Holding

An appellate court under Section 378 CrPC has full power to review the evidence and may set aside an acquittal only on very substantial and compelling reasons; none were found here, so the appeals were dismissed.

Summary

The State of Punjab appealed the trial court’s acquittal of Sukhchain Singh and others for murder and related offences, while an accused (Paramjit Singh) appealed his conviction. The Supreme Court examined the scope of appellate power under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which allows the State to challenge an acquittal. It reiterated that an appellate court may fully re‑appreciate evidence but must respect the double presumption of innocence and may overturn an acquittal only for very substantial and compelling reasons. Applying these principles, the Court found no such reasons in the present case and held that the High Court’s order of acquittal was correct. It also upheld the High Court’s reasoning for the conviction of Paramjit Singh. Consequently, both appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

The extent of the appellate court’s power under Section 378 CrPC to review an order of acquittal
Whether the High Court erred in upholding the acquittal of Sukhchain Singh and co‑accused
Whether the High Court erred in upholding the conviction of Paramjit Singh under Section 374(2) CrPC
The relevance of the presumption of innocence and the requirement of ‘substantial and compelling reasons’ for disturbing an acquittal

Legislation cited

Arms Act, 1959
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 372, s. 373, s. 374(2), s. 375, s. 376, s. 377, s. 378, s. 379, s. 380, s. 423
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 148, s. 149, s. 302, s. 307, s. 323, s. 325, s. 326

Subjects

appeal against acquittalSection 378 CrPCpresumption of innocencereview of evidenceappellate jurisdictioncriminal proceduresubstantial and compelling reasonsdouble presumption

Judgment

[2008] 15 S.C.R. 923

+
~
STATE OF PUNJAB A
II.
SUKHCHAIN SINGH & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 254 of 2002)
NOVEMBER 7, · 2008
I
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, C.K. THAKKER AND
~

LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, JJ.]

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973:
c
s. 378 - Appeal against acquittal - Ambit and scope of
- Explained - HELD: In view of the principles enunciated by
the Court, there is no scope for interference with order of
acquittal passed by trial court as affirmed by High Court -
Penal Code - ss. 3021149, 3071149 and.3261149. D
~

s.374(2) - Appeal challenging conviction - HELD: The
High Court has rightly indicated the reason as to why the
convict stood at a different footing and how accusations have
been fully established against him - Penal 'Code, ss.302134,
307134 and 326. E

The respondents in Criminal Appeal No. 254 of 2002~
filed by the State against acquittal of the accused, and the
~
appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 587 of 2002 along with
two other accused were prosecuted for causing death of F
two of the members of the complainant party and injuries
to others. The prosecution case was that with respect to
elections to various offices of the Truck Union, there
developed an ill-will between the complainant party and
the accused persons. On the day of occurrence, the G
accused, who were five in number, armed with a gun and
gandasas, went in a truck to the Truck Union Office and
attacked the complainant party. Two of the accused fired
gun shots one after the other at the complainant party and
923 H
924 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.

+~
A three of the accused caused injuries to their opponents.
All the accused then fled away in the same truck. Two of
the victims died at the spot ~nd the third one was taken
to the hospital. The remaining two informed the police.
One of the accused died during the pendency of the trial.
B The trial court acquitted two of the accused and
convicted the other two. The High Court upheld the
judgment and order of the trial court. -+--

In the appeal filed by the State against the judgment
of the High Court upholding the acquittal of the accused,
c and the appeal filed by. one of the accused against the
judgment of the High Court upholding his conviction, the
issue for consideration before the Court was as to the
ambit and the scope of the power of the appellate court
in an appeal against an order of acquittal.
D ...,,...
Dismissing both the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. This Court in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State
of Karnataka*, has culled out the general principles
enumerated in various judgments regarding powers of
E
the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against
an order of acquittal. An appellate court has full power
to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon
which the order of acquittal is founded .. The Code of .....__
Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or
F condition on exercise of such power and an appellate
court on the evidence before it may reach its own
conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. An
appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case
of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the
G accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available
to him under the fundamental principle of criminal
jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be
innocent unles_s he is proved guilty by a competent court
of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his
H
STATE OF PUNJAB v. SUKHCHAIN SINGH & ANR. 925
__,....
~
acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further A
reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis
of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not
disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.
[Para 37] (947-H; 948-A, B, E, F] B
~
*Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka 2007 (2)
SCR 630 = 2007 (4) SCC 415, relied on.

Kallu v. State of M.P. (2006) 10 SCC 313; Ramanand
Yadav v. Prabhu Nath Jha, (2003) 12 SCC 606; Harijana c
Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (2002) 6
SCC 470; Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85;
Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 3 SCC 57;
Ramesh Babula/ Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225;
K. Gopa/ Reddy v. State of A.P (1979) 1 SCC 355; Shivaji D
"-.- Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra 1973 (2) SCC 793;
M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra (1963) 2 SCR 405;
Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1961) 3 SCR 120; Aher .·
Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra (1955) 2 SCR 1285; Atley
v. State of U.P. AIR 1955 SC 807; Ajmer Singh v. State of E
Punjab 1953 SCR 418; Surajpal Singh v. State 1952 SCR
193; Prandas v. State AIR 1954 SC 36; State of U.P. v.
Krishna Gopa/ 1988 (4) SCC 302 and State of U.P. v.
Awdhesh 2008 (9) JT 591, referred to.

-
~

Nur Mohd. v. Emperor AIR 1945 PC 151 and Sheo F
Swarup vs. R. Emperor (1934) 61 1A 398, referred to.

"The Mathematics of Proof //": Glanville Williams,
Criminal Law Review, 1979, by Sweet and Maxwell, p.340
(342), referred to. G
2.1. Considering in the light of the principles
)If
enunciated by this Court, the reasonings recorded by the
Courts below, there is no scope for interference with the
order of acquittal passed by the trial court which was
H
,,,

926 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 15 S.C.R.

+·
t
A affirmed by the High Court. [Para 42] (950-C]

2.2. Coming to the appeal filed by the accused, the "'
High Court has indicated the reasons as to why he stood
on a different footing and how accusations have been
fully established so far as he is concerned. There is no
B \---
infirmity in the view of the High Court to warrant
interference. [Para 43] [950-0] .Jr

Case law Reference :
_,..
(1934) 61 1A 398 referred to par~ J4"..---
c
AIR 1945 PC.151 referred to para 18
AIR 1954 SC 36 referred to para 19 F
. 1952 SCR 193 referred to para 21
D
1953 SCR 418 referred to para 22 ...-~
'
AIR 1955 SC 807 referred to para 24
(1955) 2 SCR 1285 referred to para 25-
E (1961) 3 SCR 120 referred to para 26
(1963) 2 SCR 405 referred to para ~7
1973 (2) sec 793 referred to · . para 28. ~

F (1979) 1 sec 355 referred to para 30 ,,
z
(1996) 9 sec 225 referred to para 31
(2002) 3 sec 57 referred to para 32

(2002) 4 sec 85 referred to para 33
G
(2002) 6 sec 470 referred to para 34

..
"('

(2003) 12 sec 606 referred to para 35

(2006) 10 sec 313 referred to para 36
H
STATE OF PUNJAB v. SUKHCHAIN SINGH & ANR. 927
.
...,.

- 2007 (2 ) SCR 630 relied on

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
·No. 254 of 2002.
para 37 A

From the final Judgment and Order dated 20.2.2001 of the
'High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal B
~
Appeal No. 537-DBA of 1997.

WITH

Criminal Appeal No. 587 of 2002.
c
lndu Malhotra, Sr. Adv., Sunita Ojha, Kuldip Singh, Ajay Pal
and Vikas Mehta for the Appellant.
Prem Malhotra for the Respondents.

" - The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
D

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 254 OF 2002
E
1. Challenge in this appeal is to the order of a Division
Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court upholding the
acquittal of the respondents. The responders were respondents
in Criminal Appeal No. 537 OBA of 1997. The High Court heard
four appeals but we are concerned with the two appeals only
i.e. Criminal appeal no. 537 OBA of 1997 and. Criminal appeal F
No. 170- DB of 1997 (Paramjit Singh v. State of Punjab) and
disposed the appeals along with two other appeals.
Respondents faced trial along with two others namely Mohan
Singh and Paramjit Singh for alleged commission of offences
punishable under Sections 148, 302,307,326,325,323/302 G
read with Section 149, 307 read with Section 149, 326/149,
·r
325 read with Section 149 and 323/149 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1960 (in short the 'IPC'). Another accused Harbhajan
Singh died during trial.
H
928 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.
-I".
A 3. The trial court held that the accusations were not
T--
established so far as the present respondents are concerned
but found the two co-accused persons Mohan Singh and
Paramjit Singh guilty of various offences. Criminal Appeal No.
537 OBA of 1997 was filed by the State questioning acquittal
8 of the respondents. The connected Criminal appeal No. 587
of 2002 has been filed by the accused Paramjit Singh who was
..:,,.-
appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 170 DB of 1997 before the
High Court.

Prosecution version leading to the trial of the accused
c persons is as follows:

On 6th September, 1987 at about 6.30 PM Jit Singh and )-==
Jaswant Singh (both· deceased) alongwith Nishan Singh
(P.W.7), Ghula Singh (P.W.8), Swaran Singh and Bakhshish
D Singh were sitting near the office of the Truck Union, Khanauri ...,,...
fl'
Mandi when accused Mohan Singh armed with a SBBL gun,
Paramjit Singh, Sukhchain Singh and Swaran Singh armed with
gandasas and Harbhajan Singh unarmed came to the spot in ,l•
Truck No. HYA 6595, being driven by Harbhajan Singh. After
E parking the truck at a distance of 6-7 kadams from the Cabin,
the accused gotdown and raised a lalkara that they would teach
them a lesson.for being instrumental in making them lose the
elections held to the various offices of the Truck Union. Mohan
Singh accused thereupon fired two shots at Jit Singh Singh and .....
F Ghula singh, Harbhajan Singh then snatched the gun from ~
Mohan Singh and fired one shot hitting Jaswant Singh on his •'
arm and back. Swaran Singh, Paramjit Singh and Sukhchain
Singh accused also caused injuries to Swaran Singh, Nishan
Singh and Ght,Jla Singh.All the accused thereafter re-boarded ,'>

the truck and escaped from the spot. Jit Singh and Jaswant ·
G
Singh· died almost immediately whereas Ghula Singh, who
was in a serious condition, was taken to the Hospital by some --.:·
· persons who had come to the spot whereas Nish an Singh and
Swaran Singh ·teft for Police Post, Khanauri. Along the way,
however; they ,came across a police party headed by ASI
H
STATE OF PUNJAB v. SUKHCHAIN SINGH & ANR. 929
[DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
("°
Shamsher Singh (P.W.12). Nishan Singh made his statement A
to him at 8.00 P.M. and on its basis, the formal F.l.R was
registered at Police Station, Moonak, 25 kms away at 9.30
P .M.; with the special report being delivered to the lliaqa
Magistrate at Sunam at 2.30 AM on September 7,1987. ASI
Shamsher Singh (P.W.12) also went to the place of occurrence B
,. .. and made the necessary inquiries and amongst other articles
~
picked up three spent cartridges cases of .12 bore. The
accused were arrested on 12.9.1987 and Truck No. HYA-6595
belonging to Harbhajan Singh was taken into possession.
Mohan Singh accused also produced his .12 bore gun and two c
live cartridges. The spent cartridges and the gun belonging to
Mohan Singh accused were sent to the Forensic Science
Laboratory and the Laboratory in its report (Exh.PRR) opined
that the said cartridges had been fired from the gun in question.

- ...,._ On the completion of the investigation, the accused were D
charged for offences punishable under section 302 and other
offences of IPC as noted above and the Arms Act, 1959 (in
short the 'Arms Act') and as they pleaded not guilty, were
brought to trial.

4. Before the High Court it was contended by accused, E
who were convicted, that the FIR ~as lodged belatedly and on
that basis the prosecution version was vulnerable. There was
no motive for five of the accused persons to come to the spot
fully armed and cause the death of two persons and injuries to
three persons. The State questioned correctness of acquittal F
on the ground that the conclusions of the trial court were
erroneous, the acquitted persons supported the acquittal.

5. High Court after noticing the argument came to the
following conclusions.
G
"It is true that there appears to be some delay in the
lodging of the FIR as the special report had been delivered
to the lllaqa Magistrate at Sunam almost 6-7 hours after
its registration. We are, however, of the opinion that in the
light of the fact that there were three injured eye witnesses H
930 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.

...- ~
A including Nishan Singh and Ghula Singh, the fact that there
~
was some delay in the lodging of the FIR can be over-
looked. These two eye witnesses had clearly stated to the
motive far the offence and detailed the actual incident. It
has come in their evidence that Bhupinder Singh apld
B Harbhajan Singh had fought the elections to the Tr6ck
Union and the complainant party was helping Bhupinder
Singh whereas the accused were in favour of Harbhajan ->r-
~
Singh. The fact that the election were held and Harbhajan }--
Singh and Bhupinder Singh were the candidates has not
c been denied. We also find that the members of the
accused party were closely related to the each other and
it was on this account that they had come together to
Khanauri Mandi to avenge a perceived insult. The trial court
. itself had been conscious of the fact that there were two
D stamped witnesses who had suffered serious injuries on
their person, but in view of the fact that there was some
_..,....
,.,.
delay in the lodging of the FIR. , it had chosen to acquit
Swaran Singh and Sukhchain Singh accused. We have
also considered Mr. Narula's argument with regard to the ·
culpability of Paramjit Singh. As per the evidence of Nishan
E
Singh(P.W.-7), accused Paramjit Singh, who was armed
with a Gandasa, had g_iven a blow hitting Swaran Singh
on his left arm. It-is true that Swaran Singh has not been
examined as a witness but from the eye witness account
as also the statement of Dr. Gurcharan Singh (P.W.-5), it
F is clear that there was one incised wound measuring
3.5cm x 1 cm and one contusion 2 cm wide on the lateral
aspect of the abdominal wall on his person Dr. H.L.Garg
(OW 2), had also X/rayed the injuries of Swaran Singh but
no bone injury had been detected. We find that the injuries
G suffered by Swaran Singh have been reflected in the
,__
medical report. We therefore find that the involvement of
~
Paramjit Singh clearly stands established."

6.'.Learned counsel for the State submitted that the trial
court a~d the High Court clearly lost sight of the relevant fact~
H
I

STATE OF PUNJAB v. SUKHCHAIN SINGH & ANR. 931
[DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
--
\ .
and therefore the judgment is vulnerable.
II
A
7. In Criminal Appeal No. 587 of 2002, learned counsel
for the accused Paramjit Singh submitted that when co-accused
have been acquitted there is no reason for the high Court to
uphold the conviction so far as Paramjit Singh is concerned.
B
/
,_,. 8. In response learned counsel for the respondents-St~te
submitted that the High Court was justified in upholding1the
conviction of the appellant.

9. It would be appropriate to consider and clarify the legal c
position first. Chapter XXIX (Sections 372-394) of the Code 1

of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "the
Code") deals with appeals. Section 372 expressly declares that
no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a criminal
..__ court except as provided by the Code or by any other law for 0
the time being in force. Section 373 provides for filing of
appeals in certain cases. Section 374 allows appeals from
convictions. Section 375 bars appeals in ca~es where the
accused pleads guilty. Likewise, :no appeal is maintainable in
petty cases (Section 376). Section 377 permits appeals by the
E
State for enhancement of sentence. Section 378 confers power
on the State to present an appeal to the High Court from an
order of acquittal. The said section is material and may be
quoted in extenso:

"378. Appeal in case of acquitta/.-(1) Save as otherwise F
provided in sub-section (2) and subject to the provisions
of sub-sections (3) and (5), the State Governmentmay, in
/ any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an
appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order
of acquittal passed by any court other than _a High Court, G
or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in
)>- revision. -

(2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in
which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi
H
932 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.

-' i
A Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi
Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), or
by any other agency empowered to make investigation
into an offence under any Central Act other than this Code,
the Central Government may also direct the Public
B Prosecutor to present an appeal, subject to the provisions
of sub-section (3), to the High Court from the order of
acquittal.

(3) No appeal under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall
be entertained except with the leave of the High Court.
c
(4) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case
instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an
application made to it by the complainant in this behalf,
grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal,·
D the complainant may present such an appeal to the High ;
Court.

(5) No application under sub-section (4) for the grant of
special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be
entertained by the High Court after the expiry of six months,
E
where the complainant is a public servant, and sixty days
in every other case, computed from the date of that order
of acquittal.

(6) If, in any case, the application under sub-section (4) for
F the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of
acquittal is refused, no appeal from that order of acquittal
shall lie under sub-section (1) or under sub-section (2).

Whereas Sections 379-380 cover special cases of
G appeals, other Sections lay down procedure to be followed by
appellate courts.

1O. It may be stated that more or less similar provisions
were found in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898
(hereinafter referred to as "the old Code") which came up for
H consideration before various High Courts, Judicial Committee
STATE OF PUNJAB v. SUKHCHAIN SINGH & ANR. . 933
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.)
·--
of the Privy Council as also before this Court. Since in the A
present appeal, we have been called upon to decide the ambit
and scope of the power of an appellate court in an appeal
against an order of acquittal, we have confined ourselves to one
aspect only i.e. an appeal against an order of acquittal.
B
11. Bare reading of Section 378 of the Code {appeal in
case of, acquittal) quoted above, makes it clear that no
restrictiori's have been imposed by the legislature on the
powers of the appellate court in dealing with appeals against
acquittal. When such an appeal is filed, the High Court has full C
power to reappreciate, review and reconsider the evidence at
large, the material on which the order of acquittal is founded
,,and to reach its own conclusions on such evidence. Both
1 questions of fact and of law are open to determination by the
High Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal.
D
12. It cannot, however, be forgotten that in case of acquittal,
there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. FirsUy,
the presumption of innocence is available to him under the
fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every
person should be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved E
to be guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused
having secured an acquittal, the presumption of his innocence
is certainly not weakened but reinforced, reaffirmed and
strengthened by the trial court.
F
13. Though the above principles are. well established, a
different note was struck in several decisions by vario.us High
Courts and even by this Court. It is, therefore, appropriate if we
consider some of the leading decisions on the point.

14: The first important decision was rendered by the G
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup v. R.
Emperor(1934) 61 IA 398). In Shea Swarup the accused were
acquitted by the trial court and the local Government directed
the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court
from an order of acquittal under ~ection 417 of the old Code H
934 · SUPREME COURT REPORTS .. [2008) 15 S.C.R.

A (similar to Section 378 of the Code). At the time of hearing of
appeal before the High Court, it was contended on behalf of
the accused that in an appeal from an order of acquittal, it was
not open to the appellate court to interfere with the findings of
fact recorded by the trial Judge unless such findings could not
B have been reached by him had there not been some perversity
or incompetence on his part. The High Court, however, declined
to accept the said view. It held that no condition was imposed
on the High Court in such appeal. It accordingly reviewed all
.
the evidence in the case and having formed an opinion of its • .
c weight and reliability different from that of the trial Judge,.
recorded an order of conviction. A petition was presented to ·
His Majesty in Council for leave to appeal on the ground that.
conflicting views had been expressed by the High Courts in
different parts of India upon the question whether in an appeal
from an order of acquittal, an appellate court had the power to ·
0
interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the trial Judge.
Their Lordships thought it fit to clarify the legal position and·
accordingly upon the 'humble advice of their Lordships", leave
was granted by His Majesty. The case was, thereafter, argued.
E The Committee considered the scheme and interpreting
Section 417 of the Code (old Code) observed that there was
no indication in the Code of any limitation or restriction on the
High Court in exercise of powers as an Appellate Tribunal. The
Code also made. no distinction as regards powers of the High
Court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal and an appeal
F against conviction. Though several authorities were cited
revealing different views by the High Courts dealing with an
appeal from an order of acquittal, the Committee did not think
it proper to discuss all the cases.

G 15. Lord Russel summed up the legal position thus:

"There is; in their opinion, ·no foundation for the view,
apparently supported by the judgments of some courts in ·
India, that the High Court has no power or jurisdiction to
reverse an order of acquittal on a matter of fact, except in
H
STATE OF PUNJAB v. SUKHCHAIN SINGH & ANR. 935
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

eases in which the lower court has 'obstinately blundered', A
or has 'through incompetence, stupidity or perversity'
reached such 'distorted conclusions as to produce a
positive miscarriage of justice', or has in some other way
so conducted or misconducted itself as to produce a
glaring miscarriage of justice, or has been tricked by the B

I
- defence so as to produce a similar result." ..

16: His Lordship, then proceeded to observe: (IA p.404)

•, / ·sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High
' Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which C
the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach t~e
conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal
should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon
that power, unless it be found expressly· stated in the
Code." D

17. The Committee, however, cautioned appellate courts
and stated: (IA p.404)

"But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and
before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court E
should and will always give proper weight and
consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial
Judge as to_ the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a
presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has F
been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to
the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an
appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by
a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.
To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court G
in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in ·
accordance with rules and principles well known and
recognised in the administration of justice."

(emphasis supplied) H
936 SUPREME COURT REPORTS .. [2008]15 S.C ..R.

A 18. In Nur Mohd. v. Emperor, (AIR 1945 PC 151), the
Committee reiterated the above view in Shea Swarup (Supra)
and held that in an appeal against acquittal, the High Court has
full powers to review and to reverse acquittal.

B 19. So far as this Court is concerned, probably the first
decision on the point was Prandas v. State (AIR 1954 SC 36)
(though the case was decided on 14-3-950, it was reported only
in 1954). In that case, the accused was acquitted by the trial
court. The Provincial Government preferred an appeal which
was allowed and the accused was convicted for offences
C punishable under Sections 302 and 323 IPC. The High Court,
for convicting the accused, placed reliance on certain
eyewitnesses.

20. Upholding the decision of the High Court and following
D the proposition of law in Sheo Swarup (supra), a six-Judge
Bench held as follows:

"6. It must be observed at the very outset that we cannot
support the view which has been expressed in several
cases that the High Court has no power under Section
E
417, Criminal Procedure Code, to reverse a judgment of
acquittal, unless the judgment is perverse or the
subordinate court has in some way or other misdirected
itself so as. to produce a miscaniage of justice.•

F (emphasis supplied)

21. In Surajpal Singh v. State (1952 SCR 193), a two-
Judge Bench observed that it was well established that in an
appeal under Section 417 of the (old) Code, the High Court
G had full power to review the evidence upon which the order of
ac;quittal was founded. But it was equally well settled that the
presumption of innocence of the accused was further reinforced
by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court
which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing
H their evidence could be reversed only for vel}' substantial and
\
- '
STATE OF PUNJAB v. SUKHCHAIN SINGH & ANR. 937
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

compelling reasons. A ,
22. In Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab (1953 SCR 418)
the accused was acquitted by the trial court but was convicted
by the High Court in an appeal.against acquittal filed by the
State. The aggrieved accused approached this Court. It was 8
contended by him that there were "no compelling reasons" for
setting aside the order of acquittal and due and proper weight
) had not been given by the High Court to the opinion of the trial
court as regards the credibility of witnesses seen and
examined. It was also commented that the High Court
committed an error of law in observing that "when a strong C
'prima facie' case is made out against an accused person it
is his duty to explain the circumstances appearing in evidence
against him and he cannot take shelter behind the presumption
of innocence and cannot state that the law entitles him to keep
his lips sealed". D

23. Upholding the contention, this Court said:

"We think this criticism is well founded. After an order of
acquittal has been made the presumption of innocence is
E :
further reinforced by that order, and that being so, the trial
court's decision can be reversed not on the ground that
the accused had failed to explain the circumstances
appearing against him but only for very substantial and
compelling reasons."
F
(emphasis supplied)

24. In Atley v. State of U.P. (AIR 1955 SC 807) this Court
said:

"In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the G
appellate court in an appeal under Section 417, Criminal
Procedure Code came to the conclusion that the judgment
of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set
aside that order.
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 15 S.C.R.

A It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the
High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to
review the ·entire evidence and to come to its own
concfusion, of course, keeping in view the well-established
rule that the presumption of innocence of the accysed is
B not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of
acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage
of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence
have been recorded in its presence.
/

It is also·well settled thatthe court of appeal has as wide
·c powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against
an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against
an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the
presumption of innocence with which the accused person
starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate
D stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight +•
to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order
of acquittal.

If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those
E principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the
judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated."
(emphasis supplied)

~
25. In Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra (1955).2 1
F . SCR 1285) the accused was prosecuted under Sections 302
and 447 IPC. He was acquitted by the trial court but convicted
by the High Court. Dealing with the power of the High Court
against an order of acquittal, Bose, J. speaking for the majority
(2:1) stated: (AIR p. 220, para 1) "It is, in our opinion, well settled
G that it is not enough for the High Court to take a different view
of the evidence; there must also be substantial and
compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong."

(emphasis supplied)

H 26. In Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1961) 3 SCR

.;. ,.,
•
STATE OF PUNJAB v. SUKHCHAIN SINGH & ANR. 939
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
~ "'t-
120, a three-Judge Bench considered almost all leading A
decisions on the point and observed that there was no difficulty
in applying the principles laid down by the Privy Council and
accepted by the Supreme Court. The Court, however, noted that
appellate courts found considerable difficulty in understanding
the scope of the words "substantial and compelling reasons" B
used in certain decisions. It was observed inter-alia as follows:
"'"i .

' "This Court obviously did not and could not add a condition
...
/

to Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure. Code. The ·
words were intended to convey the idea that an appellate !

court not only shall bear in mind the principles laid down
c
by the Privy Council but also must give its clear reasons
for coming to the conclusion that the order of acquittal was
wrong."

The Court concluded as follows: D
·-+
"9. The foregoing discussion yields the following results:
(1) an appellate court has full power to review the evidence
upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) the
principles laid down in Sheo Swarup case afford a correct E
guide for the appellate court's approach to a case in
disposing of such an appeal; and (3) the different
phraseology .used in the judgments of this Court, such as,
(i) 'substantial and compelling. reasons', (ii) 'good and
~
sufficiently cogent reasons',· and (iii) 'strong reasons' are
F
not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate
court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire
evidence and to come to its own conclusion; but in doing
so it should not only consider every matter on record having
a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given
by the court below in support of its order of acquittal in its G
arriving at a conclusion on those facts, but should also
)'· express those reasons in its judgment, which lead it to hold
that the acquittal was not justified."
27. Again, in M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra (1963) fi
.
>,
,.

940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS · [2008] 15 S.C.R.
...
.·.
...... I
~
'

A 2 SCR 405; the point was raised before a Constitut.ion Bench ,,.
~-
of this Court. Taking note of earlier decisions, .it was observed ~-
as follows:
r
L
"17. In some of the earlier decisions of this Court; however,
in emphasising. the importance of adopting a cautious
B
· approach in dealing with appeals against acquittals, it was
observed that the presumption· of innocen'ce is reinforced 'j-

by the order of acquittal t;tnd so, 'the findings of the trial ~
-,.

court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and -'t-
hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very
c substantial and compelling reasons': vide Surajpal Singh
v. State (1952 SCR 193). Similarly in Ajmer Singh v.
State of Punjab (1953 SCR 418), it was observed that the
interference of the High Court in an appeal against the
order of acquittal would .be justified only if there are 'very
D substantial and compelling reasons to do so'. In some
other decisions, it has been stated that an order of acquittal
can be reversed only for 'good and sufficiently cogent
+
-
r.-

reasons' or for 'strong reasons'. In appreciating the effect
of these observations, it must be remembered that these
E observations were not intended to lay down a rigid or
inflexible rule which should govern the decision of the High
Court in appeals against acquittals. They were not I
:•
intended, and should not be read to have intended to
-l_
introduce an additional condition in clause (a) of Section ',
F 423(1) of the Code. All that the said observations are
intended to emphasize is that the approach of the High '"'
Court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal ought to
be cautious because as Lord Russell observed in Sheo t-
Swarup the presumption of innocence in favour of the ,.
'-

G accused 'is not certainly weakened by the fact that he has
been acquitted at his trial'. Therefore, the test suggested
by the expression 'substantial and compelling reasons' --<
should not be construed as a formula which has to be
rigidly applied in every case. That is the effect of the recent
decisions of this Court, for instance, in Sanwat Singh v.
H
STATE OF PUNJAB v. SUKHCHAIN SINGH & ANR. 941
"'4 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
...._
State of Rajasthan and Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab A
...... (1962 Supp 1 SCR 104) and so, it is not necessary that
before reversing a judgment of acquittal, the High Court
must necessarily characterise the findings recorded
therein as perverse."
B
(emphasis supplied)
I ~·
28. Yet in another leading decision in Shivaji Sahabrao
• Bobade v. State of Maharashtra (1973 (2) SCC 793) this Court
'held that in India, there is no jurisdictional limitation on the
powers of appellate court. "In law there are no fetters on the c
plenary power of the appellate court to review the whole
evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded and,
indeed, it has a duty to scrutinise the probative material de
nova, informed, however, by the weighty thought that the
rebuttable innocence attributed to the accused having been 0
+ converted into an acquittal the homage our jurisprudence owes
to individual liberty constrains the higher court not to upset the
holding without very convincing reasons and comprehensive
consideration."
E
29. Putting ~mphasis on balance between importance of
individual liberty and evil of acquitting guilty persons, this Court
observed as follows:

. ..> "6. Even at this stage we may remind ourselves of a
necessary social perspective in criminal cases which F
suffers from insufficient forensic appreciation. The
dangers of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of
doubt at the expense of social defence and to the soothing
sentiment that all acquittals are always good regardless
of justice to the victim and the community, demand G
especial emphasis in the contemporary context of
)-· escalating crime and escape. The judicial instrument has
a public accountability. The cherished principles or golden
thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs thro'
the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to H
942 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008} 15 S.C.R.

~

A embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The
"I
excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude· that a
· thousand guilty men may go but one innocent martyr shall
not suffer is a false dilemma. Only reasonable doubts
belong to the accused. Otherwise any practical system of
B justice will then breakdown and lose credibility with the
community. The .evil of acquitting a guilty person. light-
·;..- '
heartedly, as a learned a~thor (Glanville Williams in.Proof
of Guilt) has saliently observed, goes much .beyond the
simple fact that just one guilty person has gone ullpunished.
•
~

c If unmerited acquittals become general, they tend to lead
to a cynical disregard of the law, and this in turn leads to
a public demand for harsher legal presumptions against
indicted 'persons' and more severe punishment of those
who are found guilty. Thus, too frequent acquittals of the
guilty may lead to a ferocious penal law, eventually eroding
D
the judicial protection of the guiltless. For all these reasons +
it is true to say, with Viscount Simon, that 'a miscarriage
. of justice may arise from the acquittal of the guilty no less
than from the conviction of the innocent.. ..' In short, our
jurisprudential enthusiasm for presumed innocence must
E be moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal
justice potent and realistic. A balance· has to be struck
between chasing chance possibilities as good enough to
set the delinquent free and chopping ·the logic of .-l_.
preponderant probability to punish .marginal innocents."
F
.. (emphasis sup.plied)

30. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P (1979) 1 SCC 355,
the Court was considering the power of the High Court against
an order of acquittal under Section 378 of the Code. After
G ~
considering the relevant decisions on the point it was stated
as follows: '-( .
"9. The principles are now well settled. At one time .it was
thought that an order of acquittal could be set aside for
H
STATE OF PUNJAB v. SUKHCHAIN SINGH & ANR. 943
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
t
'substantial and compelling reasons' only and courts used A
to launch on a search to discover those 'substantial and
compelling reasons'. However, the 'formulae' of
'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and
sufficiently cogent reasons' and 'strong reasons' and the
search for them were abandoned as a result of the B
pronouncement of this Court in Sanwat Singh v. State of
Rajasthan (1961) 3 SCR 120. In Sanwat Singh case this
Court harked back to the principles enunciated by the Privy
Council in Sheo Swarup v. R. Emperor and reaffirmed
those principles. After Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan c
this Court has consistently recognised the right of the
appellate court to review the entire eviden'ce and to come
to its own conclusion bearing in mind the considerations
mentioned by the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup case.
Occasionally phrases like 'manifestly illegal', 'grossly
--+ 0
unjust', have been used to describe the orders of acquittal
which warrant interference. But, such expressions have
been used more as flourishes of language, to emphasise
the reluctance of the appellate court to interfere with an
order of acquittal than to curtail the power of the appellate E
court to review the entire evidence and to come to its own
conclusion. In some cases (Ramaphupala Reddy v. State
of A.P., (AIR 1971 SC 460) Bhim Singh Rup Singh v.
State of Maharashtra (AIR 1974 SC 286), it has been said
that to the principles laid down in Sanwat Singh case may
be added' the further principle that 'if two reasonable F
conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidence
on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding
of the trial court'. This, of course, is not a new principle. It
stems out of the fundamental principle of our criminal
jurisprudence that the accused is entitled to the benefit of G
any reasonable doubt. If two reasonably probable and
evenly balanced views of the evidence are possible, one
must necessarily concede the existence of a reasonable
doubt. But, fanciful and remote possibilities must be left .
out of account. To entitle an accused person to the benefit H
944 SUPREME COURT REPORTS · [2008] 15 S.C.R.
-t
A of a doubt arising from the possibility of a duality of views;
the possible view in favour of the accused must be as
nearly reasonably probable as that against him. If the
preponderance of probability is all one way, a bare
possibility. of another view will not entitle the accused to
B claim the benefit of any doubt. It is, therefore, essential that
any view of the evidence in favour of the accused must
be reasonable even as any doubt, the benefit of which
an accused person may claim, must be reasonable."
'f-
•
"'

(emphasis supplied)
c
31. In Ramesh Babula/ Doshi v. State of Gujarat ( 1996)
9 SCC 225, this Court said:

"While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate
D court is first required to seek an answer to the question +
wh~ther the findings of the trial court are palpably wrong,
manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the
appellate court answers the above question in the negative
the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if
the appellate court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that
E
the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of
any of the above infirmities it can then-and then only~
reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusions."
,.I,,,,
32. In Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat (2002) 3
F SCC 57,- referring to earlier decisions, the Court stated:

· j'7. The paramount consideration of the court should be to
avoid miscarriage of justice. A miscarriage ofjustice which
may arise· from the acquittal of guilty is no less than from
the conviction of an innocent. In a case where the trial court _t-
G
has taken a view based upon conjectures and hypothesis
and not on the legal evidence, a duty is cast upon the High -'(
Court to reappreciate the evidence in acquittal appeal-for
the purposes of ascertaining as to whether the accused
has committed any offence or not. Probable view taken by
H
STATE OF PUNJAB v. SUKHCHAIN SINGH & ANR. 945
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

,,
(
the trial court which may not be disturbed in the appeal is A
such a view which is based upon legal and admissible
evidence .. Only because the accused has been acquitted
by the trial court, cannot be made a basis to urge that the
High Court under all circumstances should not disturb such
a finding." B

33. In Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85,
the trial court acquitted the accused but the High Court
convicted them. Negativing the contention of the appellants that
the High Court could not have disturbed the findings of fact of ,C
the trial court even if that view was not correct, this Court
observed:

"7. We do not agree with the submissions of the learned
counsel for the appellants that under Section 378 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure the High Court could not D
disturb the finding of facts of the trial court even if it found
that the view taken by the trial court was not proper. On
the basis of the pronouncements of this Court, the settled
position of law regarding the powers of the High Court in
an appeal against an order of acquittal is that the Court . E
has full powers to review the evidence upon which an order
of acquittal is based and generally it will not interfere with
the order of acquittal because by passing an order of
acquittal the presumption of innocence in favour of the
accused is reinforced. The golden thread which runs F
through the web of administration of justice in criminal case
is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced
·in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and
the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to ,
the accused should be adopted. Such is not a jurisdiction G
limitation on the appellate court but judge-made guidelines
. for circumspection. The paramount consideration of the
court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is avoided. A
miscarriage of justice which may arise from the acquittal
of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an H
946 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.
~ ....
A innocent. In a case where the trial court has taken a view
·ignoring the admissible evidence, a duty is cast upon the
High Court to reappreciate the evidence in acqLiittal
app13al f~r the purposes of ascertaining as to whether all
or any of the accused has committed any offence or not".
B
·.
34. In Haiijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor, High Court
F
of AP. (2002) 6 SCG 470, thi~ Court said: ~-

-,
"12, Doubtless the High Court in appeal either against an
order. of acquittal
...
or conviction as a court of first appeal
c has full power to review the evidence to reach its own J
independent conclusion. However, it will not interfere with
an order of acquittal lightly or merely because one other
view is possible, because with the passing of an order of
acquittal presumption of innocence iri favour of the
D accused.gets reinforced and strengthened. The High Court
would riot be justified to interfere With order of acquittal
merely because it feels that sitting as a trial court it would
have proceeded to record a conviction; a duty is cast on
the High Court while reversing' an order of acquittal to
E examine and discuss the reasons given by the trial.court
to acquit the accused and then to dispel those reasons. If
theHigh Courtfails to make such an exercise the judgment
will suffer from serious infirmity:"
~-
35. _In Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhu Nath Jha (2003) ·12
F SCC 606, this Court.observed:

"21. There is no embargo on the appellate court reviewing
the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based.
Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with
G because the presumption of innocence of the accused is
further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which
runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal """'( . '

cases is that if tWo views are possible on the evidence
adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the ....
H accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is
./
STATE OF PUNJAB v. SUKHCHAIN SINGH & ANR. 947
-t- [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
~

... favourable to the accused should be adopted. The
paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that
A

miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of
justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less
than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where
admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the B
appellate court to reappreciate the evidence in a case
-1
where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of
ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed
any offence or not".
36. Again in Kallu v. State of M.P. (2006) 10 SCC 313, c
this Court stated:
"8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power
of the appellate court is no less than the power exercised
while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of ID
appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence.
However, one significant difference is that an order of
acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court,
where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence
and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not E
reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a
different view is possible. The appellate court will also
bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in
,I.-.
favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get
the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, F
it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of
the trial court."

(emphasis supplied)

37. From the above decisions, in Chandrappa and Ors. G
v. State of Kamataka (2007 (4) SCC 415), the following general
principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing
with an appeal against an order of acquittal were culled out:

(1) An appellate court has full power to review,
H
948 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. [2008] 15 S.C.R.

--t '(
A reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order
of acquittal is founded. ·-
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no
limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and
an appellate' court on the evidence before it may reach its own
B
conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
~
(3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and
compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong
circumstances", ."distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc.
c are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate
court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are
more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the
reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than
to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to
D come to its own conclusion.

.(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in
case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the
accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to
him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence
E
th(lt every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he
is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the
accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his

F
innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by
the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the
_,...i.,__

·-
basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not ·
disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.·

38. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be
G
convicted of an offence which is not established by the
evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Though --<
this standa.rd is a higher standard, there is, however, no
absolute standard. What degree of probability amounts to ;

~·proof' is an exercise particular to each case. Referring to the
H
STATE OF PUNJAB v. SUKHCHAIN SINGH & ANR. 949
[DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
'~ interdependence of evidence and the confirmation of one piece A
of evidence by another, a learned author says [see "The
Mathematics of Proof II": Glanville Williams, Criminal Law
Review, 1979, by Sweet and Maxwell, p.340 (342)):

"The simple multiplication rule does not apply if the.
B
separate pieces of evidence.are dependent. Two events
-1
are dependent when they tend to occur together, and the
~
evidence of such events may also be said to be
dependent. In a criminal case, different pieces of evidence
directed to establishing that the defendant did the
_, prohibited act with the specified state of mind are generally c
dependent. A junior may feel doubt whether to credit an
alleged confession, and doubt whether to infer guilt from
the fact that the defendant fled from justice. But since it is
generally guilty rather than innocent people who· make
confessions, and guilty rather than innocent people who run D
away, the two doubts are not to be multiplied togetheL The
one piece of evidence may confirm the other."

39. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from
a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite E
other than truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must.be free ·
from an overemotional response. Doubts must be actual and
substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused persons arising
j..,
from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere
vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary,
F
trivial or a merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon
reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence
in the case.

40. The concepts of probability, and the degrees of it,
cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to be G
)
mathematically enumerated as to how many of such units
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is an
unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation of the
degrees of probability and the quantum of proof. Forensic
probability must, in the last analysis, rest on a robust common H
950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.

A sense and, ultimately, on the trained intuitions of the Judge.
While the protection given by the criminal process to the
accused persons is not to be eroded, at the same time,
uninformed legitimization of trivialities would make a mockery
of administration of criminal justice. This position was
8 illuminatingly stated by Venkatachaliah, J. (as His Lordship then
was) in State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal (1988 (4) SCC 302).

41. The above position was highlighted in State of UP.
v.. Awdhesh (2008(9) JT 591).

C 42 .. Therefore on considering the reasonings recorded by
the trial court.and High Court we find no scope for.interference
with the order of acquittal passed by the trial court which was
affirmed by the High Court.

43. Coming to the appeal filed by the accused Paramjit
0
Singh, we find that the High Court has indicated the reasons
as to why he stood on a different footing and how accusations · ·
have been fully established so far as he is concerned.

44. We find no infirmity in the view of the High Court to
E warrant interference with the impugne9 judgment.

45. Both the appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed.

R.P. Appeals dismissed.