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Supreme Court of India

STATE OF RAJASTHANversusGIRDHARI LAL

Citation
2013 INSC 680
Decided
7 October 2013
Disposal
Dismissed

Holding

The Court held that the evidence did not satisfy the requirement of cruelty linked to dowry demand for a dowry‑death presumption, but did establish cruelty leading to suicide within seven years, justifying conviction under Section 306 IPC.

Summary

The daughter of the complainant was married to Girdhari Lal and died of severe burn injuries within seven years of marriage. The prosecution alleged that she was subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband and in‑laws in connection with dowry demands, leading to her death. The trial court convicted the husband under Section 3048 IPC (dowry death) and sentenced him to life imprisonment; the High Court altered the conviction to Section 306 IPC (abetment of suicide) and reduced the sentence to five years. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the statutory presumption under Section 1138 of the Evidence Act could be invoked for dowry death and whether the presumption under Section 113A could support conviction for abetment of suicide. The Court held that there was insufficient evidence to prove cruelty linked to dowry demand, so the dowry‑death presumption could not be applied, but the evidence established cruelty and harassment leading to suicide within seven years, justifying conviction under Section 306 IPC. Consequently, the appeal by the State was dismissed and the High Court's order upheld.

Issues considered

  • Whether the death of the married woman qualifies as a dowry death under Section 3048 IPC and the presumption of Section 1138 of the Evidence Act.
  • Whether the death can be treated as abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC based on the presumption of Section 113A of the Evidence Act.
  • Interpretation of the term "soon before" in the context of dowry death.

Legislation cited

Subjects

dowry deathabetment of suicideSection 3048 IPCSection 306 IPCIndian Evidence Actpresumptioncrueltyburn injuriesmarried woman

Judgment

                  [2013] 10 S.C.R. 443


                 STATE OF RAJASTHAN                           A
                            V.
                     GIRDHARI LAL
           (Criminal Appeal No. 1186 of 2008)
                   OCTOBER 7, 2013
                                                              B
      [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA AND
                A.K. SIKRI, JJ.]

     Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 306 and 3048 - Death of married
woman due to burn injuries within 7 years of marriage - C
Deceased was daughter of PW1 - Trial court convicted
accused-husband (respondent) uls.3048 /PC and sentenced
him to undergo life imprisonment - On appeal, High Court
converted the conviction from s.3048 /PC to s.306 /PC and
reduced the sentence from life imprisonment to five years D
imprisonment - Justification - Whether death of PW1's
daughter was an instance of dowry death or she was driven
to commit suicide by respondent - Held: No specific
allegation as to whether respondent demanded dowry - No
evidence on record to come to the definite conclusion that E
soon before her death, the deceased was subjected to cruelty
or harassment by respondent for, or in connection with any,
demand of dowry - In absence of such ingredient, presumption
that respondent had caused the dowry death cannot be drawn
- However, it is established from ocular and documentary F
evidence that deceased was subjected to cruelty and
harassment by respondent - As a result of such treatment of
cruelty and harassment, she was driven to meet the suicidal
death - Appellate Court (High Court) rightly presumed, having
regard to all other circumstances of the case, that such
suicidal act had been abetted by respondent and convicted G
him uls.306 /PC - Evidence Act, 1872 - ss.113A and 1138.

     Penal Code, 1860 - s.3048 - Offence under - Main
ingredient - Held: The main ingredient of the offence under
                           443                                H
                                                             t
    444      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2013] 10 S.C.R.


A s.3048 /PC which is required to be established by the State
  is whether "soon before her death" the deceased was
  subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband, ''for or
  in connection with demand of dowry", to allege "dowry death"
  - Period which can come within the term "soon before" cannot
B be put within the four comers of time frame - It is left to the
  Court for its determination depending upon the facts and
  circumstances of each case - •Words and Phrases - Term
  "soon before" - Meaning of.

      The daughter of PW1 was married   1
                                             to respondent.
C She died of burn injuries within 7 yea rs of her marriage.
  It was alleged that the deceased had been tortured and
  harassed by her in-laws in connection with demand for
  dowry from the initial days of her marriage.

D     The trial court convicted the respondent under
  Section 3048 IPC and sentenced him to undergo life
  imprisonment. On appeal, the High Court converted the
  conviction from Section 3048 IPC to 306 IPC and reduced
  the sentence from life imprisonment to five years
E imprisonment.
      In the instant appeal by the State, the question which
  arose for consideration was whether the death of PW1 's
  daughter was an instance of dowry death or whether she
  was driven to commit suicide by her husband
F (respondent).
          Dismissing the appeal, the Court
       HELD: 1. The main ingredient of the offence under
G Section 3048 IPC which is required to be established by
  the State is whether "soon before her death" the
  deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment by
  her husband, "for or in connection with demand of
  dowry", to allege "dowry death". The period which can
  corrie within the term "soon before" cannot be put within
H
      STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. GIRDHARI LAL                   445 .


the four corners of time frame. It is left to the Court for its    A
determination depending upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. [Paras 8, 11] [448-E; 449-H;
450-A]
    2. In the present case, father and mother o-f the              B
deceased (PW.1 and PW.7 respectively) made ominous
statements regarding demand of dowry that after the
marriage, demand of dowry was made by the in-laws of
the deceased. It is not made specific as to whether
respondent demanded dowry. [Para 11] [450-8]
                                                                   c
     3. Secdc)n. 1138 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
deals with the presumption as to dowry death. In the
present case there is no evidence on record to come to
the definite conclusion that soon before her death, the
deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her             D
husband, respondent for, or in connection with any,
demand of dowry. In absence of such ingredient the
presumption that respondent had caused the dowry
death cannot be drawn. The prosecution thereby cannot
take advantage of Section 1138 of the Indian Evidence              E
Act, 1872. [Para 12] [450-C, F-G]

     4. Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
relates to presumption as to abetment•of suicide by a
married woman. In the instant case, it is established from
the ocular and documentary evidence that the deceased
                                                                   F
was subjected to cruelty and harassment. As a result of
such treatment of cruelty and harassment, she was
driven to meet the suicidal death. She had committed
suicide within a period of 7 years from her marriage and
that her husband had subjected her to cruelty. Therefore,          G
the Appellate Court rightly presumed, having regard to all
other circumstances of the case, that such suicidal act
had been abetted by her husband-respondent and
convicted him for the offence under Section 306 IPC.
[Para 13] [450-G; 451-D-E]                                         H
 '
    446       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 10 S.C.R.


A       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
    No. 1186 of 2008.

       From the Judgment and Order dated 14.03.2007 of the
  High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur
B in D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 472 of 2000.

          Archana Pathak Dave, Milind Kumar for the Appellant.

        Satendar Sing Gulati, Kamaldeep Gulati for the
    Respondent.
                                                                1,
c         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

       SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. 1. This
  appeal has been preferred by the State of Rajasthan against
  the judgment and order dated 14th March, 2007 passed by the
D Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench. By
  the impugned judgment, the Division Bench partly allowed the
  appeal filed by the respondent-Girdhari Lal, modified the
  sentence and convicted him under Section 306 IPC instead of
  304B IPC. For the said offence, the Division Bench sentenced
E him to undergo five years rigorous imprisonment and fine of
  Rs.1000/-, in default he has to further suffer six months rigorous
  imprisonment. Since the respondent-Girdhari Lal had already
  undergone imprisonment for a period of more than six years,
  the High Court directed to release him forthwith, if not required
F to be detained in any other case.

          2. The case of the prosecution in nutshell is that:

       The informant-Jugal Kishore(PW.1) - father of the
  deceased Babita in his written complaint on 11th August, 1998
G informed that his daughter-Babita (since deceased) was
  married to respondent-Girdhari Lal four years back. Her in-laws
  were harassing Babita in connection with demand for dowry
  from the initial days of her marriage. Earlier also the in-laws of
  Babita made attempt to set her ablaze and neighbourers
H rescued her. Later, the in-laws assured her parents that they
      STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. GIRDHARI LAL                      447
      [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
will not harass Babita, but she was burnt to death on 10th            A
August, 1998.

     3. On the said complaint a case under Section 3048 and
498A IPC was registered and investigation was commenced.
After the investigation chargesheet was filed. In due course, the
case came up for trial to the Additional Sessions Judge,              B
Jhunjhunu. The charge under Section 3048 IPC framed against
the respondent was denied by him who claimed trial. Altogether
9 witnesses were examined in support of the case of the
prosecution. In his explanation under Section 313 Cr. P.C., the
respondent claimed innocence. Two defence witnesses were              C
also examined. The trial court on appreciation of evidence and
on hearing the parties convicted the respondent under Section
304-B IPC and sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment.

    On appeal, as noticed above, the Division Bench of the            D
High Court partly allowed the appeal, convicted the respond~nt
under Section 306 IPC instead of 3048 IPC and sentenced him
to undergo five years rigorous imprisonment with fine of
Rs.1,000/-, in default he has to further suffer six months rigorous
imprisonment.                                                         E

     4. Learned counsel for the appellant-State submitted that
the deceased-Babita died within 7 years of her marriage under
unnatural circumstances and respondent did not inform the
parents of the deceased regarding the incident. The burden to
prove innocence lies on the respondent after the prosecution          F
has proved that the deceased died under the unnatural
circumstances within seven years of marriage. Further,
according to the learned counsel for the State, the High Court
has failed to appreciate that Jugal Kishore (PW.1 ), Nand Lal
(PW.4) and Smt. Simla (PW.7) have made statements                     G
regarding harassment and torture by the in-laws of the
deceased in relation to the demand for dowry which has been
corroborated by the statement of other witnesses and the
documents on record. The aforesaid facts were not properly
appreciated by the High Court while converting the conviction         H
    448     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2013] 10 S.C.R.


A from Section 304B IPC to 306 IPC and reducing the sentence
  from life imprisonment to five years imprisonment.

        5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent on the
    other hand supported the decision rendered by the High Court.

B       6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
    gone through the materials on record.

       7. Coming to the evidence adduced at the trial, we notice
  that Babita died of burn injuries within 5 to 6 years of her
C marriage with respondent-Girdhari Lal, thereby the death
  occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances. A bare
  look at the postmortem report (Ext.P-6) shows that the
  de~ased died because of the extensive burns. Therefore, the
  question that arises for determination is whether Babita's death
  is an instance of dowry death or whether she was driven to
0 commit suicide by her husband?

       8. The main ingredient of the offence under Section 304B
  which is required to be established by the State is whether
  "soon before her death" Babita was subjected to cruelty and
E harassment by her husband, "for or in connection with demand
  of dowry", to allege "dowry death".

       Jugal Kishore (PW.1) is himself the complainant and is the
  father of the deceased-Babita. He stated that his daughter was
F married to Girdhari Lal about 6 or 7 years back. The said
  statement was recorded on 12th June, 2000 and the incident
  occurred on 10th August, 1998. Shyam Lal Mahajan, another
  resident of the Village Chhavsari, where the marriage of Babita
  was solemnised, by his statement stated that the marriage of
  Babita was solemnised with accused Girdhari Lal in the year
G 1992-93. Similar was the statement made on 12th June, 2000
  by Jagdish Prasad (PW.3) and he stated that the marriage of
  Babita was solemnised with the accused Girdhari Lal about 6
  or 7 years back. Therefore, it is clear that the death of Babita
  happened within 7 years of her marriage.
H
      STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. GIRDHARI LAL                    449
      [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
     9. The death of Babita was caused by the burn injuries and    A
thereby death occurred otherwise than under normal
circumstances. The statement made by Dr. J.P. Bugalia (PW.6)
proved the fact that death·was caused due to the burns. He
stated that on 10th August, 1998 he was working as Medical
Jurist in B.D.K. Hospital, Jhunjhunu. He along with Dr. P.S.       B
Sahu conducted the postmortem of Babita who was admitted
in the Hospital on 10th August, 1998 at 1.50 p.m. and died
during the treatment at 4.00 p.m. There were burn injuries all
over her body.

      10. So far as the harassment and cruelty are concerned,      C
Rajender Prasad (PW.8) stated that Girdhari Lal used to beat
her for dowry. Jugal Kishore(PW.1) has also supported the fact
that she was being subjected to cruelty in connection with dowry
demand by stating that Girdhari Lal used to beat and harass
Babita for dowry after her marriage. Once he was asked not         D
to do so but he did not mend his ways. He also stated that
Girdhari Lal earlier tried to burn her alive by pouring kerosene
by confining her in a room and when he came to know about
this incident, he went to her in-laws house alongwith Shyam Lal,
Phool Chand, Rajender, Jagdish, Neki Ram and Man Roop              E
where Girdhari Lal and his father begged their pardon for their
act of burning her alive and assured that they will not repeat
the incident. Simla Devi (PW.7), mother of the deceased stated
in her statement that the accused Girdhari Lal and Babita came
to their village Chhavsari one month prior to the incident and     F
stayed there for one hour. Jugal Kishore was not present at the
house at that time and Babita told her mother to send her father
to her in-laws because Girdhari Lal used to harass her. This
statement clearly indicates that Babita was being subjected to
cruelty and harassment soon before the death.                      G

     11. Now, the question arises as to whether Babita was
subjected to such cruelty and harassment by her husband soon
before her death for, or in connection with the demand of dowry.
The period which can come within the term "soon before"
                                                                   H
     450      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 10 S.C.R.


A     cannot be put within the four corners of time frame. It is left to
    · the Court for its determination depending upon the facts and
      circumstances of each case.

       In the present case, Jugal Kishore (PW.1) and Simla Devi
B (PW.7) has made ominous statements regarding demand of
  dowry that after the marriage demand of dowry was made by
  the in-laws. It is not made specific as to whether Girdhari Lal
  demanded dowry.

      12. Section 1138 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which
C deals with the presumption as to dowry death reads as follows:

           Section 1138. Presumption as to dowry death.-When the
           question is whether a person has committed the dowry
           death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her
D          death such woman has been subjected by such person
           to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any
           demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such
           person had caused the dowry 1death.

                Explanation.- For the purposes of this section,
E          "dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in section
           3048 of the Indian Penal Code(45 of 1860).

        In the present case there is no evidence on record to come
  to the definite conclusion that soon before her death, Babita
F was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband, Girdhari
  Lal for, or in connection with any, demand of dowry. In absence
  of such ingredient the presumption that Girdhari Lal had caused
  the dowry death cannot be drawn. The prosecution thereby
  cannot take advantage of Section 1138 of the Indian Evidence
G Act, 1872.

          13. Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 relates
     to presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman
     which reads as follows:

H          113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a
      STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. GIRDHARI LAL                    451
      [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
    married women.-When the question is whether the                A
    commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by
    her husband or any relative of her husband and it is
    shown that she had committed suicide within a period of
    seven years from the date of her marriage and that her
    husband or such relative of her husband had subjected          8
    her to cruelty, the court may presume, having regard to
    all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide
    had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of
    her husband.

         Explanation - For the purposes of this section,           C
    "cruelty" shall have the same meaning as in section
    498A of the Indian Panel Code (45 of 1860).

     In the instant case, it is established from the ocular and
documentary evidence that Babita was subjected to cruelty and      o
harassment. As a result of such treatment of cruelty and
harassment she was driven to meet the suicidal death. She had
committed suicide within a period of 7 years from her marriage
and that her husband had subjected her to cruelty. Therefore,
the Appellate Court rightly presumed, having regard to all other   E
circumstances of the case, that such suicidal had been abetted
by her husband Girdhari Lal and convicted him for the offence
under Section 306 IPC. Hence, no interference is called for.

    14. We find no merit in this appeal. The appeal is
dismissed.                                                         F

8.8.8.                                     Appeal dismissed.


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