Holding

Deemed vesting under s.10(3) confers only de jure title, not de facto possession; therefore, absent proof of voluntary surrender, surrender under s.10(5) or forceful dispossession under s.10(6), the landowner is entitled to the benefit of the saving clause in s.3 of the Repeal Act.

Summary

The State of Uttar Pradesh appealed against a High Court order that allowed landowner Hari Ram to claim the benefit of the saving clause in the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999. The dispute centered on whether the "deemed vesting" of surplus vacant land under section 10(3) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 gave the State de facto possession, thereby defeating the saving clause. The Supreme Court held that section 10(3) creates only a legal fiction of title (de jure possession) and does not confer actual possession unless the State can show a voluntary surrender, surrender under section 10(5), or forceful dispossession under section 10(6). Since the State failed to produce any such evidence, the landowner was entitled to the protection of section 3 of the Repeal Act. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

Does the deeming provision in s.10(3) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 amount to de facto possession of surplus land by the State?
Can the State rely on the deemed vesting to defeat the saving clause of s.3 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999?
What procedural steps must the State satisfy under s.10(5) and s.10(6) before it can claim possession?

Legislation cited

Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976s. 10(1), s. 10(2), s. 10(3), s. 10(4), s. 10(5), s. 10(6), s. 11, s. 3, s. 35, s. 6, s. 8(3), s. 8(4), s. 9
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999s. 2, s. 3

Subjects

legal fictiondeemed acquisitionvestingde jure possessionde facto possessionsaving clauseurban land ceilingrepeal actstatutory interpretationvoluntary surrenderforceful dispossession

Judgment

[2013] 2 S.C.R. 301

STATE OF U.P. A
v.
HARi RAM
(Civil Appeal No. 2326 of 2013 etc.)
MARCH 11, 2013
B
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]

Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999:
s. 3 - Saving clause - Held: No documents have been c
produced by the State to show that the respondents had been
. dispossessed before coming into force of the Repeal Act and,
therefore, the High Court is right in holding that the
respondents are entitled to get benefit of s. 3 of the Repeal
Act.
D
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976:
s. 10(3) - Acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling
limit - Expressions "deemed to have been acquired" and
"deemed to have vested absolutely - Connotation of - Held: E
'vesting' in sub-s. (3) of s.10 means vesting of title absolutely
and not possession - Under s. 10(3), what is vested is de
jure possession not de facto possession - Mere vesting of
the land under sub-s. (3) of s.10 would not confer any right
on the State Government to have de facto possession of the F
vacant land unless there has been a voluntary surrender of
vacant land before 18.3.1999 - State has to establish that
there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land or
surrender and delivery of peaceful possession under sub-s.
(5) of s. 10 or forceful dispossession under sub-s. (6) of s. 10 G
- On failure to establish any of these situations, the land
: owner or holder can claim the benefit of s.3 of the Repeal Act
- Uttar Pradesh Urban Land Ceiling (Taking of Possession,
Payment of Amount and Allied Matters) Directions, 1gs3.
301 H
302. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 2 S.C.R.

A In the instant appeals filed by the State Government,
the question for consideration before the Court was:
whether the deemed vesting of surplus land u/s 10(3) of
the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 would
amount to taking de facto possession depriving the land
8 holders of the benefit of the saving clause u/s 3 of the
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 Sub-s. (3) of s. 10 of the Urban Land
C (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 states that after the
publication of the notification under sub-s. (1 ), the
competent authority has to declare that the excess land
referred to in the Notification published under sub-s. (1)
of s.10 shall, with effect from such date, as might be
o prescribed in the declaration, be deemed to have been
acquired by the State Government. On publication of a
declaration to that effect such land shall be deemed to
have been vested absolutely in the State Government,
free from all encumbrances, with effect from the date so
E specified. [para 16] [317-G-H; 318-A-B]

1.2 Legislature is competent to create a legal fiction,
for the purpose of assuming existence of a fact which
does not really exist. Sub-s. (3) of s.10 contained two
deeming provisions, such as, "deemed to have been
F acquired" and "deemed to have been vested absolutely".
In interpreting the provision creating a legal fiction, the
court is to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is
created and after ascertaining this, the court is to assume
all those facts and consequences which are incidental or
G inevitable corollaries to the giving effect to the fiction.
[para 17] [318-C-EJ

Delhi Cloth and General Miffs Company Umited v. State
of Rajasthan (1996) 2 SCC 449; Organo Chemical Industries
H
STATE OF U.P. v. HARi RAM 303

v. Union of India 1980 (1) SCR 61 = (1979) 4 SCC 573 A
·Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan 1994 (1)
=
SCR 445 (1994) 3 SCC 440; S. Gopal Reddy v. State of
=
U.P. 1996 (3) Suppl. SCR 439 (1996) 4 sec 596; Jugal
Kishore Saraf v. Mis Raw Cotton Co. Ltd. 1955 SCR 1369 =
AIR 1955 SC 376 - referred to. B

Ex-parte, Walton, In re, Levy (1881) 17 Chance. D. 746;
Szoma v. Secretary of State for the Department of Work and
Pensions (2006) 1 All E.R. 1 (at 25); DEG Deutsche
Institutions and another v. Kosby (2001) 3 All E.R. 878 - C
referred to.

1.3 The expression "deemed to have been acquired"
used as a deeming fiction under sub-s. (3) of s.10 can
only mean acquisition of title or acquisition of interests
because till that time the land may be either in the D
ownership of the person who held that vacant land or
possessed such land as owner or as a tenant or as
mortgagee and so on as defined uls 2(1) of the Act. [para
23) [320-C-D]
E
Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Zielinski Baker
and Partners (2004) 2 All E.R. 141 (at 11) - referred to.

Legal Glossary, published by Official Language
(Legislative) Commission 1970 Edition Page 302; Black's
Law Dictionary; Webster's Third New International Dictionary, F
of the English Language unabridged, Volume Ill S to Z at
page 2547 - referred to.

1.4 What is deemed "vesting absolutely" is that "what
is deemed to have acquired". There must be express G
words of utmost clarity to persuade a court to hold that
the legislature intended to divest possession also, since
the owner or holder of the vacant land is pitted against a
statutory· hypothesis. [para 26] [321-H; 322-A]
H
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 2 S.C.R.

A Beeda/I v. Maitland (1881) 17 Ch. D. p.183 ·referred
to.
1.5 Vacant land, it may be noted, is not actually
acquired but deemed to have been acquired, in that
deeming things to be what they are not. Acquisition,
8
therefore, does not take possession unless there is an
indication to the contrary. It is trite law that in construing
a deeming provision, It is necessary to bear in mind the
legislative purpose. The purpose of the Act is to impose
ceiling on vacant land, for the acquisition of land in
C excess of the ceiling limit thereby to regulate construction
on such lands, to prevent concentration of urban lands
in hands of few persons, so as to bring about equitable
distribution. For achieving that object, various
procedures have to be followed for acquisition and
D vesting. Keeping in view the provisions of sub-ss. (5) and
(6) of s. 10, the words 'acquired' and 'vested' have
different meaning and content. [para 27] [322-D-G]
1.6 Under s. 10(3), what is vested Is de jure
E possession not de facto. The 'vesting' in sub-s. (3) of s.10
means vesting of title absolutely and not possession
though nothing stands in the way of a person voluntarily
surrendering or delivering possession. Surrendering or
transfer of possession under sub-s. (3) of s.10 can be
F voluntary so that the person may get the compensation
as provided u/s 11 of the Act early. Once there is no
voluntary surrender or delivery of possession,
necessarily the State Government has to issue notice in
writing under sub-s. (5) of s. 10 to surrender or deliver
possession. Sub-s. (5) of s.10 visualizes a situation of
G surrendering and delivering possession, peacefully while
sub-s. (6) of s.10 contemplates a situation of forceful
dispossession. Requirement of giving notice under sub·
ss. (5) and (6) of s. 10 is mandatory. Though the word
'may' has been used therein, the word 'may' in both the
H
STATE OF U.P. v. HARi RAM 305

sub-sections has to be understood as "shall" because a A
court charged with the task of enforcing the statute
needs to decide the consequences that the legislature
intended to follow from failure to implement the
requirement. Effect of non-issue of notice under sub-s.
(5) or sub-s. (6) of s. 1O is that it might result the land B
holder being dispossessed without notice, therefore, the
word 'may' has to be read as 'shall'. [para 27, 28, 32 and
34) [322-G; 323-A-B; 324-F-G; 325-E-F]

Maharaj Singh v. State of UP and Others 1977 ( 1 )
SCR 1072 = (1977) 1 SCC 155; Rajendra Kumar v. Kalyan C
(dead) by Lrs. 2000 ( 2) Suppl. SCR 114 = (2000) 8 SCC
99 - referred to.
1.7 Further, the Uttar Pradesh Urban Land Ceiling
(Taking of Possession payment of amount and Allied o
Matters) Directions, 1983 make it clear that sub-s. (3) of
s.10 takes in only de jure possession and not de facto
possession. Therefore, if the land owner has not
surrendered possession voluntarily under sub-s. (3) of
s.10, or has not surrendered or delivered possession E
after notice u/s 10(5), or has not been dispossessed by
use of force uls 10(6), it cannot be said that the State
Government has taken possession of the vacant land.
[para 35, 36) [325-H; 326-A; 328-G-H; 329-A]

Pf. Madan Swaroop Shrotiya Public Charitable Trust v. F
State of U.P. and Others (2000) 6 SCC 325, Ghasitey Lal
Sahu and Another v. Competent Authority, Under the Urban
(Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976), U.P. and Another (2004)
13 SCC 452, Mukarram Ali Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh
and Others 2007 (8) SCR 340 =(2007) 11 sec 90 and G
Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar v. Deputy Collector and
Competent Authority and Others 2012 (2) SCR 219 = (2012)
4 sec 718 - referred to.

1.8 The mere vesting of the land under sub-s. (3) of H
...,..
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 2 S.C.R.

A s.10 would not confer any right on the State Government
to have de facto possession of the vacant land unless
there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land
before 18.3.1999. State has to establish that there has
been a voluntary surrender of vacant land or surrender
B and delivery of peaceful possession under sub-s. (5) of
s. 10 or forceful dispossession under sub-s. (6) of s. 10.
On failure to establish any of these situations, the land
owner or holder can claim the benefit of s.3 of the Repeal
Act. The State Government could not establish any of
C these situations. No documents have been produced by
the State to show that the respondents had been
dispossessed before coming into force of the Repeal Act
and, therefore, the High Court is right in holding that the
respondents are entitled to get benefit of s. 3 of the
Repeal Act. There is no infirmity in the judgment of the
0
High Court. [para 39-40] [329-G-H; 330-A-C]

Case Law Reference:
1996 (1) SCR 518 referred to para 17
E (1881) 17 Chance. D. 746 referred to para 18
(2006) 1 All E.R. 1 (at 25) referred to para 19
(2001) 3 All E.R. 878 referred to para 19
1980 (1) SCR61 referred to para 20
F
1994 (1) SCR 445 referred to para 20
1996 (3) Suppl. SCR 439 referred to para 21
1955 SCR 1369 referred to para 22
G (2004) 2 All E.R. 141 (at 11) referred to para 23
(2001) 3 All E.R. 878 referred to para 23
1977 (1) SCR 1072 referred to para 28
2000 (2) Suppl. SCR 114 referred to para 37
H
STATE OF U.P. v. HARi RAM 307

c2000) s sec 325 referred to para 37 A
c2004) 13 sec 452 referred to para 37
2012 (2) SCR 219 referred to para 37
2007 (8) SCR 340 referred to para 37
B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
2326 of 2013 etc.
From the Judgment & Order dated 27.04.2005 of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ Petition No. 47369 of c
2000.
C.A. Nos. 2327,2328,2329, 2330,2331,2332, 2333, 2334,
2335,2336,2337,2338,2339,2340,2341,2342,2343,2344,
·2345,2346,2347,2348,2349,2350,2351,2352,2353,2354,
2355,2356,2357,2358, 2359,2360,2361,2362,2363,2364, D
2365,2366,2367,2368,2369,2370,2371,2372,2373,2374,
2375,2376,2377,2378,2379,2380,2381,2382,2383,2384,
. 2385, 2386, 2387-2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394,
2395,2396,2397,2398,2399,2400,2401,2402,2403,2404,
2405,2406,2407,2408,2409,2410,2411,2412,2413,2414, E
2415,2416,2417,2418,2419,2420,2421,2422,2423,2424,
2425,2426,2427,2428,2429,2430,2431,2432,2433,2434,
2435,2436,2437,2438,2439,2440,2441,2442,2443,2444,
2445,2446,2447,2448,2449,2450,2451,2452,2453,2454,
2455,2456,2457,2458,2459,2460,2461,2462,2463,2464, F
2465,2466,2467,2468,2469,2470,2471,2472,2473,2474,
. 2475,2476,2477,2478,2479,2480,2481,2482,2483,2484,
2485,2486,2487,2488,2489,2490,2491,2492,2493,2494,
2495,2496,2497,2498,2499,2500,2501,2502,2503,2504,
2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510 of 2013. G
M.R. Shamshad, Ahmad S. Azhar, Shashank, Kamlendra
' Mishra, Abhisth Kumar, Abhishek Chaudhary, Gunnam
Venkateswara Rao, Niraj Gupta, Samir Ali Khan, Deepak Goel,
flrabnab Kumar Mullick. Soma Mullick, Mohd. Parvez Dabas.
H
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 2 S.C.R.

A Shuaibudding, S.A. Syed, Pankaj Kumar Singh, Pawan Kumar
Shukla, Dr. Kailash Chand, Abha Jain, Garima Prashad, AshoK
Mathur, Laxmi Arvind, M.P. Shorawala, Praveen Jain, P.K. Jain,
Prem Sunder Jha, Ramesh Chandra Mishra, R.D. Upadhyay,
S.K. Sabharwal, Shrish Kumar Misra, Ugra Shankar Prasad,
B B. Sunita Rao, Abha R. Sharma, Yash Pal Dhingra, Chander
Shekhar Ashri, K.L. Janjani, Asha Gopalan Nair, Himanshu
Munshi, Gopal Prasad, Sujata Kurdukar, Rameshwar Prasad
Goyal, Vishnu Sharma, Daya Krishan Sharma, Shekhar Kumar,
Savita Singh, John Mathew, Gaurav Dhingra, Vishwa Pal Singh,
C Anuradha & Associates, Anoop Kr. Srivastav, Vidhi
International, Ashok Kumar Gupta II, Santosh Kumar Tripathi,
Pukhrambam Ramesh Kumar, Anupam Lal Das, Praveen
Agrawal, Sudhir Kulshreshtha, Manoj K. Mishra, Susmita Lal,
Sumi! Kumar, Namita Choudhary, Garvesh Kabra for the
D appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. We are, in these batch of cases, called upon to decide
E the question whether the deemed vesting of surplus land under
Section 10(3) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act,
1976 [for short 'the Act'] would amount to taking de facto
possession depriving the land holders of the benefit of the
saving Clause under Section 3 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and
F Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 [for short 'the Repeal Act'].
FACTS:
3. Hari Ram, respondent herein, had filed a statement on
G 28.9.1976 giving details of the vacant land he was holding in
excess of ceiling limit prescribed under the Act, as provided
under Section 6 of the Act. The competent authority under the
Act surveyed the land and the respondent was served with a
draft statement under Section 8(3) of the Act on 13.5.1981,
H calling for objection to the draft statement within thirty days. No
STATE OF U.P. v. HARi RAM 309
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
objection was preferred by the respondent and it was found that A
he was holding excess land measuring 52,513.30 sq. meters
and an order to that effect was passed by the competent
authority under Section 8(4) of the Act, vide his proceeding
dated 29.6.1981.
B
4. The competent authority later issued a notification dated
12.6.1982 under Section 10(1) of the Ceiling Act, which was
published in the Government Gazette on 12.6.1982 giving the
particulars of the vacant land held by the respondent. The
competent authority then issued a notification dated C
22.11.1997, which was published on the same date, stating the
land shall be deemed to have been vested with the Government
from 12.6.1982, free from all encumbrances. On 10.6.1999, the
competent authority vide its letter dated 10.6.1999 informed the
Bandobast Chakbandi Adhikar that the surplus land declared
as per the Notification stood vested in the State Government. D
On 19.6.1999, the prescribed authority issued a notice under
Section 10(5) of the Act directing the respondent to hand over
possession of the land declared as surplus to a duly authorized
person. Aggrieved by the same, the respondent preferred an
appeal No.29 of 1999 before the District Judge, Varanasi E
under Section 33 of the Act, contending that before passing the
order under Section 8(4) of the Act, no notice, as contemplated
under Section 8(3) of the Act, was served on him. The appeal
was allowed and the order dated 29.06.1981 was quashed,
vide judgment dated 14.12.1999. F

5. Aggrieved by the said order, State of U.P., through the
competent authority, preferred Civil Misc. Petition No. 47369
of 2000 before the High Court of Allahabad under Article 226
of the Constitution of India, and the High Court, after elaborately G
considering the various contentions, took the view that sub-
section (3) of Section 10 does not envisage, taking physical
and de facto possession of the surplus land, for which
proceedings under sub-section (5) of Section 10 have to be
followed. On facts also, the Division Bench found no reason to H
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 2 S.C.R.

A interfere with the order of the District Judge, and the appeal
was dismissed, against which this appeal has been preferred.
Following the judgment in Writ Petition No.47369 of 2000,
several writ petitions were disposed of by the High Court
against which appeals are pending before this Court.
B
6. We intend to take up the appeal filed against the
judgment in Writ Petition No. 47369 of 2000 as the leading
case, based on which other appeals can be disposed of.

7. Shri Sunil Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing for
C the appellant - State of U.P. submitted that the High Court has
committed an error in interpreting sub-section (3) to Section 10
of the Act and submitted that the expressions "deemed
acquisition" and "deemed vesting" which find a place in Section
l
10(3} of the Act would take in not only de jure possession but
D also de facto possession. Learned senior counsel submitted
that under Section 10(2) of the Act, the competent authority
considers the claims of the persons interested in vacant land
and then determines the nature and extent of such claims,
followed by a declaration under Section 10(3} of the Act by
E publication in the Official Gazette which amounts to absolute
vesting. Learned senior counsel submitted that Section 10(3}
is a self contained provision and does not make vesting
dependent on any other or further procedure to be complied
with by the competent authority. Learned senior counsel also
F submitted that Section 10(5) and Section 10(6) speak of
"hostile possession" and only in cases where hostile
possession is set up by the owner in respect of the vacant land
by growing crops, constructing buildings or other fixtures etc.,
the competent authority has to take recourse to the procedure
G laid down in those provisions. Referring to the provisions of the
Repeal Act, learned senior counsel submitted that the wide
language used therein envisages various possibilities such as
taking over possession under Section 10(3), Section 10(5) or
Section 10(6} of the Act. Learned senior counsel submitted that
H in cases where possession is seen having been taken over
STATE OF U.P. v.. HARi RAM 311
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]

legally, statutorily and by way of presumption in law, on account A
of the publication of the notification and the deeming clause and
legal fiction provided under Section 10(3) of the Act, the
requirement of Section 3(1 )(a) of the Repeal Act shall stand
satisfied and the land so vested and possessed by the State
Government shall remain intact in the ownership and B
possession of the State Government. Learned senior counsel
also submitted that the procedure laid down under U.P. Urban
Land Ceiling (Taking of Possession, Payment of Amount and
Allied Matters) Directions, 1983 (for short 'Directions 1983')
would not apply in view of the plenary character of Section 10(3). c
8. Learned counsels appearing for the respondents, on the
other hand, fully supported the judgment of the High Court and
submitted that on a conjoint reading of Sections 10(3), 10(5),
10(6) and Section 3 of the Repeal Act would show that the
expressions "deemed to have been acquired" or "deemed· to D
have vested" would not comprehend "physical possession"
under Section 10(3) in view of Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the
Act. Learned counsels urged in such situations, the State has
necessarily to follow the procedure laid down under the
Directions 1983 issued in exercise of the powers conferred E
under Section 35 of the Act. Further, it was submitted that the
Object and Reasons of the Repealing Act would be defeated,
if the interpretation placed by Shri Gupta is accepted, since it
being a beneficial enactment.
F
Judicial evaluation

9. The Parliament, after having felt the need for an orderly
development of urban areas in view of the growth of population
and increase in urbanization, enacted Act 33 of 1976. The
Parliament also felt that it is necessary to take measures for G
exercising social control over the scarce resource of urban land
with a view to ensuring its equitable distribution. To ensurtl
uniformity in approach, the Government of India had also
addressed various State Governments in this regard. Eleven
H
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 2 S.C.R.

A States had passed resolutions under Article 252(1) of the
Constitution empowering the Parliament to undertake
legislation in that behalf. Consequently, the Act of 1976 was
enacted which came into force on 17.2.1976. The Object of the
Act was to provide for imposition of ceiling on vacant land in
B urban agglomeration, for the acquisition of such land in excess
of the ceiling limit, to regulate the construction of buildings on
such lands and for matters connected therewith, with a view to
preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of few
persons and speculation and profiteering therein and with a
c view to bringing about an equitable distribution of land in urban
agglomerations to sub-serve the common good.

10. The legislature then put a ceiling on vacant land in
Chapter Ill of the Act. Section 6 of the Act placed an obligation
on persons holding vacant land in excess of ceiling limit to file
D statement before the competent authority. Section 8 of the Act
referred to the preparation of draft statement as regards vacant
land held in excess of ceiling limit. Draft statement prepared
has to be served on the person concerned together with a notice
under sub-section (3) of Section 8 calling for objections, if any,
E within 30 days to the service of notice. The competent authority,
after considering the objections has to pass orders under sub-
section (4) to Section 8, after considering the objections filed.
The final statement has to be issued under Section 9 of the Act.

F 11. We are, in this case primarily concerned, with the
scope of Section 10 of the Act, which reads as follow:
10. Acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling
limit.- (1) As soon as may be after the service of the
statement under section 9 on the person concerned, the
G competent authority shall cause a notification giving the
particulars of the vacant land held by such person in excess
of the ceiling limit and stating that-

(i) such vacant land is to be acquired by the concerned
H State Government; and
STATE OF U.P. v. HARi RAM 313
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]

(ii) the claims of all persons interested in such vacant land A
may be made by them personally or by their agents giving
particulars.of the nature of their interests in such land, to
be published for the information of the general public in the
Official Gazette of the State concerned and in such other
manner as may be prescribed. B

(2) After considering the claims of the persons interested
in the vacant land, made to the competent authority in
pursuance of the notification published under sub-section
(1 ), the competent authority shall determine the nature and
extent of such claims and pass such orders as it deems C
fit.

(3) At any time after the publication of the notification under
sub-section (1), the competent authority may, by notification
published in the Official Gazette of the State concerned, o
declare that the excess vacant land referred to in the
notification published under sub-section (1) shall, with
effect from such date as may be specified in the
declaration, be deemed to have been acquired by the
State Government and upon the publication of such E
declaration, such land shall be deemed to have vested
absolutely in the State Government free from all
encumbrances with effect from the date so specified.

(4) During the period commencing on the date of
publication of the notification under sub-section (1) and F
ending with the date specified in the declaration made
under sub-section (3)-

(i) no person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift,
lease or otherwise any excess vacant land (including any G
part thereof) specified in the notification aforesaid and any
such transfer made in contravention of this provision shall
be deemed to be null and void; and

H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 2 S.C.R. ,_
314

A (ii) no person shall alter or cause to be altered the use of
such excess vacant land.

(5) Where any vacant land is vested in the State
Government under sub-section (3), the competent authority
may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in
8
possession of it to surrender or deliver possession thereof
to the State Government or to any person duly authorised
by the State Government in this behalf within thirty days of
the service of the notice.

c (6) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order
made under sub-section (5), the competent authority may
take possession of the vacant land or cause it to be given
to the concerned State Government or to any person duly
authorised by such State Government in this behalf and
D may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary.

Explanation.-ln this section, in sub-section (1) of s17ction
11.and in sections 14 and 23, "State Government", in
relation to-
E (a) any vacant land owned by the Central Government,
means the Central Government;

(b) any vacant land owned by any State Government and
situated in a Union territory or within the local limits of a
F cantonment declared as such under section 3 of the
Cantonments Act, 1924, (2 of 1924.) means that State
Government."

12. Before examining the scope of sub-section (3) to
G Section 1O as well as sub-sections (5) and (6) to Section 1O,
reference may be made to the Repeal Act 1999 and its Object
and Reasons which are as follow:

Statement of Object and Reasons:

H "1. The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 was
STATE OF U.P. v. HARi RAM 315
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]

- passed when Proclamation of emergency was in
operation with a laudable objective in mind. The said Act
A

was passed pursuant to resolution passed by the State
Legislature under clause (1) of Article 252. Unfortunately
public opinion is nearly unanimous that the Act has failed
to achieve what was expected of it. It has on the contrary B
pushed up land prices to unconscionable levels, practically
brought the housing industry to a stop and provided
copious opportunities for corruption. There is wide spread
clamour for removing this most potent clog on housing.

2. Parliament has no power to repeal or amend the Act c
unless resolutions are passed by two or more state
legislatures as required under clause (2) of Article 252.

3. The Legislature of Haryana and Punjab have passed
resolutions empowering Parliament to repel the act in D
those States. The Act, in the first instance will be repealed
in those States and in the Union Territories and
subsequently if any State Legislature adopts this Act by
resolution, then from the date of its adoption the Act will
stand repealed in that State. E
4. The proposed repeal, along with some other incentives
and simplification of administrative procedures is expected
'
revive the stagnant housing industry and provide affordable
living accommodation for those who are in a state of
F
underserved want and are entitled to public assistance. The
repeal will not however, affect land on which building
activity has already commenced. For that limited purpose
exemption granted under Section 20 of the Act will
continue to be operative. Amounts paid out by the State
Government will become refundable. G

5. The bill seeks to achieve the above purpose."
'
13. The Act 36 of 1976 was repealed by Section 2 of the
Repeal Act, 1999 and the Repeal Act was adopted in the State
H
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 2 S.C.R.

A of U.P. on March 18, 1999. The Repeal Act contains a saving
clause vide Section 3 which reads as follow:

3. Saving.-
(!) The repeal of the principal Act shall not affect-
B
(a) The vesting of any vacant land under sub-section
10, possession of which has been taken over by the
state government or any person duly authorized by
the state government in this behalf or by the
c competent authority;

(b) The validity of any order granting exemption
under sub-section (I) of section 20 or any action
taken there under, notwithstanding any judgment of
any court to the contrary;
D
(c) Any payment made to the state government as
a condition for granting exemption under sub-
section (I) of section 20.

E (2) Where-

(a) any land is deemed to have vested in the state
government under sub section (3) of section 10 of the
principal Act but possession of which has not been taken
over by the state government or any person duly authorized
F by the state government in this behalf or by the competent
authority; and

(b) any amount has been paid by the state government with
respect to such land,
G
then such land shall not be restored unless the amount
paid, if any, has been refunded to the state government."

14. We notice even after the coming into force of the
Repeal Act, the competent authority under the Act 33 of 1976
H vide its letter dated 10th June, 1999 informed the Bandobast
STATE OF U.P. v. HARi RAM 317
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
. Ch.akbandi Adhikar that the surplus land declared as per the A
notification issued under the Act had vested in the State
Government free from all encumbrances and, therefore, in the
revenue records the name of State Government be entered and
name of the respondent be mutated. The competent authority
vide its notice dated 19.6.1999 issued under Section 10(5) of B
the Act directed the respondent to handover possession of the
land declared as surplus to duly authorized persons on behalf
of the Collector.

15. Before examining the impact of the Repeal Act on Act
33 of 1976, particularly, Section 3 of the Repeal Act on sub- C
section (3) to Section 10 of the Act, let us examine whether
possession could be taken following the procedure laid down
in sub-section (3) to Section 1O of the Act. Section 6 casts an
obligation on every person holding vacant land in excess of
ceiling limit to file a statement before the competent authority D
and after following all the statutory procedures, the competent
authority has to pass the order under Section 8(4) on the draft
statement. Following that, a'final statement has to be issued
under Section 9 on the person concerned. Sub-section (1) to
Section 10 states that after the service of statement, the E
competent authority has to issue a notification giving particulars
" of the land held by such person in excess of the ceiling limit.
Notification has to be published for the information of the
general public in the Official Gazette, stating that such vacant
land is to be acquired and that the claims of all the persons F
interested in such vacant land be made by them giving
particulars of the nature of their interests in such land.

16. Sub-section (2) of Section 10 states that after
considering the claims of persons interested in the vacant land, G
the competent authority has to determine the nature and extent
of such claims and pass such orders as it might deem fit. Sub-
section (3) of Section 10 states that after the publication of the
notification under sub-section (1), the competent authority has
to declare that the excess land referred to in the Notification
H
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 2 S.C.R.

A published under sub-section (1) of Section 10 shall, with effect
from such date, as might be prescribed in the declaration, be
deemed to have been acquired by the State Government. On
publication of a declaration to that effect such land shall be
deemed to have been vested absolutely in the State
B Government, free from all encumbrances, with effect from the
date so specified.

Legal Fiction

17. Legislature is competent to create a legal fiction, for
C the purpose of assuming existence of a fact which does not really
exist. Sub-section (3) of Section 10 contained two deeming
provisions such as "deemed to have been acquired" and
"deemed to have been vested absolutely". Let us first examine
the legal consequences of a 'deeming provision'. In interpreting
D the provision creating a legal fiction, the Court is to ascertain .
for what purpose the fiction is created and after ascertaining
this, the Court is to assume all those facts and consequences
which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to the giving effect
to the fiction. This Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills
E Company Limited v. State of Rajasthan (1996) 2 SCC 449
held that what can be deemed to exist under a legal fiction are
facts and not legal consequences which do not flow from the
law as it stands.

18. James Lords Justice in Ex-parte, Walton, In re, Levy
F (1881) 17 Chance. D. 746 speaks on deeming fiction as:

"When a statute enacts that something shall be deemed
to have been done, which in fact and in truth was not done,
the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what
G purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction
is to be resorted lo".

19. In Szoma v. Secretary of State for the Department of
Work and Pensions (2006) 1 All E.R. 1 (at 25), court held, it
H would be quite wrong to carry this fiction beyond its originally
' ;

STATE OF U,P. v. HARi RAM 319
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
intended purpose so as to deem a person in fact lawfully here A
not to be here at all. The intention of a deeming provision, in
laying down a hypothesis is that the hypothesis shall be carried
so far as necessary to achieve the legislative purpose but no
further. (see also DEG Deutsche Institutions and another v.
Kosby (2001) 3 All E.R. 878. B

20. Let us test the meaning of the expression "deemed to
have been acquired" and "deemed to have been vested
absolutely" in the above legal settings. The expression
"acquired" and "vested" are not defined under the Act. Each
word, phrase or sentence that we get in a statutory provision, C
if not defined in the Act, then is to be construed in the light of
the general purpose of the Act. As held by this Court in Organo
Chemical Industries v. Union of India (1979) 4 SCC 573 that
a bare mechanical interpretation of the words and application
of a legislative intent devoid of concept of purpose will reduce D
most of the remedial and beneficial legislation to futility.
Reference may also be made to the Judgment of this Court in
Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan (1994) 3 SCC
440. Words and phrases, therefore, occurring in the statute are
to be taken not in an isolated or detached manner, it is E
associated on the context but are read together and construed
in the light of the purpose and object of the Act.

21. This Court in S. Gopal Reddy v. State of U.P. (1996)
4 sec 596 held:
F
"it is well known rule of interpretation of statutes that the
text and the context of the entire Act must be looked into
while interpreting any of the expressions used in a statute.
The Courts must look to the object, which the statute seeks
to achieve while interpreting any of the provisions of the G
Act. A purposive approach for interpreting the Act is
necessary ...... ."

22. ln Jugal Kishore Saraf v. Mis Raw Cotton Co. Ltd. AIR
1955 SC 376, Justice S.R. Das stated: H
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 2 S.C.R.

A "The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the
statute literally that is, by giving to the words used by
legislature their ordinary natural and grammatical meaning.
If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the
words are susceptible of another meaning the Court may
B adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is
possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal
interpretation."

23. The expression "deemed to have been acquired" used
as a deeming fiction under sub-section (3) of Section 10 can
C only mean acquisition of title or acquisition of interests because
till that time the land may be either in the ownership of the
person who held that vacant land or to possess such land as
owner or as a tenant or as mortgagee and so on as defined
under Section 2(1) of the Act. The word "vested" has not been
D defined in the Act, so also the word "absolutely". What is vested
absolutely is only the land which is deemed to have acquired
and nothing more. The word "vest" has different meaning in
different context; especially when we examine the meaning of
vesting on the basis of a statutory hypothesis of a deeming
E provision which Lord Hoffmann in Customs and Excise
Commissioners v. Zielinski Baker and Partners (2004) 2 All
E.R. 141 (at 11) described as "heroic piece of deeming". t,

24. The word "vesf' or "vesting" has different meaning.
F Legal Glossary, published by Official Language (Legislative)
Commission 1970 Edition at Page 302:

"Vest: 1. To give a person a legally fixed, immediate right
or personal or future enjoyment of (an estate), to grant,
endow, clothe with a particular authority, right of property,
G 2. To become legally vested; (T.P. Act.)

"Vesting order: An order under statutory authority
whereby property is transferred to and vested, without
conveyance in some person or persons;
H
STATE OF U.P. v. HARi RAM 321
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition) 1990 at page 1563: A

"Vested: Fixed; accrued; settled; absolute; complete;
Having the character or given the rights of absolute
ownership; not contingent, not subject to be defeated by
a condition precedent. Rights are "vested" when rights to B
enjoyment present or prospective has become property of
some particular persons or persons as present interest;
mere expectancy or future or contingent interest in property
founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws does
not continue "vested right" Vaughan v. Nadel; 228 Kan.
469, 618 p. 2d 778, 783. See also Accrue Vest and c
specific typed of vested interest infra.• ;

Webster's Third New International Dictionary, of the English
Language unabridged, Volume Ill S to Z at page 2547 defines
the word "vest" as follow: D

"vest" vest ...... To place or give into the possession or
discretion of some person or authority (the regulation of
the waterways .... to give to a person a legally fixed
immediate right of present or future enjoyment of (as an E
estate) (a deed that vests a title estate in the grantee and
a remainder in his children), b. to grant endow, or clothe
with a particular authority right or property ..... to put ( a
person) in possession of land by the feudal ceremony of
investiture ..... to become legally vested (normally) title to
F
real property vests in the holder of a property executed
deed.)"

25. VesVvested, therefore, may or may not include "transfer
of possession" the meaning of which depends on the context
in which it has been placed and the interpretation of various G
other related provisions.

26. What is deemed "vesting absolutely" is that ''what is
deemed to have acquired". In our view, there must be express
H
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 2 S.C.R.

A words of utmost clarity to persuade a court to hold that the
legislature intended to divest possession also, since the owners
or holders of the vacant land is pitted against a statutory
hypothesis. Possession, there is an adage "nine points of law"
In Beedall v. Maitland (1881) 17 Ch. D. p.183 Sir Edward Fry,
B while speaking of a Statute which makes a forcible entry an
indictable offence, stated as follows:

"this statute creates one of the great differences which exist
in our law between the being in possession and the being
c out of possession of land, and which gave rise to the old
saying that possession is nine points of the law. The effect
of the statute is this, that when a man is in possession, he
may use force to keep out a trespasser; but if a trespasser
has gained possession, the rightful owner cannot use force
to put him out, but must appeal to the law for assistance."
D
27. Vacant land, it may be noted, is not actually acquired
but deemed to have been acquired, in that deeming things to
be what they are not. Acquisition, therefore; does not take
possession unless there is an indication to the contrary. It is
E trite law that in construing a deeming provision, it is necessary
to bear in mind the legislative purpose. The purpose of the Act
is to impose ceiling on vacant land, for the acquisition of land
in excess of the ceiling limit thereby to regulate construction on
such lands, to prevent concentration of urban lands in hands of
F few persons, so as to bring about equitable distribution. For
achieving that object, various procedures have to be followed
for acquisition and vesting. When we look at those words in the
above setting and the provisions to follow such as sub-sections
(5) and (6) of Section 10, the words 'acquired' and 'vested'
G have different meaning and content. Under Section 10(3), what
is vested is de jure possession not de facto, for more reasons
than one because we are testing the expression on a statutory
hypothesis and such an hypothesis can be carried only to the
extent necessary to achieve the legislative intent.
H
STATE OF U.P. v. HARi RAM 323
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
Voluntary Surrender A
28. The 'vesting' in sub-section (3) of Section 10, in our
view, means vesting of title absolutely and not possession
though nothing stands in the way of a person voluntarily
surrendering or delivering possession. The court in Maharaj B
Singh v. State of UP and Others (1977) 1 SCC 155, while
interpreting Section 117(1} of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and
Land Reform Act, 1950 held that 'vesting' is a word of slippery
import and has many meaning and the context controls the text
and the purpose and scheme project the particular semantic
shade or nuance of meaning. The court in Rajendra Kumar v. C
Kalyan (dead) by Lrs. (2000) 8 SCC 99 held as follows:
"We do find some contentious substance in the contextual
facts, since vesting shall have to be a "vesting• certain. "To
vest, generally means to give a property in." (Per Brett, L.J. 0
Coverdale v. Charlton. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 5th
edn. Vol. VI.) Vesting in favour of the unborn person and
in the contextual facts on the basis of a subsequent
adoption after about 50 years without any authorization
cannot however but be termed to be a contingent event. E
To "vest", cannot be termed to be an executor devise. Be
it noted however, that "vested" does not necessarily and
always mean "vest in possession" but includes "vest in
interest" as well."

29. We are of the view that so far as the present case is F
concerned, the word "vesting" takes in every interest in the
property including de jure possession and, not de facto but it
is always open to a person to voluntarily surrender and deliver
possession, under Section 10(3) of the Act.

30. Before we examine sub-section (5) and sub-section G
(6) of Section 10, let us examine the meaning of sub-section
(4) of Section 10 of the Act, which says that during the period
commencing on the date of publication under sub-section (1),
ending with the day specified in the declaration made under
sub-section (3), no person shall transfer by way of sale, H
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 2 S.C.R.

A mortgage, gift or otherwise, any excess vacant land, specified
in the notification and any such transfer made in contravention
of the Act shall be deemed to be null and void. Further, it also
says that no person shall alter or cause to be altered the use
of such excess vacant land. Therefore, from the date of
B publication of the notification under sub-section (1) and ending
with the date specified in the declaration made in sub-section
(3), there is no question of disturbing the possession of a
person, the possession, therefore, continues to be with the
holder of the land.
_ C Peaceful dispossession

31. Sub-section (5) of Section 10, for the first time, speaks
of "possession" which says where any land is vested in the
State Government under sub-section (3) of Section 10, the
0 competent authority may, by notice in writing, order any person,
who may be in possession of it to surrender or transfer
possession to the State Government or to any other person,
duly authorized by the State Government.

32. If de facto possession has already passed on to the
E State Government by the two deeming provisions under sub-
section (3) to Section 10, there is no necessity of using the
expression "where any land is vested" under sub-section (5) to
Section 10. Surrendering or transfer of possession under sub-
section (3) to Section 10 can be voluntary so that the person
F may get the compensation as provided under Section 11 of the
Act early. Once there is no voluntary surrender or delivery of
possession, necessarily the State Government has to issue
notice in writing under sub-section (5) to Section 1O to
surrender or deliver possession. Subsection (5) of Section 10
G visualizes a situation of surrendering and delivering
possession, peacefully while sub-section (6) of Section 10
. contemplates a situation of forceful dispossession .

Forceful dispossession

H 33. The Act provides for forceful dispossession but only
STATE OF U.P. v. HARi RAM 325
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]

when a person refuses or fails to comply with an order under A
sub-section (5) of Section 10. Sub-section (6) to Section 10
again speaks of "possession" which says, if any person refuses
or fails to comply with the order made under sub-section (5),
the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land
to be given to the State Government and for that purpose, force B
- as may be necessary- can be used. Sub-section (6), therefore,
contemplates a situation of a person refusing or fails to comply
with the order under sub-section (5), in the event of which the
competent authority may take possession by use of force. ·
Forcible dispossession of the land, therefore, is being resorted c
only in a situation which falls under sub-section (6) and not
under sub-section (5) to Section 10. Sub-sections (5) and (6),
therefore, take care of both the situations, i.e. taking possession
by giving notice that is "peaceful dispossession" and on failure
to surrender or give delivery of possession under Section 0
10(5), than "forceful dispossession" under sub-section (6) of
Section 10.

34. Requirement of giving notice under sub-sections (5)
and (6) of Section 10 is mandatory. Though the word 'may' has
been used therein, the word 'may' in both the sub-sections has E
to be understood as "shall" because a court charged with the
task of enforcing the statute needs to decide the consequences
that the legislature intended to follow from failure to implement
the requirement. Effect of non-issue of notice under sub-section
(5) or sub-section (6) of Section 11 is that it might result the F
land holder being dispossessed without notice, therefore, the
word 'may' has to be read as 'shall'.

35. Above reasoning is in consistence with the Directions
1983 which has been issued by the State Government in G
exercise of powers conferred under Section 35 of the Act.
Directions clearly indicate that the procedure for taking
possession of the vacant land in excess of the prescribed
ceiling limit. which reads as under: ·

The Uttar Pradesh Urban Land Ceiling (Taking of H
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 2 S.C.R.

A Possession payment of amount and Allied Matters) .
Directions, 1983 (Directions issued by the State
Government under Section 35 of the Act, 1976):

"In exercise of the powers under Section 35 of the Urban
Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (Act No.33 of
B
1976), the governor is pleased to issue the following
directions relating to the powers and duties of the
Competent Authority in respect of amount referred to in
Section 11 of the aforesaid Act to the person or persons
entitled thereto:
c
1. Short title, application and Commencement-These
directions may be called the Uttar Pradesh Urban
Land Ceiling (Taking of Possession Payment of
Amount and Allied Matters Directions, 1983)
D
2. The provisions contained in this direction shall be
subjected to the provisions of any directions or rules
or orders issued hy the Central Government with
such directions or rules or orders.
E 3. They shall come into force with effect from the date
of publication in the Gazette.

2. ·Definitions:-

3. Procedure for taking possession of vacant
F
Land in excess of Ceiling Limit-(1) The Competent
Authority will maintain a register in From No.ULC -
1 for each case regarding which notification under '
sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Act is published
in the Gazette.
G
4. (2) an order in Form No.ULC-11 will be sent to each
land holder as prescribed under sub-section (5) of
Section 109 of the Act and the date of issue and •
service of the order will be entered in Column 8 of
H Form No.ULC-1.
STATE OF U.P. v. HARi RAM 327
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.)
(3) On possession of the excess vacant land being A
taken in accordance with the provisions of sub-
section (5) or sub-section (6) of Section 10 of the
Act, entries will be made in a register in Form ULC-
111 and also in Column 9 of the Form No.ULC-1. The
Competent Authority shall in token of verification of B
the entries, put his signatures in column 11 of Form
No.ULC-1 and Column 10 of Form No.ULC-111.

Form No.ULC-1

Register of Notice u/s 10-(3) and 10(5) c
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 a 9 10 11

S.No Serial No. Case Cate of Land Cate Rema- Signa-
of Register Number Noiifi- to be of rks ture of
of Receipt cation acqui- taking Compe
SI. No. of u/s reed over tent D
Register of 10(3) village posse- Au tho-
Taking Mohali ssion rity
Possession

Form NO. ULC-11
Notice order u/s 10(5) E
(See clause (2) of Direction (3)
In the Court of Competent Authority
U.L.C ............... .

No .................... . Date .............................. .
F
Sri/Smt. ................. .Tio ....................................... .

In exercise of the powers vested un/s 10(5) of the Urban
Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976 (Act No.33 of
1976, you are hereby informed that vide Notification G
No ....... dated ..... under section 10(1) published in Uttar •
Pradesh Gazette dated ...... following land has vested
absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances as a

H
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 2 S.C.R.

A consequence Notification u/s 10(3) published in Uttar
Pradesh Gazette dated ....... Notification No ......... dated
. . . . With effect from .......... you are hereby ordered to
surrender or deliver the possession of the land to the
Collector of the District Authorised in this behalf under
B Notification No.324/11-27-U.C.77 dated February 9, 1977,
published in the gazette, dated March 12, 1977, within
thirty days from the date of receipt of this order otherwise
action under sub-section (6) of Section .10 of the Act will
follow.
c Description of Vacant Land

Location Khasra number Area Remarks
identification ..

1 2 3 4
D
Competent Authority

Dated .............................. .
E
No.

Copy forwarded to the Collector ............ with the request
that action for immediate taking over of the possession
of the above detailed surplus land and its proper
F maintenance may, kindly be taken an intimation be given
to the undersigned along with copy of certificate to verify.
Competent Authority

•
G
36. Above-mentioned directives make it clear that sub-
section (3) takes in only de jure possession and not de facto
possession, therefore, if the land owner is not surrendering
possession voluntarily under sub-section (3) of Section 10, or
H surrendering or delivering possession after notice, under
STATE OF U.P. v. HARi RAM 329
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]

Section 10(5) or dispossession by use of force, it cannot be A
said that the State Government has taken possession of the
vacant land.

37. The scope of Act 33of1976 came up for consideration
before this Court on few occasions, reference may be made B
to certain judgments, even though there has been no elaborate
discussion of the provision of the Act and its impact on the
Repeal Act. Reference may be made to Pt. Madan Swaroop
Shrotiya Public Charitable Trust v. State of U.P. and Others
(2000) 6 SCC 325, Ghasitey Lal Sahu and Another v. c
Competent Authority, Under the Urban (Ceiling and
Regulation Act, 1976), U.P. and Another (2004) 13 SCC 452,
Mukarram Ali Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others
(2007) 11 SCC 90 and Vinayak Kashinath, Shilkar v. Deputy
Collector and Competent Authority and Others (2012) 4 SCC D
718.

Effect of the Repeal Act

38. Let us now examine the effect of Section 3 of the
Repeal Act 15 of 1999 on sub-section (3) to Section 10 of the E
Act. The Repeal Act 1999 has expressly repealed the Act 33
of 1976. The Object and Reasons of the Repeal Act has already
been referred to in the earlier part of this Judgment. Repeal Act
has, however, retained a saving clause. The question whether
a right has been acquired or liability incurred under a statute F
before it is repealed will in each case depend on the
construction of the statute and the facts of the particular case.

39. The mere vesting of the land under sub-section (3) of
Section 10 would not confer any right on the State Government·
to have de facto possession of the vacant land unless there has G
been a voluntary surrender of vacant land before 18.3.1999.
State has to establish that there has been a voluntary surrender
of vacant land or surrender and delivery of peaceful possession
under sub-section (5) of Section 10 or forceful dispossession
under sub-section (6) of Section 10. On failure to establish any H
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 2 S.C.R.

A of those situations, the land owner or holder can claim the
benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. The State Government
in this appeal could not establish any of those situations and
hence the High Court is right in holding that the respondent is
entitled to get the benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. ·
B
40. We, therefore, find no infirmity in the judgment of the
High Court and the appeal is, accordingly, dismissed so also
the other appeals. No documents have been produced by the
State to show that the respondents had been dispossessed
before coming into force of the Repeal Act and hence, the
C respondents are entitled to get the benefit of Section 3 of the
Repeal Act. However, there will be no order as to costs.

R.P. Appeals dismissed.