STATE OF RAJASTHANversusSHERA RAM @ VISHNU DUTTA

                [2011] 15 (ADOL.) S.C.R. 485


                   STATE OF RAJASTHAN                               A
                               v.
              SHERA RAM @ VISHNU DUTTA
             (Criminal Appeal No. 1502 of 2005)
                     DECEMBER 1, 2011
                                                                    B
               {SWATANTER KUMAR AND
             RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, JJ.]

      Penal Code, 1860 - ss.84, 302, ?95 and 449 - Murder
 - Plea of insanity - Maintainability of - Respondent caused        C
 death of deceased by hurling a stone on his head - Conviction
 by Trial Court - Acquittal by High Court primarily on the
 ground that at the time of incident, accused was a person of
 unsound mind within meaning of s. 84 - Appeal against the
 acquittal - Held: Oral and documentary evidence clearly            O
 showed that respondent was suffering from epileptic attacks
just prior to the incident - Immediately prior to the occurrence,
 he had behaved violently and had caused injuries to his own
 family members - After committing the crime, he was arrested
 by the Police and even thereafter, he was treated for insanity,    E
 while in jail - There was evidence to show continuous mental
 sickness of the respondent - High Court on the basis of
 documentary and oral evidence had a taken a view which was
 a possible view and could not be termed as peNerse or being
supported by no evidence - The finding of High Court, being         F
 in consonance with the well settled principles of criminal
jurisprudence, did not call for any interference, particularly
 when the appellant-State did not bring to the fore any
 evidence- documentary or otherwise, to persuade the
 Supreme Court to take a contrary view.
                                                                    G
     Appeal - Appeal against acquittal - Distinction between
appeal against acquittal and appeal against conviction -
Limitation upon the powers of the appellate court to interfere

                              485                                   H
    486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A with the judgment of acquittal and reverse the same -
   Discussed.

        Criminal Trial - Exemption from criminal liability -
  Accused taking plea o( insanity - Held: A person alleged to
B be suffering from any mental disorder cannot be exempted
  from criminal liability ipso facto - The onus would be on the
  accused to prove by expert evidence that he is suffering from
  such a mental disorder or mental condition that he could not
  be expected to be aware of the consequences of his act -
C Once, a person is found to be suffering from mental disorder
  or mental deficiency, which takes within its ambit
  hallucinations, dementia, loss of memory and self-control, at
  all relevant times by way of appropriate documentary and oral
  evidence, the person concerned would be entitled to seek
  resort to the general exceptions from criminal liability - Penal
D Code, 1860 - s.84.
       Respondent abruptly hurled a stone on the head of
  a person resulting into his instantaneous death. The trial
  court convicted the respondent under Sections 302, 295
E and 449 IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment
  for life. However, the High Court acquitted him primarily
  on the ground that at the time of incident, he was a person
  of unsound mind within the meaning of Section 84 IPC.
  Aggrieved by the said judgment, the State filed the
F present appeal.

        Dismissing the appeal, the Court

      HELD: 1.1. As evident, this is an appeal against a
  judgment of acquittal. A judgment of acquittal has the
G obvious consequence of granting freedom to the
  accused. This Court has taken a consistent view that
  unless the judgment in appeal is contrary to evidence,
  palpably erroneous or a view which could not have been
  taken by the court of competent jurisdiction keeping in
H
 STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. SHERA RAM @ VISHNU 487
                  DUTIA
view the settled canons of criminal jurisprudence, this           A
Court shall be reluctant to interfere with such judgment
of acquittal. [Paras 8,9] [494-H; 495-A-B]

     1.2. The penal laws in India are primarily based upon
certain fundamental procedural values, which are right to
                                                                  8
fair trial and presumption of innocence. A person is
presumed to be innocent till proven guilty and once held
to be not guilty of a criminal charge, he enjoys the benefit
of such presumption which could be interfered with only
for valid and proper reasons. An appeal against acquittal         C
has always been differentiated from a normal appeal
against conviction. Wherever there is perversity of facts
and/or law appearing in the judgment, the appellate court
would be within its jurisdiction to interfere with the
judgment of acquittal, but otherwise such interference is
not called for. [Para 1OJ [495-C-D]                               D

      1.3. There is a very thin but a fine distinction between
 an appeal against conviction on the one hand and
 acquittal on the other. The preponderance of judicial
 opinion of this Court is that there is no substantial            E
 difference between an appeal against conviction and an
 appeal against acquittal except that while dealing with an
 appeal against acquittal the Court keeps in view the
 position that the presumption of innocence in favour of
'the accused has been fortified by his acquittal and if the       F
 view adopted by the High Court is a reasonable one and
 the conclusion reached by it had its grounds well set out
 on the materials on record, the acquittal may not be
 interfered with. Thus, this fine distinction has to be kept
 in mind by the Court while exercising its appellate              G
 jurisdiction. The golden rule is that the Court is obliged
 and it will not abjure its duty to prevent miscarriage of
 justice, where interference is imperative and the ends of
 justice so require and it is essential to appease the judicial
 conscience. [Para 12] [500-C-F]
                                                                  H
    488   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A      1.4. There is no absolute restriction in law to review
  and re-look the entire evidence on which the order of
  acquittal is founded. If, upon scrutiny, the appellate court
  finds that the lower court's decision is based on
  erroneous views and against the settled position of law
B then the said order of acquittal should be set aside. [Para
  13] [500-G-H]
       1.5. In the present case, the impugned judgment of
  acquittal recorded by the High Court does not suffer from
  any legal infirmity and, therefore, does not call for any
C interference. In the normal course of events, this Court
  is required not to interfere with a judgment of acquittal.
  [Para 15] [501-C]
      State of Rajasthan, Through Secretary, Home
D Department v. Abdul Mannan (2011) 8 SCC 65; State (Delhi
  Administration) v. Laxman Kumar & Ors. (1985) 4 SCC 476:
  1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 898; Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar
  & Ors. AIR 2003 SC 4664: 2003 (4 ) Suppl. SCR 208;
  Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu v. John David JT 2011 (5)
E SC 1 - relied on.
       2.1. Section 84 IPC states that nothing is an offence
  which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it,
  by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of
  knowing the nature of the act, or that what he is doing is
F either wrong or contrary to law. It is obvious from a bare
  reading of this provision that what may be generally an
  offence would not be so if the ingredients of Section 84
  IPC are satisfied. It is an exception to the general rule.
  Thus, a person who is proved to have committed an
G offence, would not be deemed guilty, if he falls in any of
  the general exceptions stated under this Chapter. [Paras
  17, 18] [501-F-H; 502-A]
      2.2. To commit a criminal offence, mens rea is
  generally taken to be an essential element of crime. It is
H said furiosus nulla voluntus est. In other words, a person
  STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. SHERA RAM @ VISHNU 489
                   DUTIA
 who is suffering from a mental disorder cannot be said         A
 to have committed a crime as he does not know what he
 is doing. For committing a crime, the intention and act
 both are taken to be the constituents of the crime, actus
 non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. Every normal and sane
 human being is expected to possess some degree of              B
 reason to be responsible for his/her conduct and acts
 unless contrary is proved. But a person of unsound mind
 or a person suffering from mental disorder cannot be
 said to possess this basic norm of human behavior. [Para
 19] [502-B-D]                                                  C

      2.3. A person alleged to be suffering from any mental
 disorder cannot be exempted from criminal liability ipso
 facto. The onus would be on the accused to prove by
 expert evidence that he is suffering frnm such a mental
 disorder or mental condition that he could not be              D
 expected to be aware of the consequences of his act.
 [Para 20) [503-B]

       2.4. Once, a person is found to be suffering from
  mental disorder or mental deficiency, which takes within      E
· its ambit hallucinations, dementia, loss of memory and
  self-control, at all relevant times by way of appropriate
  documentary and oral evidence, the person concerned
  would be entitled to seek resort to the general exceptions
  from criminal liability. [Para 21] [503-C-D]                  F

    Surendra Mishra v. State of Jharkhand (2011) 3
 SCC(Cri.) 232 - relied on.

     Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology by Modi and
 HWV COX Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology (7th Edn)         G
 by PC Dikshit - referred to.

     3.1. In the present case, the oral .and documentary
 evidence clearly shows that the respondent was
 suffering from epileptic attacks just prior to the incident.   H
    490   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A Immediately prior to the occurrence, he had behaved
  violently and had caused injuries to his own family
  members. After committing the crime, he was arrested by
  the Police and even thereafter, he was treated for insanity,
  while in jail. [Para 27] (505-H; 506-A]
B
       3.2. There is evidence to show continuous mental
  sickness of the respondent. He not only caused death of
  the deceased but also on the very same day injured and
  caused hurt to his family members including DW-1. His
  statement made under Section 313 Cr.PC is fully
C corroborated by oral and documentary evidence of DW-
  2, the Doctor who had treated the respondent, and the
  medical prescription slips, Ext. D-3 and D-4. Though, the
  High Court has not discussed this evidence in great
  detail, but this being an admissible piece of evidence, can
D always be relied upon to substantiate the conclusion and
  findings recorded by the High Court. [Para 28] [506-B-C]

       3.3. The High Court on the basis of the documentary
  and oral evidence has a taken a view which was possible
E and cannot be termed as perverse or being supported by
  no evidence. The finding of the High Court, being in
  consonance with the well settled principles of criminal
  jurisprudence, does not call for any interference. More so,
  the State has not brought to the notice of this Court any
F evidence, documentary or otherwise, which could
  persuade this Court to take a contrary view i.e. other than
  the view taken by the High Court. [Para 29] [506-E-F]
      4.1. Another aspect of this case which requires
  consideration by this Court is that the case of the
G prosecution suffers from legal infirmity. In fact, the
  prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
  that the injury inflicted by the respondent upon the
  deceased was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature
  to cause death. It is the case of the prosecution that the
H respondent had hurled a stone which had caused injury
 STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. SHERA RAM @ VISHNU 491
                  DUTTA
(lacerated wound on the left side of the forehead)            A
whereupon the deceased fell on the ground and
subsequently collapsed. The injury is said to be 2" x Y."
x upto bone, transversely Lt. side of forehead and
another lacerated wound 2" x %" x '!.'' near injury No.1
towards the forehead. These are the injuries which the        B
deceased is stated to have suffered. In addition, abrasion
of 1 cm x 1 cm on the left eyebrow was also present.
According to the doctor, all these injuries were ante
mortem in nature and the cause of death was shock and
haemorrhage due to head injury. [Para 30] [506-G-H; 507·      c
A-B]

     4.2. In the statement of PW-20, the Doctor who
prepared the post-mortem report, it is nowhere stated that
the injuries caused by the respondent were sufficient In
the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It is also      D
not recorded in the post-mortem report, Ext. 37. Th1s was
a material piece of evidence which the prosecution was
expected to prove in order to bring home the guilt of the
respondent. This is a serious deficiency in the case of the
prosecution. Absence of this material piece of evidence       E
caused a dent in the case of the prosecution. The High
Court has not taken note of this important aspect of the
case. [Para 31] [507-C-D]

     4.3. Ex-facie, the injuries do not appear to be so vital F
that they could have resulted in the death of the
deceased, but this fact was required to be proved by
expert evidence. However, the question whether the
particular injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death or not is a question of fact which G
will have to be determined in light of the facts,
circumstances and evidence produced in a given case.
There .could be cases ,,where injuries caused    . upon the
body of the deceased per se can irresistibly lead to the
conclusion that the injuries were sufficient to cause death H
    492     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A   in the ordinary course of nature, while there may be other
    cases where it is required to be proved by documentary
    and oral evidence. Resultantly, it will always depend on
    the facts of each case. [Paras 33, 35] [507-G; 511-D-F]

          State of Rajasthan v. Kalu (1998) SCC (Cri.) 898 - relied
B
    on.

          Ram Jattan and Others v. State of UP. (1995) SCC (Cri)
    169 - referred to.

c         Ha/sbury's Laws of India 5(2) Criminal Law-II - referred
    to.

                          Case Law Reference:

     (2011) 8 sec 65               relied on            Para 10
D
     1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 898 relied on                  Para 13

     2003 (4) Suppl. SCR 208 relied on                  Para 13

     JT 2011 (5) SC 1              relied on            Para 13

E    (2011) 3 sec (Cri.) 232       relied on            Para 19

     (1995) sec (Cri) 169          referred to          Para 33

     (1998) sec (Cri.) 898         relied on            Para 34

        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: CriminalAppeal
F
    No. 1502 of 2005.

        From the Judgment & Order dated 21.2.2004 of the High
    Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at D.B. Criminal Appeal No.
    375 of 2000.
G
        Kamran Malik, lmtiaz Ahmad and Milind Kumar for the
    appellant.

        Doongar Singh, V.J. Francies and Anupam Mishra for the
    Respondent.
H
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. SHERA RAM @ VISHNU 493
                 DUTTA
    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                       A
      SWATANTER KUMAR, J. 1. Respondent Shera Ram @
Vishnu Dutta was charged for committing an offence under
Sections 302, 295 and 449 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for
short 'IPC') and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for           B
life by the Additional Sessions Judge-1, Jodhpur vide judgment
dated 7th June, 2000. However, upon appeal, he came to be
acquitted of all the offences by a Division Bench of the High
Court of Rajasthan vide order dated 21st February, 2004
primarily on the ground that at the time of incident, he was a
person of unsound mind within the meaning of Section 84 IPC          C
and was directed to be detained in safe custody in an
appropriate hospital or a place of custody of non-criminal
lunatics as would be provided to him by the State Government
under the direct supervision of the Jail Authorities till the time
he was cured of his mental illness and infirmity.                    D
      2. Aggrieved from the said judgment, the State of
Rajasthan has presented this appeal by way of a special leave
petition.
     3. Before we proceed to dwell upon the merits of the case       E
and the legal issues involved in the present appeal, a reference
to the case of the prosecution would be necessary. According
to the prosecution, on 10th March, 1999 at about 7.15 a.m.,
while Pujari Tulsi Das (now deceased) was in the Raghunathji's
temple, the respondent abruptly hurled a stone on his head           F
resulting into his instantaneous death. The respondent also
damaged the idol and other properties of the temple. This all
was unprovoked. The incident was witnessed by the villagers
including PW-6 Santosh, PW-11 Narsingh Ram and PW-16,
Smt. Tiku Devi.                                                      G
    4. PW-2, Ghan Shyam Das Daga reported the matter to
the police immediately. Upon receipt of the information, the
police registered a case under Section 302 IPC and
proceeded with the investigation. Besides recording statements       H
    494   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A of number of witnesses, the Investigating Officer also prepared
  the site plan and the inquest memo. The body of the deceased
  was sent for post-mortem which was performed by PW-20, Dr.
  C.P. Bhati, who prepared the post-mortem report Ext'. P-37.

         5. After investigation, the police filed the challan upon
8
    which, the respondent was committed to the appropriate Court
    of Sessions for trial. The charge-sheet was filed under Sections
    302, 295 and 449 IPC, as already noticed. The respondent
    denied the charges leveled against him and claimed trial.

C       6. The prosecution examined as many as 23 witnesses to
   prove its case. The material piece of evidence appearing in
   the case of the prosecution against the respondent were put
  to him and his statement was recorded by the learned Trial
   Court under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
o 1973 (for short 'Cr.PC'). According to the respondent, his
  mental condition right from the year 1992-1993 was not good
  and occasionally he suffered from fits of insanity. He had
   undergone treatment for the same. He has stated that in the
  jail also, he was receiving the treatment. To put it simply, he
E claimed the defence of insanity under Section 84 IPC. The
  defence also examined DW-2, Dr. Vimal Kumar Razdan and
  DW-1, Bhanwar Lal, brother of the respondent who had
  produced records to show that the respondent was a person
  suffering from insanity of mind. The learned Trial Court rejected
F the plea of defence of insanity and convicted the respondent.

       7. The respondent preferred an appeal against the
  judgment and order of conviction by the Trial Court which
  resulted in his acquittal vide order dated 21st February, 2004
  with the afore-noticed directions to the State Government.
G Dissatisfied from the said judgment, the State has preferred
  the present appeal.
       8. As is evident from the above-noted facts, it is an appeal
  against the judgment of acquittal. The plea of insanity raised
  by the respondent has been accepted by the High Court
H resulting in his acquittal.
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. SHERA RAM @ VISHNU 495
       DUTIA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

     9. A judgment of acquittal has the obvious consequence           A
of granting freedom to the accused. This Court has taken a
consistent view that unless the judgment in appeal is contrary
to evidence, palpably erroneous or a view which could not have
been taken by the court of competent jurisdiction keeping in
view the settled canons of criminal jurisprudence, this Court shall   B
be reluctant to interfere with such judgment of acquittal.

      10. The penal laws in India are primarily based upon
certain fundamental procedural values, which are right to fair
trial and presumption of innocence. A person is presumed to
be innocent till proven guilty and once held to be not guilty of a    C
criminal charge, he enjoys the benefit of such presumption which
could be interfered with only for valid and proper reasons. An
appe_al against acquittal has always been differentiated from
a normal appeal against conviction. Wherever there is perversity
of facts and/or law appearing in the judgment, the appellate          D
court would be within its jurisdiction to interfere with the
judgment of acquittal, but otherwise such interference is not
called for. We may refer to a recent judgment of this Court in
the case of State of Rajasthan, Through Secretary, Home
Department v. Abdul Mannan ((2011) 8 SCC 65], wherein this            E
Court discussed the limitation upon the powers of the appellate
court to interfere with the judgment of acquittal and reverse the
same.

    11. This Court referred to its various judgments and held         F
as under:-

    "12. As is evident from the above recorded findings, the
    judgment of conviction was converted to a judgment of
    acquittal by the High Court. Thus, the first and foremost
    question that we need to consider is, in what circumstances       G
    this Court should interfere with the judgment of acquittal.
    Against an order of acquittal, an appeal by the State is
    maintaihable to this Court only with the leave of the Court.
    On the contrary, if the judgment of acquittal passed by the
    trial court is set aside by the High Court, and the accused       H
    496     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A         is sentenced to death, or life imprisonment or
          imprisonment for more than 10 years, then the right of
          appeal of the accused is treated as an absolute right
          subject to the provisions of Articles 134(1 )(a) and
          134(1)(b) of the Constitution of India and Section 379 of
B         the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In light of this, it is
          obvious that an appeal against acquittal is considered on
          slightly different parameters compared to an ordinary
          appeal preferred to this Court.

              13. When an accused is acquitted of a criminal
c      charge, a right vests in him to be a free citizen and this
       Court is very cautious in taking away that right. The
       presumption of innocence of the accused is further
       strengthened by the fact of acquittal of the accused under
       our criminal jurisprudence. The courts have held that if two
D      views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case,
      then the one favourable to the accused, may be adopted
       by the court. However, this principle must be applied
       keeping in view the facts and circumstances of a case and
      the thumb rule is that whether the prosecution has proved
E     its case beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution has
      succeeded in discharging its onus, and the error in
      appreciation of evidence is apparent on the face of the
      record then the court can interfere in the judgment of
      acquittal to ensure that the ends of justice are met. This is
F     the linchpin around which the administration of criminal
      justice revolves.
             14. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence
      that the burden of proof lies on the prosecution and it has
      to prove a charge beyond reasonable d-"'ubt. The
G
      presumption of innocence and the rig ht to fair trial are twin
      safeguards available to the accused under cur criminal
      justice system but once the prosecution has proved its
      case and the evidence led by the prosecution, in
      conjunction with the chain of events as are stated to have
H
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. SHERA RAM @ VISHNU 497
       DUTTA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
  occurred, if, points irresistibly to the conclusion that the     A
  accused is guilty then the court can interfere even with the
  judgment of acquittal. The judgment of acquittal might be
  based upon misappreciation of evidence or apparent
  violation of settled canons of criminal jurisprudence.
                                                                   B
         15. We may now refer to some judgments of this
  Court on this issue. In Stale of MP. v. Bacchudas, the Court
  was concerned with a case where the accused had been
  found guilty of an offence punishable under Section 304
  Part II read with Section 34 IPC by the trial court; but had     C
  been acquitted by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. The
  appeal was dismissed by this Court, stating that the
  Supreme Court's interference was called for only when
  there were substantial and compelling reasons for doing
  so. After referring to earlier judgments, this Court held as
  under: (SCC pp. 138-39, paras 9-10)                              D

          "9. There is no embargo on the appellate court
          reviewing the evidence upon which an order of
          acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal
          shall not be interfered with because the presumption     E
          of innocence of the accused is further strengthened
          by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through
          the web of administration of justice in criminal cases
          is that if two views are possible on the evidence
          adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the    F
          accused and the other to his innocence, the view
          which is favourable to the accused should be
          adopted. The paramount consideration of the court
          is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented.
          A miscarriage of justice which may arise from            G
          acqu!ttal of the guilty is no less than from the
          conviction of an innocent. In a case where
        · admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon
          the appellate court to reappreciate the evidence
          where the accused has been acquitted, for the            H
    498   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A             purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the
              accused really committed any offence or not. (See
              Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.) The principle to
             bE1\followed by the appellate court considering the
             appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to
B            interfere only when there are compelling and
             substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned
             judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and
             convincing materials have been unjustifiably
             eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason
c            for interference. These aspects were highlighted by
             this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of
             Maharashtra, Ramesh Babula/ Doshi v. State of
             Gujarat, Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana, Raj
             Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar, State of Punjab v.
             Kamai/ Singh, State of Punjab v. Pho/a Singh,
D
             Suchand Pal v. Phani Pal and Sachchey Lal
             Tiwari v. State of U.P.

                  10. When the conclusions of the High Court in
             the background of the evidence on record are
E            tested on the touchstone of the principles set out
             above, the inevitable conclusion is that the High
             Court's judgment does not suffer from any infirmity
             to warrant interference."

F           16. In a very recent judgment, a Bench of this Court
      in State of Kera/a v. C.P. Rao decided on 16-5-2011,
      discussed the scope of interference by this Court in an
      order of acquittal and while reiterating the view of a three-
      Judge Bench of this Court in Sanwat Singh v. State of
      Rajasthan, the Court held as under:
G
             "13. In coming to this conclusion, we are reminded
             of the well-settled principle that .vhen the court has
             to exercise its discretion in an appeal arising
             against an order of acquittal, the court must
H            remember that the innocence of the accused is
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. SHERA RAM @ VISHNU 499
       DUTTA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.)
        further re-established by the judgment of acquittal A
        rendered by the High Court. Against such decision
        of the High Court, the scope of interference by this
        Court in an order of acquittal has been very
        succinctly laid down by a three-Judge Bench of this
        Court in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan 212. B
        At SCR p. 129, Subba Rao, J. (as His Lordship
        then was) culled out the principles as follows:

              '9. The foregoing discussion yields the
        following results: (1) an appellate court has full C
        power to review the evidence upon which the order
        of acquittal is founded; (2) the principles laid down
        in Sheo Swarup case afford a correct guide for the
        appellate court's approach to a case in disposing
        of such an appeal; and (3) the different phraseology
        used in the judgments of this Court, such as (i) D
        "substantial and compelling reasons", (ii) "good and
        sufficiently cogent reasons", and (iii) "strong
        reasons", are not intended to curtail the undoubted
        power of an appellate. court in an appeal against
        acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come E
        to its own conclusion; but in doing so it should not
        only consider every matter on record having a
        bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons
        given by the court below in support of its order of
        acquittal in its arriving at a conclusion on those facts, F
        but should also express those reasons in its
        judgment, which lead it to hold that the acquittal was
        not justified'."

        17. Reference can also be usefully made to the G
  judgment of this Court in Suman Sood v. State of
  Rajasthan, where this Court reiterated with approval the
  principles stated by the Court in earlier cases, particularly,
  Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka. Emphasising that
  expressions like "substantial and compelling reasons",
  "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", H
     500     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A           "distorted conclusions'', "glaring mistakes", etc. are not
            intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate
            court in an appeal against acquittal, the Court stated that
            such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes
           of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate
B          court to interfere with the acquittal. Thus, where it is
           possible to take only one view i.e. the prosecution
           evidence points to the guilt of the accused and the
           judgment is on the face of it perverse, then the Court may
           interfere with an order of acquittal."
c        12. There is a very thin but a fine distinction between an
   appeal against conviction on the one hand and acquittal on the
   other. The preponderance of judicial opinion of this Court is that
   there is no substantial difference between an appeal against
   conviction and an appeal against acquittal except that while
D dealing with an appeal against acquittal the Court keeps in
  view the position that the presumption of innocence in favour
   of the accused has been fortified by his acquittal and if the view
  adopted by the High Court is a reasonable one and the
   conclusion reached by it had its grounds well set out on the
E materials on record, the acquittal may not be interfered with.
  Thus, this fine distinction has to be kept in mind by the Court
  while exercising its appellate jurisdiction. The golden rule is that
  the Court is obliged and it will not abjure its duty to prevent
  miscarriage of justice, where interference is imperative and the
F ends of justice so require and it is essential to appease the
  judicial conscience.

       13. Also, this Court had the occasion to state the principles
  which may be taken into consideration by the appellate court
G while dealing with an appeal against acquittal. There is no
  absolute restriction in law to review and re-look the entire
  evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded. If, upon
  scrutiny, the appellate court finds that the lower court's decision
  is based on erroneous views and against the settled position
  of law then the said order of acquittal should be set aside. {See
H
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. SHERA RAM@ VISHNU 501
       DUTTA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
State (Delhi Administration) v. Laxman Kumar & Ors. ((1985)         A
4 SCC 476], Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar & Ors. [AIR
2003 SC 4664], Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu v. John
David [JT 2011 (5) SC 1] }

      14. To put it appropriately, we have to examine, with         B
reference to the present case whether the impugned judgment
of acquittal recorded by the High Court suffers from any legal
infirmity or is based upon erroneous appreciation of evidence.

     15. In our considered view, the impugned judgment does
not suffer from any legal infirmity and, therefore, does not call   C
for any interference. In the normal course of events, we are
required not to interfere with a judgment of acquittal.

     16. Having deliberated upon the above question of law, we
may now proceed to discuss the merits of the case in hand.          D
The High Court after consideration of the entire evidence
produced by the prosecution, affirmed the finding that the
incident as alleged by the prosecution had occurred and the
respondent had hurled a stone on the head of Pujari Tulsi Das
which resulted in his death. This being a finding of fact based     E
upon proper appreciation of evidence, does not call for any
interference by us.

      17. The corollary that follows from the above is whether
having committed the charged offence, the respondent is
entitled to the benefit of the general exception contained in       F
Section 84, Chapter IV of the IPC? Section 84 states that
nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the
time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is
incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that what he is
doing is either wrong or contrary to law.                           G

     18. It is obvious from a bare reading of this provision that
what may be generally an offence would not be so if the
ingredients of Section 84 IPC are satisfied. It is an exception
to the general rule. Thus, a person who is proved to have           H
    502     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A committed an offence, would not be deemed guilty, if he falls
  in any of the general exceptions stated under this Chapter.

        19. To commit a criminal offence, mens rea is generally
  taken to be an essential element of crime. It is said furiosus
B nu/la voluntus est. In other words, a person who is suffering
  from a mental disorder cannot be said to have committed a
  crime as he does not know what he is doing. For committing a
  crime, the intention and act both are taken to be the constituents
  of the crime, actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. Every
  normal and sane human being is expected to possess some
C degree of reason to be responsible for his/her conduct and acts
  unless contrary is proved. But a person of unsound mind or a
  person suffering from mental disorder cannot be said to
  possess this basic norm of human behavior. In the case of
  Surendra Mishra v. State of Jharkhand ((2011) 3 SCC(Cri.)
D 232], the Court was dealing with a case where the accused
  was charged for an offence under Section 302 IPC and Section
  27 of the Arms Act. While denying the protection of Section 84
  of the IPC to the accused, the Court held as under:-

E         "9. In our opinion, an accused who seeks exoneration from
          liability of an act under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code
          is to prove legal insanity and not medical insanity.
          Expression "unsoundness of mind" has not been defined
          in the Indian Penal Code and it has mainly been treated
F         as equivalent to insanity. But the term insanity carries
          different meaning in different contexts and describes
          varying degrees of mental disorder. Every person who is
          suffering from mental disease is not ipso facto exempted
          from criminal liability. The mere fact that the accused is
          conceited, odd, irascible and his brain is not quite all right,
G
          or that the physical and mental ailments from which he
          suffered had rendered his intellect weak and affected his
          emotions or indulges in certain unusual acts, or had fits of
          insanity at short intervals or that he was subject to epileptic
          fits and there was abnormal behavior or the behavior is
H
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. SHERA RAM @ VISHNU 503
       DUTTA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.)
    queer are not sufficient to attract the application of Section   A
    84 of the Indian Penal Code."

     20. From the above-stated principles, it is clear that a
person alleged to be suffering from any mental disorder cannot
be exempted from criminal liability ipso facto. The onus would
                                                                     8
be on the accused to prove by expert evidence that he is
suffering from such a mental disorder or mental condition that
he could not be expected to be aware of the consequences of
his act.

     21. Once, a person is found to be suffering from mental         C
disorder or mental deficiency, which takes within its ambit
hallucinations, dementia, loss of memory and self-control, at all
relevant times by way of appropriate documentary and oral
evidence, the person concerned would be entitled to seek resort
to the general exceptions from criminal liability.                   o
     22. Epileptic Psycnosis is a progressing disease and its
effects have appropriately been described in the text book of
Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology by Modi, 24th Ed.
20.11 where it states as follows:-
                                                                     E
    "Epileptic Psychosis. - Epilepsy usually occurs from early
    infancy, though it may occur at any period of life.
    Individuals, who have had epileptic fits for years, do not
    necessarily show any mental aberration, but quite a few
    of them suffer from mental deterioration. Religiousity is a      F
    marked feature in the commencement, but the feeling is
    only superficial. Such patients are peevish, impulsive and
    suspicious, and are easily provoked to anger on the
    slightest cause.
                                                                     G
    The disease is generally characterized by short transitory
    fits of uncontrollable mania followed by complete recovery.
    The attacks, .however, become more frequent. There is a
    general impairment of the mental faculties, with loss of
    memory and self-control. At the same time, hallucinations        H
    504     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011) 15 (ADDL.} S.C.R.


A         of sight and hearing occur and are followed by delusions
          of a persecuting nature. They are deprived of all moral
          sensibility, are given to the lowest forms of vice and sexual
          excesses, and are sometimes dangerous to themselves
          as well as to others. In many long-standing cases, there is
B         a progressive dementia or mental deficiency.

          True epileptic psychosis is that which is associated with
          epileptic fits. This may occur before or after the fits, or may
          replace them, and is known as pre-epileptic, post-epileptic
          and masked or psychic phases (psychomotor epilepsy)
c
          Post-Epileptic Mental Ill-health - In this condition, stupor
          following the epileptic fits is replaced by automatic acts of
          which the patient has no recollections. The patient is
          confused, fails to recognize his own relatives, and wanders
D         aimlessly. He is terrified by visual and auditory
          hallucinations of a religious character and delusions of
          persecution, and consequently, may commit crimes of a
          horrible nature, such as thefts, incendiarism, sexual
          assaults and brutal murders. The patient never attempts
E         to conceal them at the time of perpetration but on
          regaining consciousness may try to conceal them out of
          fear."

      23. Similar features of Epilepsy have been recorded in the
  HWV COX Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology (7th Edn)
F by PC Dikshit.
       24. Reverting to the facts of the present case, it may be
  noted that no witness of the prosecution including the
  Investigating Officer 11tat.ed anything with regard to the mental
G condiUon qf the respondent. However, the respondent not only
  in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. took up the
  defence of mental disorder seeking benefit of Section 84 IPC
  but even led evidence, both documentary as well as oral, in
  support of his claim. He examined Dr. Vimal Kumar Razdan,
H DW-2, who deposed that he had examined the respondent and
  STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. SHERA RAM @ VISHNU 505
         DUTIA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
 had given him treatment. He, also, produced the examinati9n            A
 report in regard to the treatment of the respondent, Ext.D-5,
 which was prepared in his clinic.

      25. According to the statement of this doctor and the
 prescription, the respondent was suffering from Epilepsy and           8
 while describing post epileptic insanity, this witness stated that
 after the epileptic attack, a patient behaves like an insane
 person and he is unable to recognise even the known persons
 and relatives. During this time, there is a memory loss and the
 patient can commit any offence. In the prescription, Ext. D-3,         C
 issued by Dr. Ashok Pangadiya, it was stated that the patient
 was suffering from the fits disease and symptoms of behavioral
 abnormality. Two types of medication on the basis of diagnosis
 of epileptic disease and other one for insanity were prescrilted
 to the respondent who continued to take these medicines, post
 epileptic insanity.                                                    D

        26. Another witness who was produi:ed by the defence was
  DW-1, Bhanwar Lal, the brother of the respondent. According
  to this witness, the respondent was suffering from mental
  disorder since 1993. He stated that when he gets the fits of          E
  insanity, he can fight with anybody, hit anybQdy and even throw
  articles lying around him. At the initial stage, Dr. Devraj Purohit
' haa treated him. Then Dr. V.K. Razdan treated him and
  thereafter, in Jaipur, Dr. Ashok Pagadiya!Pandharia also
  treated him. Even when he was in jail, he was un~r treatment.         F
  He produced the prescription slips i.e. Exts. D3 /a!l(J D4, This
  witness has also stated that on the date of occurrence at about
  6.00 - 6.30 a.m., Shera Ram/respondent was not feeling well
  and, in fact, his condition was not good. Even at home he had
  broken the electricity meter and the bulbs. When the people at        G
  home including the witness tried to stop him, he had beaten
  DW-1 on his arm and after hitting him on the face he had run
  away.
      27. This oral and documentary evidence clearly shows that
 the respondent was suffering from epileptic attacks just prio.r        H
    506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A to the incident. Immediately prior to the occurrence, he had
  behaved violently and had caused injuries to his own family
  members. After committing the crime, he was arrested by the
  Police and even thereafter, he was treated for insanity, while
  in jail.
B
         28. Thus, there is evidence to show continuous mental
  sickness of the respondent. He not only caused death of the
  deceased but also on the very same day injured and caused
   hurt to his family members including OW-1. His statement made
C under Section 313 Cr.PC is fully corroborated by oral and
  documentary evidence of OW-2 and Ext. 0-3 and 0-4. Though,
  the High Court has not discussed this evidence in great detail,
  but this being an admissible piece of evidence, can always be
  relied upon to substantiate the conclusion and findings
  recorded by the High Court.
D
         29. In other words, the High Court on the basis of the
  documentary and oral evidence has a taken a view which was
  a possible and cannot be termed as perverse or being
  supported by no evidence. The finding of the High Court, being
E in consonance with the well settled principles of criminal
  jurisprudence, does not call for any interference. More so, the
  learned counsel appearing for the State has not brought to our
  notice any evidence, documentary or otherwise, which could
  persuade us to take a contrary view i.e. other than the view
F taken by the High Court.
        30. Another aspect of this case which requires
  consideration by this Court is that the case of the prosecution
  suffers from legal infirmity. In fact, the prosecution has failed to
  prove beyond reasonable doubt that the injury inflicted by the
G respondent upon the deceased was sufficient in the ordinary
  course of nature to cause death. It is the case of the
  prosecution that the respondent had hurled a stone which had
  caused injury (lacerated wound on the left side of the forehead)
  whereupon the deceased fell on the ground and subsequently
H collapsed. The injury is said to be 2" x %" x upto bone,
 STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. SHERA RAM @ VISHNU 507
        DUTTA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
transverse!ly Lt. side of forehead and another lacerated wourl'd     A
2" x %" x %" near injury No.1 towards the forehead. These are
the injuries which the deceased is stated to have suffered. In
addition, abrasion of 1 cm x 1 cm on the left eyebrow was also
present. According to the doctor, all these injuries were ante
mortem in nature and the cause of death was shock and                B
haemorrhage due to head injury.

     31. In the statement of PW-20, Dr. C.P. Bhati, it is nowhere
stated that the injuries caused by the respondent were sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It is also not
recorded in the post-mortem report, Ext. 37. This was a material     C
piece of evidence which the prosecution was expected to prove
in order to bring home the guilt of the respondent. This is a
serious deficiency in the case of the prosecution. Absence of
this material piece of evidence caused a dent in the case of
the prosecution. The High Court has not taken note of this           D
important aspect ·of the case.

      32. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent
placed reliance upon this evidence and strenuously contended
that the respondent was entitled to acquittal on this basis alone.   E
We should not be understood to have stated any absolute
proposition of law, but in the facts and circumstances of the
present case, it was expected of PW-20 to state before the
Court as well as record the same in the post-mortem report
prepared by him i.e. Ext. 37, that the injuries were sufficient in   F
the ordinary course of nature to cause death of the deceased.

     33. Ex-facie, injuries do not appear to be so vital that they
could have resulted in the death of the deceased, but this fact
was required to be proved by expert evidence. The counsel for
the respondent relied upon a judgment of this Court in the case      G
of Ram Jattan and Others v. State of U.P. ((1995) SCC (Cri)
169] where this Court held that it is not appropriate to interfere
with the conclusion that the injuries are not sufficient to cause
death unless they are so patent. The Court held as under:-
                                                                     H
                               '       '   ,,   ~

    508     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A                "4. The learned counsel, however, further submitted
          that in any event the offence committed by the members
          of unlawful assembly cannot be held to be one of murder
          and therefore the common object of unlawful assembly was
          not one which attracts the provision of Section 302 read
B         with Section 149 IPC. We find considerable force in this
          submission. Though, in general, right from the first report
          onwards the prosecution case is that all the 12 accused
          armed with sharp-edged weapons and lathis surrounded
          the three persons and inflicted the injuries but from tne
c         doctor's report we find that no injury was caused on the
          vital organs. So far as Patroo is concerned, who got the
          report written by PW 7 and gave it in the police station,
          we find 13 injuries but all of them were abrasions and
          lacerated injuries on the legs and hands. The doctor
          opined that all the injuries were simple. On Balli, PW 8,
D
          the doctor found 12 injuries and they were also on arms
          and legs. There was only one punctured wound, injurY No.
          8 and it was not a serious injury and it was also a simple
          injury. Now, coming to the injuries on the deceased, the
          doctor who first examined him, when he was alive, found
E         11 injuries. Out of them, injuries Nos. 1 and 2 were
          punctured wounds. Injury No. 5 was an incised wound and
          injury No. 6 was a penetrating wound. All these injuries
          were on the upper part of the right forearm and outer and
          lower part of right upper arm. The remaining ir.juries were
F         abrasions and contusions. The doctor opined that except
          injuries Nos. 7 and 9 all other injuries were simple. He did
          not say whether injuries Nos. 7 and 9 were grievous but
          simply stated that they were to be kept under observation.
          The deceased, however, died the next day i.e. 9-4-1974
G         and the post-mortem was conducted on the same day. In
          the post-mortem examination 11 external injuries were
          noted but on the internal examination the doctor did not
          find any injury to the vital organs. He, however, noted that
          8th and 9th ribs were fractured. Now, coming to the cause
          of death, he opined that death was due to shock and
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. SHERA RAM @ VISHNU 509
       DUTIA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
  haemorrhage. It is not ,noted that any of the injuries was          A
  sufficient to cause death in the ordinary ilourse of nature.
  It could thus be ~en that neither clause 1st1y' nor clause
  3rdly of Section 300 are attracted to the facts of this case.
  This contention was also put forward before the High Court
  but the learned Judges rejected this contention observing           B
  that the fracture of 8th and 9th ribs must have resulted in
  causing death and therefore these injuries must be held
  to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
  death~ We are unable to agree with this reasoning. In the
  absence of proof by the prosecution in an objective manner          c
  that the injuries caused were sufficient in the ordinary
  course of nature to cause death, the same cannot be
  interfered with unless the injuries are so patent. As we
  have noted above except fracture of ribs there was no other
  injury to any of the vital organs. As a matter of fact internally   D
  the doctor did not notice any damage either to the heart
  or lungs. Even in respect of these two injuries resulting in
  fracture of the ribs, there were no corresponding external
  injuries. Again as already noted all the injuries were on the
  non-vital parts of the body. The .learned counsel for the
  State, however, submitted that a forceful blow dealt on the         E
  am'! might have in turn caused the fracture of the two ribs.
  Even assuming for a moment it to be so, it is difficult to
  hold that from that circumstance alone the common object
  of the unlawful assembly of 12 persons to cause the death
  of the deceased is established.                                     F

         5. The common object has to be gathered or inferred
  from the various circumstances like nature of the weapons,
  the force used and the injuries that are caused. After
  carefully going through the medical evidence we find that           G
  it is difficult to conclude that the common object was to
  cause the death. The injuries on Patroo, PW 8 as well as
  on the deceased were more or less of the same nature
  except that in the case of deceased, there were few
  punctured wounds which were not serious but only simple.            H
     510     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

·A         He died due to shock and haemorrhage the next day. In
           any event there is no indication anywhere in the evidence
           of the doctor or in the post-mortem certificate that any of
           the injuries was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature
           to cause death. No doubt in his deposition the doctor, PW
 B         4 has stated in the general way that these injuries were
           sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
           We have already held that there was no external injury
           which resulted in the fracture of the ribs. In such an event
           clause 3rdly of Section 300 IPC is not attracted. Likewise
c          clause 1stly of Section 300 IPC is also not attracted i.e.
           intentionally causing death. If their intention was to cause
           death, they would have used the lethal weapons in a
           different way and would not have merely inflicted simple
           injuries on the non-vital parts like legs and hands.
D                  6. In the result we set aside the convictions of these
           eight appellants under Section 302 read with Section 149
           IPC and the sentence for imprisonment for life. Instead we
           convict them under Section 304 Part II read with Section
           149 IPC and sentence each of them to undergo rigorous
E          imprisonment for five years. The sentences and
           convictions imposed on other counts are confirmed. The
           four other accused who were convicted by the trial court
           as well as by the High Court are not before us. However,
           we are of the view that they must also get the same benefit.
F          They are Ram Chander (A-2), Dal Singhar (A-7), Sarai (A-
           8) and Birju (A-11 ). Accordingly their convictions under
           Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC for imprisonment
           for life are set aside and instead they are also convicted
           under Section 304 Part II read with Section 149 IPC and
G          are sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five
           years. The other convictions and sentences imposed on
           other counts are, however, confirmed.
         34. Reliance was also placed upon the judgment of this
     Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Kalu [(1998) SCC
H
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. SHERA RAM @VISHNU 511
       DUTIA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
(Cri.) 898], where in the post mortem examination of the A
deceased, the cause of death was noticed as "acute peritonitis"
as a result of abdominal injuries. However, during the cross-
examination, Dr. Prem Narayna admitted that "peritonitis" could
have set in due to surgical complications also. The Court took
the view that the medical evidence, therefore, when analysed 8
in. its correct perspective shows that the evidence recorded by
the High Court is correct to the effect that prosecution had not
proved that the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death of the lady and had acquitted the
respondent. The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the c
finding recorded by the High Court.
     35. In the present case also, there is no documentary or
oral evidence to prove the fact that the injuries caused by the
respondent to the deceased were sufficient in the ordi(lary
course of nature to cause death. This, however, cannot be D
stated as an absolute proposition of law and the .question
whether the particular injury was sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death or not is a question of fact which will
have to be determined in light of the facts, circumstances and
evidence produced in a given case. (Ref. Halsbury's Laws of E
India 5(2) Criminal Law-II).
       There could be cases where injuries caused upon the
body of the deceased per se can irresistibly lead to the
conclusion that the injuries were sufficient to cause death in the
ordinary course of nature, while there may be other cases where      F
it is required to be proved by documentary and oral evidence.
Resultantly, it will always depend on the facts of each case.
Thus, in such cases, it may neither be permissible nor possible
to state any absolute principle of law universally applicable to
all such cases.                                                      G
    36. In view of our discussion above, we find no error in the
judgment under appeal. Thus, we have no hesitation in
dismissing the appeal and the same is hereby dismissed.
8.8.8.                                       Appeal dismissed.       H