Supreme Court of India
STATE OF RAJASTHANversusSHRAVAN RAM & ANR.
- Citation
- 2013 INSC 295
- Decided
- 1 May 2013
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- K S RADHAKRISHNAN
Holding
Only a reliable, consistent dying declaration may be relied upon without corroboration; where multiple dying declarations contain material contradictions and lack corroboration, they cannot sustain a conviction.
Summary
Guddi, a 19‑year‑old married woman, died from 99% burn injuries while in the custody of her father‑in‑law and husband. The prosecution relied on three alleged dying declarations: a Parcha Bayan recorded by an ASI, a magistrate‑signed declaration that was never produced, and a statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC by a neighbour who later turned hostile. The first declaration did not name any accused, the second was unavailable, and the third lacked corroboration and was inconsistent with other evidence. The trial court convicted the accused under Section 302 IPC, but the High Court acquitted them on the ground of unreliable dying declarations. The Supreme Court held that plurality of dying declarations is immaterial; only a reliable, consistent declaration may be relied upon without corroboration, and material contradictions coupled with lack of corroboration preclude a conviction. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the High Court's acquittal upheld.
Issues considered
- Whether a dying declaration can be relied upon without corroboration if it is voluntary, reliable and made in a fit mental condition.
- Whether material contradictions between multiple dying declarations render them unreliable for conviction.
- Whether a statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC by a hostile witness can be treated as a dying declaration.
- Whether the absence of naming the accused in a dying declaration defeats its evidentiary value.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 106, s. 114, s. 161, s. 162, s. 313
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 32
Subjects
dying declarationevidencereliabilitycorroborationmultiple dying declarationssection 32 Evidence ActCrPCSection 161Section 302 IPCburn injuriesconviction reversal
Judgment
(2013) 5 S.C.R. 1076
A STATE OF RAJASTHAN
V.
SHRAVAN RAM & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 427 of 2007)
MAY 1, 2013
B
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]
Evidence Act, 1872 - s.32 - Multiple dying declarations
- Appreciation of - Held: It is not the plurality of the dying
c declarations but the reliability thereof that adds weight to the
prosecution case - If a dying declaration is found to be
voluntary, reliable and made in fit mental condition, it can be
relied upon without any comJboration but the statement should
be consistent throughout - However, if some inconsistencies
o are noticed between one dying declaration and the other, the
Court has to examine the nature of the inconsistencies,
namely, whether they are material or not and while scrutinising
the contents of various dying declarations, in such a situation,
the court has to examine the same in the light of the various
E sumJunding facts and circumstances - On facts, there are not
only material contradictions in both the dying declarations but
also inter-se discrepancies in the depositions of the witnesses
as well - Due to discrepancies and contradictions between the
two dying declarations and also in the absence of any other
F reliable evidence, the High Court was justified in reversing the
conviction of accused-respondents which calls for no
interference by the Supreme Court.
A married woman died due to 99% burn injuries.
There is no eye-witness to the occurrence and the entire
G case hinges upon three alleged dying declarations made
by the deceased and circumstantial evidence. The first
accused is the father~in-law and second accused is the
husband. The three dying declarations are: (i) Parcha
Bayan of the deceased (P14-A) as recorded by ASI which
H 1076
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. SHRAVAN RAM 1077
was signed by PW13 (SHO) in the presence of the doctor A
who also signed the same; (ii) Dying declaration stated
to have been signed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate
and (iii) Dying declaration, as tnade by the deceased,
before PW3, a neighbour, which finds a place in the
statement (Ex. P6) made by him to the police under B
Section 161 of Cr.P.C. PW3 stated that the deceased had
raised hue and cry after the burn injuries and abused her
father-in-law.
However, only two dying declarations are on record, C
the second one mentioned above was not brought out
in evidence.
The trial court convicted the accused-respondents
under Section 302, IPC and sentenced them for life
imprisonment. On appeal, the High Court reversed the D
conviction and acquitted the respondents, and therefore
the instant appeal.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. It is notthe plurality of the dying declarations E
but the reliability thereof that adds weight to the
prosecution case. If a dying declaration is found to be
voluntary, reliable and made in fit mental condition, it can
be relied upon without any corroboration but the statement
should be consistent throughout. However, if some F
inconsistencies are noticed between one dying declaration
and the other, the Court has to examine the nature of the
inconsistencies, namely, whether they are material or not
and while scrutinising the contents of various dying
declarations, in such a situation, the court has to examine G
the same in the light of the various surrounding facts and
circumstances. [Para 18] [1087-C-F]
1.2. In ttieJ~sta..nt case, there are not only material
contradictions Tri both the dying declarations but also
H
1078 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 5 S.C.R.
A inter se discrepancies in the depositions of the witnesses
as well. In the first dying declaration recorded by ASI,
signed by PW13, there is no mention of the names of any
of the accused persons ~nd the deceased had stated that
she could not recognize the person who set her ablaze
B even though the declaration was in consonance with
Rule 6.22 of the Rajasthan Police Rules, 1965. [Para 21]
[1088-D-F]
1.3. So far as the statement of PW3 recorded under
Section 161, Cr.P.C. marked as Exh. PS is concerned, the
C deceased was only abusing her father in law and that
was not even corroborated by PW4 or PW5 and PW3
himself turned hostile. Due to discrepancies and
contradictions between the two dying declarations and
also in the absence of any other reliable evidence, the
D High Court is justified in reversing the order of conviction
which calls for no interference by this Court. [Para 22]
[1088-F-H]
Arvind Singh v. State of Bihar (2001) 6 SCC 407: 2001
E (3) SCR 218; Bhajju Alias Karan Singh v. State of Madhya
Pradesh (2012) 4 SCC 327: 2012 (5) SCR 37; Smt. Kam/a
v. State of Punjab (1993) 1 SCC 1; Kishan Lal v. State of
Rajasthan (2000) 1 SCC 310: 1999 (1) Suppl. SCR 517;
Lella Srinivasa Rao v. State of A.P. (2004) 9 SCC 713: 2004
F (2) SCR 659; Amo/ Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2008)
5 SCC 468: 2008 (8) SCR 956; State of Andhra Pradesh v.
P. Khaja Hussain (2009) 15 SCC 120: 2009 (6) SCR 660
and Sharda v. State of Rajasthan (2010) 2 SCC 85: 2009 (16)
SCR 441 - relied on.
G Case Law Reference:
2001 (3) SCR 218 relied on Para 9
2012 (5) SCR 37 relied on Para 10
(1993) 1 sec 1 relied on Para 15
H
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. SHRAVAN RAM 1079
1999 (1) Suppl. SCR 517 relied on Para 16 A
2004 (2) SCR 659 relied on Para 17
2008 (8) SCR 956 relied on Para 18
2009 (6) SCR 660 relied on Para 19
B
2009 (16) SCR 441 relied on Para 20
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 427 of 2007.
From the Judgment & Order dated 10.05.2006 of the High C
Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur in D.B.
Criminal Appeal No. 124 of 2001.
Shoran Mishra, Milind Kumar for the Appellant.
Abhishek Gupta, Pratibha Jain for the Respondents. D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J. 1. This is an appeal by the
State of Rajasthan against the Judgment in D.B. Criminal
Appeal No. 124 of 2001 passed by the High Court of E
Rajasthan. The Additional Sessions Judge convicted the
accused persons under Section 302, IPC and sentenced them
for life imprisonment with fine which was reversed by the High
Court and acquitted the accused persons.
2. The prosecution case is as follows:
F
Guddi, the deceased, was admitted in the hospital on
11.09.1998 with ninety nine per cent burn injuries. Parcha
Bayan (Ex.P14A} of the deceased was recorded by ASI, Ram
Kish an and signed by SHO Mohan Lal PW13 in the hospital. G
On the basis of the said Parcha Bayan, FIR No. 300/98 was
registered at police station Madanganj (Ajmer} against the
accused persons under Section 307, IPC. During treatment,
Guddi died at about 1OAM on the same day and the case was
converted into Section 302, IPC. During the course of H
1080 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 5 S.C.R. /
A investigation, both the accused persons were arrested on
12.09.1998, first accused is the father-in-law and second
accused is the husband. The accused persons denied the
charges and the case went to trial. On the side of the
prosecution 14 witnesses were examined. The Additional
8 Sessions Judge, placed considerable reliance op the dying
declaration stated to have been made before PW 3 Prem
Chand, a neighbour which find a place in the statement {Ex.
PS) made by him to the police under Section 161 of Cr.P.C.
PW3 has stated that the deceased had raised hue and cry after
c the burn injuries and abused the father-in-law - Sharvan Ram
and based on the evidence of PW3 and his 161 statement, the
Session Court found the accused persons guilty.
3. Following are the circumstances which weighed with the
Additional Sessions Judge:
D
{i) That Smt. Guddi, aged 19 years died after two
years of her marriage due to 99% burn injuries after
pouring kerosene on her enlightening match stick,
therefore the death is homicidal.
E
{ii) Deceased was in the custody of accused
appellants and simply on account of going outside
the house were the 'occurrence took place' custody
will not be ceased.
F {iii) PW1 Nathu Lal {father), PW2 Kailash {uncle) and ,,
PW13 Smt. Su raj Devi {mother) of the deceased
in their statements have deposed that Smt. Guddi
was not allowed by the accused appellants to go
to her matrimonial home.
G
{iv) The version of Prem Chand, PW3 in his statement
under Section 161 Cr.P.C. was considered as
dying declaration and not the Parcha Bayan.
Reliance was not placed by Additional Sessions
I Judge on Parcha Bayan of deceased.
\H
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. SHRAVAN RAM 1081
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
(v) That the previous and subsequent conduct of A
accused appellants was not satisfactorily explained
in their statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C as
required under Section 8 of the Evidence Act.
(vi) Since the death was caused in the custody of the 8
accused, therefore, the accused were also
responsible for proving the fact of burn which was
specifically within their knowledge as required
under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act and
further according to Section 114 of the Indian C
Evidence Act presumption has to be drawn against
accused appellants.
4. Shri Abhishek Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents submitted that the High Court has rightly held that
it is not safe to base conviction on the statement of PW 3 - D
Prem Chand recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., who was
declared hostile. Further, it was also pointe(Lout_ that in the
statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., PW3 had not named the
second accused - Pappu Lal, husband of the deceased.
Further, it was also pointed out that PW4 Smt. Choti and PW5 E
Narayan, who are neighbours, did not disclose the cause of
death and have not mentioned the names of any of the accused
persons in their evidence. Therefore, the dying declaration
made before Prem Chand remained uncorroborated and the
High Court has rightly held that no reliance could be placed on F
uncorroborated dying declaration. Learned counsel, therefore,
submitted that the judgment of the High Court calls for no
interference.
5. Shri Shoran Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the
State submitted that the High Court has committed an error in G
not placing reliance on the evidence of PW3 and the statement
made by him before the Police under Section 161 Cr.P.C.,
wherein the name of the second accused has been mentioned.
Learned counsel also submitted that the High Court has failed
, to notice the fact that the deceased was in the custody of the H
1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 5 S.C.R.
A respondents and therefore the burden of explaining the fact of
burning is on the accused persons. Further, they have failed to
provide any explanation when examined under Section 313
Cr.P.C. Learned counsel also pointed out that the High Court
has not properly appreciated the evidence by PW1 - Nathu lal
B (father of the deceased), PW2 - Kailash (uncle of the deceased)
and PW14 - Suraj Devi (mother of the deceased). PW14 in
her deposition stated that the deceased father in law used to
say that Guddi is his wife and she had deposed that her
daughter had told if the above facts were disclosed she would
c be killed by burning. Learned counsel, therefore, submitted that
the evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW14 coupled with the
statement made by PW3 would establish the guilt of the
respondents and the trial court has rightly convicted them.
6. We notice that there is no eye-witness to the occurrence
D and the entire case hinges upon few alleged dying declarations
made by the deceased and circumstantial evidence. PW11 -
Dr. P.C. Patni conducted the autopsy and gave report Ex.P14
in which it is stated that the deceased had 99% burn injuries.
Post mortem was conducted by members of the board and in
E their opinion cause of death was hypovolumic shock as a result
of ante-mortem burn and the death had occurred within 24
hours and there was no evidence of suicide or accidental fire
and therefore the case was homicidal.
F 7. We are in this case concerned with three dying
declarations which are as follows:
(i) ASI Kishan recorded Parcha Bayan of the
deceased which was signed by PW13 Mohan Lal
in the presence of the doctor who also signed the
G same. Further, the accused also stated to have
affixed his thumb impression.
(ii) Dying declaration stated to have been made on
11.09.1998 , signed by the Sub-Divisional
H Magistrate but neither the said dying declaration
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. $HRAVAN RAM 1083
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
had been exhibited nor the Sub-Divisional A
Magistrate had beer) produced in evidence.
(iii) Dying' declaration, as made by the deceased,
before PW 3, Prem Chand, which had been stated
by him in his statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C.
B
8. We find only two dying declarations are on record, the
second one mentioned above was not brought out in evidence.
Parcha Bayan of the deceased, based on which the case was
registered reads as follows:
c
"I stay in Maliyon ki Dhani Madanganj. Today morning at
around four-five, I had gone from home to near the drain
adjacent Shivji Temple to ease myself and I was easing
myself when at that time a person wearing white pant and
shirt came. And in his hand there was a kerosene can, and D
poured over me. And lighting a match poured over me. My
terecot clothes immediately caught fire. I fell in the drain
and coming out of the drain reached the house being
inflamed and narrated the whole incident to the family
members. I did not recognize the person. I being inflamed
E
fell in the drain and coming from the drain came being
inflamed and narrated the whole incident to the family
members, who have brought me to the hospital, my
marriage took place two years back."
The third dying declaration stated to have been made by F
the deceased before PW3 - Prem Chand was referred to in
Part A to B of Ex.PS reads as follows:
"She was a woman who shouting at the site and was
abusing her father in law Shravan Ram that you be G
doomed you ran away setting me on fire."
9. We may now examine, whether statement of PW3 -
Prem Chand recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C., marked as
Ex.P6 could be accepted as a dying declaration, wherein it was
stated by him that the deceased was raising hue and cry and H
1084 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 5 S.C.R.
A was abusing her father in law for ablazing her. PW3 was
declared as hostile. Further, PW4 and PW5, the neighbours,
who have stated to have seen the deceased in a burning state
and raising hue and cry, neither disclosed the cause of death
nor mentioned the names of any of the accused persons.
B Consequently, the dying declaration made by Prem Chand
remained uncorroborated. It is trite law that it is unsafe to base
reliance on the statement made under Section 161 Cr.P.C. as
dying declaration without any corroboration. Although
corroboration as such is not essential but it is expedient to have
c the same, in order to strengthen the evidentiary value of
declaration. This court in Arvind Singh v. State of Bihar(2001)
6 sec 407 while dealing with the case of oral dying declaration
stated as follows:
"Dying declaration shall have to be dealt with care and
D caution. Corroboration is not essential but it is expedient
to have the same, in order to strengthen the evidentiary
value of declaration. Independent witnesses may not be
available but there should be proper care and caution in
the matter of acceptance of such a statement as
E trustworthy evidence. n
10. This Court in Bhajju Alias Karan Singh v. State of
Madhya Pradesh (2012) 4 SCC 327 while dealing with
admissibility of dying declaration held as follows:
F "The law is well settled that a dying declaration is
admissible in evidence and the admissibility is founded on
the principle of necessity. A dying declaration, if found
reliable, can form the basis of a conviction. A court of facts
is not excluded from acting upon an uncorroborated dying
G declaration for finding conviction. The dying declaration, as
a piece of evidence, stands on the same footing as any
other piece of evidence. It has to be judged and
appreciated in light of the surrounding circumstances and
its weight determined by reference to the principle
H governing the weighing of evidence. If in a given case a
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. SHRAVAN RAM 1085
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
particular dying declaration suffers from any infirmity, either A
of its own or as disclosed by the other evidence adduced
in the case or the circumstances coming to its notice, the
court may, as a rule of prudence, look for corroboration and
if the infirmities are such as would render a dying
declaration so infirm that it pricks the conscience of the B
court, the same may be refused to be accepted as forming
basis of the conviction."
11. Applying the above legal principles and examining the
facts on record, we are of the view that no reliance could be C
placed on the statement made by PW3 - Prem Chand under
Section 161 Cr.P.C. before the police in the absence of any
corroboration. Over ahd above, PW3 has himself turned hostile.
12. We will now deal with the question whether the dying
declaration stated to have been recorded by ASI Ramkishan, D
signed by SHO Mohan Lal (PW13) as well as Dr. Anil Kumar
Soni would be sufficient to base the conviction.
13. First we will examine whether P14-A, Parcha Bayan,
which was converted into dying declaration is made in E
consonance with Rule 6.22 of•the Rajasthan Police Rules,
1965. Rule 6.22 of the Rajasthan Police Rules, 1965 reads as
follows:
"Dying Declarations - (1) A dying declaration shall,
whenever possible, be recorded by a Magistrate. F
(2) The person making the declaration shall, if possible;
be examined by medical officer with a view to ascertaining
that he is sufficiently in possession of his reason to make
a lucid statement.
G
(3) If no Magistrate can be obtained, the declaration shall,
when a gazetted police officer is not present, be recorded
in the presence of two or more reliable witnesses
unconnected with the police department and with the
parties concerned in the case. H
1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2Q~3] Q S.C.R.
A (4) If no such witnesses can be obtained without risk of the
injured person dying before his statement can be
recorded, it shall be recorded in the presence of two or
more police officers.
(5) A dying declaration made to a police officer should,
B
under Section 162, Code of Criminal Procedure, be signed
by the person making it."
14. We notice, in this case, the above mentioned Rule is
substantially complied with, still in our view no reliance could
C be placed due to lack of corroboration over and above the fact
that even in Ex. P14-A, the deceased had not named the
accused persons. What she stated is that she did not recognize
the person who has ablazed her. Therefore, in the absence of
any corroboration and also not naming any of the accused
D persons in Ex.P14A, no reliance could be placed on the same
even though the provision of Rule 6.22 of the Rajasthan Police
Rules, 1965 has been complied with.
15. This Court had occasion to consider the scope of
E multiple dying declarations in Smt. Kam/a v. State of Punjab .
(1993) 1 SCC 1, this Court held as follows:
"A dying declaration should satisfy all the necessary tests
and one such important test is that if there are more than
one dying declaration they should be consistent particularly
·F in material particulars."
16. In Kishan Lal v. State of Rajasthan (2000) 1 SCC 310,
this Court held has follows:
"Examining these two dying declarations, we find not only
G that they gave two conflicting versions but there is inter se
discrepancies in the depositions of the witnesses given in
support of the other dying declaration dated 6.11.1976.
Finally, in the dying declaration before a Magistrate on
which possibly more reliance could have been placed the
H deceased did not name any of the accused. Thus, we have
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. SHRAVAN RAM 1087
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
no hesitation to hold that these two dying declarations do A
not bring home the guilt of the appellant. High Court,
therefore, erred in placing reliance on it by erroneously
evaluating them."
17. In Lella Srinivasa Rao v. State of A.P. (2004) 9 SCC
713, this Court had occasion to consider the legality and B
acceptability of two dying declarations. Noticing the
inconsistency between the two dying declarations, the Court
held that it is not safe to act solely on the said declarations to
convict the accused persons.
18. In Amo/ Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2008) 5
c
SCC 468, this Court interfered with the order of sentence
noticing inconsistencies between the multiple dying
declarations. It is not the plurality of the dying declarations but
the reliability thereof that adds weight to the prosecution case.
If a dying declaration is found to be voluntary, reliable and made
0
in fit mental condition, it can be relied upon without any
corroboration but the statement should be consistent
throughout. However, if some inconsistencies are noticed
between one dying declaration and the other, the Court has to
examine the nature of the inconsistencies, namely, whether they E
are material or not and while scrutinising the contents of various
dying declarations, in such a situation, the court has to examine
the same in the light of the various surrounding facts and
circumstances.
F
19. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Khaja Hussain (2009)
15 SCC. 120, this Court rejected the appeal filed against the
acquittal holding that it was not a case where the variation
between the two dying declarations was trivial in nature.
20. In Sharda v. State of Rajasthan (2010) 2 SCC 85, this G
Court has dealt with three dying declarations. Noticing
inconsistencies between dying declarations, this Court set aside
the sentence ordered by Sessions Judge as well as High Court
and held as follows:
"Though a dying declaration is entitled and is still H
1088 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013) 5 S.C.R.
A recognised by law to be given greater weightage but it has
also to be kept in mind that the accused had no chance
of cross-examination. Such a right of cross-examim\tion is
essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath. This
is the reason, generally, the court insists tha the dying
B declaration should be such which inspires full confidence
of the court of its correctness. The court has to be on.
guard that such statement of the deceased was not as a
result of either tutoring, prompting or product of
imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the
c deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear
opportunity to observe and identify the assailants. Once the
court is satisfied that the aforesaid requirement and also
to the fact that declaration was true and voluntary,
undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further
corroboration."
D
21. We have gone through both the dying declarations and
. there are not only material contradictions in both the
declarations but also inte~ se discrepancies in the depositions
of the witnesses as well. In the first dying declaration recorded
E byASI, signed by PW13, there is no mention of the names of
any of the accused persons and the deceased had stated that
she could not recognize the person who set her ablaze even
though the declaration was in consonance with Rule 6.22 of the
Rajasthan Police Rules, 1965.
F 22. So far as the statement of PW3 - Prem Chand
recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C. marked as Exh. P6 is
concerned, the deceased was only abusing her father-in law
and that was not even corroborated by PW4 or PW5 and PW3
himself turned hostile. Due to discrepancies and contradictions
G between the two dying declarations and also in the absence
of any other reliable evidence, in our view, the High Court is
justified in reversing the order of conviction which calls for no
interference by this Court. In view of above, the appeal is,
therefore, dismissed.
H B.B.B. Appeal dismissed.
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