Holding

The claim of adverse possession over public property was not substantiated; the lower courts erred, and the decree granting title to the plaintiff was set aside.

Summary

The State of Rajasthan appealed against a decree granting title to a plot of land to the deceased Harphool Singh on the basis of adverse possession. The plaintiff claimed continuous, open and hostile possession since 1955, supported only by oral statements and electricity/water bills, and later introduced a claim of his father's earlier possession. The Supreme Court held that the evidence was insufficient to establish the statutory requirement of 30 years of open, hostile and continuous possession, especially for public property, and that the lower courts erred in accepting vague assertions. It also ruled that Section 22 and Section 25 of the Rajasthan Colonisation Act, 1954 do not oust the civil courts' jurisdiction to adjudicate title disputes. The Court found the appeal was filed within the limitation period, correcting the lower courts' error on that point. Consequently, the judgment and decree of the lower courts were set aside and the plaintiff's suit dismissed.

Issues considered

The plaintiff's claim of title by adverse possession over State land and whether the statutory elements of open, hostile and continuous possession for 30 years were satisfied.
Whether the evidence adduced was sufficient to prove the required period and nature of possession.
Whether Section 22 and Section 25 of the Rajasthan Colonisation Act, 1954 bar civil court jurisdiction in a suit for title by adverse possession.
Whether the appeal filed by the State was barred by limitation.
Whether appellate courts can interfere with findings not based on legally acceptable evidence under Section 100 of the CrPC.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 9, s. 96
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 100
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 10

Subjects

adverse possessionpublic propertyRajasthan Colonisation Actevidencelimitationcivil court jurisdictiontitle disputesection 22section 25section 100 CrPCstate land

Judgment

A STATE OF RAJASTHAN
v.
HARPHOOL SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH ms LRS.
• ,.._

MAY4, 2000

B [S. RAJENDRABABU AND DORAISWAMYRAJU, JJ.]

I
Adverse possession-Proof of-Plaintiff claiming adverse possession on
a l~nd belonging to State Govemment-MeTT! vague assertions-No concrete
y 4--

or mate._rial proof to substantiate the claim-Allowed by Trial Court-Affirmed
c by fi,.st appellate court and High Court-Validity of-Held, in order to
substantiate a claim of adverse possession, the ingTT!dients of open, hostile and
continues possession for a period of30 years should be proved-In the instant
case, materials on record do not substantiate plaintiffs claim for adverse
possession-Thus, Courts below were not justified in allowing the claim-
Evidence Act, 1872-Section II 0.
D
Public property-Adverse possession-Claim-Consideration of-Held,
requires moTT! senous and effective consideration since it involves destruction
of_rightltitle of State property.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 9-Rajasthan Colonisation Act,
E ~
19~tfions 22, 24 and 25-Jurisdiction of Civil Courts to entertain a suit-
Public property-Adverse possession-Claim-Determination of-Held, deter-
mination of a claim of acquisition of State property by adverse possession is
outside the purview of Section 22 which is concerned only with summary
eviction of unauthori~ed occupants-Powers and proceduTT! under Section 22
F is no substitute for Civil Courts jurisdiction to try and adjudicate disputes
relating to title to immovable property.

Code ofCivil ProceduTT!, 1908-Sections 96and1 DO-Appellate Courts-
.
Power to inteifere-Perv/rse findings not based upon legally acceptable evi-
dence-Patently contrary to law declared by Supreme Court-Held, Courts
G have no immunity from inteifeTT!nce.

Respondent-plaintiff laid his claim to a plot of land belonging to ~·
State Government. According to the plaintiff he was in possession of the
said-land since time immemorial and in the year 1955 he had constructed a
H house on the said land and started living there. However, the A.D.M.
958
STATE v. HARPHOOL SINGH 959
ordered his eviction under Ss. 22 and 24 of the Rajasthan Colonisation Act, A
1954. Aggrieved, plaintiff filed a suit for title by adverse possession.
During trial at the time of evidence for the first time 3 claim regarding
possession of the property by the father of the plaintiff was introduced and
two witnesses in support of said claim were examined. Trial Court, allowed
the claim of adverse possession by holding that the land in dispute had
B
been in peaceful and continuous possession of the plaintiff since 1955. On
appeal, the first appellate court while affirming the findings of trial Court
regarding adverse possession, dismissed the appeal on the ground of limi-
tation. The second appeal filed by appellant-State was also dismissed by
High Court. Hence the present appeal.
c
On behalf of the appellant-State :'it was contended that the courts
below committed serious error of law in upholding the claim of adverse
possession of plaintiff when the essential ingredients necessary to substan-
tiate the claim of perfection of title were totally lacking; that there was no
specific finding about the claim of possessjon by the father projected
D
merely at the time of trial, not raised either when objections were submit-
ted before the A.D.M. or even when the suit was filed in the plaint; that the
order passed by the A.D.M. in exercise of his power under Section 22 of the
Rajasthan Colonisation Act, 1954 has become final and thejurisdiction of
the Civil Court stated ousted in respect of such matters by virtue of Section
25 of the said Act and therefore the suit could not have been entertained at E
all by the Civil Court.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1.1. The materials on record do not substantiate respondent-
plaintiff's claim for perfection of title by adverse possession to the public F
property. Thus, Trial Court was not justified in holding that the adverse
possession of plaintiff has been established. Both the first appellate court
and the High Court erred in mechanically affirming the findings of the
Trial Court without application of mind. The judgment and decree of the
courts below are set aside. (968-H; 969-A-B] G
1.2. In order to substantiate a claim of adverse possession the ingredi-
ents of open, hostile and continuous possession for a period of 30 years should
be proved. In the instant case, the plaintiff claims 'to have put up the con-
struction in 1955 and absolutely there is no concr~te and independent mate-
rial to prove the same, except an oral assertion. The story of his father H
..
960 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 3 S.C.R.
A having been there even earlier to 1955 was not projected either before the
A.D.M. when the plaintiff submitted his defence, or in the plaint when the
suit was filed but for the first time introduced only at the stage of trial. There
is no scrap of paper or concrete material to prove any such possession of the
plaintiff's father nor was there any specific finding supported by any evi-
dence. When the property was a vacant land before the alleged construction
B
was put up, to show open and hostile possession which could alone in law
constitute adverse to the State, some concrete details of the nature of occu-
pation with proper proof thereof would be absolutely necessary and mere
vague assertions cannot by themselves be a substitute for such concrete
proof. Further, even if plaintiff's allegations and claims, as projected in the
c plaint, are accepted in toto, the period of so-called adverse possession would
fall short by 5 years of the required period. [967-q-H; 968-A-B]

P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L Lakshmi Reddy, AIR (1957) SC 314 and
Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil & Others v. Balwant alias Balasaheb Babusaheb
Patil (tkad) by Lrs. etc., AIR {1995) SC 895, relied on.
D
Secretary of State for India in Council v. Debendra Lal Khan, (1933) LR
(LXI) I.A. 73, referred to.

2. The question of perfection of title by adverse possession in respect
of public property, requires more serious and effective consideration be-
E
cause it ultimately involve destruction of right/title of the State to immov-
able property and conferring upon a third party encroacher title where, he
had none. [966-H]

3. The powers and procedure under Section 22 of the Rajasthan
F Colonisation Act, 1954 is no substitute for the civil courts jurisdiction and
powers to try and adjudicate disputes of title relating to immovable prop- ,
erty. In the instant case, a citizen is asserting a claim of acquisition of title
by adverse possession in derogation of the rights and interests of the State
in the property in question. Determination of such claims are not only
outside the purview of Section 22 which only provide for a summary mode
G
of eviction of unauthorised occupants but in respect of disputes relating to
title to immovable property the jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts to
adjudicate them canm~t be said to have been ousted. (966-G-F]

Abdul Waheed Khan v. Bhawani & Others, (1966) 3 SCR 617; Firm
H and Illuri Subbayya Chetty & Sons v. The State of Andhra Pratksh, (1964) 1
STATE v. HARPHOOL SINGH [RAJU, J.] 961
SCR 752; State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, AIR SC 794 A
and Dhulabhais v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1969) SC 78, relied on.

4. The first appellate court was not justified in holding that the
appeal was not preferred in time. H the copy of the judgment dated 10.4.89
was received on 9.5.89, the limitation for filing the appeal would extend
upto 8.6.89 and if during such period on 12.5.89 a copy for the decree was B
applied for it cannot be said to have been made after the limitation period.
~. Thus, having regard to the intervening summer recess, the filing of the
appeal on the very reopening day with copies of judgment and decree
would be well within the period of limitation. (965-C-D]
c
5. The first appellate court as well as the High Court ought to have
seen that perverse findings not based upon legally acceptable evidence and
which are patently contrary to law declared by this Court cannot have any
immunity from interference in the hands of the appellate authority. Lacka-
daisical findings based upon mere surmises and conjectures, if allowed to
be mechanically approved by the first appellate court and the second D
appellate court also withdraws itself into recluse apparently taking um-
brage under Section 100, Cr.P.C., the inevitable casualty is justice and
approval of s1,1ch rank injustice would only result in gross miscarriage of
justice. [968-F-G]
E
CIVIL APPELLXTE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5188of1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 25.7.94 of the Rajasthan High
Court in C.S.A. No. 157 of 1994.

Aruneshwar Gupta, (Sushil KW:nar Jain) Additional General for F
Rajasthan, A.P. Dhamija and A. Misra for the Appellant.

Aman Hingorani, Ms. Priya Hingorani Seleem Hasan Ansari for Mis.
Hingorani & Associates for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by G

RAJU, J. The State of Rajasthan, who lost before the Courts below,
is the appellant before us, challenging the summary dismissal of a second
appeal by a learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court filed in SB
Civil S.A. No.157/94 and thereby affixing seal of approval to the judgment H
962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 3 S.C.R.
A and decree passed in favour of respondent-plaintiff.

Having regard to the nebulous manner in which relevant facts are found
to· have been stated in the judgments of the trial court as well as the first
appellate court, we thought it fit and necessary to look into the plaint of which
an English translated copy as made for the respondents has been furnished
B by the learned counsel, appearing before us. The suit property is said to be
a plot of land measuring north-south 60 ft. and east-west 40 ft. situated on
Nohar-Bhadra Road at Nohar. As per the version of the claim in the plaint
he was holding possession of the property since time immemorial by fencing
it and in the year 1955 the plaintiff constructed a house on the disputed plot
c and started living therein. The fact that in the year 1955, he constructed the
rooms, kitchen etc., and started living there, is found asserted more than once,
claiming at the same time that he was in occupation since long before without
specifying anywhere how long before. Further, assertions made in the plaint
are that he got electricity connection and water connection in 1965 and 1974
respectively, producing photocopies of an electricity bill of 1965 and water
D bill of 1981. A grievance has also been made that at the instance of Area
Patwari, Nohar, the A.D.M/Secretary, Mandi Development Committee,
issued a notice calling upon him to vacate the encroachment, to which he
claims to have submitted his defence. Since, the A.D.M. without properly
appreciating the claims of the plaintiff, ordered eviction, the plaintiff was
E forced to file the suit and as per the case of the plaintiff projected in the plaint,
he by his long possession has become the owner of the plot of land and not
only the order passed by the A.D.M. is illegal, null and void but his
possession has to be protected by the issue of appropriate orders of pemianent
injunction.
F The case of the defendant was that the encroachment was made for the
first time only in the year 1981 and the plaintiff was not in possession of
the plot before and that no connection of electricity and water was obtained
by the plaintiff as claimed during the years 1965 and 1974 respectively and
the order of the A.D.M. directing the removal of encroachment is absolutely
G legal, having been passed in exercise of the powers under Sections 22 and
24 of the Rajasthan Colonisation Act, 1954. Want of notice under Section 80
CPC has also been urged as an infirmity to non suit the plaintiff.

Both parties adduced oral and documentary evidence in support of their
respective claims. It is only for the first time in evidence the plaintiff as PW-
H
STATE v. HARPHOOL SINGH [RAJU, J.] 963

,., "" 1 introduced the theory of earlier possession of the land by the father of the
plaintiff and the two witnesses examined also in a most cavalier and 'more
A

'4 loyal than the king' fashion seem to have asserted that the property in
question was in the occupation of the plaintiff's family for nearly 55-60 years.
A cursory reference is found made to the evidence produced on the side of
the defendant-State. The trial court, on such perfunctory materials, is found
B
to have made certain observations totally lacking in precision and observed,
. '
"on the basis of the oral evidence and water and electricity bills produced
by the plaintiff in respect of plot in question, the possession of the plaintiff
over the land in question has been found continuously and uninterruptedly
since 1955". In yet another place, the trial court observed, "Thus, I hold that
on the basis of the evidence produced by the plaintiff, it is proved that the c
plot of land in question has been in possession of the plaintiff for more than
30 years peacefully, continuously and without any obstruction, clfter raising
-.\ building thereon". The startling observation is found made in the relief
portion and it reads, "on the above discussion, I have decided that the land
in question has been in peaceful and continuous possession of the plaintiff
D
since 1955, on which he constructed building and started residing therein in
1955 itself and thus, this period becomes over about 30 years. Under the
circumstances, the "adverse possession" of the plaintiff over the land in
question has been established on the basis of which he has acquired own-
ership thereon".
E
Aggrieved, the State pursued the matter on appeal before the first
appellate court but we find on a close scrutiny of the judgment that there was
no due or proper application of mind or any critical analysis or objective
consideration of the matter made, despite the same being the first appellate
court. On the other hand, by merely reproducing the findings of the nature
F
~ adverted to by us, a mechanical affirmation seems to have been made of them
without any reference to the principles of law or the criteria to be satisfied
before the claim of the piaintiff of perfection of title by adverse possession
could be sustained, involving correspondingly desttUction of title of the State
in respect of a public property. The first appellate court further chose to reject
the appeal on the ground that the same has not been presented within time G
even without properly noticing the details as to when the Court closed for
swnmer vacation and when the same was reopened, on some strange method
of reasoning.

The High Court, apparently obsessed by the limitations drawn on the H
Jl9l .
964 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 3 S.C.R.
A exercise of Second Appellate Jurisdiction, unmindful even of the glaring
inconsistencies and contradictions and serious nature of the issues raised
involving public property, has chosen to summarily reject the appeal solely
for the reason that both the courts below have found the plaintiff to be the
owner of the property and if that be the position, Section 22 of the Rajasthan
Colonisation Act, 1954, which provided for summary eviction of those in
B
illegal occupation of public property will have no application and that the
declaration granted by the courts had the effect of setting aside the order by
the A.D.M., impliedly. Hence, this appeal by the State.

Shri Sushil Kumar Jain, learned counsel appearing for the State of
C Rajasthan, strenuously contended that the courts below committed serious
errors of law in upholding the claim of adverse possession projected by the
plaintiff and that such findings were based more on hypothetical assumption
of vital and necessary facts, based on mere surmises. Reference has been
made to the fact that there was no specific finding about the claim of
possession by the father projected merely at the time of trial and not raised
D
either when the objections were submitted before the A.D.M. or even when
the suit was filed, in the plaint. Argued the learned counsel further that the
essential ingredients necessarily to be established to substantiate a claim of
perfection of title by adverse possession are totally lacking in the present case
and, therefore, our interference is called for to prevent miscarriage of justice.
E As for the finding of the first appellate court that the appeal presented by
the State before it was also barred by limitation, the learned counsel invited
our attention to the details relating to the period of vacation and the date of
reopening of subordinate courts after summer recess and contended that the
said reason also was erroneous both on law and on facts. A plea on the bar
p of civil ·court's jurisdiction based on Section 25 of the Act was also raised.

Shri Aman Hingorani, learned counsel appearing for the respondents-
legal representatives of the plaintiff, with equal force and vehemence con-
tended that the findings of the courts below concurrently recorded are quite
in accordance with law and do not call for interference in this appeal. The
G learned counsel, at length, invited our attention to the findings of the courts
below, the copy of the plaint and the evidence of PWs by furnishing his own
translated copies of the same. Since, the order passed by the A.D.M. was
illegal and a nullity, according to the learned counseL the bar of suit engrafted
in the Act cannot be a hurdle to approach the competent civil court to
H vindicate the property rights of the plaintiff. Both the learned counsel invited
STATE v. HARPHOOL SINGH [RAJU, J.] 965
our attention to some of the relevant case law on the subject and reference A
..... j. will be made, to the same· hereinafter.

Adverting first to the question of limitation, on which also the first
appellate court chose to reject the appeal before it and pursued before us
though not considered by the High Court, we find from the materials placed
B
on record that the trial court delivered its judgment on 10.4.89, that on
11.4.89, the State applied for a copy of the judgment and the summer vacation
started on 9.5.89. It is stated that after the receipt of the copy of the judgment
on 9.5.89, an application for a copy of the decree was made only on 12.5.89
and the appeal was filed on 3.7.89, the date on which the courts were said
to have been reopened after summer recess. If the copy of the judgment dated c
10.4.89 was furnished on 9.5.89, the limitation for filing the appeal would
extend upto 8.6.89 and if during such period on 12.5.89 a copy of the decree
was applied for it cannot be said to have been made after the limitation period
was over and having regard to the intervening summer recess, the filing of
the appeal on the reopening day after obtaining the decree copy also, together
D
with copies of judgment and decree on the first day of the reopening after
vacation would be well within the period of limitation and there is no merit
in the said ground assigned by the first appellate court. Our attention has also
been drawn to the original records where we found a specific endorsement
made after processing the appeal papers by the office of the first appellate
court, that the appeal has been filed within time. The first appellate court, E
therefore, was in error in holding to the contra.

Apart from the serious error committed by the first appellate court on
the question of limitation, which the second appellate was obliged but yet
failed to consider and correct, the learned Single Judge in the High Court, F
in our view, committed a grave error in dismissing summarily the appeal
when it involved substantial and arguable questions of law of some impor-
tance. Since, these issues have been raised and argued before us, we consider
it appropriate to deal with them ourselves, instead of remitting the matter back
.~
to the High Court for disposal on merits after hearing both parties, at this
belated stage. G

The learned counsel for the appellant strongly relied upon Section 22
and Section 25 of the Act to contend that the order passed by the A.D.M.
in exercise of his powers under Section 22 of the Act has become final and
the jurisdiction of the Civil Court stand ousted in respect of such matters by H
\

966 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) 3 S.C.R.
.._
A virtue of Section 25 and therefore the suit could not have been entertained
at all by the Civil Court. Section 25 of the Act stipulates that a Civil Court
shall not have jurisdiction in any matter which the Collector is empowered
by that Act to dispose of and shall not take cognisance of the manner in whic~
"
the State Government or Collector or any officer exercises any power vested
in it or in him by or under the said Act. Section 22, provides for a summary
B
eviction of any person who occupies or continues to occupy any land in a
colony to which he has no right or title or without lawful authority by treating 2c-
such person as a tre8passer in the manner and after following the procedure
prescribed therefor. Reliance has been placed by the respondents on the
decisions reported in Abdul Waheed Khan v. Bhawani & Others, [1966) 3
c SCR 61?]; and Finn and Illuri Subbayya Chetty & Sons v. The State of
Andhra Pradesh, [1964) 1 SCR 752, to substantiate his claim that the bar of
suit will not be attracted to a CllSf! of this nature. In our view, the principles
laid down in Abdul Waheed Khan's case (supra) while considering a provision
like the one before us, that the bar is with reference to any matter which a
Revenue Officer is' empowered by the Act to determine and the question of
D
title is foreign to the scope of proceedings under the Act. would apply to this
case also with all force, that is on the provisions of Section 25 of the Act.
as it stands. Even that apart in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal
.Madam, AIR (1986) SC 794 this Court, after adverting to Dhulabhais's case
reported in AIR 1969 SC 78, held that questions relating to disputed claims ~
E of parties for title to an immovable property could be decided only by the
competent Civil Court and that in the absence of a machinery in the special
enactment to determine disputes relating to title between two rival claimants, ~

the jurisdiction of the Civil Couit cannot be said to have been ousted. In the
case on hand, a citizen is asserting a claim of acquisition of title by adverse
F possession in derogation of the rights and interests of the State in the property
in question. In our view, determination of such claims are not- only outside -~
the purview of Section 22 which only provide for a summary mode of
eviction but in respect of such disputes relating to title to immovable property
the jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts to adjudicate them cannot be said to '--.
have been ousted. The powers and procedure under Section 22 of the Act,
G in our view, is no substitute for the civil courts jurisdiction and powers to
try and adjudicate disputes of title relating to immovable property. ~
So far as the question of perfection of title by adverse possession and
that too in respect of public property is concerned, the question requires to
H be considered more seriously and effectively for the reason that it ultimately
STATE v. HARPHOOL SINGH [RAJU, J.) 967
involve destruction of rightltitle of the State to immovable property and A
conferring upon a third party encroacher title where, he had none. The
decision in P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L Lakshmi Reddy, AIR (1957) SC 314,
adverted to the ordinary classical requirement - that it should be nee vi nee
clam nee precario - that is the possession required must be adequate in
continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to
B
the competitor. It was also observed therein that whatever may be the animus
or intention of a person wanting to acquire title by adverse possession, his
adverse possession cannot commence until he obtains actual possession with
the required animus. In the decisio~ reported in Secretary of State for India
in Council v. Debendra Lal Khan, (1933) LR LXI I.A. 78 PC, strongly relied
for the respondents, the Court laid down further that it is sufficient that the c
possession be overt and without any attempt at concealment so that the person
against whom time is running, ought if he exercises due vigihmce, to be aware
of what is happening and if the rights of the crown have been openly usurped
it camiot be heard to plead that the fact was not brought to its notice. In
Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil & Others v. Balwant alias Balasaheb Babusaheb
D
Patil (dead) by Lrs etc., AIR (1995) SC 895, it was observed that a claim
of adverse possession being a hostile assertion involving expressly or impliedly
in denial of title of the true owner, the burden is always on the person who
asserts such a claim to prove by clear and unequivocal evidence that his
"' possession was hostile to the real owner and in deciding such claim, the
Courts must have regard to the animus of the person doing those acts. E

The High Court without even a cursory scrutiny of the legality and
propriety of the findings in order to ascertain at least as to whether they are
based upon any legally acceptable evidence and the necessary legal ingredi-
ents of 'adverse possession' stood substantiated, mechanically seem to have
F
accorded its approval to the claim of title made by the plaintiff merely on
the basis that both the courts below have found the plaintiff to be the owner
of the property. Indisputably the State was the owner and the question is as
to whether its title has been extinguished and the plaintiff had acquired and
perfected title to the same by adverse possession. In order to substantiate such
a claim of adverse possession the ingredien!s of open, hostile and continuous G
.., possession with the required animus, as laid down by Courts should be proved
for a continuous period of 30 years. Admittedly, the plaintiff claims to have
put up the construction in 1955 and absolutely there is no concrete and
independent material to prove the same, except an oral assertion. The story
of his father having been there even earlier to 1955 was not projected either H
968 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 3 S.C.R.
A before the A.D.M. when the plaintiff submitted his defence, or in the plaint
when the suit was filed but for the first time introduced only at the stage of
trial when examined as pWl. When the property was a vacant land before
the alleged construction was put up, to show open and hostile possession
which could alone in law constitute adverse to the State, in this case, some
concrete details of the nature of occupation with proper proof thereof would
B
be absolutely necessary and mere vague assertions cannot by themselves be
a substitute for such concrete proof required of open and hostile possession.
Even if the plaintiff's allegations and claims, as projected in the plaint, are
accepted in toto, the period of so-called adverse possession would fall short
by 5 years of the required period. There is no scrap of paper or concrete
c material to prove any such possession of the plaintiff's father nor was there
any specific fmding supported by any evidence, in this regard. The father of
the plaintiff was also an employee of the Telephone Department. It is not as
though, if their story of such long possession is true, there would be no
correspondence or record to show that his father or the plaintiff were there
D before 1981. The relevance of the electricity bill to the property in question
itself has been questioned and no effort has been taken by the plaintiff to
correlate the electricity and water bill to the property claimed by examining
any official witnesses connected with those records. While that be the factual
position, it is beyond comprehension as to how anyone expected to reason-
ably and judiciously adjudicate a claim of title by objective process of
E reasoning could have come to the conclusion that the legal requirem~nt of
30 years of continuous, hostile and open possession with the required animus
stood satisfied and proved on such perfunctory and slender material on record
in the case. The first appellate court as well as the High Court ought to have
seen that perverse fmdings not based upon legally acceptable evidence and
F which are patently contrary to law declared by this Court cannot have any
immunity from interference in the hands of the appellate authority. The trial
court has jumped to certain conclusions virtually on no evidence whatsoever
in this connection. Such lackadaisical findings based upon mere surmises and
conjectures, if allowed to be mechanically approved by the first appellate
court and the second appellate court also withdraws itself into recluse
G apparently taking umbrage under Section 100, Cr.P.C., the inevitable casualty
is justice and approval of such rank injustice would only result in gross
miscarriage of justice. '

We are of the view, on the materials on record that the plaintiff could
H not beheld to have substantiated his claim of perfection of title by adverse
STATE v. HARPHOOL SINGH [RAJU, J.) 969
possession to the public property. The courts below could not have legiti- A
mately come to any such conclusion in this case. The judgment and decree
of the courts below are set aside and the plaintiff's suit sha.Jl stand dismissed.
No costs. Before parting with this case, we may observe that our decision
need not stand in the way of the legal heirs of the plaintiff, if they so desire
to approach the concerned authorities to seek for assignment of the la.lld in
their favour, for value.
B

S.V.K. Appeal allowed.