnama of place of incident is being prepared to indicate
the state of things found at the place of incident. In site plan,
Investigating Officer is not supposed to note whether electric
line had been taken in an unauthorized manner or not. That is
not the purpose for which site plan is prepared in a criminal         B
case. Thus, without sufficient reason the High Court disbelieved
the claim made by PW1 Jhabbulal that deceased Guljari had
taken electric line illegally by putting a wire on the main line.
On the facts and in the circumstances of the case emerging
from the record, this Court is of the opinion that the High Court     c.
was not justified in coming to the conclusion that there was
complete darkness in the whole village and, therefore, it was
not possible for the eye-witnesses to see the incident.
      The High Court has further held that motive alleged against
deceased Guljari was developed for the first time during trial        D
by witness Jhabbulal and there was no motive for the
respondents to commit the murders of as many as five persons
of the family of Gulzari Lal. A conjoint and purposeful reading
of FIR with the reliable testimony of PW1 Jhabbulal and that of
PW2 Madan Lal makes it very clear that the respondents were           E
agitated and angry when the daughter of respondent No.1 had
eloped with the son of the first informant. The evidence on
record further shows that during the time of first elopement, on
one day son of the first informant, i.e., Amar Singh, was spotted
in the village and on learning about the fact that son of the first   F
informant was seen in the village, the respondents were
prepared to take revenge to what is known as to maintain
honour of the family. However, the fact that Amar Singh was
likely to be assaulted by the respondents had become known
to wife of Guljari who had fore-warned Amar Singh and Amar            G
Singh had, therefore, left the village to save his life. The
evidence also indicates that the fact that Amar Singh had left
the village all of a sudden because of information conveyed by
wife of the deceased Gulzari that respondents were to assault
him was later on learnt by the respondents and, therefore, the
                                                                      H
    600     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A respondents were bearing a grudge against wife of Gulzari and
  against Gulzari. The record further shows that when the
  daughter of the respondent No.1 had returned to the village,
  Guljari in the presence of the first informant had made a
  suggestion to the respondent No.1 that he should get his
B daughter married with the son of the first informant upon which
  the respondent No.1 had taken an offence and asked Gulzari
  not to play with the honour of his family. This Court is of the
  opinion that sufficient evidence has been led by the prosecution
  to establish motive which prompted the respondents to kill five
c members of family of deceased Guljari. What weighed with the
  High Court in disbelieving the motive suggested by the
  prosecution was the fact that in the FIR lodged by PW1
  Jhabbulal, it was not stated that because wife of Gulzari had
  forewarned Amar Singh about impending assault on him by the
  respondents, the respondents were not able to take revenge
0
  against Amar Singh and that Gulzari had suggested to the
  respondent No.1 to get his daughter married with son of PW1.
  The High Court held that such story was developed for the first
  time during trial by witness Jhabbulal who was admittedly on
  inimical terms with the respondents. As far as this aspect is
E concerned, this Court notices that the FIR need not be an
  encyclopedia of all the facts and circumstances on which the
  prosecution relies. The main purpose of the FIR is to enable a
  police officer to satisfy himself as to whether commission of
  cognizable offences is indicated so that further investigation
F can be undertaken by him. The purpose of the FIR is to set the
  criminal law in motion and it is not customary to mention every
  minute detail of the prosecution case in the FIR. FIR is never
  treated as a substantive piece of evidence and has a limited
  use, i.e., it can be used for the corroborating or contradicting
G the maker of it. Law requires FIR to contain basic prosecution
  case and not minute details. The law developed on the subject
  is that even if an accused is not named in the FIR he can be
  held guilty if prosecution leads reliable and satisfactory
  evidence which proves his participation in crime. Similarly, the
H witnesses whose names are not mentioned in the FIR but
    STATE OF U.P. v. KRISHNA MASTER & ORS.                    601
               [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
examined during the course of trial can be relied upon for the        A
purpose of basing conviction against the accused. Non-
mentioning of motive in the FIR cannot be regarded as omission
to state important and material fact. As a principle, it has been
ruled by this Court that omission to give details in the FIR as
to manner in which weapon was used by accused is not                  B
material omission amounting to contradiction. Further, this is
a case wherein FIR was filed by a rustic man and, therefore,
non-mentioning of motive in the FIR cannot be attached much
importance. In Superintendent of Police, CBI & Ors. vs. Tapan
Kumar Singh, AIR 2003 SC 4140, it has been held by this               c
Court that mere absence of indication about source of light in
the FIR for identifying assailants does not, in any way, affect
prosecution version. The FIR is not the last words in the
prosecution case and in some cases detailed FIR could be a
ground for suspicion. What is relevant to find out is whether the
                                                                      0
FIR was lodged promptly and whether it is actuated by mala
fides. The record of this case indicates that FIR regarding
gruesome murder of six persons was filed promptly and without
any avoidable delay and, therefore, false implication of aoy of
the respondents in such a grievous case stands ruled out. There       E
is nothing on the· record to show that FIR was result of
deliberation by the first informant with other persons. As the FIR
was lodged promptly, the inforr mt, i.e., Jhabbulal's evidence
containing minor variations not affecting substratum of
prosecution story cannot be discarded on the ground that
motive which prompted the respondents to kill six persons was         F
not mentioned in the FIR. Further, it is well settled that the
prosecution is not supposed to prove motive when prosecution
relies on direct evidence, i.e., evidence of eye-witnesses. In this
case, the prosecution has examined first informant as PW1 who
has lost his brother in the incident as well as PW2 Madan Lal         G
who lost five members of his family. Their evidence is found to
be trustworthy and unimpeachable. As observed earlier, their
evidence does not suffer from major contradiction and/or
improvements nor noticeable embellishment have been made
by them. As the prosecution has led acceptable eye-witnesses          H
    602      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A   account of the incident, this Court is of the firm opinion that
    failure to est3blish motive would not entitle the respondents to
    claim acquittal.
       16. There is yet another evidence in form of oral dying
  declaration which implicates the respondents in the murder of
B six persons i.e. oral dying declaration made by deceased
  Baburam before his brother Jhabbulal. The High Court
  committed serious error in disbelieving the oral dying declration
  made by deceased Baburam before his real brother Jhabbulal
  (PW1) implicating the respondents as his assailants. The
C reasons given by the High Court for disbelieving oral dying
  declaration was that it was not mentioned by witness Jhabbulal
  either in his FIR or in his statement recorded under Section 161
  of Cr.P.C. As observed earlier FIR need not be an
  encyclopedia of minute details of the incident nor it is necessary
o to mention therein the evidence on which prosecution proposes
  to rely at the trial. The basic purpose of filing FIR is to set the
  criminal law into motion and not to state all the minute details
  therein. It is relevant to notice that six brutal and gruesome
  murders had taken place wherein fire arms were used. The
E hard reality of life is that the persons who has lost kith and kin
  in horrific incident is likely to suffer great shock and therefore
  law would not expect him to mention minutest details either in
  his FIR or statement under Section 161. The question before
  the Court is whether the assertion made by the witness that
F soon after the incident he had gone to the place where his
  injured brother was lying and on enquiry by him, his brother had
  told him that the respondents were his assailants, inspires
  confidence of the Court. Reading the evidence of the witness
  as a whole, t,his Court points that it has ring of truth in it. There
G is nothing improbable if a brother approaches his injured
  brother and tries to know from him as to how he had received
  the injuries nor it is improbable that an enquiry being made the
  injured brother would not give reply/information sought from him.
  The assertion by witness Jhabbulal that after the incident was
  over he had gone near his injured brother and tried to know as
H
    STATE OF U.P. v. KRISHNA MASTER & ORS.                  603
               [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
to who were his assailants, whereupon his injured brother had A
replied that the respondents had caused injuries to him, could
not be effectively challenged during cross-examination of the
witness nor it could be brought on record that because of the
nature of the injuries received by Baburam he would not have
survived even for few minutes and must have died immediately B
on the receipt of the injuries.
      17. The net result of the above discussion is that the High
Court has acquitted respondents who were charged for
commission of six murders in a casual and slipshod manner.
The approach of the High Court in appreciating the evidence        c
is not only contrary to the well settled principles of appreciation
of evidence but quite contrary to ground realities of life. The High
Court has recorded reasons for acquittal of the respondents
which are not borne out from the record and quite contrary to
the evidences adduced by the reliable eye-witnesses. The High D
Court was not justified in upsetting well reasoned conviction of
 the respondents recorded by the Trial Court which after
 observing demeanour of the eye-witnesses had placed reliance
 on their testimony. The High Court has not taken into
consideration the full text of the evidence adduced by the
                                                                     E
witnesses and picked up sentences here and there from the
testimony of the witnesses to come to a particular purpose. For
example, the High Court has not ' ken into consideration the
whole testimony of DW1 before coming to the conclusion that
there was complete darkness in the village which prevented the
eye-witnesses from witnessing the incident. The general · F
 impression this Court has gathered is that appreciation of
evidence by the High Court is cursory and has done injustice
 to the prosecution.
      18. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, this
 Court is of the firm opinion that it is firmly established by the ·G
 prosecution that respondents are persons who had committed
 six murders on August 10/11, 1991 and, therefore, liable to be
 convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 ·IPC.
      19. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties
 regarding sentence to be imposed on each respondent for H
                        ~




    604     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A having committed offence punishable under Section 302 read
  with Section 34 IPC. This Court notices that the Trial Court had
  sentenced all the three respondents to capital punishment.
  There is no manner of doubt that killing six persons and wiping
  almost the whole family on flimsy ground of honour saving of
B the family would fall within the rarest of rare case evolved by
  this Court and, therefore, the Trial Court was perfectly justified
  in imposing capital punishment on the respondents. However,
  this Court also notices that the incident had roughly taken place
  before 20 years, i.e., on August 10/11, 1991. Further, the High
c Court had acquitted the respondents by judgment dated April
  12, 2002. After April 12, 2002 till this date, nothing adverse
  against any of the respondents is reported to this Court. To
  sentence the respondents to death after their acquittal in the
  year 2002 wouid not be justified on the facts and in the
  circumstances of the case. Therefore, this Court is of the
0
  opinion that interest of justice would be served if each of the
  respondent is sentenced to RI for life and a fine of Rs.25,000/
  - each in default RI for two years for commission of offence
  punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC.
E      20. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal succeeds. The
  judgment dated April 12, 2002 rendered by the High Court of
  Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal appeal No.574 of 2001
  acquitting the respondents of the offences punishable under
  Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC is hereby set aside. The
F judgment of the Trial Court convicting each of the respondents
  under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC is hereby restored
  and each respondent is accordingly convicted under Section
  302 read with Section 34 IPC. For the commission of offence
  punishable Uf')der Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, each
  respondent is sentenced to RI for life and fine of Rs.25,000/-
G each, in default, RI for two years. Out of the amount of fine, if
  paid, a sum of Rs.50,000/- be paid to PW2, Madan Lal, as
  compensation in view of the provisions of Section 357 of the
  Code. The appeal accordingly stands disposed of.
H   N.J.                                      Appeal disposed of.