STATE OF PUNJABversusKESAR SINGH
- Citation
- 1996 INSC 764
- Decided
- 22 July 1996
- Bench
- A S ANAND
Holding
A High Court cannot order the premature release of a life convict; only the Government may exercise the power of commutation under Section 433 CrPC.
Summary
Kesar Singh was convicted of murder under Sections 302 and 34 of the IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment on 28 May 1987. After serving a little over eight years, he filed a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC in the Punjab & Haryana High Court seeking premature release. The High Court entertained the petition and ordered his immediate release, which the State of Punjab challenged. The Supreme Court held that the High Court could not direct premature release because the power to commute a life sentence under Section 433 of the CrPC vests exclusively with the Government, and a life sentence can be commuted only after the convict has served at least 14 years. Consequently, the High Court’s order was set aside, though the respondent may approach the Government for commutation in accordance with the Governor’s order of 6 March 1985.
Issues considered
- Whether a High Court can, under Section 482 CrPC, direct the premature release of a life convict before the period prescribed for commutation under Section 433 CrPC.
- Whether the power to commute a life sentence under Section 433 CrPC can be exercised by the court itself.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 433, s. 482
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 34
Subjects
Judgment
STATE OF PUNJAB A
v.
KESAR SINGH
.l ULY 22, 1996
[DR. A.S. ANAND AND S.B. MA.lMUDAR, JJ.] B
Code of Oiminal Procedw~, 1973: Sections 433, 482.
Sentence-Commutation of-Premature release of accused-Accused
sentenced to llfe in1p1isonn1ent-14 yea1:1 sentence not conl]Jle!e~Petition
under Section 482 filed after undergoing a little n1ore than 8 years sen-
c
tence-Direction for premature release by High Cowt-Appeal prefe11'ed by
State-Held direction given by High Cowt was not pem1issible in law--Order
of High Cowt set aside-Even otherwise High Cowt could not have ordered
itself the premature release of accused--lt could have only directed the State
Goven1111e11t to consider pren1ature release of accused-It is for the Govenz- D
111ent to exercise the power in accordance with nt!es.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
751of1996.
From the .1 udgmenl and Order dated 18.1.96 of the Punjab & E
Haryana High Court in Crl. Misc. No. 12243-M of 1995.
R.S. Suri for the Appellant.
H.K. Puri, Rajesh Srivastava and Ujjwal Banerjee for the Respon-
dents.
F
The following Order of the Court was delivered :
Special leave granted.
The respondent was eomfrted for an offence under Section 302/34 G
!PC and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment by the judgment and
order dated May 28, 1987. After he had undergone a little more than 8
years of sentence he filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure in the High Court of Punjab & Haryana al Chandigarh
seeking premature release. The High Court by the impugned order dated H
787
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A January 18. 1986 considered the case on its merits and allowed the petition
directing the release of the respondent forthwith. The State is aggrieved of
the order dated January 18, 1986, hence this appeal.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties. In our opinion the
direction given by the High Court was not at all appropriate or permissible
B in law. The mandate of Section 433 Cr.P.C. enables the Government in an
appropriate case to commute the sentence of a convict and to prematurely
order his release before expiry of the sentence as imposed by the courts.
Clause (b) of Section 433 Cr.P.C. provides that the sentence of imprison-
ment for life may be commuted for imprisonment for a term not exceeding
C 14 years or fine. Undisputedly, the respondent had not completed 14 years
sentence when he filed the petition under Section 482 Cr.P .C. seeking
premature release. The direction of the High Court therefore to prema-
turely release the respondent and set him at liberty forthwith could not
have been made. That apart, even if the High Court could give such a
direction, it could only direct consideration of the case of premature
D release by the Government and could not have ordered the premature
release of the respondent itself. The right to exercise the power under
Section 433 Cr.P.C. vests in the Government and has to be exercised by
the Government in accordance with the rules and established principles.
The impugned order of the High Court cannot, therefore, be sustained and
E is hereby set aside.
This order shall, however, not come in the way of the respondent for
approaching the Government for commutation of his sentence and prema-
ture release in terms of the order issued by the Governor of Punjab on
March 6, 1985. As and when such an application is made, the State
F Government shall decide that application on merits uninfluenced by this
order or by the observations made by the High Court in the impugned
order.
T.N.A.
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