STATE OF PUNJABversusMADAN LAL
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 316
- Decided
- 5 March 2009
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
Sentences for the three convictions under Section 138 should run concurrently, and the High Court's order allowing such concurrency is upheld.
Summary
The State of Punjab appealed a Punjab and Haryana High Court order that allowed the three convictions of Madan Lal under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, to run concurrently. The High Court had observed that the offences arose from the same family transaction involving different cheques and directed that the sentences imposed by two lower courts be concurrent. The State contended that the order was erroneous. The Supreme Court examined the scope of Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and the principle that sentences for offences arising from the same transaction should not be consecutive. Relying on the decisions in State of Maharashtra v. Najakat alias Mubarak Ali and Mohd. Akthar alias Ibrahim Ahmed Bhatti, the Court held that the High Court’s direction was justified and dismissed the appeal.
Issues considered
- Whether sentences for multiple convictions under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, arising from the same transaction, should run concurrently or consecutively.
- Whether Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, permits set‑off of detention periods for sentences in different cases.
- Interpretation of the phrase "same case" in Section 428 in the context of multiple convictions.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 427, s. 428, s. 482
- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881s. 138
Subjects
Judgment
[2009] 3 S.C.R. 1175
STATE OF PUNJAB A
v.
MADAN LAL
(Criminal Appeal No. 529 of 2004)
MARCH 5, 2009
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA
AND P. SATHASIVAM, JJ.]
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - s.138 - Conviction
under - Matter related to different cheques issued by C
accused-respondent to complainant party towards which
separate complaints were filed - Application in terms of s.482
rlw s.427 CrPC with prayer to the effect that the quantum of
punishment awarded to respondent be permitted to run
~ concurrently in respect of the three convictions and sentences D
imposed - Application allowed by High Court - Justification
of - Held: Justified - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 -
s.482 rlw s.427 and s.428 - Sentence I Sentencing -
Concurrent sentence.
E
State of Maharashtra v. Najakat alias Mubarak Ali (2001)
6 SCC 311 and Mohd. Akthar alias Ibrahim Ahmed Bhatti v.
~ Assistant Collector of Customs (Prevention), Ahmadabad and
Others AIR (1988) SC 2143, relied on.
F
Case Law Reference:
(2001) s sec 311 relied on Para 4
AIR (1988) SC 2143 relied on Para 5
G
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 529 of 2004.
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.10.2002 of the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal
1175 H
1176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 3 S.C.R.
A Msc. No. 33774 of 2002.
Kuldip Singh for the Appellant.
Anita Gupta for the Respondent.
B The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. The State of Punjab is in
appeal against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court allowing the application filed
c in terms of Section 482 read with Section 427 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code'). The prayer was
to the effect that the quantum of punishment awarded may be
permitted to run concurrently in respect of the three convictions
and sentences imposed.
D
2. The convictions were in terms of Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short the 'Act'). The High
Court noted that all the transactions related to the family of the
respondent and the matter related to different cheques issued
by the respondent to the complainant party. For this purpose
E separate complaints were filed. The High Court accordingly
directed that the sentences imposed by learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Ludhiana and Sub Divisional Judicial
Magistrate, Khanna were to run concurrently.
F 3. According to the State the judgment of the High Court
is erroneous.
4. In the impugned judgment of the High Court, reference
was made to the decision of this court in Mohd. Akthar alias
G Ibrahim Ahmed Bhatti v. Assistant Collector of Customs
6Prevention), Ahmadabad and Others (AIR 1988 SC 2143)
wherein it was held as under :-
"The basic rule of thumb over the years has been the
so called transactions rule for concurrent sentences. If a
H
STATE OF PUNJAB v. MADAN LAL 1177
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
given transaction constitutes two offences under two A
enactments generally, it is wrong to have consecutive
sentences. It is proper and legitimate to have concurrent
sentences. But this rule has no application if the transaction
relating to offence is shot the same or the facts constituting
the two offences are quite different." B
5. The majority view in State of Maharashtra v. Najakat
alias Mubarak Ali [2001 (6) SCC 311] was to similar effect.
Paragraphs 14 to 18 in the above case it was held as follows:
"14. The purpose of Section 428 of the Code is also for C
... advancing amelioration to the prisoner. We may point
out that the section does not contain any indication that if
the prisoner was in jail as an under-trial prisoner in a
second case the benefit envisaged in the section would
be denied to him in respect of the second case. However, D
learned counsel for the appellant contended that the words
of the same case in the section would afford sufficient
indication that the benefit is intended to cover only for one
case and not more than that. It must be remembered that
the ideology enshrined in Section 428 was introduced for E
the first time only in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
For understanding the contours of the legislative measure
involved in that section, it is advantageous to have a look
at the Objects and Reasons for bringing the above
legislative provision. We therefore extract the same here: F
"The Committee has noted the distressing fact that
in many cases accused persons are kept in prison for very
long period as under-trial prisoners and in some cases
the sentence of imprisonment ultimately awarded is a G
fraction of the period spent in jail as under-trial prisoner.
Indeed, there may even be cases where such a person is
acquitted. No doubt, sometimes courts do take into
account the period of detention undergone as under-trial
prisoner when passing sentence and occasionally the H
1178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 3 S.C.R.
A sentence of imprisonment is restricted to the period
already undergone. But this is not always the case so
that in many cases the accused person is made to suffer
jail life for a period out of all proportion to the gravity of
the offence or even to the punishment provided in the
B statute. The Committee has also noted that a large
number of persons in the overcrowded jails of today are
under-trial prisoners. The new clause seeks to remedy this
unsatisfactory state of affairs. The new clause provides for
the setting off of the period of detention as an under-trial
c prisoner against the sentence of imprisonment imposed
on him. The Committee trusts that the provision contained
in the new clause would go a long way to mitigate the evil." ...
(Emphasis supplied)
D 15. The purpose is therefore clear that the convicted person
is given the right to reckon the period of his sentence of
imprisonment from the date he was in jail as an under-trial
prisoner. In other words, the period of his being in
jail as an under-trial prisoner would be added as a part of
E the period of imprisonment to which he is sentenced. We
may now decipher the two requisites postulated in Section
428 of the Code:
(1) During the stage of investigation, inquiry or trial of a
F particular case the prisoner should have been in jail at least
for a certain period.
(2) He should have been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment in that case.
G 16. If the above two conditions are satisfied then the
operative part of the provision comes into play i.e. if the
sentence of imprisonment awarded is longer than the
period of detention undergone by him during the stages
of investigation, inquiry or trial, the convicted person need
H
STATE OF PUNJAB v. MADAN LAL 1179
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
"' undergo only the balance period of imprisonment after A
deducting the earlier period from the total period of
imprisonment awarded. The words "if any" in the Section
amplifies that if there is no balance period left after such
deduction the convict will be entitled to be set free from
jail, unless he is required in any other case. In other words, B
if the convict was in prison, for whatever reason, during the
stages of investigation, inquiry or trial of a particular case
.,
and was later convicted and sentenced to any term of
imprisonment in that case the earlier period of detention
undergone by him should be counted as part of the c
sentence imposed on him.
17. In the above context it is apposite to point_ out that very
often it happens when an accused is convicted in one case
under different counts of offences and sentenced to
different terms of imprisonment under each such count, all D
such sentences are directed to run concurrently. The
idea behind it is that the imprisonment to be suffered by
him for one count of offence will, in fact and in effect be
imprisonment for other count as well.
E
18. Reading Section 428 of the Code in the above
perspective, the words 'of the same case' are not to be
understood as suggesting that the set off is allowable only
if the earlier jail life was undergone by him exclusively for
the case in which the sentence is imposed. The period F
.. during which the accused was in prison subsequent to the
inception of a particular case, should be credited towards
the period of imprisonment awarded as sentence in that
particular case. It is immaterial that the prisoner was
undergoing sentence of imprisonment in another case also G
during the said period. The words "of the same case" were
used to refer to the pre-sentence period of detention
undergone by him. Nothing more can be made out of the
' collocation of those words." (Per Justice Thomas)
H
1180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 3 S.C.R.
A 6. Justice Phukan agreed with the view expressed by
Justice Thomas and observed in Para 44 as follows:
"The only question which according to me needs
consideration is the true effect of the expression "same
B case" as appearing in Section 428 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. The provision is couched in clear and
unambiguous language and states that the period of
detention which it allows to be set off against the term of
imprisonment imposed on the accused on conviction must
be one undergone by him during investigation, enquiry or
c trial in connection with the "same case" in which he has
been convicted. Any other period which is not connected
with the said case cannot be said to be reckonable for set
off. The view of learned Brother Mr. Justice Thomas
according to me accords the legislative intent. Acceptance
D of any other view would mean necessary (sic necessarily)
either adding or subtracting words to the existing provision,
which would not be a proper procedure to be adopted
while interpreting the provision in question."
E 7. Above being the position, the appeal is without merit.
deserves dismissal which we direct.
B.B.B. Appeal dismissed.
...
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