STATE OF TRIPURA & ORS.versusARABINDA CHAKRABORTY & ORS.
- Citation
- 2014 INSC 296
- Decided
- 21 April 2014
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- ANIL R DAVE
Holding
The limitation period starts from the date the cause of action arises (the fresh appointment), and mere representations without a statutory appeal do not extend or reset the limitation period.
Summary
The employee was initially appointed as librarian in 1964 but was terminated for a year of unauthorized absence and later re‑appointed on a temporary basis in November 1967. He repeatedly made representations seeking seniority to be counted from his original appointment, all of which were rejected, and finally filed a title suit in 1979 claiming continuity of service. The employer contended that the suit was barred by limitation, arguing that the cause of action arose on the date of the fresh appointment in 1967. The Supreme Court held that the limitation period begins when the cause of action arises and is not extended by filing representations where no statutory appeal exists. Consequently, the suit was deemed hopelessly time‑barred, the lower courts' orders were set aside, and the appeal was allowed, dismissing the suit.
Issues considered
- When does the limitation period commence for a claim to seniority and continuity of service?
- Do representations made to the employer without a statutory appeal provision extend or reset the limitation period?
- Can continuity of service be claimed from the original appointment after termination due to unauthorized absence and a fresh appointment?
Subjects
Judgment
[2014] 5 S.C.R. 281
STATE OF TRIPURA & ORS. A
v.
ARABINDA CHAKRABORTY & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No.1322 of 2007)
APRIL 21, 2014
··I B
[ANIL R. DAVE AND VIKRAMAJIT SEN, JJ.]
Limitation:
Suit - Period of limitation - Services of plaintiff C
terminated for remaining unauthorisedly absent - Given a
fresh appointment on purely temporary basis - Suit filed after
12 years claiming seniority from the date of initial
appointment and claiming limitation from the date of rejection
of his last representation - Held: Period of /imitation would
commence from the date on which cause of action takes
0
place - Simply by making a representation, when there is no
statutory provision or there is no statutory appeal provided,
period of limitation would not get extended - Law does not
permit extension of period of /imitation by mere filing of a
representation - Period of limitation would not Commence E
from the date on which the last representation is decided - In
the instant ca~e, there was no provision with regard to any
statutory appeal -Respondent kept on making representations
one after another and all the representations were rejected -
Courts below committed an error by considering the date of F
rejection of last representation as the date on which cause of
action had arisen - Orders of courts below are set aside - Suit
stands dismissed - Service law.
Service Law: G
Seniority - Initial appointment terminated for employee
being unathorisedly absent - Subsequently employee given
fresh appointment on temporary basis - Claim for seniority
281 H
282 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 5 S.C.R.
A from initial employment - Held: Services of respondent in his
first employment having been terminated because of his
unauthorised absence, there could nqt have been any
question with regard to continuity of service with effect from
first employment.
B
Respondent no. 1, on his appointment as Librarian,
joined his duties on 12.9.1964. From 1.8.1966 to 20.9.1967
respondent no. 1 remained unauthorisedly absent and,
therefore, his services were terminated. However, he was
C given a fresh appointment as Librarian, by order dated
22.11.1967, on purely temporary basis. Respondent no.
1 made a representation to count his seniority from the
date of his initial appointment as Librarian in 1964. The
said representation was rejected in 1973. The final
seniority list was published in 1975 in which the service
D of respondent no. 1 was shown to have commenced
from 22.11.1967 as per fresh appointment. Respondent
no. 1 continued unsuccessfully to make representations
and ultimately filed a title suit in 1979. The appellant·
employer contested the suit stating that the suit having
E been filed after more than 13 years from the date of
joining the service in 1967, was barred by limitation. The
suit was decreed and the employer's first appeal and
second appeal were dismissed.
F Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. Simply by making a representation, when
there is no statutory provision or there is no statutory
appeal provided, the period of limitation would not get
extended. The law does not permit extension of period
G of limitation by mere filing of a representation. Nor would
the period of limitation commence from the date on which
the last representation is decided. [Para 10] [288-C-D]
1.2. In the instant case, the suit was hopelessly
H barred by law of limitation. It is a fact that services of the
STATE OF TRIPURA v. ARABINDA CHAKRABORTY 283
respondent in his first employment had 6een lerminat~p A
because of his unauthorised absence· and he- was given
a fresh appointment order on 22.11.1967 and, therefore,
there c;ould n~t have been any-question with regard to
continuity of service with ~ffect from the first employment.
The respondent did not make any representation or B
grievance when he was- given a fresh appointment. He
knew if well that his services had been terminated and
he was obliged by the appellant authorities by giving him
a rresh appointment. Even after the draft seniority list was
published on 11.11.19.72 and was finalized in September, c
1975, the respondent did not file any ~uit but continued
to make representations which were rejected throughout.
[Para 10-12] [288-D-F, 289-C-E]
1.3. It is a settled legal position that the period of
limitation would commence from the date on which the D
cause of action takes place. Had there been any statute
giving right of appeal to the respondent and if the
respondent had filed such a statutory appeal, the period
of limitation would have commenced from the date when
the statutory appeal was decided. In the instant case, E
there was no provisfiin \j\fith regard to any statutory
appeal. The respondent k~pt qn making representations
one after another and all the representations were
rejected. It cannot be accepted that the period of
limitation would commence from the date on which the F
last representation was rejected. The courts below
committed an error by considering the date of rejection
of the last representation as the date on which the cause
of action had arisen. This could not have been done. The
order of J:he High Court confirming the orders passed by G
the first appellate court and the trial court is set aside. T~
suit stands dismissed. [Para 13-14] [289-E-H; 290-A-C]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
1322 of 2007.
H
284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 5 S.C.R.
A From the Judgment & Order dated 17.03.2006 of the High
Court of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura,
Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh at Agartala (Agartala Bench)
in S.A. No. 20 of 1998.
Rituraj Biswas, Gopal Singh for the Appellants.
8
Avijit Bhattacharjee for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
C ANlL R. DAVE, J. 1. Being aggrieved by the judgment
delivered in RSA No. 20of1998 by the High Court of Gauhati
at Agartala on 17th March, 2006, the State of Tripura and
others-employers of respondent no.1 have filed this appe~I.
.
:..: ·(.· -
2. The facts giving rise to the present appeal, in a nutshell··
D are as under:
Respondent No. 1 had been appointed as a librarian by
the Directorate of Education, Government of Tripura by an order
dated 04.09.1964 and he had joined his duties at Birchandra
E Public Library, Agartala on 12.09.1964.
While in service, he was sent to Banaras Hindu University,
Varanasi to undergo further education and to get qualification
of Bachelor of Library Science during the academic year 1965-
66. After completion of his studies, he had resumed his duties
F on 27.07.1966. Thereafter, the respondent-employee had
remained absent without any intimation or sanctioned leave for
about one year i.e. from 01.08.1966 to 20.09. 1967. During his
absence from service, by letter dated 13.08.1966, the
respondent had been called upon to report at the place of his
G duty within seven days, failing which his service was to be
terminated. lnspite of th.e said notice dated 13.08.1966, the
respondent did not report at the place of his work and therefore,
a Memorandum dated 14.11.1966 had been issued to the
respondent calling upon him to resume his duties, but as the
H respondent had not resumed his duties, his services had been
STATE OF TRIPURA v. ARABINDA CHAKRABORTY 285
[ANIL R. DAVE, J.]
terminated. It was learnt subsequently that during the period A
when he had remained un~uthorisedly absent, he had
undergone further studies and had attained degree of Masters
in Library Science and after attaining the said qualification, he
had once again approached the concerned authorities for his
re-appointment. Looking at the fact that the respondent had 8
become better qualified, he was given a fresh appointment by
an order dated 22.11.1967 on purely temporary basis as a
librarian and again he was posted at Birchandra Public Library,
Agartala, Tripura.
Though the respondent knew it well that by virtue of an C
order dated 22.11.1967, he was given a fresh appointment on
purely temporary basis as a librarian and he had lost his earlier
seniority, he made a representation for his seniority in service
from the day on which he was initially appointed as a librarian
in 1964. The repres~ntation made by the respondent was D
rejected on 31.08.1973. ltis also pertinent to note that a draft·
seniority list of Librarians was published on 11.11.1972 and
thereafter, the said draft list was finalized and the final seniority
list was published on 24.09.1975. In the said seniority list it was
clearly shown that service of the respondent had commenced E
from 22.11.1967 in pursuance of his fresh appointment.
lnspite of the aforestated fact, the respondent continued to
make representations and all his representations were rejected.
Ultimately the respondent filed Title Suit No. 175 of 1979 on F
19.09.1979 in the Court of Munsif, Sadar, West Tripura: praying
for the aforestated reliefs. In the said suit, the respondent had
referred to all the representations made by him and had also
stated that reply to his last representation was given on
15.1.1979 and therefore, the suit was filed within the period of G
limitation.
In the written statement, the employer-appellant had taken
a specific stand with regard to limitation to the effect that the
respondent had filed the suit after more than 13 years because
he had joined his service in September, 1967 and he wanted, H
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 5 S.C.R.
A by virtue of the prayer in the suit, that he should be deemed to
have been appointed with effect from 12.08.1964
The suit was decreed in favour of the respondent and
therefore, the appellant employer filed Title Appeal No. 28 of
1985 against the judgment dated 18.04. 1-985 delivered by the
B
trial court. The judgment delivered by the trial court was upheld
by the appellate court and therefore, second appeal was filed
before the High Court which was also dismissed by virtue of
the impugned judgment.
c 3. The learned couflsel apiiJearing for the appellant-
employer had submitted"·that the courts b€10W- had committed
a mistake by believing that the StJit was filed within the period
I
of limitation. The trial court had expressed its view to the effect
that the period of limitation would start from the date on which
D last representation made by the respondent was decided.
Therefore, the suit was treated to have been filed within the
period of limitation and the said view was confirmed by both
the appellate courts.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant had further
E
submitted that on facts also, the courts below committed a
mistake because the respondent had been given a fresh
appointment by an order dated 22.11.1967. Initial appointment
made in 1964 had already been terminated as the respondent
had remained absent without sanctioned leave. He had further
F submitted that upon perusal of the appointment order dated
22.11.1967, it is clear that the respondent had been given a
fresh appointment as a librarian on temporary basis because
his earlier appointment had already come to an end.
G 5. It had been further submitted that the respondent
wanted continuity of service with effect from 12.08.1964 thoogh
his service had already been terminated as he had remained
absent.unauthorlsedly. In the circumstances, the respondent had
no right to have continuity of service. He had further submitted
H that the respondent ought to have filed suit within 3 years frorr
STATE OF TRIPURA v. ARABINDA CHAKRABORTY 287
[ANIL R. DAVE, J.]
the date of order giving him fresh appointment if he was A
aggrieved by the said order.
6. Alternatively, it had been submitted that the draft
seniority list of Librarians had been published on 11.11.1972
which had been finalized on 24.09.1975 and the said fact was
8
known to the respondent. The respondent was made aware of
the fact that he was appointed with effect from 22.11. 1967 and
in that event the period of limitation would start from 11.11.1972
when the draft seniority list was published or at the most with
effect from 24.09.1975 when the draft seniority list was finally
published. Instead of approaching the court, the respondent k~pt C
on making several representations which had been rejected.
His representation had been rejected on 19.07 .1976. Even
after rejection of his representation on 19.07.1976 he had made
another representation on 16.02.1978 to the Director of
Education, Tripura which had also been rejected on 03.06.1978. D
Thereafter, he made another representation to the Director of
Education, which had also been rejected on 15.01.1979.
r
7. Looking at the above facts, it had been submitted by
the learned counsel appearing for the appellants that the title E
suit ought to have been dismissed on the ground of limitation,
however, not only the suit had been decreed but the courts
below had also confirmed the judgment delivered by the trial
court. He had further submitted that the appeal deserved to be
allowed with costs.
~. F
8. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for
the respondent-employee had tried to support the judgments
delivered by the High Court and the trial court. He had
submitted that the period of limitation would start with effect from
the date on which his representation was finally rejected by his . G
employer and as the suit had been filed on 19.09.1979, the suit
was filed within the period of limitation.
9. As the respondent had attained degree of Masters in
Library Science and he was taken back in service, his services H
-288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS .[2014] 5 S.C.R.
A were rightly ordered to be continued by the trial court and the
High Court had rightly confirmed the judgment and decree
passed by the first appellate court. He had, therefore, submitted
that the appeal filed in this Court deserved to be dismissed.
9. We had heard the learned counsel appearing for the
9
parties and had also carefully gone through the relevant material
pertaining to appointment orders and the representations made
by the respondent.
10. In our opinion, the suit was hopelessly barred by law
C of limitation. Simply by making a representation, when there is
no statutory provision or there is no statutory appeal provided,
the period of limitation would not get extended. The law does
not permit extension of period of limitation by mere filing of a
representation. A person may go on making representations
D for years and in such an event the period of limitation would
not commence from the date on which the last representation
is decided. In the instant case, it is a fact that the respondent
was given a fresh appointment order on 22.1f1967, which is
on record. The said appointment order gave a fresh
E appointment to the respondent and therefore, there could not
have been any question with regard to continuity of service with
effect from the first employment of the respondent. It is pertinent
to note that service of the respondent had been terminated
because of his unauthorised absence. It was unfortunate that
F the suit had been filed after 13 years and therefore, the relevant
record pertaining to the order of termination of the respondent
had been destroyed or could not be traced but in such an event,
no harm should be caused to the appellant-employer because
the appellant-employer was not supposed to keep the record
pertaining to the order terminating service of the respondent
G forever. Had the respondent filed the suit within the period of
limitation i.e. within three years from the date when he was given
a fresh appointment on 22.11.1967, possibly the Government
could have placed on record an order whereby service of the
respondent had been terminated. The respondent, after having
H
STATE OF TRIPURA v. ARABINDA CHAKRABORTY 289
[ANIL R. DAVE, J.]
' additional qualification approached the concerned authority in A
the month of November, 1967 with a request for fresh
appointment and therefore, by virtue of an order pated 22.11.
1967 he was given a fresh appointment as a librarian. In fact
there was no question of losing his seniority because he was
given a fresh appointment by virtue of the order dated 22.11. B
1967.
11. The respondent did not make any represent~tion or
grievance when he was given a fresh appointment. He knew it
well that his service had been terminated and he was obliged
by the appellant authorities by giving him a fresh appointment. C
Had he been aggrieved by a fresh appointment after
termination of his service, he should have taken legal action at
that time but he accepted the fresh appointment and raised the
grievance about his seniority and other things after more than
a decade. D
12. Even after the draft seniority list was published on
11.11.1972, which had been finalized in September, 1975, he
did not file any suit but continued to make representations which
had been rejected throughout. E
13. It is a settled legal position that the period of limitation
would commence from the date on which the cause of action
takes place. Had there been any statute giving right of appeal
to the respondent and if the respondent had filed such a
statutory appeal, the period of limitation would have F
commenced from the date when the statutory appeal was
· decided. In the instant case, there was no provision with regard
to any statutory appeal. The respondent kept on making
representations one after another and all the representations
had been rejected. Submission of the·respondent to the effect G
· that the period of limitation would commence from the date on
which his last representation was rejected cannot be accepted.
If accepted, it would be nothing but travesty of the law of
limitation. One can go on making representations for 25 years
H
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 5 S.C.R.
A and in that event one cannot say that the period of limitation
would commence when the last representation was decided.
On this legal issue, we feel that the courts below committed an
error by considering the date of rejection of the. la!t
representation as the date Qn which the cause of action had
B arisen. This could not have been done.
14. We, therefore, quash and sel aside the order of the
High Court confirming the orders passed by the trial court as
well as the first appellate court. As a result thereof, the suit
C stands dismissed. The appeal is allowed with no orders as to
costs.
Rajendra Prasad Appeal allowed.
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