STATE OF PUNJABversusRAMDEV SINGH
- Citation
- 2003 INSC 731
- Decided
- 17 December 2003
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- DORAISWAMY RAJU
Holding
A delay in filing the FIR, if satisfactorily explained, does not by itself vitiate the prosecution, and a rape victim’s testimony can be acted upon without corroboration, leading to the restoration of the conviction.
Summary
The State of Punjab appealed the acquittal of Ramdev Singh, who was convicted by a trial court for raping a minor girl. The FIR was lodged 17-18 days after the incident because the victim's father was seriously ill, and the medical report noted that the girl was habituated to sexual intercourse. The Punjab and Haryana High Court set aside the conviction, relying on the delay in filing the FIR, the alleged lack of corroboration of the victim’s testimony, and the medical evidence. The Supreme Court held that a satisfactorily explained delay in lodging an FIR cannot, by itself, defeat the prosecution, and that a rape victim’s testimony does not require corroboration in material particulars. It also rejected the view that prior sexual activity or the absence of visible injuries undermines the allegation, restored the trial court’s conviction and sentence, and reiterated that the victim’s identity must not be disclosed under Section 228‑A of the IPC.
Issues considered
- The effect of a delay in lodging the FIR on the prosecution's case in a rape trial.
- Whether the testimony of a rape victim requires corroboration in material particulars.
- The relevance of medical evidence indicating prior sexual activity of the victim.
- The significance of the absence of evidence of the victim’s employment as a maid servant.
- The applicability of Section 228-A IPC concerning the non‑disclosure of the victim’s identity.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 21
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 228-A, s. 376, s. 376-A, s. 376-B, s. 376-C, s. 376-D
Subjects
Judgment
STA TE OF PUNJAB A
v.
RAMDEV SINGH
DECEMBER 17, 2003
[DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PA~:\Y:\T, JJ.] B
Penal Code, 1860-Section 376-Rape committed on minor-Delay
of 17-18 days in lodging FIR-Medical evidence confirmed that victim.
habitual to sexual intercow·se-Trial Court convicted accused-High
Court set aside conviction due to delay in lodging FIR and on basis of C
medical evidence-Held, delay in lodging FIR cannot be used as a
ritualistic formula to doubt and discard proseczition case-Explanation of
delay by prosecution remained unshaken in spite of cross-examination. by
defence-No rule of law that testimony of rape victim cannot be acted
without corroboration in material particulars-Signs of previous sexual D
intercourse no ground for acquittal-Unmerited acquittal does no good to
society-Conviction and sentence imposed by trial court restored.
Section 228-A-Disclosure of identity of victim-Social object of
provision-Restriction on disclousure of identity does not relate to printing
or publication ofjudgment by High Court or SupremP Court-However, E
appropriately in judgments of any court name of victim should not be
indicated-Sections 376, 376-A, 376B, 376C and 376-D.
The respondent-accused had allegedly committed rape on a minor
girl. The mother of the victim lodged the information with the police F
after 17-18 days of the occurrence. The delay in lodging the informa-
tion was caused, as the father of victim was seriously ill. The medical
examination of the victim revealed that she was habituated to regular
sexual intercourse. The accused denied the charges of rape stating that
a false accusation had been set up as the mother of the victim owed
some money to him, which she refused to refund. The trial court G
convicted the accused. The High Court on appeal set aside the
conviction mainly due to delay in lodging FIR, non-examination of a
friend of the victim to whom the incident was conveyed, confirmation
by medical evidence that the victim was habituated to sexual inter-
course and that there was no evidence to show that she was employed H
995
996 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A in the house of the accused. Hence this appeal against acquittal.
The appellant contended that delay in lodging FIR was properly
explained; that hypothetical medical evidence was given primacy to
cast doubt over the victim's version; and that the defence itself had
B suggested that the victim was employed in the house of the accused.
The respondent-accused contended that testimony of the victim
was completely unreliable as it was at great variance with the medical
evidence; and that a judgment of acquittal should not be interfered
with after a long lapse of time.
c Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD : 1. Sexual violence apart from being a dehumanizing act
is an unlawful i.ntrusion on the right of privacy and sanctity ofa female.
It is a serious blow to her supreme honour and offends her self-esteem
D and dignity-it degrades and humiliates the victim and where the
victim is helpless innocent child or a minor, it leaves behind a traumatic
experience. A rapist not only causes physical injuries but more
indelibly leaves a scar on the most cherished possession of a woman
i.e. her dignity, honour, reputation and not the least her chastity. Rape
E is not only a crime against the person of a woman, it is a crime against
the entire society. It destroys, the entire psychology of a woman and
pushes her into deep emotional crisis. It is a crime against basic human
rights, and is also violative of the victim's most cherished of the
Fundamental Rights, namely, the Right to Life contained in Article 21
F of the Constitution oflndia. The Courts are expected to deal wi_th cases
of sexual crime against women with utmost sensitivity. Such cases need
to be dealt with sternly and severely. A socially sensitized judge is a
better statutory armour in cases of crime against women than long
clauses of penal provisions, containing complex exceptions and provisos.
G (999-G, H; 1000-A-C]
Shri Bodhi Sattwa Gautam v. Miss Subhra Chakraborty, A.I.R.
(1996) SC 922, relied on.
2.1. Delay in lodging the FIR cannot be used as a ritualistic
H formula for doubting the prosecution case and discarding the same
STA TE OF PUNJAB v. RAMDEV SINGH 997
solely on the ground of delay in lodging the first information report. A
Delay has the effect of putting the Court in its guard to search if any
explanation has been offered for the delay, and if offered, whether it
is satisfactory or not. If the prosecution fails to satisfactorily explain
the delay and there is possibility of embellishment in prosecution
version on account of such delay, the same would be fatal to the B
prosecution. However, ifthe delay is explained to t~e ~atisfaction of the
Court, same cannot by itself be a ground for disbelieving and discard-
ing the entire prosecution version. [1002-E-G]
2.2. The evidence clearly explained as to why the first information
report was lodged after 17-18 days. Evidence of the witnesses clearly C
show that the father of the victim was seriously ill and the family members
did not want to create tension in his mind when he was not physically
well and waited for his recovery. In spite of the lengthy cross-examination
this aspect has not been shaken by the defence. [1002-G, H; 1003-A]
3. The view that the victim should have told some respectable D
person or the father earlier to. say the least is a view which has no
foundation and overlooks the very reason to shun or openly publicise
it to avoid the ignominy involved in it. In a tradition bound and
conservative society, more particularly in a rural area, the shame of
.. sexual assault on a girl of about 14 years cannot be lost sight of. E
This down to earth reality has been lost sight of in the judgment of
acquittal. [1003-B-C)
4. As regards absence of injuries on the person of the victim, the
doctor examined the victim after about 3 weeks, and the effect of the act
on the physical form was practically obliterated, which is not denied by F
the doctor. Merely because the friend of the victim to whom the victim
narrated the incident was not examined that also cannot be a suspicious
circumstance to throw suspicion on the victim's evidence. [1003-E-F)
5. Signs of previous sexual intercourse on the victim cannot, by
any stretch of imagination be a ground to acquit an alleged rapist. G
Even assuming that the victim was previously accustomed to sexual
intercourse, that is not a determinative question. On the. contrary, the
question requiring adjudication was did the accused commit rape on
the victim on the occasion complained of. Even if it is hypothetically
accepted that the victim had lost her virginity earlier, it did not and H
998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A cannot in law give license to any person to rape her. It is the accused
who was on trial and not the victim. Even if the victim in a given case
has been promiscuous in her sexual behavious earlier, she has a right
to refuse to submit herself to sexual intercourse to anyone and
everyone because she is not a vulnerable object or prey for being
B sexually assaulted by anyone and everyone. (1003-G-H; 1004-A)
. 6. There is a fallacy in the reasoning about lack of evidence
relating to the employment of the -victim as a maid servant. The
judgment of acquittal completely overlooked the fact that the sugges-
tions given to witnesses, more particularly the victim and her parents
C that the accused or his wife had threatened to put an end to the victim's
service as a maid servant because of her immoral character~ or refusal
to refund the amount taken as advance for her employment as a
servant. [1004-B, CJ
7. A prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the
D offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule
of law that her testimony cannot be acted without corroboration in
material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured
witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while
in the former it is both physical as well as psychological and emotional.
E However, if the court of facts finds it difficult to accept the version of
the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or ...
circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assur-
ance, short of corroboration as understood in the context of an
accomplice would do. [1004-D, E)
F State of Rajasthan v. Noore Khan, (2003) 3 Supreme 70, relied on.
8. High Court was not justified in reversing the conviction of the
respondent and recording the order of acquittal. An unmerited acquit-
tal does no good to the society. If the prosecution has succeeded in
G making out a convincing case for recording a finding ~s to the accu.sed
being guilty, the court should not lean in favour of acquittal by giving
weight to irrelevant or insignificant circumstances or by resorting
to technicalities or by assuming doubts and giving benefit thereof
where none reasonably exists. A doubt, as understood in criminal
jurisprudence, has to be a reasonable doubt and not an excuse for a
H finding in favour of acquittal. An unmerited acquittai encourages
STATE OF PUNJAB v. RAMDEV SINGH [PASAYAT, J.] 999
wolves in the society being on the prowl for easy prey, more so when A
the victims of crime are helpless females or minor children. The courts
have to display a greater sense of responsibility and to be niore
sensitive while dealing with charges of sexual assault on women,
particularly of tender age and children. The acquittal deserves to be
set aside and conviction as recorded by the trial Court and the sentence B
imposed be restored. 11005-D-G)
9. Section 228-A of IPC makes disclosure of identity of victim of
certain offences punishable. Printing or publishing name of any matter
which may make known the identity of any person against whom an
offence under Sections 376, 376-A, 376-B, 376-C or 376-D is alleged C
or found to have been committed can be punished. The restriction does
not relate to printing or publication of judgment by High Court or
Supreme Court, but keeping in view the social object of preventing
social victimization or ostracism of the victim of a sexual offence for
which Section 338-A has been enacted, it would be appropriate that D
in the judgments, be it of this Court, High Court or lower Court, the
name of the victim should not be indicated. [1000-E-G]
State of Karnataka v. Puttaraja, (2003) 8 Supreme 364, relied on.
CIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 547 E
of 1997.
From the Judgment and Order dated 2.12.1994 of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in Crl. A No. 432-SB of 1986.
Bimal Roy Jad (N.P.) for the Appellant.
F
Ranbir Singh Yadav for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. : Sexual violence apart from being a
dehumanizing act is an unlawful intrusion on the right of privacy and G
sanctity of a female. It is a serious blow to her supreme honour and
offends her self-esteem and dignity - it degrades and humiliates the victim
and where the victim is a helpless innocent child or a• minor, it leaves
behind a traumatic experience. A rapist not only causes physical injuries
but more indelibly leaves a scar on the most cherished possession of a H
1000 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A woman i.e. her dignity, honour, reputation and not the least her chastity.
Rape is not only a crime against the person of a woman, it is a crime against
the entire society. It destroys, as noted by this Court in Shri Bodhisattwa
Gautam v. Miss Subhra Chakraborty, AIR (1996) SC 922, the entire
psychology of a woman and pushes her into deep emotional crisis. It is
B a crime against basic human rights, and is also violative of the victim's
most cherished of the Fundamental Rights, namely, the Right to Life
contained in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short 1 the
'Constitution'). The Courts are, therefore, expected to deal with cases of
sexual crime against women with utmost sensitivity. Such cases need to
C be dealt with sternly and severely. A socially sensitized judge, in our
opinion, is a better statutory armour in cases of crime against women than
long clauses of penal provisions, containing complex exceptions and
provisos.
The State of Punjab questions acquittal of the respondent (hereinafter
D referred to as 'the accused') who was charged for commission of offence
punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short
'the IPC').
We do not propose to mention name of the victim. Section 228-A of
E IPC makes disclosure of identity of victim of certain offences punishable.
Printing or publishing name of any matter which may make known the
identity of any person against whom an offence under Sections 376,
376-A, 376-B, 376-C or 376-D is alleged or found to have been committed
can be punished. True it is, the restriction, does not relate to printing or
F publication of judgment by Hi?h Court or Supreme Court. But keeping in
view the social object of preventing social victimization or ostracism of
the victim of a sexual offence for which Section 228-A has been enacted,
it would be appropriate that in the judgments, be it of this Court, High Court
or lower Court, the name of the victim should not be indicated. We have
G chosen to describe her as 'victim' in the judgment. [See State ofKarnataka
v. Puttaraja, (2003) 8 Supreme 364]
Prosecution version as unfolded during trial is as follows:
On 1.10.1985 the mother of the victim PW-4 lodged information with
H the police that 17-18 days back the accused had committed rape on her
STATE OF PUNJAB v. RAMDEV SINGH (PASAYAT, J.] 1001
daughter PW-7. According to the information lodged, the victim had told A
her mother after coming from house of the accused that she was forcibly
dragged away by the accused while she was cleaning utensils and was
raped. At the time of occurrence wife of the accused was absent and taking
advantage of her absence, the accused committed the lustful act. As the
father of the victim PW-5 was lying ill seriously they did not think it proper B
to inform him and when he recovered from illness, and the police had come
to the village for investigating into some other case, information was
lodged. The victim-girl was sent for medical examination and she was
examined by PW-2. After completion of investigation, charge sheet was
placed and accused faced trial. He denied the accusations and pleaded false C
implication. It was stated that the mother of the victim had taken some
money as advance for serving as maid servant and as she did not work and
refused to refund the money, a suit was filed for recovery of the amount
and, therefor~, with a view to avoid payment false accusation has been
made. The trial Court placed reliance on the evidence of the prosecution
witnesses and convicted the accused of the offence punishable under D
Section 376 IPC and sentenced him to 7 years rigorous imprisonment and
a fine of Rs. l ,000 with default stipulation. Being aggrieved by the
judgment, accused filed Cr!. A. No. 432-SB/86 in the Punjab and Haryana
High Court. By the impugned judgment dated 2.12.1994 the High Court
allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and consequently the E
sentence.
According to High Court primarily four factors render the prosecu-
tion version vulnerable. Firstly, there was unexplained delay in lodging
FIR. Secondly, the victim's evidence did not inspire confidence as there
were exaggerations, and a .friend to whom she claimed to have told about F
the incidence was not examined. Thirdly, the medical evidence indicated
that the victim was habituated to sexual intercourse and, therefore, her
version that she was raped by the accused is not believable. Fourthly, there
was no evidence to show that the victim was employed as a maid servant
in the house of the accused. G
In support of the appeal learned counsel for the State submitted that
approach of the High Court is totally erroneous. In case of sexual assaults
the Court has to take note of the realities of life and should not enter into
hyper technicalities. The delay was properly explained and nothing was H
1002 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A brought on record to raise any doubt about the reason indicated by PWs.-
4 and 5. Merely because respectable persons in the loGality and police were
not informed the prosecution should not have been doubted. Had they
informed police earlier there was no question of explaining the delay. The
reasons for which there was delay have been properly explained. The
B hypothetical medical evidence has been given primacy to cast .doubt over
the victim's version. When the defence itself suggested that victim was
engaged as maid servant, the High Court's conclusion that there was no
material to show about her employment as a maid servant is based on total ·
misreading of the evidence.
c Merely because of doctor's hypothetical and opinionative evidence
that the victim was accustomed to sexual intercourse, prosecution version
of rape was not to be discarded.
In response, learned counsel for the.accused supported the judgment
D submitting that reasonings indicated by the High Court are on terra jirma,
. more particularly when the victim's testimony is completely unreli~ble
because it is at great variance with the medical evidence. Residually, it is
submitted that the judgment is one of acquittal and after a long lapse of
time the jurisdiction under Article 136 should not be exercised.
E
Delay in lodging the FIR cannot be used as a ritualistic formula for
doubting the prosecution case and discarding the same solely on the ground
of delay in lodging the first information report. Delay has the effect of
putting the Court in its guard to search if any explanation has been offered
for the delay, and if offered, whether it is satisfactory or not. If the
F prosecution fails to satisfactorily explain the delay' and there i.s possibility
of embellishment in prosecution version on account of such delay, the same
would be fatal to the prosecution. However, if the delay is explained to
the satisfaction of the Court, same cannot by itself be a ground for
disbelieving and discarding the entire prosecution version, as done by the
G High Court in the present case.
~he evidence of PWs-4 and 5 read with that of the victim clearly
explained as to why the first· information report was lodged after 17-18
days. . The evidence of the aforesaid three witnesses clearly show that
H PW-5 was seriously ill and the family members did not want to create
STATE OF PUNJAB v. RAMDEV SINGH [PASAYAT, J.] 1003
tension in his mind when he was not physically well and waited for his A
. recovery. In spite of the lengthy cross-examination this aspect has not been
shaken by the defence. The view of the High Court that PW-4 should have
told some respectable person or the father earlier to say least is a view
which has no foundation and overlooks the very reason to shun or openly
publicise it to avoid the ignominy involved in it. In a tradition bound and B
conservative society, more particularly in a rural area, the shame of sexual
assault on a girl of about 14 years cannot be lost sight of. This down to
earth reality has been lost sight of by the High Court. The trial Court hac!
rig~tly emphasized this aspect, but unfortunately, the High Court took a
contra1y view irrationally.
c
Fwther, the victim's evidence has been discarded by holding that
it is at variance with the medical evidence. The High Court has not
indicated as to in what way it is at variance with the medical evidence.
Mere statement that according to doctor, victim's vagina admitted two
fingers and she could on earlier occasions have had sexual intercourse five, D
ten oi: fifteen times rules out rape by accused once as alleged in no way
casts doubt on victim's evidence.
Learned counsel for the respondent-accused pointed out that rape
as claimed by the victim was discounted by the evidence of PW-2, who E
did not find visible injury when she medically examined the victim. In
our opinion the same is of no consequence. The doctor examined the
victim after about 3 weeks. That being so, the effect of the act on the
physical form was practically obliterated. That is not denied by the doctor.
Merely because the friend of the victim was not examined that also cannot F
be a suspicious circumstance to throw suspicion on the victim's evidence.
Another factor which seems to have weighed with the High Court
is the evidence of doctor PW-4 that there were signs of previous sexual
intercourse on the victim. That cannot, by stretch of imagination, as noted
above, be a ground to acqui! an alleged rapist. Even assuming that the G
victim was previously accustomed sexual intercourse, that is not a deter-
minative question. On the contrary, the question which was required to
be adjudicated was did the accused commit rape on the victim on the
occasion complained of. Even if it is hypothetically accepted that the victim
had lost her virginity earlier, it did not and cannot in law give license to H
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A any person to rape her. It is the accused who was on trial and not the victim.
Even if the victim in a given case has been promiscuous in her sexual
behaviour earlier, she has a right to refuse to submit herself to sexual
intercourse to anyone and everyone because she is not a vulnerable object
or prey for being sexually assaulted by anyone and everyone. Finally, if
B we may say as a last straw, is the fallacy in High Court's reasoning about
Jack of evidence relating to the employment of the victim as a maid servant.
The High Cou11 completely overlooked the fact that the suggestions given
to witnesses, more particularly PWs-4, 5 and 7 that the accused or his wife
had threatened to pu~ an end to the victim's service as a maid servant
because of her immoral character, or refusal to refund the amount taken
c as advance for her employment as a maid servant.
It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a
victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There
. is no rule of Jaw that her testimony cannot be acted without corroboration
D in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured
witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in
the former it is both physical as weli as psychological and emotional.
However, if the court of facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the
prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or
E circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance,
short of corroboration as understood in the context of an accomplice would
do.
As was noted by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Noore Khan,
F (2000) 3 Supreme 70.
"Absence of injuries on the person of the prosecutrix has
weighed with the High Court for inferring consent on the part of
the prosecutrix. We are not at all convinced. We have already
noticed that the delay in medical examination of the prosecutrix
G was occasioned by the factum of the lodging of the FIR having
been delayed for the reasons which we have already discussed.
The prosecutrix was in her teens. The perpetrator of the crime was ,
an able-bodied youth bustling with energy and determined to fulfil
his lust armect with a knife in his hand and having succeeded in
H forcefully removing the victim to a secluded place where there
STATE OF PUNJAB v. RAMDEV SINGH [PASAYAT, J.] 1005
was none around to help the prosecutrix in her defence. The A
injuries which the prosecutrix suffered or might have suffered in
defending herself and offering resistance to the accused were
abrasions or bruises which would heal up in the ordinary course
of nature within 2 to 3 days of the incident. The absence of visible
marks of injuries on the person of the prosecutrix on the date of B
her medical examination would not necessarily mean that she had
not suffered any injuries or that she had offered no resistance at
the time of commission of the crime. Absence of injuries on the
person of the prosecutrix is not necessarily an evidence of falsity
of the allegation or an evidence of consent on the part of the
prosecutrix. It will all depend on the facts and circumstances of C
each case."
The High Court was not justified in reversing the conviction of the
respondent and recording the order of acquittal. An unmerited acquittal
does no good to the society. If the prosecution has succeeded in making D
out a convincing case for recording a finding as to the accused being guilty,
the court should not lean in favour of acquittal by giving weight to
irrelevant or insignificant circumstances or by resorting to technicalities or
by assuming doubts and giving benefit thereof where none reasonably
exists. A doubt, as understood in criminal jurisprudence, has to be a E
reasonable doubt and not an excuse for a finding in favour of acquittal.
An ui:imerited acquittal encourages wolves in the society being on the
prowl for easy prey, more so when the victims of crime are helpless females
or minor children. The courts have to display a greater sense of respon-
sibility and to be more sensitive while dealing with charges of sexual F
assault on women, particularly of tender age and children.
Looked from any angle the High Court's judgment does not stand
scrutiny and deserves to be set aside which we direct. The conviction as
recorded by the trial Court and the sentence imposed by it are restored.
The accused shall surrender forthwith to serve remainder of sentence, if G
any. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated.
A.Q. Appeal allowed.
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